TShe
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
OF THE IMTED STATES ARMY
IN THE WORLD WAR
uil.rjIE VIII
FIELD OPERATIONS
RtFUttAtt ONLY
r»ir»«ji t \w» TWR MMCT1
M v.i i,\ s II W. IHELAKD
i "i < Ft ARM - I ^ SCII, M <
• ••! '"-) III M. FORD, M. <
l li i r. < "I PRANK wwil D, M. (
RtftRUitt ONLY
WASHINGTON : : GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : : 1925
OTIS HISTORIC*! ABCHTVTS
ARMEO FORCES MEDICAL MUSEUM. AF1P
vi'pi ri->>. vi ■ ..rir->
i .
II IN R OF IIJWSMISSION
I U»r Ihr )»..iH.r |a •■il>t*ttt Urrrmtli » portioa »f i»»r hiMon <.f llio
MEDICAL DKI'ARTMKM OF TIIK t'XITED M\ll- UIMY IN
Till tV()R|«I) W Ml Tin- portion mihtnUtfd i* Volume VIII. ■nd
liilril " Kir.iii OrwuTw»*«
M \\ Inn »M«
M.ty.r Gtneral, Tk< >•#.
I lif Sm hit »m «<r W»b.
Lieut Col Krvnk \\ Won, Mi' m ' AW
Lot McAm, I M M I' Imkiamt BJilmr im CUtf
BD1TOIUA] BOAltl
CoL IUum K V»ii»..i:i> M »
( -.1 Ki:vnk BltUXoa, M I
( «>l. I'h.'m u \i Boon, M I
• ..| <ni- I Itnr.wrii. II «
C©1 W. P. CbAMBOD wn. M »
CoL < I •■ < I I \l «
CoL ilwfv Embmod M C.
Brig. Gen. .Fmiin M. I KtN\»r. M l»
< ..I Joora H. Fan, M I
Li. nt. Col Finciv. II GamsoX, M <
< d|. II. L Gnu nan, M <
Brig. Gen. JEfTOBOM R. Kn\. 11 |»
Lieut Col. A. <i Loirs, M i
Col. I II MI f- L\ \< II, M. C.
Col JaXM F. McKnxon, M C
Col. B. T. Outn, M I
Col. Cll Wilts l{ l>l\\i.|h«. \| <
Col. Thomai \V. >vimmn. M <
Lieut. Col. G. K. t>r ScHwuxrn M '
Col J. F. StI.FR. M. C.
Brig. <tpn. W. S. TirxTru. M l>
Col A I). Tom* M I
Col William If. Wuxu, M. C.
(..I E. P. Wouv, M. c.
Lieut Col Caski A Wood, M <
( o|. II \\s Zi\ mi I M C.
'Thr hlgh«H»t rank hflrt (1nrln« th» \V.»rl,| VV«r h»« »w»n »«»«t In th* r»*» o* ««rh M*<»r
I
ri.ii \< E
TIm* content* of tin* rolnmc are confined mainly to a di-*ru**ion of th«*
■rtiritM of the Medical Ifc>|i«rftwn( in lb* major operation** of the American
EspedHionarj I in the preliminary chajiter-* sufficient in-
fomMtioa of a general character ha* brrn in* ••ii I" enable tli»* medico military*
•Indent intelligently |o appreciate in what manner ibr Medical Department
wa« fitted to fonctioo In a<l<liiion to ibr diacnonoo <>f Um major operation!
in ibr text, there i* a supplement in the appendix «bi< li give* a chronologic*]
record of each dirknon, with more or |c*» on trench warfare ami minor
da, <ii< li a- raids, which illustrate tl»e nature ••( andci md i«
•liii*
In M far a* the major operations are concerned, and i ocialljr if
tln« in f ibr Si Milnrl ami Menee Argonn* operationa, nnoc artniea and
tit with separately in aibblion to dirfanone, th<* plan to discus*
iial military act m tic* «»f the arm***, corpa, ami diviaJoui each in turn.
then to parallel thi» ■li-.u-nuon with |-er1inent Medical Department a.(n
ha* nw'feeitated an inctitaMr repetition. It i* belicxed. however, the advan-
tage* of tin* method more than cotinterl-alance it* fault*.
TIm- official document* of the Media al Department vary greatly both in
content ami in extent, «iitK being full, Hear, and explicit, while other* an*
hrief. fragmentary. an«l. a* ahown by crow* checking, occawioiially inaccurate.
Record* of certain organization* are full ami complete fbl «<me period* and
scant (or others. Thi* unctenne*.* in the material available preventa uniform
thoroughness in the d ia t uaa ion of the Me<licai Dapartment'e activities in
different organitatioPi and. in *«»me case*, in Ihe «ame organization at different
time*. It i* especially unfortunate that the hietoriea and record* of eon
the mo*t active organization*, for example. Kvacuation Hoapitahl X«». 1 and
.. and the Medical Department of the 4th Division an so incomplete that
a more thorough di«ru*-*inn of their service than i>- ui*«cn herein if UnpoattDW.
In order thai information might l-e drawn from a* mam 090X01
hie and that each organization receive attention, a sustained effort has
lieen made to use such portion of an\ t<\t. hoW*?0l fragmentary, as would
ribe eoma me th od in each organization. AJloatona, eutVienl to indicate
their limitations, are made to unusual arid individual me t h od e .
In the doJtl'iptimi of the essential military actiMtic- of the American
Expeditionary Forces much ■meatanca •***• obtained from member* of the
hietoriea] Nctinn. the Army War College: officers of this section have frwly
contriboted l»oth advice and constructive criticism, for which grateful acknowl-
edgment is now made.
S
O PREFACE
During the several years in which the preparation of the volume has been
in progress, the work has been evolutional in its nature. In its earliest stages
of preparation, Col. Bailey K. Ashford, M. C, had the work in charge. At
that time the conception was to record the Medical Department activities from
individual organization viewpoints: that is to say, each operation was to be
viewed separately and chronologically only in so far as a particular organiza-
tion was concerned, such as. for example, a division. When, through the
exigencies of the service, Colonel Ashford became separated from work in
connection with the history, and was replaced by Lieut. Col. Louis C. Duncan,
M. C. Colonel Duncan developed the original conception, as to arrangement
of text material, so as to consider each military operation separately, and in
connection therewith only so much of organizational activities as were perti-
nent. In the main, the latter plan has been followed, and in so doing there
has been an inevitable disregard of certain portions of organizational histories
not required for the purpose. Colonel Duncan became detached from work
on the history by reason of his retirement from the service. Subsequent to
his separation from duties in connection with the history, so much new ma-
terial became available as to make it advisable to rewrite the entire volume.
Acknowledgment is made to Messrs. D. Wilbur Parks and Benjamin M.
Oppenheim for the construction of the maps used in this volume. In con-
nection with this preparation, Lieut. Frank Steiner. M. A. C, has been of
great assistance in checking the maps against original manuscript and other
documents. This officer also, assisted by Mrs. L. G. Knowles. has been of
no little assistance in the preparation of the text when the necessity for
reconciling discrepancies in different official authorities arose.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Preface 5
Section I. — General View of thk Medical Department Organization
Chapter 1. Personnel, materiel, organization 13
II. General direction of tlie medical services, theater of operations r>."i
III. Combat divisions in training and rest areas, and on the march 83
IV. Medical service of the division in combat 105
V. Evacuation hospitals, mobile hospitals, mobile surgical units, mobile
operating units, professional teams, convalescent depots, evacuation
ambulance companies, mobile laboratories 157
VI. The United States Army Ambulance Service 223
VII. Primary evacuations from the zone of the armies 201
VIII. The veterinary service 281
Section II. — American Divisions with French Armies
IX. The 1st Division in the Sommerville, Ansauville, and Cantigny sectors
and in the Montdidier-Noyon operation 201
X. Aisne operation. May 27 to June 5, including Vaux and Belleau Wood,
June 6 to July 15, 1018. The 2d and 3d Divisions 311
XI. The Ohampagne-Marne operation, July 15-17, 1918. The First Corps
(American 26th and French 167th Divisions) ; the American 3d, 28th,
and 42d Divisions 341
XII. The Aisne-Marne operation. July 18 to August ti. 1918 357
XIII. The Oise-Aisne operation, August 18 to September 17, 1918 431
Section III. — The St. Mihiet, Operation
XIV. The First Army 449
XV. The First Corps (82d, 90th, 5th, 2d, and 78th Divisions). _ 461
XVI. The Fourth Corps (89th, 42d, 1st, and 3d Divisions) 483
XVII. The Fifth Corps (26th Division. French 15th Colonial Division, and
4th Division) 499
XVIII. Army hospitals 507
XIX. Evacuation from the zone of the army 521
Section IV. — Meuse-Abgonne Operation
XX. First phase — army operations — 525
XXI. First phase continued — the First Corps (77th, 28th, and 35th Divisions
in line; 1st and 92d Divisions in reserve) 540
XXII. First phase continued — the Fifth Corps (91st, 37th, 79th, 3d Divisions.
with the 32d Division in reserve) 581
XXIII. First phase continued— the Third Corps (4th, 80th, and 33d Divisions)- 600
XXIV. Second i>hase — army operations 629
XXV. Second phase continued — First Corps - 637
XXVI. Second phase continued — Fifth Corps 667
XXVII. Second phase continued — Third Corps 691
XXVIII. Second phase continued — Operations east of the Meuse 721
XXIX. Third phase — army operations 720
XXX. Third phase continued — First Corps 737
XXXI. Third phase continued — Fifth Corps "55
XXXII. Third phase continued — Third Corps "'■'
XXXIII. Third phase continued — activities of the American divisions attached to
the French corps east of the Meuse "'•''
7
8 FIELD OPERATIONS
Chapter Page
XXXIV. General considerations, Medical Department activities 800
.Section V. — Operations Contemporaneous with the Mecse-Argonne Operation
XXXV. The Second Army S43
XXXVI. Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) operation (2d and 30th Divisions) ;
Ypres-Lys (Flanders) operation (37th and 91st Divisions) S63
Section VI. — American Expeditionary Forces with the British
XXXVII. Second Corps 875
Section VII. — American Expeditionary Activities in Germany, Italy, Nobth
Russia, and Siberia
XXXVIII. The advance into Germany 895
XXXIX. American operations in Italy 041
XL. American Expeditionary Forces in North Russia 945
XLI. American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 955
Appendix :
Abhreviations 073
Brief histories of combat divisions 973
Field Service Regulations, United States Army. Part I. Organization. Article
I. -Land forces of the United States. Part III. Administration. Article IV. —
The zone of the advance 1021
Manual for the Medical Department, 1916. Article XII. — The theater of op-
erations, general. Article XIII. — The zone of the advance. Article XIV. —
The line of communications. Article XV. — Administration of the sanitary
service of the theater of operations. Article XVI. — Resume of the operations
of the sanitary service in war 1026
Tables of organization. I'nited States Army 1054
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Estimate of sanitary personnel 15
2. Program for the Medical Department, A. E. F. (General Organization Project) 1G
3. Organization of Medical Department provided by Manual for Medical Depart-
ment, 1916 47
4. Final organization. Medical Department. American Expeditionary Forces 49
5. Number of hours required for trains to make runs from evacuation points
to hospitalization points, Meuse-Argonne operation 27(!
6. Evacuations by hospital trains, regulating station, Creil. Oise, February 17 to
July 18, 1918, 26th and 1st Divisions 276
7. Evacuations by hospital trains, regulating station, Connantre, Marne, October 4
to November 5, 1918, 2d and 36th Divisions 277
8. Evacuations by hospital trains, regulating station, Dunkenpie, Nord, October
29 to December 25, 1918, 91st and 37th Divisions 278
9. Evacuations by hospital trains, regulating station, Le Bouget, Seine, June 4 to
October 25, 1918, Paris group army 278
10. Separate oi>erations in the Chateau-Thierry operation 278
11. Evacuation by hospital trains, regulating station, St. Dizier, Haute Marne, Sep-
tember 5 to December 1. 191S, First Army 280
12. Operation in the St. Dizier regulating station 280
13. Record of evacuations made by trains regulated at St. Dizier 280
14. Daily record of trains sent from each evacuation center, served by St. Dizier
regulating station. St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations 282
15. Number of trips made by hospital trains in the performance of evacuation 282
16. Summary, classified by officers, enlisted men, and types of patients evacuated 282
17. Hospital trains employed 283
18. Evacuations by trains from First Army, September 5 to December 1 (including
both St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations) 283
TABLE OF CONTENTS 9
Table Page
19. Summary of evacuations from the front by hospital trains 2S3
20. Hospital train garages 284
21. Evacuations from base hospitals in advance section, American Expeditionary
Forces 2S5
22. Evacuations effected by regulating station at Is-sur-Tille 285
23. Assignment of hospital trains to regulating stations, September 20 to November
11, 1918 2S5
LIST OF CHARTS
Chart Page
I. Organization of Medical Department, American Expeditionary Forces 56
II. Schematic Diagram of Hospitalization and Evacuation System, A. E. F 262
III. Organization of American Regulating Station "A," Is-sur-Tille 203
IV. Supply-control installation of French Army in the winter of 1917-18 204
LIST OF PLATF.S
Plate Facing page
I. Railway evacuation routes, American Expeditionary Forces, France 262
II. 1st Division. Ansauville sector, January 15 to April 3, 1918 292
III. 1st Division, Cantigny sector and Montdidier-Noyon operation, April 25
to July 7, 1918 296
IV. Chateau-Thierry sector, 2d Division, May 31 to July 9, 1918. 3d Division.
June 1 to July 14, 1918 312
V. Marne salient. General map 35s
VI. Aisne-Marne operation (Soissons). 1st Division, July 17-23, 1918 358
VII. Aisne-Marne operation (Soissons), 2d Division, July 17-20, 1918 368
VIII. Aisne-Marne operation, First Corps. 4th. 26th, and 42d Divisions and 50th
Infantry Brigade of the 28th Division, July IS to August 12, 1918 382
IX. Aisne-Marne operation, 20th Division, July 17-24, 191S — 392
X. Aisne-Marne operation. 42d Division, July 25 to August 3, 1918 396
XI. Aisne-Marne operation, 4th Division, August 2-12, 1918 400
XII. Aisne-Marne operation. 3d Division 406
XIII. Aisne-Marne operation, 32d Division, July 30 to August 0, 1918 41(1
XIV. Oise-Aisne operation, Third Corps, 28th and 77th Divisions, August 18 to
September G, 1918 432
XV. St. Mihiel operation, September 12-16, 1918 450
XVI. St. Mihiel operation, 82d Division 400
XVII. St. Mihiel operation, 90th Division 40s
XVIII. St. Mihiel operation, 5th Division 470
XIX. St. Mihiel operation. 2d Division 470
XX. St. Mihiel operation, 89th Division 4!ki
XXI. St. Mihiel operation, 42d Division 492
XXII. St. Mihiel operation, 1st Division 496
XXIII. St. Mihiel operation, 26th Division 502
XXIV. St. Mihiel operation, 4th Division, September 14, 1918 504
XXV. Meuse-Argonne operation, first phase, First Army, First. Third, and Fifth
Corps. September 20 to October 3, 1918 520
XXVI. Meuse-Argonne operation, first phase, 77th Division 560
XXVII. Meuse-Argonne operation, first phase, 28th Division 564
XXVIII. Meuse-Argonne operation, first phase, 35th Division 50s
XXIX. Meuse-Argonne operation, first phase. 91st Division 5S0
XXX. Meuse-Argonne operation, first phase, 37th Division 592
XXXI. Meuse-Argonne operation, first phase, 79th Division 59S
XXXII. Meuse-Argonne operation, first phase, 4th Division. September 20 to
October 3, 1918 616
XXXIII. Meuse-Argonne operation, first phase, 80th Division, September 26-28,
191S 622
13570— 25 2
10
FIELD OPERATIONS
Plate Facing page
XXXIV. Meuse-Argonne operation, first phase, 33d Division. September 26 to
October 3. 1918 626
XXXV. Mense-Argonne operation. First Army, second phase 630
XXXVI. Meuse-Argonne operation, second phase, 77th Division 642
XXXVII. Meuse-Argonne operation, 1st, 91st (181st Brigade), and 42d Divisions,
second phase 648
XXXVIII. Meuse-Argonne operation, second phase. 82d Division 652
XXXIX. Meuse-Argonne operation, second phase. 78th Division 656
XL. Meuse-Argonne operation, second phase. 3d, 5th. 32d. and 89th Divisions. 672
XLI. Meuse-Argonne operation, second phase. 4th and SOth Divisions 704
XLII. Meuse-Argonne operation, second phase, 90th Division, showing aid sta-
tions. October 21-31, 1918 714
XLIII. Meuse-Argonne operation, second phase, 2Gth, 29th. 33d, and 79th Divi-
sions — 722
XLIV. Meuse-Argonne operation, third phase, First Army 730
XLV. Meuse-Argonne operation, third phase, 1st, 42d. 77th, 78th, and SOth
Divisions, Xovember 1-11, 1918 738
XLVI. Meuse-Argonne operation, third phase, 2d and 98th Divisions, November
1-11. 191S 764
XLVII. Mense-Argonne operation, third phase. 90th Division, November 1-11,
1918 782
XLVII1. Meuse-Argonne operation, third phase, 5th and 32d Divisions 788
XLIX. Meuse-Argonne operation, third phase. 26th. 79th, and Slst Divisions 798
L. Second Army. October 12 to November 11, 1918 844
LI. Meuse-Argonne operation (Champagne) 2d and 36th Divisions 864
LII. Ypres-Lys operation (Flanders), 37th and 91st Divisions; 37th Division,
October 30 to November 5 and November 9-11 : 91st Division. October
30 to November 10-11 870
LI 1 1. Ypres-Lys operation, 27th Division 882
LIV. Soinme offensive. 27th and 30th Divisions 884
LV. March of the Third Army S96
I.TST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Plan of the different cars comprising the hospital train, of British construction,
used by the American Expeditionary Forces 38
2. Kxterior view of Hospital Train No. 56, American Expeditionary Forces 39
3. Interior of ward car, beds not made up 40
4. Interior of ward car, showing attendant's compartment 40
5. Interior of ward car. beds raised 41
II. Hospital train operating room 42
7. Hospital train kitchen 43
8. Hospital train personnel car 44
9. Hospital train: method of loading 44
10. French converted hospital train, being unloaded at Hospital Center, Allerey,
American Expeditionary Forces 45
11. Light railway train : fitted for carrying wounded 45
12. Hospital barge 46
13. Battalion aid station. 101st Infantry, 26th Division, Bois de la Voisogne, France,
May 31. 1918 112
14. Adjusting improved splint on a litter patient; Broussey, France, April 20, 1918_- 115
15. Dressing station operated by Ambulance Company Xo. 137, Ampherbach, Alsace,
August 31. 1918 121
16. Dressing station at Betricamp, France, April 26, 1918 121
17. Gas-proof shelters f,.r dressing stations, 42d Division, near Bodonville, Baccnrat
Sector, April 29, 1918 ■jo''
TABLE OP CONTENTS 11
Figure P«*se
18. Field Hospital No. 112, 28th Division, Cohan, France, August 12, 1918 126
19. Field Hospital No. 125, near Jaulgonne, France, July 29, 1918 127
20. Shell hole where first-aid was administered. 7th Artillery Regiment, 1st Division,
Serevillers, France, July 5, 1918 129
21. First-aid station, 4th Division, Septsarges, France, Septemher 27, 1918 130
22. First-aid station, 325th Infantry, near Fleville, Ardennes. France, October 12.
1918 131
23. Evacuation Hospital No. 2, Baccarat, France, June 28. 1918 100
24. Operating room. Evacuation Hospital No. 2, Baccarat 161
25. Sterilizing plant and tentage. Evacuation Hospital No. 2, Baccarat 162
20. Evacuation Hospital No. 1, Sebastopol. Toul 104
27. Tentage used by Evacuation Hospital No. 1 105
28. Conventional ground plan of an evacuation hospital 100
29. Ground plan. Evacuation Hospital No. 1, Toul 167
30. Ground plan of Evacuation Hospitals Nos. and 7, Souilly 168
31. Ground plan of Evacuation Hospital No. 8, Petit Maujouy, Meuse, France 109
32. Mobile Hospital No. 2, loaded on trucks and prepared for change of location 185
33. Mobile Hospital No. 39. when at Chaillons, France 191
34. Plan of operating group, Mobile Hospital No. 39 192
35. Reception ward. Mobile Hospital No. 39 193
30. Operating room, Mobile Hospital No. 39 194
37. X-ray truck, Mobile Hospital No. 39 190
38. Sterilizing truck, Mobile Hospital No. 39___ 197
39. Evacuation office, Mobile Hospital No. 39 199
40. Perspective of Mobile Operating Unit No. 1 200
41. Boiler car, sterilizing unit, Mobile Operating Unit No. 1 202
42. Sterilizing truck, Mobile Operating Unit No. 1 203
43. An ambulance of the Norton-IIarjes Ambulance Unit 224
44. Type of ambulance used by the United States Army Ambulance Service 228"'
45. Interior view of ambulance, United States Army Ambulance Service 229--
ii ;. Scci inn \n. 640, United States Army Ambulance Service ___ __ 230
47. Regimental aid station, 28th Infantry, 1st Division, near Cantigny, May 28, 1918— 297
4S. Evacuation of wounded from regimental aid station, 28th Infantry, near Can-
tigny. May 28. 1918 298
49. Field Hospital No. 13, near Vendeuil-Caply. July 2, 1918 303
50. Church at Bezu-Ee-Guery, France, used as a ward for wounded by Field Hospital
No. 1, 2d Division, June 10, 1918 315
51. Evacuating wounded by truck from Field Hospital No. 15, near Montreuil.
France, June 7, 1918 310
52. American Red Cross Military Hospital No. 1. Paris 321
53. American Red Cross Military Hospital No. 5, Auteuil, Paris, July, 1918 322
54. Oressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 5, at Courboin 347
55. Aid station, 167th Infantry, 42d Division, Souain, France. July 17, 1918 351
50. Triage, 42d Division, near Suippes, France, July 17, 1918 351
57. French and American wounded being received at the dressing station at Epieds,
operated by 117th Sanitary Train, 42d Division, July 27, 1918 352
58. Advance post and aid station. 1st Division. Missy-aux-Bois, France, July 20, 1918- 360
59. First-aid station, 1st Division, immediately back of the front-line trenches,
.Missy-aux-Bois, July 17, 1918 361
60. Field hospitals of the 4th Division at Chateau de la Foret, August 10, 1918 402
01. Entrance to dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. Ill, 28th
Division, near St. Gilles, France, August 15, 1918 H4
62. Field Hospital No. 353, 89th Division, at Bernecourt, France, during the St.
Mihiel operation 491
12 FIELD OPERATIONS
Figure I'age
63. Dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 167, 42(1 Division, at Essey,
France 493
04. La Chalade, Ardennes, France, wliere a triage was established by Field Hospital
No. 308, 77th Division. September 28, 1918 561
05. Triage operated by the 77th Division, La Chalade, September 28, 1918 562
06. Dressing station operated at Cheppy, France, September 29, 1918 574
07. Ambulance Company No. 13 and Field Hospital No. 3, 1st Division, on the road at
Very, Meuse, France, October 3, 1918 577
68. Town of Very, used as a dressing station by 91st Division 5S9
69. Wounded walking to dressing stations, Argonne Forest, because roads were
impassable to ambulances 590
70. Advanced dressing station near Avocourt, September 26, 1918 595
71. Entrance to dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 148, 37th
Division, near Cierges, September 20, 1918 59G
72. Field Hospitals No. 314 and No. 315, 79th Division, at Les Clairs Chenes 602
73. View from Cuisy across the valley toward Septsarges, showing Field Hospitals
No. 19 and No. 21 CIS
74. Field Hospital No. 319, 80th Division, at Bethincourt, Meuse, September 27, 1918_ 023
75. Location of Field Hospital No. Ill, at Les Islettes, October 5, 1918 647
76. Dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 311, 78th Division, at
Marcq, Ardennes, October 17, 1918 661
77. First-aid station, 312th Infantry, Grandpre, Ardennes, October 18, 1918 662
78. Collecting point for wounded, 3d Division, near Nantillois, Meuse, October 12.
1918 674
79. Field Hospital No. 7, 3d Division, at Bethincourt, October 22, 1918 675
80. Medical supply depot, 32d Division, near Montfaucon, October 22, 1918. Field
Hospital No. 126 in background 670
81. Field Hospitals No. 25 and No. 29, 5th Division, consolidated at Bethincourt,
October 22, 1918 710
82. Aid station, 358th Infantry, at Cunel, Meuse, October 27, 1918 714
83. Dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 102, 26th Division, near
Samogneux, Meuse, October 23, 1918 720
84. Ambulance Companies No. 317 and No. 318, SOth Division, at Vaux, Ardennes,
November 6, 1918 749
85. Field Hospital No. 13, 1st Division, at Vaux, Ardennes, November 6, 1918 776
SO. Field Hospitals No. 314 and No. 315, 79th Division, at Ferine Notre Dame de
1'alameix, Meuse 70S
87. Dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 310, 79th Division, Les
Eparges, Meuse 799
88. Aid station, 315th Infantry, 79th Division, Bois de Consenvoye, France, Novem-
ber 8, 1918 S00
89. Wounded from the 27th Division being carried to the rear, Busigny, Nord,
October 17, 1918 888
90. American hospital and Infirmary, Neuenahr, Germany, December 29, 1918 904
91. Surgical and medical wards of the American hospital group, Coblenz, Germany 905
92. Typical Russian barracks 956
93. Interior of Bussian barracks subsequent to renovation by American troops 956
94. Medical ward, Evacuation Hospital No. 17 959
95. Interior of surgical ward, Evacuation Hospital No. 17 959
:m;. Improvised hospital car, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 961
97. Interior of car shown in Figure 96 962
9s. Converted hospital car, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 962
99. Bussian barracks in Habnrovsk, used as an isolation hospital by the American
Expeditionary Forces in Siberia qqq
SECTION I
GENERAL VIEW OF THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER I
PERSONNEL, MATERIEL, ORGANIZATION •
No hard and fast boundary line between the front and the Services of Sup-
ply was, or could have been drawn, so far as medical personnel and materiel
were concerned. Naturally, however, so far as might be, the needs of the front
had precedence. For example, as noted elsewhere, the statement was made by
the chief surgeon, A. E. F., that base hospitals were robbed of medical per-
sonnel to provide operating teams for the front, and similar action was taken
in other respects, whether personnel or materiel was involved.
This being the case, it is not possible to discuss personnel and materiel
solely from the standpoint of the front. This discussion must be in part
of the American Expeditionary Forces as a whole. It need not be exhaustive
in the latter particular, however, as the question involved pertains mainly to
other volumes of the history. In short, in this volume the personnel and
materiel of the front will always be kept in mind primarily, but whenever it
seems advantageous to discuss these subjects in their regard to the. American
Expeditionary Forces as a whole this will be done if it is essential to a clear
understanding of Medical Department operations at the front. Organiza-
tion presents fewer difficulties, but here, too, the scope of other volumes must
be invaded more or less.
PERSONNEL
Shortly after our declaration of war with Germany, an act of Congress. 1
gave practically unlimited powers to the President to increase temporarily the
Military Establishment of the United States. Empowered by this congres-
sional authorization the relative strengths of the Medical Corps 2 and the
enlisted force of the Medical Department 3 were increased to 1 and 10 per
cent of the Army, respectively. As will be seen, however, this allowance
was not put into effect in the American Expeditionary Forces.
ALLOWANCE OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL
Our Tables of Organization prescribed a certain allowance of medical per-
sonnel, so far as divisions were concerned, and this had been mobilized and
trained with its respective divisions in the United States. The same thing was
"The text of the Manual for the Medical Department in force during the war which is pertinent to
service in campaign is given in full in the Appendix p. 1026, Tables of Organization are given in
the Appendix p. ior>4.
13
14 FIELD OPERATIONS
true of smaller units, generally, and a few nondivisional hospitals were sup-
plied. On the other hand, though the general organization project, American
Expeditionary Forces, included the organization of an army and its five
component corps, the organization of these was not completed in the United
States, so their needs in the American Expeditionary Forces were not met in
the same way as were those of divisions. Especially is this true in so far as
the Medical Department was concerned. Furthermore, numerous other units
which were organized in the American Expeditionary Forces were in the
same situation as were the armies and corps.
In these respects it was found there was need for additional personnel
for organizations, and replacements, of course, made additional demands.
Practically all had to come from the United States, and for every officer and
man of the Medical Department place had to he found on a priority schedule,
whereon demands hy other parts of the Army were equally if not more
insistent. Then, too, if possible, priority had to he worked out long in ad-
vance, so long, in fact, that future needs could not always he clearly foreseen.
CHIEF SURGEON'S EARLY ESTIMATES OF PERSONNEL NEEDED IN THE
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
In the summer of 1917, when General Pershing prepared his projects
lor t he organization of the forces to he sent to France, the forces considered
were divided into the following two groups: A general organization project. 4
which included army, corps, and divisional troops; and a project of the rear 5
winch included the personnel for the Services of Supply.
In the general organization project, the organizations comprehended
were hased on Tables of Organization. These tables provided for Medical
Department personnel, and no great problem connected with this personnel,
confronted the chief surgeon, A. E. F., at the time. The contrary was true
for the Medical Department personnel of the Services of Supply.
On August 11, 1917, the chief surgeon, A. E. F., made an estimate of the
Medical Department personnel as follows:
s
August 11, 1017.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
The attached estimate of sanitary personnel is submitted in compliance with instruc-
tions dated July 30, 1017.
This estimate includes the personnel required for all sanitary formations except those
listed in the Tables of Organization as belonging to the division.
The basis of the calculation is an army of 5 corps and 30 divisions. The other funda-
mental factor in the preparation of this estimate is that hospital beds should lie available
in the ratio of 1 to each 4 men of the enlisted strength of the Army.
The sanitary formations listed below are those provided by existing regulations. It
is probable that the developments of modern warfare will require the creation of sanitary
formations not provided for in the attached estimate.
It will be observed that, including dental surgeons, veterinarians, chemists, and female
nurses, this estimate calls for a total sanitary personnel of 118,512, or 10.5 per cent.
If to this figure is added the sanitary personnel attached to each division, the percent-
age becomes 14 per cent.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
15
It is believed tliat if this calculation is erroneous tlie error will be on the side of con-
servatism. The duration of hostilities and the difficulties of transporting the totallj
disabled to the United States and thereby relieving hospital congestion are factors which
can only be approximated.
Table 1. — Estimate of sanitary personnel
Unit
Num-
ber
Beds
Medical
officers
Dental
sur-
geons
Veteri-
narians
Chem-
ists
Nurses
Noncom-
missioned
officers
Cooks
Pri-
vates
Total
fi8
171
20
20
SO
6
2
29, 376
171,000
20,000
20, 000
1,088
6,840
400
200
150
12
300
8
9
3
3
160
20
20
30
1,904
8,208
480
480
150
36
2,000
8
6
2
2
160
CO
20
30
200
680
4,788
280
320
100
9, 588
39, 330
2, 300
1,000
1,000
240
8,000
25
18
6
6
960
680
40
60
2, 200
13,260
22, 230
81, 396
Venereal hospitals
3, 400
Convalescent camps..
2, 000
Hospital trains
200
1,700
Medical supply de-
288
Casual camps 2 _ _ ...
10, 300
Surgeon, base group. .
41
Base section, base
33
U
11
1,280
Evacuation ambu-
lance company, mo-
tor '
760
s
30
10
30 „
90
Laboratories, field
150
1,132
3, 532
200
200
240, 376
9,243
1, 132 200
40 22, 430
13, 746
6,168
65, 553
118,512
1 Including contagious and special diseases but not venereal.
2 Reserves and training (1 each at base and advance section).
3 Eight per division; 20 divisions.
' One per division; 20 divisions.
PERSONNEL ALLOWED
The program for the Medical Department, exclusive of Medical Depart-
ment personnel attached to combat organizations, for an army of 20 combat
divisions. 10 replacement and base divisions, for general headquarters, army,
corps, and Services of Supply troops was as follows: 5 For the forward serv-
ices, 31,017 officers and men; for the Services of Supply, 05.593 (plus 10 per
cent replacement). The number of officers and enlisted men of the Medical
Department attached to the combat organizations of the 30 divisions then
contemplated was approximately 17.910. 7 Thus the allowance of personnel
of the Medical Department was about 121,079'' for the projected army of
1,328,448 men, or practically a percentage of 9. When compared with the
estimate for Medical Department personnel made by the chief surgeon,
A. E. F., on August 11. 1917. it will be seen that the total percentage allowed
was less by IV2 P er cen t than that considered by the chief surgeon as being
necessary for the Services of Supply alone. However, the figures in the
service of the rear project were considered only as a reasonable approxima-
tion of what actually would be required, both for the organization of the
Medical Department. A. E. F.. and for the preparation of a shipping
program. 5
1 This number of personnel Is exclusive of the Veterinary Corps which. In the service of the rear
project, was included in the Quartermaster Department.
16
FIELD OPERATIONS
The following tabulation outlines in detail the program for the Medical
Department, A. E. F., both for the forward services and for the Services of
Supply as given in the project of the rear: 5
Table 2. — Program for the Medical Department, .1. E. F.
GENERAL ORGANIZATION PROJECT
Item
No.
Unit
M-l—
\t-2_
M-3.
M-101
Division Ambulance Service.
do ] Camp infirmaries
do Field hospital sec-
tions.
Corps .-_ Sanitary train
Total
number
of units
Total
strength
officers
and
soldiers
Remarks
References
M-201 Army do
M-202 do Evacuation hospi-
tals.
30
120
30
17,010
900
10,300
2 motor and 2 animal
drawn.
927
1,500
2 motor and 2 animal
drawn.
Motor units with-
drawn for replace-
ment and base divi-
sions.
.See note attached.
See note M-l.
Do.
A. E.F. project, Julv
11, 1917.
Do.
3,456 to 4,680 beds See note attached.
PROJECT OF THE REAR
M-401 Line of communica- Evacuation hospi-
tions. tals.
M-402 do... Hospitals.-
M-403 do Venereal hospitals.—
M-404i_ do. Convalescent camps.
M-405 do do
M-400 I <lo Evacuation ambu-
lance company.
M-407 I do Hospital trains
M-408 do Hospital ships.
M-400 1 .. ..do Headquarters staff..
M-4I0 ... .do Section staff
M-41I Division billets , Mobile laboratory ...
M-412 Line of communica- Stationary labora-
tions. tory.
M-413 do... Sanitary squads
M-414 do Medical supply
depot .
M-415 do Dentists...
M— 110 Line of communica- |
tions; 10 per cent [-Total-
replacement.
22,404 to 30.420 beds..
138, 000 beds
10,000 beds
12,000 beds
5,000 beds.
900 lying or 1,920 sit-
ting.
10,000 beds
2,000 1 private assistant.
15,593 I
6, 500
05,593 |1
Sec note attached.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
' 1 per 1,000.
NOTES EXPLANATORY OF TABLE 2
Item No.
M-l. A. E. F. project, July 11, 1917, as corrected by cable sent No. 114, par. IS. Aug. 20,
lf>17: i. e. Sn. Tn. organized as per Table 30, Tables of Organization. 1917.
M-202. A. E. F. project, July 11, 1917. Organized as per par. 791, Manual for the Medical
Department: i. e.. 432 beds. In a crisis can be increased to at least three times
as many beds as personnel ; i. e., 595 beds.
M-401. Par. 793, Manual for the Medical Department, assigns two evacuation hospitals to
L. of C. per division in the zone of the advance: i. e., 40. Including 8 with the
army, this allots 2 per all divisions: i. e., 60, and gives the following hospitali-
zation at the front in case of crisis:
Beds
00 evacuation hospitals 25,920
Practical expansion 9, 180
69 (55 percent) field hospitals immobilized 14.904
50, 004
Total
Or 10 per cent of the combat divisions, the maximum to be expected.
M-402. organized .as per par. 700. Manual for the Medical Department: capacity increased
to 1.IMHI beds and personnel to 33 officers, 200 soldiers, and 100 nurses.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 17
Item No.
M-403. Personnel for 1,000-bed venereal hospital: 20 officers, 24 NO Os, 14 cooks. 115
privates ; total, 173.
M-404. Personnel for 1,000-bed convalescent camp: 10 officers, 24 NC Os, 10 cooks, 50
privates; total, 100.
M-405. Personnel for 5.000-bed convalescent depot, approximately 10 officers, 4 XC Os, 20
privates. Medical Corps, and 5 officers, 16 NC Os. 20 privates for administering
duties. The purpose of this depot is to transform the convalescent into the
soldier by physical exercises and drills; the convalescents being organized into
companies and performing all the routine duties, the most experienced regular
medical officers having supervision. Total hospitalization provided exclusive of
field hospitals of 200,100 beds.
M-406. Par. 804, Manual for the Medical Department, allots 1 per division at the front.
Headquarters personnel, 1 major. 1 supply officer, 2 sergeants, 2 privates. 2 ears ;
companies. 1 officer, 3 NC Os, 34 privates, 12 motor ambulances. 1 truck, 1 car,
1 side car.
11-407. Personnel for trains having capacity of 200 patients, as per par. G14, Manual for
the Medical Department, with the addition of 4 nurses.
M— 108. Personnel for hospital ships capacity of 200 beds, as per par. 621, Manual for the
Medical Department, G0-70 per cent of wounded will be returned to the front.
M-409. Personnel, 8 officers. 8 NC Os. 25 privates ; total, 41.
II— HO. 3 ports, 1 intermediate, and 1 advance section sanitary service, each : 3 officers.
2 NC Os, 6 privates; total, 11.
XI-411. Personnel, 1 medical officer, 1 chemist, 1 NC O, 2 chauffeurs ; total. 5 : motor
laboratory, 1 car.
M— 112. Personnel. 4 medical officers. 2 chemists, 4 NC Os. 8 privates; total. 18.
M-413. Personnel. 1 officer, 4 NC Os, 20 privates. 1 truck. 1 side car, 4 bicycles, and 2
chauffeurs; total, 27. Two for each division billet at the front and 12 for lines
of communication, viz, 3 ports, 3 port depots, 4 intermediate. 2 advance.
M-414. Personnel, 2 officers. NC Os, 40 privates. 3 port depots, 2 intermediate, 1 advance.
M-410. Personnel for 3 port receiving camps. 1 intermediate and 1 advance casual camp :
corps and army school details.
PRIORITY SCHEDULE
To provide a proper balance between all tlie various elements of the
American Expeditionary Forces to be shipped from the United States, a prior-
ity schedule of shipment of personnel was forwarded by General Pershing
to The Adjutant General, October 7, 1917. s The priority schedule comprised
six phases. Each of the first five phases embraced a theoretical army corps
and in addition certain army troops and Services of Supply troops; the six
phases covered the personnel for the organization of an army (exclusive of
aviation and replacements) and the Services of Supply troops (exclusive of
replacements) necessary to maintain that army. The personnel called for in
each of the first five phases varied from 275,200 in the first phase, to 210.000
in the fifth phase; aggregating, 1.230,781. The sixth phase called for Services
of Supply troops only, numbering 16,618. The errand total of the phases of
the priority schedule was, excluding aviation personnel and replacements,
! ,247.399.
DEPARTURES FROM THE PRIORITY SCHEDULE
The first departure of magnitude from the program laid down in the
original priority schedule was in consequence of the military situation in
18 FIELD OPERATIONS
France in March, 1918, and was the direct result of an agreement with Great
Britain following a meeting of the supreme war council in the latter part of
that month. 9 Under this agreement, Infantry and Machine Gun troops were to
be brought to France in great numbers, by the use of British shipping, without
reference to the priority schedule. This agreement made necessary an exten-
sive readjustment of the priority schedule.
Under the Abbeville agreement, May 2, 1918, the policy of giving abso-
lute priority to Infantry and Machine Gun units was continued. 9 Based on
this agreement, a further revision of the priority schedule, to apply to ship-
ments for May and June, was prepared and cabled to War Department, May
12, 1918.° From this time on, frequent revisions were made in the priority
schedule, that had in view the increase of the initial project of 30 divisions
to one of a much greater number of divisions. 9 In other words, the project
changed from a 1,000,000 basis to one of approximately 2,000,000 men.
EFFECTS OF THE DEPARTURES FROM THE PRIORITY SCHEDULE
Surprisingly rapid work in the summer of 1918 caused the shipments
from the United States to exceed all expectations. They contained an excess
of combat troops. This was partly due, as has been explained above, to our
agreement to ship Infantry and Machine Gun units to France without refer-
ence to the priority schedule, and also to the fact that the War Department
required from three to six months notice in order to prepare special units,
such as the Medical Department units, for the Services of Supply. 10 So long
a notice could not be given by General Headquarters A. E. F., and as a
result such troops as were already organized in the United States, principally
combat troops, were shipped. 10 The practical effect of this, in so far as the
Medical Department was concerned, was that combat troops were being
shipped to France for the 60 divisions project before the Medical Department
had received its allowance for the initial project, which was based on 30
divisions, as will be seen later.
SHORTAGES OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL
Until the spring of 1918, the demands for medical personnel were not
so insistent as was the case later. Our forces had not been heavily engaged
and the French had provided their hospital care in part. Yet, even so, there
was then and had been practically from the beginning, a shortage in Medical
Department personnel. 11
On April 15. 1918, and again on May 2, the chief surgeon. A. E. F.,
made full and comprehensive statements to the commanding general, Serv-
ices of Supply, of the constantly increasing deficiency in medical personnel
in the A. E. F. 12 It was shown in these communications that the case
was urgent, and that the deficiency was not due to recent or unexpected causes,
but largely to a failure, extending over many months, to furnish the replace-
ment and Medical Department units which were due the troops in France.
On May 2. 1918, in a cablegram to The Adjutant General, the commander
in chief, A. E. F.. reported that since July 1, 1917, repeated urgent cable
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 19
requests had been made for Medical Department replacements. 1 "' Because
these requests had been met only in small part, the Medical Department at this
time was facing a critical shortage. There were hospitals which could not be
opened for lack of personnel : and there was an inadequacy of replacement
personnel for organizations with combat units. 13
As a result of the investigation conducted under the direction of the
general staff, General Headquarters, following the engagement at Chateau-
Thierry (the Aisne operation) and the attack on Soissons (the Aisne-Marne
operation), the Medical Department personnel shortage was clearly defined. 14
The recommendation of the inspector general, A. E. F.. based on the situation
at Chateau-Thierry was that further provisions be made for emergency reserve
surgical teams, and that steps be taken to secure an increase of the sanitary
personnel, both commissioned and enlisted. 14
The chief surgeon, A. E. F., in a memorandum dated duly 30, 11>18, to G-4.
General Headquarters, called attention to the fact that surgical teams were
being obtained by stripping base hospitals, to a considerable extent, of their
surgical staffs, at the very time when their services were needed at the hos-
pitals because of active evacuation of wounded from the front. 15
At times the shortages of approved priority were much larger than in May.
1918, and a cable from the commander in chief, A. E. F., sent on zYugust 10,
called for a total Medical Department personnel of 21,700, to be given
priority in so far as possible over divisional units. 10 On September 30, the
total shortage of approved priority was 26.497. 10
Tlie Medical Department personnel expected in October amounted to
Sl.SfiS. while approximately 18.000 arrived. 10 On November 11 the shortage
of approved priority was: Officers. 3.004: nurses, 6,925: men. 28,023."
The following tabulation covering Medical Department personnel shows
the bimonthly totals by class of personnel from June 1 to November 30, 1918.
These totals are only approximately correct, as reports of arrivals of personnel
were often delaved in the mail. 10
Officers
Nurses
Mon
5, 108
9, (iui
14. 483
17,487
2, 529
4, 735
7. 522
8,951
30, 574
67, 14(1
104. 557
137. 403
The highest numbers of officers, nurses, and men reported in the American
Expeditionary Forces at any time (first week of December. 1918) are as
follows: Officers, 18,146; nurses, 10,061; men, 145,815.
The situation at times was desperate, and in the early days of November it
appeared that the armistice was the only thing that could save the Medical
Department from breaking under the strain. 11 On November 11 the Medical
Corps was short approximately 250 officers on the division requisitions alone. 11
There is no doubt that the shortage in officers, and nurses particularly, con-
tributed to the death of several patients in hospital, as it was nevessary
in some base hospitals for the bacteriologists, ophthalmologists, otolaryngolo-
20 FIELD OPERATIONS
gists, commanding officers, and adjutants to assist in performing operations,
and in many cases these specialists or administrative officers, comparatively
untrained in major surgery, had to perform major operations in order to do
what they could to prevent loss of life. 17 Instances were reported where
patients died of secondary hemorrhage in base hospitals when no trained
attendant was present or available. 17
ASSIGNMENT OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL OF COMBAT DIVISIONS TO OTHER.
DUTIES
One other matter should be mentioned here which interfered seriously
with the Medical Department organization of combat divisions. The growth
of the American Expeditionary Forces constantly led to an increase in the
number of camps and camp hospitals. The policy of General Headquarters,
at first, was that no permanent personnel should be supplied camp hospitals. 18
This necessitated the use of the Medical Department personnel attached to
units in training or at rest camps. When the units in training or at rest
changed station, their Medical Department personnel as a matter of course
had to accompany them. In order to accomplish this, it was imperative that
Medical Department personnel with combat units be not diverted and that a
certain percentage of personnel not belonging to divisions be assigned perma-
nently to each camp hospital. This subject was presented very forcibly by
the commanding general. Services of Supply, February 8, 1918, in a letter
to the commander in chief: 13
I may say that no organization arrives in France without a large distribution of
measles, mumps, meningitis, and scarlet fever. It requires personnel to decently care
for these unfortunates, and I am sure that they are not at this moment getting the
care they might have were the personnel available.
The chief surgeon. A. E. F., pertinently stated the situation in referring to
the use of personnel withdrawn from combat units in training: 10
This personnel has been entirely inadequate numerically and could not at the same
time accompany its organizations when they left camp and remain behind with the sick.
Therefore replacements have been used up and base hospitals robbed in an effort to
supply the deficiency. But the basic difficulty lies in the continued failure to send over
base hospitals and evacuation hospitals in accordance with the priority schedule, which
calls for four base hospitals, and two evacuation hospitals for each combat division.
Therefore, there should be 104 base hospitals and 52 evacuation hospitals, instead of
which there is a total of 42 base hospitals and 8 evacuation hospitals with the A. E. F.
SPECIALIST PERSONNEL
A novel feature of the World War was the A y ery liberal utilization of
medical, surgical, and other specialists, exclusively, or practically so. in their
own specialities. This plan, of course, was a logical outcome of what had
occurred in the ranks of the medical profession throughout the world. No
longer do many men holding medical degrees carry on a general practice, the
majority being internists, surgeons, orthopedists, ophthalmologists, otolaryn-
gologists, etc. In this connection, the real problem in the American Expedi-
tionary Forces was how best to use the special professional skill of the medical
officers.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 21
In September, 1917, special services of the Medical Department were
established, with headquarters at Neufchateau. 20 These special services were
divided into eight branches, each under a director, and comprised surgery,
medicine, X ray, neuropsychiatry, skin and genitourinary diseases, and eye.
ear, nose, and throat diseases. Medical officers of known qualifications were
assigned as consultants to the special services to coordinate and improve the
professional activities of the Medical Department. Prior to the publication
of General Orders No. 88. G. H. Q... A. E. F., 1918. a number of specialists
were so assigned, but there was no adequate organization which could coordi-
nate their activities. With the promulgation of General Orders No. 88, how-
ever, the work of these specialists was put on a much more systematic and
efficient basis; a director of professional services was appointed: and the
positions of chief consultant in both medicine and surgery were created.
The consultants were assigned to supervisory duty wherever their services
were needed. The scope of their work included hospitals, principally, but it
likewise took them to organizations at the front where their special knowledge
could be utilized even before the patients were admitted to hospital.
In order to supplement the facilities for emergency surgical work in
evacuation hospitals, surgical teams, consisting usually of one surgeon, an
assistant, one anesthetist, two nurses and two orderlies, were organized early
in 1918. 21 Subsequently, splint teams and shock teams were developed." 1
Specialization obtained also within the divisions, specialists being assigned
to the sanitary train for such duties within their respective specialties as
might be required by the division concerned. The specialists in question
usually comprised a surgeon, an orthopedist, a psychiatrist and a urologist, but
this varied somewhat. A medical gas officer was also assigned to each
division. 22
MEDICAL PERSONNEL FROM AN UNEXPECTED SOURCE
There was a provision in the Abbeville agreement which proved of
inestimable advantage to the Medical Department, A. E. F., namely, the
request of the British that we limit sanitary train personnel of the Second
Corps, attached to the British Expeditionary Forces, to one-half the comple-
ment authorized in our Tables of Organizations. This was necessitated
through shortage of British equipment and the fact that a well-organized
overhead in British hospitalization and evacuation resources was always
locally available for use of these divisions. Consequently, the personnel of
approximately 2 field hospitals and 2 ambulance companies of each of our
10 divisions brigaded with the British when sent to France, were concentrated
in the seventeenth training area. As there was little likelihood that this
sanitary personnel would ever be called for while the divisions continued to
operate with the British Expeditionary Forces, they were assigned to service
with American forces; and despite their total lack of eqiupment, they practi-
cally saved the day for our medical service during operations in the summer
of 1918. In consultation with G-3 of G. II. Q., A. E. F., an arrangement was
made whereby this personnel could be utilized wherever their services were
OTIS HISTORICAL ARCHIVES
ARMED FORCES MEDICAL MUSEUM, AFIP
22 FIELD OPERATIONS
most needed. 23 They were then thrown in behind the line to augment depleted
Medical Department establishments, except that some of the ambulance com-
panies were utilized to good advantage at base ports, in rapidly assembling
and forwarding incoming ambulances so urgently needed at the front. This
reserve, which so fortunately came to hand in this manner in the hour of need,
was one of the most important factors enabling the Medical Department to
discharge the weighty obligations imposed at that time. 23
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT CASUALS— REPLACEMENTS
It was not until September 30, 1917. that any fairly large number of
Medical Department casuals arrived in France. On September 30, 1917, about
G50 men landed. 24 This was just prior to the establishment of a medical re-
placement camp at Blois, and it was necessary to assign these 650 soldiers in
groups to various base hospitals, which had already arrived and had barrack
space to accommodate the additional men. Another casual detachment of
250 men arrived in November, 1917. 24 This was the last detachment of any
size to arrive for several months, and it was only after urgent appeals had
been sent to The Adjutant General that Medical Department casuals again
began to be received. This occurred in the latter part of February and in
March, 1918. 24
Replacements were handled entirely through the Services of Supply.
In the fall of >917, a Medical Department replacement camp was planned at
Blois. Its organization was practically completed when its site was given
over to a casual officers' depot. 11 The depot, however, continued to handle
Medical Department casuals, until July, 1918, when a depot for these officers
was made a part of the First Depot Division at St. Aignan. 11 This transfer
was made with a view to establishing a short course of training in field work
at the First Depot Division, hut it was never possible to carry out this plan
because of the constant shortage of Medical Department enlisted personnel
which necessitated using all available men at; all times, the longest stay in the
depot being not more than two weeks. The transfer was a disadvantage in that
it caused some delay in getting officers and men shipped to points where they
were needed at once. The delay was mainly due to lack of transportation. 11
The "greatest difficulty was experienced, in January and February, 1918,
in tracing Medical Department men who arrived in France. It was estimated
that fully 1,000 men. who were sorely needed by the Medical Department, suc-
ceeded in transferring to the line of the Army while they were passing through
the First Depot Division, St. Aignan. 24
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT CONCENTRATION AREA
Establishment of a concentration area for the Medical Department proved
an important factor in meeting hospitilization and evacuation demands inci-
dent to combat activities. Under conditions first existing in France the Medi-
cal Department mobile formations were landed at base ports and dispersed in-
dividually to various localities in the area of the Services Supply for the
purpose of securing necessary equipment. After this was obtained they were
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 23
transported to the combat area and there located. To expedite and facilitate
this work there was urgent need that the Medical Department he assigned an
area properly located in the zone of the armies to which incoming sanitary
formations, particularly evacuation and mobile hospitals, ambulance com-
panies, surgical teams, and other auxiliary personnel for front-line work,
could lie sent for mobilization, equipment, training, and assignment. Accord-
ingly, upon recommendation of the medical section of G— 4, (1. H. Q„ and
with the approval of the French, a Medical Department concentration area
was designated and set aside in October, 1918, at Joinville. Department of
Haute Marne. for the exclusive use of sanitary formations. 25 This area com-
prised approximately 25 square miles and contained nine villages, affording
a billeting capacity for about 500 officers and nurses and 10.0(H) enlisted men.
Good roads led from it to all parts of the American front, and its location
was such that any sector could be reached by motor transport within a few
hours. Furthermore, it was located on several railroads, which served ad-
mirably to assemble units arriving from base ports and to distribute them by
rail to the more remote parts of the fronts should need arise. 25
Prior to the establishment of this concentration area the Medical Depart-
ment had lacked means of providing reserve units and of keeping them in
close liaison with troops. 25
In order that the trained units held in reserve might be thrown in
behind any part of tlve line, as the military situation dictated, geographic
proximity, good roads and adequate railroad facilities, were factors of prime
importance in the selection of this area.
Upon arrival at a base port, the personnel of all army and corps mobile
sanitary formations was sent to this concentration area. 25 A supply depot
was established in the Joinville area, with sufficient material always on hand
to equip these corps and army units as they arrived. After having been
equipped, the personnel was given an intensive course of training in a demon-
stration unit of the same character as that to which they belonged, which was
established there. They were thus given a working knowledge of the equip-
ment and functions of the organization which they were to operate in the
field. 25
This concentration area was also used as a rest area for the personnel
of mobile formations when not engaged in active operations, and afforded
facilities for overhauling and repairing equipment. Where overworked per-
sonnel was sent there for much needed rest, it was replaced by fresh personnel
from the area without any change being made in transportation or equipment
of the units concerned. 25
The value of this expedient was demonstrated even during the very brief
period when the Joinville area was operated.
PERSONNEL SUPPLEMENTING THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
The personnel of the Medical Department. American Expeditionary
Forces, was supplemented extensively by personnel from other branches of
the Army as well as from sources without the Army. The practice was tern-
24 FIELD OPERATIONS
porary in some instances, and in others it was continuous. There were occa-
sions when the Medical Department was confronted with tasks which were
infinitely greater than it could accomplish in the time available. It was
then that other forces were used temporarily to supplement the Medical
Department.
The assistance rendered us by our allies involved a personnel reenforce-
ment as well as help in other directions. When American organizations served
with the British and the French, the plan was to hospitalize the American
wounded in hospitals (save in field hospitals which Ave provided ourselves)
of the particular ally with which the American organizations were serving.
Prior to the organization of the First Army, the French had charged them-
selves with the care of American wounded back of divisional areas. 20 The
French were forced to give up this plan. The reasons for this are discussed
in Chapter XTI. There were occasions, however, when large numbers of
American wounded were cared for in French hospitals; for example, when the
French general hospital at Bar-le-Duc, provided 2.200 beds for a prospective
overflow of American casualties during the St. Mihiel operation. 27
During the same operation, because of the acute shortage in Medical
Department personnel and to help out in the emergency, it was necessary to
secure authority for the assignment of 1,200 men of the line from the
orthopedic training battalion to our mobile sanitary formations. 28
That the personnel of the Medical Department might be used for more
pressing duties connected with the care of the sick and wounded, labor troops
were utilized, when their services were available, to dig graves for those
who died in hospitals at the front. 20
Sections of the United States Army Ambulance Service, on duty with
the French, frequently supplemented divisional Medical Department organiza-
tions, 10 to clear our aid stations. Less frequently they were used to clear our
dressing stations: rarely to clear evacuation hospitals not located near a rail-
head: and very rarely to serve troops in training areas and other localities.
During the preparations made for the St. Mihiel operation the situation
seemed so acute that 1.") ambulance sections, sent to Italy from the United
States for duty directly under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government,
through its prompt cooperation, were detailed to our service and brought up
for use in the engagement. 30 It is true that the transport of the sections
was the principal consideration, but the personnel of the sections were also
acquired and in consequence played their part in increasing the strength of
the Medical Department. A. E. F.
To the troops of the Marine Corps and other naval units that served
in France there were attached naval Medical Department personnel. This
personnel never exceeded f>00 in number for any one month (except the month
of September, 1918, when it was 561 ), 31 but as a supplemental force it was
constant.
As will be noted elsewhere, good use was also made to a considerable
extent of certain Red Cross personnel.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 25
RESULT OF SHORTAGE IN MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL
There is ample testimony from the highest military authorities to the
effect that our Medical Department performed good service in France, and
there is certainly no disposition here to controvert such testimony, if this
were possible, which is not the case. On the other hand, no subject concern-
ing the Medical Department is of so much importance as the strength of the
personnel, which experience shows to be necessary for an army in campaign.
The actual fact is that all evidence is to the effect that our Medical Depart-
ment in France proved too small. If possible, it would be highly desirable,
from the historical standpoint, to record what resulted. As the possible re-
sults of inadequate medical personnel in an army in campaign are well known,
no difficulty presents in a study of the situation as it applies to our Army
in France. Inadequacy in Medical Department strength generally results
in (1) details from the line to the Medical Department to a considerable ex-
tent, thus taking trained line soldiers from combatant duties. In France
such detail ran in many companies in battle, from 10 to 12 men. 32 Tims the
loss in combatant strength (Infantry) in battle ran from 4 to 4.8 per cent.
(2) Loss of combatants from the battle line to give aid to wounded comrades
and to accompany them to the rear in the absence of Medical Department
personnel to do this. (3) Neglect of sick and wounded. This question has.
of course, a military, a moral, and a humanitarian aspect. Our Medical De-
partment seems to have succeeded well here, though the chief surgeon men-
tions loss of life due to shortage in medical personnel. 17
This summary should not be concluded without pointing out the danger
of basing future Medical Department strength on the strength in France.
Everybody concerned seems to have agreed there was serious shortage. That
we got through as well as we did was obviously due to much assistance from
outside agencies which was available, fortunately, though to an extent that
is not likely to be the case again; to the greatest devotion to duty of the medi-
cal personnel generally, which it is hoped can always be counted on, and to
a comparatively short war for us. As is pointed out in the chief surgeon's
report, the armistice was the only thing that saved us from a disastrous situ-
ation resulting from personnel shortage. 11
MATERIEL
SUPPLIES
The full discussion of this subject will be given in a special volume on
supplies. What is said here is confined, so far as possible, to the front,
though in order to explain the supply situation there it has been found neces-
sary to discuss supplies in part from the standpoint of the American Expe-
ditionary Forces as a whole.
By no means were all supplies used by the Medical Department furnished
by that department. For the present purpose, however, this offers no par-
ticular difficulty, as the Medical Department actually supplied a large per-
centage of the articles involved in the care of sick and wounded at the front
26 FIELD OPERATIONS
including motor ambulances for a greater part of the war. For convenience,
the motor ambulances will be considered under the head of transportation.
The amounts and kinds of medical supplies were prescribed in certain
tables which appeared in the Manual for the Medical Department. Basic
allowances brought to France by divisional and other Medical Department
organizations were in conformity with these tables, but, as will be seen, great
independence was manifested in supplementing this official allowance. This
was more especially true in trench warfare. On one occasion the Medical
Department of the 1st Division, when that division turned over its sector
to another division, is reported to have, transferred seven carloads of sup-
plies." 3 Xor was this great increase of supplies wholly confined to trench
warfare. In numerous places in the text will be found mention of additional
supplies in open warfare. These consisted mainly of blankets, splints, and
gas and shock apparatus. Besides these, shell-wound dressings and anti-
tetanic serum were found to be especially demanded by the Medical Depart-
ment at the front during the World AVar.
Generally speaking, medical supplies were furnished in ample quantity.
Mention was made of this fact by the surgeon of the 2Gth Division,
who regarded it as remarkable that in all situations supplies were adequate
and were obtainable without delay. 34 This does not mean, however, that there
were not some shortages in particular articles.
One of these shortages that was keenly felt was that of splints of the
latest approved pattern. The American Eed Cross established a factory in
Paris where these splints were made and supplied to the American Expe-
ditionary Forces in quantities adequate to meet the needs of battle casualties
occurin<i in .Tune and July. 1918. 8 " Some time later plans were made for
the establishment of a plant for the production of nitrous oxide and oxygen
for use in anesthesia. This plant also was established in Paris by the Amer-
ican Red Cross. 3 ''
RESERVE SUPPLIES IX FRAXCE
On August 20. 1917, when there were about 25,000 troops in France,
General Pershing announced his policy of supply to the chiefs of the various
services. American Expeditionary Forces. 3 " In this memorandum, with its
subsequent additions, there was outlined a definite method of supply pro-
curement, both from the United States by shipment overseas and by purchase
in foreign markets. In this it was furthermore specifically set forth by what
policy, under procurement, the increment of reserve supplies was to be accu-
mulated. The supplies were divided into the following three classes: Auto-
matic supply for articles regularly conserved so as to permit of automatic
supply: replenishment supply for articles of which specified stocks had to
be maintained: and exceptional supply for articles of which no specific stocks
had to U* established.
On September 7. 1917. General Pershing, in a cablegram to The Adjutant
General, announced his decision to establish in France reserves of all classes
of supplies for 90 days. 17 This reserve was based on authorized issues, where
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 27
such issues were regular, and on actual periodic consumption of other articles
based on French and British experiences during the War. General Pershing
directed the chiefs of the various services in France to prepare estimates
for cabling, first, a list of four months' supplies to accompany each movement
of troops from the United States. This provided a 90 days' reserve and, in
addition, one month's automatic supply for consumption and emergency.
Second, a list showing the amounts which would have to be shipped monthly
for each 25,000 men of the American Expeditionary Forces. In terms of days.
the 90-day reserve plan provided for 15 days of the reserve to be in the advance
section, 30 days in the intermediate section, and 45 days in the base ports.
In January, 1918, the problem of automatic replacement of supplies of
the Medical Department. A. E. F., was taken up by that department on re-
ceipt of a letter on this subject from the Office of the Surgeon General. 88
The study of the problem was completed by the latter part of March follow-
ing. In a letter on the subject to the Surgeon General dated April 2, 1918. 39
the chief surgeon, A. E. F.. explained that it was highly desirable to have a
single list of articles used in common by the various branches of the Medical
Department, and for that reason a consolidated list of field and post supplies
had been made.
ESTABLISHMENT OF MEDICAL SUPPLY DEPOTS
In accordance with the plan to have 90 days' reserve medical supplies in
France, supply depots were established as follows: Base depots at each of the
ports utilized by American troops; an intermediate depot at Cosne; and an
advance depot at Is-sur-Tille. 40
At an early date (July 15, 1917), a depot was established at Cosne, which
later grew into Intermediate Medical Supply Depot No. 3. 41 This depot was
the Medical Department's main, full-stock distribution point, and from this
establishment the entire medical supply distribution system was largely
elaborated. For a considerable period of time practically all supplies were
concentrated at and likewise distributed from Cosne.
The original plan was to develop the supply depot at Cosne and plans were
submitted for its expansion. Since Cosne was off the railroad lines operated
by the Americans, and the French railroads were unable to handle increased
shipments therefrom, the original plans for its development were abandoned. 42
As a substitution. Intermediate Medical Supply Depot No. 2. which had
been established at Gievres. October 20, 1917,'" was to replace the depot at Cosne
as the main issuing depot, the Cosne depot being retained as an auxiliary- As
the depot at Oievres developed, this plan was being made effective.
Advance Medical Supply Depot No. 1. at Is-sur-Tille, was put into opera-
tion November 18. 1917. 43 This depot, an extremely important unit, largely
took over the distribution of medical supplies to troops and units in the
advance section. It was not, however, until considerably later that this depot
was made a full-stock unit. Prior to its being made a full-stock depot its
activities were confined largely to the supply of medical units on duty witli
combatant organizations- The problem of supplying the numerous fixed
28 FIELD OPERATIONS
Medical Department organizations in the advance, intermediate, and base
sections continued to be a responsibility of the main depot at Cosne. As the
situation developed the depot at Gievres was increased in capacity and
utilized largely for shipments of carload lots. Small issuing depots were
gradually established at the main base ports and gradually larger base stor-
age stations were installed at these places." 4
ESTABLISHMENT OF " .UMY DUMPS " (MEDICAL )
With the organization of the Paris group and later of the First Army,
the establishment of army dumps became essential. In connection with the
Medical Department purchasing business in Paris, there had been established
previously in Paris a small medical receiving warehouse ; and although this
was utilized somewhat in the manner of an army dump, it was not essentially
that type of depot. The first army clump established was at Lieusaint, 45 and
this w r as organized and administered for the purpose of supplying combat
units in the Paris group and, later, the First Army.
The supply table authorized for an army dump, which in common parlance
later became known as the " Lieusaint list," grew out of the establishment of
this army dump. 45 The original basis of the "Lieusaint list" was the re-
placements necessary for one combat division for eight days, and the officer
in charge of this distribution point was authorized to maintain in storage
as many times this amount as there were combatant divisions in his area. 45
This practically constituted a stock maximum for his depot. Practically this
same system, although with a modified list, was adopted for use in planning
the distribution of medical supplies when the offensive operations, directed
toward the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, and later against the Meuse-
Argonne area, were in preparation. Gradually, however, a policy was
developed of establishing army dumps for which there was authorized a
definite fixed stock maximum without reference to the number of combat
units to be supplied, but based more upon the number of such dumps estab-
lished in relationship to the known number of divisions to be employed in
the operation. Such dumps, for instance, were established at Toul, Souilly,
Yaubecourt. Fleury. and Les Islettes. and in the order named. 45
Toward the end of hostilities the manner of distribution from the supply
echelons at the base to those in the most forward areas had been worked out
with exceeding care. The plan of distribution, as evolved, was an elaboration
of the policies under which the units previously had been functioning, but
it was better balanced, and all echelons were much more clearly defined. This
was also true as regards the important technique of filling the requests for
supplies of forward units from the unit next in the rear. 45
MEDICAL SUPPLY ECHELONS AND SYSTEMS OF REPLENISHMENT
Essentially this scheme of distribution involved the use of several echelons.
They were as follows: 45 Divisional medical supply unit; army park medical
supply dump (for each corps) ; army medical supply depots (for each army) ;
Services of Supply depots (advance and base).
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 29
The officer in charge of the divisional medical supply unit normally
indicated the need of all organizations in his particular division upon a con-
solidated requisition, which, after passing through the office of the division
surgeon and that of G-L was forwarded for filling to an army park. 40 Often
the division medical supply officer was far removed from the division surgeon
and the division staff generally, and as a result numerous requisitions had to
be sent to the nearest army park in a most informal manner and without any
vise or approval. This was recognized as a necessity, and such contingencies
were provided for by authorizing the park personnel to honor such emergency
calls, It was found in practice that such authorizations increased the con-
fidence of those in the forward areas and that the end result was a better and
closer cooperation of* all concerned. 40
The logical medical stock for army parks included only articles of combat
equipment and supplies and trench stores, and divisional units would naturally
requisition only such articles, but in the early developmental days of the corps
echelon it was found necessary to carry limited replacements at these parks,
for such units as mobile and evacuation hospitals. It was very soon learned,
however, that this produced a useless dispersion of equipment which it was
difficult to obtain, and quickly rendered immobile the army park medical
supply dumps — units, which of necessity, must remain mobile. It therefore
became the policy to confine articles on the fixed stock maximum of such parks
to those of combat material and trench stores. Just as soon as this decision
was made it necessitated the establishment of a new echelon, inasmuch as
large hospitals in the advance zone would now be required to replenish their
stock from a new advance supply unit. 4 "
It was therefore contemplated immediately to establish (and sites were
actually selected) full-stock army advance medical supply depots on a basis
of one per army. 40 This unit, although carrying a complete stock, carried its
articles, in so far as quantity was concerned, upon a very limited time basis.
The functions, then, of this larger unit would l>e primarily to fill the calls of
the army parks and secondarily to fill requisitions from medical units in the
advance zone. The latter was obviated as far as possible by distribution from
the rear through " controlled stores " in other depots. 40
SHORTAGES
It Mill be recalled that it was not until well into the spring of 15)18 that
medical supplies began to be shipped automatically to Fiance. Prior to this
time procurement was by American Expeditionary Forces requisition, which
led to a real shortage about December 1. 1917. Toward the end of that
month there were approximately 175.000 31 troops in the American Expedition-
ary Forces, and, although the troops had lx>en coming over slowly, more had
arrived than had been anticipated. This inevitably reduced the reserve sup-
plies, which on. January 2, 1918, were reported by the chief surgeon, line of
communications, to be 25 per cent short. 47
On March 11. 1918, General Pershing cabled to The Adjutant General that
the reserve stock in the medical supply depots in France had been reduced
30 FIELD OPERATIONS
to the unsafe level of approximately 30 days' supply. 48 General Pershing
also stated in this cablegram that lie was convinced that the automatic medical
supplies were not being placed on ships in quantities determined as necessary
and sufficient to meet the needs of troops then in France. He requested that
immediate steps he taken to ship these supplies.
In the latter part of March, 1918, when the Germans began their first
spring offensive, call after call was sent to America to ship combat troops
and combat supplies. Nothing else was given priority: the Medical Depart-
ment priority shipment schedule was set aside. 49 Though there were but
320.000 troops in France on April 1. S1 and 800,000 now due to arrive each
month, base hospital after base hospital arrived without its equipment. Camp
hospitals were being rapidly expanded to meet the local needs of incoming
troops.
At this time (April. May, and June. 1918), the dispersion of the Ameri-
can Expeditionary Forces became progressively greater. With each extension
the supply problems of the various services became more complex.
In the case of the Medical Department the reserve had never been great.
As a result of the extremely active period between June 1 and August 1. 1918,
this reserve became considerably depleted. There were several reasons for
this depletion, but the principal one was the inability of the authorities in
home territory to ship supplies equal to the needs of the Medical Department,
A. E. F.
By August 1. 1918, there were approximately 1.184.000 men in the Ameri-
can Expeditionary Forces, 81 including 29 divisions. Great quantities of
material had to be shipped them for replacement as well as initial equipment.
Shortages of strictly technical Medical Department equipment and sup-
plies were consistently distributed among all classes of such material during
the period prior to the large offensive of the autumn. 1918. It appeared,
however, that the more highly technical articles were most lacking and short-
ages were particularly apparent in dental, veterinary, and X-ray supplies,
and in surgical instruments.'"'" Fortunately, a repair unit for surgical in-
struments and typewriters reached the American Expeditionary Forces from
the United States at about this time."' 1 This unit proved of the greatest value
in connection with the conservation of surgical instruments and typewriters.
Just before the armistice, the major part of the combat troops of the
American Expeditionary Forces was concentrated behind a front approx-
imately 50 miles in extent. Advance, intermediate, and base depots existed
and their storage contained a reasonable amount of supplies. Maintenance
problems bad been worked out in actual combat. Our troops had overcome
every German division which had been thrown agiinst them, and throughout
it all there had been no essential shortage in medical supplies.
HOSPITALS
It lias been necessary in discussing personnel to mention certain shortages
in hospitals. This description of the situation is pertinent here also, but
what has been said need not l>e repeated.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 31
The division medical units, including field hospitals, had been organized
in the United States, and accompanied their respective divisions overseas.
The situation was far different, however, in respect to the hospital establish-
ments immediately to the rear of divisions.
In providing for early care of battle casualties behind the divisions,
reliance was placed, by our pre-war organization, chiefly on evacuation hos-
pitals. For each division sent to France the shipping schedule called for the
coincident dispatch of two of these units; but in spite of repeated cable
appeals to the War Department this automatic supply was never furnished,
and shortage of evacuation hospitals was a source of continual anxiety to the
Medical Department."- Not until after the armistice was there ever more
than 25 per cent of the authorized quota of these units in France: though as
indicated elsewhere in the early period of our activities there, this shortage
did not cause any great concern.'' 2 Then, with fixed hospitalization in the
rear fairly well established, the hospital needs of our troops engaged in train-
ing for trench warfare were easily met. Static conditions then prevailed.
A state of immobilization of troops, too. had obtained long enough to permit
the French to construct well-organized and well-equipped hut evacuation hos-
pitals behind their trenches, or, in lieu of construction, to take over and alter
existing buildings for hospital purposes. 58 These French hospitals afforded
every facility for carrying on treatment of the wounded along modern lines.
Coincident with the arrival of one of our divisions in the trenches, it was
arranged that the French should turn over to our use one or more of these
hospitals, either temporarily or permanently, and hospitals thus taken over
were transferred to us with full equipment. r ' a Then merely the installation
of our own medical personnel was required before the formation concerned
could function as an American hospital and care for American patients. This
very desirable arrangement from our point of view obtained, however, only
in fairly restricted areas, notably in Toul. Luneville. and Baccarat. These
were the areas in which the greater part of the training of American troops
in trench warfare was conducted."' In remoter regions to which it sometimes
was necessary that our troops be sent, either for training or to relieve French
troops in quiet sectors of the line, our casualties were sent to near-by French
hospitals administered by French personnel. Then, frequent changes in the
designation of training sectors for American troops made strictly American
hospitalization impracticable at times. While this Avas our policy from the
first, changes were made so rapidly that rarely was it advisable to be very in-
sistent in requests for such facilities. The situation then was that while Ameri-
can troops still possessed and operated to a maximum degree their own division
Held hospitals, when sick and wounded were admitted to French hospitals
it was seldom that American personnel was authorized to care for them. This
unsatisfactory condition soon made it necessary for the Medical Department,
A. E. F.. to use every effort to obtain control over the treatment of American
patients. Quite naturally the Americans preferred to be cared for by their
own countrymen, if for no other reason than that they could thus easily make
known their wants."' 5
32 FIELD OPERATIONS
The German offensive of March 21, 1918, created an entirely new hospital
situation on all ports of the allied front. 54 Until that time, hospitalization for
the allies had been a comparatively simple matter. This German offensive
caused a reversion from static, or trench, warfare to mohile, or open warfare.
Incident to the changes daily taking place in the surging battle lines, the
stationary, hutted evacuation hospitals, which previously had answered well,
became relatively useless and, for purposes of immediate combat hospitaliza-
tion, a thing of the past. 04
To maintain hospitalization near the front, the utilization of tentage,
and such existing buildings! as could be found and were habitable, became
necessary. As the Medical Department did not have at hand the mobile
hospitalization provided for in the shipping schedule, this shortage seriously
increased our operating handicaps. 51
The pioneer experience in our divorce from the conditions of static war-
fare to more or less constant movements of open warfare devolved upon the
1st Division. 5 " As mentioned elsewhere, this division was hurriedly with-
drawn from the Toul sector and placed at the disposition of the French, in
reserve behind the Montdidier salient."' 5 The American Expeditionary Forces
possessed no hospitalization in that region, at the time, short of Paris. 55 As
the division was placed under the French, the responsibility for hospitalizing
the sick and wounded devolved upon and was assumed by the French. 50 This
obligation was in keeping with the ruling previously adopted during our
period of trench warfare instruction. In orders prepared by the French and
directing the dispatch of the 1st Division to the new front, it was specified
that all hospitalization (except that furnished by divisional field hospitals)
and evacuation of our troops would be provided by them. 55 These orders also
prescribed the liaison to be established between our field hospitals and the
French hospitals farther to the rear.
Despite a most serious shortage in personnel and equipment for our army
sanitary units, and the frankly stated objection of the French to the es-
tablishment of American Expeditionary Forces evacuation hospitals in the
rear of divisions operating with them, it was very early recognized that we
should make every effort to provide for the evacuation and hospitalization
of our own wounded.
Repeated efforts were made to secure permission from the French to es-
tablish at Beauvais at least one American evacuation hospital in the rear of
the 1st Division, during the operations of that division at Cantigny, the latter
part of May. 1918. 55 These requests were disapproved by the French on
the ground that a dual hospitalization and evacuation service in that region,
in view of existing traffic conditions, would result only in confusion. 55 As
will be mentioned later, the permission of the French was obtained to es-
tablish an American Red Cross hospital there.
AVith the beginning of the German Aisne offensive, the, latter part of
May, 191S, it became necessary hurriedly to place additional American divis-
ions on the enemy front before Paris. 55 This created a new hospitalization
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 33
problem. Since the French had lost all their evacuation hospitals in that
region, in their retreat, they were not in a position to assume the additional
burden of caring for American casualties."
For the first time, the French not only permitted but assisted the Ameri-
can Expeditionary Forces in every way to begin the establishment of its
own chain of hospitalization behind its engaged divisions, and the evacua-
tion of our casualties from the hospitals, by means of American hospital
trains, to our fixed hospitals in the rear/' 7 Obstacles, however, were almost
insuperable, for the rapid German advance had so demoralized railway serv-
ice that it was impossible to operate hospital trains, and for a short time
evacuation by ambulance and truck was necessary for a distance of from
40 to 100 kilometers. ('25 to 02 miles) in order to clear our field hospitals.
This situation was immeasurably aggravated by our great lack of ambu-
lances. 57 The difficulties thus encountered and the manner in which they
were met are discussed later.
ASSISTANCE RENDERED BY AMERICAN RED CROSS HOSPITALS
At this point it should be stated that especially during the early part of
the development of the American Expeditionary Forces, American Red
Cross hospitals played a very important part in the care of our sick and
wounded. Among other institutions which the Red Cross had established
for service of the French, was the ''American Ambulance " in Paris. This
was turned over to the American Expeditionary Forces on July 20. 1917, and
was designated American Red Cross Military Hospital, No. 1, though it
continued at first to receive only French casualties. 55 As General Pershing
would not permit American military hospitals in Paris at that time, 59 and
hospital facilities proved to be needed there, the American National Red
Cross then established a number of hospitals whose collective capacity was
rapidly increased to 10,000, beds. 57 The association also established other
hospitals in the field, where they operated as evacuation hospitals in rear of the
various divisions. These Red Cross hospitals were used in the zone of the
armies only through urgent necessity. They were organized at the request of
the chief surgeon. Personnel for them came largely from the arm}', but their
equipment was supplied by the Red Cross. The Medical Department was at
all times so short of resources that it was necessary to call upon the Red Cross
to furnish hospital tentage, equipment, and some personnel to meet our needs.
Its hospitals, functioned in the same manner as did the army evacuation
hospitals, each being under the command of an officer of the Medical Corps,
save one under a French medical officer, located at Beauvais during the
Cantigny operations. Two were utilized during the Chateau-Thierry oper-
ation, and two during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations. 58
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT TRANSPORTATION
Transportation facilities of the Medical Department, A. E. F., com-
prised ambulances, trucks, trains (including those on light railways), and
canal barges.
13576—25 3
34 FIELD OPERATIONS
AMBULANCES
Ambulances comprised two kinds of vehicles: Animal-drawn and motor.
The Medical Department made use of both kinds of ambulances for the
transportation of patients, in the American Expeditionary Forces. Trans-
portation of patients was a responsibility with which that department was
charged throughout.
PliOCUREMENT OF AMBULANCES
In the American P^xpeditionary Forces, the use of animal-drawn ambu-
lances was very restricted. These ambulances were assigned only to Medical
Department units serving with combat troops; that is, one ambulance com-
pany of each divisional ambulance section was animal-drawn."" Both animal-
drawn ambulances and animals for them were supplied by the Quartermaster
Corps; 00 their procurement was not a responsibility of the Medical Depart-
ment.
The procurement of motor ambulances, on the other hand, was a direct
responsibility of the Medical Department for the greater part of the war. 61
In discussing this question it must be considered from both sides of the At-
lantic. This is because motor ambulances, though classed as Medical Depart-
ment materiel when we entered the World War, became Motor Transport
Corps materiel some months prior to the armistice. Since this change was
effected considerably earlier in the American Expeditionary Forces than it
was in the United States, there was a period wdien, as will be explained, the
Medical Department in the United States was purchasing motor ambulances
and shipping them abroad on Motor Transport Corps tonnage.
In December, 1917. what was then the Motor Transportation Service was
created a part of the American Expeditionary Forces. 62 Its purpose, in part,
was the technical supervision of all motor-driven A 7 ehicles; their reception,
organization, and assignment (except vehicles belonging to organized units) ;
and the organization and operation of repair and supply depots for motor
vehicles. Until May. 1918. motor ambulances in the American ^Expeditionary
Forces were not included in the classes (if vehicles controlled by the Motor
Transport Service, A. E. F. : •* however, they were maintained in a state of
repair by that service. From May. however, all motor ambulances arriving
in the American Expeditionary Forces were turned over to what had now
become the Motor Transport Corps, A. E. F. : but being classed as special
vehicles, motor ambulances were held by that corps subject to the orders
of the chief surgeon. A. E. F. 88 Between this time and the folowing August,
though the Medical Department procured motor ambulances in the United
States, they were shipped overseas on Motor Transport Corps tonnage. 64
Subsequent to August, when the Motor Transport Corps, in the United
States, took over the procurement of motor ambulances from the Medical De-
partment. 65 their shipment overseas became a responsibility of the Motor
Transport Corps. Thereafter shipments ;were based on estimates furnished
by the Medical Department, A. E. F.
general view of medical department organization 35
Methods of Shipping Ambulances feom the United States
Tables of Organization and Equipment prescribed the number of am-
bulances for Medical Department units serving with combat troops. For
a while (until October, 1917) ambulances belonging to these organizations
were shipped from the United States with the organizations. This was not
a practical method, and it was discontinued in October, 1917. 60 Thereafter all
ambulances were sent to France in a knocked-down condition.' 10 This Avas
done not only to conserve tonnage but to preserve the ambulances in good
condition.
Shipping ambulances knocked down necessitated having a skilled force of
men in France to assemble them on their arrival. It was intended that all
ambulances should reach the American Expeditionary Forces through the
base port at St. Nazaire. Accordingly, a group of skilled mechanics was
established at that port by the Medical Department soon after (November,
1917) it was determined to ship unassembled ambulances. However, as it
happened, ambulances were subsequently received not only at St. Xazaire
but also at Brest, T>e Havre, La Pallice, Bordeaux, and sometimes at Mar-
seille. There never was any way of determining in advance how many
ambulances would arrive at any of these places, nor when they might be
expected." It was a common occurrence for chassis to arrive at one port
and bodies of ambulances at another, necessitating driving the chassis over-
land to where the bodies had been received.
Distribution
The distribution of ambulances in the American Expeditionary Forces
was influenced by two factors: Ambulances for Medical Department units
with the forward services, and those for the services of the rear. In the for-
ward services, Tables of Organization governed the question of the number
of ambulances that each Medical Department unit should have. The actual
assignment of ambulances to units serving in the zone of the advance, how-
ever, was controlled by General Headquarters on a priority basis and in
accordance with Tables of Organization. 67
Since no allowances of ambulances were specified by Tables of Organiza-
tion for the Services of Supply, except for combat organizations serving
therein, the distribution of ambulances in that area was based on local needs,
and was, in turn, contingent upon the ambulances available. As the supply
of ambulances in the American Expeditionary Forces was always short, as
will be shown later, it was necessary to effect some measure which would
stretch the smallest number over the greatest territory. This was done by
establishing a system of pooling the ambulances.
Pooling System
The principle of supplying individual units in the Services of Supply,
such as regiments, service battalions, and signal companies, with ambulances
36 FIELD OPEBATIONS
was found to be uneconomical as regards both supplies for and upkeep of
these vehicles. 07 Therefore, in order that our resources might be conserved
and the greatest use of the limited number of ambulances on hand might be
made, pools of ambulances were established at all hospital centers, base hos-
pitals and in each base section. These pools were under the direct control
of the transportation section of the chief surgeon's office, A. E. F. As fre-
quently happened, ambulances were detached from tbese pools for purposes
of temporary duty elsewhere, being returned to the pool when the unit, to
which the ambulances had been assigned temporarily, moved out of the
Services of Supply, or when there was no longer a need for the temporary use
of the ambulances. As might be seen, this allowed a very elastic use of am-
bulances located in the Services of Supply.
Owing to the great shortage of ambulances in the American Expeditionary
Forces, it was frequently necessary for all of the ambulances in one pool to
be sent to such places as base hospitals so as to facilitate unloading hospital
trains, or for like emergencies. Upon the completion of such duties the am-
bulances concerned would be returned to the pool to which they belonged. 07
Shortages of Amhulances
Before December, 1917, there had already developed an acute shortage
of ambulances, and shipments from the United States, because of procure-
ment and tonnage difficulties, were under our estimated need. os Although
cable after cable was dispatched setting forth our emergency needs along this
line, the shortage continued to increase. The problem of estimating our re-
quirements was made more difficult by the lack of tables of organization in
Services of Supply, corps, and army units; 08 existing tables indicated trans-
portation for divisions only. In the late spring of 1918, however, an esti-
mate of the situation was made, which resulted in the Medical Department
assuming that from front to rear a minimum of 120 motor ambulances per
division in France would be required. os The number of ambulances required
for the American Expeditionary Forces to cover past shortages and future
needs was estimated, and on July 3, 1918, the results of these estimates were
included in a cable. 64 Only during the months of September, October, and
November, 1918, was it apparent that the number of motor ambulances which
the authorities in the United States stated the} r would float would have any
influence upon reducing the accumulated shortage. 68 Shipments had hereto-
fore not even covered current needs.
Shortages were the subject of constant reports. To cover them in part,
large numbers of ambulances were borrowed from the French and from the
Red Cross. 00 Sections of the United States Army Ambulance Service proved
of particular value. The need for ambulances was so acute that we actually
had to borrow 15 of these sections we had sent to Italy for service with the
Italian army." 9
In all there were shipped to France (and Italy) approximately 3.070
G. M. C. ambulances and 3,805 Ford ambulances. 70
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 37
MOTOR TRUCKS
The primary purpose of motor trucks assigned to mobile Medical Depart-
ment units was, of course, to convey the equipment of such units from one
point to another within the theater of operations, as well as to transport
their replenishment supplies when the units had been established and were
operating. The number of trucks for each motorized field hospital and each
ambulance company was prescribed by Tables of Organization and Equip-
ment. 71 For other mobile Medical Department organizations, such as the
evacuation hospital, there was no prescribed number of trucks.
In most divisions in the American Expeditionary Forces truck trans-
portation was pooled as a matter of conservancy. Consequently, when it
became necessary to change the location of a field hospital, trucks were
assigned for this purpose. Likewise, trucks were assigned to evacuation
hospitals whenever it was necessary to move the mobile parts of such hospitals.
There were frequent occasions, during active operations, when motor
trucks were put to other uses by the Medical Department, than for cargo-
carrying purposes. This was the case when great numbers of casualties had
occurred, from time to time, and the number of ambulances available was
inadequate to effect prompt evacuation.
HOSPITAL TRAINS
For the purpose of this history, hospital trains are considered more
in the light of hospitals than as a means of transportation, because they were
for the most part truly mobile hospitals. Their general make-up, their direct
administrative control, and the details of what they effected in the way of
evacuation will be found in Volume II of this history, which has to do with
the administration of the Medical Department, A. F. F. For present purposes
the question of their procurement and their subsequent operative control
at the front will be discussed.
The first plan of the chief surgeon, A. E. F., was to use ordinary box
cars adapted to hospital train purposes by introducing fittings into them
for supporting tiers of litters." These fittings were metal posts to be screwed
to the floor of the box cars in such a way that they would occupy little space
and could be cleared away, when not wanted, thus permitting the box cars
to serve the double purpose of evacuating wounded from the front and.
when empty of wounded, of carrying supplies back to the troops at the
front. Because both the British and French had found this arrangement
inexpedient, the plan was not carried out in the American Expeditionary
Forces. 71
Limited ship tonnage space precluded procuring railroad coaches for
hospital trains from the United States; consequently, two converted hospital
trains were leased from the French, and 19 specially constructed, were
purchased from the British. 71 As these 21 trains were entirely inadequate
during the St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne operations, 45 additional
38
FIELD OPERATIONS
HOSPITAL TRAIN
BRITISH CONSTRUCTION
KITCHEN AND SITTING SICK OFFICERS CAR
36 BEDS
TYPICAL WARD CAR
MORGUE
WARD AND PHARMACY CAR
KITCHEN AND MENS MESS CAR
' ©'
3 BEDS
3 BEDS
1 3 BEDS
3 BEDS
3 BEDS
3 BEDS
'
33 BEDS
O^IkIt!
*^i+- 1 — i — i — ►
3 BEDS
| 3 BEDS
3 BEDS
3 BEDS
3 BEDS
WARD AND PERSONNEL CAR
5
LINEN
STORES
* STORES
STORES
5 BRAKE
Ei^J
BRAKE AND STORES CAR
SCALE
8 K> IB
20TEET
■1
.917 ^f
USA.
Ki<;. 1. flan of the different cars comprising the hospital train of British construction used by the
American Expeditionary Forces
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
39
40
FIELD OPEBATIONS
Fig. 3. — Interior of ward car ; beds not made up
Fig. 4. — Interior of ward car. showing attendant's compartment
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
41
trains were rented from the French for use of the Medical Department
during the former operation, and 4G during the latter.' 2
Because the office of the chief surgeon, A. E. F., was in the Services of
Supply, far removed from the front, it was necessary to divide the control
of the movements of hospital trains. This was accomplished by giving
the control of the trains, operating at the front, to the representative of
the chief surgeon in the fourth section of the general staff at General Head-
quarters. This control normally covered primary evacuation from the front.
All other hospital train movements, however, were controlled from the office
of the chief surgeon at Tours.
Fig. 5. — Interior of ward car ; beds raised
Hospital train movements from the front were effected directly by
regulating officers, who had on their staffs officers of the Medical Depart-
ment representing the chief surgeon, A. E. F. Regulating stations were estab-
lished and administered by the assistant chief of staff G-4. Movements of
hospital trains in the rear of the zone of armies were provided for by the
train movement bureau, headquarters, Services of Supply, in accordance with
requests made upon it for this purpose by the chief surgeon, A. E. F.™
LIGHT RAILWAY TRAINS
During the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations, some use was
made of narrow-guage (60 cm.) railway lines, to evacuate casualties. Tt Hospital
1357&7-25 4
42
FIELD OPERATIONS
F|<;. 6. — Hospital train operating room
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
43
Fi<:. 7. — Hospital train kitchen
44
FIELD OPERATIONS
Pig. 8. — Hospital train personnel car
Fig. 9. — Hospital train ; method of loading
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
45
Fiu. 10. — French converted hospital train, being unloaded at Hospital Center. Allerey. A, E. F.
*m2k *- *
Fig. 11.— Light railway train; fitted tor carrying wounded
46
FIELD OPERATIONS
trains were formed from the returning ears, and appliances that were readily
removable were attached to the flat gondolas of this system, so that it was
possible with a train composed of an engine and 10 cars to transport- some
80 "lying cases." This method of transportation would have been very
saving of ambulances, and it is believed had the war continued for even
a few months more a great deal of use would have been made of it by the
Medical Department."
At the time of the signing of the armistice, some 500 cars were available
for purposes of evacuation, and it was practicable to manufacture others
as fast as need for them developed. The oars, however, winch were used
Fig. 12. — Hospital barge
in the St. Muriel and Meuse-Argonne operations were built with the center
of mass too high for the rough construction of the light railways in these
sectors, and derailments were so numerous as to cause their abandonment."
HOSPITAL BARGES
During the activities of the American Expeditionary Forces at Chateau-
Thierry, many patients were evacuated to Paris by means of barges. The
barges were operated in flotillas of six, motive power being furnished by
tugboats.™
In August, 1918, the chief surgeon, A. E. F., proposed that barges be
regularly used as an additional means of transporting sick and wounded,
more especially seriously wounded and gassed soldiers who could not be
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
47
otherwise transported. His plan was adopted. At about the time of the
signing of the armistice there were 60 barges being converted to hospital
purposes. 75
ORGANIZATION
When we entered the World War, the organization of the Medical De-
partment in the theater of operations was as follows: 70
Table 3. — Organization of Medical Department provided hy Manual for the Medical
Department, 1916 n
Zone of the advance (divi-
sion surgeons).
Sanitary trains.
Ambulance companies.
Field hospitals.
Theater of operations
(chief surgeon, field'
army).
Zone of the line of com-
munications (surgeon
base group) .
Medical department personnel on duty with line organizations
1 Directors of ambulancejCamp infirmaries
companies.
Directors of field hos
pitals.
Base section (surgeon, base group) :
Base medical supply depot.
Base hospitals.
Convalescent camps.
Contagious disease hospitals.
Trains, boats, and ships.
Casual camps for sanitary troops.
Sanitary squads.
Field laboratories.
American National Red Cross units.
Sanitary inspectors.
Intermediate section (surgeon, intermediate group) :
Rest stations.
American National Red Cross units.
Advance section (surgeon, advance group):
Advance medical supply depot.
Evacuation hospitals.
Evacuation ambulance companies
Sanitary column.
It will be noted that this plan contemplated a field army made up
of divisions, which was in conformity with our Army organization at that
time. To meet the new conditions of warfare, however, an entirely new army
organization was adopted by the commander in chief, A. E. F., and proposed
by him to the War Department July 11, 1917. 77 This organization project
of General Pershing, as adopted by the War Department, replaced the field
army by corps, each consisting of six divisions, 4 of which were designated for
combat, 1 for replacement and school, and 1 for replacement and training. 73
Armies were also provided for, to consist normally of five corps. 79
Certain Services of Supply troops were provided for in this general or-
ganization project. There was not included, however, all of the organization
of the lines of communications, which was not projected until September
18, 1917, when plans for a complete service of the rear, which listed item by
item the troops considered necessary for the Services of Supply, were cabled
to the War Department and then approved. 80 For purposes of local admin-
istration the lines of communications in France, now Services of Supply, was
subdivided into districts or sections. 81 The territorial sections corresponding
to and immediately surrounding the principal ports were called base sections:
48 FIELD OPERATIONS
there was an intermediate section embracing the region of the great storage
depots: and an advance section extending to the zone of operations, within
which the billeting and training areas for the earlier divisions were located.
Following these changes, a change in administrative and technical super-
vision of troops was evolved by General Pershing. 82 The general staff of
General Headquarters, A. E. F., was expanded to comprise two additional
sections. It should be noted that Field Service Regulations, United States
Army, contemplated three sections of the general staff for an army operating
in the field, as follows: 83 First, combat: second, administrative: third, intelli-
gence. The composition of the general staff at G. H. Q., A. E. F., however,
was organized as follows: 84 First, administrative: second, intelligence: third,
operations; fourth, coordination of supply services (including Construction,
Transportation, and Medical Departments): and fifth, training. These sec-
tions were referred to as G-l, G-2, etc.
It was with the fourth section of the general staff, General Headquarters,
that the Medical Department was particularly concerned, for it was this section
that was charged with the supervision of hospitalization and the evacuation
of sick and wounded. 84 To enable it to function with the greatest degree of
effectiveness, it was essential that expert technical advice be immediately and
constantly available to its chief. This was possible so long as the chief
surgeon's office remained at General Headquarters, but the order which estab-
lished the general staff at General Headquarters on its new, expanded basis,
also provided for the removal of the offices of certain chiefs of staff services
to headquarters. Services of Supply. Among these was included the office of
the chief surgeon. A. E. F. Consequently, to provide representation of the
chief surgeon at General Headquarters, authority was given him, as was given
to all chiefs of staff services, to designate an officer of the Medical Department
for service in connection with each section of the general staff at General
Headquarters. 84
How the chief surgeon continued to coordinate the activities of the
Medical Department attached to organizations in active operation is separately
considered in the next chapter. At this time the intention is briefly to indi-
cate only the more important changes of the organization of the American
Expeditionary Forces as a whole, in order that an interpretation of the follow-
ing outline of the organizations of the Medical Department, American Expe-
ditionary Forces, might be facilitated. For details connected with this organi-
zation table see Appendix, p. 1054.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
49
Table 4. — Final organization, Medical Department, A. E. F.
Theater
tions.
of opera-
duty with
[Zone of the armies
(G-4-B representing f Army (army surgeon)
the chief surgeon) .
Corps (corps
surgeon) .
Services of Supply
(chief surgeon) .
Sections of Services of
Supply (chief sur-
geons of sections).
Special units.
Medical Department personnel
army troops.
Consultants in special subdivisions of surgery
and medicine.
Sanitary train (commanding officer):
Ambulance company section.
Field hospital section.
Camp infirmaries.
Divisional medical supply unit.
Evacuation hospitals, including Red Cross.
Mobile hospitals.
Evacuation ambulance companies. 1
Hospital trains.
Mobile laboratory.
Mobile veterinary hospital.
Army supply park (medical supply depot company)
Convalescent depot.
Medical Department personnel on
duty with corps troops.
Consultants.
Sanitary train (commanding officer):
Ambulance section.
Field hospital section.
Camp infirmaries.
Divisional medical supply units.
Mobile hospital.
Mobile veterinary hospital.
Medical Department
personnel on duty
with division troops.
Sanitary train:
Ambulanccsection .
Field hospital sec-
tion.
Camp infirmaries.
Divisional medical
supply unit.
Mobile laboratory.
Mobile surgical unit.
.Sanitary squads.
Medical supply depots (base, intermediate, and
advance) .
Hospital centers:
Base hospitals.
Convalescent camps.
Supply depots.
Base hospitals.
Trains and barges.
Casual camp for sanitary troops.
Medical Department concentration area.
Fixed laboratories.
Field laboratories.
National Red Cross units.
Sanitary inspectors.
Consultants (professional) .
Veterinary hospitals (base) .
Mobile operating unit.
Aviation medical unit.
Aviation ophthalmo-otological unit.
Medical classifying unit.
Museum unit.
Roentgenological unit.
Ophthalmological unit.
Medical Department repair shop unit.
Central optical unit.
Neuropsychiatry! unit.
Rodentological unit.
Division (di-
vision sur-
i Sections of the TJ. S. A. A. S. were also used for the evacuation of the sick and wounded.
Sources of information: 1. Manual for the Medical Department, U. S. Army. 2. General Orders, A. E.F.
of Organization and Equipment, W. D.
3. Tables
50 FIELD OPERATIONS
REFERENCES
(j) Bull. NO. 82, W. D., May 24, 1917.
fi?) Memorandum from the Surgeon General of the Army to Senator Chamberlain,
September 20, 1017. Subject: Preparation for war of the Medical Department of
the Army. On tile, Record Boom, S. G. O., 321.6 (Medical Department).
(;;) Better from the Surgeon General of the Army to The Adjutant General of the Army,
May 21, 1917. Subject : Increase of the enlisted personnel, Medical Department.
First indorsement thereon. The Adjutant General's Office, June 15, 1917. On tile.
Record Room, S. G. O., 128732-T (Old Files).
(_f) General organization project, A. B. F., July 10, 1917. On file, General Headquarters
A. E. F., Washington, D. C.
(5) Services of the rear project, American Expeditionary Forces, September (i, 1917.
On file. General Headquarters, A. E. F, Washington, D. C.
(<;) Memorandum from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., for the chief of staff, A. E. F., August
11, 1917. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(7) 'fables of Organization and Equipment, I*. S. Army, Series A. Table I, August. 1917.
(g) Better from the commander in chief, A. E. F., to The Adjutant General of the Army.
October 7, 1917. Subject: Priority of shipment (personnel). On rile, General
Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington. D. C.
(9) Report of activities of G-l, G. H. Q., volume 2, 3.
(10) Ibid., 7.
(11 ) Report of the activities of the chief surgeon's office. A. E. F., from the arrival of the
American Expeditionary Forces in Europe to the armistice, by the chief surgeon,
A. E. F, March 20, 1919, 47. On tilts Historical Division, S. G. O.
(12) Better from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the commanding general, S. O. S.. May 2.
1918. Subject: Deficiency of" medical personnel. On file, Historical Division, S.
G. O.
(13) Cable No. 1037-S, from General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, to
The Adjutant General of the Army, May 2, 1918.
(14) Exhibit "K" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of investigation concerning charges of
inefficiency on part of the Medical Department, from the inspector general, A. E.
F., to the commander in chief, July 17, 1918, 0. On file. Historical Division. S.
G. O.
(15) Report of activities, chief surgeon's office, A. E. F., to the commanding general, S.
O. S.. March 20, 1919, 47. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(Hi) Report of the activities of the chief surgeon's office. A. E. F.. from the arrival of the
American Expeditionary Forces in Europe to the armistice, by the chief surgeon.
A. E. F.. March 20, 1919, 49. On file, Historical Division, S. Q. O.
(17) Ueport of the Surgeon General, I'. S. Army, 1919, Vol. II, 1291.
(18) Report of the activities of the chief surgeon's office, A. E. P., from the arrival of
the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe to the armistice, by the chief
surgeon, A. E. F.. March 20, 1919, 52. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(19) The Medical Department, A. E. F., to November 11, 1918. compiled by Capt. E. O.
Foster. S. C, from the chief surgeon's records, A. E. F., under the direction of the
chief surgeon, undated, 56. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(20) Report of the activities of the chief surgeon's office, A. E. F., from the arrival of the
American Expeditionary Forces in Europe to the armistice, by the chief surgeon,
A. E. F.. March 20, 1919. 53. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(21) The Medical Department, A. E. P., to November 11, 1918, compiled by Capt. E. O.
Foster, S. C, from the chief surgeon's records, A. E. F., under the direction of the
chief surgeon, undated. 64. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(22) <;. o. No. 144. G. H. Q.. A. E. F.. 1918.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 51
(23) Report on activities of G-4-B. medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q.,
A. E. V., by Col. S. II. Wadhams, M. V., December 31, 1918, 58. On tile. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(24) Report of the activities of the chief surgeon's office, A. E. F.. from the arrival of the
American Expeditionary Forces in Europe to the armistice, by the chief surgeon,
A. E. F., March 20, 1919, 51. On tile, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(25) Report on the activities of (J— 1-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff,
G. H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. ('., December 31, 1918, 46. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(26) Ibid., 53.
(27) Medical activities in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C, undated, 8.
On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(28) Report on activities of GI B, medical group, fourth section, general staff,
G. H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. ('., December 31, 1918, 56. On file,
Hstorical Division, S. G. O.
(29) Report of Medical Department Board, G. H. Q., A. E. P., 1919. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(30) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff,
G. H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. 0., December 31, 1918, 66. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(31) Monthly returns of the American Expeditionary Forces, made to The Adjutant
General of the Army.
(32) Report of Medical Department activities, Fifth Army Corps, by Col. W. R. Eastman,
M. O, corps surgeon, November 18, 1918, 32. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
Memorandum, Headquarters, First Army Corps, A. E. F., July 30, 1918. On file.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(33) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, 18. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(34) Report of Medical Department activities, 26th Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 4. On file. Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(35) Letter from the American Red Cross, Paris, to the chief surgeon, A. E. F.. August
25, 1918. Subject: Nitrous oxide plant, splints, research society, nurses' home,
farms, laundries, ice plant, recuperation camps, diet kitchens, rest stations, and
Infirmaries. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section
(Chief Surgeon's files).
(36) Memorandum, G. H. Q., A. E. F., August 20. 1917. Subject: Automatic supply.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(37) Cable No. 145-S from General Pershing to The Adjutant General, September 7, 1917.
(38) Letter from the Surgeon General to the surgeon. Medical Base Group, A. E. F..
October 27, 1917. Subject: Automatic replacement of supplies. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(39) Letter from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the Surgeon General, U. S. Army, April 2.
1918. Subject: Automatic supply. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(40) The Medical Department, American Expeditionary Forces, to November 11, 1918.
compiled by Capt. E. O. Foster, S. C, from the chief surgeon's records, A. E. F.,
under the direction of the chief surgeon, undated, 75. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(41) Report of the activities of the chief surgeon's office, A. E. F., from the arrival of the
American Expeditionary Forces in Europe to the armistice, by the chief surgeon.
A. E. F., March 20, 1919, 70. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(42) The Medical Department, American Expeditionary Forces, to November 11, 1918.
compiled by Capt. E. O. Foster, S. C, from the chief surgeon's records, A. E. F..
under the direction of the chief surgeon, undated, 72. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
52 FIELD OPERATIONS
(43) Report of Medical activities. Line of Communications, A. E. F.. during the War Period,
by Brig. Gen. F. A. Winter, M. D., undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(44) Report on activities of G— 4-B, medical group, fourth section, geeral staff. G. H. Q.,
A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, December 31, 1918, 79. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(45) Ibid., 80.
(46) Ibid., 81.
(47) Telegram from the chief surgeon, Line of Communications, to the chief surgeon,
A. E. F., January 2. 1918. On file. A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records
Section (chief surgeon's files).
(48) Cable No. 706-S, from General Pershing to The Adjutant General.
(49) Memorandum from Col. A. P. Clark, M. C, to the assistant chief of staff. G-l,
G. H. Q., September 12, 191S. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(50) Annual Report of the Surgeon General, U. S. Army. 1919, Vol. II, 1340.
(51) The Medical Department in the American Expeditionary Forces to May 31, 1918,
compiled under the direction of the chief surgeon. A. E. F., undated. S3. Circulars
Xos. 12. 23. and 43. Office of the chief surgeon. A. E. F., 1918. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(52) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff. G. H. Q.,
A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams. M. C, December 31, 1918, 48. On tile. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(53) Ibid., 49.
(54) Ibid., 50.
(55) Ibid., 51.
(56) Letter from the undersecretary of state of the Service de Sante (French) to the chief
surgeon. A. E. F.. February 12, 1018. Subject: Hospitalization of American soldiers
in French hospitals and French soldiers in American hospitals. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(57) Report on activities of G— 4-B. medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q..
A. E. F.. by Col. S. II. Wadhams, M. C, December 31, 191S, 53. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(58) Ibid., 34.
(59) Ibid., 35.
(60) Tables of Organization and Equipment, U. S. Army, Series A, Table 2S, W. D.. April
17, 1918.
(01) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q..
A. !•:. F.. by Col. S. H Wadhams, M. C, December 31, 1918, 84. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(62) G. O. No. 70, G. H. Q., A. E. F., December S, 1917.
(03) O. (). No. 77. O. H. Q., A. E. F.. May 11. 1918.
(64) Cable No. 1407. from General Pershing to The Adjutant General, July 3, 1918.
(05) O. (). No. 75, W. D„ August 15, 1918.
(00) Report of activities on G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q..
A. E. F., by Col. S. II. Wadhams, December 31. 1918. 85. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(07) Ibid., SS.
(68) Ibid., 86.
(09) Ibid.. 66.
(70) Report of the Surgeon General, U. S. Army, 1919. Vol. II, 1302.
(71) Report of the activities of the chief surgeon's office, A. E. F., from the arrival of
the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe to the armistice, by the chief
surgeon. A. E. F.. March 20, 1919. 11. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(72) Final Report of the chief surgeon. First Army, upon St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne
operations, by Col. A. N. Stark. M. C. chief surgeon, First Army, undated. 4.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
GENERAL, VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 53
(73) Letter of instruction from Section 4, general staff, G. H. Q.. A. E. F., August 29.
1918. Subject : Evacuation of sick and wounded. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(74) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q.,
A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, December 31, 1918, 93. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(75) Report of the activities of the chief surgeon's office, American Expeditionary Forces
in Europe to the armistice, by the chief surgeon, A. E. F., March 20, 1919, 13. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(76) Manual for the Medical Department, U. S. Army. 1916, par. 5SG.
(77) Final Report of General Pershing, September 1, 1919, 8.
(78) Tables of Organization and Equipment, U. S. Army, Series B, Table 101, W. D.,
March 5, 1918.
(79) Tables of Organization and Equipment, U. S. Army, Series C, Table 201, W. D.,
November 7, 1918.
(80) Final Report of Gen. .Tolin J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, 9.
(SI) Ibid., 11.
(82) Ibid., 13.
(83) Field Service Regulations, U. S. Army, 1914.
(84) G. O. No. 31, G. H. Q., A. E. F., February 16, 1918.
CHAPTER II
GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE, THEATER OF
OPERATIONS
CHIEF SURGEON, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
By referring to the Appendix of this volume (p. 1()2(>) it will be seen that
the pre-war plans for the organization of the Medical Department in the theater
of operations contemplated that the chief surgeon of a held army, as a member
of the technical and administrative group of the staff of the commander, act,
in general, as an advisory officer, administering directly only the limited per-
sonnel of the Medical Department attached to headquarters. Under these
conditions — that is. during the period of grand tactical operations, when a
line of communications would be functioning — he was to concern himself only
with the broad principles underlying Medical Department administration,
without maintaining an office of record. The office of record was to be that
of the surgeon, base group (line of communications). 1
The chief surgeon, A. E. F., shortly after his appointment as an original
member of the technical staff of the commanding general of the American
Expeditionary Forces, 2 organized his office so that it comprised the following
divisions : 3 Hospitalization, sanitation and statistics, personnel, supplies,
records and correspondence, and gas service.
To the chief surgeon, line of communications, was given immediate charge
of base hospitals, supplies and Medical Department personnel on duty in the
line of communications. 4
This arrangement of the general direction of the Medical Department.
A. E. F., obtained until, as described in Chapter I, General Pershing effected
certain changes in the organization provided for by Field Service Regula-
tions, and evolved a territorial rearrangement of the theater of operations
in France by which the zone of the advance became a part of the line of
communications, the whole being merged in the Services of Supply. There-
after, the chief surgeon, A. E. F.. was geographically detached from Gen-
eral Headquarters, and many of his duties were performed by deputies witli
the general staff.
The conduct of the affairs of the chief surgeon's office, in so far as his
office concerned the Services of Supply, will not be discussed in this volume."
However, there were certain activities of the Medical Department which
straddled both the zone of the armies and the Services of Supply. Because
of this fact, and especially because of the intimate relationship of the activities
■ See Volume II. Administration, American Expeditionary Forces.
56
FIELD OPERATIONS
of the Medical Department at the front and in the rear, which made the super-
vision of these activities so complex a problem, the organization scheme of
the Medical Department, A. E. F., as of November 11, 1918, is given.
In this chart it may be noted that the contact between the chief sur-
geon, A. E. F., and the Medical Department assigned to combat troops
CiiAitT I. — Scheme for organization of Medical Department, A. E. F., corrected to November 11, 1018
was not direct, but was through the general staff, G. H. Q. The control
which the general staff maintained over the troops was by authority dele-
gated by the commander in chief, and instructions issued by each assistant
chief of staff in charge of the separate sections of the general staff were by
the direction of the commander in chief. This must lie understood in order
to correctly interpret the chart.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES WITH THE GENERAL STAFF.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
Prior to the organization of the American Expeditionary Forces, com-
paratively little attention had been paid to the subject of Medical Depart-
ment representation with the general staff in war, but as early as July, 1917.
it became apparent that such representation must be provided in order to
secure coordinated action. The chiefs of the administrative and technical
staff services were transferred to Tours, March 21. 1918. Each of them,
including the chief surgeon. A. E. F.. was authorized to designate an officer
of his department to represent him with each section of the general staff at
General Headquarters, which remained at Chaumont. 5 Under this arrange-
ment the chief surjreon's relations with combat forces necessarilv became more
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 5 I
remote, being not direct but through the representatives whom he left at
Ohaumont attached to the first, fourth, and fifth sections of the general staff.
The medical officer associated with the first section was charged with super-
vision of ocean tonnage, requisitions, replacements, welfare work, and similar
duties in so far as they affected the Medical Department; those with the
fourth section were in charge of Medical Department supplies, construction,
transportation, hospitalization, evacuation of the sick and wounded, and
assignment of all Medical Department units newly arrived in France; while
the medical officer with G-5 supervised the training of Medical De-
partment personnel. No representatives were assigned to the second (in-
telligence) or third (operations) sections, chiefly because of the great short-
age in the Medical Department personnel at the time. 6
It soon became evident that medical representation on G-2 was not
necessary, but as to G-3, it appeared desirable, though no medical officer
was assigned thereto, that there should be such representation in order that
Medical Department plans might be coordinated with combat operations in
general.
As events developed and American troops began actual participation in
the war, it was soon apparent that no medico-military operations could be
planned or undertaken without consultation and fullest cooperation with the
assistant chief of staff, G-4. It was the policy of this officer consistently
to take the medical representative of his section into his confidence. The
wisdom of so doing was amply demonstrated, and it was equally well dem-
onstrated that without this harmonious cooperation Medical Department
service in the field would have been doomed to failure. The stand of the
assistant chief of staff, G-4 was particularly to be remarked for the reason
that so few of the high ranking officers of the general staff appeared to ap-
preciate that the Medical Department, if it were to accomplish its mission,
must have knowledge of the general plan of combat activities."
Being in immediate touch with all combat troops, the senior medical
officer with G-4 carried out, as deputy of the chief surgeon. A. E. F., the
policies of the latter and supervised Medical Department activities in the
zone of the armies. Gradually almost all of the activities of the Medical
Department at general headquarters were concentrated under him, and as
he was head of the group under G^. known as G-4-B. this group soon be-
came the center to which matters affecting the Medical Department, whether
arising at General Headquarters or referred to it, were in turn referred for
recommendation and action. The composition of G-4—B varied according to
circumstances, but usually included four medical officers of field rank, and
two officers of the Sanitary Corps charged with office management.' Two of
its members were almost constantly in the field representing G-4 in the
coordination of hospital and evacuation services. A large clerical force as-
sisted in the performance of office duties. G-4-B submitted questions of
policy to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., before ruling on them and thus con-
tinued actually to represent him. 8
58 FIELD OPERATIONS
Much of the time of this group was taken up with Medical Depart men!:
problems incident to combat. As the assistant chief of staff, at the head of
G-4, kept the medical group of the section informed concerning plans for
impending military operations, it was able to assist the surgeons of the
various armies, corps, and divisions concerned in preparing for coming needs
and to meet them when they arose. To a large degree this section prepared
the plans for procurements, hospitalization, and evacuation utilized during the
St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations, and put them into effective opera-
tion through personal consultation with the chief surgeons of the First and,
later, the Second and Third Armies. 8 It estimated the number of battle
casualties which would require care and drew upon every available resource
to make due provision for them. Owing to limited resources it frequently
became necessary to move sanitary formations and supplies from one sector
to another, but as G-4 controlled all transportation facilities, the affiliation
of this group therewith assisted materially in these movements. All changes
of station of army Medical Department units were carried out on orders
issued by G-3, based on recommendations jirepared in G-4-B for the signa-
ture of the assistant chief of staff, G-4. From a practical standpoint, there-
fore. G— 1— B supervised battle disposition of sanitary units as dictated by
military necessity, and eventually thus discharged the important functions of
the chief surgeon of a group of armies."
In the early, formative stage, before our First Army was organized, tins
group. G— f— B, also provided for hospitalization, evacuation, and supply in
the immediate rear of separate divisions and corps. This service had not, it is
true, been contemplated in the organization of the general staff, but under
the circumstances it could be discharged by no other agency, though it placed a
very heavy responsibility on the medical group in question. 8
Thus, it was to effect and supervise hospitalization, evacuation, and sup-
ply in rear of the 1st Division that one of the members of G-4-B was sent
to the Cantigny sector in May, 191 8. 10 Later he went to the Chateau-
Thierry region to perform the same service for the divisions and corps
in the Marne area. This, it should be understood, was before this same
officer was detailed as chief surgeon of the Paris group, as American
divisions operating in that area were later designated. 1 " With the appoint-
ment of corps and army surgeons, in the summer of 1918, G-4-B was grad-
ually relieved of this part of its duties, but even after the formation of
corps and armies it continued to exercise very careful supervision over Medi-
cal Department activities at the front.
The efficiency of the supervision exercised by G-4— B was greatly facili-
tated by the geographical location of Chaumont (G. H. Q.) and its excellent
system of telegraph and telephone communication which made it possible
for the medical group to learn quickly of needs and very rapidly to move
army hospitals, ambulance companies, operating teams, and other formations
from one sector to another. Without the machinery for coordination of effort
and consofidation of resources, the care and removal of battle casualties
would have been well-nigh impossible because of the limited Medical De-
partment personnel and other resources available. 11
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 59
MAINTENANCE OP CONTACT BETWEEN FRENCH AND AMERICAN MEDICAL
SERVICES
From the outset of American activities overseas the French stressed the
necessity for maintaining contact, or liaison, a need which was not fully
appreciated at first by some American officers, but which rapidly became more
apparent to all, especially after American divisions were placed Tinder French
command in March, 1918. Such contact, as affecting" the Medical Depart-
ment. Avas maintained through a designated officer of G— t-B and a subdepart-
ment known as the Franco-American section of the office of the French under-
secretary for the medical service. 12 An experienced medical officer had been
selected by the French Minister of War to handle all matters affecting the
relations of the two medical services, exclusive of those pertaining to the zone
of the armies. At Chaumont the French high command established a military
mission, which included a medical section. This office handled all questions
of mutual interest affecting medical services in the zone of the armies. The
same American medical officer who maintained contact for our Medical De-
partment also performed like services with the French military mission at
Chaumont in matters affecting cooperation of the medical services of French
and American forces in the army area. 12
CONTROL EXERCISED BY G-4-P. OVER EVACUATIONS BY HOSPITAL TRAINS
The fourth section of the general staff, General FTeadquarters, was the
supply, coordinating, and evacuating section. It was specifically charged
with the supervision of hospitalization and evacuation of the sick and the
wounded/' Its instrument of control over the movements of hospital trains
evacuating sick and wounded was the regulating station.
COORDINATION OF HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION
The first departure from static to mobile warfare devolved upon the
1st Division, which, in April, 1918, had been hurriedly withdrawn from the
Toul sector and placed at the disposition of the French in reserve behind
the Montdidier salient. 13
Before May 28, when this division conducted the Cantigny action, 13
G-4— B had received notice of the impending attack and had sent a member
of the group to that front for the purpose of providing hospitalization and
supply in rear of the division.
At this time our divisions were absolutely under French command.
Xot only was the evacuation and hospitalization of our wounded in the rear
of the divisions a duty of the French, but this was the case with the medical
supply of the divisions as well. 14 As it soon became apparent that this arrange-
ment was not workable, it devolved upon the representative of G-4— B to play
an important part in securing uninterrupted supply for divisions widely
scattered along the front. 1 " It was in this operation that the medical group
with the 4th section of the general staff first adopted the plan of sending one
of its members to represent it in all important field operations. Application
60 FIELD OPERATIONS
of this plan secured very effective coordination, as the representative had a
freedom of action and latitude which could not have been exercised by an
officer attached to the operating forces. He kept in close touch with Gr-4, G. H.
Q., by telephone or telegraph, and also with the officers in charge of the
hospitals to which he directed evacuations, usually making his headquarters
with the office of the French corps or army with which our troops were incor-
porated. The value of his services was increased by the fact that hospital
trains operated under jurisdiction of G-4. 10 During quiet periods he returned
automatically to headquarters and resumed his office duties.
With the bejiinninc: of the Aisne offensive by the Germans, in the latter
part of May. 1918, when the 1st Division was on the front near Montdidier, it.
became necessary hurriedly to throw in other American divisions on the
enemy front before Paris. The first American divisions to be used in the
respulse of this offensive were the 2d and 3d. 10 At the height of our activities
in the Marne area nine American divisions were intermittently engaged, 11 "'
thus creating a new hospitalization and evacuation problem. The French
had lost many evacuation hospitals in their retreat from that region and there-
fore were not in a position to assume the additional burden of caring for
American casualties. They now not only permitted but also assisted in evac-
uating from them by means of French and American trains to fixed American
formations in the rear." There was no army hospital available in rear of the
divisions and no organized machinery higher than a division to effect evacua-
tions. To meet this emergency, as stated elsewhere in this chapter, a medical
officer, representing G— 4— B in the field, was charged with the duties of a chief
surgeon of the divisions scattered through the area. In this capacity he sub-
mitted recommendations for coordination of the medical service to the medical
group with G-4 and actively conducted the evacuation service in rear of the
divisions. 18
Our evacuation hospitals, which were gradually brought up, did not have
the necessary mobility to meet changing military conditions existing at that
time, chiefly because of shortage of motor transportation. Divisions were
withdrawn hurriedly from one part of the line and thrown into another part
alongside the French without advance notice to the medical representatives
in the field and. at times, evidently without due notice being furnished the
tactical headquarters of the "Paris Groupe," then established at Da Ferte-
sous-Jouarre and under which all American divisions in the Marne area were
operating. 17 Not until our troops were massed on the true Chateau-Thierry
salient were we able to utilize our limited hospitalization and evacuation facil-
ities to maximum advantage, and even then only by careful husbanding of
inadequate resources and by working insufficient personnel to the limit of
human endurance. 19 By the work of this personnel day and night, often with-
out proper rest, and by operating hospital trains, ambulances, and trucks to
their maximum possibilities, the representative of G-4— B was barely able to
meet requirements. Reserve personnel and hospitalization were withdrawn
from am' organization from which they could be spared and sent to that area
for duty."
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 61
The early phase of battles in the Marne salient found us confronted by
shortage not only of personnel and hospital equipment but also of trains and
ambulances. Evacuation into Paris, where our nearest fixed hospitals were
located, from 40 to 100 km. (24 to 62 miles) distant, was effected at first by
ambulance, or, if need be, by truck, until the railroad situation permitted the
use of hospital trains which G-4— B had garaged near that city to meet this
emergency. After railway service was established, evacuation was regulated
from the station at Creil and later at the more centralized station at Le
Bourget. 18 Evacuations were effected at first by means of French and later
by American hospital trains, our arrangements being intimately identified with
those of the French and utilizing their lines of communication. 18
In the early part of operations in the Marne area, G— 4, of the Paris dis-
trict, requested trains, sometimes in anticipation of needs, by telephone call
to the regulating station. Because of faulty telephone communication between
G-4 and the evacuation hospitals, this system proved unsatisfactory and was
corrected later by having evacuation hospitals telephone their bed status direct
to the regulating officer. That officer received daily from the chief surgeon of
the Paris district a telephoned report of the bed status in that city, and after
July 24 he also received from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., daily notification of
the bed space in base hospitals in other parts of France. Eventually, the regu-
lating officer at Le Bourget had under his control 17 American, 3 British, and
35 French trains which were operated quite constantly, French trains being
inadequate even for French evacuations. 20
Following the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, the greatly augmented
American First Army began preparations for further and, as it proved, final
combat activities in the Meuse-Argonne operation. The Medical Department
still faced critical shortages in equipment, personnel, hospitalization, and
ambulances. 21
During the entire progress of these operations a representative of G-4-B
remained at headquarters of the First Army, Souilly, for the purpose of
coordinating Medical Department activities, and other representatives of that
bureau were frequently at the front. 21
AVhile the 2d and 36th Divisions were on detached service with the French
Fourth Army in the Champagne sector, in October, 1918, they naturally became
separated from the administrative and supply control of the American First
Army, and it accordingly devolved upon G-4-B to arrange for their hospitali-
zation, supply, and evacuation during this period. To effect this, 2 evacuation
hospitals. 1 mobile hospital, 3 evacuation ambulance companies, and 1 medical
supply unit were withdrawn from the First Army and assigned to the service
of ihese divisions, with stations at Mont Frenet and La Veuve, until no longer
needed. They utilized tentage exclusively, were located on two French sidings
installed for serving French evacuation hospitals at that point, and were en-
tirely self-sustaining in every detail. Hospital trains for casualties arising
in these divisions were furnished through the regulating station at St. Dizier
and were regulated by the representative of G-4 stationed at the subsidiary
regulating station at Connantre. 21
62 FIELD OPEBATIONS
Jurisdiction of G-4-B, General Headquarters, over the medical service of
the American Second Corps was very different from that over other American
field medical organizations on the Western Front. The corps was attached to
British forces, who provided all the hospitalization required and supervised it
exclusively, thus relieving G-4-B, General Headquarters of any responsibility
therefor. 22
During the final phase of our combat activities, two divisions (37th and
91st) were detached from the First Army and sent to Belgium to cooperate
with the French and Belgian forces in the offensives then taking place on that
front. 22 For these divisions a regulating station was established at Dunkerque.
An evacuation hospital and a mobile hospital and two evacuation ambulance
companies were sent by rail and established behind the divisions to care for
American sick and wounded. Casualties, happily, were relatively few,
although approximately 4,000 patients were received by these units Avithin a
brief period. The entire Medical Department activities, connected with hos-
pitalization, evacuation, and supply, were supervised by a medical representa-
tive from G-4— B sent to that sector for the purpose. 22
Activities of G^i-B on the Italian front were practically nil. One regi-
ment of Infantry (the 332d) had been detached from the 83d Division
and sent to Italy. With this regiment G-4-B sent a fully equipped field
hospital, with such additional X-ray and other surgical facilities as might be
needed. 23 Extra surgical personnel was also attached to this unit. As forces in
France were so short of ambulances, the chief of the United States Army
Ambulance Service attached to the Italian Army was directed to provide the
necessary ambulance facilities to meet the needs of this regiment. A base
hospital, No. 102, was sent to Italy direct from the United States for the pur-
pose of assisting the Italian medical department in the hospitalization of their
casualties. With the arrival of our small force in Italy, authority was obtained
from the Italian Government to admit to Base Hospital No. 102 such Ameri-
cans as could not be hospitalized in the field hospital. G-4— B kept in close
touch with the senior medical officer on duty with this regiment in order that
his supply and other needs might be met. He established in Italy a small
medical supply dump. To reinforce its surgical facilities, arrangements had
been made with the American Bed Cross to provide the medical organization,
on duty with the regiment, a mobile hospital then at the disposition of the Bed
Cross in Italy. Combat activities of our troops in that country were so slight,
however, it was not necessary to take advantage of this loan. 23
While en route through England, one regiment of Infantry (the 339th)
and the 1st Battalion of the 310th Engineers were detached from the 85th
Division and sent with the Allied Expeditionary Forces to western Russia.
None of the details of hospitalization of that force were handled by the fourth
section of the general staff, A. E. F. One field hospital and one ambulance
company (337th) which accompanied the forces to Russia furnished all the
hospitalization provided by the army throughout their operations there. 23
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 63
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SANITARY SERVICE OF THE DIVISION
It would be logical from one point of view to continue the consideration
of the management of Medical Department affairs by taking up at this time
that of an army, since, in the organization evolved in the American Ex-
peditionary Forces, the army surgeon came next in sequence of importance
and control, in so far as the Medical Department was concerned, to Gen-
eral Headquarters, and then the corps followed in due course. How-
ever, as the division was the great administration unit of our combatant
forces when we entered the World War, and was, in consequence, organized
first, it was used largely, especially by the Medical Department, as an ad-
ministrative model for the management of the affairs of the corps and armies
which were organized later; therefore the division will be discussed first.
It should also be noted in considering the division that the basis for
its Medical Department operation was originally the Manual for the Medical
Department.
The administration of the sanitary service of the division in a theater of
operations, as outlined by the Manual for the Medical Department, is given
in Appendix I. However, many departures from this plan, which obtained
at the beginning, were effected during the course of the war. Some of these
departures were directed by official promulgations; others came about through
the adoption of methods used in foreign armies, or as the result of necessity.
One of the first changes in the organization of the Medical Department
of the division which had a bearing on the conduct of its affairs was the pro-
vision of a sanitary train commander. 24 This, though it did not relieve the
division surgeon of any ultimate responsibility for the operation of the sani-
tary train, divorced him from a relation with it that had been likened to that
of a regimental commander, thus affording him more time for the direction of
the activities of his department as a whole.
With the division as the administrative unit, it was the duty of the di-
vision surgeon to make definite recommendations concerning the announcement
in the battle order of the location of dressing stations and of field hospitals.
With the organization of the corps, however, control of the locations of division
field hospitals was, in some instances, taken by corps headquarters.
The equipment of the field hospitals, when they arrived in France, was
similar throughout. To meet the conditions which existed in France, it was
found necessary to make additions to this equipment. It was likewise neces-
sary to increase the personnel of these units to enable them to carry on the
specialized form of treatment required in field hospitals during the World
War. 2 - 1
The most important of the changes in the equipment of the field hospitals
was the addition of surgical equipment to one in order that it might function
on a larger scale as a surgical hospital to care for seriously wounded, including
the injured classed as nontransportable. To one of the other hospitals was
added the equipment for the treatment of gassed patients. 24
64 FIELD OPERATIONS
The operation of these specialized hospitals required the provision of
teams of personnel, highly trained to function in their specialty in the most
expeditious manner. These teams, comprising surgical, shock, splint, gas, and
other teams, were usually organized from the personnel of the field hospitals
themselves or were obtained from other Medical Department units of the
division. When a mobile surgical unit was attached to a division field hospital,
during active operations, the personnel of that unit was likewise attached to
the divisional Medical Department for the time being.
With the specialization of the field hospitals there was evolved what might
be called a normal distribution of the four field hospitals of the division,
especially after the type of warfare in France had changed from trench to
open. The open warfare was the character of warfare with which the Amer-
ican Expeditionary Forces was mostly concerned. Bearing in mind that the
terrain usually determined the tactical distribution of the field hospitals, the
chief requirement in making this distribution was found to be to provide for
the following classes of sick and wounded: Seriously wounded; slightly
wounded; gassed; and the sick, including the contagious sick and those with
Mar neuroses. 23
In each division there was established a triage (sorting station) for the
reception, classification, and distribution of those being evacuated. 25 At each
triage the specialist medical personnel was stationed, especially the psychia-
trist, orthopedist, gas medical officer, and other medical officers who possessed
the soundest medical and surgical judgment in the division. 25
The triage had long been an established feature in the organization of
the French Service de Sante. It was universally adopted by the American
Expeditionary Forces.
An advanced triage was occasionally established at what was planned, by
the Medical Department, to be the ambulance company dressing station — an
institution that had little employment on the Western Front. 25
The sorting of casualties was done, naturally, wherever j)racticable, by any
medical officer through whose hands the casualties passed. The term triage,
however, generally referred to the one or more field hospitals established
for the specific purpose of effecting a logical sorting of the wounded. 25
Because no general instructions were ever issued requiring a uniform
distribution and employment of the field hospitals of the division, 25 and
especially since there was a lack of personnel in the Medical Department that
had been well grounded by similar training, there was a diversity of admin-
istrative arrangements in our divisions that was limited only by the numl)er
of divisions employed. This lack of uniformity was overcome, in a measure,
when the corps and armies were organized and there was opportunity for
coordination. This coordination resulted in what came to be known as a
normal distribution of the field hospitals in the area of a division. 25 The
normal distribution varied, dependent upon whether the division was actively
engaged, holding a position in line but not on an offensive, or whether it was
in line in a quiet sector or in training.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 65
When the division was in line and actively engaged, three field hospitals
were used as a triage for the wounded, gassed, and medical cases. Here the
patients were classified as heing nontransportable, transportable sitting, and
transportable lying. One field hospital was held in reserve, such portion of
its personnel as necessary being used to augment the triage or sometimes for
other purposes. Under such conditions as those outlined, the main considera-
tions were the treatment of the wounded and the gassed, and the maintenance
of the mobility of the hospitals. In effecting a forward movement of the
hospitals, the hospital held in reserve was habitually used to open a new
triage before the old one was closed. 23
A large number of cases were received into the divisional triages classified
as "Avar neuroses" varying in degree from the pronounced psychoneuroses —
so-called " shell-shock " cases — to those that were in fact shell fright, gas
fright, hysteria, mental and physical fatigue, malingering, and cowardice. 28
There were few of the last named, but the situation in having to differentiate
all these seriously complicated the problems of evacuation. After unfortunate
experiences up to and including the St. Mihiel operation, during which many
cases not requiring evacuation were unnecessarily evacuated to base hospitals,
a plan for their more effective control, retention, and care was put into oper-
ation. This was based on careful examination and classification by the
divisional psychiatrist at the triage, the retention of mild cases within the divi-
sion, and the transfer of others to special neurological hospitals established by
the army and conducted by specially trained personnel. 20 The result of this
method was the return to duty of 65 per cent of the cases which reached
divisional hospitals and the transfer of 35 per cent to the army neurological
hospitals. 20 Of this latter group, 57 per cent were returned to duty and 43
per cent were evacuated by special ambulances or busses (to avoid mental
contamination of the actually wounded from association) to Neurologic Base
Hospital No. 117, situated at La Fauche, in the advance section, Services of
Supply ; i. e., only 15 per cent of war neuroses were evacuated from the Army
area. Of this number, in turn. 20 per cent were returned to duty, 73 per cent
were classified for special kinds of service in the rear areas, and 7 per cent
were evacuated to the United States as totally unfit for military duty. 20
When the division was in line in a quiet sector, or when it was training,
one field hospital was used for triage and the treatment of the wounded and
gassed, one for sick, one for men afflicted with skin and venereal diseases, and
one was held in reserve to meet the demands of an epidemic, a gas attack, and
for use in evacuating patients to be hospitalized in the rear, or to establish a
convalescent camp. Under such conditions as these, the Medical Department
of the division made every effort, consistent with the military situation, to
retain with the division all patients except those requiring definitive surgical
treatment, and the sick requiring prolonged treatment, or expert treatment in
a more fully equipped institution. 27
As the motor transportation of most divisions was pooled and was
assigned to field hospitals only wdien they were moved, it made little differ-
13570—25 5
66 FIELD OPERATIONS
ence which field hospital was supposed to be animal drawn, as contemplated
in Tables of Organization, No. 28, since moves were nearly always made by
trucks assigned for the purpose. 24
ADMINISTRATION OP THE SANITARY SERVICE OP THE CORPS
COMPOSITION OF CORPS
The American First Army Corps was created by General Orders, No. 9,
G. H. Q., A. E. F., January 15, 1918, with headquarters at Neufchateau, other
corps being created later as troops became available. The organization of a
corps was later modified so that at the time of the armistice it consisted of
a permanent staff and corps troops and of those divisions which were tem-
porarily under its tactical control. There also developed a geographic element
in their limitation, for the corps sector was always accurately described, and
as divisions moved in or out of the sector they simultaneously entered or left
the corps. The number of divisions assigned to a corps, therefore, changed
maternally from time to time. On one occasion the Third Corps began the
day with five divisions; that night there were four, only one of which had
been present in the morning. During 24 hours there had been 9 divisions
under the corps control. 28
When they first entered the lines, American corps were under the tacti-
cal command of the French or British, but eventually they operated under
American command, except the Second Corps, which continued under the
British in Flanders. Corps headquarters consisted of the commanding gen-
eral, a general staff, and departments commonly termed the technical services.
The Medical Department pertained to the first or coordinating section (G-l)
of the general staff. Officers and personnel of corps headquarters were divided
into two echelons — often stationed in different towns — the first consisting
of the commanding general and the general staff sections, and the second
of all other officers. In both echelons were officers of many different grades. 29
In the developmental stage of the corps, before it assumed tactical com-
mand, the corps surgeon was obliged to maintain liaison with his French
colleagues in the same sector and army, for evacuation and hospitalization
in rear of our divisions were then effected, to a certain extent at least, by
them. 30 This arrangement did not always give satisfactory results, especially
in the service of the 1st and 2d Divisions in their attack against Soissons.
On this occasion the surgeon of the Third Corps to Avhich these divisions
belonged, was informed that the plan of evacuation was a military secret, and
as the representative of G-4-B in that area likewise received no preliminary
information, the hospital services of the French were not at first supplemented
by any American units. 11 In the Third Corps, as operations in the Marne
area progressed, there was notable improvement in the evacuation service
which the corps surgeon attributed in part to the training of all concerned
in general staff work. The surgeon of the First Corps stressed the fact that
the success of the corps medical service depended eventually upon the atti-
tude of the assistant chief of staff, G-l, of the corps staff, under whom the
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 67
Medical Department functioned. 32 The surgeon of the Third Corps attrib-
uted to the hearty cooperation of G-l, much of the success in evacuating the
wounded. In this and the First Corps the surgeon received from G-l full
information and careful consideration of all his recommendations, and after
conference with the chief of the section he wrote the paragraph of the ad-
ministrative order pertaining to evacuation. 33
DETAILS OF ACTIVITIES, CORPS SURGEON'S OFFICE
Maps furnished the corps surgeon of the Third Corps Avere of two kinds,
those which gave vague battle lines and approximate corps sectors, and those
which were issued preparatory to a battle. The former, posted in the corps
surgeon's office, gave accurate details of the location of Medical Department
units of the divisions, corps, and army. The latter were absolutely secret,
and though given the corps surgeon to study, it was ordered that their de-
tails should not be communicated to anyone. 34
Other maps, used and posted up to date, were one of the general battle-
field on which battle lines were marked in charcoal so that they could be
changed readily, and the corps circulation map, which indicated available
roads and the regulations concerning traffic. Some 10 days before the begin-
ning of the Meuse-Argonne operation the surgeon of the Third Corps was
given a map showing in detail the phases of the coming battle, with a very
full, written description of military plans. Only the day and the hour,
designated as " D " and " H," respectively, were kept secret, and these were
whispered to officers some time before the battle began. 34
Organization of the corps medical staff in the First Corps was so effected
eventually that there was an officer corresponding to the head of each similar
department in the division surgeon's office. As contemplated, and as later
carried out, the organization was as follows: 35
Corps surgeon. — In charge.
Assistant corps surgeon. — In charge of corps troops, and in charge of office during
the absence of the corps surgeon. Duties relative to corps troops were very similar to
those of a division surgeon.
Executive officer. — In charge of office, and all records.
Corps sanitary inspector. — Sanitary inspector for corps troops, and supervision of
the work of the division sanitary inspectors.
Corps consultant in surgery. — Supervision of all surgery done in division and corps
field hospitals (which should be extremely limited) ; supervision of surgery in mobile
surgical hospitals, when the latter were under the control of the corps surgeon as they
should always be.
Corps consultant in medicine. — Supervision of medical care in the division and corps
field hospitals, particularly supervision of shock work (his most important function in
active periods).
Corps consultant in urology. — Supervision of the work of division urologists. Con-
duct venereal work and prevention and treatment of skin diseases for corps troops.
Corps consultant in orthopedics. — Supervision of division orthopedists. Conduct
splint teaching for corps troops.
Corps consultant in psychiatry. — Supervision of the work of division psychiatrists;
conduct psychiatric work for corps troops.
68 FIELD OPERATIONS
Corps medical fins officer. — Supervision of the work of the division medical sas
officer. Conduct the same for corps troops.
Commanding officer corps sanitarii trains. — Commands sanitary train of the corps;
supervision evacuation of wounded in the various divisions; and conducts evacuation from
field to evacuation hospitals.
Xecessary clerks.
The specialist officers circulated constantly throughout the divisions con-
stituting the corps, for the purpose of giving assistance wherever it was
needed. Aside from the performance of their duties specified above they
proved invaluable for keeping the corps surgeon constantly informed con-
cerning all the Medical Department activities of the various divisions of the
corps. Each specialist officer being carefully selected because of the knowl-
edge he possessed of his branch of medicine or surgery, was able to give
expert opinions on conditions found and sound advice for the correction of
defects.
As it was not proposed that the office of the corps surgeon should be
one of record, its clerical personnel and equipment in the First Corps were
very limited. Retained records of all papers passing through this office were
held in the files of the corps adjutant, where they were always available for
reference, the corps surgeon's office keeping copies of a few important docu-
ments only. :ili In the Third Corps records were kept at a minimum, but a
weekly sanitary report was required from all divisions and from corps
troops, and from the same source was received by telephone twice daily (or
oftener during battle) a numerical classified report of sick and wounded.
In these latter reports promptness was regarded as being of more importance
than was absolute accuracy. The accurate nominal lists, which came later
were not prepared by the Medical Department. In the Third Corps, sick
were classified as suffering from com mimic able or noncommunicable diseases,
foot disorders, scabies and other skin diseases, and after November 1, 1918,
reports of venereal diseases were required, lleports of communicable dis-
eases gave the name of the ailment and the location of the case. Battle cas-
ualties were numerically differentiated as wounded, gassed, and psycho-
pathic. 37
In the Fifth Corps the corps surgeon required the following information
from division surgeons immediately upon joining the corps : 3S (1) Numeri-
cal list of medical personnel and transportation. (2) Roster of medical officers
including specialists, dental, sanitary corps and veterinary officers. (3)
Daily: Casualty report. (4) Weekly: Personnel and transportation (Form
!). A. (J. O., S II). (5) Contagious diseases (for the allied commander).
(6) Venereal (name, rank, organization, and number of each new case).
Reports required from corps were : Daily casualties and changes, adding
number of cases evacuated direct to evacuation hospital.
In addition to the foregoing, the usual routine reports passed through the
corps surgeon's office.
Originally, the office equipment of the Third Corps was that authorized
for a division surgeon, but later was somewhat increased. It included, as its
most important items, a box for maps and map-making instruments, another
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 69
which contained live records, and three typewriters. These, with the officers'
bedding rolls and the men's equipment, were sent forward in charge of an
officer when the office moved. During moves it was necessary to divide the
office equipment into two shipments. Tables, chairs, and boxes of files grad-
ually accumulated, the total weight of essentials amounting to about 000
pounds. A 3-ton truck provided for the office was more than adequate to move
both the office and its enlisted personnel. 37
The chief functions of the corps surgeon in the evacuation of wounded
were to systematize the operation of division triages, to supervise the location
and operation of field hospitals, to evacuate those units, and to regulate the
flow of casualties from them into the army hospitals according to the army
plan of evacuation. 30 This plan was issued as part of the operations order
of the army. As it was essential that he maintain close contact with the army
surgeon or his representative in order to equalize evacuation into different
hospitals in the army zone and to divert it from one to another in accordance
with changing conditions, the corps surgeon assigned to a capable assistant
the duty of maintaining such contact and of coordinating evacuation. This
officer was designated in the different corps as the transportation, evacuation,
or regulating officer, as the case might be. He maintained active liaison with
division surgeons, on the one hand, and, on the other, with the chief surgeon
of the army (through the army hospitalization and evacuation officers), who
advised the army evacuation officer frequently during active operations con-
cerning available bed space in army hospitals and the additional transporta-
tion on hand. In this way the routing of ambulances was directed to those
hospitals best prepared to receive casualties at a given time. Courier service
was maintained between corps and divisions and the army evacuation and
mobile hospitals. Traffic regulators (traffic police) were posted at appro-
priate places along the roads leading from divisional triages to evacuation
hospitals, and at night illuminated signs directed the ambulance convoys. 40
Corps sanitary trains, each consisting of four field hospitals and four am-
bulance companies, were authorized; but these trains were not actually avail-
able until some time after the organization of corps. It was their duty to
clear field hospitals, if need arose to supplement the deficiencies of intra-
tlivisional resources, and to hospitalize those patients who coidd not endure
the full journey to evacuation hospitals and those who would be fit for duty
within a few days. Frequently, in the earlier operations, demands upon corps
transportation were such that the quota of corps vehicles was inadequate;
for example, in the First Corps, in the Maine area, when its ambulances had
to make round trips 70 miles in length. 41 Difficulties of the corps evacuation
service were aggravated by the fact that, while the ambulance quota for a
division was generally adequate in trench warfare, it was quite inadequate
for an offensive and then needed reinforcements from the corps at the very
time when, if the attack were successful, the distance which the corps am-
bulances had to travel progressively increased. Under such circumstances,
unless reinforced by transport assigned by the army, and unless army hospitals
were well advanced, many wounded had to be moved by trucks both in divi-
70 FIELD OPEKATIOSTS
sions and in rear of them. The corps surgeon distributed his transportation
where it was most urgently needed. At first there was no corps reserve,
because of lack of vehicles, but when this need had been met his ambulance
companies often served in rotation, if possible, in order that opportunity
might be given for personnel to rest and to repair ambulances.
The field hospitals which formed a part of the corps sanitary train were
utilized as convalescent depots (First Corps) or as rest or relay stations
(Third Corps). As a rule they were located midway between division triages
and the evacuation hospitals serving a corps. 42 Surgeons of all corps em-
phasized the desirability of adding a mobile hospital to the corps sanitary
train.
The surgeon, Fifth Corps, reported that during the Meiuse-Argonne
operation no division entered that corps with its full quota of ambulances or
with anything approaching the allowance of trucks for field hospitals or of
motor cycles or motor cars. 43 The corps sanitary train, authorized by Tables
of Organization, was lacking except that three field hospitals reported in the
first part of November entirely without transportation at first, and with no
cots, stoves, extra blankets, or tents for officers. At the beginning of this
offensive four United States Army Ambulance Service and two French am-
bulance sections were attached to the corps, giving a total of 88 ambulances,
of which about 74 were fit for service. 44 At the time, this allowance was
adequate, but it became progressively less and less so as division triages
advanced, a round trip eventually taking from 20 to 24 hours. Great difficulty
was experienced in obtaining spare parts for vehicles.
Trains of the several corps were gradually increased as resources of any
kind became available, until at the time of the armistice they conformed
approximately or actually to the authorized quota.
There was some confusion, at first, in the corps evacuation service. There
were several reasons for this. Division medical officers did not sort cases
properly, but loaded into one ambulance patients who had to be distributed
to several army hospitals. Ambulance drivers occasionally did not go to the
hospitals to which they were sent, but went to some other than the one des-
ignated. Receipt of notification that certain hospitals were filled and that
casualties, already en route, would have to be diverted to some other point,
was belated. 43
The multiplicity of evacuation and: special hospitals in the army area
increased the difficulties of ambulance evacuation and caused confusion, delays,
and waste of transportation. At one time in October, 1918, there were 11
hospitals in different places draining the front of one corps. Hospitalization
facilities and the military situation often determined the location of evacua-
tion hospitals, but experience during the Meuse-Argonne operation demon-
strated the desirability of grouping them wherever practicable and condemned
the establishment of separate institutions to receive special cases of casualties.
The ideal arrangement, so far as evacuation was concerned, was reached when
the number of evacuation points was minimized and evacuation hospitals
were generalized, that is, prepared to receive all kinds of casualties. 40
GENERAL VIEW OP MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 71
One of the principal difficulties encountered in effecting evacuation from
divisions was due to the fact that their evacuation methods were not standard-
ized and that in order to promote coordination it was necessary to harmonize
their different practices so far as possible. The difficulty was increased by the
frequent changing of divisions in a given corps and by the fact that methods
in different corps were often dissimilar. Thus, the First Corps required that
dressing stations perform triage service for divisions, 46 while in the Third
Corps this duty was performed at field hospitals. 47 Standing orders on this
subject were issued in some corps, the First, for example. 48 Field hospitals
of a division generally were located by the division surgeon after consultation
with the corps surgeon; but in preparation for an offensive the original loca-
tion usually was made by the corps surgeon because of his superior knowledge
of supply points and road conditions.
In some corps, especially in the First, it was the practice to designate as
evacuation officer the commanding officer of the sanitary train, and he was as-
sisted by officers from this train, stationed at each division triage. The corps
evacuation officer was thus kept constantly apprised of conditions in division
field hospitals, on the one hand, and of those in army hospitals, on, the other,
and he was therefore in a position to route casualties to the best advantage.
In addition, especially during periods of battle activity, the corps surgeon was
in daily personal contact with the evacuation officer of the army and with
division surgeons, and he visited daily, if possible, all the division triages. It
soon became apparent that personal inspection of the location and operation
of dressing stations and field hospitals was necessary to obtain the best results
and the highest degree of coordination. Location of these by maps was less
satisfactory than were results obtained by reconnoissance.
Evacuation methods utilized by different corps varied considerably, not
only one from another but also in a given corps at different times, on account
of mutable conditions. The following memorandum order, covering the
evacuation of sick and wounded, was promulgated in the First Corps as a
means of standardizing the various methods of evacuation practiced by the
divisions becoming parts of the corps :
Headquarters First Army Corps,
S September, 18 — 11.80 a. m.
G-l
4S
Memorandum: Evacuation sick and wounded.
The following plan of evacuation of sick and wounded for each division in the corps
will be put into effect at once.
AMBULANCE DRESSING STATION
1. Ambulance dressing station : This will be placed at the farthest point forward
where ambulances can be concentrated with reasonable safety. It should be on a good
road, with shelter, if possible, and with water available. It will be established by the
ambulance section of the division sanitary train. Care must be exercised that it be
established at a point which will not interfere with traffic. It should be on a return
road.
72 FIELD OPERATIONS
At this point, patients, brought in by litter or by ambulance from the front line,
will be examined ; dressings adjusted, and hemorrhage controlled, if necessary ; antitetanic
serum administered, if not already done; food and hot drinks given where permissible;
shock treated when the patients' condition makes it necessary; and the patients placed
under shelter while awaiting transportation to the rear.
A shock table will be installed so that patients needing shock treatment can be
properly cared for. Patients in shock will be held, if military conditions permit, on the
shock table until their condition permits transportation to the rear.
2. The ambulance dressing station will also be a triage. Patients will be sorted,
placed in an ambulance, and sent direct to the appropriate hospital, the idea being to
reduce to the minimum, handling of the patient, from the time he is wounded until he
arrives in hospital.
3. At this ambulance dressing station will be stationed the following medical officers
in addition to the personnel of the ambulance section conducting the station : Division
psychiatrist, division orthopedist, division medical gas officer, and a medical officer with
good surgical experience and judgment. Each of these officers should have an under-
study who can relieve him when necessary to secure rest or food.
4. Tile division psychiatrist will examine all cases of shell shock, simulated shell
shock, and other nervous conditions that may pass through this station. He will return
to the front such patients that he considers fit for duty and to the rear those requiring
hospitalization.
5. The division orthopedist will examine all patients with fracture and joint injuries
and will see that all such are properly splinted before being sent to the rear.
6. The division medical gas officer will examine all gassed patients, returning to the
front line all deemed fit for duty. He will return to the rear all that require hospitaliza-
tion. He will also supervise the preliminary gas treatment at this point- Bathing facili-
ties will be provided so that mustard gas patients will get the earliest possible attention
and thus prevent subsequent burning.
7. The medical officer with good surgical experience and judgment who is selected
for duty at this point will examine all wounds and direct to which hospital each
wounded patient will be sent. The wounded will fall under one of three beads: (a)
Very slight, who after the necessary dressing and antitetanic serum will he able to return
to the front for duty; (b) nontransportable wounded, who will be sent to the field hospi-
tal designated for that purpose; and (c) all other wounded, who will be sent to the
nearest evacuation hospital.
S. In past experience during open warfare, it has been found that large numbers of
men return from the front diagnosed as shell shock or gas casualties. The great majority
of these men present neither of the above conditions, but are simply exhausted, mentally
and physically. They are disabled for the time being, but should not he sent to evacuation
hospitals. They must be held in divisional sanitary organizations, given the necessary
food, a bath when possible, and an opportunity to thoroughly rest. It will be found that
within one to four days they will be able to return to full duty at the front, thus saving
a very marked loss of man power when the maintenance of the man power of a division
at its full strength is most important Any such subsequently developing serious symp-
toms will at once be transferred to an evacuation hospital.
9. During active operations when the number of casualties becomes very large, it
will be found that the available ambulance transportation will be entirely insufficient
to carry all wounded to the rear and to prevent congestion of wounded in the front areas.
It therefore is necessary for division surgeons to maintain liaison with the division
motor transport officer and to secure the use of as many trucks as possible to carry
back slightly wounded and gassed patients. Severely wounded and gassed must be car-
ried in ambulances only. The corps surgeon will give every possible assistance to division
surgeons during such periods of stress and will utilize for this purpose all available
ambulances within the corps.
10. Close liaison must be maintained in the division between the director of the ambu-
lance company section and the director of the field hospital section of the divisional
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 73
sanitary train. The commanding officer of the sanitary train under the supervision of the
division surgeon will see that this liaison is constantly maintained. It is particularly
important that the director of the ambulance section know immediately when any change
is made in the location of a field hospital so that ambulances may be properly directed.
Otherwise much confusion and loss of valuable time will result.
11. The station of the director of the ambulance section, divisional sanitary train,
will normally be at the ambulance dressing station; of the director of field hospitals at
the place where the field hospitals are grouped.
12. Roads in the vicinity of the ambulance dressing station and of the field hospitals
will be plainly marked so that litter bearers and ambulance drivers may locate them
without trouble. The divisional assistant provost marshal will be kept advised of the
location of all sanitary units and of any changes made so that the military police will be
competent at all times to give necessary and intelligent instructions as to their locations.
FIELD HOSPITALS
1. Field hospitals will be utilized as follows during periods of activity. This applies
particularly to open warfare where rapid changes are probable. In sector warfare which
is practically stationary, location of field hospitals need not follow this plan absolutely,
especially as to location, which will be determined by the terrain, buildings available,
proximity of evacuation hospital and other considerations.
2. The four field hospitals of a division will be placed together if conditions of the
terrain permit. They will always be plainly marked by the Red Cross emblem in order
to protect them from enemy fire. Placing the field hospitals together has been tested in
actual open warfare and found to have certain definite advantages.
(a) They are much more easily located by ambulance drivers. If located at separate
points depending upon the character of service they are intended to furnish, ambulances
are apt to wander about and have great difficulty in locating their particular hospital.
This, of course, is especially true in new country with which drivers are not familiar.
(6) The administration of the hospital is much simplified by being concentrated at
one point.
(c) Assistance from the field hospital in reserve is always immediately available for
whichever unit may have need of such assistance.
The field hospitals should be placed as close to the ambulance dressing station as is
reasonably safe.
3. The field hospital will be utilized as follows: (a) Gas hospital, (!>) hospital for
nontransportable wounded, (c) hospital for minor sick, including skin and venereal dis-
eases, and (d) one hospital in reserve.
4. Gas hospitals : One field hospital will be utilized as a gas hospital. To this hospital
will he sent from the triage all patients who have been gassed. Therefore, facilities must
be provided to give them the necessary special treatment required — proper bathing, alka-
line treatment, administration of oxygen and, if necessary, venesection. As soon as the
necessary treatment has been given and their condition permits, such patients as require
further hospitalization will be sent to the nearest evacuation hospital. However, during
open warfare, it will be found as noted before that the majority of gassed patients or the
so-called gassed, will not require anything beyond a few days' rest, sleep, and food. These
must not be sent to evacuation hospitals but must be retained until fit for duty (provided
this does not require more than four days) and then returned to the line. At this hospital,
there will also be installed a shock table for the treatment of those needing shock treat-
ment at this point.
5. Hospital for nontransportable wounded : One field hospital will be utilized for
the care of nontransportable wounded. This hospital will be supplied with surgical teams,
female nurses and an X-ray oufit in order that proper surgical treatment and care may be
given these cases. To this hospital will be sent direct from the triage only patients whose
transportation farther to the rear will probably mean death. In past experiences these
have usually comprised three classes: (a) Sucking chest wounds, (b) perforating abdom-
13576—25
74 FIELD OPERATIONS
inal wounds, and (c) severe hemorrhages. Patients with heart and spinal conditions
stand transportation better before operation than after, and should, therefore, not be
stopped here. There has been a tendency in the past to retain at this hospital the seriously
wounded who, however, would be able to stand transportation to the evacuation hospital.
This must be discontinued. Only such patients will be retained as are actually nontrans-
portable. When available, the corps surgeon will detail to each division an assistant con-
sultant in surgery, who will be the sole judge of what cases will be operated at this hos-
pital and what cases will be transferred to the evacuation hospital. A shock team will
be on duty at this hospital for treatment of all shock cases both pre and post operative.
C. Hospital for minor sick including skin and venereal diseases: To this hospital will
be sent only patients with minor conditions who will be fit for duty within four days. All
seriously sick must be sent to an evacuation hospital at once. This includes the minor
sick sent to this hospital who later develop serious symptoms. During active operations,
patients with venereal diseases, except those having disabling complications, such as
orchitis, epididymitis or cystitis, or who are in the infectious stages of syphilis, must
be retained for full duty at the front.
7. One field hospital in reserve : This will be used to give assistance where needed both
in personnel and equipment. A detail of 1 medical officer and 10 enlisted men will be sent
to the ambulance dressing station to give the necessary preliminary bathing and alkaline
treatment to patients with mustard gas burns as may be deemed necessary by the division
medical gas officer on duty at this station. This detail must of course be relieved by
another similar detail at regular intervals to allow the former to secure the necessary
rest and food.
8. It must always be borne in mind that divisional hospitals must be as rapidly
cleared as is possible in order that they may be mobile at all times. Necessarily, a hos-
pital for nontransportable wounded must be more or less immobilized, but it also must be
evacuated as rapidly as the condition of the patients will permit so that it, too, may
advance with the troops when occasion requires. The corps surgeon will give the necessary
assistance in replacing the personnel and equipment of field hospitals with corps sanitary
train units when such are available.
9. Exchange of supplies : It is of utmost importance that a systematic exchange of
supplies — as litters, dressings, splints, blankets, hot water bottles, operating from the
front line all the way back to the final hospital to which the patient is delivered, be insti-
tuted at once. When a patient is placed in an ambulance, the ambulance orderly must
return to the litter bearers a duplicate of all supplies furnished the patient. Similarly,
when the ambulance delivers the patient to a hospital, the ambulance orderly must get
from the hospital a duplicate of all supplies furnished the patient. This must operate at
every point where a change of transportation is made. Otherwise the supplies at the front-
line positions will soon become exhausted and unnecessary delay and suffering will result.
If this system of exchange is enforced, there is a constant steady stream of all necessary
supplies going forward and there need be no interruption in the care given to wounded or
other casualties.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SANITARY SERVICE OF THE ARMY
Organization of the First Army, with headquarters at La Ferte-sous-
Jouarre, was announced to take effect on August 10, 1918. 49 On October 10,
during the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation, the Second Army
was created, 50 occupying that portion of the American front extending from
Port-sur-Seille east of the Moselle to Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun. 51
Plans had been made before the armistice for the organization of a Third
Army, and after the armistice, on November 14, this was designated the Army
of Occupation. 52
GENERAL VIEW OE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 75
The army surgeon not only supervised and coordinated the Medical
Department activities of corps, divisions, and regiments, but he also had at
his disposition the following formations, varying in numbers according to
resources and needs: An army sanitary train, mobile hospitals, special neuro-
logic, gas, and contagious disease hospitals, ambulance companies, sections of
the United States Army Ambulance Service, hospital trains of standard 1-m.
and 60-cm. gauge, medical supply parks and " dumps," convalescent depots,
field medical laboratories, sanitary squads, specialists, including consultants
and epidemiologists, operating, shock, splint, and gas teams, radiologic
groups, sanitary inspectors, attending surgeons, mobile degassing units, courier
service, disinfection units for prisoners of war and repatriates, labor battal-
ions, prisoners-of-war companies, the Medical Department concentration
area, the medical group at the regulating station, and American Red Cross
stations and supply parks in the army area.
ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE ARMY CHIEF SURGEON
War Department Tables of Organization provided for the following
personnel of the Medical Department for the operation of the office of the
chief surgeon of an army: 53 1 colonel; 1 lieutenant colonel; 1 major; 1
captain; 1 sergeant, first class; 2 sergeants; and 8 privates, first class, or pri-
vates.
The experiences of the three armies which were organized in the Ameri-
can Expeditionary Forces differed materially; therefore the demands made
on the Medical Department of each of these armies likewise varied. Conse-
quently, the organization of the office of the chief surgeon of each of the armies
differed.
The problems which engrossed the army chief surgeons were hospitaliza-
tion, transportation, medical supply, sanitation, administration, professional
supervision, and evacuation. These were all problems of considerable mag-
nitude, and their immediate supervision could not be intelligently accom-
plished by one person.
As in the corps, the organization of the army chief surgeon's office had to
be perfected with practically no precedent as a guide. The pioneer work in
this direction was done by the first chief surgeon of the First Army, which,
as has been seen, was organized August 10, 1918. In his preparations for the
part which the Medical Department Avas to play in the St. Mihiel operation
that took place within a month, the chief surgeon, First Army, so organized
his office as to have the following heads of departments : 54 Assistant to the
chief surgeon; medical supply officer; officer in charge of correspondence;
statistical officer; sanitary inspector; supervising dental surgeon. On Sep-
tember 25, 1918, when the chief surgeon moved his office from Xeufchateau to
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, and the strength of the First Army exceeded
1,000,000 men, 55 there were the following officers in the chief surgeon's office,
additional to those mentioned above : 55 Motor transport officer ; representative
chief surgeon, at the front ; assistant to director, ambulance service ; 3 assist-
ant medical supply officers. Though there were consultants in the special
76 FIELD OPERATIONS
subdivisions of surgery and medicine assigned to the First Army, the chief
surgeon did not carry them as a part of his office organization.
In the development of the organization of the office of the chief surgeon,
Second Army, it became necessary to expand the personnel to 20 officers in
charge of the following administrative sections under his immediate
supervision : 5C
Hospitalization. — Direction and supervision of evacuation, mobile and
special army hospitals, and mobile surgical units. Organization, supervision,
and assignment of surgical, shock, and fracture teams, and auxiliary pro-
fessional personnel. Control of hospitalization within the army.
Transportation. — Direction and supervision of all Medical Department
means of transportation within the army, except that with army artillery.
Supply. — Medical, dental, and veterinary supply of division, corps, and
army troops except initial equipment. Organization and administration of
army advance medical supply depots.
Sanitation. — Supervision of sanitation of divisions, corps, and army;
activities of sanitary squads; preparation of sanitary reports, control of
epidemics, organization and administration of area sanitary service, control
of army and mobile laboratories in conjunction with Engineers' Water Service.
Medical service of army troops. — Organization and administration of
the medical service of army troops other than army artillery in the capacity
of a division surgeon for these units.
Statistics and record. — Duties of personnel adjutant. Preparation of
the statistical reports of Medical Department units as prescribed in orders.
Organization and internal administration of the army surgeon's office.
Records, reports, charts, returns, and correspondence of administrative and
consulting sections.
Evacuation (G-4,). — Medical representative on staff of G^. Supervision
of evacuation from the army and transportation of army hospitals in the
army area. Action on medical requisitions in conformity with General
Orders, No. 44, G. II. Q.. A. E. F., 1918.
Medical consultant. — Supervision of clinical medicine in division, corps,
and army hospitals. Selection and instruction of subordinate consultants and
chiefs of medical services for army hospitals. Organization and supervision
of shock teams. Adviser of chief surgeon concerning the professional service
of the army.
Surgical consultant. — Duties similar to those of medical consultant.
Orthopedic consultant. — Duties similar to those of other professional
consultants. Organization and instruction of fracture teams, distribution
of splints and splint material, and instruction of Medical Department per-
sonnel in their use.
A 'euro psychiatry consultant.- — Duties similar to those of medical con-
sultant. Cooperation with judge advocate in examinations contemplated
by par. 219, Manual of Courts-Martial.
Urology consultant. — Supervision of clinical work pertaining to urology,
dermatology, and prophylaxis of venereal and skin diseases, in a manner
similar to the services of the medical and surgical consultants.
GENERAL VIEW OE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 77
Medical gas treatment officer. — Duties analogous in this field to those
of medical and surgical consultants. Supervision of instruction of all medical
personnel in treatment and management of gassed cases.
Roentgenologist. — Supervision of clinical work and other duties pertain-
ing to this specialty, including procurement and maintenance of fixed and
portable X-ray apparatus.
Dental surgeon. — Supervision of dental service throughout the army, and,
in cooperation with supply sections, distribution of dental supplies.
Attending surgeons and attending dental surgeons were attached to
army headquarters and to headquarters troops.
Though plans had been made before the armistice for the organization
of the Third Army, it was not until November 14 that this army was given
a mission — the American army of occupation on the Rhine. 52 Active hostilities
had ceased, but, because of the plan for the advance of the Third Army, which
was to follow up the retreating Germans, to see that the terms of the armistice
were carried out by them, it was necessary to maintain as effective an organ-
ization for it as though hostilities were still going on. The organization
of the office of the chief surgeon, Third Army, differed slightly from that
adopted by the chief surgeon. Second Army. Beside the chief surgeon,
there were in the former's office a chief dental surgeon, a medical supply
officer, an officer in charge of hospitalization; consultants in medicine and
surgery, a director of laboratories, an evacuation officer and representative
of the chief surgeon; consultants in urology, ophthalmology, otology and
laryngology, neuropsychiatry, and orthopedics ; and an officer in charge
of finance and accounting; a sanitary inspector; an epidemiologist; an officer
in charge of water supply; an executive officer; an assistant to the chief dental
surgeon. 57
Though all the several kinds of Medical Department formations under
the immediate jurisdiction of the army surgeon were indispensable, the most
important of these were regarded as the evacuation and mobile hospitals
and the mobile surgical units and ambulance companies. These are dis-
cussed in Chapter V. Army hospitals received the wounded from the front,
operated upon them if necessary and possible, prepared them for transporta-
tion to base hospitals, and placed them on hospital trains.
Evacuation from the army zone was hampered by the considerable
number of hospitals provided, especially when these were scattered, for
not only did their multiplicity tend to confuse incoming ambulance drivers
and thus to delay delivery of patients at the proper destination, but it also
made more difficult the coordination of evacuation from these army hospitals.
It had been intended that evacuation hospitals should receive all classes of
cases, but because of their inadequacy to do so despite their expansion, it
proved essential that they be supplemented by other units, especially after
the appearance of the influenza epidemic in the autumn of 1918. 2,; The
evacuation hospitals were distributed according to needs, roads, sites avail-
able, etc.. and it was in order to facilitate coordination of evacuation from
these scattered units that they were grouped into evacuation areas during
the Meuse-Argonne operation.
78 FIELD OPERATIONS
No plan of evacuation, issued as part of a field order prior to an engage-
ment, could automatically continue to meet changing conditions; nor was
it practicable to issue a new order from army headquarters whenever the
situation in the line, or in evacuation hospitals, demanded a change in the
original scheme. Plans of evacuation quoted at various points in succeeding
chapters express only general policies for collecting the sick and wounded
into the army hospitals severally designated for the reception of different
classes of cases — normal sick, contagious, seriously wounded, slightly wounded,
gassed, and psychopathic Execution of such plans required, of course, a
coordinated division of labor.
All transportation belonging to the Medical Department of an army was
pooled and operated and distributed under an officer charged with the evacu-
ation ambulance service who was attached to the office of the army surgeon. 58
This transportation consisted of ambulance companies, evacuation ambulance
companies, and all other motor transport assigned to the army for the evacu-
ation of casualties. The transportation officer who was immediately charged
with its control utilized it to evacuate corps and army hospitals, located off
the railroad, to other hospitals from which railway evacuations were made,
to reinforce the corps and division evacuation service, and in emergencies to
transport Medical Department personnel (teams and nurses) changing sta-
tions. 58 Four or five ambulance companies and 10 sight-seeing busses were
assigned to each corps in the Meuse-Argonne operation in addition to the
corps quota, and an army reserve was established consisting of 7 ambulance
companies and 30 trucks fitted for transporting the slightly wounded.
The policy was maintained for attaching sections of this army reserve, as
needed, to the several corps for temporary duty. By this means the reserves
were used where most required, were readily shifted, and after a period of
hard service were withdrawn for rest of personnel and repair of vehicles.
Until a short time before the St. Mihiel operation, September 12, 1918,
the system employed for evacuation of casualties from the zone of the armies
was an adaptation of the system used by the French and was operated to a
large extent through their facilities and with their aid. When, however, the
First Army was organized and took over its designated sector, it adopted a
definite system of its own which, operating over its own lines of communica-
tion, provided for the movement of casualties from the front to base hospitals.
For the successful operation of this system it was necessary that there be
close coordination between the activities of the Medical Department and those
of the Services of Supply. This was effected through the agency of the gen-
eral staff, which so far as possible centralized in one bureau information con-
cerning the following subjects: 59 (1) Army hospitals: Location, number,
capacity, number of operating teams, and number of patients classified in
reference to their evacuability. (2) Hospital trains: Number, type, capacity,
routes, and schedules in coordination with military activities and traffic.
(3) Base hospitals, distance, available bed space, classified.
The machinery or organization of the system adopted required: (a) An
evacuation officer, attached to G^ of the army, (b) A regulating officer, in
GENEBAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPAETMENT ORGANIZATION 79
charge of hospital train service, also operating under G-4. (c) A hospitali-
zation officer, in the office of the chief surgeon, A. E. F.
Evacuations were coordinated by the Medical Department representatives
with the fourth section of the general staff, one member of the group being
charged with this duty and also representing here in such matters the chief
surgeon of the army in the field.
Priority right in field telephone communication was secured and a med-
ical officer was assigned to each corps sector, charged with the duty of collect-
ing information concerning casualties and those to be evacuated and of trans-
mitting it to the medical officer — an assistant to the army surgeon — wdio was
attached to the fourth section of the general staff of the army concerned. This
officer, charged solely with the evacuation of casualties, received twice every
24 hours the casualty reports of division, corps, and army troops by classes
and the reports of army hospitals, with their statements of the number of
casualties and empty beds. Upon these figures he based his reports to the army
surgeon and his requests to the regulating stations for trains. His communi-
cation with the army surgeon and the regulating office was by telephone, as
these officers were located at points having direct trunk-line communica-
tion. 60 " 61
The method above described, known as the second plan of evacuation, as
determined and directed by General Headquarters, became effective on August
29, 1918; but though it was satisfactory in quiet periods, certain changes
were found necessary in the active periods of an offensive, for then the situa-
tion in army hospitals changed from hour to hour, and a more automatic sys-
tem, utilizing more frequent reports, was found necessary. It was essential
that there be closer, more intimate contact between the army hospitals and
the regulating officer. To effect this, the evacuation office of G-4, army, was
decentralized, representatives taking station at evacuation centers. 01 Each of
these centers consisted of the army hospitals which, whether grouped or scat-
tered in a certain defined area, were evacuated as an entity. The extent of
these centers was determined by railhead facilities. Ambulance companies to
carry patients to the railway sidings were distributed among the centers
according to the distance of hospitals from their entraining points, their
capacity, and the character of disabilities which they treated. At these centers
reports could be received hourly, if necessary, and whenever possible such
reports were telephoned by a preferred wire direct to the regulating officer.
The area representative of the evacuation officer did not now call for a certain
kind of train or for a specific number, but simply gave the number and type of
cases to be evacuated and named the hospital or group of hospitals to be
served. 01 This close contact with the regulating station enabled the evacuating
officer to control the stream of oasualties and to divert it to the best advantage
into the various army hospitals. This duty required the utmost diligence, for
the hospitals' capacity was measured by the amount of their bed space, by
their operating teams and evacuation facilities, and overtaxation of any of
these would cause congestion or necessitate sending patients out on preoper-
ative trains. When a certain limit was reached beyond which a hospital could
80 FIELD OPERATIONS
not, with its available operating teams, clear its patients within four hours,
for instance, admissions were stopped and the stream of wounded was diverted
to other hospitals."
The services of the evacuation officer, who supervised evacuations and
coordinated them with other military activities, were supplemented by those
of the army hospitals officer, who was in immediate control of evacuation,
mobile and special hospitals, and mobile surgical units. This officer performed
in the zone of the armies duties similar to those of the hospitalization officer
in the office of the chief surgeon, A. E. F., at Tours, who controlled hospitali-
zation in the advance, intermediate, and base sections. Thus he assigned and
supervised surgical, shock, and fracture teams and other jjrofessional person-
nel, selected new sites for army hospitals, and supervised their opening,
operation, and closing. During engagements he kept close watch over these
units and maintained liaison with the corps surgeons in order to direct the flow
of casualties according to changing conditions. In this duty he collaborated
with the evacuation officer, with whom he was in constant touch. During the
Meuse-Argonne operation the hospitalization officer in the First Army became
assistant to the evacuation officer." 2
The plan thus developed eventuated in a simple but efficient system in
which evacuations were controlled by one bureau. 01 Kept informed of needs
at the front and of resources at the rear, the regulating officer could send his
trains to the best advantage in each direction. To meet normal daily needs,
during the Meuse-Argonne operation (q. v.) a specified number of trains were
sent daily to each evacuation center, and in emergencies other trains than those
normally provided were sent upon call. But such special trains were rela-
tively infrequent.
Arrangements for the hospitalization of casualties in the zone of the
armies were preliminary to their further transfer, for definitive treatment, to
base hospitals farther to the rear. These were located in the base, intermediate,
and advance sections of the Services of Supply, while in the district of Paris
were American Bed Cross hospitals discharging similar duties. The area of
the Services of Supplies covered all that territory of France which was not
included in the zone of the armies or the district of Baris.
EEFEEENCES
(1) Manual for the Medical Department. U. S. Army, 1910, par. 82S.
(2) G. O. No. 1, G. a. Q., A. K. F.. 1917.
(3) Report of the chief surgeon, A. K. F., to the commanding general, S. O. s., April 17.
1919, 6. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Ibid.. 5.
(5) G. O. No. 31, G. H. Q.. A. K. F., February If;, 1918.
(6) Report on the activities of G-4-B. medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H.
Q.. A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. f„ chief of section, December 31, 1918, 0.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(7) Ibid., 5.
(8) Ibid., 7,
(9) Ibid.. 8.
(10) Ibid., 51.
(11) Ibid., 9.
GENERAL VIEW OE MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 81
(12) Wadhams, S. H., and Tuttle, A. D. : Some of the Early Problems of the Medical
Department, A. E. F. The Military Surgeon, Washington, D. C, 1919, xlv, No. 6.
626.
(13) Report of the assistant chief of staff, G-4, G. H. Q., to the commander in chief, A. E.
F., undated, 27. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(14) The French supply control installation for the field forces, by Lieut. Col. J. W.
Beacham, Inf. ; The French control of Evacuation, by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C.
Supply Course No. 45, March 23, 1921. (Remarks delivered at the General Staff
College, Washington, D. C.) On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(15) Report of assistant chief of staff, G-4, G. H. Q., A. E. F., to the commander in chief,
undated, 28. On file, Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(16) Report on the activities of G^4- B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G.
H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31, 1918,
52. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(17) Ibid., 53.
(18) Ibid., 55.
(19) Ibid., 54.
(20) Exhibit " S " to the report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of hospital evacuation section. Regulating
Station B, St. Dizier, France, undated, Part IV, 21. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(21) Report on the activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff. G.
H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C„ chief of section, December 31, 1918.
57. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(22) Ibid., 58.
(23) Ibid., 59.
(24) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds. M. ('., undated. 1. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(25) Ibid., 2.
(26) Ibid., 8.
(27) Ibid., 3.
(28) Report of Medical Department activities, Third Army Corps, by Col. .lames L,
Bevans, M. G, corps surgeon, undated, 1. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(29) Ibid., 8.
(30) Ibid., 10.
(31) Ibid., 13.
(32) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, by Col. J. Grissinger,
M. C. corps surgeon, undated, 13. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(33) Report of Medical Department activities. Third Army Corps, by Col. .). L. Bevans.
M. G, corps surgeon, undated, 23. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(34) Ibid., 30.
(35) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, by Col. J. W. Grissinger,
M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 11. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(36) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, by Lieut. Col. R. M.
Culler, M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 5. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(37) Report of Medical Department activities. Third Army Corps, by Col. .T. L. Bevans,
corps surgeon, undated. 50. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(38) Report of Medical Department activities, Fiftli Army Corps, by Col. W. R. Eastman,
M. C, corps surgeon, November 18. 1918, 41. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(39) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. G, undated. 35. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(40) Ibid.. 36.
(41) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, by Col. .T. W. Grissinger,
M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 66. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(42) Ibid.. 7.
82 FIELD OPEEATIONS
(43) Report of Medical Department activities, Fifth Army Corps, by Col. W. It. Eastman,
M. C, corps surgeon, November 1.8, 1918, 7. On file, Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(44) Ibid., 34.
(45) Ibid., 35.
(46) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, by Col. J. W. Grissinger,
M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 17. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(47) Report of Medical Department activities, Third Army Corps, by Col. J. L. Bevans,
M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 32. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(48) Memorandum on evacuation of sick and wounded, headquarters, First Army Corps,
September 3, 1918. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(49) G. O. No. 120, G. H. Q., A. E. F., July 27, 1918.
(50) G. O. No. 175, G. H. Q., A. E. F., October 10, 1918.
(51) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, 48.
(52) Ibid., 50.
(53) Tables of Organization and Equipment, U. S. Army, Series C, Table 202, July 30,
1918.
(54) Final Report of the Chief Surgeon, First Army, November 20, 1918, 1. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(55) Ibid., 6.
(56) Report of the Chief Surgeon, Second Army, undated, 2. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(57) Report of the Chief Surgeon, Third Army, June 20, 1918, 1. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(58) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C, undated, 11.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(59) Ibid., 14.
(60) Evacuation system in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C, undated,
4. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(61) Evacuation system in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C, undated,
16. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(62) Ibid., 10.
CHAPTER III
COMBAT DIVISIONS IN TRAINING AND REST AREAS AND ON THE
MARCH; DEPOT AND REPLACEMENT DIVISIONS
As stated elsewhere, the general organization project dated July 10, 1917,
approved by the commander in chief, A. E. F., July 11, 1917, provided for
the organization of the American forces, each army to consist of five corps
and supplementary units, designated as army troops. 1
A corps was to have six divisions, four of which were to be combat
divisions, one a replacement and school division, one a base and training
division, and supplementary units designated corps troops. Provision was
thus made for a replacement system of two echelons, each echelon to consist
of a division from each corps. 2
The function of a combat division is so well understood that no descrip-
tion is necessary. The function of the rear echelon, the corps base and train-
ing division, was to be the reception, classification, and preliminary training
of troops arriving from the United States. The forward echelon, corps re-
placement and school division, was to receive replacements from the base divi-
sion, to continue their training, to forward them to combat divisions, and to
supply the troops for the corps schools. 2
The provisions of the general organization project and the priority
schedule, A. E. F., contemplated that the third division in each corps (or
group of six divisions) to arrive in France should be the replacement division,
and that the sixth to arrive should be the base division. 3
The first four divisions to arrive in France were the 1st, 2d, 26th and
42d. 3 However, the first division to be designated for replacement purposes
was the 41st, which was the fifth division to arrive. 3 It was at first intended
that this division should become the replacement division of the First Corps,
but during the period of its assembly at La Courtine it was determined to
utilize it as the base division instead. 4 The 41st Division was formally desig-
nated the base and training division, First Corps, January 15, 191S, 5 which
designation was changed to First Corps Depot Division, by telegraphic in-
structions from General Headquarters, A. E. F., March 5, 1918, to the com-
manding general, Service of the Rear. 4
The necessity of providing the other echelon of the replacement system
for the First Corps having been decided, the sixth division (32d) to arrive
in the American Expeditionary Forces was announced as the replacement
division of the First Corps. 4 The portion of this division which had been
assembled in the tenth training area functioned as a replacement depot only
until the great German offensive, which began on March 21, 1918. led to the
division being ordered into the line for training as a combat division. 4 It
ceased to function as a replacement division.
The military situation at this time also led to the training of all divisions
of the American Expeditionary Forces, except the 41st, as combat divisions,
83
84 ITELD OPERATIONS
until the arrival of the 83d Division, which was designated as the 2d Depot
Division on June 27, 1918. 4
By the time 30 divisions had arrived in France, only 4 of them had
been designated depot divisions. 4 In all, there were seven depot divisions,
41st, 83d, 76th, 85th, 39th, 40th, 31st, though one. the seventh to arrive, never
functioned as such. Except for the brief time when the 32d Division func-
tioned as a replacement division, there were no replacement divisions.
COMBAT DIVISIONS IN TRAINING AND REST AREAS
Combat divisions on arrival in France were assembled in training areas,
where they received their preliminary instruction prior to going into the line.
When withdrawn from the line after combat, such divisions habitually
moved to training or rest areas, where they received replacements, renewed
equipment, and in some instances underwent intensive training.
LOCATION
Areas where American troops were trained (save for those divisions which
served with the British) were located in the northeastern part of France, in
the advance section, Services of Supply. In general terms it might be said that
they were grouped around Neufchateau. Though they varied considerably
in size and contour, most of them averaged from 250 to 300 square miles in
area and were roughly quadrangular or elliptical: some were much smaller
and a few were larger. Each contained from 30 to 60, usually about 50, small
communities whose populations varied from less than a hundred to several
thousand. In these communities and to a very much less extent in barracks, or
in isolated buildings at a distance from the local communities, troops were
billeted. The proximity of the communities in question varied considerably.
In the Neufchateau area, generally speaking, they were from 1 to 6 km. apart
(0.6 to 3.6 miles), but sometimes they were more, with the result that the troops
were more widely separated.
BILLETING FACILITIES
As the billeting facilities of the average French town were very limited,
our organizations were often necessarily scattered among a number of towns.
Thus at one time the sanitary train of the 1st Division was quartered in four
villages and the 53d Infantry Regiment was distributed among seven villages.
The billeting of troops in individual buildings at a distance from communi-
ties added especially to dispersion. In training areas, troops occupied all
available structures which afforded any shelter, such as public buildings, bar-
racks, storehouses, barns, houses, lofts, stables, and sheds. 7 The Field Artillery,
e. g., the 20th, sometimes occupied gun emplacements and dugouts. In some
commands, e. g., the SOth Division in the Samer area during June, 1918. shelter
tents were used on any convenient site. Any barracks that were available in
the area were taken over by our troops, for example, by the 1st Division in the
(iondrecourt area, but relatively speaking such buildings were very few, es-
pecially when our troops first moved to the areas in question. Occasionally
men were quartered in tents loaned by welfare organizations. Billeting facili-
GENERAL VIEW 01'' MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 85
ties varied considerably in the different areas, being reported as good in some
and as poor in others. As rapidly as possible new buildings were erected, the
Medical Department bending its efforts especially toward the construction of a
camp (i. e., a class B) hospital in each area.
STAFF DIFFICULTIES INCIDENT TO DISPERSION (IF TROOPS IN BILLETS
Usually the divisions arrived in successive increments, the staff reporting,
as in the 26th Division, in small detachments, the last of which did not arrive
until nearly a month after the first. 8
Division artillery was sent for training to an area other than that to which
the infantry was assigned. The earlier arrivals of each division, infantry or
artillery, sought to make every suitable arrangement for the troops of their
command which were to follow in the same area. Separate areas for infan-
try and artillery augmented appreciably the difficulties of staff service, in-
cluding those of the Medical Department. Chief among its duties in the special
circumstances were sanitation, procurement of supplies and transportation,
provision of hospital facilities, care and evacuation of sick, perfection of or-
ganization of Medical Department formations, training of the same, and
elimination from the division of all officers and men found physically unfit for
combat. Sanitation and care of the sick usually proved of most urgent im-
portance, but all the duties mentioned were prosecuted simultaneously. Sanita-
tion of the training areas is discussed in the volume on that particular subject.
DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL
Division surgeons had been carefully selected at home and were officers
of experience, but their office forces usually consisted largely of personnel
unfamiliar with many military details, though some organizations fortunately
included commissioned and enlisted Medical Department personnel who had
had experience in the National Guard or elsewhere. Thus in the 26th Division
the office force had formerly performed the same duties for the surgeon general
of one of the States whose contingent became a part of the division. Such men
quickly learned their new duties, but there was a great and constant need for
experienced noncommissioned officers. The problems confronting the newly
arrived division surgeons were numerous and pressing; and though they dif-
fered somewhat in different organizations, there was great general similarity,
especially in divisions which arrived in France at the same period of develop-
ment of the American Expeditionary Forces. 9
In our earlier overseas service, the armies and army corps had not yet
been organized. The general staff, A. E. F., on the contrary, was organized,
but it had not been developed, as it was later. It was still possible, however.
then to call up the chief surgeon, A. E. F.. at Chaumont. and thus to
straighten out some of the constantly arising complications by direct con-
versation over the telephone.
While a division was in training there usually was a daily conference of
its chief medical officers, including the consultants, and a weekly conference
attended by all medical officers who could be present. The places where
86 FIELD OPERATIONS
the officers so congregated were changed frequently in order that they could
inspect various parts of the division area. These conferences proved a con-
venient expedient for checking up what was being accomplished and for dis-
cussing many matters of mutual interest.
PROVISION FOR MEDICAL CAPE OF TROOPS
Offices were established for the attending surgeon and the dental surgeon
for the troops at division headquarters, but for the command at large medical
attention was provided primarily by battalion surgeons. Battalion surgeons
sent cases, requiring more thorough treatment than they could give locally,
to a regimental infirmary or to a camp hospital. The number of infirmaries
established varied considerably according to needs, geographic distribution
of troops, and cognate conditions. Sometimes they grew to considerable size,
as in the 39th Division during September and October, 1918, in the St.
Florent area, each of whose three infirmaries expanded to 100 beds. 10 For
the 26th Division infirmaries were built in the Neuf chateau area in the winter
of 1917 in almost every village by an organization called " divisional areas,"
then in control of the training territories, and these housed a fairly large
percentage of the sick. 11 In the Rimaucourt area during the winter of 1917
the 42d Division established a small infirmary in each village where troops
were billeted. Sometimes, as in the 39th Division in the St. Florent area,
infirmaries had to be extemporized, and because of limited hospital facilities
this division treated in infirmaries cases which otherwise it woidd have trans-
ferred to hospitals. 10 In this manner mild cases in the Artillery of the 90th
Division were treated at Le Courneau in the fall of 1918, though sometimes,
as in the 1st Division in the Valdahon area, a field hospital was provided for
the artillery. Equipment for 17 infirmaries was requisitioned by the 39th
Division to meet its needs in the influenza epidemic. 10
ESTABLISHMENT OF CAMP HOSPITALS
In each divisional area a camp hosi^ital was established which ordinarily
was operated by one of the field hospitals of the division. Sometimes this
personnel was augmented by details from other parts of the sanitary train
whose companies normally were billeted in different towns. As rapidly as
resources permitted, the personnel of these hospitals was replaced by other
personnel assigned to them permanently. It was found that the detail of
divisional personnel to such duties interfered seriously with their training
and also detained them, to care for the sick left behind, w 7 hen the division
moved. This question has been discussed in connection with personnel in
Chapter I. The camp hospitals were at first established in any buildings
available such as hotels, factories, chateaux, or barracks, and as the capacity
of these buildings usually was small it was sometimes necessary to have
recourse to several hospital establishments in an Infantry area. As already
indicated, the 39th Division found no buildings suitable for a camp hospital
and was obliged, therefore, to develop its infirmary service and to send its
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 87
patients to three small hospitals in its vicinity until the camp hospital was
constructed. 10 The 26th Division operated as a camp hospital one of its
field hospitals in barracks at Neufchateau during the winter of 1917 and a
little later another at Liffol-le-Grand. The former, which grew to a capacity
of several hundred beds, was taken over eventually by a base hospital. 9 As
rapidly as possible, a barrack camp hospital (type B) was constructed in each
area, staffed by personnel permanently assigned thereto; but a number of divi-
sions, especially those which first arrived, did not have the benefit of these
facilities or had them only to a limited extent, though the Medical Depart-
ment strained every resource to provide them.
Each of these units (type B hospitals) had a normal capacity of 300 beds,
and facilities for a crisis expansion to 500. 12 Sometimes these camp hospitals
were under construction when a division arrived; sometimes, on the other
hand, they had not been started until the division entered the area. Several
camp hospitals were established by some divisions; for example, the 1st Di-
vision while training in the Gondrecourt area operated one camp hospital at
Gondrecourt for the majority of the division and another in an entirely
different area at Valdahon where its artillery was located. 13 Sometimes other
and special hospital establishments were provided, such as a camp for venereal
cases, or one for skin and venereal diseases. 14
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT TRANSPORTATION
Until ambulances became available, which was not the case in the begin-
ning, patients were sent to these camp hospitals in any transportation avail-
able, such as peasant wagons or motor trucks. Even much later, lack of trans-
portation, especially in the presence of the epidemic of influenza, rendered
transfer of patients difficult in a number of divisions.
Ambulances on receipt were distributed in a number of different ways.
The 82d Division assigned one motor and one animal-drawn ambulance to
each regiment or separate battalion and sent collecting ambulances which
visited each battalion headquarters daily. 15 In some divisions ambulances
made daily visits to regiments; and, as was the case in the 85th Division,
emergencies were met by sending ambulances on call. 16 Liaison was main-
tained lw runners if the telephone service was inadequate.
EVACUATION OF PATIENTS
From the camp hospitals patients were sent to any neighboring hospital
prepared to receive them. Usually these were American base hospitals. Thus
the 1st Division in the Gondrecourt area evacuated to Bazoilles 30 km. (18.G
miles) distant, 17 the 2d Division sent contagious cases to Neufchateau. and
special cases to Bazoilles, but later sent all its patients to the base hospitals
at Vittel and Contrexeville. 18 The 88th Division sent its sick to a French
hospital, whose staff it reenforced by details from its Medical Department
personnel, and the 90th to Field Hospital No. 42, to which it assigned some
of its personnel for instruction. 19
88 FIELD OPERATIONS
CLASSIFICATION OF OFFICERS AND MEN
A very important duty of the Medical Department in training areas was
the classification of all officers and men of the divisions.
Under the provisions of General Orders, No. 41, G. H. Q., A. E. F.,
March 14, 1918, the classification was to be as follows : "A," for combat service;
" B," temporarily unfit for such service but fit for other duty and potentially
class "A" within six months; "C," permanently unfit for combat duty but
not so disabled as to justify return to the United States; " D," those unfit
for any duty with the American Expeditionary Forces. Classification of
officers and men began as soon as a division entered its training area and
continued until it was completed. Though efforts to eliminate all the unfit
had been made while the divisions were in the United States, reexamination
in France led to the transfer of hundreds of others including officers of both
line and staff. Though the less efficient officers had been eliminated in the
United States, some of them had accompanied the troops to France, often in
the higher grades (26th Division). 11
Many mental defectives in troops had escaped the examining boards at
home. The division psychiatrist aided greatly by picking out these men, for
he frequently was called upon as a consultant in cases of exceptional difficulty.
Sometimes he was a member of boards determining the efficiency of officers.
Before a trial by court-martial he was valuable as an adviser or, later, as a
witness, and had a peculiar usefulness in imparting instruction concerning
mental hygiene and the control of Avar neuroses or psychoses. 20
Elimination and Reassignment of Medical Officers
During the training period, as the qualifications of individual members of
the Medical Department personnel became more and more apparent, some
officers were eliminated from the division concerned, and others were reas-
signed. In some divisions a number of officers were shifted in order both to
assign them to those duties for which they were best fitted and to avoid the
necessity of placing junior officers over seniors. In the 26th, some lieutenants
were assigned as regimental surgeons, for to secure best results it was found
necessary to ignore rank to a certain extent. 11
DIVISION VENEREAL DISEASE CAMP
During the early training period of most divisions no camp for the
treatment of venereal disease was established; but though this was done later,
the study of the venereal problem, from the beginning, kept the division
urologist fully occupied. His supervision of the semimonthly inspections and
of social diversions developed both appreciably. Much of his time was de-
voted to lectures and to personal inspection of all the prophylaxis stations of
the division. ♦
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
Experience in obtaining equipment varied considerably. Ordinarily,
when divisions arrived in France the equipment of their sanitary trains was
GENEEAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 89
salvaged, and organizations proceeded to their training areas with a minimum
of supplies. Thus the 42d arrived in its training area with only the drugs
that had been carried on the persons or in the lockers of individuals. 21 Sup-
plies were issued to all such divisions as promptly as possible after arrival,
issues corresponding to requisitions or needs. As a rule they were obtained
readily because of direct communication between the division surgeon and
the chief surgeon, American Expeditionary Forces, or his representative at
Chaumont, and proximity of the training areas to the advance medical
supply depot at Is-sur-Tille, but to this general rule there were some excep-
tions. The 26th Division records : X1
It was not long before supplies began to arrive in great quantities, and thereafter one
of the most striking features of the service in France was that in spite of lack of pre-
cision in determining what were trench stores and what were organization supplies, and in
spite of the fact that later the medical supply system of the army was consolidated with
that of other departments, the flow of medical supplies for combatant troops was not
only sufficient in quantity but its great abundance never failed. No matter what the
difficulty of the situation or the extravagance of the demand, advance depots were always
prepared to furnish the needed dressings, medicines, or other medical supplies.
There was a considerable difference in respect to the immediate needs
of the divisions which moved to areas where camp hospitals had been estab-
lished and in respect to those where there were no such hospitals. Adequacy
of supplies sometimes fluctuated in the same division. Supplies normally
adequate ran short in some divisions in the presence of the influenza epi-
demic, when the number of patients reached proportions which had not
been foreseen. Some divisions reported their equipment as incomplete, in
others the equipment of the sanitary troops and train was satisfactorily
completed except in the matter of transportation. Sometimes delivery of
supplies was delayed because of traffic embargoes. In the 1st Division a
source of some difficulty was lack of spare parts for ambulances and the
need that new rims be made for ambulance wheels in order to fit French
tires. 17 In the 39th Division special difficulties were encountered, for lack of
adequate supplies was aggravated by lack of transportation and of hospital
facilities. Almost all divisions in training areas were embarrassed by lack
of ambulances, for in general there was a great ambulance shortage, especially
when a division first occupied an area. Thus the 90th Division received no
ambulances until just before it moved into the lines, 19 and the 71st Division
(except when it was able for a few days to use ambulances borrowed from
another division) had a similar experience. Sections of the United States
Army Ambulance Service were assigned temporarily to some divisions. 19
When the earlier divisions arrived in France, War Department Tables
of Organization did not provide a divisional medical supply unit, but the
necessity for this was so evident that one was established in each division
then in France. 23 Later such a unit was prescribed by the Tables of Organ-
ization which assigned it to the sanitary train. 23 At first the demands of
the division supply units on the Is-sur-Tille depot were very great, because
all of the Medical Department organization of the division needed to be
brought up to standard. On the other hand, when divisions prepared to
90 FIELD OPERATIONS
move to the trenches some of the supplies used in the training areas were
salvaged, for only mobile equipment was taken to the front.
Conditions forced many changes in supplies within the divisions, nor
were divisions alike in their distribution or use of supplies. Generally speak-
ing, the total weight of equipment, as stipulated in the Manual for the
Medical Department, was reduced when a division prepared to leave a
training area; but on the contrary there were increases in the weight of
certain supplies, such as blankets, litters, and dressings of the larger sizes.
Automatic replenishment of supplies by means of returning empty am-
bulances was worked out to a certain extent in the training areas, but this
system was developed to a much higher degree when divisions moved into
the lines.
When the first divisions arrived in France there were no attempts at
specialization in their field hospital service, but later certain field hospitals
in each division were specialized after receiving equipment for the treatment
of gassed and surgical cases, respectively. 24
The Medical Department organizations of the Second Corps turned in
their equipment and were refitted to conform to British standards. Their
regimental detachments and their sanitary trains were reorganized. By
consolidation of one field hospital and one ambulance company, a unit was
formed similar to the field ambulance of the British, and two of these were
assigned to the division from whose sanitary train they had been organized.
The surplus field hospitals and ambulance companies, two of each per division.
were detached from the British Expeditionary Forces and assigned to the
American Expeditionary Forces in France. 25
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT TRAINING
Training began immediately after divisions reached their respective areas
and was very intensive. Generally speaking, training of the Medical De-
partment was handicapped by the necessity of inaugurating and supervising
sanitary measures and of operating infirmaries and hospitals. Also, the
wide dispersion of that department in a division precluded the assembly of
its sanitary train except when it participated in divisional maneuvers, and
even then a part of the train usually was obliged to remain in attendance
at the camp hospital or to perform routine evacuation service. Thus the am-
bulance section of the 26th Division was located at LifFol le Grand, two of
its field hospitals at Bazoilles-sur-Meuse, a third at Neufchateau, and a fourth
in a rear area. 11 Later, one of its field hospitals operated as a camp hospital
at LifFol le Grand. Similarly, the sanitary train of the 1st Division was dis-
persed in three villages, included in its Infantry area, while one of its field
hospitals operated as a camp hospital in a fourth, also a part of the division
medical personnel remained with the Artillery in another area from that oc-
cupied by the Infantry. 13 For these and other reasons, training of the Medi-
cal Department varied considerably in thoroughness and scope and in the
relative amount of stress laid on different subjects.
In some divisions there was little Medical Department training except
drills and in gas defense. So far as possible, however, extensive and thorough
GENERAL VIEW OP MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 91
schedules of training were thoroughly followed, as in the 1st Division, whose
sanitary train conducted or participated in elaborate maneuvers covering a
wide area and lasting over a considerable period. 26 Ordinarily, Medical De-
partment organizations of a division conducted terrain exercises in conjunc-
tion with line troops ; and constant instruction was given to commissioned and
enlisted Medical Department personnel, as the case might be, in such subjects
as hygiene, sanitation, nursing, ward and mess management, treatment of
gassing, pathology and treatment of wounds and wound infection, trench
foot, road sketching, and first aid. In this last subject, which was specially
for enlisted men, particular stress was laid on control of hemorrhage, treat-
ment of fractures and dislocations, and the application of splints. Consultants
gave instructions in their respective specialties. The training of the divisions
which first arrived in France was more thorough than that of those which
came later, as the need for all troops on the firing line was increasingly urgent
after the spring of 1918. 27
Throughout, training in open warfare was stressed, but different divisions
emphasized certain other items to different degrees, so far as was possible
under the schedule. Thus the 1st Division gave special attention to the
physical development of troops, to first-aid, and to degassing. 26
In the 32d Division special attention was given to treatment of fractures
and to the application of different kinds of splints. Instruction in this divi-
sion, as was the case in others, was in continuation of that already given in
the United States, supplemented by that prescribed by bulletins issued by
General Headquarters and by drills and maneuvers. 28 Some medical officers
of this division were assigned to French hospitals to learn war surgery. The
36th Division gave special attention to training litter bearers of the line. 29
Training of its sanitary troops included lectures, map reading, and field
sketching. Also much attention was given to coordination of the Medical
Department with the line in the care and removal of casualties and to the
instruction of all troops in the application of shell-wound packets. Some
divisions were largely trained by the French. In practically all divisions
medical officers gave lectures to the troops. Some divisions sent officers from
regimental medical detachments and the sanitary train to the sanitary school
at Langres, but others did not. Officers who had attended the school gave
instruction to those that remained in the divisional training area, and these
relayed it to others. 27
The amount of instruction which the medical officers received varied
considerably. Thus the medical officers of the 36th Division received but two
general lectures, one of which was given by the divisional orthopedist. 29 Other
instruction in this division was given by the medical officers of their organi-
zations among themselves. In the 91st Division medical officers were assem-
bled for but three general lectures. 30 Laboratory officers were sent for
instruction to the Army laboratory at Dijon.
Ordinarily, when a division was withdrawn from the lines for rest and
renewed training, a conference of all the medical officers of the division was
held, as in the 3d Division, after its operations in the Marne area, with a view-
to improvement of service and thorough instruction in the lessons learned at
92 FIELD OPERATIONS
the front. 31 The animal-drawn ambulance company of this division was des-
ignated by the division surgeon as a training and replacement unit for other
Medical Department organizations of the division.
In the British areas, our organizations, after replacing their supplies with
British equipment and organizing to conform to the British standard, Mere
trained in conformity with British methods of warfare. This training Avas
very thorough: it included the following subjects: Instruction in the British
system of collection and evacuation of wounded; performance of regimental
ambulance service for troops in the trenches; assignment of detachments of
ambulance companies to British dressing stations and to bearer posts; tem-
porary assignment of medical officers to British medical units and the opera-
tion of these units by them under British supervision; assignment to field
ambulances at the front; detail of officers to the Army sanitary school at
Langres and attendance at other schools where lectures and drills were given
in such subjects as gas defense, operation of the evacuation service, bathing,
disinfestation. provision and operation of laundries, methods of cleaning
clothing, etiology, pathology and treatment of trench fever and trench foot.
and treatment of fractures and wounds. In connection with these lectures
demonstrations were given of surgical and sanitary equipment. 32
SANITARY SQUADS
The first regulations concerning sanitary squads as distinct military enti-
ties of our Army were published in the Manual for the Medical Department.
1911. These instructions, which were general in character, contemplated that
the personnel of these units would be drawn from medical organizations on
the line of communications; would be under the direct control of the chief
surgeon of the line of communications; and would be charged with the super-
vision of sanitation, operation of sanitary apparatus, selection of water, dis-
posal of wastes, and under certain circumstances the performance of duties of
sanitary detachments. The edition of the manual published in 1916 prescribed
that these units be organized on the line of communications at such places as
might be necessary; that they consist, under the immediate command of a
medical officer, of enlisted men of the Hospital Corps and such numbers of
other enlisted men and civilian laborers as circumstances required ; that they be
charged with the duties mentioned above; and that they be not employed to
relieve regimental and other sanitary organizations of the responsibility of
providing for the sanitation of their own camps.
On December 3, 1917, sanitary squads were provided in the proportion of
two for each division, each squad to consist of the following personnel: One
officer, 4 noncommissioned officers, 20 privates, and 2 chauffeurs. 33 Though
these squads accompanied their respective divisions to France, and at first ac-
companied them to the front, they were designated in June, 1918, as organiza-
tions belonging to the Services of Supply, 34 and thereafter thev r were used
to assist the sanitary inspectors of divisions, or, later, the town majors (bil-
leting officers), in the performance of their sanitary duties as these were pre-
scribed in General Orders, No. 18, G. H. Q., A. E. ¥., January 31, 1918. Town
majors belonged to the Services of Supply, and were permanently assigned to
GENERAL VIEW Ob' MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 93
the training areas through which the successive divisions passed. The eventual
relationship of the sanitary squads to these officers and to the authorities of
the division is shown by the following communications from the office of the
chief surgeon, A. E. F. :
July 16, 1918 : " Sanitary squads are Services of Supply organizations,
and while at present some are attached to divisions it is only a question of time
before they will be removed and used for Services of Supply purposes entirely.
No equipment has been designated." 3 "
August 5, 1918 : " It is the intention to use all sanitary squads for the
various divisional areas and hospital centers, etc. The sanitary squad should
not accompany the division when it moves to the front or at any other time
unless the area is being totally abandoned. While in the divisional area the
sanitary squad should be under the control of the division surgeon." 3G
September 3, 1918: " The sanitary squads will remain with a division until
it goes into the line. Thereafter they will be separated from the division,
remaining in the divisional area. The idea is to have sanitary squads with
each divisional area that are familiar with the conditions and remain there
constantly. 37
October 1, 1918 : " It is not the policy to detach sanitary squads from
divisions which are serving permanently in the Services of Supply." 3S
In a number of divisions and divisional areas, as there was at first no clear
lonception of the duties of sanitary squads, these squads were required to per-
form the duties of prisoner fatigue details, to do general police or miscellaneous
work only remotely connected with sanitation. Later, when responsible
officers became better educated in the matter and came to appreciate the value
of trained men in promoting sanitation, members of these squads were em-
ployed to a progressively greater degree in educating troops in the measures
necessary to maintain health, the construction and operation of bathing and
disinfesting plants, supervision of disposal of sewage, garbage, and refuse,
sanitary inspections, and cognate duties." 9 Such activities as care of bath-
houses and laundry and disinfesting plants and conservancy outside of divi-
sional areas, it was soon established, properly pertained to the Quartermaster
Department. 40
When a division, well trained in sanitation, occupied an area, the sani-
tary squads, with the concurrence of the zone major, were used for any neces-
sary work, the nature of their service being influenced by existing conditions.
Intervals between particular periods of activity were spent often in estimating
the actual billeting space per man available for troops in the areas, for this
information proved to be of considerable value not only when divisions entered
these areas for the first time but also when they reentered them from the
line. 41
The men of the sanitary squads were encouraged to enlarge their opportuni-
ties and to use their own discretion in the formulation of plans which might
yield the best results under differing circumstances. They were given a clear
outline of work that they were expected to perform, the details to be filled in
by them as conditions indicated.
94 FIELD OPERATIONS
COMBAT DIVISIONS ON THE MARCH
In general, the duties of the Medical Department of a division on the
march had been adequately outlined in the Manual for the Medical Depart-
ment, which was published prior to our entrance into the World "War. How-
ever, because of the unique situation that existed in the American Expedi-
tionary Forces, there were, necessarily, some divergences from the principles
outlined in the manual.
It was the exception rather than the rule for a division as a whole to
march when changing from one area or sector to another. Railroads usually
were used in the transportation of divisional troops from base ports to their
training areas near the front; and. because of the imperative demands of the
World War, motor transportation was utilized to a great extent for quick
transport of troops from one part of the front to another. At times, when
a division moved, marching, motor transportation, and railroads were all
used. For present purposes the change of locality of a division is considered
marching, since in no other way can the duties of the Medical Department
connected with this activity be briefly covered.
In short, the duties of the Medical Department on the march are to lender
first aid where required, to transport the sick and wounded, and to make
suitable disposition of them on arrival in camp. 42 The coordination of the
discharge of these responsibilities by the various Medical Department organi-
zations of the division is the function of the divisional surgeon.
Back of the front lines, when our divisions moved from one location to
another in France, it was not the custom to make use of field hospitals of the
divisions for the reception and care of the sick and wounded at the end of each
day ? s march. The necessity for this was obviated because there existed in
France sufficient immobile hospitals in close proximity to the routes which
divisions took in moving from one area to another, thus permitting of imme-
diate evacuation from the moving columns to hospitals. There being, then, no
necessity for using field hospitals en route, the sanitary train moved as a
unit, frequently being left behind the division for a day or two to care for
and evacuate its sick to near-by hospitals. When the troop movement was
made by train the sanitary train moved overland. 43 ' 44
Usually, ambulances were assigned to regiments on the march. The num-
ber so assigned varied, as did the type of ambulance. Some divisions used
animal-drawn ambulances for work connected with marching troops, others
used motor ambulances.
The following extract from the report of a division surgeon illustrates
the use made of animal-drawn ambulances in connection with a marching
division : 44
Before a march animal-drawn ambulances were distributed to regiments, and were
used just in the rear of marching columns to pick up such cases requiring attention as
" fell out." Motor ambulances could not be used immediately behind troops because of
the impossibility of running them at the low speed required. These last-mentioned vehicles
remained with the other motorized elements of organizations and picked up such cases
as required hospitalization and evacuated them to hospitals in the rear. These cases
to be evacuated were left with a member of the Medical Department detachment at
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 95
definite places on the road. As a rule it was the experience of medical officers that very
few hospital cases were picked up on inarches. Such a condition was obviated by careful
examination of all potential cases of that character before the movement began. One
great advantage of the presence of an animal-drawn ambulance with moving troops was
the fact that a medical officer could examine and, generally, administer all necessary treat-
ment to minor cases in the moving ambulance without getting out of touch with his
organization. In many instances the men so picked were able to return to their
companies after they had been given brief attention and a short rest in the ambulance
and complete the march with no further trouble.
On the other hand, animal-drawn ambulances were not so favorably
considered in other divisions, as evidenced by the following' extract from the
report of a division surgeon (2Cth Division) : 43
The division left Soissons March 18, 1918, and detrained between Brienne-le-Chateau
and Bar-sur-Aube. There was to be a maneuver, with practice in entrainment, detrain-
ment, and a march in several columns toward the Marne against a hypothetical enemy.
Although there was a military problem to solve, the real work consisted of maintaining
the supply of rations, reclothing the division, and evacuating the sick while moving away
from the railway. A considerable amount of clothing left in the hands of the Medical
Department after the treatment of gas cases was distributed at this time. Although the
marches were long and there were many cases of sore feet, due to worn-out shoes or
to improperly fitted ones, it was noted that the physical condition of the men improved
at once after getting away from the dugouts and the strain of battle which they had
endured at Soissons.
This move gave the Medical Department its lesson in functioning while covering
long distances by train, by truck, and by marching, with coincidental sanitary activities,
long runs to hospitals, and care of transportation. Here was shown the uselessness of
horse-drawn as compared with motor transportation. The horse-drawn ambulances
which had been attached to the Artillery regiments proved finally to be of some value
acting as portable aid stations in open warfare, and could be immediately used for
ambulance service over short hauls. The condition of the horses, however, prevented this
latter use except in rare emergencies.
The French transportation authorities refused to permit any medical units to entrain
with the first elements of the division ; this in spite of specific instructions for such entrain-
ment. The result was evacuation of the sick from the entire division had to be accom-
plished with one ambulance. It was fortunate that there were little French hospitals
at both Brienne-le-Chateau and Bar-sur-Aube, the chief detrainment points of the division,
and, until the ambulance companies of the division arrived, that the haul was very short.
During the later days of the maneuver the evacuation of the sick for the most part
was to Chaumont, and at a still later period men were evacuated to the base hospital at
Neufchateau. In view of the shortage of hospital and transport facilities there was
some concern about 175 cases of delayed mustard-gas action, which occurred in this area,
but they proved not to be severe. The 102d Infantry was shelled just before it left
Soissons; it was not until 24 hours after detrainment at Bar-sur-Aube that marching and
perspiring made the burns apparent.
Division headquarters was established at Bar-sur-Aube, and for the first time there
was a distinct separation into two echelons. The commanding general, his aides, and the
general staff sections were billeted in one hotel, the technical staff in another, with junior
officers scattered throughout the town. From then on this division of the headquarters
staff became customary.
Something in the military situation became urgent, and plans for the maneuver
ceased. The troops were marched rapidly to the Rimaucourt area, where a rest was
expected. On arrival the sanitary train was concentrated at La Fauche and Pressous-la-
Fauche. A period of inspection, with attention to equipment and instruction of personnel,
would have been useful after the disorganization due to the training period. This was not
96 FIELD OPERATIONS
accomplished, however, and on March 31, 1918, the division was put aboard trucks and
trains and sent to the Tonl sector. The transportation of the sanitary train traveled
over the roads.
There were occasions when the sanitary train was removed from control
of the division surgeon while the division was on the march. Such an instance
was reported by the division surgeon. 1st Division, when that division moved
to its assembly area near Beauvais in July, 1918." The division had been
moved by truck, and in consequence the troops arrived in the assembly area
well ahead of the division train (of which the sanitary train formed a part).
The effect of this measure was to delay the arrival of the field hospitals and
Medical Department supplies at a time when the division was scheduled to
advance on the enemy within 30 hours, thus preventing the division surgeon
making orderly and complete arrangements for the care of the wounded.
Another instance where ambulances were separated from a division
changing areas occurred when the 2d Division moved in May, 1918, from the
Verdun sector to its new area, of which Chaumont, Oise, was headquarters. 411
The division was relieved from the Verdun sector on May 12, 1918. During
the next four days all organizations had moved by train, truck, or by march-
ing to an area slightly west of Bar-le-Duc. Prior to leaving the Verdun
sector, nine animal-drawn ambulances were assigned to the three regiments
of artillery, to accompany them on the march.
On May 19, 1918, the move to the Marne was begun. The motorized
trains, in convoys of motor cycles, touring cars, ambulances, and trucks,
skirted Paris and after a run of two days arrived in the new division area.
The Infantry, xVrtillery, and animal-drawn trains arrived by rail at the edge
of the area, and reached their destination by marching. Influenza was
epidemic, and the trip in the box cars exposed many of the men. Consequently,
when the troops started on the march, after detraining, a great many of the
men, who had developed the disease, were unable to undertake the march.
The motor ambulances had gone on ahead with the motorized trains, and
liaison with the division surgeon could not be established and regimental
surgeons had difficulty in evacuating those taken sick during the trip. For-
tunately, the distance to division headquarters was not great, and as soon as
possible ambulances were sent to the aid of the regimental surgeons. Sub-
sequent to this experience, the division surgeon, 2d Division, always assigned
ambulances to troops on the march, to remain with them until their billets
or entraining points were reached. 46
Because of the slow movement of railroad trains, especially in the zone
of the armies, it was possible to send motorized ambulances to detraining
points prior to the arrival of troops moving by train, so as to evacuate the
sick promptly to hospital, and to accompany the troops on the march from
the detraining points.
On the march the services of the Medical Department personnel attached
to combatant organizations were constantly available to men of those organ-
izations. This availability was effected by distributing the medical personnel
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 97
among the troops, usually by battalion. The ambulance accompanying the
marching troops was used for the care of those dropping out of the marching
column. When the troops went into bivouac, or billets, at the end of the day's
march, regimental surgeons established infirmaries where sick call was held.
Medical Department supplies, carried in the medical carts, were used at this
time. On the other hand, when troops moved by train, contact between the
Medical Department personnel and troops of the division could not be con-
stantly maintained. This was due to the fact that box cars, between which
there was no communication, were used. During brief halts of the train,
medical officers of a regiment had opportunity to visit the men in the cars
and to administer to their needs from emergency medical cases which were
carried by medical officers.
DEPOT AND REPLACEMENT DIVISIONS
MEDICAL SERVICE
The medical service in depot divisions differed essentially from that in
combat divisions and. therefore, requires special description: but as in all
such divisions the medical service was similar, an account of one depot divi-
sion will serve for all. The Medical Department activities of the First Depot
Division (41st Division) have been chosen for description.
First Depot Division
Headquarters of this organization arrived in France December 30, 1917. 47
Fpon landing at Brest individual regiments were scattered throughout the
line of communications, while division headquarters and about one-fourth
of the division, including two field hospitals and two ambulance companies,
moved to La Courtine for station. 47 The weather was bitterly cold, buildings
were indicated, wood was scarce, and there was entire lack of sanitary
apparatus. Xo transportation, either motor or animal-drawn, was available.
The hospital facilities consisted of an empty barrack. In this a camp hospital
was established, equipped with the small amount of the medical combat sup-
plies which it had been possible to brine from the port of embarkation.
Acute infectious diseases which had been prevalent on shipboard per-
sisted at La Courtine. where a number of cases of pneumonia developed and
where several deaths occurred from this disease. 47
Through the chief surgeon of the line of communications, needed equip-
ment was obtained as speedily as possible. The shortage which existed was
due to the fact that most of the supplies which had been brought from the
United States had largely been salvaged en route. The majority had been
taken over at the port of debarkation (Brest) by the medical supply depot.
What was left was received very slowly.
On January 24, 1918. the division left this station for St. Aignan-Xoyers,
where it arrived January 25. 4T This change of station had an immediately
beneficial effect upon the health of the command, which was enhanced by the
fact that a detachment had been sent ahead to provide quarters and supplies.
1357(5— 25 7
98 FIELD OPERATIONS
Troops were billeted in empty buildings, barns, and lofts. While there were
no medical supplies except the small amount which had been brought with
the troops, more were purchased locally.
Three ward units of 50 beds each and 24 ambulances were obtained and
arrangements made to evacuate patients to base hospitals at Chateauroux and
Blois. The former was receiving patients at this time: the. latter was still
in process of organization.
The health of the command steadily improved. Acute infectious diseases
greatly diminished, and in a short time pneumonia ceased to be of
importance.
Hopir.vi. Facilities
At various points throughout the divisional area, buildings were hired
for hospital purposes, and in these the sick were placed upon litters or bed
sacks. Facilities for their care were few at first, but the men were made com-
fortable and carefully looked after. Happily the sick were not numerous
at first nor were their ailments serious. 47
As the troops were billeted in small training detachments throughout
an area covering about 250 square miles, the medical administration of this
territory was divided into three districts, each provided with a district sur-
geon, a district sanitary inspector, and an infirmary of 50 beds. 48 As the
principal infirmary grew, near-by buildings were rented so that finally it
accommodated nearly 200 patients and began to assume the functions of a cen-
tral camp hospital for the area. 4s
During the reorganization of the division, the field hospitals and
ambulance companies, which were numbered from 161 to 164, inclusive, were
detached, sent to the front, and the establishment of camp hospital No. 26 was
begun.'" This camp hospital, which was established April 10, had previously
operated a small infirmary where adequate care of the sick was provided.
It now consisted of 15 Service de Sante buildings, each of which had a
capacity of about 30 beds. After providing space for officers' quarters the oper-
ating room, laboratories, and other hospital departments, the capacity of tin'
hospital proved to he about 300 beds. The personnel for the operation of
this hospital was drawn from the Medical Department of the division. Gen-
erally an important part of this institution was a large dental clinic, later
(July 29) supplemented by the central dental laboratory which was provided
with base laboratory equipment for the purpose of doing prosthetic dental
work. 40 In this clinic a course of instruction was carried on for enlisted den-
tal assistants.
After the camp hospital had been established. Infirmary Xo. 1 was con-
verted into a neurological unit and placed under the direction of the division
neurologist.
The camp hospital was rapidly increased by the addition of new bar-
racks, until by the 1st of September. 1918. it had 1,000 beds. Because of the
appearance of influenza it already had more patients than that, and the over-
flow had to be cared for in tents."
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 99
On September 10 a convalescent hospital was established in the convent
building at Pontlevoy. Hospital accommodations here were 250 beds, with an
anticipated expansion to three times that number."'"
On October 20, 1918, Infirmary No. 3 was established. This infirmary
had a capacity of 300 beds. 00
In the early part of November authority was obtained to enlarge the
camp hospital 900 beds by constructing additional wards, each measuring
30 by 156 feet. The Chateau la Leu was leased in order to accommodate
200 additional patients for the convalescent hospital at Pontlevoy.'"
On November 14. 1918, an infirmary with a capacity of 250 beds was
established at St. Aignan. 52 It occupied a French hospital and a three-
story building formerly used as a school. Personnel for its operation was
drawn from the 304th field hospital, which had been assigned to the divi-
sion as a neurological hospital. As the wards of the neurological hospital
were now almost empty, it was practical to close it by transferring its patients
to Camp Hospital No. 26.'" 2
Changes in Medical Department Operations
On March 7, 1918, the name of the division was changed from the 41st
Division to First Corps Depot Division." Its chief function was to receive.
classify, equip, and train troops for combat divisions; and in order that this
might be accomplished, casuals from the United States and patients dis-
charged from base hospitals were forwarded to it.
In order to meet the special duties incumbent upon the Medical Depart-
ment of the division, it now became necessary to make certain changes in
its operation. Its chief functions were now as follows: 48 (1) The care of
the sick of the permanent organization and of the casuals passing through the
area. (2) Sanitation of the area. (3) The removal of the physically unfit
from combat organizations and assignment of them to appropriate duties.
(4) The training of the enlisted men of the medical detachments prior to
sending them to the front for duty.
On the last of July. 1918, the area was divided into six districts in
order to promote medical administration, and in each of these districts a
district surgeon and a district sanitary officer were assigned."
Incoming troops were received at the classification camp, where each
man was given a physical examination/" Those found physically fit were
passed on, while the physically unfit were sent, if necessary, to hospital for
treatment or to the disability board for classification.
The military population of the divisional area was increasing, and in
order to meet its sanitary requirements it became necessary to augment the
size of the sanitary squads by details from the line, but as this necessarily
interfered with the training of these details the sanitary squads were then
entirely reorganized. Their original personnel was greatly increased by
men in class B or C being transferred to the Medical Department for the
period of their service in sanitary organizations. These squads now took
•>ver all the police work of the area except the care of kitchens and billets.
100 FIELD OPERATIONS
Their work included such tasks as the procurement and supervision of water
bags and shower baths, cleaning of the streets, care of latrines, disposition of
wastes, and similar duties. 54 Because of the difficulty in enforcing proper
sanitation of the towns, the Medical Department took over complete control
of all police work therein and performed it as in the area at large through its
sanitary squads.
As the number of casuals passing through the area was very great, some-
times numbering as many as 4,500 a day, the quarantine for infectious diseases
became very difficult. The usual system had to be abandoned.
When orders were received, as was the case, that the division hereafter
would receive men in classes B, C, D. and organize them into companies of
2 officers and 150 men each, another disability board was appointed with
station at the special training battalion at Mehers. 52
Four American steam sterilizers were procured, and provision was made
at the classification camp that all men in classes B and C have their clothing
sterilized before leaving the division. Arrangements were also made whei'eby
they would be given new underwear and class A equipment except rifles,
helmets, and gas masks. 52
In order to avoid great delay in the movement of troops and overcrowding
of the area, a medical officer was appointed division epidemiologist. He was
authorized to issue necessary orders in the name of the commanding general. 54
Cases of infectious diseases among casuals were sent to the hospitals, and only
the immediate contacts were isolated. When epidemics occurred in the per-
manent personnel, quarantine of companies and other organizations was
practiced when necessary.
Many casuals arrived in a dirty condition because of their long journey
from the United States and the inadequacy of bathing facilities en route.
Some were infested with lice. This situation was met by establishing a dis-
infesting station and portable shower baths in a local canning factory. The
clothing of the men was treated by steam under pressure in the vats that had
been used by the plant.
On July 9 casual officers and enlisted men of the Medical Department
were ordered to report to this division for classification as replacements instead
of to the Medical Department camp at Blois, as had been the former practice. 18
On duly "26, 1918. 100 officers and 2,000 enlisted men of the Medical
Department reported at the sanitary school which had been established at
Thesee.
The sanitary personnel of six divisions was forwarded to the depot
division for disposition, one field hospital, and two ambulance companies. The
organizations so received were skeletonized, each to consist of one officer, one
noncommissioned officer, and five privates: the rest of the personnel was used as
replacements.
On the 24th of September plans for a cantonment at Thesee to accommo-
date 2.000 troops were completed, and a camp was established there to receive
the sanitary troops which formerly had been scattered throughout the town. 5 "
In order to combat the influenza, the following measures were adopted
on October 22. 1918 :
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPABTMENT ORGANIZATION 101
All troops upon arrival were given a physical examination. Seriously
sick were immediately transferred to the hospital, and the slightly sick were
placed in certain barracks at the classification camp, which had been set aside
for the purpose. Here they were kept under the observation of a physician
and ward attendants. If they recovered within a few days, they were sent
to their organizations, otherwise they were sent to the hospital. This meas-
ure had for its object the segregation and observation of cases before the
actual onset of serious disease. Whenever it was practicable to do so.
troop trains passing through the area en route to other destinations were
stopped and the men on board were taken off and given a medical examination.
They were permitted to dry their clothing and were given a hot meal.' 1 The
men of the command who showed minor symptoms were carefully observed,
and those with slight coughs were segregated in separate billets. Divisional
orders were issued that men sleep head to foot. Twenty square feet of floor
space was the minimum allowance, but provisions were made for -40 square
feet where this could be afforded. Officers of the day were required to inspect
billets at night in order to see that proper ventilation was maintained, and
that the men were sleeping head to foot. 51
Orthopedic Training Battalion
On March 23. 1918, a special orthopedic battalion was organized at
Mareuil, which was within the division area. 40 This unit was organized on
military lines by the assistance of the chief consultant in orthopedics for
the American Expeditionary Forces. The training was conducted by medical
officers. The purpose of this orthopedic training battalion was to rectify,
or at least improve, the condition of the men suffering from flat foot or other
orthopedic disabilities. Men sent to it were selected from the classification
camp of the division or in a few instances transferred to it from other divi-
sions. Members of the orthopedic battalion were on a duty status. Within
a month its personnel rose to 1.000 men. On April 29, this detachment was
moved to Mehers, where its capacity was enlarged to 2,500 and shelter pro-
vided in tentage and temporary barracks. * !> In addition to the orthopedic
cases, convalescents of all types were now sent to the camp for recuperation
and training, with successful results.
VENEREA!. LABOR ('AMI'
A number of casuals had venereal diseases. To care for these a venereal
labor camp was established during the month of July, 1918; and while all
acute cases of this character were, isolated and assigned to light duties
while undergoing treatment, such cases as required hospital attention were
sent to venereal wards in the camp hospitals/' 5
By October 10. the venereal labor camp had 950 patients under treat-
ment. The greater part were accommodated in tents, but generally some per-
manent buildings were constructed. To this camp were sent all patients suf-
fering from venereal diseases who did not require rest in bed or surgical treat-
ment. Its occupants came from the depot division and from the casuals
102 FIELD OPERATIONS
passing through the camp. On October 11. its designation was changed to
medical labor camp, the former nomenclature being objectionable as a mail
address, both for patients and for attending personnel. 5 "'
First Depot Division Discontinued
The First Depot Division was abolished December 26, 1918, pursuant to
telegraphic instructions, headquarters. Services of Supply. 56 Units of the
41st Division were ordered to reorganize with as many of the personnel of
that division as remained in the divisional area, supplemented by a sufficient
number of casuals to bring them up to authorized strength. Officers and en-
listed men who desired to remain in France and requested to do so were trans-
ferred to the first replacement depot, which thereafter was to replace the First
Depot Division. 50
REFERENCES
(1) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, 8.
(2) Report of activities G-l, G. II. Q., A. E. F., undated, Vol. II. 3.
(3) Ibid.. 23.
(4) Ibid., 24.
(5) G. O. No. 9, G. H. Q.. A. E. F., January 15, 1918.
(6) Report of activities G-l, G. H. Q., A. E. F., undated. Vol. II, 27.
(7) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, I'art 1, 8. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(8) Report of Medical Department activities, 20th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I, 3. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(9l Ibid.. Part I, 2.
(10) Report of Medical Department activities, 39th Division, A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon. 39th division, undated, 3. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(11) Report of Medical Department activities. 20th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon. 20th Division, undated. I'art I. 4. On file.
Historical Division, S. G. <).
(12) Report on activities of G— 4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H.
Q., A. E F., by Col. S. H. AVadhams. M. C, chief of section. December 31. 1918. 22
On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(13) Report of Medical Department activities. 1st Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon. 1st Division, undated, Part I. 39. On file.
Historical Division. S. (J. O.
(141 Report of Medical Department activities. 42(1 Division, A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon. 42d Division, undated. Part III. 10. On file.
Historical Division. S. G. O.
(15) Report of Medical Department activities. 82(1 Division, A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon. 82d Division, undated. 9. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(1(5) Hei>ort of Medical Department activities. 85th Division, A. E. F. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon. 85th Division, undated, 48. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(17) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon. 1st Division, undated. I'art I. 7. On file. Histori-
cal Division. S. G. O.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 103
(18) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. I'\. prepared under tile
direction of the division surgeon, 2d Division, undated. Part I. 7. On tile. Histori-
cal Division. S. G. O.
(19) Report of Medical Department activities. 90th Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 90th Division, undated, Part I. 2. On file.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(20) Report of Medical Department activities, 26th Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 26th Division, undated, Part I. 6. On tile.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(21) Report of Medical Department activities, 42d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 42d Division, undated. Part I. 2. On tile.
Historical Division. S. G. O.
(22) Equipment Manuals for Service in Europe. Series A, No. 18, Sanitary Train, General
Headquarters, A. E. F.
(23) Tahles of Organization and Equipment, U. S. Army, Series A, Table 28. April 17.
1918.
(24) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds. M. ('.. undated. On file.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(25) Report on activities of G-4^P>. medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H.
Q.. A. E. F., by Col. S. H. AVadhams, M. C, chief of section. December 31, 1018,
58. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(26) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 1st Division, undated. Part I. 11. On file,
Historical Division. S. G. O.
(27) Report on Medical Department training in the A. E. F., by Col. B. K. Ashford.
M. C. undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(28) Report of Medical Department activities. 32d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 32d Division, undated, Part II, 38. On file.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(291 Report of Medical Department activities, 36Ui Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 36th Division, undated. Part I, 99. On file.
Historical Division. S. G. O.
(30) Report of Medical Department activities, 91st Division, A. E. E., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 91st Division, undated, 2. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(31) Report of Medical Department activities, 3d Division. A. E. F., prepared under tht
direction of the division surgeon. 3d Divison. undated. Part V, 2. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
1 32) Report of Medical Department activities. Second Army Corps, by Col. C. C. Collins.
M, C, corps surgeon, undated. 3. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(38) Letter from Surgeon General, U. S. Army, to The Adjutant General, December 3,
1917. Subject: Sanitary Squads. On tile, Record Room, S. G. O.. 322.91-21.
(Sanitary Squads).
(3-D G. O. No. 85, G. H. Q., A. E. P., June 3. 191,8.
(35) First indorsement from the chief surgeon, A. E. F„ to the division surgeon, 82d
Division. July 16. 1918. Subject: Sanitary Squads. On tile. A. G. O.. World War
Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Eiles 322.324).
(36) First indorsement from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the division surgeon, 79th
Division. August 5, 1918. Subject: Sanitary Squads. On file. A. G. ().. World War
Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 322,324).
(37) First indorsement, from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the division surgeon, 80th
Division, September 3, 1918. Subject: Sanitary Squads. On file, A. G. O., World
War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 322.324).
(38) First indorsement, from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the division surgeon, 6th
Depot Division, October 1, 1918. Subject: Sanitary Squads. On file, A. G. O.
World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 322.324).
104 FIELD OPERATIONS
(30) Report on the activities of sanitary squads. A. E. P.. by Maj. Henry Pleasant, jr.,
M. C, undated, 3. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(40) Ibid., 5.
(41) Ibid., 20.
(42) Manual for the Medical Department, 1916, par. 635.
(43) Report of Medical Department activities, 26th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 26th Division, undated, Part I, 11. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(44) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 1st Division, undated, Part II, 36, 37. On file.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(45) Report of Medical Department activities, 26th Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 26th Division, undated, Part I, 11. 12, 13. On
tile. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(46) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division. A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 2d Division, undated, Part I, 20. On file. His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(4T) Report of Medical Department activities, 41st Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 41st Division, undated, 4. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(48) Ibid., 5.
(40) Ibid., 6.
(50) Ibid., 9.
(51) Ibid., 11.
(52) Ibid., 12.
(53) Ibid., 8.
(54) Ibid., 7.
(55) Ibid., 10.
(56) Ibid., 13.
CHAPTER IV
MEDICAL SERVICE OF THE DIVISION IN COMBAT
The following discussion of methods generally employed in divisions in
combat for the care and evacuation of sick and wounded comprehends im-
portant details of the usual practices. As will be noted, no one method univer-
sally was employed: much was left to the initiative, discretion, and resource-
fulness of the divison surgeon and his subordinates. Xo orders standardizing
the methods in question were issued by higher authority except to a limited
degree by corps surgeons and to a lesser degree by army surgeons. Though,
in general, the system followed was that prescribed in Field Service Regulations
find, in more detail, in the Manual for the Medical Department, the divisions
differed not only in the methods of their so doing, but individually they em-
ployed different methods at different times under varying circumstances, both
in trench and in open warfare. This went so far that methods in one regiment
sometimes differed for certain reasons from those of other regiments in the
:;ame division. It is not practicable to discuss in this chapter all the numerous
differences in the details of medical service which are noted later in the chap-
ters having to with individual engagements. Here only the most important
differences in methods will be mentioned briefly. For further details the reader
should consult subsequent chapters.
ORDERS PRESCRIBING METHODS IN PARTICULAR DIVISIONS
Before, going into further details it will perhaps be best to quote certain
orders prescribing methods actually followed by particular divisions.
In the 42d Division the following plan for the evacuation of sick and
wounded and for furnishing a forward How of medical supplies was prepared
by the division surgeon April 4, 1918 1 1
MEDICAL SEKVICE FROM FRONT TO REAR
For medical service from tlie front the following will he observed:
Front line trenches. — Wherever possible first aid and splints — when the nature of
the injury renders the hitter necessary- will be applied where the man falls. Hemorrhage
will he controlled at the earliest possible moment. If we can avoid carrying a man with a
fractured extremity for even a foot, until a splint has been applied, we will save much pain.
Mi'K-k. infection, and damage to tissue from jagged ends of bone. The patient will be
carried by the regimental medical personnel, or by men from combatant troops detailed
tot that purpose, from place of injury to the battalion aid post.
Battalion aid post. — Here any attention that may be necessary will be given — first
aid, splints, and control of hemorrhage, if not already done. See that dressings and splints
are properly adjusted. Diagnosis tag will be made out and attached by the first medical
officer or member of the Medical Department who treats the man. Antitetanic serum will
lie administered and proper notation made by a " T " marked on the forehead with in-
delible pencil and the letters "A. T. S.," with date and hour on diagnosis tag. Warmth
1307G— J5 S 105
106 FIELD OPERATIONS
will be administered to the patient. Tins is of tlie utmost importance in the prevention of
shock. Patient will not be removed from litter, but another litter, with three blankets
and whatever other supplies have been used on the case, will be sent back to the trendies
by the bearers to replace those used. Patient will then be carried by litter bearers
detailed from the ambulance section, 117th Sanitary Train, to the ambulance dressing
station.
Ambulance dressing station. — This will be established at the farthest point forward
that ambulances can reach with reasonable safety. Here any further attention that may
be needed will be given. The patient, however, will be disturbed as little as possible and
will not be removed from the litter. Warmth will be constantly maintained and hot
drinks given to those able to take them but withheld in abdominal cases. The same system
of exchange will operate. The ambulance dressing station will return by the litter
bearers a duplicate of everything that came with the patient. In addition it will send
by these bearers any supplies that the medical personnel at the front may require. Tc
this end it will comply, as far as its supplies permit, with any request for supplies that
may reach it from the front. To avoid confusion and mistakes these requests should
preferably be by written memorandum. Reserve supplies of antitetanic serum, dressings,
and other necessities will be kept on band for this purpose. Antitetanic serum will be
given to those who have not yet received it and the proper notations made as noted above.
At the ambulance dressing station cases are selected for distribution to the various
hospitals. They will be placed in an ambulance and transported direct to the appropriate
hospital.
Ambulance service. — In addition to ambulance service noted under ambulance dressing
stations, ambulances will be stationed at various points through the area, to be known
as ambulance posts. The location of these ambulance posts will be shown in a later
communication. These ambulances will transport to hospitals the sick arising in the
various organizations in their vicinity, also wounded that may occur in a locality which
ivould not naturally drain into an ambulance dressing station.
Field hospitals operating the various hospitals noted above. — These hospitals will be
prepared to receive and care for sick and wounded at any hour of the day or night.
They will keep a reserve supply of material on hand to replace the supplies on ambulances,
as noted above. Evacuation of patients to base hospitals will be done only upon direction
of the division surgeon, 42d Division.
The following points are emphasized:
(a) Surgical operations are prohibited except in a hospital. Treatment at the front
and during evacuation to the hospital will be limited to first aid, splints, control of
hemorrhage, and shock. Probing for bullets or fragments of any sort is expressly
forbidden.
(6) Every effort will be made to secure delivery of the patient to the proper hospital
at the earliest possible moment after receipt of the injury. Saving of time during the
early period of the injury may mean life or death of the patient.
(c) During the evacuation of the patient he must be kept as comfortable as it is
possible to provide. He must be disturbed as little as possible, and in any event, after
the first dressings and splints are applied, only so much as is necessary to see that the
dressings, splints, etc., have been properly applied and continue in good shape.
(<J) Warmth will be continuously applied. This is our best preventive for shock. It
will be secured by hot-water hags, alcohol or oil stoves, hot bottles, etc.
(e) A constant flow of supplies will be kept up from rear to front lines by the system
of exchange noted above.
The following order concerning evacuations was issued in the 3d Division.
July 23, 1918 : «
Regimental surgeons will keep in touch at all times with the ambulance company
dressing stations which evacuate their wounded. They will instruct their assistants,
commissioned and enlisted, concerning the position of the particular dressing station
winch evacuates the wounded from the battalion t<> which their assistants are attached.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 107
When a cull is made for an ambulance the surgeon making the call will state explicitly
the number of cases to be evacuated, which of them are litter and which sitting cases.
He will also give sufficiently clear directions concerning location of the wounded to enable
the ambulance driver to reach his destination with the least possible delay.
Redressing of wounds in the main dressing station should be reduced to a minimum.
Arrest of hemorrhage is the principal cause for redressing. Dressings apparently in
place should not be disturbed.
On September 6, 1918. additional instructions on this same subject were
issued in the 3d Division, as follows:' 1
Method of supply while in action. — Regimental and battalion surgeons requiring
medical supplies for their battalion aid stations during action will send request for the
same to the advance ambulance dressing station evacuating their aid stations. The first
ambulance returning to the triage will carry this request to the medical supply officer,
who will immediately forward the necessary supplies by an ambulance returning to the
advance ambulance dressing station. Wheel litters are an excellent means of transporting
supplies to battalion aid stations. If necessary to abandon supplies during movement,
they should he turned in at the advance ambulance dressing station.
When calling for ambulances be definite in giving location of the wounded, the number
of sitting cases, and number of lying cases. Do not send for ambulances until enough
wounded have been collected to fill an ambulance. A few hours of rest, after dressing
and nourishment, while waiting for an ambulance is not detrimental and helps to over-
come the first shock. Purely exhausted men after being given food and a few hours' sleep
at the battalion aid station will often be able to return to duty.
Do not be in too much of a hurry to make a diagnosis of gas poisoning.
Regimental aid stations may usually be dispensed with to advantage, leaving the
regimental surgeons free to keep up constant liaison between battalion aid stations and
advanced ambulance dressing stations and to encourage as well as to supervise battalion
aid surgeons at their work. Conserve the energy of your assistants and yourself by
working proper shifts and taking every opportunity when off duty to sleep.
Antitctanic serum must be given at battalion aid stations. Hake proper notation on
the diagnosis tag and also place a " T," with indelible pencil or iodine, upon patient's
forehead after the serum has been given.
Battalion aid stations should be separated from battalion P. (!.
Tlie division surgeon should be informed promptly of any loss in medical personnel.
If telephone communication is not available, messages for the division surgeon will be
transmitted from the advance ambulance dressing station by ambulance returning to the
triage.
Intelligent men should be trained as runners. If a verbal message is sent, have the
messenger repeat it to the sender in order to be sure that lie thoroughly understands it.
Send written messages except when the substance of them would betray matters of
military importance.
The following report of the methods adopted in the 30th Regiment is
descriptive of the evacuation service in many regiments:*
Advanced aid station company posts were in line with the troops. The first and
most essential prerequisite for evacuation from front lines to battalion aid stations was
tile proper location of the latter. These were placed at the most advanced point to which
an ambulance could possibly go; often within one-half kilometer of the front, or. again
perhaps, three — rarely four — kilometers away, according to the character of the terrain.
The battalion aid station was never placed in advance of the point reached by ambulances
if this could be avoided. When situated beyond that point the difficulties of evacuation
were doubled. On the Maine in July, 1918, it was found that having the aid station in
advance of the ambulance head fully doubled the number of patients who had to be
removed by litter, for a large number of patients made their own way to the aid station
108 FIELD OPERATIONS
who would not walk farther, and if this station was in advance of ambulances these
patients had to be carried back to them. Tims a large number of wounded, and especially
psychoneurotics, had to be taken by litter to the ambulances, who otherwise would have
walked that distance. Details of litter bearers sent with patients from aid stations back
to ambulances did not return readily through, shell tire and were apt to become dis
organized, whereas when sent forward for patients they returned in the quickest possible
time.
During the defensive battle of the Marne evacuation was by far the most difficult of
any experienced by the 30th Regiment, 3d Division, on account of the extremely heavy
bombardment of the support and reserve positions and the back areas, and the formation
of the terrain, which made it impossible for ambulances to go nearer than three kilometers
to the front, or. during the early part of operations, nearer than four kilometers. Wounded
in the front areas could be carried out only at night, and they had to be carried up a
steep hill through a narrow, winding trail in the woods. The Medical Department
personnel in this battle was wholly Inadequate, each battalion having altogether only
about 20 medical men and bandsmen. No provisions had been made at this time for
furnishing litter bearers from the line troops, although line officers cooperated heartily
with the -Medical Department in furnishing details for this - purpose.
The operation of ambulance companies in the 3d Division is thus described
by the division surgeon: 5
Main dressing stations were usually established from four to six kilometers back
of the front lines, on a good road if possible, with one or more good roads leading
to the front and rear. From these places ambulances, medical officers, and a sufficient
number of enlisted men were sent to points farther to the front, working in cooperation
and at times under direction of the regimental surgeons, but so far as practical it was
found best to keep all ambulance personnel under the direction of the ambulance company
itself, at the same time furnishing the regimental and battalion surgeons with what help
they required. In many instances it was necessary to furnish litter bearers for evacuation
from the farthermost posts toward the front. Here the enlisted personnel of the animal-
drawn ambulance company proved of great value, it having been found impractical to
rise animal-drawn ambulances for evacuations from the line when actually under shell
fire. This was due to the increased hazard incident to slow progress and the distance
it was almost always necessary to transport the wounded.
The litter bearers of the ambulance companies were sometimes in charge of a com-
missioned officer from the ambulance companies, and functioned from the battalion aid
posts back to the farthest advanced ambulance station, which was only far enough to the
rear to be reasonably safe. At other times they were under the control of the regimental
or battalion surgeons, to augment the regimental medical personnel either on account of a
depleted force or to help in the care and transportation of an unusually large number of
casualties.
The commissioned personnel of the animal-drawn ambulance company was likewise
used in replace the battalion surgeons as casualties occurred among them,
At the main dressing station in some instances where facilities would permit, gassed
cases were separated from wounded, all casualties able to take nourishment were given
hot chocolate or hot coffee and other refreshment, antitetanic serum was administered,
wounds were redressed when necessary, tourniquets were looked for and examined, and
only when absolutely necessary, blood vessels were ligated.
Sometimes all of the ambulance companies of a division consolidated. Thus
during the Meuse-Argonne operation all the ambulance companies of the Sanitary Train.
3d Division, were stationed at Montfaucon, maintaining one large main dressing station,
which was operated by one company under the supervision of the director of the ambulance
section.* Every portion of the narrow sector then occupied by the division was accessible
by roads from this point. Two of the motor-ambulance companies functioned from the
regimental and battalion aid stations back to the main dressing station and no farther.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 109
Here all patients were removed from the ambulance and attention was given them by the
medical officers there on duty. These medical officers usually numbered from four to six,
one of them being an orthopedist. Nearly all splints needed readjustment, and many
oases of fractures had not been put in splints before sent to this station because of the
limited facilities for such service at the most advanced posts and the great number of
casualties occurring at times. Nearly all nntitetanie serum was adininstered at the
ambulance company dressing station."
Evacuation of patients from the dressing station to the field hospital was
effected by the motor ambulances of the company operating the station. By
this arrangement a perfect liaison was maintained at all times between the
regimental surgeons and the section headquarters, as well as between the main
dressing station and the field hospitals.
The practice followed by the regimental surgeon, of uotifying ambulance
section headquarters of number, location and character of wounded reduced
to the minimum half loaded ambulances — an important item when the front
was active.
The rate of How of casualties through the dressing stations depended en-
tirely on the resistance encountered by the combatant troops; during a period
of 27 days, when the division was on the offensive, the daily number varied from
">•> to 931." Likewise, the length of time consumed in transporting wounded
from the front lines to field hospitals was subject to wide variation, dependent
on the rapidity with which the troops were advancing, road conditions, whether
day or night, and amount of traffic. It averaged five hours from the front
lines to triage or field hospital during the operation of the 3d Division on the
Marne and two and a half hours for the 27 days that division spent in that of
the Meuse-Argonne area."
The following orders concerning field hospital service were published in
the First Corps, September 3, 15)18. 7 In this corps, the divisional triage was
operated at a dressing station, staffed by the ambulance company section and
such others as the consultants, detailed to that formation.
1. Field hospitals will be utilized as follows during periods of activity. This applies
particularly to open warfare where rapid changes are probable. In sector warfare which
is practically stationary, location of Held hospitals need not follow this plan absolutely.
esj>ecially as to location, which will be determined by the terrain, buildings available,
proximity of evacuation hospital, and other considerations.
2. The four field hospitals of a division will be placed together if conditions of the
terrain permit. They will always be plainly marked by the Red Cross emblem in order
tn protect them from enemy fire. Placing the field hospitals together has been tested in
actual open warfare and found to have certain definite advantages: (o) They are much
more easily located by ambulance drivers. If located at separate points, depending upon
the character of the service they are intended to furnish, ambulances are apt to wander
about and have great difficulty in locating their particular hospital. This of course is
especially true in new country with which drivers are not familiar, (o) The administra-
tion of the hospitals is much simplified by being concentrated at one point, (c) Assistance
from the field hospital in reserve is always immediately available for whichever unit may
have need of such assistance.
The Jield hospitals should be placed as close to the ambulance dressing station as is
reasonably safe.
110 FIELD OPERATIONS
15. The field hospitals will be utilized as follows: (a) Gas hospital. (>)) Hospital for
nontransportable wounded. (c) Hospital for minor sick. Including skin and venereal
diseases, (d) One hospital in reserve.
4. Qas hospital. — One field hospital will he utilized as a gas hospital. To this hospital
will he sent all the gas cases from the triage. Therefore, facilities must be provided to
give them the necessary special treatment required — proper bathing, alkaline treatment,
administration of oxygen, if necessary, venesection. * * *
5. Hospital for nontransportable wounded. — One field hospital will be utilized for the
care of nontransportable wounded. This hospital will be supplied with surgical teams,
female nurses, and an X-ray outfit, in order that proper surgical treatment and care may
he given these cases. To this hospital will be sent direct from the triage only such cases
wtiose transportation farther to the rear will probably mean death. In past experiences,
these cases have usually comprised three classes: («) Sucking chest wounds, (b) Per-
forating abdominal wounds, (c) Severe hemorrhage cases.
Head and spinal cases stand transportation better before operation than after anil
should therefore not be stopped here. There has been a tendency in the past to retain
at this hospital seriously wounded cases who, however, would be able to stand transpor-
tation to the evacuation hospital. This must be discontinued. Only such cases will be
retained as are actually nontransportable. When available, the corps surgeon will detail
to each division an assistant consultant in surgery, who will be the sole judge of what
cases will be operated at this hospital and what cases will be transferred to the evacu-
ation hospital. A shock team will be on duty at this hospital for treatment of all shock
cases both pre and post operative.
6. Hospital for minor sick including skin and venereal diseases. — To this hospital
will he sent only those cases which are minor and which will be fit for duty within four
days. * • *
7. Otic field hospital in reserve. — This will be used to give assistance where needed,
both in personnel and equipment. A detail of 1 medical officer and 10 enlisted men will
he sent to the ambulance dressing station to give the necessary preliminary bathing and
alkaline treatment to mustard-gas cases as may be deemed necesary by the division medi-
cal gas officer on duty at this station. This detail must, of course, be relieved by another
detail at regular intervals, to allow the former to secure the necessary rest and food.
s. * * •
!i. Erchannc of supplies. — It is of utmost importance that a systematic exchange of
supplies as litters, dressings, splints, blankets, hot-water bottles, operating from the front
line all the way back to the final hospital to which the patient is delivered, lie instituted
at once. When a patient is placed in an ambulance, the ambulance orderly must return
to the litter hearers a duplicate of all supplies furnished the patient. Similarly, when
the ambulance delivers the patient to a hospital, the orderly must get from the hospital
a duplicate of all supplies furnished the patient. This must operate at every poitd where
a change of transportation is made. Otherwise the supplies at the front-line positions
will soon bee exhausted and unnecessary delay and suffering result. If this system
of exchange is enforced, there is a constant steady stream of all necessary supplies going
forward and there need be no interruption in the care given to wounded or other oasual-
t i«-s. • • •
Methods employed when troops were enpaged in trench warfare differed
considerably from those followed when they attacked in the open, and for this
reason trench warfare and open warfare will now be considered separately.
It should In' explained, however, that, when troops holding trenches were
heavily attacked, the difference was less marked. Yet always in trench war-
fare, casualties were more localized and Medical Department formations were
more fixed, better equipped, antl better protected than they were when the
troops they accompanied were on the offensive.
GEXERA1. VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 111
TKENCH WARFARE
CARE OF CASUALTIES IN COMPANIES. BATTALIONS, AND REGIMENTS
COMPANY AID
In old, quiet, defensive positions, the front line usually was little more
than a line of outposts lightly held, the remainder of the troops being in
support trendies or in reserve. Sometimes, as in the 5th Division in the
Yosges. a battalion thus held a frontage of 5 km. ('■) miles). s One battalion
surgeon was usually on duty with the advance troops, while the other was
in charge of the battalion aid station. Two enlisted men of the Medical
Department were normally assigned to each company at the front and staffed
what was, in effect, a company aid post located at some sheltered point and
near a communicating trench to the rear." Frequently, it was provided with
some equipment such as litters, splints, bandages, dressings, whale oil, sodium
bicarbonate and a few drugs. The Medical Department enlisted men were pro-
vided with ammonia ampules and instructed in their use,ajid were also instructed
m other elements of first aid. They were ordered promptly to adjust the
respirators of disabled men who had been gassed. The location of the col-
lecting post (company aid post) was made known to the company concerned
and here first aid usually was given. Often, however, especially if casualties
were few, one of the medical attendants stationed here would leave to give
aid to a man where he fell. The function of the company aid post was to
give primary, or. if the patient had already received this, supplementary first
aid, to return to duty men not in need of further treatment, and to prepare
other wounded men for evacuation, grouping those who were able to walk.
Professional aid, as given by the battalion surgeons concerned, was limited
in general to the control of hemorrhage and to the application of dressings
and splints. Those disabled in the front line habitually were brought to the
company aid post (if necessary, on litters carried by company bearers), except
when their wounds had been dressed where they fell and it was easier to
remove them from that place to a battalion aid station.
BATTALION All) STATION
Patients were taken to the battalion aid station from company aid posts
or from the line. It usually was located in a support trench from 240 to 500
yards from the front and so as to be readily accessible from all parts of it
that the station served. (In the 89th Division aid stations for the support
lines of reserve also were provided.) 1 " Normally, there Avas one battalion aid
station for each battalion, and it was located near the communicating trench
to the rear, utilizing any shelter available. Sometimes it was near the battalion
post control, in order that the surgeon might be in close touch with his com-
manding officer, but in some divisions this was expressly forbidden on the
ground that juxtaposition of the two aggravated the danger to both. 11 Some-
times it was much farther back than the distance mentioned above, in order
that it might be accessible to ambulances. When the distance was more than
l.(MH) yards (in the 4th Division 800 yards) relays of litter bearers were utilized.
112
FIELD OPERATIONS
stationed at posts that distance apart. Portage for 1,000 yards was the limit
of a squad's endurance. 12 When available, four litter bearers were employed
to bring patients to the battalion aid station, and if the moving squad was
invisible to the enemy lines the litter was sometimes carried shoulder high.
This portage over rough ground, through winding trenches, and by trails
deep in mud was slow, arduous, and, when the group was exposed to enemy
fire for a considerable time, hazardous. 8 After 10 or 12 hours of such work
under shell fire, bearers often became nervous and exhausted. While
habitually the battalion aid station was located, if possible, at a point acces-
sible by ambulance, this desideratum was regarded of secondary importance,
the primary essential being such proximity to the front that the wounded
would receive prompt attention.
Fin. 13. — Hattalinn aid station. 101st Infantry. 26th Division, Bois de la Voisogne, Franco, May 31.
1018
The battalion aid stations of the American Army in fixed positions were
modeled on those of the British and French. These were rather elaborate
installations, for heavy bombardment often necessitated that they retain
patients until after dark. In general, such a station as constructed by our
allies, and taken over by our troops when serving with them, consisted of a
series of communicating rooms, 2 meters (6.5 feet) high and from 2 to 4
meters square (6.5 to 13 feet). One room was for office purposes and the
reception of patients, one for the application of dressings and for shock
treatment, one for the battalion surgeon, one for stores, and one or more for
the personnel. It had 2 by 2 meter (6.5 by 6.5 feet) galleries, with two or
three tiers of improvised litter racks, which sometimes accommodated 30
patients, but rarely more than 12." Usually, in a separate dugout at one side.
were two rooms for the bathing, emergency treatment, and re-clothing of gas
cases. The doors to these aid-station dugouts were generally '■] feet wide and
GENERAL VIEW OE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 113
were protected by two tight-fitting blanket curtains placed at least s feet
apart. These curtains were soaked with alkaline or sometimes hexamethyi-
enainine solution, and were so adjusted that they would fall into place upon
touching a release. The first curtain was intended to be shut down before
the second was opened. The descent to the battalion-aid dugout was found to
be preferably at an angle of 30° : but as dugouts used by line troops were used
commonly for aid stations. Medical Department personnel soon adopted the
same angle of ramp as that used by line troops. In such cases a litter chute
was often made of greased planks nailed on either side of the stairs leading
down into the station. An important item of station equipment was a water
storage tank or well. Usually, light was furnished by petroleum lanterns,
but a few of these dugouts were lighted by electricity. Each attendant gen-
erally possessed a flashlight. 8
To prevent water dripping into them, dugouts usually had corrugated
iron ceilings. Walls were boarded and flooi's provided. Frequently, ceilings
and walls were calcimined. or at least whitewashed. Some dugouts even
had dining rooms. The deptli of a dugout below the surface of the ground
was usually 10 to 12 feet on an average, but in localities subject to shelling
by heavy guns a depth of 20 feet was preferred. Dugouts situated on the
higher level were unprotected against direct hits by shells of more than
155 mm. caliber. 13 Such shells rarely fell on the support trenches except
during great activity. Whenever possible, cooking was done below; other-
wise, food was brought to the stations in marmites. Coke fires were made
in braziers; ventilators, with dampers to exclude gas, tapped the principal
rooms. While remarkable ingenuity was displayed in making these dugouts
comfortable, it should be understood that the description given above is for
the most elaborate ones, and ordinarily they were much simpler.
On taking over French or British sectors, or in occupying them tem-
porarily, the American Army fell heir to these subterranean battalion aid
posts. While battalion aid stations actually constructed by American troops
were similar to those described above, they usually were much less pretentious.
The medical personnel of all our divisions received instruction in the subject
of constructing them from the divisional engineers or at the Army sanitary
school. In some cases our aid stations would accommodate 25 or 30 patients,
but usually the number was 10 or 12. 13
The personnel on duty at a battalion aid station consisted normally of
one medical officer, a dental officer if available, and from four to six enlisted
men of the Medical Department. 11 These usually were supplemented by two
runners and one or more litter squads assigned from an ambulance company,
the number of these squads being increased if unusual activity was anticipated. 11
Supplies
Equipment, beyond that furnished by Supply Tables, to a battalion
included at least two Thomas splints, a shock table for warming patients,
114 FIELD OPERATIONS
two 500-liter oxygen tanks, suits of overalls, with gloves and masks, for at-
tendants earing for gas patients, gas fans, and alkalies and sprayers for
attendants to use in cleaning out the galleries to which gas had penetrated. 11
Supplies were brought forward as far as possible by battalion medical
carts or other vehicles. They were replenished by one of several systems."
That mostly commonly used required empty ambulances to carry forward to
the battalion station or the ambulance head articles similar in kind and num-
ber to those they had brought back with patients. Another system was that
of having the battalion surgeon send, by runner to the dressing station, a list
of the articles he desired. A third method was that, of the automatic replace-
ment first mentioned, supplemented, as required, by the second. The first
system worked well except during heavy engagements, when ambulances could
not carry forward all supplies required. Then the supplies they could not
transport had to be brought forward in trucks. The medical supply carts were
not much used. At times of stress there was occasional shortage of litters,
blankets, and large dressings, due in the majority of instances to the fact that
responsible officers at the front had not foreseen their needs or that trans-
portation was inadequate. 11 There was always a large surplus of these ar-
ticles constantly available in depots. 11 If ambulances and trucks could not
reach battalion aid stations, supplies were carried forward by litter bearers
from (lie ambulance head or the dressing station.
In order to reduce transportation of equipment, on the relief of an or-
ganization in a sector, much of that in its medical dugouts was sometimes left
behind when the division moved. 11 The 1st Division on one occasion thus
transferred to its replacement materiel sufficient to fill several freight cars. 15
These " trench stores " usually consisted of all supplies and equipment which
would not normally accompany troops in a war of movement.
Service at battalion aid stations included control of hemorrhage, appli-
cation or readjustment of dressings and splints, administration of antitetanic
serum and of morphine, if indicated, emergency treatment of gassed cases, and
the preparation of field cards or diagnosis tags. When it was possible to do
so. hot food or something hot to drink was given to patients. Slight cases of
illness were treated and returned to duty.
The following is taken from the report of the division surgeon, 3d
Division : 1G
The treatment and evacuation of the wounded from a quiet sector, cither with or
without a perfected trench system, was not difficult. The wounded were few in numher:
and as enemy fire was light, first-aid dressers and litter bearers had much freedom of
action. Personnel and transportation were more than adequate. At the battalion aid sta-
tion, passed cases could be stripped, bathed, and redressed, hot drinks and food given to
all, shock cases recuperated, and many comforts administered.
When, however, a quiet trench sector was converted into an active one, the situation
became very different from that just described. Time, personnel, supplies, and trans-
portation, heretofore fully adequate, became insufficient, and the character of the work
performed at the battalion aid station had to be modified accordingly, influenced chiefly
by the number of patients arriving, extent of shelter available, and promptitude of
ambulance service. For example, if ambulances were waiting, shelter Inadequate for ail
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
115
flie wounded, as along the Maine, and tlie action was not severe enough to preclude evacua-
tion, disabled were held only long enough to receive the necessary first-aid and the anti-
tetanic serum.
In order to expedite service, patients were classified into several categories,
each of which was cared for according to a definite plan. In the 3d Division
the classification was as follows: (1) Very slightly wounded who were able to
return to the line ; (2) slightly wounded requiring evacuation; (3) seriously
wounded; (4) patients with fractures: (5) severely wounded with considerable
attendant shock; ((>) gassed patients; (7) psychoneurotics; (8) sick. 10
The patients in the first class were dressed and retained for the time
being. Some of those in the eighth class also were retained. All others were
evacuated. Usually those in the second cdass were dressed onlv with first-
Fic. 14. — Adjusting improved splint on a litter patient, Brousaey, France, April 20, litis
aid packets, and most of them were able to reach the ambulance dressing
station unaided. Wounds of severely injured patients were lightly painted
with iodine and an adequate dressing was applied, antitetanic serum, mor-
phine, and, if needed, a stimulant, were administered, and the patient was
evacuated as soon as possible. The dosage of serum was 500 units: that
of morphia usually 1C mgms. Their administration was noted on the diag-
nosis tag, and often the letter "T" was painted with iodine on the forehead
of a patient as soon as he had received the serum. 10
Fractures were immobilized here by the use of Thomas splints, if these
had not already been applied. If a patient had been splinted, the splint was
examined and, if necessary, it was readjusted. These patients were handled
as little as possible and often placed in the ambulance on the same litters
on which they had been brought from the front. Patients in severe shock
were held, if possible, until reaction occurred. They were wrapped in
116 FIELD OPERATIONS
blankets, given strychnine hypodermatieally, and hot coffee or chocolate.
As a rule, they reacted well."
The most difficult patients proved to be those claiming to have been
gassed." It was impossible for the surgeon to diagnose properly and promptly
all patients claiming disability from this cause, for he had no means of
knowing whether a doubtful condition was one of delayed gas poisoning or
gas fright." Some suspected cases of gas poisoning were held for obser-
vation and cared for in dugouts, basements, or cellars. After a few hours'
rest, almost all patients, doubtfully gassed, were able and willing to return
to the front. " Frank gas-intoxication patients, received during very active
operations, were evacuated immediately, taking precedence over all others.
for at such times it was impossible to strip and bathe them at the battalion
aid station. Not only was personnel inadequate, but sufficient water was un-
obtainable, and they could not be retained with other patients because of
diffusion of gas from their clothing. The psychoneurotics and sick were
evacuated if their condition demanded it. Of the former, patients with
gas fright were the most numerous and, as stated above, most of them were
returned to the line."
A battalion aid station's activities in a moderately active defensive
sector, as described, were often somewhat modified by changed conditions.
The administration of antitetanic serum was not always possible, as some-
times there was none on hand. 1 ' At some places no fires could be built to
prepare hot drinks."
During periods of intensive bombardment, when the trenches and back
areas were subjected to destructive fire from high-explosive shells, patients
usually were moved under cover of darkness by ambulances which went
directly to the battalion aid stations, if this was at all possible. Removal of
patients by daylight, whether by litter or ambulance, under such circum-
stances would have exposed all concerned to needless risk. By day, it was
impossible for ambulances to approach nearer to the front than 3 or 4 km.
(l.N to 2A miles) and removal by litter then would have been unwarrantable,
though litter bearers frequently ran forward, at great risk, during a lull
in the enemy fire. When roads were subject to interdiction fire, patients
wounded early in the day did not reach hospital for 18 hours or more.
Though, under such circumstances, they received every attention locally,
except surgical intervention, the period of detention, dependent on military
conditions, as a systematic procedure, was cut to a minimum in order to
reduce the danger incident to the development of gas-forming bacilli in
wounds. This danger, as noted in other chapters, had a profound influence
upon the organization, equipment. location, and service of all medical units
as far back as the base hospitals, for surgical interference within 12 hours
proved highly desirable and. in the case of extensive wounds, essential."
The French, in order to meet the requirement for early operation, made
provision for a considerable amount of surgical work in their battalion sta-
tions, and when the sector concerned was not very active this was accom-
plished, though not so well as in a fully equipped hospital.'" The Americans
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OKtiA X IZATION 117
did not follow this practice, and orders were issued that no operations he
performed at such advanced posts. 10 They helieved the French practice
caused dispersion of medical forces, and preferred to take some risks with
the amhulance service in order to secure for a patient early operation at
a better-equipped formation. 111 Although ambulances were sometimes lost,
their use as far forward as possible and wherever possible presented many
advantages. Patients carried by them suffered less danger than those con-
veyed by litter, for the period of exposure to lire was less. There was a
great saving of hearers, and the time of transport was greatly shortened.
THE REGIMENTAL AID STATION
In many divisions the regimental aid station was soon discontinued, while
in others it shrank into a formation of very minor importance whose chief
function was to give first-aid and medical attention to the regimental head-
quarters detachment. 2 " Definite benefits accruing from discontinuance of this
station were saving of time and labor, release of medical personnel for duty
farther forward, and reduction in the number of points where patients were
collected and relayed.
The term "regimental aid station " persisted, it is true, but it often
indicated a very different organization from that contemplated in orders
before the war began. Frequently it signified merely the station of the
regimental surgeon, the location of his office and the liaison point for the
medical service of the regiment. 20
At the time our Field Service Regulations were drafted the regiment
was approximately the size that a battalion assumed during the war, new
tables of organization having been published, 21 so that the battalion station
in point of fact performed the service formerly intended for a regimental
station. When employed as originally contemplated, the regimental aid
station was similar to the battalion station which has been described above,
though it was somewhat larger and more elaborate. 22 Sometimes the regi-
mental station was the liaison point between an ambulance company and the
battalion aid stations, but more frequently the former maintained direct con-
tact with the battalion aid station by assigning two of its men as runners
to each battalion station it served. When the regimental aid station was not
used, the dressing station frequently was established at the tactical point
which it would have occupied. 11
THE SANITARY TRAIN
The sanitary train of each division consisted of train headquarters, an
ambulance company section, a field hospital section, eight camp infirmaries.
and a divisional medical supply unit. 23 Three of the four companies in each of
the ambulance and field hospital sections were motorized, the fourth being
animal drawn.
Ambulance Companies
Headquarters of the ambulance company section of the sanitary train
habitually was located near that of the field hospital, except during active
118 FIELD OPERATIONS
periods, when the director of the ambulance companies was usually to lie
found at the regulating: station or at one of the dressing stations.
Each ambulance company had the personnel of the Tables of Organiza-
tion, and, presumably, 12 ambulances. The company was subdivided into two
sections: One operated a dressing station or stations, and, if need be, removed
wounded thereto by litter; the other operated the ambulances, whether working
in front of the station or in the rear of it. 24 Evacuation from fixed trench
positions into other fixed formations to the rear was usually a comparatively
simple procedure, though it required constant surveillance and adaptation to
changing military conditions.
Litter-bearer and Ambulance Skrvice
As noted above, in active operations, one or two litter squads and two
runnel's from an ambulance company were frequently attached to each of the
battalion aid stations. When a sector became active the number of these squads
was greatly increased, and when unusual action was imminent or was in
progress, certain divisions, e. g., the 4th, assigned to duty with regiments
all the ambulance company personnel that could be spared for the purpose. 2 "'
Ambulance companies, especially those whose vehicles were animal-drawn, also
furnished replacements for casualties in Medical Department personnel serv-
ing regiments and batteries. As the ambulance head often was located con-
siderably farther forward by night than by day — as, for instance, in the 1st
Division at Seicheprey — usually actually reaching the battalion aid stations
after darkness fell, nonambulant patients were sometimes held at these stations
until ambulances could reach them; 20 but it was a general practice to remove
patients promptly, especially the most seriously wounded, if battle conditions
permitted. As previously stated, if the distance from the battalion aid stations
to the dressing station was more than 1,000 yards, relay posts were established
similar to those in advance of the former. At each of these, one or more litter
squads was stationed. In the 4th Division each of these relay posts was under
command of a noncommissioned officer, and the distance between them was
800 yards. 27 Such posts were not usually necessary, however, if wheeled lit-
ters, or motor cycles with side cars, were available and the terrain permitted
their use: but in the Vosges, where the distances were exceptionally long be-
tween battalion aid stations and the ambulance head, the 5th Divison used these
vehicles and also developed relay posts into miniature emergency stations.-"
The Anould sector, which this division then occupied, was very rugged, and
wheeled litters, either horse-drawn or hand-pushed, proved invaluable. Some-
times two or more were used tandem. Conveyances of this type were em-
ployed to advantage also at odd times in places where their use was reasonably
safe and other wheel transport was not practicable. For instance, the 37th
Division used wheeled litters to carry dressings forward to battalion aid sta-
tions inaccessible to ambulances. 29 Motor cycles with side cars also at times
were used to advantage, those of English make proving preferable, as they
were sturdy and usually had 8-horsepower engines. 30 The 35th Division in the
Vosges used the French equipment identical with the Spanish mule litter
for that sector.* 1
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 119
When a division occupied a quiet, defensive sector and had its full comple-
ment of vehicles, it usually had one of its motorized ambulance companies in
active operation, the second in support on the alert, the third in reserve, and
the fourth at rest, while cleaning its vehicles. 32
Many divisions, e. jr.. the 28th, organized motor repair parks. 83 The
animal-drawn ambulance companies made short hauls from battery positions
and from points inaccessible to motor ambulances and between the field hospi-
tals when they were closely grouped. Its personal often supplemented
that of other Medical Department units at the dressing station and at points
in advance of it, and its wagons sometimes carried fuel and supplies to the
dressing station or performed other miscellaneous services. Often only two
animals were provided for each ambulance of this company, and animal-drawn
vehicles proved too slow and presented too large a target to be used to great
advantage near the front in trench warfare. 34 Also, if the animals were re-
quired to haul the load necessary in active service they soon became exhausted,
particularly if the sector was rugged or deep, and if the roads were in bad
condition.
In general, the distribution of ambulances in trench warfare was as fol-
lows: In advance of the dressing station established by the ambulance com-
pany (usually between 3,000 and 6,000 yards from the front) two or three
ambulances were parked at one or more points called " ambulance posts " or.
more colloquially, " cab stands." 3 - In a deep, narrow sector there was usually
but 1 of these posts, but the 42cl Division in the Baccarat sector used
11 of them, with 1 ambulance at each stand. 35 These posts were at the points
farthest forward where vehicles would be reasonably safe, and beyond that,
toward the front, was the ambulance head, the farthest point to which ambu-
lances could reasonably go; sometimes, if the terrain permitted, these points
coincided. Distance of penetration beyond the ambulance posts was depend-
ent upon military activity, darkness, and road conditions. While after night -
fall the ambulance head was frequently advanced to the battalion aid station,
during the day it was usually one or more kilometers in rear of it. In some
divisions, as, for example, the 1st, 30 an ambulance on call moved up after dark
from its ambulance post to the battalion aid station or to the ambulance
head, and after taking its load to the dressing station returned to its post.
If roads and the military situation permitted, ambulances visited battalion
aid stations daily as a matter of routine. In some divisions, as soon as an
ambulance had delivered its patients at the dressing station it picked up
another load of patients and went on to a field hospital in the rear. It was
soon found, however, that service in advance of the dressing station could be
performed best by the light Ford cars, which could go through mud and
demolished roads more easily than other motor ambulances, while on the
better roads in the rear of the dressing station, the heavier and more com-
fortable G. M. C. ambulances were preferable. This use of transport, first
developed in the 1st Division and soon adopted by others, was often spoken
of as " ambulance circuits.'' one set of ambulances making round trips between
their posts, battalion aid, and dressing stations, while another set made round
120 FIELD OPERATIONS
trips between the last mentioned and the field hospitals. 38 In the early days
of American combat activities, before evacuation from field hospitals was
taken over by corps and army surgeons, there was a third circuit by ambu-
lances under control of the division surgeon. This comprised the round trip
between field and evacuation hospitals. 3 "' :!T
During the first operations in which the American Army participated
the intradivisional and extradivisional services of ambulance companies were
not clearly differentiated. Evacuation ambulance companies were at that time
attached to divisions, supplementing other ambulance companies of the sani-
tary train and operating interchangeably with them. Though the system was
satisfactory for conditions then existing, it was not suitable for open warfare
as well, for which reason the following system was adopted when the First
Army was organized. 3T ' 3S
Division ambulance companies will transport patients from battalion or regimental
aid stations to the triage and division hospitals ; an ambulance station will be established
midway between aid stations and triage; a reserve of ambulances wll be stationed there,
sending one to the front to replace eacli one returning witli patients. The loaded ambu-
lance will return to this station after delivering its load at the triage.
Evacuation ambulance companies will move patients from the triage and field
hospitals to evacuation hospitals and loading platforms.
The adoption of this system, which equalized labor and allowed time for
rest and repairs, gave such satisfactory results that it was applied to each
division successively entering the Toul and Luneville sectors. 98
Back of the dressing station each division habitually maintained a relay
ambulance post and regulating station, at a point past which all vehicles used
for transporting wounded would travel on their way between dressing station
and Held hospital. At this place were parked most of the vehicles of the com-
pany on active duty — if these were not distributed at the ambulance posts —
and here the headquarters of the company in question was located. As one
loaded vehicle passed on its way to the rear, an empty ambulance moved to the
next station ahead, thus keeping up a circuit of empty vehicles to the front. 34
If more ambulances were needed, the regulating officer sent them forward
from the park at his station. Though this was the most popular method of
locating and operating ambulances, it was modified in many ways, in greater or
less degree, under varying circumstances. The 5th Division, in the Vosges, 30
when its sector was quiet, kept an ambulance at each regimental aid station
and held five in readiness in the company park near the field hospitals; but when
an unusual action was imminent it disposed of its ambulances as follows:
From '■) to 4 at ambulance posts, from 3 to f> at a point midway between them
and the field hospitals, and the remainder near the latter. 30 Only under
exceptional circumstances in trench warfare, as in the Chateau-Thierry anil
Champagne areas, was it necessary to use trucks for removing the wounded.
In such emergencies even- kind of vehicle returning from the front was uti-
lized, ambulances being reserved for the severely wounded. The intradivisional
service by trucks was employed especially between dressing stations and field
hospitals."'
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 121
Fig. 15. — Dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 137, Amperbacb, Alsace, August 31.
1018
Fig. 16. — Dressing station at Betricamp, France, April 20, 1918
122
FIELD OPERATIONS
Thk Ambulance Company Dressing Station
Each division regularly established one or more dressing stations at a
point or points accessible from all parts of the front served and also acces-
sible to vehicles from the rear. Battalion aid stations rarely evacuated direct
to field hospitals and even more rarely to evacuation hospitals. Dressing
stations functioned properly only when placed on natural evacuation lines,
as hearers almost inevitably carried casualties to the nearest point where re-
lief could be given. These stations were usually between :?.00() and 6,000 yards
from the front, and. if possible, at relatively protected points, such as in build-
ings or cellars; sometimes dugouts were constructed like, those for battalion
stations, but thev were more elaborate. Thus in the Baccarat Sector the 42d
Oas proof »hPlt**ri» for drefalntf stations, 4'Jml Division, near BodonvlllF
April J'.K HUM
carat Sector,
Division provided three gas-proof shelters for dressing stations from 2y%
to :\ miles In-hind the front, each shelter accommodating 20 patients, with
facilities for bathing, treatment of shock, hemorrhage, etc. 41 The number of
dressing stations varied from one to three, according to the width and activity
of the sector. If the sector was narrow only one station was established, as
a rule, to lx> reinforced if need 1h> by men detailed from other ambulance com-
panies. Occasionally an advance dressing station was established, but in
positional combat this substation was relatively unusual, being provided usually
only when vehicular traffic was not possible for some distance back of the front.
When an advanced station was used, it frequently was from 1,500 to 2,000 yards
from the lines, and the main dressing station about the same distance in rear
of it. at the ambulance head. If an advanced dressing station was used, its
personnel averaged 1 officer and from 8 to If! men: that of a main dressing
station \\ii» •> to !'» officers and from VI to •>:> men. In some divisions one of
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 123
the officers attached to the dressing station was charged with maintaining con-
tact with the troops which the station served and with supervision of the
litter-bearer service between it and the battalion aid station, while in others,
t. g., the 2d Division, 42 an officer was especially assigned to the same service
without being assigned to the dressing station.
Organization of the dressing station varied considerably, naturally being
most elaborate in the comparatively few divisions which used this formation
as a triage or sorting station. Tn the 42d Division, which employed its
dressing station as a triage, the organization was that described below. 43 This
description applies especially to the dressing station, as that division developed
it in open warfare, but is given here as the organization was inaugurated in
trench sectors. The station consisted of the following departments: 43
(1) Receiving and forwarding department, subdivided into two sections
concerned with (a) transportation, and (b) sorting and checking of patients.
The former section consisted of a transportation officer and a sergeant, who
supervised the dispatch of ambulances both to the front and to the rear,
controlled the number working in either direction, and supervised the loading
and unloading of patients. The last-mentioned service was performed by a
jrroup of eight litter bearers. A sorting and checking officer examined all
patients on admission, returned to the front those needing no further treatment,
and distributed others to proper departments within the station, designating
which patients required immediate attention. He was assisted by a few
enlisted men who, under instruction from a commissioned officer, gave nourish-
ment, adjusted bandages to minor injuries, administered antitetanic serum,
and attended to the comfort of patients. Those not requiring special treat-
ment in this department were held until evacuated, and unnecessary handling
of patients was thus avoided. Two or more clerks listed all casualties and
checked up the administration of serum.
(2) The general dressing room was manned by from 2 to 4 medical
officers and 4 competent noncommissioned officers, all of whom were engaged
in adjusting or applying dressings, administering morphia and antitetanic
serum, if these had not already been given. In addition to the foregoing,
two men were engaged in sterilizing and filling syringes with antitetanic
serum.
(3) The orthopedic department cared for all fractures, readjusting or
applying splints as required, and giving any other treatment needed, including
that for shock. Personnel of this department consisted of the division ortho-
pedist and two trained enlisted assistants.
(4) The gas department was located in a room, not communicating with
my room for wound-dressing purposes. Here, under direction of the di-
visional gas officer, gassed patients were stripped, bathed, and reclothed with
such raiment as could be obtained from the salvage section.
(5) A complete company kitchen was kept in operation day and night,
supplying hot food and hot coffee to patients, duty personnel, and casuals.
This service proved highly important, especially in cold and wet weather.
124 FIELD OPERATIONS
(6) The medical supply department of the station pooled the property
of companies serving it. replenishing by issues from the divisional medical
supply unit.
(7) The salvage department collected all equipment no longer needed
for patients, and from it issued necessary supplies such as blankets and
canteens, the latter being used as hot-water bottles. 43
The personnel operating the dressing station triage of the 4'2d Division
was drawn from all four ambulance companies ami was assigned in 12-hour
shifts, if the rate of admissions did not require longer hours of duty. 44
When a dressing station was used as a triage, the division orthopedist,
psychiatrist, and gas officer were regularly attached to it. together with an
officer possessed of good surgical experience and judgment, 45 and sometimes
an understudy was assigned for the relief of each of these officers. Usually
a dressing station, used as a triage, was located at the point farthest forward,
where, with reasonable safety, ambulances could be concentrated, and these
were grouped near it. In the Baccarat sector, at one time, the slightly
wounded, because of tactical disposition, could be sent direct from the dress-
ing station to an evacuation hospital and all others to the designated field
hospital (see order quoted, p. 386). but usually all patients were sent to the
appropriate field hospital.
As the great majority of divisions did not use the dressing station as a
triage, the personnel of the station, normally, was less numerous than that
of the station just described, and was habitually drawn from but one ambu-
lance company; the equipment was less elaborate and the organization was
simpler. In all respects, however, there was great mutability and flexibility
in all such stations, allowances of personnel especially being changed fre-
quently to meet varying needs. 11
At dressing stations the sick and wounded were classified according to
the nature of their disability and its degree. By the first classification, in-
juries caused by gas. miscellaneous sickness, psychic disorders, venereal dis-
eases, skin diseases, and convalescents were separated. The second classifica-
tion, pertaining to the degree of disability, ranged from malingerers to fatal
wounds or illness. It had certain more or less arbitrary and fluctuating sub-
divisions. For example, the wounded often were classified as '* very slight."
" slight.'' "serious,'' and " nontransportable." Practical application was given
to this gradation, for patients in the first class were returned to duty: those in
the second class were sent to hospital, walking or sitting: those in the third
class were sent recumbent to hospital: while patients in the fourth class were
held until they rallied and then were evacuated with exceptional care. Simi-
larly, the sick, the gassed, and those suffering from gas fright were classified
either as "seriously disabled." who should be retained until they rallied or be
evacuated at once, and the "slightly disabled" or "subjectively affected," who
could 1h> returned to duty. Men claiming mental or nervous disability were
especially difficult to classify, for some of them were malingerers, others were
slightly affected but magnified their symptoms, and a few were bona fide cases
of disability. 11
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 125
Whether used for triage purposes or not, at the minimum the functions
of a dressing station were to receive and classify patients, give emergency
treatment — that is, control hemorrhage, treat shock and gassing, readjust
splints, administer antitetanic serum if it had not already heen given, and
morphine if indicated — supply nourishment, group the disabled, and forward
them to their designated destination. Yet, normally, the last was the work
of the triage hospital, and as a matter of fact, sorting of patients at the dress-
ing station with a view to direct distribution to appropriate hospitals was
unusual except in the divisions of the First Corps, 40 or when the seriously
wounded were sent direct from dressing station to the proper field hospital
without passing through the triage hospital. Few operations were performed
at the dressing station, and these were minor ones; hut they sometimes in-
cluded closure of aspirating chest wounds by a few silkworm-gut sutures, and
when absolutely necessary, ligations. 47 If a hemorrhage was not checked bv
operation, the wound was packed and a tourniquet applied which was left
loose in place after hemorrhage had ceased. Ambulance orderlies were in-
structed to tighten the tourniquet, if necessary, when en route to the hospital. 47
Patients in shock usually were held until they rallied, and the sick were re-
tained until a full ambulance load of them could be sent back. Soldiers not
incapacitated for performance of duty, after receiving all necessary attention,
were returned to their organizations. The field medical cards of patients
admitted were made at the dressing station and records of them made, if other
work did not prevent. Patients able to wait to field hospitals — about 40
per cent of the total — were sent back to them in groups. 4S In practically all
divisions the dressing station was also the Medical Department supply point
for regiments and batteries. Supplementary to dressing stations, rest stations
for furnishing nourishment and medical aid were established by the 4tli
Division along its evacuation routes, in connection with relay posts. 49
Though the foregoing description gives in general terms the usual opera-
tion of a dressing station, certain individual methods were employed by the
several divisions at different times; but these were transient or of relatively
minor importance. Considerable mutability in personnel, materiel, organiza-
tion, and thoroughness of treatment characterized practically all these sta-
tions, for in all these characteristics they were influenced profoundly by mil-
itary conditions varying from quietude to intense activity.
FIELD Hospitals
The field hospital section of the sanitary train consisted of four of these
hospitals. 50 each accommodating 210 patients. The personnel authorized for
them is noted in Tallies of Organization in the Appendix (p. 1054). but in the
World War this was augmented by the assignment of divisional specialists and.
as occasion required and resources permitted, of operating and shock teams.
The equipment of all these hospitals was at first identical, but later — as noted
lielow — it became considerably diversified when the field hospitals were special-
ized. In some divisions field-hospital facilities for nontransportable wounded
were further increased bv the assignment to them of mobile surgical units, but
126
FIELD OPERATIONS
as only 12 of these formations became available before the armistice, the result
was that the plan of supplying one to each combat division did not fully
materialize. 51
In trench warfare, field hospitals were located from 10 to 1"> km. (6 to
8 miles) behind the front, or frequently farther back, in order to be beyond
range of ordinary shell fire. The distance varied considerably, being influ-
enced by proximity to the front of suitable buildings, and considerations
similar to those affecting the location of evacuation hospitals (q. v.), especially
convenient roads and availability of water and fuel. In order to utilize build-
ings to the best advantage, a field hospital occupying them was at times
somewhat scattered, but whenever possible near-by buildings were used.
*pitnl N
inn. France. August 12, 1918
Often field hospitals were comfortably, even luxuriously, established in towns,
chateaux, or barracks, and when such hospital sites in buildings were taken
over from the French, many supplies were sometimes transferred with them,
thus expediting putting our field hospitals into operation.* 1
It should l>e remarked here as affecting field hospital shelter that, in the
early days of American service in France, the use of tentage near the front
was disapproved, on the ground that it was readily visible to enemy aviators
and In'trayed the presence of troops."
Profiting by developments in the medical service of the 1st Division at
Cantigny, field hospitals in all divisions rapidly U'canie specialized."' 2 Gen-
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
127
erally speaking, one developed into a hospital for nontransportable wounded,
and a second into a hospital for gassed patients, with corresponding changes
in equipment, the others retaining their original purpose and their original
equipment; but there were many modifications of this plan. Very generally
the divisional triage or sorting Held hospital also received the seriously
wounded and sometimes the gassed. 52 Almost without exception only one
triage was maintained by a division in positional warfare, but the '2(">th. in
the Toul sector (April and May, 1917). having a frontage of 17.6 km. (11
miles), then operated two. one behind either flank/' 3
Fig. 1ft. — Field Hospital No. 125, near Jaulgonne, France, July 20, 1018
In a quiet trench sector a common method of dividing the field hospitals
was the following: (1) Triage and care of wounded and gassed patients;
('■!) sick; (3) skin and venereal diseases; and (4) reserve. 11
Frequently the last was used as a convalescent camp, to care for trans-
portable patients, or to supplement one of the other field hospitals, as required.
When not actively operating, its personnel was often assigned to one of the
other field hospitals. Under these conditions it was the practice to retain in
the division field hospitals all patients who were likely to be fit for duty in
from 10 days to 2 weeks, or who could be treated here as well as farther to
the rear; for example, skin and venereal cases. Then, only those requiring
definitive surgical treatment or such of the sick as would require prolonged
or exceptionally expert treatment were evacuated. 14
1'28 FIELD OPERATIONS
When a trench sector became moderately active, a division often continued
to hold its cases of Avar neuroses, slightly gassed and slightly sick, making such
use of its field hospitals as the following: (1) Triage and care of non-
transportable patients (wounded or gassed) ; (2) slightly wounded; (3) sick,
slightly gassed, convalescents: and (4) reserve. When called into operation
the reserve hospital frequently cared for the gassed cases. 11
If the enemy was very active, as in the second battle of the Marne, all
field hospitals were opened and utilized as described under the caption "Open
warfare," evacuating patients as rapidly as possible.
Selection of nontransportable patients, as contrasted with the severely
wounded (for the two categories did not exactly correspond) was difficult
and subject to changing standards imposed by the changing military situation.
When divisions were actively engaged in trench warfare, as along the Marne
and in the Champagne areas, many patients who otherwise would have been
retained had to be evacuated.
The reports of the Medical Department activities of the several combat
divisions, from which this chapter is largely derived, do not differentiate in
their descriptions, except in a few matters such as those noted above, the
service of field hospitals in trench and in open warfare. Further information
on the subject will be found in the section of this chapter which treats of
these units in open warfare. It is only necessary to note here that methods
in open warfare were similar to those in trench warfare except that in the
former field hospitals usually occupied tents, moved frequently, were employed
in a more diversified manner, were more subject to enemy fire, underwent
greater strain, and had greater difficulties both in bringing up supplies and
in effecting evacuation of their patients.
OPEN WARFARE
CARE OF CASUALTIES IX COMPANIES, BATTALIONS, AND REGIMENTS
In open warfare the problem of caring for the wounded on the battlefield
and of removing them to field hospitals was very different from that presented
when troops were in the trenches, and its solution proved much more difficult
as well as more varying.
COMPANY All)
A company aid post was sometimes established, as in the 90th Division,
which located it at or near the company post control;'' 4 but very few divisional
histories make any mention of this formation in open warfare, though that
of the 5th Division noted that two enlisted men of the Medical Department
continued to be attached to each company as was the case in the trenches. 55
When used, this post was located at any shelter available — a shell hole, for
instance — and the wounded were brought to it; but much more frequently the
wounded were taken to any sheltered place near which they fell, and dressings
and splints were there applied. The equipment of the Medical Department
men detailed to render company aid was very simple, consisting chiefly of
dressings, splints, tourniquets, and stimulants, for it was limited to such
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
129
articles as they could carry when troops moved forward."" They placed these
articles in any receptacles available, such as pouches, sacks, and gun cases.
After dressing a patient they again advanced with the troops to winch they
were attached.
THE BATTALION All) STATION
In open warfare, even more than was the case in the trendies. I lie impor-
tance of the battalion aid stations tended toward their substitution for that of
the regiment. These stations were placed as near the front as possible. In
Pig. 20.— Shell hole where first-aid was administered. 7th Artillery Regiment. 1st Division, Sera
villers, France. July 5. 101S
the 2d Division, in the beginning of the offensive against Soissons, one station
was located within 50 yards of the enemy lines."" 1 During that operation,
battalion aid stations in that division were from 1 to 8 km. (0.6 to 4.8 miles)
•n advance of the triage hospital."' 7 In the 5th Division two aid stations to
a battalion, each under a medical officer, were placed in the support lines,
in rear of the flanks of the battalion." "Whenever possible, battalion aid sta-
tions were placed as conveniently as possible to natural routes of evacuation,
for otherwise they did not function, as litter bearers went to more accessible
locations. As the prime considerations for these stations were proximity to
13576—25 9
130
FIELD OPERATIONS
the front and some shelter from hostile fire, they occupied any well located
spot affording some protection, such as a shell hole, cellar, culvert, quarry,
dugout, or behind a ruined wall. Actually they were exposed to heavy fire
from infantry, machine guns, and artillery. Occasionally they received direct
hits by shells, as in the 90th Division, but sometimes then they escaped injury
to patients or personnel/' 2 Sometimes, as in the 2d Division at Vierzy, in
the Chateau-Thierry area, 88 and in the 3d Division during the Meuse-Argonne
pptrarge
eptember 27
operation," two or more battalion aid stations— perhaps those of different
regiments and. in the latter offensive, even those of neighboring divisions —
consolidated. Such a course was rendered advisable at times by the prox-
imity of the organizations which they served, and the paucity of avail-
able shelter and of evacuation routes. Furthermore, such consolidations gave
opportunity for mutual exchanges of supplies, allowed the personnel to work
in shifts instead of continuously, and facilitated ambulance evacuation by
reducing the number of stations which the ambulance companies had to locate
and clear. Battalion aid stations in open warfare were much more simple
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
131
than in trench warfare, for there were neither lime, facilities, nor transporta-
tion for their elaborate development. Habitually, regimental Medical De-
partment detachments were supplemented by details from the ambulance
companies. To mention but two of many instances of this practice, the 2d
Division in the Chateau-Thierry region assigned 160 ambulance company men
In duty with the regiments.'" and the '.Kith Division in the St. Millie] operation
thus assigned SO men from :\ of its ambulance companies."" The manner of
distributing these men varied considerably in the several divisions. Some-
times they were allocated by the regimental surgeon to the battalion aid sta-
tions needing them most, where they worked under the battalion surgeons.
-First-aid station, H23th Infantrj
Ardennes', France, October 1-. ti>lS
Sometimes, though assigned to these stations, they remained under control
of the officers of ambulance companies detailed with them. In many divisions
the ambulance company litter bearers carried patients from the front lines
to battalion aid stations' as well as thence to the ambulance head. As described
earlier, most divisions detailed men from the line companies to act as litter
bearers. Bandsmen, when employed, performed similar duties, but. as pre-
viously stated, their service as. litter bearers was soon discontinued. Prisoners
also were used wherever most needed, until their employment near the front
was prohibited, and thereafter they carried patients only when on their way
back from the front. 11
132 FIELD OPERATIONS
111 open warfare, provision in adequate quantity of even the most neces-
sary supplies was an urgent and difficult problem for battalion aid stations.
Frequently, stations could be supplied with only such materiel as enlisted men
could bring upon their jjersons from the dressing station or ambulance head.
For this purpose they used any available receptacle; wheeled litters if these
were at hand. The battalion medical cart proved too heavy for its one animal,
and it usually remained with the train. Whenever possible, supplies were sent
up by ambulances, or, in case of need, by trucks of the sanitary train. 11 If these
vehicles could not reach the battalion aid station they transferred their sup-
plies to litter bearers at the ambulance head. The same replacement methods
were used as in the trench warfare ; that is, for each article sent back from the
front and equivalent one was sent forward from the dressing station. 11 Sup-
plies also were sent forward on requisition. If materiel needed by battalion aid
stations was not on hand at the dressing station, the first ambulance going
from it to the triage carried to the supply " dump " or unit there a request
for the needed articles, and they were sent up by the supply officer by the next
ambulance going forward.
Sometimes, after an offensive had begun, no attempt was made for an
hour or two to bring in the wounded from the forward area to the aid stations,
for the reason that attacking and support troops were under heavy direct tire
from the enemy, and any attempt by a litter group to remove the wounded
would have been folly. After this time had elapsed, however, enemy fire
usually slackened or was directed against the troops as they advanced, and
litter evacuation could be conducted with less danger. 11 Meantime. Medical
Department personnel with the attacking troops dressed the wounded, applied
splints and placed patients at any sheltered points accessible. The "first-aid
packet"' was generally used for bullet wounds, and this or the " front packet,"
as required, for shell wounds. Fractures were immobilized usually by the
Thomas splint. As the troops advanced, the battalion aid station moved
forward to successive locations. 11 Thus in the 78th Division such a station
was scarcely established before its personnel again advanced to open a new
one. In such cases " collecting points," which sometimes corresponded to a
centrally placed battalion aid station, were often established, where patients
were collected to facilitate evacuation by ambulance company personnel." 11
In open warfare service at battalion aid stations was similar to that
given at such stations in the trenches so far as facilities permitted. Wounds
were redressed and splints adjusted, if necessary: hemorrhage was checked
and shock controlled, as well as possible. Ciassed patients were given as much
relief as practicable. I'sually. antitetanic serum was administered here. The
3d Division stressed this point. 17 Because of road congestion and heavy
enemy fire, patients sometimes had to be kept in a battalion station until
nightfall. During the Meuse-Argonne operation it was frequently remarked
in the hospitals that patients with comparatively slight wounds were gravely
shocked — a condition attributed to cold, exposure to wet, and to exhaustion
Even if supplies were brought forward in considerable quantities, little could
l>e done to combat shock at the battalion stations other than to rectify splinting,
to apply blankets proj>erly. and to administer morphine. 11 Therefore, the
GENERAL VIEW OK MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 133
wounded were removed systematically as soon as diminished intensity of enemy
fire permitted this procedure. Yet the retention of shock patients until they
rallied, instead of removing them immediately, was advocated in some divi-
sions, notably the 3d Division, 17 but, as has just been stated, as a general rule,
patients were evacuated as promptly as possible.
As soon as they could be removed, patients who were 1 unable to walk
were taken from the battalion aid station either by litter bearers or — oftener
after nightfall — by ambulances coming as far forward as the station. This
was done despite the fact that this plan caused numerous casualties and the
loss of much-needed cars. Their coming to these stations was considered
expedient because evacuation was thereby expedited.
The following vivid description of front line and battalion service is taken
from the report of the Medical Department activities of the 1st Division in
the offensive toward Soissons : 61
Battalion surgeons and enlisted personnel accompanied their units and established
aid stations and collecting points as close to the firing line as the terrain would permit.
They moved forward almost hourly during the five days of battle. While advantage was
always taken of protected points, the collecting stations during the greater part of the
advance were in hastily dug holes, in open fields, shell holes, old gun emplacements, etc. ;
at other times under shelter of hills, in cellars, or behind ruins of buildings or low
embankments along the sides of the roads. After the first two days in this offensive
there was a great shortage of litters, and other supplies proved insufficient. These had
been carried by corps men in pouches, sacks, or "feed bags." German equipment was
hunted for on the field. Litter bearers were constantly in the open, under machine-gun
and shell fire, and a number of them were killed. German prisoners were used as litter
bearers, and some wounded were removed (contrary to existing orders) by men of the
line. First-aid dressings and splints were applied at. the first point behind the line when
there was comparative protection. Litters were often improvised, that extemporized
from the blouse, with rifles for side bars, being the most common. Often, because of
heavy fire, the wounded were kept in shell boles until nightfall. As no hot refreshment
was available in advance of the dressing station, the wounded reached that point in much
worse condition than would otherwise have been the case. It was impossible tor the
rolling kitchens or water carts to get up close to the line, and the dressing stations
therefore dealt with wounded whose vitality had been lowered by lack of food and water.
In the early part of the St. Mihiel operation the 5th Division transported
by litter such of its wounded as were unable to walk, but the supply of litters
was insufficient to meet the need, as was also the number of bearers. This
condition was attributed to the irresponsibility of bearers from the line, for
though provision had been made for their detail, these bearers had not then
been organized into squads under noncommissioned officers. In this extremity
additional litters were brought up, and prisoners also were used as bearers. 02
Because it was impracticable to use mounted messengers or to have direct
telephonic communication from the more advanced formations, maintenance
of contact, or liaison, between the battalion aid stations and the dressing
station was much more difficult in open than in trench warfare. Enemy fire,
shell holes, dense brush or forest, barbed-wire entanglements, abandoned
trenches, movement of stations, ignorance of the newly occupied terrain, and —
(luring the time when the wounded could be moved with the greatest safety —
darkness, all conspired to aggravate the difficulties of maintaining contact.
134 FIELD OPERATIONS
The report of the Medical Department activities of the 35th Division records
that line officers supplied medical officers with insufficient information con-
cerning forward movements and that battalion and ambulance company per-
sonnel had inadequate knowledge of each other's locations.'" 1 Usually, contact
in the several divisions was maintained by two runners detailed from the
ambulance companies to each battalion aid station, and if these failed, re-
turning litter hearers were interrogated. In the 90th Division five men were
assigned to each brigade for liaison service.' 14 In the 5th Division contact was
maintained between regimental and battalion stations — which were located near
their respective control posts — by runners from the regimental medical per-
sonnel or from the regimental and battalion message centers and by telephone
between them.' 1 ' Battalion medical officers usually maintained direct contact.
through runners or litter bearers, with the ambulance company and. with line
officers, before each enjrajrement made a reconnaissance of the terrain, with a
view of determining the location of future stations." The regimental surgeon
was required to keep himself informed at all times of the location of his aid
stations and of dressing stations and to keep subordinates acquainted with
the exact location of dressing stations, relaying his information in lmth direc-
tions. He required that whenever one of the battalion stations moved he be
notified and that whenever one of these required an ambulance he be given
clear directions concerning the station's position. In the Meuse-Argonne
operation, however, battalion aid stations in some regiments of this division
maintained direct contact with ambulance companies without the regimental
surgeon acting as an intermediary. This was the habitual practice in other
divisions."
In the 2d Division the divisional litter bearer officer (so detailed) and
his subordinates knew where the battalion aid station would be located at
the jump-off, and had determined, after reconnoissance with line officers,
where they would be located if the attack progressed as anticipated.''' 1 lie
determined, likewise, the present and future sites of the dressing stations, with
the roads and paths leading to them from battalion aid stations. Before the
attack, litter squads were placed well forward toward the stations they would
be required to evacuate. In these duties he was assisted by two officers from
each ambulance company, both before the attack and during its progress.
who commanded the litter bearers details and gave them full information
concerning the present and future locations of the formations with which
they were concerned. He continued to perforin the duties of reconnoissance
and supervision throughout the attack.""
The two outstanding lessons developed by experience in the Tsth Division
were recorded as follows:" 7
Arrangements must i»- made in advance ami personnel trained in maintain an abso-
lute chain of Unison, no matter what troop movements may occur in a sector, say. 10 km.
(6 miles) in width anil 20 km. (12 miles) in depth, and that in preparation for an
expected military operation of whatever nature it is extremely important to prescribe,
hot the actual location of dressing stations and tield hospitals, hut the road or roads along
which Medical Department communications. Including supply and evacuation and liaison,
will !»• conducted.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 135
Difficulties of Unison arose through the following causes: (1) Difficulties of terrain.
(2) Lack of training of medical personnel. ('■'<) Failure of front line personnel to send
Inck to the sanitary train or division surgeon information concerning location. (4)
Interchange of battalions between front line and brigade or division reserve. Since
cipher telephone calls followed organizations to their new locations, it was only by
Obtaining from G-.'? the names of organizations occupying certain aid posts that the
reserve station could communicate with these aid posts except through its own evacuation
service."
Eventually, in many divisions, responsibility for maintenance of contact
was placed on ambulance company commanders, who effected it in front of the
dressing station, as described above, by assigning runners to aid stations, and
to the rear by ambulances and motor cycles.
THE REGIMENTAL All) STATION
Few divisional histories make mention of the regimental aid station toward
the end of the war, for it was generally discontinued then for its original
purpose; but some divisions continued so to use it. For example, one regiment
of the 5th Division in the Meuse-Argonne operation established both regi-
mental collecting stations and regimental aid stations, the former in advance
of the latter. 08 Six bearers from each line company carried patients to these
points from the battalion stations. In the 3d. Division, during the same
action, the 7th Infantry at one time evacuated through a regimental aid sta-
tion, while other troops evacuated direct from the battalion aid station to the
dressing station.'" 1 Liaison between the regimental aid station and the dress-
ing station was maintained by runners, by litter bearers, and by telephone
from the advance post control. Whenever possible, collecting points for
regiments were on roads.
Control of the walking wounded presented a grave problem. The need
of military police to direct the movements of these was remarked by some of
the divisions in the Meuse-Argonne, especially when the country was open
and rolling and bills afforded some shelter. Men seeking cover or escape
from enemy fire would leave the roads and follow hill contours or would
attempt short cuts, with the result that some wandered until exhausted. The
situation was met to a degree by sending wounded men to the rear in groups
under escort. 11
MEDICAL SERVICE OF ARTILLERY AND MACHINE-GUN COMPANIES
Medical service of batteries and machine-gun companies was similar to
that of the Infantry. Two enlisted men of the Medical Department were
attached to each battery or company, and sometimes utilized selected shelter
as an aid station. For example, the medical detachment with the 13th
Machine (inn Battalion of the 5th Division occupied a dugout 100 yards in
the rear of its position at the commencement of the St. Mihiel operation. 7 ''
In the Meuse-Argonne. when this battalion was split, one company going to
each flank of an Infantry battalion, its aid station was established in a shell
hole midway l>etween and behind them. 70 In the 19th Field Artillery the
regimental and battalion aid stations were located near the respective posts
of command."
136 FIELD OPERATIONS
THE SANITARY TRATN
The methods of the sanitary train in open warfare also differed from those
in trench warfare. Difficulties were augmented greatly by the prolonged
increase in enemy fire, road congestion, movement of troops and of Medical
Department formations serving them, limited facilities for supply, increased
numbers of wounded, greater need for Medical Department replacements,
inexperience of these replacements on arrival, and by physical exhaustion caused
by long-continued hard labor and by exposure. During the Meuse-Argonne
operation the strain on the Medical Department was further intensified by an
epidemic of influenza, which nearly decimated its effectives. These subjects
will be discussed in more detail in appropriate chapters.
Ambulance Company Evacuation
The method for employing ambulance companies in trench warfare was,
in general, followed when our troops assumed the offensive in open warfare.
but there were some differences in detail. Sometimes two or more ambulance
companies were consolidated, as in the 2d Division in the offensive against
Soissons. 72 Much larger details of litter bearers were commonly assigned
with regimental detachments: and at times, when regimental personnel could
not cover the field, every man who could be spared from the ambulance com-
panies was thus assigned. Usually, the ambulance personnel with regiments
was drawn from several companies; much less frequently one company was
so assigned almost in its entirety, or more than one company might be so used.
At times, as in trench warfare, and as noted above, the ambulance company
hearers serving with regiments were placed under the orders of the battalion
surgeons concerned, but sometimes they operated under their own officers.
Both practices were followed in some divisions (as in the 3d)' 3 at different
times, the latter method coming to be more highly regarded. The -id Division
reported that the system of having patients brought to aid stations and col-
lecting points by litter bearers with regiments — including details from line
and from ambulance companies if these were needed — and of having evacua-
tions back of these effected a.s usual by the litter-bearer sections of the
ambulance companies proved highly satisfactory."
As in positional warfare, in all divisions the litter-bearer sections of the
ambulance company cleared the battalion aid stations, if these were not acces-
sible to ambulances, and frequently established collecting points at con-
venient places, preferably convenient to vehicles. Here patients from battalion
stations were gathered, and thence they could lie carried by litter to the dress-
ing station or could be readied from there by ambulances. The 5th Division,
for example, established eight such collecting points during the Meuse-
Argonne. 7 '' Just as in trench warfare, the litter-bearer sections established
relay points if necessary, but there was a progressive tendency to advance
the ambulances, even at considerable risk, and collecting points were, in fact.
relay points as well, if litter-bearer service back of them was necessary.
Habitually they were accessible to ambulances if battalion aid stations were
not. Often a subsidiary or advanced dressing station was established and
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 137
patients were brought to it by litter. If tliis advanced station Avas not acces-
sible to ambulances by daylight — as was often the case — patients had to be
carried by litter farther back to the main dressing station, the advanced station
then being used as an elaborated relay point. 11
In the 2d Division during the k St. Mihiel operation, as battalion aid per-
sonnel moved forward to open new stations, detachments of the Medical
Department with support and reserve troops successively took over care of
the casualties in stations left behind, until in turn they were taken over and
evacuated by an ambulance company. 74 Later, the ambulance company took
over these unfortunates direct from medical personnel in the advance lines.
After the delay in evacuation experienced at Soissons, this division desig-
nated a divisional litter-bearer officer and two commissioned assistants from
each ambulance company. Under the general direction of the litter-bearer
officer, the noncommissioned assistants had command of the litter-bearer squads
used to clear battalion aid stations. When the battalion surgeons advanced
the}' were accompanied by runners who, for the ambulance companies, main-
tained liaison between the new aid station and the former one, so that after
clearing the one farther to the rear the ambulance company could locate with
certainty the one farther advanced. As a result of this arrangement the bat-
talion surgeon and his detachment kept near the troops they served, and bat-
talion litter bearers, evacuating patients from the place where they fell, had
to go no farther back than the battalion aid station last established. When the
ambulance company took over a station the battalion surgeon had to give it
no further thought. 70 But until that time, if he and his personnel moved
farther forward, it was the usual practice to leave one or two attendants until
the station was taken over by a detachment with support troops, or until the
ambulance company came up. The method employed in the 2d Division at
Mont Blanc is described as follows : T7
The enlisted men of the Medical Department with the companies followed the attack,
dressing the wounded, who were carried back to battalion aid stations by company litter
bearers (1- men from each infantry and machine-gun company) as provided by divisional
order. * * * As battalion aid stations advanced, the old stations were taken over
and cleared by ambulance company litter bearers under their litter-bearer officers, who
maintained liaison with advancing battalion aid stations. The division litter-bearer
oltieer, meanwhile, was everywhere, seeing that the work of litter bearers was coordinated
and that ambulance posts were kept well advanced. With two Army ambulance sections
operating Ford cars and G. M. C. ambulances assisting when needed, the wounded were
rapidly removed from the sector and congestion rarely occurred.
In general, ambulances were operated under the system developed during
trench warfare; that is, with a regulating station, ambulance posts, an am-
bulance head, service by circuits, the light Ford cars operating in advance
of the dressing stations, the heavier G. M. C. or other cars in the rear of it.
As in trench warfare, usually the ambulance companies on active duty rotated
by roster, in order that one or more might repair cars while resting; but in
]>eriods of stress this arrangement was not feasible. There were so many
differences in the details of applying the ambulance company system that it
is considered advisable merely to mention here the more usual, typical prac-
tices, reserving more lengthy discussion for appropriate chapters.
13576— 2:> 10
138 FIELD OPERATIONS
One of the most conspicuous differences between ambulance service in
trench and in open warfare was that, in open warfare, especially during the
Meuse-Argonne operation, animal-drawn ambulances proved of great value
and were much more frequently employed. This was due chiefly to the fact
that they could go over routes impassable to motor vehicles, and often, by
leaving the road, could pass obstructions which blocked other traffic.
In narrow sectors it was a common practice during the Meuse-Argonne
operation for a division to operate but one ambulance head, served by several
companies through one regulating station. The 90th Division reported that in
that engagement its ambulances often reached battalion aid stations 300 yards
from the line, but that at first roads were in such frightful condition and so
crowded that not more than two round trips could be made in 24 hours. 78 In
other divisions in the early part of this operation one round trip sometimes
required as long as this.
A regulating station often was operated in conjunction with the dressing
station, and ambulances were parked near it.™ Under such circumstances the
directors of ambulance companies worked in conjunction. Here, the wounded
were not out of danger from shells and gas after being placed in ambulances,
for roads and approaches to dressing stations which occupied sites known by
the enemy to afford some shelter were often shelled and bombed.
Ambulances were sent up regularly after nightfall or on demand of the bat-
talion surgeons, as in the 5th Division, 8 " to battalion aid stations, if the military
situation permitted. The 2d and 82d Divisions, like practically all others, in-
creased their evacuation resources, in times of stress, by using the trucks of the
sanitary train and any other trucks obtainable. sl In the 82d Division the
sanitary trucks carried six litters lengthwise on the bottom of each truck and
six crosswise on the sidelx>ards, lashed in place by wires engaging the hooks
provided for the cover fastening. Sitting cases were removed in groups of
24. S1 On their return trips these trucks brought up supplies. They were
used especially to clear field hospitals, but if need arose they also cleared
dressing stations. Supply and ammunition trucks returning empty were also
used to carry the wounded, for without exception the ambulances available in
large engagements during open warfare proved utterly inadequate. One
result of this was the increased difficulty in renewing medical supplies at for-
ward points, for trucks returned to the front filled with their normal loads,
and the ambulances moving forward did not have capacity to carry materiel
sufficient to replace fully all supplies that had been sent back with patients."
Trucks of the divisional sanitary trains relieved this condition, but later, in
many divisions they were pooled with those of other trains, after which any
trucks obtainable were utilized for wounded. This pooling of sanitary train
trucks with others interfered with the availability of these vehicles to the
medical authorities, but apparently was necessitated by military exigencies.
Tlie most serious difficulty ex]>erienced in ambulance company service in
open warfare in the early part of the war was the necessity for sending
ambulances to points far in the rear. During the early activities along the
Mame. though additional evacuation ambulance companies were provided
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 139
to evacuate divisional hospitals, ambulances proved inadequate at times; for
example, when they had to carry patients 60 km. (37.2 miles) or more to
evacuation hospitals. The 2d Division, during its action along the Manic,
had a total of 200 serviceable ambulances, including those of its own sanitary
train and those assigned to it/' 1 Before the St. Mihiel operation arrange-
ments were made to avoid the necessity for these long- trips by divisional
ambulances by providing ambulance companies operated by the corps and
army to clear the field hospitals. 83
The supplies of ambulances were increased as the war progressed. In
the 42d Division the following articles were added to their regulation equip-
ment: 84 Ammonia, ampules, boxes, ID; catheters, 4: coats, gas, 2; masks. M2,
French. 4: mittens, gas. 2: oxygen tanks, small, and connections. 4.
The Dressing Station-
As a rule, two or three dressing stations to a division were established
according to the width of its sector, availability of roads, and military activ-
ity. It was a common practice in some sectors to utilize two ambulance com-
panies in the service of one main dressing station, while a third operated an
advance station and the fourth was held in reserve except during periods of
especial stress, when all — particularly the litter bearers— were active; but
there were many departures from this method, even in the same division, at
different times. Tactical needs determined disposition. Thus, in the Sd
Division, three ambulance companies during the Meuse- Argon ne operation
served a main dressing station at Montfaucon, the fourth being in reserve,
while at other times individual ambulance companies operated their own
stations. 8 "' The 90th Division, which at one time utilized two companies at
the main dressing station, a third company at an advance station, and held
the fourth in reserve, on another occasion, when two roads were available,
operated parallel evacuation routes, assigning one company to each station,
while two companies were in reserve. 88 Under other circumstances it used
a third disposition, one company operating an advance station, another a main
station in the rear of it. the third operating a main station for a different part
of the line, while the fourth company was in reserve. The changes of tactical
arrangements in these divisions were typical of all the divisions. The 77th
Division habitually kept two ambulance companies in action and two in re-
serve, the personnel of one of t lie latter companies assisting one of the active
companies if needed/ 7
Only one main dressing station was established by a division in a narrow
sector. and if communication to this point was delayed or obstructed — asit usually
was during the Meuse-Argonne operation — an advance station was operated.
Under such circumstances two ambulance companies often were assigned to
the main station and one to that in advance, the fourth Ixdng held in reserve
to leapfrog when needed ; or two companies operated both the main and
advance stations and two were held in reserve. When the advance was rapid
one company was usually kept at rest behind another, the rear one leapfrog -
irinjr when another station was needed farther forward. 84 Evacuation serv-
140 FIELD OPERATIONS
ice was very exhausting; it was carried on night and day, and difficulties were
aggravated by the loss of personnel and of vehicles. Dressing stations were
located as near the front as possible, the 80th Division reporting that those
which it established were often within 0.3 km. (i/> mile) of the front line and
were never more than 0.6 km. (1 mile from it). 88 In the St. Mihiel operations
the 5th Division established its dressing stations approximately in the line of
regimental stations but more centrally located and often somewhat in the rear
of them. 80 The 1st Division, at Cantigny, placed its station in advance of
the command post of the division surgeon; 8 " and the 2d Division, at Vaux, on
July 1. 1918, sent up a dressing station to reinforce the regimental aid station
of the 9th Infantry/'' This formation also established a Medical Depart-
ment "dump" still farther forward, at a point accessible to ambulances.
Dressing stations were often established in or near villages, if their location
was suitable from a military standpoint, because these villages Mere marked
on maps and were on roads and thus more easily accessible. Such sites,
however, were shelled frequently; oftener, perhaps, than other locations would
have l>een.
Sometimes, two divisions located their stations in the same village; for
example, at Montfaucon during the Metise-Argonne operation. The site was
often at a place affording some shelter, and a tendency developed to locate
stations at points which could l>e used later for triage purposes. The method
of advancing various medical units is illustrated by the following extract from
the report of the division surgeon. 2d Division: 00
Following the attack on Wane Mont, an ambulance dressing station personnel fur-
nished by the 1st Ambulance Company was established at Somme-Py on the afternoon of
October 3, the 16th Ambulance Company dressing station taking its stand at Soualn. On
the -41 li the ambulance head had advanced to Somme-Py and the 15th Ambulance Company
dressing station leapfrogged to a point 2 km. north of Somme-Py, while the triage — 1st Field
Hospital — had set up at Souain. On the 5th the 23d Ambulance dressing station leap-
frogged to a position near Medenh Ferine and the 1st Field Hospital advanced to Somme-
l'y. as did the surgical unit — 15th and 23d Field Hospitals.
Divisions frequently established an advanced dressing station if the main
dressing station was at the ambulance head; but. as noted above, whenever
possible, ambulances brought patients to the latter station direct from battalion
posts and collecting points. Either the advanced station, if established, or the
main dressing station, took over the site of what would have l>een a regimental
station formerly and served the troops as the regimental station hail been
designed to do originally. When information was received that the battalion
aid station had advanced, one or two officers and a small detachment of enlisted
men went forward with materiel carried perhaps by ambulances, and estab-
lished a new station. In the 81st Division, if the advance dressing station
moved, a man was left posted until the director of ambulance companies had
received report of the new location." 1 All divisions found that these stations
must be centrally located and on natural evacuation routes.
The stations utilized tentage. but frequently their tentage afforded very
limited shelter, it sometimes being no more than a tent fly. Toward the end
of the Meuse-Argonne operation each division in the Third Corps was or-
GENERAL VIEW OK MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 141
dered to establish a field hospital near its main dressing station, where patients
often collected in large numbers before they could be removed." 2
Sometimes, the dressing station operated the triage, methods being much
the same in this respect as those previously described under trench -warfare.
In order to relieve the dressing station, the SOth Division 1 '"' and a few other
divisions maintained a station for ambulant patients — the slightly wounded,
slightly ill, or fatigued — but this formation was very unusual.
Dressing station equipment was often limited in variety, consisting chiefly
of dressings, splints, litters, blankets, antitetanic serum, a few' drugs and in-
struments, and antigas supplies. An important factor in the equipment of
a dressing station was a kitchen with ample cooking facilities. 11
In open warfare, the service of dressing stations was similar to that when
troops were in the trenches. The personnel often worked in shifts, except
during periods of stress, when all were constantly on duty. At such times,
records were fragmentary and incomplete. Redressing of wounds at these
times was reduced to a minimum and was confined chiefly to wounds with
hemorrhage. Dressing stations in narrow sectors frequently received patients
from neighboring divisions. The majority of casualties usually occurred
close together, as to both time and location, and stations would be congested
for a period followed by an interval of comparative calm. It was a general
practice to give morphine to all the seriously wounded. 11
The main dressing station operated a small medical supply dump,
which was replenished constantly, as already described under trench warfare,
by ambulances returning from the rear and by trucks. This was a highly
important feature in the service of these stations, and their maintenance of
adequate supplies in the Meuse-Argonne operation required constant effort
because of road congestion and limited transportation."
Another very important service here was that of supplying hot food.
The 5th Division reported that from one of its dressing stations more than
3.000 men were fed in 48 hours. 34 Many of those seeking the station required
no other care, and some, after receiving food, returned to their companies of
their own volition.
Treatment of patients before they reached the hospital was generally re-
ported as good. Thus, the 00th Division reported that 91) per cent of cases
reaching hospital had been well splinted and dressed.' 1 "' The 5th Division re-
ported that less than 10 per cent required antitetanic serum.'" 1 The same divi-
sion reported that fracture cases invariably reached field hospitals in good con-
dition, owing to the very careful and judicious application of the Thomas
splint — which proved to be a great boon during the war. " The benefits of
special training, given regimental medical personnel in the application of the
Thomas splint, were shown by the good condition in which patients were
received at hospitals.
The 2d Division reported that the average time consumed in transferring
the wounded to field hospitals was a little more than one hour in the St.
Mihiel operation, some nontransportable patients reaching the operating
table at Thiaucourt within 20 minutes after being wounded." 7 At Soissous,
142 FIELD OPERATIONS
however, because of road conditions, the ambulances of this division frequently
needed from seven to eight hours to make a trip. The 5th Division, in the
St. Mihiel operation, had its patients in hospital in from 4 to 6 hours, and
in the Meuse-Argonne in from 10 to 12 hours, except in some few instances
where 24 hours elapsed after individual patients had been gassed or wounded. 98
Field Hospitals
Usually, in open warfare, field hospitals were located from 4.S to 9.t» km.
(3 to 6 miles) from the front, the site often being determined to a Large ex-
tent by conjunction of the roads of the sector served. As field hospitals in
open warfare habitually used tentage, the location of available buildings
l>ecame a matter of minor importance. In many divisions field hospitals were
so near the front that they were hit by enemy shells: for example. Field
Hospital No. 3G0, 90th Division, on October 25. 1918. 9 " Field hospitals of
the 5th Division were habitually at some distance from towns or crossroads,
but placed on some highway from front to rear. 100
During the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation the Third Corps,
which had a rather narrow front and good road facilities, grouped the field
hospitals of its three component divisions at Bethincourt. designated three
hospitals — one from each division in line — to perform triage service, and
operated in effect a corps triage, though divisions retained control over their
respective field hospitals composing it. each division thus having a field
hospital to receive, classify, and record its own casualties. 101 One division
then established a hospital for all nontransportable wounded: another, one
for all gassed patients: and third one for overflow; each of the three last-
named units receiving patients from all three divisions composing the corps
front. The third field hospital of each division remained outside the battle
area to receive sick daily, and served as a relay station, while the fourth was
held in reserve to leapfrog if necessary.
Mobility of field hospitals depended largely upon the expedition with
which they were cleared by corps ambulance companies. At times, transpor-
tation for this purpose could not be furnished in sufficient amount. Although
all divisional Medical Department units suffered from this lack, the held
hospitals were most gravely affected by it. 10 * At times it was impossible, he-
cause of military exigencies, for field hospitals to keep their trucks even
after they had received them. The animal-drawn field hospital, though
usually a rear formation, could sometimes advance over ground impassable
by motor vehicles, and its mobility under such circumstances proved of defi-
nite assistance in solving the Medical Department problems of the division.
A very important service of field hospitals was that of supplying hot
food to all who needed it. whether patients or not. thus alleviating fatigue
and maintaining morale, as did the same service at the dressing stations.
No orders prescribing the use or distribution of divisional field hospitals
were issued by authorities higher than the corps. Much was left to local
initiative. In general terms — to which many exceptions may be found — in
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 143
active offense the field hospitals were used as follows: (1) Triage and non-
transportable wounded: (2) slightly wounded: (?>) passed and sick: (4)
reserve.
Triage
For convenience the triage will he discussed at this point in connection
with field hospitals, with which, usually, it was associated both in trench
and in open warfare.
The triage, or sorting station, whence patients were distributed to appro-
priate hospitals, was a new formation in the, American Army, the idea having
been borrowed from our Allies after the United States entered the war. 103 and
it was first used, with some modifications, in the 1st Division. 104 Though
operated in all divisions in trench as well as in open warfare, no orders from
higher authority required it or standardized it in personnel, organization,
equipment, or operation, each division following its own methods except when
a corps surgeon prescribed for divisions within his jurisdiction. Several di-
visions operated the triage at the dressing station, but usually it was a depart-
ment of a field hospital, or, less frequently, was attached to a field hospital.
Between the several divisions there was some difference in what was under-
stood by the term "triage." Not infrequently it meant only the sorting
station which either belonged to a hospital or was attached to it, and, rarely,
it was made to include the neighboring hospitals to which patients were
distributed. Sometimes, as already indicated, it was a main dressing station
more elaborately developed than these formations usually were, from which
sorted patients were distributed direct to appropriate hospitals.
The manner in which the triage was operated at a dressing station has
already been described. When operated in conjunction with a field hospital
it functioned habitually with the one farthest forward. In some divisions the
triage hospital received all nontransportable patients whether sick, wounded,
or passed; in others it received the seriously wounded only: in yet others, as
in t lie 36th Division, this hospital retained no patients, but was used solely
as a distributing agency. 10 "' In trench warfare a designated hospital usually
performed triage service as long as a division occupied a given sector, a change
lx'ing made only when the division was moved to another part of the line,
when sometimes another field hospital was assigned to triage duty: in open
warfare, on the contrary, field hospitals often alternated in triage service.
The personnel conducting a triage consisted in part of the divisional con-
sultants: i. e., the divisional chief of surgery or his representative, orthopedist,
psychiatrist, urologist, tuberculosis expert, and gas-treatment officer. 101 Often
the chief of surgery was replaced here by a carefully selected officer chosen
for his surgical judgment rather than for his operating ability. Members of
the professional group often were supplemented by other officers and by
enlisted men permanently, or. more commonly, temporarily assigned to triage
duty. Triage officers were required to make quick but unhurried diagnoses
and to estimate correctly the patient's needs in their relationship to available
facilities for treatment. To the finest discrimination and most unerring
144 FIELD OPERATIONS
judgment had to be superadded a thorough knowledge of medicine and
surgery, and of human nature. The task became especially difficult when
most important: that is to say, when hospitals were filling and evacuation
facilities were limited. Then. too. often at this time the diagnosticians were
worn out by the long-continued admission of many patients. In the 32d
Division, a permanent triage group was organized consisting of the specialists
above mentioned and, in addition, of officers drawn from all the field hospitals.
This group was independent, performing triage and consultant duty only. 1 "
In the 90th Division one ambulance company in conjunction with a field
hospital established the divisional triage. 107 The triage hospital of this divi-
sion consisted of four sections, the triage proper, gas, nontransportable, and
psychopathic In the Meuse-Argonne operation, unlike, its practice at St.
Mihiel, the triage of the !)0th Division retained no gas patients unless it was
imperative to do so to save life, evacuating all others to appropriate units, and
operating day and night shifts. 108
In the 77th Division, two triage units were organized by drawing on the
personnel of two field hospitals, and surgical, shock, gas, and medical teams
were organized. 100 Enlisted personnel, carefully selected, were assigned in
the proportion of two to each officer, the group remaining a permanent team.
Other qualified enlisted men were designated for special duties, such as the
administration of morphine and serum, and the application of bandages and
splints. Permanent details were assigned for litter bearing, clerical work,
policing, and the serving of food. The detachment on duty in the operating
room was composed of men who in civil life had been hospital orderlies. The
triage equipment was selected from the two field hospitals concerned. The
Medical Department supply table was ignored for this purpose, and much
of the hospital equipment was salvaged, being replaced by other articles which
were thought to be more useful; for example, additional blankets and litters. 110
The triage of the 80th Division Consisted of two field hospitals, usually
combined, and included a receiving ward and wards for slightly wounded,
seriously wounded, shocked, gassed, sick, transportable patients, an operating
room, and a mortuary. 111
At the triage of the 5th Division, patients were redressed, if necessary, and
emergency treatment, such as for shock or gassing, was given. 1 " In the 2d
Division the triage carried bathtubs and other facilities for gas treatment. 112
Though sorting of patients was practiced in every stage of the evacuation
service, each division habitually operated but one official triage. In the St.
Mihiel operation the 82d Divison had a triage on each side of the Moselle
River, 118 and in the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne the 33d Division 114
had two, one at Glorieux and the other at Bethincourt. The 78th Division, in
the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation, attacked on a rather wide
front, through heavy brush and timber, traversed by so few roads and trails
that the wounded could not l>e collected at any one point reasonably near the
front. For tins reason it organized two triages from its ambulance companies
and located one with two hospitals behind either flank. 115 There were several
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION It)
other instances in which two triages were operated by divisions, hut the fore-
going illustrates the conditions which usually necessitated this — a lone: front,
or such a one that evacuation from its flanks to a central point was difficult
because of enemy fire, location of roads, ruggedness of terrain, or hisection by
a river.
The following quotation illustrates certain phases of triage service : 11G
In the Meuse-Argonne offensive, t lie triage hospital was opened about <> km. behind
the line, and with it were the three other hospitals and the medical supply depot. Two
of the hospitals cared for the sick and wounded and one operated as a gas hospital.
The fourth hospital was held in reserve. This was found to he a very satisfactory
arrangement on that particular front, since it gave wide expansion under canvas, with the
necessary personnel to care adequately for all cases received. Also, it allowed the three
hospitals to open immediately all their wards, while the personnel of the reserve hos-
pital could do the necessary road building and i>olice work. Triage of cases was con-
ducted by Field Hospital No. 27, which cared also for the seriously wounded, and the
direction of the whole field hospital section was under the supervision of the director of
field hospitals.
The professional work was about the same as on the Marne front except that fewer
operations were performed. Patients as a whole arrived in better condition, but there
was a large number of shock cases, the weather being cold and rainy. Many cases of
exhaustion were received, due to the exposure and hardships of long-continued service
in the front line.
Usually simple records were made of all patients at the triage. Cases
were rapidly classified, hemorrhage was controlled, dressings were readjusted
if necessary, shock was treated, antitetanie serum was injected if it had not
l>een administered previously, hot food was given, and emergency opera-
tions were performed on a few nontransportahle patients by the hospital
staff or by operatin<r units assigned by the chief surgeon of the army.
If a mobile surgical unit was assigned to a division it was operated in
conjunction with the field hospital for nontransportahle patients. 102 Often
the personnel of a field hospital was increased by surgical teams; for example,
in the Chateau-Thierry sector the 2d Division received a number of surgical
teams, including IS nurses, and the personnel of an overworked field hospital
was often reinforced by details from others in reserve. 117 Thus, on June 6,
1918, the 2d Division ordered half the personnel of Field Hospital Xo. 28 to
Bezn to assist Fueld Hospital No. 1.
The triage was usually the first hospital reached by patients, and others
were grouped as near it as was practicable, the rearmost one being held in
reserve. (This arrangement of hospitals was called the "diamond forma-
tion'' in the 32d Division.) 81 As troops advanced, the rear hospital moved
forward past the others and established the triage, the other units following
it as soon as practicable and the former triage then going into reserve. There
were many departures in details from this practice. Sometimes, as in the 90th
Division, half the triage group accompanied the newly-advanced forward
hospital while the remainder, after the new one had opened, continued to op-
erate the former triage. 118 Sometimes two full triage groups were organized
146 FIELD OPERATION S
which leapfrogged each other, as in the 77th Division. 110 In the 32d Division
the rear surgical hospital evacuated its patients and moved forward to take
over triage work, and the gas hospital moved up beside the advanced surgi-
cal hospital. 81
There were further departures from these uses of field hospitals, of which
only a few will he mentioned here. Though generally following the foregoing
disposition, the 1st Division had at times only two field hospitals open, keep-
ing two in reserve. 110 The 2d Division consolidated two hospitals into one
establishment for the wounded, and sought to maintain its capacity at 250
beds. 1 - In the St. Mihiel operation one hospital of the 78th Division received
gassed patients, another the. sick and slightly wounded, and a third field
hospital cared for nontransportable patients, the fourth being held in reserve. 121
The triage was operated by an ambulance company which called on a field
hospital for additional personnel if needed. 122 At one period the 36th Divi-
sion operated one hospital as a triage, sending nontransportable patients to
another, passed patients to a third, and all others to evacuation hospitals. 10 "
In the Aisne-Marne operation the 42d Division set up one field hospital near
the dressing station after its evacuation became difficult because of road con-
gestion. 123
The following quotation, which covers the activities of the jzas hospital
of a division, is made from the report of the 3d Division : 124
The gas hospital was fitted up with the following equipment : A large shower hath, a
large supply of blankets, pajamas, lied sacks, and an extra number of ward tents in order
to accommodate several hundred patients. In addition to the regular field-hospital
equipment, the following were provided: Oxygen-inhalation sets, sodium bicarbonate 1 per
pent solution, novocaine I per cent solution, albolene, camphorated oil in ampules, caffeine
citrate in ampules - , quarter-grain solution of morphine in ampules. This equipment and
supplies were placed in each ward. Shower baths were provided, with a large supply of
soap, towels, and sodium bicarbonate.
Patients were divided into three classes: (1) Those suffering from surface contact
with mustard gas; (2) those intoxicated by the inhalation of noxious gases; (3) cases
suffering from both these conditions. Those in the third class were numerous.
Patients were admitted through a receiving ward, where the diagnosis was verified
and proper records were made. They were sent at once to the baths, where clothing was
removed and each patient given a thorough bath, soap being used freely. Water used in
the showers contained sodium bicarbonate (1 pound to 15 gallons). A fountain syringe
was supplied with a 1 per cent solution of sodium bicarbonate, and the eyes, ears, nose,
anil throat of every patient were irrigated. All cases with blisters were then sent to the
dispensary, where blisters were opened and the escaping fluid caught on gauze or cotton
to prevent its coming in contact with the healthy s-kin. Gauze wet with a 1 per cent
solution of sodium bicarbonate was applied to burned surfaces. Often, when a burn was
slight, the sodium bicarbonate was dusted on. Patients were then sent to the wards,
where they were given hot. stimulating drinks, such as coffee, cocoa, and broths, and
morphine was administered as required. Most patients with mustard-gas burns had a
complicating conjunctivitis, either slight or severe. Slight conjunctivitis was relieved
by irrigating the eyes with sodium-bicarbonate solution, followed by a few drops of
albolene. Severe conjuntivitis was treated with a I per cent solution of novocaine as often
as required to relieve pain, and gauze wet with a 1 per cent solution of sodium bicar-
bonate was placed over the eyes. Patients gassed by inhalation were given a bath while
recumbent. Severe cases were given a sponge bath in the wards as soon as their condition
GENERAL VIEW OK MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 147
permitted, but if the patient had difficulty in breathing he was at once given oxygen by
Inhalation for live minutes. Then followed an intermission of five minutes, and oxygen
again applied. In five minutes' time there was usually a great improvement, and it was
not often necessary to repeat its administration. Some patients* who were unconscious
were restored to consciousness by the first application : Others remained unconscious for
30 minutes or longer, Hypodermic injections- of camphorated oil, 1 <•. <•.. or caffeine
citrate, 2 grains were then given. The patient was kept warm by the use of blankets,
and by heat, if necessary, and was given hot drinks as soon as lie could take them. The
majority of these patients soon recovered.
The rapidity with which patients were evacuated to and from field hos-
pitals varied widely, being dependent chiefly upon the number and character
of casualties and the intensity of enemy fire, which delayed the removal of
the wounded in forward areas, road conditions hack of the forward areas, and
transportation.
In times of great stress, few patients were returned to duty from Held
hospitals, a fact largely duo to the impossibility of temporary retention on
account of the demand for beds, to the elimination at the dressing station of
patients with trifling conditions, and to the disposition to give the benefit
of any doubt to those whose need of further hospital care was questionable.
It was then quite impossible to hold patients in the division, as beds had to
lie provided for later casualties. The 2d Division reported that the average
time men were held in its field hospitals, if not evacuated, was four days, and
that in very active warfare it evacuated most of them. 12 "' This was in striking
contrast to the experience of this division in quiet sections, where 32.4 per
cent of patients were returned to duty. In the 89th Division the average time
patients spent in field hospitals was two hours, and the average time for
nontransportable wounded was from five to eight days. 12 "
In the -26th Division the factors determining transportability of patients
were regarded as intrinsic and extrinsic. The former comprised the patient's
condition: the latter, bed space and other local factors, such as distance, time,
means of evacuation, and road conditions.' 27 Surgical conditions warranting
evacuation, therefore, varied considerably at different times in this division,
as in others. Specialists decided which patients should be transferred, while
the director of field hospitals and the commanding officer of the triage kept
them informed concerning extrinsic conditions governing selection of patients
to be evacuated. In periods of stress, nontransportable patients in this divi-
sion comprised only those with hemorrhage, aspirating chest wounds, severe
abdominal wounds, partial traumatic amputations, and deep shock.
The activity of the Held hospitals is indicated from the statistics quoted
in other chapters concerning the casualties during different engagements.
The celerity with which patients could be cared for by the divisional medical
service is evidenced by the report of the 2d Division. 120 In that division,
miscellaneous casualties were received, distributed, treated, and evacuated
(if need be) at the rate of 120 per hour, and operated upon at the rate of 50
a day. The total number of patients operated upon in the field hospitals of
the 2d Division during its entire experience in France was 1,665, 90 per cent
of whom were nontransportable. 12 ' 1
148 FIELD OPERATIONS
MEDICAL SUPPLY UNITS
Divisional medical supply units performed services similar to those in
the 3d Division. Extracts from the report of the 3d Division (concerning
the medical supply unit) read as follows : 128
When the Germans launched their great offensive along the Marne on the night of
July 14-15, the medical supply unit, 3d Division, was called upon to furnish supplies in
abundance. Owing to the vast number of wounded men pouring into aid stations it was
necessary that surgeons have sufficient blankets and litters on which to lay them. Trucks
were sent to advance medical suppy depots and to American lied Cross warehouses,
bringing back with them sufficient litters, blankets, shell-wound packets and splints to
meet the demand. In the interim after the night of the attack until early August, when
the division was relieved, no shortages of any kind arose.
While the division was at this front a great demand was made for Thomas traction
arm and leg splints, Cabot splints, and a vast number of shell-wound packets. Snowshoe
and wheel litters were used to great advantage, but when the division went into action
in the Meuse-Argonne sector these items were rarely, if ever, called for.
The work of the medical supply unit at this latter station was to equip organizations
after their long stay at the front, during which time many of them had lost a considerable
portion of their equipment, some from enemy shell fire and others while moving. This
reequipment was duly accomplished, and in anticipation of a situation similar to that
existing on the Marne, the medical supply officer requested that four trucks be assigned.
These were provided and requisition was made for a 10-days' supply of articles that
would be in greatest demand while troops were in action.
During the Meuse-Argonne operation the medical supply officer made frequent trips
to the regimental infirmaries of the various organizations, bringing with him an assort-
ment of medical supplies which in his judgment might be needed.
October 2 found the unit proceeding overland to join the field-hospital section of the
sanitary train, located near Very, arriving there that night. The depot was established
in a ward tent and supplies were sent out the same night. Litters and blankets were
most in demand, and in order to meet the situation, trucks were dispatched back to
Souilly day and night during the remainder of the stay here.
A branch distributing station of the medical supply unit was established witli the
ambulance section of the sanitary train at Montfaucon. This proved a vantage point
for the reason that it was the dispatch point for the ambulance service. The stock main-
tained at this point consisted chiefly of emergency dressings, medicines, and food supplies.
The medical supply unit functioned nt all times near the triage hospital of the division,
employing ambulances returning to aid stations to transport supplies to the medical officer
at the point. Trucks belonging to the unit Carried patients to evacuation hospitals in the
rear, and brought up supplies on return trips.
In some divisions, the TcSth, for instance, trucks of the medical supply unit
carried materiel as far forward as the battalion aid stations. 329
DIVISION LABORATORIES
In the American Expeditionary Forces transportable laboratories were
added to the sanitary trains of the divisions. 130 and proved of great value
in the examination of water supplies and of pathological specimens and in
determining wound bacteriology. 1 * 1 The 1st Division found that the useful-
ness of the field laboratory was impaired by the limited amount of transporta-
tion at its disposal, and that it was of less value in active operations than when
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 149
the division occupied quiet or semipermanent sectors. 182 Under the latter
conditions it was a necessity to the sanitary inspector in his epidemiological
work and to ward surgeons treating" certain classes of the divisional sick.
BURIAL OF THE DEAD
The dead Avere buried in small plots selected with reference to prompt
location. Very few, in the St. Mihiel or Meuse-Argonne operations, Avere
buried at isolated places, and then only when the bodies AA-ere in such condition
and at such a distance from the burial plot that local interment was necessary.
The 3d Division reported, as did others, that the bodies of those who died on
the field in No Man's Land remained unburied for many days. 188 Trench
burial A\as emjiloyed near some hospitals, but only when facilities were not
available for the prejjaration of individual graves. The work of preparing
graves Avas very toilsome for men already Avell-nigh exhausted, and at times
graves Avere dug by pioneer troops, and at other times the work Avas done by
details from the line. Habitually the dead were buried in blankets, with an
identification tag, and the grave Avas marked by a cross bearing the decedent's
name and his official number inscribed upon it. If a second identification tag
was available, this was affixed to the cross.
REFERENCES
(1) Letter from the division surgeon, 42d Division, to the commanding general, 42d
Division, April 4, 1918. Subject : Evacuation of sick and wounded. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(2) Memorandum No. CO, division surgeon's office, 3d Division, A. E. F., July 23, 191S.
On tile. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(3) Memorandum No. 82, division surgeon's office, 3d Division, A. E. F., September 0,
1918. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Report of Medical Department activities, 3d Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part III, 156. On tile, Historical
Division, S. G. ().
(5) Ibid., Part II, 81.
(6) Ibid.. Part V, 72.
(7) Memorandum, September .'!. 1918. Headquarters. First Army Corps, Subject:
Evacuation sick and wounded. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(8) Keport of Medical Department activities, 5tli Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part III, S. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(9) Keport of the Medical Department activities of the combat divisions, by Col.
I!. K. Ashford. M. C, undated, 11. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O. Evacua-
tion system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C, undated, 19. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(10) Keport of Medical Department activities. 89th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 52. On tile, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
'Ill From reports of Medical Department activities of divisions in the A. E. F., undated.
On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
*12i Report of Medical Department activities, 4th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 3. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
150 FIELD OPERATIONS
(13) Report of Medical Department activities of the combat divisions, by CoL B. K.
Ashford. M. C, undated. 12. On file. Historical Division. S. 6. O.
(14) Ibid, 19.
(15) Report of Medical Department activities of 1st Division. A. H. P.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 11. On file. Historical Divi-
sion. S. G. 0.
(16) Report of Medical Department activities of 3d Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
tile direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part V. 35. On tile. Historical
Division, S. o. o.
(17) Ibid.. Part V. 36.
(IS) Ibid., Part V. 37.
(19) Report of Medical Department activities of the combat divisions, by Col. B, K
Ashford, M. ( '.. undated. 17. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(20) Ibid., 15.
(21) Tables of Organisation and Equipment I'. S. Army, Series A, Table 4, August, 1917.
(22) Report of Medical Department activities. 3d Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part IV. 68. On file. Historical
Division, S. (J. O.
(23) Tables of Organization and Equipment, I'. S. Army, Series A. Table 28, April 17.
1918.
(24) Manual for the Medical Department, U. S. Army. 1916, par. (574.
(25) Keport of Medical Department activities, 4th Division, A. E. F„ prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 5. On file. Historical
Division. S. (1. O.
(26) Report of Medical Department activities. 1st Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 5. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(27) Report of Medical Department activities. 4tli Division. A. E. P.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I, 3. On tile. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(28) Keport of Medical Department activities, 5th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 7. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(29) Report of Medical Department activities. 37th Division. A. E. P.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 9. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(301 Report of Medical Department activities. 5th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 11. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. ().
(31) Keport of Medical Department activities. 35th Division, A. E. P.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 1<>. On tile. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(32) Report of Medical Department activities of the combat divisions. A. E. F.. by Col.
P.. K. Ashford. M. ('.. undated. 25. On tile. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(88) Report of Medical Department activities. 28th Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part 1. 4. On tile. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(34) Rejmrt of Medical Department activities of the combat divisions. A. E. P.. by Col.
P.. K. Ashford. M. ('., undated, 2ti. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(35) Report of Medical Department activities of the 42d Division, prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 38. On file. Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(36) Re|mrt of Medical Department activities of 1st Division, A. E. P.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 42. On file, Historical
Division. S. O. ( ».
GENERA]. VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 151
(37) The evacuation system in the zone of the armies, by CoL A. N. Stark. M. < '..
umlated. 1. On file. Historical Division, S. G. < >.
(38) Ibid., 2.
(39) Report of Medical Department activities of the 5th Division. A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 10. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(40) The evacuation system in the zone of the armies, by Col. A. N. Stark. M. <'..
undated, 3. On file. Historical Division. S. (!. <).
(41) Report of Medical Department activities*. 42d Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 39. On file. Historical
Division. S. G, O.
(421 Report of Medical Department activities. 2d Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II, 5. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(43) Report of Medical Department activities, 42d Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I, 48. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(44) Ibid., 51.
(45) Report of Medical Department activities of the combat divisions, A. E. F.. by
Col. P.. K. Ashford. M. C. undated. 34. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(4G) Memorandum, Headquarters, First Army Corps, September 3. 1918. On file. His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(47) Report of Medical Department activities of the combat divisions. A. E. F.. by
Col. B. K. Ashford, M. C. undated. 27. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
I4S) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff. G. II. Q„
A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section. December 31, 1918, 62.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(49) Report of Medical Department activities. 4th Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 10. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(50) Tables of Organization and Equipment, l". S. Army. Series A, Table 28, April 17.
1918.
(51) Report on activities of G— 4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q..
A. E. F.. by Col. S. II. Wadhams, M. C. chief of section. December 31, 1918. 43.
On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(52) Report of the Medical Department activities of the combat divisions. A. E. F.. by-
Col. B. K. Ashford, M. ('.. undated. 32. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(53) Report of Medical Department activities of the 26th Division, A. E. F.. prepared
under the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 13. On file. Ilis-
(orical Division. S. G. O.
154) Report of Medical Department activities of the 90th Division. A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part III. 2. On file. His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(55) Report of Medical Department activities. 5th Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part IV. 41. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(58) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 30. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(57) Ibid.. Part III, 17.
(58) Report of Medical Department activities. 3d Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part V. 38. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(59) Report of operations, Medical Department. 2d Division, May 31 to July 10, 1918.
from the division surgeon to the commanding general. 2d Division. February 24,
1919. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
152 FIELD OPERATIONS
(•Mi) Report of Medical Department activities, 00th Division, A. K. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part II, (!. On file, Historical
Division, S. (1. O.
(*il) Iteport ill" Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. !•'.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part II, 24. Op file, Historical
Division, S. O. <».
(G'_') Iteport of Medical Department activities, 5th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division Burgeon, undated. Part I, ."17. On file, Historical Division,
s. <;. o.
(t*0 Iteport of Medical Department activities, 35th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part II. 3. on tile. Historical
Division, S. O. < >.
(154) Iteport of Medical Department activities, 90th Division, A. E. ]•'.. prepared under
the direction id" the division surgeon, undated. Part II, 21. On tile, Historical
Divisi s. O. (>.
(t>5) Heport of Medical Department activities, 5th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II, 7. On file. Historical Divi-
sion, S. (1. o.
(*St>) Iteport of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I. 34. On file. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
((57) Iteport of Medical Department activities, 7iNth Division, A. E. I-\, prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 32. On file, Historical Divi-
sion, S. O. O.
(68) Report <>( Medical Department activities. 5th Division. A. E. I'., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part IV. 41. On file, Historical
Division, s. o. O.
(t>0) Heport of Medical Department activities. 3d Division, A. E. 1-'., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part IV, 71. i Mi file. Historical Divi-
sion, S. Q. O.
(70) iteport of Medical Department activities, 5th Division, A. E. I'., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 38. On file. Historical Divi-
sion. S. V,. O.
171 » lipid.. p„rt II. 11.
1 72i Keport of operations. Medical Department, -<\ Division, A. E. F., March 16, 1018.
to December 31, 1018, from the division surgeon to the commanding general.
2d Division. February 25, l!»ll>. 7. On file. Historical Division. S. <i. O.
(7H) Report of Medical Department activities. 3d Division, A. E. F„ prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part V, .'17. On tile. Historical Divi-
sion. S. 0. (>.
174) Heport of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. I'., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 35. On file. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. (t.
I 7.i i Report "»f Medical Department activities. 5th Division, A. E. P., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 46. On file. Historical Divi-
sion. S. (1. O.
(7t>t Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
directum of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. .'14. On tile. Historical Divi-
sion. S. O. O.
I 77 1 Ihid.. Part I. 41.
(78) Report of Medical Department activities. SHith Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 23. On file. Historical Divi-
sion. S. O, o.
(70) l!ep..rt of Medical Department activities. Ittith Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 0. On file. Historical
Division, S. O. O.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 153
(80) Report of Medical Department activities, 5th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part IV, 2. On tile. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
i si) Heport of Medical Department activities, 32d Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part II, 42. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(82) Report of the Medical Department activities of the combat divisions. A. E. I<\, by
Col. I!. K. Ashford. M. ('.. undated, 29. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(83) Ibid., 31.
(84) Memorandum 142. Headquarters, 42d Division, office of the surgeon, June 10, 1918.
On tile. Historical Division. S. (!. O.
'So) Report of Medical Department activities, 3d Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part IV, 17. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
isc,) Report of Medical Department activities, 00th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part II. 9. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(87) Heport of Medical Department activities, 77th Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. 12. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
IS.S) Heport of Medical Department activities. 80th Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 21. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(89) Heport of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I, 22. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
i '-to i Heport of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part III. 37. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
it'll Report of Medical Department activities. 81st Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 21. On file. Historical Division,
S. G. O.
''•'J i Memorandum from the surgeon. Third Corps, to division surgeons. Third Corps,
October li). li)18. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(98) Heport of Medical Department activities, SOth Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 35. On file. Historical Division,
s. g. o.
i!»4) Rei>ort of Medical Department activities, 5th Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 51. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
186) Report of Medical Department activities. 90th Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 12. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
'%\ Report of Medical Department activities, 5th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part IV, 29. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
'07) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 0. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
•88) Report of Medical Department activities. 5th Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part III, 9. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
''■'■>> Report of Medical Department activities, 90th Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 37. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
154 FIELD OPERATIONS
(1(H)) Report of Medical Department activities, 5th Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part IV. 30. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(1(H) Report of Medical Department activities, Third Corps, by Col. .Tames I.. Bevans,
M. ('., corps surgeon, undated, 33. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(102) Report on activities of (!— i-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff. G. n. Q.,
A. E. P., by Col. S. H. Wadhams. M. ('.. chief of section. December 31, 1918, 42.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(103) Report of the Medical Department activities of the combat divisions, A. B. P., by
Col. B. K. Ashford. M. ('.. undated. 34. On file. Historical Division. S. G. <).
(104) Report of .Medical Department activities. 1st Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 41. On tile. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(105) Report of Medical Department activities. .'5(ith Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 5. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(108) Report of Medical Department activities, 32d Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 04. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(107) Report of Medical Department activities, 90th Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II, 22. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(108) Ibid., Part II. 28.
(10!)) Report of Medical Department activities. 77th Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. 12. On file. Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(110) Ibid., 18.
(111) Report of Medical Department activities. SOtli Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. 24. On file. Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(112) Report of Medical Department activities. 2d Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part II. 14. On tile. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(113) Report of Medical Department activities, 82(1 Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. !). On file. Historical Division.
S. <i. (I.
(114) Report of Medical Department activities, 83d Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 7. On tile. Historical
Division. S. <;. ( ).
(115) Report of Medical Department activities. 7Sth Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. 27. On rile. Historical Division.
S. G. ().
(lit!) Report of Medical Department activities. 3d Division. A. E. P., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part IV, 44. On file. Historical Divi-
sion. S. G. <>.
(117) Report of Medical Department activities. 2d Division. A. E. P., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 25. On file. Historical Divi-
sion. 8. G. O.
(IIS) Report of Medical Department activities. !M)th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 10. On file. Historical
Division. 8. G. O.
(11!)) Report of Medical Department activities. 1st Division. A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part II. 42. On tile. Historical Divi-
sion, 8. <}. O.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 155
(120) Report of .Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. I'.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 14. On tile. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
(121) Report Of Medical Department activities. 78th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 62. <>n file, Historical
Division. S. G. O.
il22i Ibid.. Part II. 64.
1123) Report of Medical Department activities, 42d Division. A. K. I'\. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. I'arl I. 51, On tile. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
1124) Report of Medical Department activities. 3d Division. A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part IV. 44. On tile. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
(126) Report of Medical Department activities. 2d Division. A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 13. On file. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
1120) Report of Medical Department activities. 80th Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 57. On tile. Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(1271 Report of Medical Department activities. 2<>th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 7C>. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(128) Report of Medical Department activities. 3d Division, A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction id' the division surgeon, undated. Pari IV. 4ti. On tile. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
(129) Report of Medical Department activities, 78th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 83. On file. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
(130) Letter from the chief surgeon. A. E. I'', to the Surgeon General, U. S. Army,
August 12, 1!)17. Subject: Oulline of laboratory organization, A. E. F. On file.
A. (!. ().. World War Division. Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon Files.
322.3271).
031 1 Report on the division of laboratories and infectious diseases in the A. E. F., by
Col. J. F. Siler. M. ('.. chief of division, undated. On tile. Historical Division.
S. G. O.
032) Report of Medical Department activities. 1st Division. A. E. P., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part T. 84. on file. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
(183) Report of Medical Department activities, 3d Division. A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Fart V. 81. On file. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. (I.
CHAPTER V
EVACUATION HOSPITALS, MOBILE HOSPITALS, MOBILE SURGI-
CAL UNITS, PROFESSIONAL TEAMS, CONVALESCENT DEPOTS,
EVACUATION AMBULANCE COMPANIES, MOBILE LABORA-
TORIES
EVACUATION HOSPITALS
NUMBER
A description of our evacuation hospital, as provided for at the beginning
of the World War, will be found in the Manual for the Medical Department,
which is quoted at length in the Appendix (p. 1020) , so far as it pertains to the
present subject. It will be noted that the prescribed plan was ordinarily to fur-
nish two such hospitals, each accommodating 432 patients, for each division at
the front, and that they were lines of communication units. 1
15y 191G, the Medical Department had assembled equipment for 20
evacuation hospitals. This equipment was on hand at the beginning
of the World "War. No such organizations were actually in being in peace
limes, however, and the only evacuation hospital which Ave had ever organ-
ized, prior to the entry of the United States into the World War, was one
which functioned at Galveston, Tex., during American activities near Vera
Cruz. Mexico, in 1914. 2 The personnel for this evacuation hospital was as-
signed to it for the time being, assuming other duties as soon as the hospital
was broken up.
When the strength of our division was increased in 1917 to some 28,000
men, the prescribed standard capacity of an evacuation hospital was increased
to 1,000 beds, based on a recommendation of the chief surgeon, A. E. F. 3 On
occasions, however, even this number proved quite inadequate : that is to say,
some such units cared for more than twice this number at one time; for
example, Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at Sebastopol Barracks, in September.
1918, reached a bed capacity of 2,800. 4
The great expansion of individual evacuation hospitals was necessitated
primarily by the continuous shortage of these units in France, as they did not
arrive overseas in the number provided by regulations and in the shipping
schedule. As a matter of fact, until the armistice, never was there more than
about 25 per cent of the authorized quota of evacuation hospitals available, 5
for use as such in France. Prior to the armistice, only 37 evacuation hospitals
actually reached France (7 arriving after the armistice) to serve the 42 di-
visions of the United States Army sent there. To this number should fairly
be added Red Cross Hospital No. 114, which was taken over by the Army on
November 1, 1918, as Evacuation Hospital No. 114. 6
157
158 FIELD OPERATIONS
Five of the '-W evacuation hospitals winch had reached France on or before
November 11. 1918, arrived in November; two others had been previously as-
signed to duty in the Services) of Supply (Allerey and Mesves) and two in the
.loinville concentration area. Of the remaining 26, 4 (Nos. IK, 20, 22. ami
•2'-\) were broken up temporarily, though part of No. Is continued to function
as a unit." Twenty-two evacuation hospitals, therefore, in the zone of the
armies served the 29 divisions which took part in actual combat.
Most of the evacuation hospitals, which served other than in the /.one of
the armies, operated as liase hospitals in the base or intermediate sections. 7
As noted ahove. several were broken up. their personnel being assigned t<>
other units. Other hospitals of this type, while retaining their skeletonized
organization, were depleted by the assignment to other organizations of ■
large part of their personnel as operating teams and the like. It should be
remembered that, throughout the war. these teams were drawn not only fr
base hospitals in rear areas hut also from evacuation hospitals in quiet sectors
to he assigned to temporary duty with other hospitals most active at the time/
It was only dire and immediate necessity in other directions which forced
diverting these evacuation hospitals from their proper purpose. On the othet
hand, so desperate were the shifts required to meet the needs of the evacuation
hospital service thai units not originally intended for this purpose were sn
used. Twelve mobile hospitals were provided by resort for personnel to all
possible formations, including Red Cross Base Hospitals Nos. lln and 114."
In the St. Miliiel operation Base Hospitals No. l."> and No. 51, in the Justice
Groupe at Toul, though under control of the chief surgeon, S. ( ). S.. operated
as pari of an evacuation center virtually controlled by the army surgeon.
With them, in addition to Kvacuation Hospitals Nos. :> and 14. were Red
Cross Military Hospital No. 11). a neurologic unit from Base Hospital N".
117. a convalescent unit, and a hospital for gassed cases, the last staffed
from three organizations, viz. Kvacuation Hospital No. •_'. Base Hospital N"-
51, and the orthopedic battalion. 1 "
I l \( T IONS
Kvacuation hospitals which reached the zone of the armies were operated
directly under the jurisdiction of the army surgeon, and not under the
chief surgeon of the line of communications, as our regulations had stipn
Inted previous to our entry into the war." The army surgeon, cooperating
with the deputy of the chief surgeon. A. E. F., at G. II. Q., supervised their
distribution, location and expansion, coordinated their activities with tin
service of the front: and through a medical officer assigned to the regulating
station, effected their clearing by hospital trains. In the few instance!
when evacuation hospitals were not located on a railway line, the arm)
surgeon effected their evacuation to a railway by ambulance companies umlei
his command." These evacuation hospitals, too. were supplemented by tnobil
hospitals «hich performed similar functions hut were smaller and roort
mobile, i See infra. I
UENERAL VIEW OF .MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 159
While in certain respects our field hospital, as in France, continued to
be an emergency hospital for the battlefield, it became more nearly a magni-
fied and improved dressing station than a hospital. This made the evacuation
hospital the actual theater of our surgical effort there, especially during
very active periods. The evacuation hospital, plus the mobile hospital and
the mobile surgical unit, thus constituted the hospital for early surgery:
upon it. to a very great extent, the patient's life and limb depended. It
proved necessary in this hospital to apply, with greal rapidity, to the most
urgent cases, the best treatment known to modern surgery in order to secure
satisfactory professional results: and at the same time, in order to secure
the best administrative service, it was likewise necessary to evacuate its
patients as quickly as possible to provide beds for incoming wounded. To
a certain degree these needs conflicted, and it was only by the utmost dili-
gence and perspicacity that they could he reconciled in periods of stress.
or. that, if this proved impossible, their conflict could be reduced to a
minimum. 12
It should Ik' explained here that our medical service did not accept the
tenet of our allies that the more lightly wounded should receive preferential
attention in the zone of the armies because of the greater probability of their
return to active service and also because a greater number could thus lie
cared for in a given period. 1 ' 1 Nor did it accede to the policy, which was
followed by our allies generally, of making evacuation hospitals practically
immovable and of large size. Some similar establishments in the French
army, located from 15 to 20 km. (!) to bi miles) back of the line, accommo-
dated as many as 5,000 patients, and the English, by grouping their casualty
clearing stations, made arrangements which in general effect were the same."
Plus had secured prompt treatment of all the wounded it is true, during
the long period of trench warfare, but proved to be a tactical error when
the war became one of movement : for when the armies which the hospitals
nrved retired in the face of overwhelming onslaughts by the Germans the
French lost many thousand beds. 15
Increased knowledge of surgery proved that removal of devitalized tissue
and foreign bodies from slight wounds could lie accomplished successfully
l«ck of the zone of the armies and that surgical intervention within 12 hours
«as not essential in the slighter cases in order to prevent infection by the
I j- forming bacilli. 14 The earlier belief that early operation was essential
in all cases hail had an important influence, however, in causing the British
ami the French to locate so many large, relatively immobile hospitals so
1« ►— «• to the front. Their entire evacuation hospital service was also pro-
foundly influenced by the fact that shell wounds, so common in this war.
were practically always infected by gas-forming organisms and that, in
aider to get the liest results, operation was advisable within 12 hours after
injury. 14 At such operations, foreign bodies were removed, the wound de-
l>ri(ie<l and left open until bacteriological examination showed that its closure
w».« warrantable. This last procedure, in uncomplicated flesh wounds, was
moally |K»ssihlp in 4 to ."i days and recovery was complete in from •"> to :> weeks.
160
FIKU) OPERATIONS
No one questions the necessity for very prompt action in serious wounds.
nut it had also been believed that return to the colors would be expedited
if the slightly wounded as well as the seriously wounded could he operated
on within the 12-hour limit of time. Later observations showed that practicaljy
the same results were obtained in the slightly wounded, without retained
foreign bodies, if operation were delayed 24 hours or even longer. Upon
this knowledge was based the American policy of sending such cases farther to
the rear for operation if pressure was such that their numbers would overtax
an evacuation hospital ot approximately 1,000-bed capacity at the front."
Flo. '-'3. — Evacuation Hospital Ni>. 'J, Baccarat, France, June yx. 1018
Our evacuation hospitals then sought especially to give surgical treat-
ment to severely wounded patients whom it was not advisable to send, unoper-
ated upon, farther to the rear, and then to hospitalize such patients until they
were fit to lx> moved, so far as might be necessary, but only, as circumstances
permitted, to hospitalize here also the less seriously injured. As a rule, the
treatment given the latter was temporary, though sometimes it was definitive,
but this was only if the demand for lieds was not pressing. In times of great
stress there were never enough evacuation hospitals at the front to give full
surgical attention to all the wounded: nor was it proposed that there should
1k», for such provision would have required an excessively large hospitalization
in the zone of the armies. Except for the small percentage of very seriously
UEXEItAI. VIEW OK MEDICAL IIEI'AHT.M K N'T OK(iA X IZATH IX
1(51
wounded who had to be hospitalized in evacuation hospitals because they
could not endure transportation to the rear, our evacuation hospitals were
merely relay or clearing stations in the hospitalization and evacuation chain.
While the more seriously wounded properly required two weeks, hos-
pitalization after operation before being transferred, sometimes the demand
for beds was so great that the more seriously wounded had to be removed in
less than half that time. Brain injuries, if operated upon here, were kept, if
possible, at least 10 days. Knee-joint, abdominal, and chest wounds were re-
tained from 10 days to 2 weeks when possible, but patients with these wounds
FlG. 'J4. — Operating room, Evacuation Hospital X
Baccarat
■ometimes were evacuated after 5 days, or, very rarely, in even less
time. Patients with compound fractures of the femur were kept as lon<r as
[lossible." It was estimated that about 10 per cent of the beds in evacua-
tion hospitals would ordinarily be used for the severely wounded, and the
remainder for patients to be evacuated immediately. It was recognized, how-
ever, that this proportion, like many others pertaining to evacuation hospitals.
wis subject to radical modification in order to meet the constantly shifting
military situation and its hospital requirements.* 4 Elasticity of these hospitals
proved essential in both size and service."' The principle of mobility was
stressed, except in the case of certain evacuation hospitals, which, because of
1X876—25 1 1
162
FIELD OPERATIONS
peculiar circumstances, were in effect immobilized: for example. Evacuation
Hospital No. 1 at Sebastopol Barracks, just north of Toul. 4
As lias already been noted, our evacuation hospitals had officially 1,000
beds. The capacity and organization of individual evacuation hospitals were
based, to a certain extent, on an estimate of what the maximum daily admis-
sions would be. With some exceptions these did not exceed 1,000. but on some
occasions there were more than 1.400: for example, in Evacuation Hospital
No. !), on October L0, 1918, during the Meuse-Argonne operation. 17 Excessive
pressure, (\w to the intake of more patients than an evacuation hospital could
-Sterilizing plant and tentage, Evacuation Hospital No. 2. Baccarat
care for. was controlled by sending patients out on " preoperative trains,
though some hospitals objected to this practice on the ground that it indicated
inability of the institution to handle patients properly. It was contended also
that the time which must elapse before these patients could be delivered by
train to hospitals in the real' would exceed the length of time they would have
to await operation in the evacuation hospital concerned and that their chances
of infection woidd thereby be increased. In any event, these patients were
transferred from the evacuation hospital only after very careful examination
and re-dressing. The transferable were held to include those with such in-
juries as fractures caused by rifle and machine-gun bullets, but without much
bony destruction: gutter wounds: and flesh wounds with retained bullets.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATIONS 163
But local demands and the resources available at the time really determined
what classes of patients should he transferred. An important factor influenc-
ing the use of preoperative trains was the number and rapidity of operating
teams available at the evacuation hospitals. The number of operating teams
was increased in the evacuation hospitals: their work was speeded up. The
number of unoperated patients it was necessary to evacuate from the
evacuation hospitals during the Meuse-Argonne operation fell from above
1.370 in the first phase of that engagement to 293 in the second. 1 "
When the 24-hour intake of patients at an evacuation hospital exceeded
1,000 the routine plan of work ordinarily had to be changed if all patients
were to he cared for locally. The necessary speeding up of operating teams
under such circumstances depended on their good organization. Shifts, at the
eleventh hour, generally proved unsatisfactory, and it was found that some-
times, due essentially to inadequacy in number, experience, and speed of oper-
ation teams, preoperative trains had to he used. How severe the pressure was
at times is indicated by the fact that, in the six weeks subsequent to June
13. 1918, Evacuation Hospital No. 7 at Coulommiers, near Chateau-Thierry,
received and evacuated 27,000 cases. Between June 14 and November 11.
1018. it admitted more than 50,000 patients. 1 " while Evacuation Hospital No.
admitted more than 32.000 during the Meuse-Argonne operation, September
26 to November 11. 1!)18. 17
Generally speaking, more than half the patients admitted to evacuation
hospitals in the zone of the armies were surgical cases, and of these about half
were operated upon. Data on this subject, however, are incomplete, and these
figures apply only to those hospitals which reported on this subject.
Evacuation hospitals at the front often received patients from several
divisions. Thus, during the Aisne-Marne operation. Evacuation Hospital
No. 4 received patients from five divisions, and from September 2(5 to No-
vember 11. 1018, it received patients from 11 divisions. 20
The most essential details for the successful operation of an evacuation
hospital proved to be the following: Location at a suitable place — on a rail-
way siding if possible; free mobility: rapid and systematic pitching and
striking of tents: rapid entraining and detraining; elimination of unnecessary
materiel which would impair mobility: the use of tentage or movable bar-
racks rather than permanent buildings if these did not lend themselves readily
to hospital purposes: provision of tentage and blankets for crisis expansion
for at least 500 beds; adequate personnel, each officer and man assigned ac-
cording to his best abilities; well-balanced, resilient organization ; appropriate,
systematic local distribution of patients based on their condition and on the
availability of beds; instruments for 10 operating teams; high speed without
haste or carelessness in examining, distributing, operating upon, and evacuat-
ing patients: medical supplies and rations for 10 days for total strength, in-
cluding crisis expansion : provision for accurate records and for care of
patients" valuables. 21
164
FIELD OPERATIONS
OENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
165
LOCATION
The site proposed for an evacuation hospital was inspected either by
the army surjreon or by a competent assistant. 21 The preferable location was
one as near the front as possible, yet safe from direct or indirect artillery
fire — usually at a distance of from 15 to 25 kilometers (9 to 15 miles) from
the line — accessible by <rood roads from the forward area to be served and
by hospital trains from the rear. Location at a point not accessible to hospital
trains proved to be a tactical error. Even when troops were moving forward.
it was found better to retain an evacuation hospital at the railhead and to
used by Evacuation Hospital N<
transport the wounded an increasing distance to it by ambulance than to
move it forward and relay its transportation patients to the railhead by
ambulance. 022 Other desiderata in the selection of a site were proximity to
fuel and water supplies and separation from ammunition dumps, depots,
aviation fields, and cantonments which would be searched by enemy tire.
A site on a railway spur at least half a mile from any of these formations
was chosen whenever possible. Suitable buildings were another prime de-
" The French did not call any hospital an evacuation hospital if it was removed from a railway.
They designated it an " ambulance," that is, a field hospital or " Groupe d'Amhulance." Our
Medical Department learned that an evacuation was such in name only, if an evacuation hospital
was located at a distance from a railway. The method of the French in utilizing evacuation hospitals
proved exceedingly valuable : they selected a site, built a railway siding to it, prepared the loading
'iuay. and then brought in the unit.
166
H1KKI) OPERATIONS
sideratum, or. failing tlie.se, suitable ground space for tent age. Sometimes,
as already indicated, existing buildings were supplemented by tentage.
Occasionally it was easier to utilize, for an evacuation hospital, tentage
which could lie pitched where desired than t<> adapt available buildings ti>
its needs. However, tents did not prove >o satisfactory as Adrian ha r racks,
as thcv conlil not h«> so well heated, ventilated, or lighted.
*m — ft«— w.^%*
i
|*r*&tk.
1
fimm i
IwTXSL'nL.
|»r-n_-i_
[jys-'es
I ■"■*— ***"
-war- |
-
1
i
i
i
**"XS — |
'~5:£= — '
1
1
|
1
1
-i r^E~-
r"^
nz
i cm:
i ; r-ar
WL-P000
mm
d
~rt* I L
ill
~ 1
few **»» M>n
-=^~ I
I
■•• I
EVACUATlOn HOSPITAL
Havmir -elected a site and having secured for it the approval of the
coordinating section of the army general staff concerned (if the evacuation
hospital was to occupy a site on a railway, and transportation "as available),
a request was made in memorandum form to the o|*M-atinj; section of Um
armv general staff. This produced the necessary order, which was ■in—
pli->hed l>v the troop movement hureaii of the coordinating section of the
armv. If the *ite wlected was beyond the limit of armv control. ■ request
made Bpofj General Headquarters, A. K. K., by the armv commander ««.«
necessarr."
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
1(>:
The commanding officer of the hospital prepared, in advance if possible.
diagrams for illustrating the layout <>f tents to supplement available build-
ings. At any rate he had a typical layout prepared and was ready t<> use
this, or to modify it as required hy local conditions. 21
In the summer of l'.Ms an attempt was made to provide separate evacua-
tion hospitals for non transportable, seriously wounded, and ambulant patients.
a» the rase might l>e: but this method of disposal usually broke down at
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 1
TOUL, FRANCE
Mb tors
■• ~^_ 00003000
qSOOQOODQS JESSE
1 ?
— — iJ # C=l ^=» J I
*"- ■ y SAB SO. J
LEOENO
;__aua«o mousc
1_««C1'VWS AMD rD«wA*D*i» «a»o
*_*»CO»I«AT.»#o WA«0
3_0*CRATIN0 MKViuON*
«_Mv'l.iON3.«waKOS. '««£09 f *■- -
r_MV>kiO««}.?w*»Dt.« BEDS E AC"
fc^Q W 0C*OT. UA«OHATO«» AMO CAMTflM
• _J»AM
If HITCHIN
3 Quaatcms ' j» :**-* •■ ■ ••
'* acw'am ba»«a.-«3
i$_0*» C*« OUAllTfM
i»_NU*HS QOA*TC«»
tT l_>tUTtHAAjT» OuA-'t ft;
• - *-' ■ -«■»--■
t&_EN-r*A»«Ct
Pic. 29
times of pressure, probably because of the difficulty attendant upon sorting
patient* at more adranced positions. Because of this difficulty and of the
•IiuVulty of properly routing different classes of patients from the tri:iL f *'.
the plan in question was soon abandoned. While it was true, so far as evacua-
tion hospital- were concerned, that it did not prove possible to segregate
wnottth* wounded in certain units, this did not apply to mobile hospitals.
Tfcese units, which worked nearer the front than did the evacuation hospital-.
«nWy received wounded who would almost certainly have died if tran*|>orted
168
FIELD OPERATIONS
if)
J
<
H
HH
a
rt,
o
Jh
^
J
2
d
5
O CO o
o
B
J
80
00
i=a i^j en en
i=i a czd a
czi □"□ □
en □ □ c=>
CZ^J CZZI □
(=13 E33 n
CHJ C=ZI CTJ
00
0TO
I or
BJJU
fffl a Ba
m 00
TS=
B000
©BBJfl
B B BB
D D
D«D
D D
ji iiii
1®% Ac It
(SS« E o § w^
h l isBils
i-3 s i a s
. o i Br 5 6 S
j| 1 2 :.? 'I
cc 9 — *5*5i!
iisij
Pills
- wn*o«Hflc
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
169
to the evacuation hospitals, and they proved to be of great value for this
purpose. With this exception, however, it was found that the provision of
special hospitals for special patients was wasteful of transportation and of
personnel, even in fixed warfare. 23
Supplementary professional groups for evacuation hospitals were pro-
vided, however, for special types of patients; namely, contagious, neurological,
gas patients, and the like. Sometimes, special wards for these were set aside
in the hospital itself.
In order to facilitate delivery of patients from the triages, as the war
progressed, evacuation hospitals were grouped as close together as possible:
and instead of increasing their number, their size was increased and their
evacuation was expedited. The importance of grouping evacuation hospitals
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 8
PETIT MAUJOUY
MEUSE, FRANCE.
LEGEND
D-WOODEN BUILDING
A-EXECUTIVE OrFICE
B- RECEIVING WARD
C- PREPARATION 6f X RAY ROOM
O- OPERATING ROOM
C- INCINERATOR
F- YM.CA. BLDO.
G- POWER PLANT
NUMBERS INDICATE WARDS
O- TENT
m - orncERs
J - KrrCHEN
K - STERI LIZERS
L - NURSES' MESS HALL
M - NURSES
N- PHARMACY, LABORATORY
P - STORE5
Q- ENLISTED PERSONNEL
Scale 01 Feet
-TO 30UILLY
TO ANCEMONT
FIO. 31
must be stressed. It was easier for an ambulance driver to find his proper
destination with a few closely grouped hospitals than with many scattered
ones, and then. too. concentrated units were more easily coordinated and
evacuated than separated ones. 23
From the beginning, routes to evacuation hospitals were conspicuously
marked by pasteboard signs, but as these were easily destroyed in inclement
weather the inspector general, A. E. F., recommended that they be replaced
by sheet-iron signs, marked with luminous paint, and that these l>e made
a part of the equipment of the hospital. 24 This plan was bettered in the
Meuse-Argonne operation by providing a metal box with removable front.
At night this contained a lantern. It was posted at crossroads as a sign-
board. For the box a number of metal sheets, perforated to indicate dif-
ferent hospitals and their locations, were provided. This plan afforded a
13.170—25 12
170 FIELD OPERATIONS
luminous sign at night. The appropriate metal sheet was inserted on notice
from the rear, and the stream of wounded men diverted to the hospital best
prepared at the time to care for them. 23
In locating evacuation hospitals an ideal arrangement was to pitch two
of them in juxtaposition, so that, when troops moved, one hospital could
transfer the patients to the other ami could then participate in the move-
ment without delay, the other hospital clearing its patients and following
later if need be. In order to approximate this method it was proposed, in
view of the limited number of evacuation hospitals, that each be made to
consist of two sections, one of which, much more freely movable than the
other because of lieing supplied with cots instead of beds and other light
equipment, should accompany troops, while the other section disposed of re-
maining patients and rejoined its companion section later when more trans-
portation became available. This plan, however, was put into operation
only on a very limited scale, as the 12 mobile hospitals which were organized
and the mobile surgical units proved better suited for quick movement than
evacuation hospitals. 21
To serve as notice to enemy flyers, the site of an evacuation hospital was
marked at first by a black cross of tarred stones in a whitewashed circle of
stones, by strips of muslin 30 feet long, forming a cross, or by similar de-
vices. 21 Later, it was found advisable to equip such hospitals with a cross
of white canvas, each arm 9M feet long and 6 feet wide. This was
fastened firmly to the ground, preferably on a plot of green grass, before any
other detail in respect to locating the hospital was given attention. If green
grass was not available, black cinders were placed in the quadrants. Ex-
perience showed that a white cross on a green or black background was much
more conspicuous than a red cross when viewed from the air. 21
The surgeon of the First Army reported that many hospitals were spared
by enemy airplanes because of their being marked in the way indicated.
A further reason for employing the white cross, instead of the red. was
found to be that the former showed up in photographs taken from the air
and the red cross did not. as it blended with its background. Enemy ob-
servers took photographs dining the day, and at night bombing planes dis-
charged their missiles against points indicated in these photographs unless
the cross marking a hospital site was plainly observable. 21
The amount of transportation required for the 1,000-bed unit (30 French
freight cars on 00 three-ton trucks), considerably restricted the mobility of
the evacuation hospital, for it was not always obtainable. Sometimes, too.
as many as 120 trucks were needed to move such a hospital. 2 "'
The commanding officer of each evacuation hospital had available at all
times a schedule which he had prepared for loading his unit on railway
cars. 21 This was based on its weight in tons, and on its cubic displacement.
Besides the maximum authorized equipment, 3.000 rations were included.
The number of each class of cars required, that is, passenger, box. or flat
cars, was also carefully determined, and requisitions specified exactly the
number of cars by class. When possible, the commanding officer obtained.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 171
with the oilier cars, a car for use as a kitchen, which was open at the ends
to allow, en route, easy communication with passenger cars.
After once being located within the zone of the armies, further move-
ments of evacuation hospitals were made, as a rule, by motor-truck trains,
railway trains not usually being available there. It was found that if move-
ment by truck was not a long one. the most satisfactory plan was to trans-
port the different departments of a hospital by successive trips of one train
made up of not more than 20 trucks. 21 This method made a comparatively
small draft on the army automobile pool and so facilitated obtaining the
necessary vehicles. Neither did it delay leestablishnient of the hospital, for
after the first truck-train load had been received at the new site, prepara-
tions progressed there while, at the same time, property still at the former
site was being made ready and forwarded. The commanding officer had
a truck-loading schedule which provided that the first personnel and equip-
ment to arrive should be the commissioned officers, nurses, cooks,
and surgical department, with a sufficient number of enlisted men to assist in
the preparation of the new site, and tentage and equipment for this per-
sonnel, for kitchens, and for operating room. 21
EQUIPMENT
The equipment originally issued evacuation hospitals proved fairly satis-
factory, hut tentage for use of personnel during inclement weather and for
special wards was sometimes inadequate. 13
Three ground sheets similar to paulins were furnished for each tent,
lumber for flooring rarely being available, and some floor covering being
essential to reduce the discomfort caused by mud and dirt. 21
Enough instruments to supply as many operating teams as the hospital
might utilize were essential. It was found better to supply each hospital
with such equipment for 10 teams rather than to supply individual operating
teams with instruments and equipment and thus to restrict their mobility. 13
15y pooling the necessary instruments it was also found that fewer were
necessary.
Throughout the hospital section equipment was kept as simple as possible
consistent witli efficient service. Each ward was provided with the usual ward
furniture, and at the entrance a cubicle was screened off for the nurse. This
contained a small apparatus for heating water and food. In the infectious
wards beds were cubicled by sheets to prevent cross infections.
Electric lights were found to be superior to acetylene, as acetylene
lamps were exhausted after four hours and were extinguished invariably by
the jar from the discharge of a near-by gun or bursting shell. 21 Duplicate
electric generators were provided for illuminating at least the receiving ward.
preoperative ward, operating room and office, and for activating the X-ray
plant. A telephone system installed by some evacuation hospitals proved of
the greatest value lioth in the saving of messengers and in speeding up interior
service. 21
172 FIELD OPERATIONS
Whenever possible, field laundries were assigned to these hospitals, espe-
cially if the hospital were located, as was often the case, at a point where
the laundry work could not be, done by civilians. 21 The output of a field
laundry varied considerably but averaged about 1.-200 pieces of flat work a
day. Field laundry installations were movable and were operated by two
men of the permanent hospital personnel. Field laundries were supplemented
by laundries of a less mobile type operated at the army medical depots Avhich
afforded a linen exchange. One of the difficulties with these mobile laundries
was the extern porization of drying rooms which were found indispensable in
winter in the humid climate of France. 21 The inspector general, A. E. F.,
reported as follows, concerning the laundry facilities of these units during
the Meuse-Argonne operation: 21
Some hospitals have no laundry facilities, and in others facilities are far below
hospital needs. This made it necessary in some cases to salvage soiled linen instead of
washing it, and requisition was made on supply depots to replace that salvaged, taxing
the linen supply of the dumps. Tiie supply of laundries, though the French sold us all
they could, was always limited, and the shortage was made good to some extent before
the close of the operation.
PERSONNEL
The personnel of an evacuation hospital, as officially prescribed, consisted
of 31 officers and 237 enlisted men. but in practice this number was at times
greatly increased. 26 For example. Evacuation Hospital Xo. 1. at its maxi-
mum in September. 1918, had 97 officers, 92 nurses, and 074 enlisted men. 4
In the Meuse-Argonne operation there was in general a shortage of personnel
in all units of this character, especially for their labor, fatigue duty, litter
bearing, and grave digging, though the situation improved as the attack
progressed. 24 As in other hospitals, the commissioned personnel was divided
broadly into administrative and professional groups, though many of the offi-
cers in the latter category, for example, the chiefs of services, ward surgeons,
and others, performed, as well, certain administrative duties. The adminis-
trative staff of the hospital performed the duties usually incident to hospital
administration, though on account of the peculiar character of their unit these
were considerably modified in some respects. In many hospitals the command-
ing officer was constantly engaged in inspecting and coordinating the services.
As a rule, therefore, the adjutant cared for correspondence and assumed cer-
tain office duties analogous to those of an executive officer or a chief of staff.
The quartermaster, selected from the Quartermaster Corps, was bonded so that
he might discharge the duties of a disbursing officer, and he often performed
the duties of a medical supply officer as well. In such a case he had charge
of all supplies, including clothing, subsistence, fuel, and other necessities
which normally pertained to his office, as well as performing the usual duties
relating to transportation, installation, and operation of the lighting plant
and laundry. Frequently he was the motor transport officer for the unit.
The quartermaster also was charged with the maintenance of utilities service
and hail at his command several artisans, usually carpenters, a plumber, a tin-
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 173
smith, and an electrician. The work required of them was often indispensable.
urgent, and of large proportions, so that only exceptionally good workmen
were qualified for service on this force. 21
Each unit had] its fire marshal, fire-fighting force, and salvage squad,
detailed from the permanent personnel. These were drilled until proficient
and then exercised usually at irregular, unexpected intervals. Despite the
inflammable character of the structures which these, hospitals habitually occu-
pied — tents or Adrian barracks — it is a noteworthy fact that no serious fire
occurred in any of them. This is all the more remarkable because of the
occurrence of a number of small fires, usually attributed to lighted cigarette
ends, and the paucity of fire-fighting apparatus. Fire risks in these units
were very great, and the prevention of serious conflagrations is attributable
chiefly to the vigilance to all those concerned. 21
Salvage proved difficult because of shortage of personnel, and much prop-
erty was lost before the Salvage Department arranged to collect property at
these units and transport it to dumps. 24
A specially qualified officer was selected to command the detachment of
enlisted men, Medical Department, to train them in their military duties, to
care for their service, pay, and other records, to command the guard, and to
supervise police of the unit. 21
The registrar, frequently an officer of the Sanitary Corps, usually dis-
charged also the duties of a statistical officer. He supervised the preparation
of the cards for sick and wounded, notified the chief surgeon, A. E. F.. if
epidemic disease appeared, collected and forwarded individual medical record
cards. X-ray plates, records, and histories of cases evacuated, and in case of
death notified the chief surgeon, A. E. F. At 6 a. m. daily he reported by
telephone or by courier to the evacuation officer of the army the number of
empty and occupied beds, the number of admissions, classified as sick, wounded.
and gassed, for both officers and men. and the number of deaths during the
preceding 24 hours. Another of his duties was the daily posting of a diary
which gave appropriate data concerning movement of the unit and the number
of patients admitted, classified as medical, surgical, or gassed. These patients
were subclassified as infectious or noninfectious medical, severe or slight
surgical, while the gassed were classified, if possible, according to the kind of
gas used. This officer also kept a daily record of the number of operations
on patients with slight and severe surgical conditions, and the number of
deaths, with name, cause, time and place of death, and number of grave. One
of the subjects considered in this war diary was the number and class of
patients evacuated, classification being made both according to the condition
from which patients were suffering, whether they were sent out recumbent or
sitting, and whether they were commissioned or enlisted. 21
Still another member of the administrative staff was the mess officer, who
was often selected from the professional staff, and who supervised this im-
portant service in addition to his other duties. Two diet cooks and a dietitian
were provided if possible. Field ranges did not prove so satisfactory as did
174 FIELD OPERATIONS
the rolling kitchens, supplemented by five army ranges No. 5. or by gasoline
ranges. 21
The chief nurse performed the duties usually incident to her position. 21
A. chaplain proved indispensable. Assignments were made irrespective of
the ecclesiastical denomination of the incumbent, who supervised and pro-
moted both religious and moral activities. The latter he interpreted in their
broadest sense, including among them diversion for patients and personnel.- 1
The professional groups were headed by the chiefs of the surgical and
medical services, in their respective jurisdictions, but an approved plan in
some units was to have the surgical chief limit his activities to the operating
area and to entrust to a director of wards the supervision of all other profes-
sional matters within this specialty. Usually, however, the chief of the surgical
service supervised all triage activities, together with those in the operating
room, shock wards, and other surgical sections of the hospital, organized teams
to care for special classes of patients, according to the known ability of each
member, selected patients for operation, distributed surgical patients to appro-
priate teams peculiarly well fitted to care for them, and assisted in determinin<r
the need for hospital trains. The chief of the medical service supervised the
medical work to secure prompt and skilful treatment of medical and gassed
patients. Often he was the assistant chief of the triage service, alternating in
this duty with the surgical chief. 21
The surgical teams were a very important factor in the service of these
hospitals. Usually, four of them were organized from the personnel on duty
in the hospital, and these were supplemented as occasion required by teams
drawn from other sources. 21 Usually there were 7 or 8 teams on duty, but
their number was increased, according to needs, to 14 or more. 27 It was found
advisable to add to the personnel of each hospital 12 surgical and 2 gas teams,
each surgical team consisting of 2 surjreons. 1 anesthetist and 2 nurses. 21
Experience showed that the best chiefs for teams were not usually oper-
ators with the highest civilian reputation. Such older men often proved un-
adaptable, unable to learn quickly, and lacking in physical endurance. It was
an unfortunate fact that the. older men. because of their civilian professional
standing, confined to be sent forward with teams long after other nations
had learned that such details were better filled by younger men. because of
their greater endurance and adaptability.'' 1S In times of great pressure, teams
were sometimes split, but good results were obtained then only if the assistant
showed himself unusually competent. On rare occasions it proved better to
keep a team on duty 18 hours rather than to split it. 13 Most operators were
able to endure this ordeal during a short emergency, but in order to make
the method effective, consideration had to be given, in making details to
teams, to take cognizance of each operator's endurance.
As a rule the medical officers who proved most generally valuable in
evacuation hospital service were those who had been graduated not more than
8 or 10 yeai-s before entering the Army, as they were more vigorous and more
ft Our service fully recognized this principle, hut was umihlc to apply It hecnuso of tin* urgency of
our need for operators at the front.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 175
adaptable than their seniors. Officers were usually assigned in the proportion
of one medical to three surgical, an excess of medical trained personnel being
detailed to duty in the wards for ambulant wounded, the receiving ward,
dressing rooms, and for similar service. 13
SPECIAL DEPARTMENTS
The departments of an evacuation hospital, other than the administrative,
whose services arc discussed above, were the following: Receiving ward.
dressing tent, preoperative ward, X-ray room, examination and operating
rooms for patients with serious conditions, operating room for patients witli
minor conditions, sterilizing room, pharmacy, laboratory, dental clinic, shock
ward, wards for special patients, other classified wards for retained patients,
medical, surgical and gassed (if these latter were not cared for in neighboring
hospitals), and wards for transportable patients to be evacuated. Other de-
partments of the hospital which require no discussion here were the mess halls
and kitchens for patients, officers, nurses and enlisted men, quarters for duty
personnel, and a recreation tent which was provided whenever possible.- 1
Space allotted the several departments of the hospital varied accord-
ing to a number of very mutable conditions, that is, severity of combat, num-
ber of operating teams available, train service and other considerations. The
ground plan varied with the terrain, available buildings, water supply, dis-
tribution, and kindred conditions, but whatever plan was adopted, the neces-
sity for short litter carriage received careful consideration. Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 5 arranged five Bessonneau tents in line. These five tens provided
successively for admission, dressing. X-ray examination, preoperative treat-
ment and operation. Patients were carried through all of them if necessary,
beginning with the admission tent: otherwise they passed out of line to the
appropriate ward after being taken to the tents where they received necessary
attention. Location of the receiving ward was indicated by a conspicuous
sign. For use at night, an illuminated sign, which could not be seen from
above, was sometimes employed. This consisted of a metal box, its face per-
forated by appropriate lettering. Habitually this ward was placed at the
side of the hospital opposite to the evacuation ward. It occupied a well-heated
tent or barrack large enough to accommodate from 20 to 60 litter patients and
had benches for sittin<r patients. It was also provided witli a quantity of
blankets, splints, and litters for replacement issue to ambulances which left
such articles with patients they delivered. The point where these articles were
stored was sometimes designated by a conspicuous sign. " Blanket. Splint,
and Litter Exchange."- 1
At the receiving ward commenced one of the most important procedures of
the service of the hospital, that is, the soiling of patients and their proper dis-
tribution. This sorting and re-sorting continued throughout all the depart-
ments to which patients successively were sent. It was essential that the stream
of sick and wounded move systematically, that there be no reverse or cross
currents. The method followed differed somewhat in different hospitals, but
that described below Mas the one generally employed.
176 FIELD OPERATIONS
The quota of personnel on duty in the receiving ward also differed some-
what in the several hospitals, but usually it consisted of 2 officers, 1 sergeant.
8 clerks, 2 guards, and 8 or 10 litter bearers. Officers on duty here gave emer-
gency treatment in case of hemorrhage, supervised litter bearers' 1 activities, the
preparation of records, and the care of valuables, made appropriate note on the
admission card of a patient if antitetanic serum had not been administered,
and distributed patients to wards for gassed and medical patients, to the dress-
ing tent for walking wounded, to the preoperative ward or to the shock ward,
as the case might be. Records were made here giving each patient's name, his
military designation, diagnosis and any other necessary data obtained from
persona] interrogation and from an examination of his field card and diagnosis
tag. 13 If the patient was unconscious these facts were obtained from other
patients accompanying him, and from his identification tag, as well as from
the other sources mentioned. 21 In some hospitals a nominal list was usually
made on the admission of patients, and two copies of Form 52 were made out
for each patient in the wards. One of these was sent to the sick and wounded
office at once and this furnished the data for reports called for from the hos-
pital. The other copy was turned in to the sick and wounded office when the
patient was evacuated. In other units complete records were made, so far as
this was possible, in the receiving ward, and these records were supplemented
later by data from the operating room and wards. Walking wounded who were
seriously injured were sent to the preoperative ward, tagged for immediate
attention. Similar tags were placed on shock patients and on those with tourni-
quets. Gassed patients were classified as medical and were sent to appropriate
wards or to a neighboring unit which provided for such patients exclusively. 13
If the patient's condition permitted he was sent to his destination via the bath-
house. There patients were treated or bathed with alkaline soap and solution
as indicated. Otherwise they were bathed in the ward. If the patient was to
be retained he was furnished pajamas; if he was to be evacuated or returned
to duty he was given fresh clothing and sent to the evacuation ward. 21 Medical
patients were distributed to appropriate wards. Patients suffering from epi-
demic respiratory disease were masked. 21
Attention was given at the receiving ward to the care of patients' valuables.
In this important detail service improved greatly after the St. Mihiel operation.
Men sent to evacuation wards sometimes retained their valuables, but all others
were relieved of them. All were notified that the hospital disclaimed all re-
sponsibility for valuables retained by patients. A noncommissioned officer of
established probity placed the patient's valuables in a bag and gave him an
itemized receipt, ticketing the bag in duplicate. These valuables were kept in
a locked box or locker until the patient left the hospital, when they were re-
turned to him, his receipt for them was obtained, and the original receipt was
collected. These receipts were retained until the hospital was closed, when
they we'-e sent with other records to the office of the chief surgeon. A. E. F.
In case of death patients' valuables were turned over to the proper authorities. 21
In most instances, food and hot drinks were given at the receiving ward,
sometimes by a volunteer aid society, to all patients admitted, but in some units
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 177
refreshments were given here only to such patients as were sent from this
point to the medical and gas wards, others receiving nourishment in the dress-
ing tent or in the preoperative ward. Arrangements were made also at the
receiving tent to give food and drinks to ambulance drivers. 21
The dressing room for the slightly wounded was located near the receiving
tent. Its equipment was simple, consisting of one or two operating tables,
benches, a table for instruments, and dressings and utensils which had been
sterilized in the main sterilizing room. 21 One or sometimes two officers,
assisted by one or two nurses and by two or three eidisted men, were on duty
here. At this point a second sorting was effected. The officer on duty ex-
amined, dressed, and recorded patients admitted to this department, giving
antitetanic serum to such patients as had not already received it. Patients
requiring immediate operation or who might be evacuated at once (on litters,
if the pressure was great) were properly tagged and sent to the preoperative
ward. Patients, whose conditions were not critical, requiring X-ray examina-
tion were sent to the X-ray department. Since patients with very serious
injuries — for example, injuries of the large blood vessels and even compound
fractures of the skull — were sometimes ambulatory, careful attention was given
every wound, however slight it might appear to be. At this point, too. careful
search was made for injuries of nerves and blood vessels. Provisional diagnosis
and administration of antitetanic serum or morphine were noted on the
patient's field medical card. 21
Patients other than those already mentioned were sent to the wards
for slightly wounded, or to the evacuation ward, after their wounds had
been dressed and they had received hot food or drinks if. as in some hos-
pitals, these had not already been given in the receiving ward. Slightly
wounded patients who had developed intercurrent diseases, such as pneu-
monia, dysentery, or the like, were sent habitually to the appropriate medi-
cal wards. 21
Decision as to whether slight wounds should be operated upon was
based on the rate of admissions, the number of surgical teams and
their speed. It was found that an experienced team ojjerating 2 tahles
often handled 35 or 40 minor patients during its shift: later this number
was notably increased because of better organization and improved skill,
until many teams operated upon more than 60, some more than 80, patients,
and 1 team more than 90 patients, during the daily shift. 23 In periods of
comparative quiet, at first practically all surgical patients admitted were
operated on. and toward the end of the Avar this was the case even dur-
ing periods of great military activity. The chief of the surgical service
kept his teams fully occupied, the number of preoperative patients trans-
ferred being limited only by the surgical facilities locally available. 21
The third major sorting of patients was effected in the preoperative
or classification wards, which received the wounded admitted on litters
and certain ambulatory patients sent from the dressing tent. Patients re-
ceived here required 80 per cent of the professional skill available in an
178 FIELD OPERATIONS
evacuation hospital. At this point, on alternating day and night shifts,
were stationed the most experienced men on the professional staff, selected
with regard to accuracy and rapidity of decision and adjustability to the
constantly shifting standards which controlled the disposition of patients.
The quota of nurses and orderlies in this department was large: usually
there were 1 officer. 1 nurse, and i enlisted men to each ward. Day and
aight shifts were provided. Patients were undressed, bathed, if possible,
and their wounds were examined and dressed. When possible they were
undressed in one tent and their wounds were dressed in another. 18
Provision of adequate bathing facilities was often, indeed usually, very
difficult. Furthermore, the use of the bathhouse, if one was provided, and
the administration of baths in wards at night were attended by the danger
from airplanes incident to the necessary showing of lights. Many patients
admitted after nightfall, whose conditions required immediate operation,
were bathed in the preoperative ward and were not sent to it via the bath-
house. Whenever possible the bath hut was equipped with instantaneous
heaters, 2 boilers containing 50 gallons each, and shower heads, perhaps as
many as 8, and floored with duck boards. As patients usually arrived in the
hours from 12 noon to midnight, these baths, in some evacuation hospitals,
were used exclusively by the detachment personnel before 8 a. m.. by the
nurses from 8 to 10, and by the officers from 10 to 12. 21 As noted, bathing
was not always feasible, if patients were admitted in great numbers at night
and enemy airplanes were attacking all places which showed lights.
In some hospitals a sketch and description of the wound were made
when patients were being bathed, and this record accompanied the patient
to the operating room. If the patient's condition was critical, his clothing
was not removed until he had l>een anesthetized, or if he was badly shocked,
not until rising blood pressure warranted it. 13
In the preoperative ward waiting patients received morphine, if this
was needed, and hot drinks and food if these had not already been ad-
ministered or if desired. 21
The success of an evacuation hospital's service was commensurate in
very large decree to its methodical and successive distributions of patients.
At the three points mentioned al>ove-— receiving ward, dressing room, and
preoperative ward — it was essential that there l>e prompt, accurate diagno-
sis and immediate distribution in conformity with very changeable demands
for evacuations. Distribution from the preoperative ward was determined
primarily by the number of patients to be cared for and by the facilities for
operating, and not entirely by the patient's condition. When operating teams
were limited in number, or inexperienced, a rapid influx of patients would
change the standard of selection of patients for operation from all litter and
the more serious walking cases; for example, into a very much more restricted
class composed chiefly of patients with abdominal wounds, aspirating chest
wounds, and fractures of the femur by shell fragments. Under such cir-
cumstances patients had to be sent out on preoperative trains until operat-
GENERAL VIEW OK MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION' 179
ing teams were furnished in sufficient number and had acquired sufficient
speed to care for them. 18
Only in exceptional cases were patients sent from the preoperative ward
direct to the operating room. These included patients with active hemor-
rhage, or patients received with tourniquets in place, and with certain frac-
tures without splinting. 13
The preoperative ward. X-ray section, operating rooms, and wards for
the severely wounded were grouped as near together as possible, for it was
essential to reduce carriage by litter to a minimum. If this was not done,
it was found that litter squads were exhausted after a week's offensive. 13
Patients were distributed from the preoperative ward according to rate
of admission and available operating facilities, into (a) special wards for
head, chest, and abdominal patients: (b) shock ward: (e) X-ray ward:
(d) operating rooms, and (e) evacuation ward. 13
In some hospitals, to facilitate their care, patients with head, chest, or
abdominal wounds were segregated in a special ward which accommodated both
preoperative and postoperative patients. Such a ward was l>est located next
the shock wards but was not attended by the same personnel, the shock teams
lieing fully occupied in their own department. When this arrangement was
followed this special ward received, among others, patients who were too badly
shocked to undergo immediate operation. 13
The special ward for head, chest, and abdominal patients, containing
those both operated and unoperated upon, was in charge of one of the most
toni])etent officers available. If patients with head injuries were to be oper-
ated upon before evacuation, the operation was performed as soon as possible.
Patients with abdominal wounds were operated upon as soon as their condi-
tion warranted. In injuries of the chest, immediate operation was indicated
in only a small group of cases: (1) Aspirating chest wounds: (2) large re-
tained foreign bodies; (3) severe injury of bones: (4) complicated lesions of
the diaphragm. 13 Other chest wound cases were sent to this ward for observa-
tion and were there placed in the sitting position, given morphine, splinted
by adhesive plaster when this was called for, and given other necessary
treatment. A combined infection by B. welchu and streptococcus usually
required oix'ration, but a large majority of the chest wounds did not require
surgical intervention. Those requiring it were X rayed, and in many cases it
was found that if the missile had originally been embedded in the lungs it had
dropped down and could be removed from the bottom of the chest cavity. A
thorough examination of the wound was made and drainage established if
needed. Preoperative treatment of head, chest, and abdominal wounds, and
decision concerning operation required special care, skill, and judgment.
Head wounds usually, no matter how severe, did better if treated at once, but
such interference delayed the evacuation of the patients concerned by some
two weeks. Whether operation should be performed here or deferred until the
patient reached a base hospital where he could remain indefinitely, was a highly
controversial subject. 13 From a professional standpoint operation on head
180 FIELD OPERATIONS
wounds at an evacuation hospital was indicated; from a military standpoint it
usually was not. This was one of the instances where general and individual
interest conflicted. 13
For the shock ward, a Bessonneau tent usually was employed, equipped j
with all means for treating shock, including heat, posture, morphine, fluids.
and gum acacia solution, or titrated blood. It was adjacent to the preoperative
ward, and in addition to being kept at a high temperature — 90° F. — was
equipped with hooded tables which further secured warmth to patients in a
state of shock. In general, this ward received patients with blood pressure
below 100, and other patients as condition indicated. 13 A large proportion of
patients admitted here had fractures of the femur, and most of its other pa-
tients had severe and multiple injuries. Patients were usually sent to this
ward direct from the receiving department, but occasionally those who had
developed shock more slowly also reached it from the dressing room, from the
preoperative ward, or from the operating room. When a shock patient had
improved and his blood pressure was rising, the chief of the surgical service
determined when operation should be performed. As delay now meant in-
creased infection or lost opportunity, such patients had precedence over all
others except those with active hemorrhage. Patients who developed shock
while under operation were sent to the shock ward or, if necessary, were trans-
fused by the shock team while on the operating table. 13
It proved convenient to place the X-ray department at one side of the
operating room, and the sterilizing room at the other side. If a Bessonneau
tent was used for the X-ray department there was room for dental and lab-
oratory departments in the same tent. 13
The X-ray ward was also close to the preoperative ward and sometimes
connected with it. Itsinterior was darkened by black cloth or paper. Selection
of patients to receive fluoroscopic or screen examination was made by the chief
of the surgical service. Most patients so examined were those with fractures
or foreign Inxlies. Clean, uncomplicated, perforating bullet wounds were not
examined radiologically, as a rule, unless the missile had passed close to a
hone or a joint. 21 Shell wounds, on the contrary, required X-ray examination
in every case, as otherwise it was impossible to determine the presence or loca-
tion of shell fragments in the deeper tissues. Injuries to the cranium were
photographed both to facilitate immediate care and to furnish a record for
the use of other surgeons who would attend the patient in future. 21 However,
plates were used only for conditions of peculiar interest and where accurate
localization of foreign bodies was desired. Whatever the method of examina-
tion employed, the radiographer made a record of his findings in a brief note
or sketch on a slip which was affixed to the patient's field medical card, or en-
tered it on the card itself. As a matter of fact, the majority of patients o]>er-
ated upon were examined radiologically before they were sent to the operating
room, though certain types were operated on without this: for example, those
with active hemorrhage or those received with a tourniquet in place, and frac-
tures that had not been splinted l>efore admission. 13
GENERAL VIEW OV MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 181
From the radiological department the patient was sent to the operating
room: or if no fracture or foreign body was found, and (before team service
was fully developed) if early operation was not possible, to the evacuation
ward. 13
Though operating-room facilities differed considerably in the several
hospitals, when possible to avoid it. not more than 10 patients were allowed
to accumulate, awaiting operation. A Ressonneau tent, floored with wooden
sections (transportable) and provided with a sectional table and one sec-
tional shelf under it running the length of the tent, proved very satisfactory,
but two such tents were advisable to meet emergency needs. One of these
was sometimes used for minor injuries only. 13 The top of the table mentioned
was used for scrubbing basins and sterile instruments, while the shelf below
contained packets of gauze, towels, sheets, bandages, and similar articles, and
below this, on the floor, was space for splints. The operating tent was made
light proof by black linings with hinged window flaps. From G to 10
operating tables — usually 8 — were spaced on the side of the tent next the
long table holding instruments, leaving a 4-foot passage at their other end
for litters, which were made to pass in one direction only. One or, if pos-
sible, two electric lights — one on a long cord, and each provided with a cone
shade to prevent dispersion of light rays, especially upward — were placed
over each operating table. Tables were provided also with slings, rigged up
on wires. Each operating team used two tables, a method which speeded
up work considerably, especially on minor wounds requiring local anesthesia,
and head wounds which required shaving of the entire scalp. Patients with
abdominal, head, and chest wounds were assigned to special teams. 13 Local
regulations concerning such matters as suture or nonsuture of wounds, hours
of assignment, and conservation of supplies were posted, especially for the
information of surgical teams temporarily assigned. 13
Two surgically clean nurses, with all the available instruments boiled and
divided equally between them, could supply any number of teams that could
operate in a Bessoneau-tent ward. When each shift went off duty, and, as
happened much more frequently, a break in asepsis or other condition required,
an entirely fresh layout was made. 13
An orderly served each shift, noting on each patient's field medical
card a statement of the surgeon's findings, the operation performed, and
the word " evacuate " or " detain." Patients held included especially those
with wounds of the head, chest, and abdomen, with fractured femur, and
with shock. A copy of the note made was entered in the operating-room
liook. supplemented by an entry of the patient's name, his official designation,
the interval between injury and operation, the diagnosis, and the X-ray
report. The operator's name followed both entries. Decision as to whether
patients were to be evacuated was influenced by admissions, concerning which
the chief of the service kept the operating teams informed. The field medical
cards of patients who died on the operating tables were completed and turned
in to the record office. 13
182 FIELD OPERATIONS
The operating room was usually in charge of an officer under whom were
the recorder, a noncommissioned officer in charge of the enlisted personnel
then on duty, a nurse in charge of sterile instruments, an enlisted man who
received them from her for each operation, three general utility men to move
patients and to hold a leg or an arm to facilitate operation, six litter hearers,
one messenger, and one man in charge of sterilizing dressings. The nurse in
charge of sterile instruments had a great quantity of these at hand on a table
provided for the purpose, and issued them as called for.- 1
When a patient was carried from the operating room he passed the
assignment sergeant, who designated the ward to which he should be taken.
This was determined from notes on the patient's card — evacuate or detain —
and from the record kept here of the location of vacant beds.
Sterilization apparatus was installed in a hut or tent near the operating
room, hut separate from it. as a rule, because of the danger of fire. This equip-
ment approximated the following articles: Autoclaves of 24-inch diameter,
numerous drums for dressings, instrument boilers, and three vessels each pro-
vided with a faucet and having a capacity of 25 gallons. The last named were
supported on an iron foot base, and all were heated by gasoline burners. There
was some variation in this equipment, the personnel of a unit sometime show-
ing considerable resourcefulness in extemporizing apparatus. 21
The work of sterilization was conducted as a rule by two nurses assisted
by two or three enlisted men. 21
The wards of the hospital other than those mentioned above were for
postoperative patients, for other surgical patients awaiting evacuation, for
certain medical and for gassed patients. In postoperative wards alternate
shifts of one officer, one nurse, and six enlisted men usually were provided. In
some units the operating surgeons spent eight hours a day in ward service.
These postoperative wards, like others, were assigned to different ward sur-
geons who might or might not be members of operating teams. As a ride,
ward surgeons dressed postoperative cases except when these were difficult
and the admissions few. All surgeons in charge of wards carried out the
usual administrative record routine, making needed notations on field cards,
daily reports of transportable and detention patients, classifying transport-
able patients as "walking" or "litter." "medical" or "surgical." "officers."
and so on. This classification was made daily: in some hospitals, twice
a day. In certain hospitals patients were tagged for removal with distinctly
colored cards. 13
In order to utilize the floor space of the evacuation wards to the greatest
capacity possible, racks for litters were used, and sometimes for as many as
250 patients. Furnishings of these evacuation wards were few and simple,
and there were comparatively few attendants, as patients could care for
themselves here to some extent. 21
Evacuation wards received postoperative patients for evacuation in addi-
tion to those sent to it from the receiving ward and the dressing tent. 13 As
hospital congestion increased to beyond the point where patients could l»e
operated upon locally within a reasonable period, naturally more and more
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 183
severely wounded patients were sorted out of the preoperative wards and sent to
the evacuation wards; for example, gutter wounds, clean, perforating wounds,
wounds with retained bullets, gunshot fractures of smaller bones, until it
might be that only patients with wounds of the most severe type were retained
for operation. 13
In some hospitals the evacuation officer was the detachment commander:
in others he was both receiving and evacuating officer. He usually had charge
of the evacuation wards and arranged, under the commanding officer, for
hospital trains. Not infrequently he had an assistant who alternated with
him, being on duty during the night. The evacuation detail consisted of about
40 men. selected from among the strongest men of the detachment, to perform
the exhausting duty of litter bearing. 21
In the early part of our activities north of Toul, prior to the St. Mihiel
operation, when evacuation hospitals were still lines of communications' units,
evacuation from them was not made automatically, but occurred only when
such a hospital became pressed for bed space, or needed to evacuate patients
more or less permanently unfit for military duty. Evacuations were then
arranged for by the French, under whom our divisions were then serving, and
usually occurred only when a full trainload of transportable patients was
ready. The hospital concerned reported to the chief surgeon of the advance
section and also to the chief medical authorities of the area. The latter then
notified the hospital of the time of the expected arrival of the train and the
number of wounded, sitting and prone, which it would carry. Nominal check
lists of patients evacuated were furnished the chief surgeon, advance section,
and the commanding officer of the destination hospital. At this time the
French required reports of all patients to be evacuated in forward hospitals
so that they might be cared for in the event of a hurried retreat. 15
Later, during the Meuse-Argonne operation, if an evacuation hospital
was not located at a railhead, and it was desired to evacuate by ambulance
to one so located, the evacuation officer of the former hospital ascertained how
many vacant beds there were in the latter, and upon mutual agreement be-
tween the two sent it such a number of patients as it could receive, accom-
panied by a nominal and classified list of patients. 28 The evacuation officer
sent to the regulating officer and to G-4. General Headquarters, a copy of this
list and a statement of the hospital to which the patients had been sent.
When an evacuation hospital w r as at a railhead and a train was desired,
the evacuation officer of the hospital notified the evacuation officer of the army,
on duty with (i— t of the army concerned, stating the number of transportable
patients, classified as to medical, surgical, and gassed, prone and sitting:
officers and men separately. 21 G-4 of the army supplied this information to
the regulating officer, who then dispatched a train. In time of great activity,
as during the Meuse-Argonne operation, the evacuating officer of a group of
hospitals in an evacuation center notified the regulating officer twice daily
concerning the number of patients to be evacuated, classified as above. With
this information the regulating officer reduced the necessity for requests for
trains to a minimum, as these fi<rures showed where trains were needed. The
184 FIELD OPERATIONS
situation was further simplified during the Meuse-Argonne operation by pro-
viding that in time of stress the commanding officer of an evacuation hospital
could notify the regulating station of his number of transportable patients
in detail: with this information, and without any specific request for a train,
the regulating officer would supply his need. During all the hitter part of
our combat activities this method became the rule and not the exception.
But. in order to diminish need for such reports, a certain number of trains
arrived daily in each evacuation area. 20
Trains usually arrived on from one to six hours' notice, but sometimes
they were spotted before orders to evacuate were received. If possible, medi-
cal and surgical patients were sent out on separate cars. When possible,
patients with infectious diseases were segregated when placed on the hospital
trains, but this was not always possible, especially during the influenza epi-
demic. Psychiatric patients were reported to the train commander and placed
in a separate group. Weapons of all kinds were removed from the men
evacuated and were turned in to the salvage officer, and the patients concerned
informed of their disposition. 21
Litter surgical patients were segregated from ambulant surgical and
medical patients, when conditions permitted, especially if the latter were
infectious. As a ride, litter patients were loaded first, but when American
trains were used it was often possible to load ambulant and litter patients
simultaneously. The time necessary for loading a train was determined
largely by the number of litter patients, usually from 40 minutes to 2
hours. Between September 8 and December 12, 1918, Evacuation Hospital
No. 9 evacuated 36,204 patients on 106 trains, the largest number on one
train being 787 (all ambulant). 17
When possible the morgue at evacuation hospitals was equipped with
demountable racks for four litters, washing facilities, and galvanized-iron
cans. It was often located in the same hut with the lighting unit and the
carpenter shop. 21
Graves were dug by neighboring labor troops if their services could !>e
obtained. This did not always prove practicable, and, with the exception
of litter bearing, grave digging proved the hardest physical labor imposed
on enlisted men serving at these hospitals. 21 and one the proper performance
of which was attended with great difficulty. Demands on hospital personnel
were such that most careful arrangements were essential in order that patients
might be adequately cared for, and. at the same time, the dead be properly
interred.
MOBILE HOSPITALS AND MOBILE SURGICAL UNITS
Our Medical Department found in the French service two medical units,
previously unknown in our Army, organized and equipped to care for the
seriously wounded at locations well up toward the front, ™ and quickly under-
took to provide similar units for like duty with our troops. These were
the mobile hospital and the mobile surgical unit called, respectively, by the
French auto-chir and groupe complementaire." Until the latter part of 1917.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
185
the French auto-chirs were being improved and modified so constantly that
scarcely any two were alike in the earlier years of the war. The type they
o-enerally used early in 1917 had no hospital facilities, and for this reason
it habitually operated in conjunction with an evacuation hospital. Toward
the fall of 1917, the need of a hospital section had become evident to the
French, and this was added in the Plisson-Proust model (type 1917). This
model occupied wooden barracks when these were available, otherwise, large
and small Bessonneau tents. The mobile equipment was divided into the
following units, each of which was carried in a motor van r 1 (1) Operating-
room truck, with operating tables and other equipment; (-2) X-ray truck.
Fig. 32. -Mobile Hospital No. -J. loaded on tracks, and prepared
with generator for lighting: (3) sterilizing truck: (1) kitchen truck: (5)
truck for tentage and bedding. The personnel consisted of two groups, one
permanent, as follows: 4 surgeons and 4 assistants: 1 quartermaster; 1 bac-
teriologist and an assistant: 4 anesthetists: 1 pharmacist; 1 chemist: 1 radi-
ologist and an assistant: 10 nurses, and 35 orderlies. This personnel was
considered sufficient to allow the mto-chir to function continuously for 24
hours. 3 - For periods of great activity a second group of emergency personnel,
when available, was added as required.
Since the function of the auto-chir was to receive seriously wounded close
to the front and to give them thorough X-ray examination and surgical treat-
ment before sending them farther to the rear, its value depended largely upon
186 FIELD OPERATIONS
its elasticity, which permitted it to extend its bed capacity from 100 to 500,
and upon its mobility, which permitted it to be pushed forward beyond the
railhead, and rapidly from one point to another.
Prime features in the operation of the auto-chir were: (1) Early receipt
of patients, within six to eight hours; (2) retention of patients with wounds
of the head, chest, or abdomen: (3) debridement, with Carrel-Dakin treatment
later: (4) primary suture; (5) X-ray examinations; (6) laboratory study:
(7) delayed evacuation. **
Trucks enabled the auto-chir to follow troops closely, and it could be made
ready for work in a few hours. When possible it was grouped about some
building which could be used for receiving and retaining patients. In such a
case it might be necessary to send forward only the first three trucks. It was
intended that, in connection with suitable, barracks, an auto-chir would care
for 550 patients. Two of them, in connection with an evacuation hospital,
could thus accommodate 2,100 cases. Under such circumstances, eacli separate
surgical group remained on duty until 400 patients had been received, then
the companion group went on duty for a like period/ 11
The. (jroupe com pie merit aire was a lighter form of auto-chir which car-
ried operating and X-ray equipment and was generally' used for some special
service; for example, for operations on the face. 32
Under date of February 25. 1918, the chief surgeon. A. E. F., wrote the
Surgeon General as follows: 33
1. Tlie chief surgeon, A. B. P., lias entered a contract for the manufacture of 2n
auto-chir* and 20 complementary groups for use in connection with the field hospitals and
evacuation hospitals. Delivery of these units will be begun on March 1 and continue
until August MO of the present year.
2. As each unit will be equipped with complex machinery, dynamo, X-ray machine,
sterilizer, autoclave, boiler, etc., it is very evident that it should not he entrusted to non-
skilled labor but should be supplied with sufficient skilled technical personnel to operate
and make repairs on the machinery.
:{. To this end it is recommended that the following personnel be sent to France in
increments of 12 per month for the next five months, the first 12 to be started at the earliest
practicable date and the remainder to follow at the rate of 12 per month. Each auto-chir
should be provided with a team composed of the following men: (a) An electrical ami
mechanical engineer who is an officer in the Sanitary Corps; (ft) a steam fitter who i>
able to run boiler, autoclave, gas engine, etc., and make repairs to same; (c) an expert
automobile mechanic able to repair auto trucks. In addition, a handy man with carpen-
ters' tools would be available.
4. It is requested that a search be made for the above men among the personnel of
the ambulance companies at Allentown, Pa., and 4 teams be shipped to France each month
until the entire 20 teams are sent.
5. Immediately upon arrival in France it is intended to have these men undergo a
course of instruction at the factory near I'aris, where the auto-chirs are manufactured, so
that they may be able to study the assemblage, the operation, and the repairs to the same
prior to being put into service.
The auto-chir and aroupe com.pJemetttairc were adopted by our service,
and their organization was prescribed by General Orders. Xo. 70. General
Headquarters, A. E. F., May G, 1918, which reads in part as follows:
II. 1. The developments of modern warfare have necessitated the adoption by the
Medical Department of the A. K. F. of two ty|>es of mobile sanitary formation which in
the French Army are known as auto-chirs (autonomes) and groupes complemeiitaires.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 187
These units have been designed in order that facilities for immediate surgical aid to the
seriously injured may lie brought to the man instead of removing any chance of recovery
that the nontransportahle wounded have by conveying them an uncertain distance to the
hospital.
2. As supplied from time to time, these organizations will he given numerical designa-
tions, in a single series for each class, and known, respectively, as " Mobile Hospital
No. . A. E. V.." and " Mobile Surgical Unit No. . A. E. F."
3. A mobile hospital consists of FIXED sterilizing, X-ray. and electric lighting plants
mounted on two motor trucks. In addition, and transported upon ordinary motor trucks
to be temporarily assigned as required, are a light frame operating room, tentage. and
hospital material sufficient to establish a surgical hospital of 120 beds. The operating-
features lire designed to provide all modern facilities for six surgical teams. Mobile hos-
pitals may function independently, or they may he attached to other advanced sanitary
formation to reinforce their X-ray and surgical departments.
4. A mobile surgical unit consists of PORTABLE sterilizing. X-ray. and electric-light-
ing plants, a light frame operating room, and surgical material mounted on two motor
trucks, or on a truck and trailer. It does not provide hospitalization facilities, and there-
fore can not function independently. This unit supplements the equipment of the advanced
field hospital of the division and provides requisite surgical facilities for immediate sur-
gical aid to the nontransportahle wounded.
5. The above organizations will be attached to tactical organizations to meet the
varying requirements of field service. They will he withdrawn from such organizations
when their services are no longer required or there exists a more urgent need for them
elsewhere. Their assignment to duty will be regulated by fl— 1 of the Army to which they
are attached.
0. In conformity with the above. Auto-Cbir No. 1, now being operated by the personnel
of Base Hospital No. 39, is hereby designated and will hereafter be known as " Mobile
Hospital No. 39. A. E. F." Groupes Oomplementaires Nos. 1 and 2. now in operation, are
hereby designated and will hereafter he known as " Mobile Surgical Unit No. 1. A. E. F.."
and " Mobile Surgical Unit No. 2. A. E. F."
7. For these new-type organizations, and as they are organized from time to time in
the future, the following personnel is authorized :
A MOBILE HOSPITAL
in I Commissioned :
Major. Medical Department 1
Captains or lieutenants. Medical Department 10
Captain or lieutenant. Sanitary Corps 1
(1>) Enlisted:
Sergeant first class. Medical Department 1
Sergeants. Medical Department IT
Privates first class or privates. Medical Department 02
(c) Army Nurse Corps :
Female nurses 22
A MOBILE SURGICAL r.NIT
In) Commissioned :
Captain or lieutenant. Medical Department 1
(ft) Enlisted:
Sergeant, first class. Medical Department 1
Sergeants, Medical Department 3
Privates first class or privates. Medical Department 8
Mobile hospitals, numbered from 1 to 11 and No. 39 operated in France.
""ix others. Xos. 100 to 106, inclusive, organized in the United States, and three
others. Xos. 12 to 14. inclusive, organized in France, were ready too late to par-
188 FIELD OPERATIONS
ticipate in the war." 4 It had been planned to provide one for each combat
division.
Twelve mobile surgical units were organized at Paris and four others at
Joinville. but the latter were not completed in time to see active service. 34
Concerning the organization of mobile hospitals in the American Expedi-
tionary Forces, the following extracts have been made from the report to the
chief surgeon, A. E. F., by the officer charged Avith the mobilization of these
formations. This was made in the spring of 1919:""
During the latter part of August, 1918, I was instructed by the chief surgeon's office
to find a suitable location for assembling mobile hospitals, the place to be suitable for
assembling equipment, mobilizing, and giving preliminary training to the personnel, and
to have sufficient space for setting up two or more mobile hospitals at one time. As the
mobile hospitals had as a nucleus the equipment of the French ailto-chir, Obtained from
the French Government at Fort De Vavnes. near Paris, it was necessary to find such a
location in the vicinity of Paris.
Previous to this Mobile Hospitals Nos. 1, 2, and 3 had been equipped in the polo field
near Paris. This was accomplished by the personnel being ordered to Paris and the
equipment obtained by the commanding officer as it became available from the French
and from our Quartermaster and Medical Department supply divisions. At that time
Mobile Hospital No. 4 was being equipped at the polo field, and the personnel of No. ~>
were there awaiting equipment.
What was believed to he an ideal place was found at the Pare ties Princes. Port St.
Cloud, just outside the city wall of Paris. 5 miles from Fort De Vavnes. and three-quarters
of a mile from the Gare Grinello freight yards. It was being used at the time by the
French as an auto park. It hail barracks and kitchen facilities for a personnel of
4oo. automobile sheds covering approximately 48,000 square feet, storehouses with 25,000
square feet of floor space, a building suitable for use as a machine shop; macadamized
roads, electric lights, telephone, and sewer systems. The surrounding grounds were well
drained, having a hard cinder surface, and were of sufficient size for assembling three
middle hospitals at one time.
This park was obtained and the personnel of Mobile Hospital \o. 4 moved from the
polo field on September 4.
It was planned to have a sufficient personnel on duty at the park to handle supplies,
do the necessary guard duty, and to act as instructors for the mobile hospitals. This
personnel was to consist of 4 officers and 68 enlisted men.
Owing to the shortage of Medical Department personnel at that time the above number
Could not be assigned: so authority was obtained to transfer to the park for duty such
personnel of Mobile Operating I'nit No. 1 as had not been assigned to other duty. There
were also assigned for duty at the park, Lieut. Seldon Hose. S. ('.. who had previously
been on duty with Mobile Hospital No. 3!). was familiar with the French equipment of
mobile hospitals and. in addition, spoke French fluently ; 2 sergeants and 2 privates from
Medical Repair Shop No. 1. who were familiar with the French sterilizer truck and
portable laundry : and 1 sergeant from Mobile Hospital No. 39. who was familiar with the
setting up of tentage and arranging the equipment of mobile hospitals.
With the assignment of this personnel an attempt was made to organize a permanent
working force as above outlined, using Lieutenant Pose, on duty at Fort De Vavnes. as
liaison officer, and checking the French property as it was delivered : one sergeant and one
private on duty at Fort De Vavnes as Inspectors during the assembling and testing of the
sterilizer and electrical trucks: the mobile operating unit personnel distributed according
to their qualifications. During the latter part of September the personnel of Machine
Shop I'nit No. 352. which had been assigned to Mobile Operating I'nit No. 1. arrived from
the United States and was retained at the park its part of the permanent personnel. The
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 189
attachment of this organization was of the greatest benefit, as practically all of the motor
equipment, as received from the French, had to be completely overhauled. Up to this time
there had not been personnel at the park qualified to do this work.
Request was made that 5 officers and 30 men be sent to the park for each new unit
before the equipment of that unit was received, the idea being that this personnel would
he selected from the ones who were to handle the technical equipment and this personnel
could he given training by the permanent personnel so that when the equipment was
complete the organization could be reported ready for duty without unnecessary loss - of
time and still have sufficient personnel trained in pitching the hospital, running the laundry
and the sterilizer, electrical and cargo trucks. It was planned to have the nurses join a
few days before the organization was- ready to leave, and the balance of the personnel to
join at the time of leaving, or at the new station.
The above plan was carried out in most instances, and as soon as the personnel of a
new organization arrived the commanding officer was given a typewritten list of the
equipment of the mobile hospital and instructed to make the following assignment of his
personnel, and after such assignments were made to have this personnel report to the
officer in charge of instruction, who would detail them as follows:
(«) The supply officer, one other officer, and such enlisted men as were required, would
report to the park supply officer and check the property and become familiar with its
location and packing.
I b I The truck drivers would report to the transportation officer for instruction in
driving.
(e) The sterilizer man would report to the sergeant in charge of the sterilizer for
Instruction.
i'/i The laundryinan would report to the man in charge of laundry lor instruction.
(e) The X-ray man would report to the X-ray technician for instruction.
l/l Balance of the personnel would report to the sergeant in charge of tentage fur
instructions in erecting the hospital.
Attempt was made to have each organization pitch the entire tentage at least twice,
do the laundry work of the camp twice, and run the sterilizer and X-ray equipment until
all became familiar with the different details of the work. Truck drivers were kept on
the trucks until found proficient in handling them. Nurses when they arrived prepared
dressings and were made familiar with the sterilizing apparatus, operating room, and
plan of hospital. Xo attempt was made to give instruction in hospital administration,
paper work, except the statistical reports, or obtaining and caring for supplies, as instruc-
tions of this character could not have been given with any degree of success in the short
time available. All the available time was concentrated in familiarizing the personnel
with the technical equipment of a mobile hospital, where it differed from that of a base
hospital. This proved to be a very serious mistake, one that was not realized until just
before the armistice was signed. It has since been learned that the majority of these
organizations could erect their hospitals, operate their laundries, sterilizing apparatus, and
X-ray equipment, but were practically helpless when it came to administering a hospital,
obtaining supplies, or having their organizations function as such. It was also considered
to have been a mistake not to have ordered the entire personnel of the new organization
to the park at one time, as men selected by the commanding officer of the unit for
particular duty were often found to be hopeless when it came to instructing them in that
duty. If the entire organization had been on hand these men probably could have been
replaced by better ones.
The question of standardizing the equipment of mobile hospitals was one of the most
difficult problems presented. The chief difficulty was that previous organizations had had
a free hand in obtaining what they believed they required, obtaining their supplies from
the French, the Medical Department, the Quartermaster Department, and the lied Cross.
Each new commanding officer obtained the list showing the equipment that the previous
organization had started out with, and he not only obtained what this list called for but
also such additional articles as he individually believed necessary- These, of course.
190 FIELD OPERATION'S
varied according to the specialty of the commanding officer. For example, one commanding
officer was an eye specialist. He not only wanted all the equipment that previous organi-
zations had taken out, but also all the equipment, instruments, and supplies which an eye
specialist might require.
Before attempting to standardize the equipment mobile hospitals in operation at the
front were visited and the opinion of commanding officers who had had the most active
experience obtained as to what articles of equipment could be dispensed with and as to
what additional articles they required. After obtaining this information n list was made
tip. and this standard list of equipment was jriven to Mobile Hospital No. 10 and to those
that followed it. This equipment could be moved with 20 three-ton trucks, not including
the personnel, as compared with anywhere from :{"> to till trucks required by previous
organizations.
Below is a list of organizations that were instructed and equipped at the park from
the time of its organization until the armistice was signed, with date of arrival and
departure. They were usually reported ready for duty, in so far as their training was
concerned, two weeks after arrival. Delay in departure, as a rule, was due to failure to
receive supplies from the Medical Department or to difficulty in obtaining transportation
after organizations were reported ready.
.Mobile Hospital No. 5, mobilized September 4. left for duty September 20.
Mobile Hospital No. 6, mobilized September 4. left for duty September 26.
Mobile Hospital No. 7. mobilized September 16, left for duty October 2.
Mobile Hospital No. 8, mobilized September '-'(I. left for duty October l.S.
Mobile Hospital No. it. mobilized September 20. left for duty October 2(1.
Mobile Hospital No. 10, mobilized September 25, left for duty November 11.
Mobile Hospital No. 11. mobilized September 29, left for duty November 11.
Mobile Hospital No. 12. mobilized September 20, left for duty January 23, 1919.
Mobile Hospital No. l.'i was equipped and assembled, and on November 11 was ordered
delivered to the Belgians. Mobile Hospital No. 14 was equipped and assembled Novem-
ber 14. but no personnel was assigned, the equipment remaining iit the park.
In October. 1918, Medical Repair Shop No. 1 was moved from Neuilly to the park.
The building assigned to this organization was ideal for the character of the work, it
had a cement floor, was well lighted, anil had sufficient space on the second floor for
quarters for the personnel and for storerooms. This not only increased the capacity of
the shop but set free a certain number of instrument makers and opticians for work in
the shop who previously had been used for running the enlisted men's mess and for guard
duty.
The equipment of Mobile Operating Unit No. 1 was received from the United State;-
during October, Ibis, and was overhauled at the park, the intention being to send the
equipment when completed to the Medical Department concentration area. .loinville
I Haute Marne), where the personnel was to be mobilized. Two of the five sections of
this unit were ready for transfer on November 10 and the other three the following week,
but owing to the signing of the armistice this transfer was not made.
The question of spare parts and replacements for the mobile hospitals after they left
the park was taken up and a list compiled covering the principal articles that most fre-
quently became unserviceable. This list was made up after consultation with commanding
officers of mobile hospitals who had seen the most active service and from data obtained
from the French records at Fort De Vavnes showing the replacements required by the
French for their mobile hospitals during the last three years. Request was made for six
months' supply of these spare parts, the idea being to furnish mobile hospitals that were
operating with the spare parts required direct from the park instead of having organization
commanders sending to the French, as hail previously been the practice. The armistice
was signed before the requisition was filled.
The difficulty in shipping spare parts to the mobile hospitals at the front and in
having these parts reach the hospital before it was moved, was to be overcome hy having
a point nearer the front where all supplies for mobile hospitals could he shipped from the
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
191
park and then transferred from that point l>y truck. Tliis plan was in process of mate-
rializing, using the Medical Department concentration area, Joinville (Haute Marnei. as
the point from which spare parts were to be sent forward by truck, when the armistice
was signed and the plan abandoned.
Sometimes our mobile hospitals operated in conjunction with evacuation hospitals.™
I nit sometimes they served with field hospitals™ or operated Independently. Their distribu-
tion is exemplified on the map of the Meuse-Argonne operation. lake evacuation hospitals,
tliey were army units. They habitually remained under the command of their respective
commanding officers without coming under the administrative jurisdiction of the units to
which they were attached. Sometimes a mobile hospital operated independently of any
other sanitary formation from a geographic as well as from an administrative standpoint.
Thus. .Mobile Hospital No. 3i( for much of its service at Aulnois was located northwest
of Sebastopol, quite independent in every sense of any other hospital.
The administrative methods of the mobile hospital, given below, exemplify the
arrangements in mobile hospitals generally, though inevitably there were numerous
'lepartures from them in certain details because of differing conditions, resources, etc.
MOBILE HOSPITAL NO. :«> AT AULNOIS
The Yale unit, organized as a Red Cross base hospital, and later changed
to Mobile Hospital No. 39, was tlie first mobile hospital which saw service
in the American Expeditionary Forces. Its history is <riven here at some
length, as it was the prototype of other mobile hospitals. Its commanding
officer had readied France with funds privately raised to purchase a French
192
FIELD OPERATIONS
auto-chir, preliminary arrangements having been made in the United States
through the French ambassador. 1 ' In point of fact the equipment of this
unit was finally paid for by the United States Government, except that
instruments, etc., to the value of $11,000 were purchased by the unit. The
equipment was not ready for delivery when the personnel arrived in France.
a circumstance which gave its commanding officer an opportunity to familiar-
ize himself with the needs, functions, and organization, of similar units in
the French Army. As soon as it was equipped, the unit moved to Aulnois.
where it occupied tents and Adrian barracks.
OPERATING GROUP
MOBILE HOSPITAL NO. 39
SEPT. 30. — 1918
, OPERATING ROOM X moo "J - 4 fe . /I! [
r — i shock
.W,..;b
_M____
PREPARATION * HrSTOPY ANO
J*^7L.*I'?' , '« VALUABLES
+ 5= it it t -°— -
BIO. 34
For the St. Mihiel operation it was expanded to 524 beds. An estimate
then made of the personnel necessary for a hospital of this type with 500
beds and 200 admissions per day. was as follows: '• 9
Miscel-
laneous
Triag
Wards
Teams
operating
Splints
X-ray Total
2
11
44
44
1(1
10
10
2
4 38
7
12(1
61
180
The number actually on duty was much less, the following being present
during this operation: Surgical teams, 14; resuscitation teams. 2: nurses.
14; enlisted men, 180. Several officers, about 6. from Evacuation Hospital
No. 11, also reenforced the hospital. 40
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
193
With the personnel then available it was estimated (on the basis of 1
case per team per hour) that 144 major cases could be cared for per day. The
hospital was designed for seriously wounded only and it was estimated that
50 per cent of such cases would be nontransportable. 40 It followed that the
limit of bed capacity would be reached, by accumulation of patients, in six
clays.
As it was anticipated that the reception and operating rooms would
he points of congestion, every possible attention was given to the organization
of these parts of the hospital in order that wasted motion and unnecessary
delay might be avoided. It was laid down as a fundamental rule that from
Fig. 35. — Reception ward, Mobile Hospital No. 39
the time when the wounded entered the front door until they left the operat-
ing room, movement must be in one direction only. Every unnecessary
maneuver and record was dispensed with so that a maximum output should
he secured with a minimum personnel. In general the barrack wards were
assigned to nontransportable patients, who gradually accumulated, while
the tents of the auto-chir were used for transportable patients. This plan
allowed the speedy forward movement of the hospital when necessity
required. 40
It was recognized that three essential points would determine efficiency
of operation and that these points must be absolutely coordinated. These
were: (1) The admission office; (2) the bed assignment office; and (3) the
evacuation office. 40
13576—25-
-13
194
FIELD OPERATIONS
During inclement weather the porte-cochere protected the wounded and
served as a storeroom for a stock of blankets. Immediately on entering the
door, accommodation was provided for two ambulance loads of the wounded.
These passed to the admission desk, where a team took care of patients' val-
uables, field cards, and clinical briefs, and made records of casualties and
changes. Patients were then passed on to the undressing section, where were
installed a series of racks for 16 litters, a chute for soiled or infested clothing,
and 2 bathing tables; beyond these were racks for 1G more litters. Here were
held patients awaiting X-ray examination. On either side of this portion of
the reception ward were shock rooms, kept at a temperature of 90°. Patients
in shock were removed at once from the main channel of progress and treated
Fig. 36. — Operating room, Mobile Hospital No. 39
until in condition to be forwarded. If they became operable they were re-
turned to circulation. Both shock rooms were in charge of resuscitation
teams. 41
Two operating rooms were provided, one of which was connected with
the reception room by a covered passageway. The other had an X-ray room
at one end, with a few litter racks, for patients awaiting operation after X-ray
examination. Patients not needing to be so examined could be short-circuited
by a passage along the side of the room. This operating room had space for
five teams and the other room for three, working simultaneously at double
tables provided with every improvement and convenience. After operation
patients were taken into an end vestibule, where bearers were stationed, under
the direction of the bed assignment office located just beyond the vestibule.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 195
The sterilization room, between the two operating rooms, contained the
sterilization truck, splint racks, and storage for dressings. A reserve space
for preoperative patients was provided in the front end of the operating
rooms at the right. 42
Admissions. — The admission team consisted of three men for the night
shift and four for the day shift. Work was so organized that the field card
and envelope, brief (Form 55A), and valuables were handled at the rate of 1
card in three minutes, or 480 per day. A clerk at a typewriter kept the report
of casualties and changes posted to the minute. A fourth or fifth man was
necessary in order to care for the record of deaths, to complete inadequate
diagnoses, to make corrections, and to serve as a reserve. Promptly at 12
o'clock daily the report of casualties and changes was given to the courier.
In the routine one man made out this report (Form 22 A. G. O.) , another made
the brief (Form 55A), and a third made the register card (Form 52). Val-
uables were placed in a paper bag, marked with the name and hospital num-
ber of the patient, and sent to the evacuation office.* 3
Undressing team. — Immediately behind the admission desk was the un-
dressing station, where clothing was removed by the undressing team and
placed in the clothes chute. 'Three men here could keep pace with four bath-
ing and preoperative tables. 44
Bathing and preparation of patients. — Two bathing tables, with water
heater, formed the equipment of this station. The patient was bathed and
his wound prepared for operation. While this was being done, an officer took
brief clinical notes and made the diagnosis, while an enlisted man made a
sketch of the wound. The team here normally consisted of one officer, a
barter, and two other enlisted men. 41
Shock room. — This room, on a siding or detour from the main route, was
kept heated by a stove and contained two electric pads. These devices allowed
rapid heating of the patient and continued treatment on litters in the open
room. On the opposite side of the main pavilion was another shock room
used for overflow and for postoperative patients. 44 Teams also worked the
shock room.
Surgical teams. — These teams were in two groups, alternating on eight-
hour shifts. 45 During their rest periods they were expected to do the ward
work needed for patients upon whom they had operated. There were two
regular teams and nine attached, casual teams. A third regular team did
"class B" work. The special emergency teams w T ere made up by cooperation
of the ophthalmological consultants. The assignment of the main teams was
so arranged that the directors of surgery in the operating room headed the
two groups which took alternating periods of duty. One ophthalmological
team was assigned to each group, so that there would always be such a team
available. There was also a special team for maxillofacial as well as one for
neurological surgery. 40
There were two shifts of six main teams each. These worked during
two periods on one day and the next but one. Their rotation brought about
an automatic alternation in periods.
196
FIELD OPERATIONS
Output of operating room. — The output of the six teams, operating con-
tinuously dui-ing 24 hours, should have heen 144 operations in the first 24
hours. During that period in the St. Mihiel operation, 201 patients were
admitted and 170 passed through the operating room. It was surprising
to see how quickly the teams fell into their stride and, after the first few
hours, how smoothly the machine worked. 47
X-ray department. — The X-ray rooms were also arranged to work on
the one-way traffic principle. Four teams were on duty, in alternating
shifts; they found no difficulty in keeping ahead of tlie six surgical teams.
i i ■
-X-ray truck, Mobile Ilospilal No. '■'■'■>
Sterilizing room. — Two teams worked in the sterilizing room on 12-hour
shifts. One team (two men) cleaned and scrubbed instruments, while another
team cleaned and repaired gloves and sharpened instruments. A nurse
superintended sterilization and the storage of instruments in standard sets.
Surgeons were required to use standard sets of instruments and dressings,
but when needed complementary sets for lung, head, abdominal, or other
operations could be called for. Dressings likewise were standardized, a
certain set of dressings being provided for each operation. The system
worked well and surgeons appeared satisfied with the instruments and dress-
ings furnished. 4 *
During the entire period the sterilizing truck functioned perfectly. Hot
air was employed for sterilizing a supply of instruments in advance, but dur-
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 197
Fin. 38. — Sterilizing truck. Mobile Hospital No. ",')
198 FIELD OPERATIONS
ing an offensive instruments usually were boiled. Tin cans of various kinds
were used as containers. The sterilizer truck was managed l>y two teams of
three men each, one for firing and two for operating the sterilizing equipment.
Bed assignment office. — When an operation was completed the orderly
knocked on the door of the vestibule, and two bearers entered, removed the
patient, and deposited him in the vestibule until the lied assignment was
made. The bed assignment officer was stationed in the vestibule in the rear
of the sterilizing rooms, between the two operating rooms. 49 Here, assign-
ments to wards were governed by colored tags, attached to the patients by
the operating teams. A white tag indicated the patient was to be immediately
evacuated (after recovery from ether) ; brown, evacuation in 10 to 24 hours
after recovery from ether; and gray, that the patient was to be retained —
usually this was because of head, chest, and abdominal operations.
Ward assignments. — Wards were so assigned that each surgeon had half
of a ward for transportable patients and half of a ward for nontransportable.
Assignments were so made that one team would be on duty in the wards
while the corresponding team was operating, thus making it possible for
surgeons to follow up their cases and also making impossible the neglect of
any wounded man. 50
Evacuation and consultation team. — In order to control the evacuation
of patients, to check dressings, and to survey the condition of patients before
their evacuation, one team was constantly detailed for work as an evacuation
team. To it was also assigned the duty of consultation in any emergency
which might arise in the wards in the absence of the ward surgeon. This
plan was necessitated by the fact that operating surgeons also cared for
ward cases. 51
Evacuation. — In the evacuation ward some readjustment of cases was
made necessary by delayed departure of trains. Evacuation was accomplished
by ambulances and by narrow-gauge railways. 52
Laundry. — During part of the time the laundry operated day and night,
handling 4J285 pounds of work in 44 hours. The following supplies were used
during that period: Soap, 43*4 pounds; soda, 168 pounds; gasoline, 22 gal-
lons. It was estimated that 2,300 pounds of laundry could have been handled
daily for any reasonable period. The plan of using pieces of muslin in the
operating room instead of sheets and towels resulted in marked economy in
the laundry. A full output necessitated two teams of four men each, working
in 12-hour shifts, each under general charge of a sergeant. 63
Litter bearers. — Experience demonstrated that five different groups of
bearers were necessary: (1) Four men to unload ambulances and carry pa-
tients to the bathing tables; (2) four men to carry patients to the X-ray room;
(3) a supervisor and four men to handle patients in the X-ray room; (4) a
supervisor and six men to remove patients from operating tables and carry
them to wards; (5) eight men for evacuating patients. One supervisor and
one man were required to remove soiled litters and blankets from the admis-
sion room. For a 500-bed hospital, running 6 double teams continuously,
two shifts of 28 men each were required. The nature of the work was such
that 8-hour periods proved better than those of 12 hours. 64
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
199
MOBILE SURGICAL UNITS (COMPLEMENTARY GROUPS)
Unfortunately, there is no individual history of a mobile surgical unit on
file in the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army, nor can such a history be
found elsewhere. Records of these units were obtained from divisional and
other reports of Medical Department activities.
On April 22, 1918. the chief surgeon. A. E. F.. cabled the Surgeon General
that equipment for 20 complementary groups (later known as mobile surgical
units) was being manufactured in France and requested that personnel for
these units, each to consist of 1 roentgenologist, 1 sergeant, first class. '■'> ser-
geants, and 8 privates (including 1 X-ray operator), bo organized in the United
Evacuation office, Mobile Hospital No. .'!9
States and sent to France. Twelve such units were to be cleared in May and
eight in June. 1918. 35 On November 11, as has been noted, of the 20 mobite
surgical units required, the following 16 were in service : Xo. 1 to No. 12, in-
clusive, and Xo. 100 to Xo. 103, inclusive. 33
The following extract on mobile surgical ivnits is quoted from a report
of the Medical Department group of the fourth section of the general staff.
Gr. H. Q. : " This f omiation enabled us to provide portable sterilizing. X-ray.
and electric-lighting facilities and a small operating room for divisional,
corps, and army field hospitals, thus enabling these to carry on surgical
operations on nontransportable wounded." -- The Medical Department group
of the fourth section, general staff, also reported that these mobile surgical
units should be retained in our equipment manuals and transportation pro-
200
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 201
vided for them on the basis of one per division. 22 Though they functioned
under the army and were assigned to divisions and withdrawn from them as
occasion demanded, their assignment for duty with the corps was advocated
by many officers. It should be noted that nontransportable patients — that is,
those for whom these units were especially designed — were usually relatively
few in number, comprising only the gravely shocked, patients with abdominal
wounds complicated with hemorrhage, and patients with open chest wounds.
The value of the mobile surgical unit is attested not only by the above recom-
mendation but also the Medical Department reports of many divisions.
MOBILE OPERATING UNIT NO. 1
A unique formation was Mobile Operating Unit No. 1. In August, 1917,
6 medical officer, who had been in charge of a hospital in France, proposed
to the Surgeon General that there be provided a mobile operating unit mounted
on automobile trucks and provided with a well-lighted and heated operating
room, electric lighting, steam and sterilizing plants, these to be fully equipped
in such a manner as to insure the best hospital conditions and at the same
time capable of being erected and in action in less than an hour. 56 The follow-
ing month he wrote to the War Department of an offer by Mr. George E.
Turnure, of New York, of such a unit. This voluntary offer was promptly
accepted by the Secretary of War."- 58 Shortly thereafter the medical officer in
question was assigned to the Surgeon General's Office to organize the mobile
operating unit. 59
The unit was provided with 64 officers, 50 nurses, and 218 enlisted men, and
with equipment consisting of 5 touring cars, 5 motor cycles with side cars, 20
three-ton trucks, 20 one-half-ton trailers, and 50 Ford trucks, 60 Attached to
it was one machine-shop truck unit, with a. quartermaster detail of 1 officer
and 25 men. 60 In its final form the unit consisted of five sections, each of
which was a complete surgical hospital which could care for 40 patients and
could be operated independently. Equipment of this unit was much more
elaborate and complete than that of any other surgical hospital sent to France.'
It was forwarded in sections which were concentrated in the training area at
•Toinville, but as the entire organization, because of the priority schedule, did
not arrive until shortly before the armistice, it did not see service in battle. "
PROFESSIONAL TEAMS
The professional services of field, mobile, evacuation, and base hospitals
were all improved by the use of appropriate professional teams. These teams
varied in number and in specialty. The large expansion of facilities for emer-
gency surgical work in individual evacuation hospitals, by means of surgical
teams, was imperative on account of the shortage in number of these hospitals.
On June 6, 1918, we had 42 surgical teams, of which 12 were on duty with the
French and 30 with base hospitals of the American Expeditionary Forces. 01
Each of these teams (they were modeled on teams already organized by the
13576— 2. r ) 14
202
FIELD OPERATIONS
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
203
Fio. 42. — Sterilizing truck, Mobile Operating Unit No. 1
204 FIELD OPERATIONS
French) consisted of 1 surgeon, 1 assistant surgeon, 1 anesthetist, 2 nurses, and
2 orderlies taken ordinarily from the base hospitals." 1 Following the same
plan, splint and shock teams were developed later, the former to work with the
operating teams and the latter as emergency medical formations.' 11
SURGICAL TEAMS
The director of professional services, A. E. F., issued the following letter
of instructions, May 13, 1918 : 62
1. Hereafter surgical teams will be classified as follows:
(a) Teams detailed from base bospitals for duty with advanced A. E. F. formations.
(6) Teams for duty with allied formations.
2. With reference to the formation of surgical teams available for duty with all
formations, the senior medical officer of the team will forward, through his commanding
officer, a report of its composition, giving full name and rank of each officer, nurse, and
enlisted man, and station of each, if the team is recruited from different organizations.
3. When a team or the members of any team are detached from their permanent
station, the senior medical officer will forward a report, giving date of departure, destina-
tion, and name and rank of each individual.
4. No member of a surgical team will be detached from his station without orders
from competent authority, and when assigned to temporary duty elsewhere, will not ab-
sent himself from the station to which assigned nor return to his proper station with-
out orders from the same or higher authority. Members of teams will be informed that
they are not to determine when their services can be spared, and that they must await the
receipt of orders.
5. No change in the composition of any team during the time it is on detached serv-
ice will be made without authority, and except in cases of illness or other urgent neces-
sity, recommendations for such changes will not be made without consultation with the
chief consultant, surgery, A. E. F.
• 0. Medical officers and nurses on teams will, when serving with allied forma-
tions, equip themselves with sufficient funds to defray all expenses for subsistence.
7. The senior medical officer with a team will submit a monthly report of the work
performed, where done, and under what circumstances. After return of the team to its
proper station, he will forward a final report covering the entire period of detached
service.
8. The above-mentioned reports will be forwarded in duplicate to the chief con-
sultant, surgery. A. E. F. who will forward one copy to the director of professional
services. A. E, F.
!». Operating teams should familiarize themselves with the regulations and customs
of the hospitals to which they are assigned, and faithfully observe them.
That the professional staffs of evacuation hospitals must be reenforced
early became apparent. This was in fact very clear by July of 1918, as only
8 such hospitals, instead of the 52 authorized by Tables of Organization, had
then arrived in France. 61 The situation could be met only by enlarging the
evacuation hospitals which were available by assigning to them personnel
drawn from other sources. So, plans were at once made to increase the number
of surgical teams, and, in addition, to organize casual surgical teams. A casual
surgical team had the same personnel as a surgical team except that it had
one nurse and one orderlv. 61
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 205
The total number of teams organized by the professional services were
shown as follows in a table submitted December 31, 1918 : 01
Teams
Personnel
Surgical:
244
95
:to
78
1,708
475
Splint
90
Shock
390
Total
447
2.683
The brunt of the work was borne by less than 200 of these teams." 1
OAS TEAMS
Organization of gas teams at base hospitals was authorized by the chief
surgeon, A. E. F., by an endorsement to the director of professional services
dated June 2, 1918. C3 The chief consultant in medicine previously had ex-
pressed the desire to have two gas teams organized in each base hospital which
could lje called on for service elsewhere as desired. Such teams were formed
in several base hospitals (e. g.. Base Hospital No. 8, Base Hospital No. 27).
Each of these teams consisted of 1 officer, 2 nurses, and 2 enlisted men. A
course of degassing instruction at the central laboratory at Dijon was pro-
vided for officers designated to perform degassing service. 63 Their attendance
was contingent, however, on the possibility of releasing them from other
duties for the time being.
MISCELLANEOUS TEAMS
Tn various hospitals teams other than those mentioned were organized
from local sources. Tims the field hospital which cared for nontransportable
wounded would organize surgical teams, sometimes from its own personnel
and sometimes from selected personnel assigned to it from other organizations
of the divisional sanitary train. Surgical hospitals generally, whether divi-
sional or army, organized teams from their own personnel. In some of these
units two dressing teams to dress the slightly wounded and to assist in the
operating room were organized, replacing each other every eight hours.
Similarly, two shock teams were organized in each hospital, composed of
an officer. 1 or (usually) 2 nurses, and 1 or (usually) 2 orderlies. The officers
had received an intensive course of instruction in the central laboratory at
Dijon, where they had attended lectures on traumatic shock and its treatment
by heat, transfusions of blood, by gum solution, and kindred matters, and had
learned the use of instruments of precision by which they checked the shocked
patient's condition and response to treatment. 13 It was essential that these
officers be highly trained, for the lives of many patients admitted to their
department were often in the balance.
A number of evacuation hospitals organized two orthopedic or splint
teams, each consisting of one specially trained officer and two enlisted men
whose duty it was to maintain a supply of splints in the operating room and
206 FIELD OPERATIONS
other parts of the hospital and to apply them after operation. These teams
operated in 12-hour shifts, and were of great benefit to the operating surgeons
not only by applying splints for them, but by preventing breaks in asepsis
on their part. 21 They supervised the distribution and use of splints in other
parts of the hospital as well as in the operating room, reapplying them in the
wards or supervising their application there, and maintained at the receiving
ward an exchange for splints with ambulance orderlies, replacing those which
had been brought in on patients.
One or, if at all possible, two radiologic teams were made up from the
permanent personnel of the hospital. These teams consisted of one officer
skilled in radiology, fluoroscopy, and screen technique, and one or two order-
lies. It was found essential that these teams be composed of young men, be-
cause of the long hours that they had to be on duty. 21
Despite the shortage in personnel and the pressure under which all had
to labor at times, it proved very desirable, in fact almost imperative, that
alternating teams for shock, splinting, and radiology be provided, as well as
alternating surgical teams. Usually the shock, splint, and radiologic teams
operated in 12-hour shifts. 21
Specialists in the eye, ear, nose, and throat and dental surgeons operated
under the supervision of the chief of surgery.
It was found that there should be available at least two surgeons proficient
in operations on the brain and eye. 21
If the hospital received gassed patients, degassing teams (usually three
men) were organized under the chief of the medical service though under the
direct supervision of another officer.
The laboratory officer, selected from the permanent personnel, was one
well versed in wound bacteriology and in pathology. As a rule, this officer
had taken the prescribed course in wound bacteriology in the central labora-
tory at Dijon, his place being filled temporarily at the time by some other offi-
cer already qualified. The laboratory officer not only performed routine bac-
teriological examinations and made smears from wounds to insure their con-
trol, but he also prepared Dakin's solution, made post-mortem examinations,
and collected specimens of pathological material for the Army Medical Mu-
seum. In some hospitals the laboratory, pharmacy, and dental departments
were located in the same tent, but in others their location w-as somewhat
different. 21
In all gas hospitals degassing teams were organized. This tendency to
work by means of more or less permanent teams was remarked also in the
hospitals in other directions than in the purely professional services, for a
number organized definite groups, such as those for the receiving and
evacuating departments, which served as teams in rotation, each of whose
members was given specific duties.
CONVALESCENT DEPOTS
It was found that, in the height of an offensive, particularly if it was
prolonged, many patients with slight illness or injury who would soon have
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 207
been fit for return to duty were sent to the evacuation hospitals; and then
as these hospitals needed their beds for the casualties which were constantly
arriving, they were obliged to send the slightly sick and injured to the rear.
This practice not only burdened the railway rolling stock and the base hos-
pitals, but also lost these men to their divisions for several weeks. In order
to meet this situation, attempts were made to provide army and corps con-
valescent depots, and only on account of the lack of medical personnel was
a convalescent depot for the First Army not completed at the time the
armistice was signed. 04 The establishment of this depot, which was located
at Eevigny, was then well under way." 4 At this time, for the Second Army,
the barracks at Toul were available for hospital purposes and this, plus the
fact that its casualties were comparatively small in numbers, made the need
for such a depot less urgent in it than in the First Army. By the time of the
armistice the several corps, especially the First Corps, were caring for slightly
incapacitated patients in field hospitals of the corps train set apart for this
purpose, designating and employing them as convalescent depots. 05
EVACUATION AMBULANCE COMPANIES
In the edition of the Manual for the Medical Department, issued in 1916,
the designation of the then so-called transport column, which had been
authorized in 1910, was changed to the evacuation ambulance company, and
provision was made that its personnel and equipment would be those of an
ambulance company with such modifications as the conditions of its par-
ticular service warranted, specifying that " motor ambulances should if
practicable be substituted for horse-drawn vehicles." It was further provided
that when a battle was imminent the number of vehicles and bearers should
be increased by the officer in charge of the advance section. The primary duty
of these units was to clear the field hospitals and to transport patients to
evacuation, base or other hospitals or to points with rail or boat connections.
They also were to transport wounded on occasion from dressing stations,
stations for slightly wounded, and from other places in the field.
In November, 1917, the Surgeon General wrote the chief surgeon,
A. E. F., 3 evacuation ambulance companies were being organized at
home, each consisting of 2 officers and CO enlisted men, that it was hoped to
have 1 such unit with each division, and that the equipment would be that
of a motor ambulance company with 12 ambulances less dressing station
equipment. 00 He requested recommendations. The chief surgeon, A. E. F.,
replied, advocating 20 ambulances per ambulance company instead of 12. 0T
The Surgeon General ordered the commanding officers, Medical Officers'
Training Camps at Fort Riley and at Fort Oglethorpe to organize the com-
panies in question, one at the former and two at the latter. 68
In the meantime, the chief surgeon, line of communications, had recom-
mended (November 27, 1917) that ambulance personnel and transport within
his jurisdiction be organized into evacuation ambulance companies, each con-
sisting of 5 sections with 20 ambulances each. 03 He also urged that, if it were
possible. 30 sections of the United States Army Ambulance Service, then in
208 FIELD OPERATIONS
the United States but ready for shipment, be secured for the A. E. F.. in
order to avoid the complete breakdown in transport which he considered
imminent. He remarked that the need of evacuation ambulance com-
panies was becoming more and more apparent, both to the transportation
department of the chief surgeon's office and to the hospitalization depart-
ment, General Headquarters. The need for motor ambulance companies, con-
veniently located to meet current needs, instead of individual ambulances dis-
tributed among many combat and other organizations and the special need
for such a unit (under the control of the advance section. Services of Supply)
in the vicinity of the training areas were emphasized. Other companies as
required would be located at other places in the line of communications.
It was anticipated that personnel and materiel might ultimately be supplied
for the evacuation ambulance companies from the sections of the United
States Army Ambulance Service which had been assembled, but that until
that service's resources were more than enough to meet its own needs, our
evacuation ambulance companies might be developed quickly though tem-
porarily by drawing in from various base and other hospitals all available
transport and personnel. It was believed that even though this organization
would lack symmetry it would meet the situation temporarily until units of
the, United States Army Ambulance Service could be made available. The
memorandum further remarked that 88 sections of that service in the United
States, not yet assigned, might be considered available for requisition for
service on the line of communications. The necessity for a maintenance de-
partment with ample spare parts and other equipment was noted as was also
that for the immediate establishment of an ambulance park in the vicinity
of the training areas.
The same date (November 27, 1917) the chief surgeon, A. E. F., cabled the
Surgeon General that evacuation ambulance companies should be organized
from the equipment and personnel of sections of the United States Army
Ambulance Service. 70
Under date of December 8, 1917, in a memorandum for the Surgeon
General, the chief surgeon, A. E. F., emphasized the need for organizing on
a large scale transportation for casualties, noted the limited amount of trans-
port and inadequate ambulance spare parts available at camp and base hospi-
tals; and to establish a precedent, requested that the chief of United States
Army Ambulance Service loan the United States Army one ambulance com-
pany section. He further requested that The Adjutant General authorize
necessary transport or its purchase. 71 A few days later (December 13) the
chief surgeon, A. E. F., received a report from one of his subordinates who
had been ordered to investigate transportation requirements, in which empha-
sis was laid upon the need for evacuation ambulance companies; the waste-
ful results of assigning ambulances to small scattered commands; the diffi-
culty of making evacuations in training areas, and suggesting number and
locations of companies, sources of personnel and materiel, facilities for
repairs, etc. 72
On December 18, 1917, the Surgeon General notified the commanding offi-
cers of the home training camps above mentioned that the personnel of an
GENEKAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 209
evacuation ambulance company would be 1 lieutenant, Medical Corps, 3 non-
commissioned officers, and 34 privates. 73 On December 28, 1917, tbe War
Department formally prescribed this personnel and authorized the organiza-
tion of 20 such companies with 12 G. M. C. ambulances each. 74
On January 14, 1918, the chief surgeon, line of communications, reported
that it was imperatively necessaiy to make provision for more motor ambu-
lance transport in that area in order to evacuate the field hospitals, and recom-
mended that a provisional motor ambulance company be organized from the
resources (116th Sanitary Train) of the 41st Division (the First Depot Divi-
sion). 75 The organization he recommended was that mentioned above in the
letter from the Surgeon General dated November 12. This recommendation
was approved and the organization of this provisional company was ordered
January 17, 1918. 7 " This unit first designated the 116th Evacuation Ambu-
lance Company, and later Provisional Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 1
was the first evacuation ambulance company of the American Expeditionary
Forces. It was located at Toul.
On January 30, 1918, the Surgeon General initiated with The Adjutant
General the following correspondence: 77
1. In cable from tlie commanding general, American Expeditionary Forces, No. 322,
par. 3, subpar. A, it was stated that it was the unanimous opinion that evacuation ambu-
lance companies be organized with the equipment and personnel of the sections of the
U. S. Army Ambulance Service. This request was referred to again in a letter from the
chief surgeon, A. E. F., written December 24.
2. In cable No. 486, par. 8, from the commanding general, A. E. P., the recommenda-
tion was made that the remaining 73 sections, U. S. Army Ambulance Service, be used in
organizing the ambulance companies of the Army sanitary train, item M 201, and evacua-
tion ambulance companies, M 406, and that the remainder be drawn on all ambulance
personnel for replacement draft according to par. 4, cablegram 318.
3. The sections of the American Ambulance Service referred to are those now mobi-
lized at Allentown, Pennsylvania.
4. It is the understanding in this office that when these sections were organized they
were intended for service with the French Army, and they have heretofore been used
for that purpose.
5. A decision is requested as to whether these sections could he used for the purpose
indicated in General Pershing's cables.
6. It is to be noted that in some cases the officers attached to these sections are not
medical officers. Also that they are equipped and have been trained with Ford ambu-
lances, and that the ambulances provided for the ambulance companies of the Army are
G. M. C.'s. Should the use of these sections be allowed, the personnel will differ from
that as authorized for evacuation ambulance companies in the second indorsement of The
Adjutant General's Office, dated December 28, par. 3, subpar. 8.
[1st ind.]
To the Chief of Staff. A. G. O.. February 1, 1918.
[2d ind.]
Was Department, A. G. O., March 12, 1918.
322.33 (Misc. Div.)
To the Surgeon General of the Army :
There is no objection to the use of the enlisted personnel of the American Ambulance
Service now at Allentown, Pennsylvania, organized under section 2. General Orders,
No. 75. War Department. June 23. 1017, as amended by section 1. General Orders. No. 124,
War Department, September 20. 1917, for any purpose for which the enlisted personnel
210 FIELD OPEKATIONS
of the Medical Department may lie used. The commissioned personnel may he used in a
like manner, except that those officers who are not doctors of medicine will be assigned
to such duties as their technical training permits. It is, however, to be understood that
this authorization in so far as it relates to these officers is not to be construed as in any
way modifying the provisions of paragraph 3, Manual for the Medical Department, 191(i,
which prescribes that : "An applicant for appointment in the Medical Corps of the Army
* * * must be a graduate of a reputable medical school legally authorized to confer
the degree of doctor of medicine," and as fast as these officers are separated from the
service their places will be filled by the appointment of medical officers.
By order of the Secretary of War :
The chief surgeon, A. E. F., on March 5, 1918, in an estimate of the total
Medical Department transportation needed for the American Expeditionary
Forces, included 1 evacuation ambulance company for each division, the trans-
portation of each such unit to be 1 motor car, 1 motor cycle with side car,
20 motor ambulances, and 2 motor trucks. 78
The 22d of the same month, the Surgeon General wrote The Adjutant
General, United States Army, as follows: 79
1. Subparagraph " H," paragraph 3, of 2d indorsement, Adjutant General's Office,
December 28, 1017 (322.3 Medical Department, Misc. Div.), gives the personnel of evacua-
tion ambulance companies as 1 lieutenant, Medical Corps, 3 noncommissioned officers,
34 privates.
2. It is requested that this be amended to read as follows: 1 captain or lieutenant,
Medical Corps ; 3 noncommissioned officers ; 3 mechanics ; 2 cooks ; 24 wagoners : 5 privates,
first class, and privates.
3. In General Pershing's organization project for evacuation ambulance companies
all transportation is motorized and consists of 20 motor ambulances, 1 touring car, 1 motor
cycle with side car, 2 motor trucks.
4. The unit is liable to expansion by the addition of other ambulances.
5. The 2 cooks for the organization are necessary ; the 3 mechanics are required to
keep the motor transportation in proper order, and the 24 wagoners are the chauffeurs.
This request was granted in the following terms :
[1st ind.]
A. G. O., March 26, 1918.
To the Chief of Staff (R. A. H.).
[2d ind.]
War Department, A. G. O., April 15, 1918.
To the Surgeon General of the Army.
Returned.
The following personnel for evacuation ambulance companies has been approved:
1 captain or lieutenant, Medical Corps; 3 noncommissioned officers; 3 mechanics; 2 cooks;
23 wagoners; 6 privates, first class, and privates.
This authorization must not be construed to change the numbers or grades of medical
officers provided for the Medical Department in W. P. D. 9199-25, approved February
4, 1918.
By order of the Secretary of War.
On September 26, 1918, the chief surgeon, A. E. F., recommended to the
chief of staff, General Headquarters, the issuance of a general order, which
he had prepared, concerning the operation of ambulances in the Services of
Supply. 80 This, in brief, was to provide that all ambulances in that territory
be assigned to 18 definite evacuation ambulance companies, with the enlisted
personnel then assigned to duty with these vehicles. The personnel of each
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 211
unit, it was recommended, should be 2 ofticers (captains or first lieutenants,
.Medical Department), 2 sergeants, first class, 4 sergeants, 28 wagoners, 1 cook,
1 mechanic, 20 privates, first class, and 5 privates. The units were to be
equipped with 20 ambulances or more, 1 motor cycle with side car, and such
temporary additional machines and personnel as might be necessary; and the
vehicles, so far as possible, were to be garaged at hospital centers, base hospi-
tals, camp hospitals, and other camps where they were used, but at all times
would be under the orders of the commanding oflicers of the resj>ective com-
panies. A list showed that from 9 to 22 ambulances were garaged at the more
important localities in the Services of Supply. In support of this proposed
arrangement the chief surgeon, A. E. F., urged that this organization would
promote service by the pooling of ambulances, and would provide units which,
in emergency, could be sent to the Zone of the Advance. To these recommen-
dations the chief of staff replied that, as the assignment of ambulances was
under the jurisdiction of the chief surgeon, it was believed that they could be
distributed by him as required for the purpose mentioned; and further
that: 81
If it is desired to organize evacuation ambulance companies, a cablegram should be
prepared outlining how many can be organized in the A. E. F., and requesting that
numbers be assigned for the units. Upon receipt of reply authority will be granted for
the formation of the companies under approved tables of organization.
A total of 82 evacuation ambulance companies (including Provisional Am-
bulance Company No. 1) saw service in the American Expeditionary Forces.
Twenty-one arrived before the armistice and sixty-one after the armistice.
Twelve of those which arrived after the armistice were disbanded and their
personnel reassigned in Base Section No. 2. st
Those which served overseas before the armistice, November 11, were the
following : 34
Provisional Ambulance Company No. 1. organized, as above described,
from the 116th Sanitary Train of the 41st Division, which arrived December
31, 1917. Located at Toul.
Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 1 arrived May, 1918. Attached to
26th Division October, 1918. In November it was at Roche fort.
Company No. 2 arrived May 30, 1918. Paris during August, September,
and October, 1918; at Fromereville, Meuse, during November. Transported
69.925 patients, including those moved more than once.
Company No. 3 arrived April 22, 1918. At Staden, Belgium, October,
November, December.
Company No. 4 arrived May 5. 1918. Attached to 89th Division until
September, 1918. At Royaumeix, Meurthe-et -Moselle, September; Commercy,
Meuse. October; Mars-la-Tour, Menrthe-et-Moselle, November to March.
Company No. 5 arrived July 19, 1918. With First Army, August, Sep-
tember. October, and November. Assigned to different hospitals at different
times in clearing field and evacuation and mobile hospitals. Army troops
in St. Mihiel, cleared field hospital and served 10th French Army at Chateau-
Thierry. Moved into German}*. Transported 10,332 patients, not including
3.000 in Germany.
212 FIELD OPERATIONS
Company Xo. 6 arrived July 19, 1918. At Vaux-les-Palameix, Meuse,
September and October ; Virten, Belgium, November.
Company No. 7 arrived July 19, 1918. With Second Army. Served
with Evacuation Hospital No. 3 in Marne area and with Justice group, Toul,
evacuating the hospital to railhead; answered emergency calls and here
operated the motor transport park for the hospital group; participated in
the offensive against Mont Blanc east of Rheims by the 2d and 38th Divisions.
It worked between the dressing station and the hospitals. Then assigned to
Evacuation Hospital No. 15, near Verdun.
Company No. 8 arrived July 19, 1918. At Rimaucourt, Haute Marne,
until ordered to proceed to Le Mans.
Company No. 9 arrived September 14, 1918. Operated at St. Xazaire,
Base Section 1. Detained there until ambulances were received ; that is, until
after the armistice. On November 25 Ambulance Company No. 144, with 121
men, and Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 9, with 37 men, were organized
into an evacuation ambulance battalion which evacuated hospital trains to
the transport and moved sick and wounded in and out of hospitals. The
battalion moved 80,000 patients by July.
Company No. 10 arrived August 12, 1918. At Froidos, Meuse, September,
October, and November.
Company No. 11 arrived August 13, 1918. At Camp 1, Base Section 1,
August to January, 1919.
Company No. 12 arrived August 13, 1918. At Vaubecourt, Meuse,
October to December.
Company No. 13 arrived September 9, 1918. At St. Nazaire, September
and October.
Company No. 14 arrived September 3, 1918. At St. Nazaire, September
and October. Then at Bordeaux.
Company No. 15 arrived September 18. 1918. Camp Capelette, Base
Section No. G, October. Reception park, Base Section 6, November and
December.
Company No. 16 arrived September 18, 1918. At Camp Capelette, Base
Section 0. October; motor reception park. Base Section 6, November. Never
received ambulance equipment nor moved patients. Operated as a motor
transport unit and assembled cars.
Company Xo. 17 arrived October 13, 1918. Brest motor ambulance pool
formed December 28, including this unit.
Company Xo. 18 arrived October 8, 1918; on October 12 assisted in
assembly of carts, trucks, and ambulances at Bordeaux.
Company Xo. 19 arrived October 12. 1918. At St. Xazaire, October:
Bordeaux, Xovember.
Company Xo. 20 arrived October 12, 1918. At Bordeaux, October and
Xovember.
The rest of the evacuation ambulance companies were employed at base
sections, hospital centers, and with the Army of Occupation.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 213
MOBILE LABORATORIES
Prior to the World War, our Medical Department had no mobile labora-
tories. Yet, as may be seen in the Appendix, p. 1044, provisions had been
made so that laboratory work might be accomplished in the theater of opera-
tions, though only in the line of communications. 82 That is to say, the organi-
zation of the Medical Department in war, as outlined in the last pre-war edi-
tion of the Manual for the Medical Department, provided for field laboratories
and for the equipment of evacuation and base hospitals with laboratory facili-
ties. As regards the field laboratory, it was intended to be a relatively fixed
institution, conveniently located somewhere on the line of communications;
and as regards the laboratories of evacuation and base hospitals, they were
mobile, but only to the extent of the mobility of their parent organizations.
The arrangement thus outlined necessitated that all laboratory work
required in the zone of the advance be accomplished in the line of communi-
cations.
In the summer of 1917, when the chief surgeon, A. E. F., was formu-
lating his plans for the Medical Department of the American Expeditionary
Forces, he appreciated the necessity for laboratories which could be made a
part of the organization of the Medical Department attached to the combatant
forces. On August 12, 1917, he forwarded to the Surgeon General an outline
of the tentative organization for the laboratory service of the American Ex-
peditionary Forces. 83 This outline provided, on the basis of five corps of six
divisions each, for stationary army and corps laboratories, and for mobile field
laboratories staffed by two officers and four men each for every division. It
was planned that the principal work of the division mobile laboratory would
be the chemical and bacteriological examination of water supplies, the exami-
nation of smears, and the securing of cultures for examination in the labora-
tories of the corps or army. It was further planned to include in the work of
the mobile laboratory all necessary chemical analyses.
One week after the chief surgeon, A. E. F., forw y arded to the Surgeon Gen-
eral his tentative plan for the laboratory service overseas, he initiated plans
for securing equipment for mobile laboratory units. On August 19, 1917, he
placed an order with a British firm for two " motor bacteriological labora-
tories," each to consist of a small but well-equipped outfit mounted on a 3-ton
chassis. 84 However, delivery of these laboratories w 7 as delayed until early in
the following year because of the difficulty experienced in securing from the
British Government a release of the chassis for them. 85
On January 11, 1918, the director of laboratories, A. E. F., submitted to
the chief surgeon, A. E. F., an elaborated plan, which had already been ap-
proved in principle by the chief surgeon, for the organization of the division of
laboratories and infectious diseases. 86 This plan is given in full in Volume II
of this history and will not be reproduced here. It is sufficient, for present pur-
poses, to state that it contemplated two classes of laboratory equipment for
service in the zone of the armies, immobilized and portable. The immobilized
(army laboratory) equipment was for installation in permanent buildings
in the zone of the advance, or in the advance section. Tlie portable equipment
214 FIELD OPERATIONS
■was of two classes: Equipment installed in a specially constructed motor ve-
hicle (mobile laboratory) and that packed in standardized chests (portable
equipment). The mobile laboratories were designated corps laboratories and
were given serial numbers. However, these mobile laboratories were not as-
signed definitely to corps but were attached to armies, corps, and to other units
as demands for them arose. The portable equipment, in contradistinction to
the mobile laboratory, being packed in standardized chests could be readily
transported in any kind of vehicle. This was the equipment that was assigned
for the laboratory work of a division : it was adequate for such routine work,
including bacteriological and chemical examinations of water supplies. The
personnel was 2 medical officers. 1 officer of the Sanitary Corps, and 4 enlisted
men.
On January 14, 1918, the director of laboratories reported to the chief
surgeon, A. E. F., that plans for the newly adopted portable equipment for
the laboratories of divisions, mentioned in the preceding paragraph, had "been
completed, and that a model was being constructed at the Pasteur Institute,
Paris. 87
On May 22, 1918, the two types of transportable laboratories which had
received consideration were available and in use. 83 As rjreviously indicated,
one of these was a bacteriological motor car, the other a set of chests which
could be transported on trucks. It was found the British utilized the former
because of the assurance that the laboratory transportation was thereby pro-
vided, the French the latter because of its greater convenience. Our division
of laboratories now decided that the former equipment had several disad-
vantages, viz, its initial cost was much greater ($7,500 as contrasted with
$4,400), it was constructed by one firm only; its equipment was not flexible:
and its operation was dependent on the proper functioning of other parts of a
special vehicle, for example, the motor. 83 It was reported that the French
had given up the use of the bacteriological motor cars in favor of transportable
laboratories packed in chests. 83 After a thorough investigation, the division
of laboratories adopted the transportable laboratory in chests, but it was also
decided that for different units of this character different sets of chests would
be employed. Thus an army laboratory would be issued in eight chests,
a division lal>oratory in three. The transportation required would be either
a «%-ton or a 1^6 -ton truck, according to the number of chests. 88
On July 7, 1918, in Memorandum No. 5, published by the Division of
Laboratories and Infectious Diseases, the personnel, transportation, and duties
of the divisional laboratory unit were discussed in some detail. The pro-
visions of this circular were later republished, somewhat amplified, in Memo-
randum No. 7 from the same office under date of August 14, the revised
document reading as follows : 89
1. In the organization of the laboratory service for the American Expeditionary
Forces provision was made for a divisional laboratory unit to serve with each division.
The personnel, equipment, and proposed transportation for each unit is as follows:
Personnel :
1 captain or first lieutenant, Medical Corps or Medical Reserve Corps.
1 captain or first lieutenant, Sanitary Corps, Medical Department.
4 enlisted men. Medical Department.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 215
Equipment :
Chest 1, Standard equipment for clinical pathology.
Chest 2, standard equipment for clinical pathology.
Chest 3, standard bacteriological Incubator.
Transportation :
1 light truck (%-ton Ford or other standard).
1 motor cycle with side car.
2. It is contemplated that these laboratory units shall constitute a part of the sanitary
staff of the division surgeon and that they will he used by the divisional sanitary inspector
in the investigation and control of communicable diseases and in the inspection, supervision,
unci control of sterilization of water supplies. While the question of immediate control
of these units is a matter of internal administration, it is deemed advisable to place the
medical ofiicer in charge of the divisional laboratories because of the relative importance
of the fields covered by the members of these units.
Some division surgeons have found it most practicable to attach the laboratory unit
to the divisional sanitary train. When in divisional training or rest areas it is contem-
plated that the laboratory unit will be attached to the camp hospital functioning for the
division. At the front it is attached to an immobilized field hospital, preferably the one
through which infectious diseases and medical cases are evacuated.
3. To properly perform its functions it is contemplated that the medical officer and
ofiicer of the Sanitary Corps attached to this unit shall, on arrival in France, be sent to
the central Medical Department laboratory for temporary duty for a brief course of
instruction in the epidemiology of communicable disease and .supervision of water supplies,
respectively, and to obtain their laboratory equipment. Further practical instruction
will be given these officers by specially trained officers of the infectious diseases and water
supply sections of this office, who will visit them from time to time for the purpose of
giving aid in the solution of local problems.
4. When an epidemic disease prevails in a division in such proportions as to make it
seem desirable to temporarily reinforce the divisional personnel and to have special
epidemiological and laboratory studies made for the control of the disease, the division
surgeon is authorized by Bulletin No. 32, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary
Forces, to communicate directly with the director of laboratories and infectious diseases,
who will dispatch special personnel and mobile equipment to reinforce the divisional
authorities in controlling the epidemic. In the zone of the advance these units are usually
located in close proximity to evacuation and mobile hospitals. These organizations are
provided with a complete laboratory equipment, which is available for use by the members
of the divisional laboratory units when highly technical laboratory examinations are
required.
Many of the evacuation and mobile hospital laboratories are prepared to do Wasser-
mann tests, and the officer in charge of the divisional laboratories should consult with the
laboratory staff of the organization to determine whether demands for such examinations
can be met. (See revised Memorandum No. 0, this office.)
5. The equipment to be supplied the divisional laboratory unit has been standardized
and arranged in chests in order that it may be packed and moved at a moment's notice.
Chest 1 (weight 230 pounds, dimensions 24 by 24 by 36 inches) ;
Chest 2 (weight 140 pounds, dimensions 21 by 24 by 30 inches) ;
Chest 3 (weight 180 pounds, dimensions 30 by 22 by 28 inches) ;
constitute the divisional laboratory equipment. Chests 1 and 2 contain the equipment
and supplies for routine clinical pathology, while chest 3 contains a bacteriological
incubator complete, arranged for heating with coal oil. The coal oil is to be secured
from the divisional supply officer.
6. With the equipment mentioned above the following classes of work can be done :
Sputum: Microscopic examinations of smears for the tubercle, pneumococcus, influenza,
and animal parasites.
216 FIELD OPERATIONS
Urine: Appearance, color, odor, reaction, specific gravity, and qualitative tests for
albumin, sugar, acetone, and diacetic acid. Microscopic examinations of urinary sediments.
In suspected cases of typhoid fever about 10 c. c. of the urine should be sent to the central
Medical Department laboratory of the nearest base or army laboratory in a bottle of bile
medium, for isolation of the suspected microorganism.
Venereal lesions: Microscopical examinations of smears for gonococcl and Fontana
stained preparations from venereal sores for spirochetes.
Blood: Hemoglobin estimations (Tallquist), leucocyte counts, red-cell counts, and
differential leucocyte counts. Microscopical examinations of stained preparations for
pathological changes, Plasmodia, etc. In every case of undetermined fever of over 48 hours'
duration, 2 to 5 c. c. of blood should be collected in a bottle of bile medium and the culture
sent to the central Medical Department laboratory or nearest base or army laboratory
for further study. Sera for agglutination tests, the Wassermaun test, etc., should W
collected in the serum capsules furnished with this equipment and sent to the nearest
of the laboratories mentioned above.
Feces: Microscopical examinations of fresh specimens for parasites, ova, blood, mucus,
and pus cells.
In suspected cases of typhoid fever, paratyphoid fever, or dysentery, about a gram
of the feces should be sent to the central Medical Department laboratory, or the nearest
base or army laboratory, in a bottle of bile medium, for insolation of the specific micro-
organism.
Transudates and exudates : Microscopical examinations of stained specimens for
tubercle bacilli, gonococci, spirochetes, etc., and cytological changes.
Spinal fluid: Microscopical examinations (cytologic and bacteriologic).
7. It is not intended that highly technical bacteriological and serological work shall
be done by these units. In epidemics requiring epidemiological study and laboratory
control, it is contemplated as noted in paragraph 3, above, that special personnel and
mobile equipment will be sent to reinforce the local authorities on request from the
division surgeon.
8. It is not contemplated that the Sanitary Corps officer attached to this unit for
supervision of water supplies shall do any extensive chemical or bacteriological work.
In so far as his water work is concerned, usually it will be confined to sanitary surveys
of sotircs of supply, recommendations concerning quality of water, and supervision and
instruction of sanitary detachments in the detail of the sterilization of water by ehlorina-
tiou or otherwise. His work will be done under the supervision of the divisional sanitary
Inspector. Where bacteriological or chemical analyses are deemed advisable, the speci-
mens will be collected by the water supply officer of the laboratory unit and forwarded
to the nearest army or base laboratory or mobile water laboratory. A chlorine test
ing outfit for use in controlling the chlorination of water supplies will be issued to
divisional laboratory units. When extensive surveys requiring laboratory control are
necessary, the Medical Department representative on the staff of the water supply officer
for the army, will be called on for assistance. He has under his control mobile water
analysis laboratories designed to carry out such investigations.
12. At the present time no transportation is provided for these units in tables of
organization, and request had been made that one motor cycle with side car and one
light truck (%-ton Ford or other standard) be included in the revised tables of organiza-
tion for this unit. This request has not as yet been approved.
Circular Xo. 40 of the chief surgeon's office, A. E. F., published July 20,
1918, provided that the laboratories of the American Expeditionary Forces
would l>e of two general types, stationary and transportable, the latter to serve
evacuation and mobile hospitals and divisions. It was directed that equip-
ment of the transportable laboratories consist of standardized expendable units
in chests and that their personnel l>e especially trained for the duties they were
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 217
to perform. This training was accomplished hy sending newly arrived per-
sonnel to the central laboratory at Dijon and there giving them an intensive
course of instruction.
On September 19 the Surgeon General informed the chief surgeon. A. E.
F., that it was desirable that the mobile laboratories be. numbered and allotted
to the chief surgeon, numbers from 1 to 45. inclusive, for such of these forma-
tions as were already overseas or en route. 90 Records of the Surgeon General's
Office at thai time showed that mobile laboratories had been sent to France with
31 divisions but had not accompanied G others. 01 The director of laboratories
stated in reference to this that, in point of fact, many of these units had not
actually accompanied their divisions from the United States; that some had
come after them ; and that, in some instances, it had been necessary for the
director of laboratories to find personnel in the American Expeditionary
Forces who could be trained and assigned to their service. In view of the
signing of the armistice the proposed numbering of the mobile laboratories
never became effective.
In his report for the week ending October 28, 1918. the director of labora-
tories reported to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., in part as follows: 01
(a) Additional transportable lalwratory equipment arrived relieving acute shortage
in this equipment. Sufficient number of those units now on hand to meet the requirements
for about one month. Original order (placed last March) for 100 of these outfits now com-
plete and received at central Medical Department laboratory. Additional orders to meet
further needs have been placed by supply division, your office.
(6) Your attention is invited to the fact that the divisional laboratory units, attached
to each division, are having the greatest difficulty in performing their functions because of
the utter lack of transportation. It was intended that the two officers forming this unit
should function as assistants to the sanitary inspector, one in general sanitation (more
particularly the prevention and control of epidemic diseases) and the other supervision of
the sterilization of water supplies. Actual laboratory work was to be of secondary im-
portance. Several months ago it was requested that a light truck (%-ton) and motor
cycle witli side car be supplied these units. This recommendation has been repeated on a
number of occasions. The recommendation was incorporated in the proposed revision of
Tables of Organization but this revision has not yet been approved at General Head-
quarters. It is suggested that a strong effort be made to secure this transportation as
~'"'ii as the transportation problem eases up. Either the light truck or the motor cycle,
preferably the truck, if furnished these units, would enable them to perform their duties
in part.
On November 1 the chief surgeon wrote the director. Motor Transport
Corps, that the time consumed in the manufacture of specially constructed
laboratory trucks and bacteriological cars had been so protracted and the
difficulty of their transport to France so great that ordinary cargo trucks had
lieen substituted for them and that the first -mentioned classes of vehicles were
not needed. 92
REFERENCES
ill Manual for the Medical Department, U. S. Army. 1010, par. 703.
'-'I letter from the Surgeon General, l T . S. Army, to The Adjutant General, May 2,
1014. Subject: Organization hospital. On file. Hecord Boom, S. G. 0.. 148807.
218 FIELD OPERATIONS
(3) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q.,
A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Warlhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31, 1918, 45. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital Xo. 1, prepared under
the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(5) Report on the activities of G-4—B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q.,
A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C„ chief of section, December 31 1918, 37.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(G) Reports of Medical Department activities of evacuation hospitals in the A. E. I<\,
undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(7) Report of the chief surgeon, A. E. P., to the commanding general, S. O. S., April 17,
1919, 58. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(8) Reports of Medical Department activities of mobile hospitals, A. E. F., undated. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(9) Report of Medical Department activities of the Justice Hospital Groupe, Toul,
France, by Lieut. Col. H. C. Maddux, M. C, undated. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(10) Report of Medical Department activities of the gas hospital, Justice Hospital Groupe.
Toul, by Lieut. Col. H. V. Goodall, M. C, commanding officer, undated. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(11) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C, undated, 6. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(12) Report on evacuation hospitals, by Maj. George W. Crile, M. C, undated. On file.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(13) Cutler, E. C, Maj., M. C. : Organization, Function, and Operation of an Evacuation
Hospital. The Military Surgeon, Washington, 1920, xlvi, 9.
(14) The evacuation hospital, Lecture Xo. 146, Army Sanitary School, Langres, France.
by Col. B. K. Asbford, M. C, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(15) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C, undated, 20. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(16) Report on the activities of G d -B, medical group, fourth section, general staff.
G. H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31,
1918, 45. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
<17) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital Xo. 9, A. E. F., pre-
pared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(18) Report on the evacuation of wounded in the Meuse-Argonne operation, by Col. II. H. M.
Lyle. M. C, undated. 20. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(19) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital Xo. 7, prepared under
the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(20) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital Xo. 4, A. E. F., pre-
pared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(21) Report of Medical Department board, G. H. Q., A. E. F., 1919, undated. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(22) Report on activities of G-^-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff.
G. H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31,
1918, 44. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(23) Report on Evacuation of the wounded in the Meuse-Argonne operation, by Col.
H. H. M. Lyle, M. C, undated, 36. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(24) Report of the inspector general, A. E. F., December 11, 1918. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 219
(25) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 5, prepared under
the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(26) Second indorsement to letter from The Adjutant General of the Army, May 21, 191S.
Subject: Personnel for evacuation hospitals. On file, Record Room, S. G. O.
(27) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 6, A. E. F., pre-
pared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(28) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C., undated, 31. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(29) Exhibit " S " to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, gen-
eral staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of hospital evacuation section, Regulating
Station " B," St. Dizier, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(30) Report on activities GM^B, medical group, fourth section, general staff. G. H. Q.,
A. E. P., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31, 1918, 43.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(31) Report and observations on French Auto-Chir No. 17, by Maj. J, J. Moorhead, M. C,
undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(32) Report on Evacuation Hospital No. 18, French, by Lieut. Col. J. M. Flint, M. C,
undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(33) Letter from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the Surgeon General, February 25, 1918.
Subject: Auto-chirs and complementary groups. On file, A. G. O., World War Divi-
sion, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
(34) Index to Medical Department organizations, chief surgeon's office, A. E. F. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(35) Organization and operation of mobile hospital units, by Lieut. Col. E. C. Jones, M. C,
undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(36) Report of Medical Department activities, Mobile Hospital No. 1, prepared under the
direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(37) Report of Medical Department activities, Mobile Hospital No. 4, prepared under
the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
<38) Report of Medical Department activities of Mobile Hospital No. 39, A. E. F., from
organization to St. Mihiel operation, by Lieut. Col. X M. Flint, M. C., undated, 2.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(39) Report of Medical Department activities of Mobile Hospital No. 39, A. E. F.,
during the St. Mihiel operation, by Lieut. Col. J. M. Flint, M. C, undated, 2.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(40) Ibid., 4, 5.
(41) Ibid., 14.
(42) Ibid., 16.
(43) Ibid., 18.
(44) Ibid., 19.
(45) Ibid., 20.
(46) Ibid., 21.
(47) Ibid., 29
(48) Ibid., 24.
(49) Ibid., 31.
(50) Ibid., 22.
(51) Ibid., 23.
(52) R>ld., 32.
(53) Ibid., 34.
(54) Ibid., 35.
220 FIELD OPERATIONS
(55) Cable from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to The Adjutant General, April 22, 1918. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(56) Letter from Cant. P. R. Turnure, M. C, to the Surgeon General of the Army,
August 27, 1917. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(57) Letter from Capt. P. R. Turnure, M. C, to the Surgeon General of the Army.
September 3, 1917. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(58) iLetter from the Surgeon General of the Army to Capt. P. R. Turnure. M. C,
September 18. 1918. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(59) Memorandum from the Surgeon General to The Adjutant General of the Army.
September 25, 1918. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(60) Report of Medical Department activities, Mobile Operating Unit No. 1, prepared
under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical Di-
vision, S. G. O.
(61) Report on the activities of the chief surgeon's office, A. E. F., to the Surgeon Gen-
eral, U. S. Army, May 1, 1919. 115. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(62) Letter from the director of professional services, A. E. F., to commanding officers
of hospitals, May 13, 1918. Subject : Surgical Teams. On file, A. G. O., World War
Division. Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 322.32S2).
(63) Letter from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the director of professional services.
A. E. F., June 2, 1918. Subject: Gas teams. On file, A. G. O., World War Di-
vision, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 321.621).
(64) Report on activities of G^-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff,
G. H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31,
1918, 47. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(65) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps. A. E. F., by Col. J. W.
Grissinger, M. C, corps surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(66) Letter from the Surgeon General to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., November 12, 1917.
Subject: Evacuation hospitals and ambulance companies. On file, A. G. O., World
War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
(67) Letter from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the Surgeon General, December 24, 1917.
Subject: Evacuation hospitals and ambulance companies. On file, A. G. O.. World
War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
(68) Letter from the Surgeon General to the commanding officers, training camps, Fort
Riley, Kans., and Fort Oglethorpe. Ga. Subject: Evacuation ambulance companies.
On file, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 322.3211).
(69) Letter from the chief surgeon, Line of Communications, to the chief surgeon.
A. E. F.. November 27, 1917. Subject: Evacuation ambulance companies. On file.
A. G. O, World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files
322.3211).
(70) Cable No. 322-S, from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the Surgeon General, Novem-
ber 27, 1917. On file, A. O. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section
(Chief Surgeon's Files 322.3211).
(71) Memorandum from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the Surgeon General. December 8,
1917. Subject: Transportation of sick and wounded. On file, Medical Records
Section. A. G. O., (Thief Surgeon's Files, 322.321).
(72) Memorandum from Maj. A. P. Clark, M. C, to the chief surgeon, A. E. F.. Decem-
ber 13, 1917. Subject : Need of evacuation ambulance companies. On file, A. G. 0.,
World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files. 333.3211).
(731 Letter from the Surgeon General to commanding officers, training camps, Decem-
ber 18, 1917. Subject : Personnel of evacuation ambulance companies. On file.
Record Room. S. G. O., 322.3.
(74) Second indorsement to letter from the Surgeon General, December 2S, 1917. Subject:
Personnel for evacuation ambulance companies. On file. Record Room, S. G. O,
322.3.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 221
{!')) Letter from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the commander in chief, A. E. F., Janu-
ary 14, 191S. Subject: Provisional ambulance companies for immediate need. On
file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's
Files, 322.3211).
(78) Telegram No. 196, from the commander in chief, January 17, 1918, to the chief
surgeon, A. E. F. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section
(Chief Surgeon's Files 322.3212).
(77) Letter from Surgeon General to The Adjutant General, January 30, 1018. Subject:
Use of U. S. Army Ambulance Service sections as evacuation ambulance companies.
On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's
Files, 322.3211).
(7S) Memorandum from chief surgeon, A. E. F.. to Chief of Motor Transport Service,
March 5, 1018. Subject: Motor transportation for Medical Department. On file,
A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files,
451).
(701 Letter from Surgeon General to The Adjutant General, March. 22, 1918. Subject:
Personnel of evacuation ambulance companies. On file, Records Section, S. G. O.,
322.3.
(80) Letter from chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the chief of staff, A. E. F., September 2(i, 191S.
Subject : Proposed general orders for evacuation ambulance companies. On file,
A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files,
300.42).
(81 1 Memorandum from the assistant chief of stall', G-l, G. H. Q., A. E. F., to the chief
surgeon, A. E. F., October IS, 1018. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical
Records Section, (Chief Surgeon's Files, 300.42).
(82) Manual for the Medical Department. 1010, par. 580, 778.
(83) Letter from the chief surgeon, A. E. P., to the Surgeon General, August 12. 1017.
Subject: Outline of laboratory organization, A. E. F. On file, A. G. O., World War
Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 322.3271).
(84 1 Letter from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the general purchasing agent, September
20, 1017. Subject: Purchase of mobile laboratories. On file, A. G. O., World War
Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3271).
(85) Letter from P.aird and Tatiock. London, Ltd., to Maj. D. I'. Card, M. C, December 12,
1017. Subject: Motor bacteriological laboratories. On file, A. G. ()., World War
Division, Medical Records Section, (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3271).
(8*i) Letter from the director of laboratories, A. E. F., to the chief surgeon, A. E. F..
January 11. 191S. Subject: Organization of the division of laboratories and infec-
tious diseases. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section
(Chief Surgeon's Files, 321.630).
(87 1 Weekly report on the activities of the division of laboratories and infectious dis-
eases, Dijon, for the week ending January 13, 1918, to the chief surgeon, A. E. F.
On file. A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's
Files, 321.030).
(8S) Letter from the director of laboratories, A. E. F., to the chief surgeon, A. E. F.,
May 22. 1018. Subject : Transportation for transportable laboratory units. On
file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files,
322.3271).
(80) .Memoranda Xos. 5 and 7 (revised), chief surgeon's office, division of laboratories
and infectious diseases, A. E. F., July 7, 1918, and August 14, 1918. On file,
A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files,
321.360).
(90) Letter from the Surgeon General to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., September 19, 1918.
Subject: Mobile laboratories. On file, A. G. O.. World War Division, Medical
Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.327).
222 FIELD OPERATIONS
(91) Weekly reports from director of laboratories to the chief surgeon, A. E. F. On file,
A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files,
322.3271).
(92) Memorandum from the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to the director, Motor Transport
Corps, A. E. F., November 4, 1918. Subject: Trucks for mobile laboratories. On
file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's
Files, 322.3271).
CHAPTER VI
THE UNITED STATES ARMY AMBULANCE SERVICE
AMERICAN AMBULANCE SERVICE IN FRANCE PRIOR TO APRIL 5, 1917
Long before we entered the World War as an official participant, certain
American unofficial volunteer groups and individuals rendered service to our
future allies in the interests of humanity. Immediately after the beginning
of the war in 1914, the American colony in Paris established the American
Ambulance, following in their nomenclature the French practice of applying
the term ambulance to the type of military institution which Americans call
a hospital. 1 Shortly after the organization of this unit, a volunteer field
service section was provided for it, this latter organization being developed
by the efforts of individuals who had employed their own automobiles to
remove wounded during the first battle of the Marne. It consisted of a
volunteer ambulance corps known as the American Field Service, and was
composed of sections, each made up of 20 ambulances, a mobile kitchen and
a truck. The ambulances were almost exclusively of the Ford type. These
sections were equipped by voluntary contributions of people in the United
States. 1 A little later the Norton and Harjes units were organized along the
same lines. At first the latter were quite separate, having been organized
independently, but eventually they were consolidated into the Norton-Harjes
unit, which was affiliated with the American Red Cross. 1
In these two organizations several hundred young Americans served before
America entered the war, on much the same status as the American aviators
of the Lafayette Escadrille. By the fall of 1917, the American Field Service
bad 34 ambulance sections organized and 3 sections undergoing organiza-
tion, while the Red Cross had 12 sections in operation. 2 All of the sections
were on duty with the French. Most of them were at the front, but one
detachment, equivalent to three sections, was on duty in the entrenched camp
of Paris.
These sections, having been created to aid the French Army, conformed
to its tables of organization. 2 Each consisted of one lieutenant of the French
automobile service, one American sons-chef, about 25 American drivers, and
8 French soldiers. Each section had 20 ambulances, 1 large truck, 1 small
truck, 2 touring cars, and 1 kitchen trailer. The ambulances were of two
types, viz, large cars which carried 4 recumbent or 8 sitting, and small cars
with a capacity of 3 recumbent or 5 sitting. The function of these sections
was solely that of transportation and did not include rendition of first-aid.
establishment of dressing stations, or bearer work, as is the case with our
223
224
FIELD OPERATIONS
ambulance companies. The personnel, largely soldiers of adventure, were
somewhat free and independent, but developed an esprit de corps and a morale
that won high honor for their organization. To evacuate battalion aid sta-
tions, they ran their light cars day and night, amid shell holes and under
shell fire, carrying wounded to the field hospitals. The success of these for-
mations was undoubted: their aid to the French Army beyond question.
I'lii. 4.1. — An ambulance of the Norton-IIarjes Ambulance Unit
AMERICAN ORGANIZATION
When the French military commission, headed by Marshal Joffre, came
to the United States, shortly after the United States entered the war, it was
charged with the duty of making arrangements concerning the form of
assistance to be first given. One of the subjects that came up at once was care
of the wounded, for France needed on the firing line every able-bodied man
available. Marshal Joffre asked that an ambulance service be supplied, and
recommended the organization mentioned above. His request was approved
and the War Department, by the following orders, directed the organization
of the "United States Annv Ambulance Service" : 2
General Orders,
No. 75.
War Department.
Washington, June 23, 1911.
II. 1. Under authority conferred by section 2 of the act of Congress " authorizing the
President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States."
approved May is. li)17. the President directs* that there be organized for the existing
emergency, the enlisted strength being raised by voluntary enlistment or draft, as a part
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 225
of the Medical Department, the United States Army Ambulance Service, consisting of the
following personnel :
Commissioned
Colonel 1
Lieutenant colonels 2
Majors S
Captains 32
First lieutenants 160
203
Enlisted
One hundred and sixty ambulance sections, each consisting of:
Sergeant, first class — 1
Sergeants 2
Corporal 1
Mechanics 2
Cooks 2
Privates, first class 26
Privates ' 11
45
2. The following transportation is authorized for each section :
Motor ambulance 20
Motor truck (2-ton) 1
Motor truck (%-ton) 1
Motor car ( 5-passenger ) 1
Motor cycle (with side car) 1
General Orders, War Department,
No. 124. Washington, September 30, 1917.
I. Paragraph 1, Section II, General Orders, No. 75, War Department, 1917, organizing
the United States Ambulance Service as a part of the Medical Department, is amended so
as to provide for a total of 34 captains, 169 first lieutenants, and 169 ambulance sections.
General Orders, War Department,
No. 149. Washington, November 28, 1917.
***** * *
II. Paragraph I, Section II, General Orders, No. 75, War Department, 1917, is amended
so as to fix the enlisted strength of each ambulance section authorized therein as follows :
Sergeant, first class 1
Sergeants 2
Corporal 1
Mechanics 6
Cooks 2
Privates, first class 22
Privates 11
45
The United States Army Ambulance Service occupied a unique position.
Though composed of members of the American Army, its personnel in France,
so far as the performance of duty was concerned, was under the jurisdiction
of the French Government, to whose army it was assigned. Similarly, the
13576—25 15
226 FIELD OPERATIONS
personnel assigned to Italy was under the jurisdiction of the Italian Govern-
ment. 3 While in emergencies the American Expeditionary Forces borrowed
many of the sections from both France and Italy, it had no direct military
control over them, except when they were thus actually in its service. To
all intents and purposes, therefore, the United States Army Ambulance
Service was a part of the French and of the Italian armies. The fact should
be clearly recognized, and this organization distinguished from the ambulance
organizations of the American Expeditionary Forces, which consisted of the
personnel and equipment authorized by our Tables of Organization for the
service of our own troops. 3
Despite its assignment, however, to allied countries, the United States
Army Ambulance Service was under the American Expeditionary Forces in
matters affecting organization, discipline, and supply. It.s personnel was
paid, rationed, clothed, and equipped through the American Expeditionary
Forces, and its motor vehicles, spare parts, gasoline, and oil were furnished
by the American Government. 3
The orders quoted above were based on the general plan that an ambu-
lance section would be assigned to each division of the French Army: that
for every 5 sections a repair shop and general supply depot in command
of a captain would be established; that for each group of '20 sections an
inspector with the grade of major would be provided, and that the higher
administrative work of the service would be conducted by 1 colonel and
2 lieutenant colonels. This general scheme, like many other preconceived
plans for the operation of American troops abroad, was ultimately greatly
modified. The senior officer of the organization, with 30 sections, went to
Italy for duty with the Italian Army, while the large number of sections in
France operated under the command of an officer commissioned in the Medical
Corps and not in the Ambulance Service. 4
Plans for securing personnel and equipment were begun several weeks
before the first order, that quoted above, was promulgated by the War Depart-
ment. A medical officer was directed to begin recruiting for the Ambulance
Service in Philadelphia. 5 Applicants were enlisted in the Medical Enlisted
Reserve Corps. Two other medical officers were ordered to Philadelphia to
take charge of the recruits/'
As soon as practical. Camp Crane was established at Allentown. Pa.
primarily as a mobilization and training camp for the. Ambulance Service,
though later it was utilized as a general mobilization camp for Medical De-
partment units/'
MOBILIZATION AT CAMP CRANE
The rumor had spread rapidly that an ambulance service would probably
be among the first organizations to be sent abroad, and applications for
enlistment by men who were impatient to go overseas were immediately
received from all parts of the United States. 5 Colleges asked to lie permitted
to form complete sections of their own men. and the War Department granted
their requests. Over 40 colleges and universities furnished 1 or more sec-
tions of 4;") men each, who were sent to Camp Crane in charge of some one of
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION "227
the party who had been selected as leader. In addition to the men recruited
at the Ambulance Service recruiting station at Philadelphia, and the large
number of men enlisted at the colleges, a considerable part of the personnel
was derived from the previously organized American Red Cross ambulance
companies, who also desired immediate service. Pasadena. Calif., the Uni-
versity of California, Washington, D. C, Cleveland. Ohio, the University
of Minnesota, and the University of Washington each contributed an ambu-
lance company (Army standard) which was reorganized into three Ambulance
Service sections; some of the companies secured sufficient additional recruits
from their home localities to make a fourth section. A number of cities and
a few industrial corporations contributed complete sections to the service,
and a very considerable number of men came to it from Army recruiting
stations throughout the country which were authorized to send applicants
to Camp Crane. 5 Volunteer enlistments furnished all the personnel for the
sections of the Ambulance Service except for a few which were organized
from drafted men, just before the armistice. The enlisted personnel as a
whole was of a very high grade.
At first officers of the Medical Reserve Corps were assigned to command
sections, but they were gradually replaced by officers promoted from the ranks
who were given commissions in the Ambulance Service. So when the armistice
was signed there were few medical officers on duty with it, for by this time
most of its commissioned personnel were officers who had entered the service
as privates."
The headquarters of the Ambulance Service moved from the recruiting
rendezvous at Philadelphia to Camp Crane, Allentown, Pa., on June 9, 1917."
Some recruits for the organization had already arrived at the camp, and in a
short time 3,000 men were assembled."
The two senior medical officers then on duty there had no Regular Army
assistants, either commissioned or enlisted, except eight lieutenants, recent
graduates of the Army Medical School. A few men who had had military
drill at school and the men who had had some experience in drilling the Red
Cross ambulance companies rendered invaluable service by helping to establish
military procedure and by teaching elementary military principles. 6
TRANSPORT
The French High Commission was very insistent in its recommendation
that Ford ambulances, touring cars, and light trucks be used. 7 This require-
ment was based on experience during the preceding years of the w r ar. It was
stated that the lightness of this car, its durability, and the ease with which
it could be repaired and its parts interchanged gave it great superiority for the
work to be performed. Therefore, orders were placed by the Ambulance Serv-
ice for approximately '2,400 Ford ambulances, 120 Ford trucks, 120 Ford touring
cars, 120 Packard trucks, and 120 motor cycles with side cars, with an allow-
ance for replacement and a fair quantity of spare parts. By special effort on
the part of the manufacturers early delivery was secured. This large amount
228
FIELD OPERATIONS
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 229
Kig. 45. — Interior view of ambulance, U. S. Army Ambulance Service
230
FIELD OPERATIONS
of motor equipment having arrived at the seaboard, before cargo space was at
a premium, was shipped immediately and landed at St. Xazaire to await the
personnel for which it was intended. 7
When it became known, after we had entered the war, that our Govern-
ment had agreed to furnish the French Army a number of ambulance sec-
tions, the American Red Cross and the people in the United States who were
supporting the American Field Service proposed to the War Department
that it take over the sections they had already formed, which were then oper-
ating in France. 3 This proposal was accepted. 8 It was contemplated that 120
Fig. 40. — Section No. 646, U. S. Army Ambulance Service
sections of the United States Army Ambulance Service be organized in Amer-
ica and that the remaining sections, to a total strength of the 160 sections then
authorized, be obtained by enlisting in the military service the men composing
the volunteer sections then at work in France. 8 In July, 1917. a colonel of the
Medical Corps, United States Army, was designated as chief, United States
Army Ambulance Service, and accredited to the French Government to arrange
the details for the operation of that service and for the enlistment in it of the
personnel of the ambulance sections of the American Field Service and of the
American Red Cross. This medical officer visited Camp Crane before sailing
for Europe. At Camp Crane it was arranged that the 20 sections which had
been organized in the United States, and for which complete equipment had
been secured, should sail as soon as ocean transportation was available. These
sections sailed August 7, 1917, and disembarked at St. Xazaire. August 21, 1917."
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 231
Some discrepancy occurred between the number of sections authorized
and the number thought necessary at different times. The French War De-
partment stated that Marshal Joffre had asked for 50 sections in addition to
the volunteer sections already serving with the French Army. 9 The chief
of the United States Army Ambulance Service reported that, in August,
1917, he had been informed by a representative of the directeur, service auto-
nobile, that so large a number of sections as that indicated above was not
deemed necessary; that the total number desired was 63. 10 On August 27,
a representative of the directeur, service automobile, informed the chief of
the United States Army Ambulance Service that the needs of the armies of
the north and northeast were 20 sections in addition to the volunteer sections
then in the French service, and the coming of further sections was stopped
by cable on August 28. 11 Also the finality of the assignment of these sec-
tions to the French was brought into question, for on August 17, 1917, the
chief of the Army Ambulance Service in a memorandum for the commanding
general, A. E. F., stated that the sections organized should be subject to
recall for service with the American Army when needed. 12 He had been
authorized to militarize 40 sections from the personnel of the volunteer
sections already serving in France: but finding on his arrival in France
that the American Field Service had 37 sections organized and the American
Red Cross 12, he requested authority to organize in France a total of 49. 12
In point of fact, only about 25 sections of the Army Ambulance Service were
organized in France, for most of the men of the volunteer organizations there
preferred to go into aviation or into other services, and many did not wish
to bind themselves at all by enlistment in the Army. 13 Consequently only
about 500 men joined the Army Ambulance Service in France. The great
majority of these came from the American Field Service, about half of
whose members joined, and only a few from the Norton-Harjes unit. 13
On September 26, 1917, the commander in chief, A. E. F., requested that
10 sections be sent to France as soon as possible, in addition to the 20 sec-
tions already there, plus 300 unassigned recruits. 14 His telegram also stated
no more ambulances were needed, as there was an abundance of motor trans-
portation on hand. On October 11, 1917. the commander in chief, A. E. F.,
informed the chief of the Army Ambulance Service that the French military
mission requested that the sending of further sections be stopped until after
some 12,000 automobile mechanics had been sent to France, and that, there-
after, 50 additional sections be sent according to tonnage facilities, and
that the shipment of the last 50 sections be held up until the following spring. 1 "'
In this matter there was lack of coordination between the French Ministries
of War and of Munitions. Ambulance sections of the French Army were,
with all other motor transport, under the jurisdiction of the Minister of
Munitions. On December 17, 1917, the French military mission proposed
that 73 additional sections be sent over during the first five months of 1918.
The chief of the Army Ambulance Service then wrote the commander in
chief that this corresponded exactly with the wishes of the Service de Sante,
viz, that all the 120 sections organized in the United States be brought
232 FIELD OPERATIONS
over but that the directeur, service automobile, who was in actual control
of the transport service of wounded at the front, did not wish to turn over
more than one-third of this to the Americans. 10 On January 11, 1918, relative
to these 73 sections, the commander in chief replied that, because of the
tonnage situation, he could not accede to the request for 73 additional sec-
tions; 17 and on April 30, when asked when the remaining 57 sections would
be sent, he replied that he had cabled a recommendation that the personnel
of the sections remaining in America be used as replacements and no longer
be kept intact in ambulance units. 18 August 13, 1918, the commander
in chief wired that 48 sections were urgently needed, 10 this being the number
still believed by him to be available under General Orders, Nos. 75 and 124,
quoted.
On August 26, 1918, the commanding officer at Camp Crane reported
that 82 sections had been sent overseas and 8 had been disbanded, but that
31 sections were being organized and motor transport for them secured. 20
The Surgeon General had based his figures, until this time, on the following
data : Shipment of 59 sections to France, 30 to Italy, and organization of
49 in France, thus leaving a balance of 31 sections in the number author-
ized. 21 On Sejitember 16. the commanding officer, Army Ambulance Service
in France, wrote that of the 82 sections in France only 30 had been organized
in that country and that there were 30 other sections in Italy. The 31 sections
now requested organized left a balance of 26. The request that 48 sections
be sent from the United States was based on these figures, leaving a balance
of 9. 22
A large reserve of ambulances which had been accumulated for the Army
Ambulance Service was appropriated by the Motor Transport Corps during
the operations in the Ma-pne area for conversion into trucks. 23 This reserve
was not needed by the Army Ambulance Service, but this action eliminated
ambulances needed later by the United States Army.
While the misunderstandings noted above were being straightened out,
our Government had decided to send troops to Europe as rapidly as possible,
and the priority list for shipment of troops was based on calls for them from
General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces. Until all
differences of opinion in the French service concerning the number of
ambulance sections needed had been settled, no place on the priority list
could be secured for the sections which were awaiting transportation at Camp
Crane. 8 But at the end of December. 1917, 10 more sections, in January 17
sections, and in March 5 sections were shipped, making a total of 52 organized
sections sent from Camp Crane for service in France before the armistice was
signed. 8 On June 13, 1918, 30 sections were sent direct to Italy. 24 Casuals,
in detachments numbering from 100 to 300, were also forwarded from time
to time and were organized into sections after their arrival in France. 25
The United States Army Ambulance Service with the French Army at the
time of the signing of the armistice consisted of 184 officers and 4,858 enlisted
men, with 113 organized sections. 20 A number of the militarized volunteer
sections had not been completed when taken over and had to be augmented
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 233
at once by the assignment to them of personnel from the United States. At
the time of the armistice about one-tenth of the service consisted of volunteers
in France from the old ambulance service, five-tenths had come from Camp
Crane, and four-tenths were draft personnel. 27
As previously explained in part, while the French Government first
asked for 63 sections, after about 70 had been made available, it informed
the commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces that no more
were required. 10 Then, after providing 30 sections for assignment to the
Italian Government, a considerable number of sections already organized
in the United States were disbanded and their personnel distributed to other
branches of the service. This was due to the fact that the French Ministry
of Munitions had informed a representative of the commander in chief that
no more would be required. 10 It afterward developed that the French had
made a serious mistake in declining the remainder of the sections organized
for their service. This misunderstanding arose from the fact that under the
French organization its service automobile provided and controlled under the
department of munitions all motor transportation, including ambulances,
though these last-mentioned vehicles, when provided, were at the disposal of
the Medical Department. 28 The French Medical Department had asked,
through the department of war and through the French military attache in
Washington, that the remaining sections then organized in the United States
(about 90 in number) be sent overseas in such manner that the last would
arrive before the beginning of the spring of 1918. 20 It appears that the faulty
calculation, as regards ambulances, of what would be needed in open warfare
had arisen from consideration of only what had been required in trench war-
fare. As a matter of fact, the need for ambulances in the open warfare of
1918 was found to be very much greater than the French Department of
Munitions had anticipated, for hauls were longer, wear and tear more severe,
destruction by artillery fire was more frequent, and facilities for repair were
relatively less. A further unanticipated shortage occurred because the
ambulances necessary for our own troops did not arrive in France in sufficient
numbers; therefore it was necessary, as mentioned above, for the American
Expeditionary Forces to borrow from the French and Italian Governments
a number of the sections of the Army Ambulance Service which our Govern-
ment had attached to them. 28 At the time of the St. Mihiel operations, for
instance, our own shortage was very great, as hardly 50 per cent of the number
authorized had been sent to France. It was only through the generosity of
the French and Italians in turning back to us these sections which had been
organized for, and presented to, their respective Governments that the trans-
portation of our wounded could be handled. 28
Thus it occurred that in the decisive contests of the summer and autumn
of 1918 sections of the United States Army Ambulance Service were on duty
with the Italian and the American Armies.
The story of the sections sent to Italy (the Italian contingent of the United
States Army Ambulance Service) is given elsewhere in this volume in the
discussion of the activities of the Medical Department in Base Section 8.
i:}r>7«— 25 16
234 FIELD OPERATIONS
In the late summer of 1918, as regulation ambulance companies and am-
bulance equipment for the American Expeditionary Forces had not arrived
and as there seemed little prospect of them being furnished, a request was sent
to Washington that 31 sections of the Army Ambulance Service, authorized
by General Orders, No. 75, War Department, 1917, but which had not been
provided, be reorganized and sent to France for service with the American
Expeditionary Forces. This request was approved, but, because of difficulty
in securing priority transportation, none of these units arrived until after the
armistice. 30
UNITED STATES ARMY AMBULANCE SERVICE IN FRANCE
The following account of the United States Army Ambulance Service in
France is very much condensed from the complete historical report of the com-
manding officer of that service.
ORGANIZATION IN FRANCE
HEADQUARTERS
The organization of the headquarters of the United States Army Ambu-
lance Service with the French Army was a miniature Quartier General. It
functioned through divisions or departments with officers at their heads who
were directly responsible to the chief of the service. The peculiar status of
the service, its detachment from the American Expeditionary Forces, and its
attachment to the French Army, presented unique and difficult problems of
organization and administration. Liaison was necessary with the American
Army as it was with the French, but separation from the American Expedi-
tionary Forces led naturally to organization of the Army Ambulance Service
into a body complete and self-sustaining. As the service was forced to operate
more or less independently, it was necessary to get many special authorizations
of general application. 31
Careful centralization and systematization of the service contributed much
to its success. The large problems of keeping in touch with the many sections
scattered with the French Armies all along the front from Dunkei'que to Bel-
fort: clothing, subsisting, and paying the personnel; handling their personal
problems; delivering and collecting their mail: caring for their sick and
wounded; and keeping their ambulances in serviceable condition, all fell to
headquarters.* 1
Headquarters activities began immediately after the arrival, w T ith the first
contingent of American troops in France, of the chief of the service and a
small office force. It was the duty of this advance party to establish offices,
make arrangements for the arrival of the first sections, establish liasion with
French and Americans, begin the enlistment and militarization of the Ameri-
can Field Service and Red Cross sections then working at the front, organize
a base for the service, and arrange numerous relevant matters. 31
The War Department order creating the United States Army Ambulance
Service made no provision for headquarters personnel, for the personnel neces-
sary to conduct the various assembling and repair plants, or for a base camp.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 235
This personnel was obtained by reducing the sections from 45 to about 40 en-
listed men each. The headquarters enlisted personnel was formed into a sec-
tion (S. S. U. (350), to which all men on duty at the headquarter's office and
all its subdivisions located in Paris were assigned. This headquarters organi-
zation consisted of 18 officers and about 150 enlisted men; that at the base camp
of 9 officers and 120 enlisted men. 32
In the beginning, the headquarter's offices were situated at 10 Rue St. Anne,
Paris. In October. 1917. they were removed to 27 Rue Constantine. With the
growth of the service and the demand for larger quarters they were moved
again, in December, 1917, to 47 Rue Penthieu, where they remained until
recalled from service with the French. 32
The main divisions of the headquarters organization were as follows:
Commanding officer and executive officer, motor transport, quartermaster,
statistical, promotions and morale, attending surgeon, inspection, shipping and
post office, and general. 32
COMMANDING OFFICER AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER
The commanding officer maintained an office at headquarters and directed
the activities of the Ambulance Service through divisions which will be dis-
cussed below. His exective officer assisted him in this according to the usual
military practice. It should also be explained that, though the office of the
commanding officer Avas in Paris, he was found often in the field.
MOTOR TRANSPORT DIVISION
Second in importance to the actual administration of headquarters by the
chief of service, assisted by the executive officer, came the administration of the
Motor Transport Division. 33 Maintenance of transportation at a high stand-
ard, of ordnance and medical property, and regulation of the issue of spare
parts and other motor supplies, were the primary duties of this division.
These functions were carried on through the medium of 10 repair parks which
were attached to as many French automatic repair parks, of which there was
one for each army area.
For convenience of administration the Motor Transport Division was
subdivided into five branches, all of which were coordinated in the office of
the division's head. These branches were as follows: Motor supply depots,
service garage, assembly and revision plant, supply and ordnance, direction
and inspection. 33 At the heads of these departments were officers who had had
practical experience in their special lines of work.
MOTOR SUPPLY DEPOT
The motor supply depot was planned and perfected by officers from the
Army Ambulance Service. 33 It was situated in Paris where it could be in
touch with the Magasm Central Service Automobile of the French Army.
which supplied part of its material. The open market at Paris also furnished
rertain supplies, which were purchased by the motor supply depot, but only
236 FIELD OPERATIONS
after authorization by the head of the division. Most of the supplies of the
service came directly from America, where they were purchased from the fac-
tories by the Quartermaster Corps and shipped to Paris. The supply depot
from time to time submitted requisitions for the necessary spare parts, hut
kept on hand sufficient for issues for several months. 88
The motor supply depot at first issued material directly to the sections, but
after the park system had been perfected it supplied them, and the parks in
turn supplied the sections. This development greatly increased the efficiency of
the supply service. 3 '
SERVICE GARAGE
The service garage was charged with the storage, upkeep, and repair of all
motor vehicles attached to headquarters and was located at the barracks of
the headquarters detachment. 34
ASSEMBLY AND REVISION PLANT
In order to provide for the assembling of ambulances in great numbers
near the base of supplies, where their bodies could be built satisfactorily, the
assembly and revision plant of the service was established in Paris, on Avenue
St. Ouen. 34 Here the chassis shipped directly from base ports were put
together and the bodies, furnished by Paris makers, fitted on. A number of
men, belonging to the Army Ambulance Service, were kept constantly engaged
assembling these vehicles. 34
This plant also served as a revision park for the service. When a section
was completely worn out, the personnel of the section was sent to the base
camp at Ferrieres, and its transport, including motor ambulances, touring cars,
trucks, etc., was forwarded to the plant in Paris, where it «as overhauled ami
made fit again for service. When this was impossible the cars were salvaged
and the spare parts used to repair those of other sections. 35
Among the departments of the plant were a carpenter shop, where the
ambulance bodies, often completely riddled by shell fragments, were repaired,
a paint shop, a radiator repair shop, a motor cycle repair shop, and a machine
shop for general work. The whole plant was organized so as to care com-
pletely for the assembling, repairing, and supplying of motor transportation
to the front. 1 "'
The reserve cars of the Ambulance Service were held in this park, whence
they were shipped to the smaller parks nearer to the front. They were issued
in small numbers in order not to embarrass the park commanders, who always
kept their material as near the minimum as practicable in order to be ready to
move promptly. 3 ''
SUPPLY AND ORDNANCE
The supply and ordnance department was concerned with the record of
motor transport property, of medical property, and with the operation of
the supply department. The following totals were reached October 25«
1918 w.m
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
237
.AIOTOR VEHICLE SITUATION
Vehici.es in Service
Ford ambulances 2, 113
Ford touring cars 152
Heavy trucks
Consisting of the following types :
Packard
Garford
White
A. E. C
Riker
G. M. C
Sterling
Pierce Arrow
Peugeot
94
23
22
32
6
Light trucks (Fords, 4 converted am-
bulances) 135
Two cars (converted ambulances) 2
Kitchen trailers 57
Motor cycles 62
Side cars (5 fitted for stretchers) 70
Work shops (4 Packard, 3 Hotch-
kiss) 7
Cadillac touring car 1
Packard touring car 1
Of all the foregoing, the following
States :
were received as gifts to the United
709
32
28
3
1
Touring cars
33
Light trucks
28
Consisting of the following types :
White, 2-ton
Workshops (3 Hotchkiss, 2 Renault) _
Kitchen trailers
Total received
5
28
White 3-ton
G. M. C. 1-ton _
S35
Lost in Service
Ford ambulances
Manner of loss :
Shell fire
Captured
Road accident
Abandoned
Scrapped
Ford touring cars
Manner of loss :
Shell fire
Captured
Fire
Road accident
Abandoned
Scrapped
Heavy trucks
Light trucks
Manner of loss :
Captured
Scrapped
126
50
°2
9
13
23
8
Kitchen trailers
Manner of loss :
Shell fire
Captured
Scrapped
Motor cycles
Manner of loss :
Shell fire
Captured
Road accident
Scrapped
Side cars
Manner of loss :
Road accident--.
Scrapped
Workshops
Manner of loss :
Scrapped
Chassis (reception park).
Manner of loss :
Scrapped
2
36
36
Transferred to Other Services
The following were separated from the American Ambulance Service by
transfers to other branches to fill pressing needs for transportation in the
238
FIELD OPERATIONS
American Expeditionary Forces in the latter part of 1917. They were dis-
tributed as follows: 37
To chief quartermaster 282
Consisting of:
Ford ambulances 252
Motor cycles and side cars 30
To naval aviation (Ford ambulances). 6
To Y. M. C. A. (Ford ambulances)—- 5
To American Red Cross (Ford chas-
sis) 18
To Engineer Corps (Ford ambulances)- 150
To Signal Corps 62
Consisting of :
Ford ambulances 60
Ford chassis 2
Issued to the Medical Department 285
Consisting of :
Ford ambulances 273
Motor cycles and side cars 6
Ford touring cars 6
In all cases the property was transferred to the receiving service under
paragraph 671, Army Regulations, and in conformity with Memorandum
179, Surgeon General's Office, War Department. January 11, 191S. This
involved a transfer of funds, except when transfer was made to the Medical
Department. 37
Operating Supplies
The activity of the Ambulance Service is indicated by the following
table, which gives the actual consumption of tires and tubes, gasoline and
oil for the six months, February to July, 1918, inclusive: 38
Month
February
March. .
April..-.
May...
Juno
July
Gasoline
Kerosene
Oil
Tiros
Tubes
Liters
Liters
Liters
Number
Number
105, 034
3, 445
7,115
408
783
172, 501
4, 005
7, 021
728
1,464
203. 325
4, 023
5, 003
090
1,820
249. 028
3, 154
6,175
1,100
2,310
826, 74fi
2.011
10, 375
1,435
3.039
32li. '-'I 1
3,708
11,160
1,585
3,134
These materials were furnished the units directly from French depots.
At each echelon and section an account of these issues was kept and a report
made to the headquarters of the automobile service, French Army. This
consolidated report was submitted to the chief of service in the form of a
claim. A monthly settlement was made in the form of receipts drawn from
the American supply book separately: (a) For gasoline and ingredients;
{h) for tires and tubes. The gasoline and ingredients were returned in kind,
and the bill for tires and tubes paid on public voucher.
DIRECTION AND INSPECTION
The direction of the motor transport department was performed by a
lieutenant colonel of the United States Army Ambulance Service, who was
in close touch with the chief of service. His orders were issued " By direc-
tion of the chief of service." After consultation with the chief of service,
lie issued all directions concerning care of transportation, equipment allow-
ances, supply of parks, and the relationship to be maintained between the
parks and the sections. He was in close liaison with the French automobile
service and attended to the matriculation of Army Ambulance Service cars
in the French service. One of his duties was to determine where parks could
GENERAL VIEW OP MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 239
be placed to the greatest geographical and tactical advantage, reporting his
conclusions to the chief of service who, if he approved them, ordered the
parks moved accordingly. An assistant to the director of motor transport
cooperated in the reporting of and accounting for transportation. Another
officer under the immediate jurisdiction of the director was the inspector of
the transportation of the service. With the permission of the chief of service,
the inspector of transportation might send one of his assistants on inspection
trips at times when he himself was needed elsewhere. The reports from the
parks on the conditions of transportation of the sections came to his office
every 10 days, so that an accurate record of the actually moving transportation
was available at all times."'
QU AETEIIMA STER
The quartermaster of the Army Ambulance Service was a major of the
Quartermaster Corps; the enlisted force under him, however, was composed
of enlisted men of the United States Army Ambulance Service. The prin-
cipal storeroom, as well as the office of this department, was at headquarters
in Paris. Here, the administration of the quartermaster service was carried
on. Besides the outfitting of sections, the quartermaster handled the rental
and leasing of all buildings needed by the service. There were four sub-
departments of the quartermaster's office: 30 (1) Supply department; (2) sales
commissary; (3) paymaster; (4) advance depot at Metz (after the signing
of the armistice).
Supply Department
The supply department had charge of the requisitions, and issued clothing
and other quartermaster propeily to the sections. 39 Requisitions were sub-
mitted through the medium of the bureau central militaire (postal service of
the automobile service), which brought in the requisitions from the sections
and took back the articles requisitioned to the front. All supplies of this
character were sent directly to the sections. The unusual conditions existing
in the Ambulance Service where the sections were widely scattered made
the furnishing of their supplies a very difficult task. Their service with
the French also called for a different equipment from that supplied to other
American troops in the way of raincoats, rubber boots, and overcoats. 40
The supply department was of course in direct touch with the chief
quartermaster of the American Expeditionary Forces. It functioned promptly
and the men of the service were never without the necessary supplies, those
which contributed to their comfort and those which allowed them to present
a smart appearance at all times. The French divisions, to which the sections
of the service were attached, were, for the most part, " crack " divisions whose
combat effectiveness, discipline, neatness, and smart appearance were the
pride of the French Army. They exacted from the ambulance sections with
them the same smartness and good appearance of uniform as they did from
their other troops. 40
The clothing of a section was rated by means of frequent inspections
made by the inspector of personnel. While only the worn-out uniforms were
240 FIELD OPERATIONS
exchanged, a uniform of good fit and appearance was always kept on hand
for inspections and ceremonies. 40
Sales Commissary
In order to facilitate the supply of sections with additional food, and,
in some cases, with the actual ration, a sales commissary was established at
headquarters. 40 This kept on hand certain subsistence stores, which could be
ordered by any section commander to supplement the ration or to form the
actual ration. As the sections attached to French divisions did not draw
rations in kind, but were allowed commutation, amounting to 70 cents per
man per day, some difficulty was experienced in their getting food in the
field. 40 Sections frequently purchased the French ration in the open market
and then supplemented with purchases from the commissary. The French
ration varied a good deal in different divisions and in different parts of
the front and for this reason if no other the sales commissary of the service
was a very necessary part of the supply system. 40
Paymaster
The paymaster of the service looked after the payment of individual
officers and men and the issuance of ration money and travel expenses. 41 The
pay rolls were sent to his office by the bureau central militaire (postal service)
just after the beginning of the month. After the computation was com-
pleted, the paymaster made out a schedule, which included the different parts
of the service, and appointed a time when all section commanders should be
at the parks to obtain the pay for their sections. As the sections were widely
separated it was impossible for him to make a visit to each section. The
parks, however, were easily reached. In the absence of any section com-
mander, the park commander signed for the money and later delivered it in
person to the section commander, on his next tour of inspection
The ration accounts were sent in twice a month, as the French commissary
required that sections settle their ration bills every 15 days. 41 These were
paid on regulation voucher. Until October 11, 1918, all money saved from
rations could be placed in a section's ration savings account. A general order
issued that date prohibited the saving of money from the ration and there-
after if any money was left over at the end of the month this amount was
deducted on the next ration voucher. 41 The system worked well and gave
no trouble, although the procedure, through force of circumstances, was
somewhat unusual.
Advanced Depot at Metz
After the armistice, an advanced depot was established at Metz to supply
sections which accompanied the Third Army into Germany. 14
STATISTICAL DEPARTMENT
The statistical department rendered consolidated daily and weekly reports
of the personnel of the service to General Headquarters, American Expedi-
tionarv Forces. An army field clerk was in charge of the office, which was
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 241
a subbranch of the Paris statistical bureau. All data concerning sick and
wounded of the Ambulance Service were collected, verified, and reported
from this office. 42 A record was kept of all communications forwarded to
headquarters. American Expeditionary Forces, as well as of all administrative
data concerning the personnel of the service.
With the discontinuance of the muster roll, and the adoption of the
monthly roster, additional men had to be placed in this department, because
of the increased clerical work involved. All service records, officers' classi-
fication cards, and section statistical reports, were forwarded through this
office. Difficulty was experienced by this department in rendering adequate
reports at the appointed time. This was due to the fact that though some
of the sections were near, others were far away. Also there were differences
in their transportation facilities so that statistical reports, mailed by all sec-
tions on the same day. sometimes reached Paris days apart. This situation,
however, was overcome in part by constant communication with sections and
by use of the telephone when necessary. 42
PROMOTIONS AND MORALE
The department of promotions and morale was concerned with the
general welfare of both officers and enlisted men of the Army Ambulance
Service. The officer in charge supervised the discipline of the members of
the service, their military bearing and their personal appearance. 43
ATTENDING SURGEON
The attending surgeon of the United States Arnvy Ambulance Service
was charged by the chief of the service, with the responsibility for pro-
fessional care of the sick and wounded of the members of the service. In
addition he was sanitary inspector, and supervised the sanitation of the
various ambulance sections.
For the sick, a camp hospital was established at the base camp, referred
to below. This hospital was under the general supervision of the attending
surgeon, but was in the charge of a junior medical officer. Here, all sick of
the Army Ambulance Service were sent when their hospitalization could be
controlled by the attending surgeon. For others, such as members of the
service on duty with French and American divisions, arrangements were
made by the attending surgeon whereby these sick and wounded would be
evacuated to American Red Cross Hospitals Nos. 1 and 2, Paris. 43
INSPECTION
In order to facilitate the control as well as to coordinate the functioning
of sections, three officers, each at the head of his own department of the
Ambulance Service, were detailed as inspecting officers. 44 These were : The
inspector of transportation, the inspector of personnel, and the attending
surgeon. The reports of these officers with their recommendations made on
their return from inspection trips were submitted to the chief of service. The
242 FIELD OPERATIONS
chief of service acted as general inspector for the whole service in all its
parts. 44
The inspector of transportation, who has been previously mentioned,
looked after the care of the cars, the work of the repair shop, the supply of
spare parts and the general condition of all transportation. He was generally
at the front, during an attack, to see that the sections then functioned properly.
He cooperated with the park commander concerned, each of whom acted as
a subinspector of transportation and equipment, and consulted him before
making out his own inspection report. 4 ''
The inspector of personnel was head of the department in charge of pro-
motion and the. general welfare of officers and enlisted men. He looked
after the discipline, reported on the correctness of the military attitude of
the men, inspected the condition of their personal outfits, audited and revised
reportsof section funds, and reported on the morale of the sections. In case
there had been trouble in a section, he made inquiry concerning the action
taken by the section commander, or checked up on the behavior of this officer,
if there had been an adverse report on him by a park commander. 45
The attending surgeon, who was sanitary inspector, investigated the
general sanitation of the personnel of the parks and sections. He saw to
it that the venereal prophylaxis reports were carefully made, he inspected
the latrines, advising concerning their locations. He instructed officers con-
cerning newly published sanitary rules and received reports having to do
with the supply and preparation of food. He investigated the condition of
the men's teeth, and gave general advice concerning the health of individuals.
His duties proved especially important during the colder months.
Through this system of inspection, the service was kept at a high degree
of efficiency. The inspecting officers were constantly in the field and were
required to visit each section at least once every six weeks. It was found
the inspections greatly stimulated the section commanders. 45
SHIPPING AND POST OFFICE
The function of the shipping and post office department was primarily
that of receiving mail intended for officers and enlisted men of the Army
Ambulance Service and forwarding it to their proper addresses.
Because all mail matter for sections of the Army Ambulance Service
serving at the front was conveyed to French military base parks by the
French postal service, the shipping and post office department was located
at the bureau of the Service Portal Convols Aiitomobi/ex of the Bureau
Central Militaire in Paris. 10
ACCIDENT DEPARTMENT
In the accident department a record of each accident occuring in the
Army Ambulance .Service was kept, together with the names of witnesses,
reports, and claims, if any.
Because it was essential that the officer in charge of this department be
familiar with not only the French language but French civil law as well.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 243
one possessing these qualifications was so detailed. 47 Since all of this officer's
time was not occupied investigating accidents, and because his special
knowledge of French and the law were readily available, he was charged
with the translation of French official documents reaching headquarters of
the Ambulance Service, and was made summary court officer, and reviewed all
summary courts-martial of the sections of the Ambulance Service. One other
duty that he performed was that of censoring the mail of the Ambulance
Service. 4S
COUNCIL OF ADMINISTRATION
The council of administration comprised three officers of the Ambulance
Service. The purpose of the council was to provide means of clearing the
money accounts of section commanders. To effect this, the council audited
all records pertaining to these accounts. It also administered the Ambulance
Service fund.
The Ambulance Service fund was established to provide means for pur-
chasing comforts for members of the Ambulance Service on their way home
to the United States, and was raised by requiring each section of the service
to deposit in a designated bank all money in their separate funds over 2,000
francs. 48
FRENCH LIAISON OFFICER
An officer of the French automobile service was attached to headquarters
of the Army Ambulance Service to maintain liaison between that service
and the French Government. This officer was attached to the office of the
chief of the Ambulance Service and accompanied the chief of service on all
his trips to the front- 4S
All direct orders issued by the chief of the Ambulance Service, affecting
the Directeur Service Automobile, were issued through the liaison officer.
It was the duty of the liaison officer to maintain a constant touch with
the movements of the Directeur Service Automobile in order that all regula-
tions governing the sections of the French automobile service might be
properly interpreted to the United States Army Ambulance Service. 40
BASE CAMP
Immediately after the establishment of the Army Ambulance Service
headquarters in Paris, steps were taken to procure a suitable site for a base
camp. The first location was at Sandricourt, about 35 km. (about 21 miles)
north and west of Paris.''" This soon proved inadequate to meet the demands
made upon it, and in February, 1918, after many disappointments, a new
location was procured at Ferrieres en Gatinais. about 100 km. (about 70 miles)
south of Paris. 50 The main building here had formerly been a monastery
built 700 years before. In this building were established the headquarters
of the camp, the infirmary (a floor being devoted to convalescents), the
pathological laboratory, the quartermaster's storehouse, and the guardhouse.
In the grounds of the property five Adrian wooden barracks were erected.
244 FIELD OPERATIONS
one of which was used as a combination kitchen and mess hall. The buildings
now furnished accommodations for 500 men. 51 By taking over an old tannery,
which was near by, and the erection of additional barracks, the capacity
was increased to 2,000. 52 A complete power plant was installed, latrines,
garbage pits, and incinerators were provided, shower baths were procured,
and other steps necessary to the formation of a comfortable and sanitary
camp were instituted. There was a permanent personnel of about 150 officers
and men from which were furnished all permanent details, including the
necessary teaching force for a school for cooks, a school for mechanics, and
a school for instructing noncommissioned officers in paper work. All new
sections and all casuals arriving from the United States were first sent to
this camp for a preliminary course of instruction. 53 Sections were fitted out
here with personal equipment, quartermaster and medical supplies. The
casuals, having been equipped, were then used as replacements for sections
at the front, or were organized into new sections. An effort was made to
send here for convalescence all sick and wounded eventually to be returned
to duty. 53
During demobilization, as mentioned elsewhere, all the sections were
sent to this camp for a thorough sanitary survey, including disinfestation, and
to turn in all their property not needed en route home. They were then sent
from this point to the base ports for embarkation. 63
THE PARK SYSTEM
It is essential that this be described in order that the operation of the
ambulance service in the field may be understood.
To each French army serving on the Western Front, 12 in number, were
attached about 3,000 vehicles of all sorts, makes, and types. For the purpose
of supplying, repairing, and replacing these vehicles, the automobile parks of
the French armies were established. 54 To each army there was attached a
reserve park ; to each group of armies a revision park ; and for the whole army
a central clearing park at Versailles was maintained, through which all matric-
ulation records, replacements of pei-sonnel, reports of promotion, decorations,
and special orders of the ambulance were required to pass. 54
The reserve park served essentially as a distribution point for automo-
bile sections whether these were equipped with camions for the transporta-
tion of personnel or materiel, or wore sanitary sections for the evacuation
of the wounded. The number of the sections depended upon the number
of divisions in the army, its activity, and its liability to attack. 54
The reserve park, though a fixed organization, could be moved promptly.
Especially was this true of its repair machinery. It was established generally
at the railhead or at some point where easy rail transportation could be pro-
vided. All gasoline, tubes and tires, mail, food, and equipment passed
through the French reserve parks. It was through these parks that the sections
serving at the front were supplied with all the necessities for carrying on their
work. 55
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 245
UNITED STATES ARMY AMBULANCE SERVICE PARKS
Attached to each French reserve park, if there were sections of the Army
Ambulance Service on duty with the French divisions concerned, there was an
American park or echelon. 513 This American park consisted at first of 1 officer
and 15 men, furnished with automobile supplies and materials sufficient to
keep in working order the sections dependent on the park, even if there was
no mobile repair unit attached/' 7 Later, as the work of the American parks
increased, complete machine-shop truck units of the Motor Transport Corps.
A. E. F., each consisting of one officer and a number of mechanics, with a com-
plete machine-shop truck, were obtained and assigned to these parks. In each
case the whole American organization was under the command of the Army
Ambulance Service officer of the particular park."' 8 There was also at each
American park a reserve of two ambulances for each Ambulance Service sec-
tion on duty in the army zone."'
The revision park of the Army Ambulance Service was attached to the
French revision park at Chalons." As was the practice by the French sys-
tem, all machines too badly damaged for repair either at sections or in reserve
parks were shipped to this place by rail or camion, and here they were re-
paired or scrapped. A reserve of 50 ambulances was always on hand at this
revision park. New ambulances might be requisitioned from it by reserve
park commanders when any of their cars were completely destroyed." 7
ASSEMBLY PLANT
The assembly plant of the Army Ambulance Service, situated in Paris,
took over part of the duties of the French pare d? organization at Versailles. 60
At this point all ambulances forwarded from base ports and not destined for
Chalons were set up and equipped with bodies before being sent to the front.
However, before this was done they had to be matriculated (registered), either
by special arrangement with the French of by passing through the park at
Versailles. 60
MODE OF OPERATION UNDER THE PARK SYSTEM
An example of the ordinary procedure follows: Chassis of the ordinary
Ford type, boxed, though poorly protected from the weather, arrived at one of
the base ports. It was necessary that the chassis be unboxed immediately and
set up, or that the crated cars be stored in a covered warehouse. Two plans
were in operation for getting these chassis to Paris, or to the revision park of
the service at Chalons, as the case might be. 60 One plan was to set the cars up
immediately, strap on temporary seats, and drive them by road from the base
port to the assembly and revision plant at Paris, which has been described in
the headquarters organization. The other plan was to ship the crated cars
by rail directly to Chalons where they could be set up, the bodies attached,
and the ambulances completed in every respect by mechanics and men especially
trained for the work. Most of the chassis arriving in France had to go by road
to Paris, due to the immense amount of material of the American Expedition-
ary Forces which required rail transportation. 80
246 FIELD OPERATIONS
Before an ambulance left Paris it was sent to the French pare ^organi-
zation, where it was matriculated into the French service — that is, a French
number was painted on it — its motor number was taken, its description and
pedigree were registered, and the driver of the car was given supply books
which were to remain with the car wherever it went. 01
From the pare d 'organization at Versailles the ambulance was forwarded
to a reserve park, by road or rail, according to the conditions of traffic. From
the time it entered a reserve park until it was issued to a section it was
accounted for by the park commander to headquarters as "in condition" or
" out of condition."
When an ambulance was issued to a section, this fact was reported to
headquarters and the car was taken up on the section reports. 62
PARKS IX OPERATION
The need for mobility in a park can not be overstressed. A park, like
a section, might be called upon to follow up an attack or to retreat before
one. A study of the military situation during the three pivotal months of
1918, with that of the rapid changes of location which occurred in the parks
with both French and American troops, shows to just what extent mobility
was of value. 63
During an attack a park was extremely busy. A great stream of cars,
worn out, shot to pieces, or destroyed by accidents, came to it. In an active
sector when division replaced division, and the attack continued for days
and days, the work became gigantic in its proportions. " The constant strain
on the men as well as on the transport made a breakdown seem inevitable.
However, this did not occur, due to the elasticity of the system which had
been planned for just such an occasion. When necessary, reserve cars and
reserve men could be borrowed from a neighboring park, and all supplies
could be replenished from the rear. In order to facilitate these procedures
the chief of service, as well as the head of the transportation department,
were frequently at the front during an action. Their presence insured rapid
decisions and prompt action, and greatly promoted the successful overcoming
of obstacles in extreme crises. 04
In March. 1918. the parks of the Army Ambulance Service were strung
along the stabilized battle line at points where, unless an extreme advance
came, they were safe. All organizations near the front were exposed to
bombardments from airplanes, and, in the case of one park, to a long-range
gun. However, they were reasonably peacefully settled and functioned with-
out difficulty. 64 In the German offensive of March, 1918, only few of the
Army Ambulance Service parks were concerned. 64 The Dunkerque park,
because of its distance from the base and the overtaxed railroad between, now
became hard to supply, but there was no other effect upon its service. At this
time two new parks were established, one at Campteville, the other at
Beauvais. These parks were subjected to heavy bombardment from airplanes,
but were able to function with success, the one at Campteville supplying 20
divisions at one time during the counter attacks just after this period. 64
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 247
On May 27, 1918, the German Army began another great offensive, this
time on the line between Soissons and Reims. Overwhelming the French
divisions along the Chemin des Dames, the Germans advanced southward
until on May 30, they had reached the Marne between Mont St. Pere and
Brasles. 05 This attack was so sudden and successful to so great an extent
that it was surprising that the Army Ambulance Service parks were able to
move before it. Three parks were affected. 66 These had to move rapidly
and with a great deal of judgment while retreating in order to continue to
supply sections which they were serving. Vierzy, where park B was sta-
tioned, was captured, but there was practically no loss by the park either of
ambulances or of other material. 66 From Vierzy park B moved to
Coulommiers, which was under the guns of the enemy, but where it suc-
ceeded in functioning. Park D, which had been at Chalons, moved back for
safety to Sarry in order to be relieved of exposure to the constant bombard-
ment to which Chalons was subjected. Park E at St. Martin-Ablois moved
without difficulty to Sezanne. 66
The German advance in May demonstrated to the Army Ambulance
Service the necessity for keeping the equipment of the sections, as well as
that of the parks, limited to what was absolutely necessary. Park and section
commanders were cautioned to this effect, and the equipment, already light,
was reduced somewhat. The hardest fighting was yet to come to the allied
armies. In July occurred another German attack and then came the quick
counterattack on July 18. 66
By that date the parks had again become more or less stabilized and
had set themselves the work of keeping the sections equipped under a pro-
gram applicable to long-continued actions. Each day brought other sections
into the armies, for the service was increasing. The American divisions
had asked for sections and these had been furnished, though the, difficulty
of supplying such sections was greater because of the lack of liaison between
the Ambulance Service parks and the American divisions. This defect was
afterward overcome. 67
With the counterattack on July 18, however, the whole situation proved
different from that which had preceded it. A harder task had to be accom-
plished. It was more difficult to supply the advancing army, for it could
not continue, as in trench warfare, to draw from conveniently located and
fixed depots. Its supplies had to follow it. 6T Roads were jammed and there
were priority of munitions, priority of engineer materiel, etc. Roads, which
had been excellent during the retreat a few weeks before, were now full of
shell holes, and this caused breakage of many springs and axles and other
accidents. Also, the advance, by lengthening the lines of communications,
impaired the maintenance of the close liaison necessary. By this time, ambu-
lance sections were serving along the whole line, from the English Channel
to the Swiss border. To supply them, to keep their cars in good condition,
to get orders to them, and to maintain their high standard of individual
efficiency became an increasingly difficult task. 67
248
FIELD OPERATIONS
Step by step, as the armies advanced, the parks moved forward with
infinite pains, keeping in liaison with the sections they were supplying. 67
Each day meant some change, some new problem that had to be solved.
There were telephone messages to headquarters in Paris, quick visits to the
front, with instant responses to the rapidly changing conditions. Success
made the whole organization appreciate its strength. Through August, witli
the reduction of the Chateau-Thierry salient, through September with the
advance on all fronts, through the Argonne, in Belgium, over the Chemin
des Dames, past St. Quentin. sections and parks kept up with advancing
troops, the difficult}' of supply ever increasing. By November, at the time
of the signing of the armistice, almost every park had moved or was on
the point of moving. 08
AMBULANCE SECTIONS
The organization of the Army Ambulance Service sections with the French
army differed in a few minor details from that of the sections which served
temporarily with American divisions during the operations of 1918. 09 Those
serving with the American Army were planned by the chief of the Army
Ambulance Service, for special use with American troops, and were made
up of a strictly all American personnel, but their organization was based
on the experience gained from the use of similar sections with the French
army. 09 The equipment was practically the same for the two types, except
that an additional touring car was allowed for each of the sections with
the French Army for the French lieutenant, and a French truck, usually
of a standard type, was provided for transporting gasoline. In general, what
is said of a section serving with a French division applies with equal force
to one serving with an American division. 00 The following tabulation gives
the personnel in both the American and French sections : T0
PERSONNEL
AMERICAN SECTION
Officers 1
Noncommissioned officers 4
Mechanics
Cooks 2
Drivers .__ 25
Privates (extra) 8
Total (enlisted) 45
FRENCH SECTION
Officers (American, 1; French, 1) 2
Noncommissioned officers (American.
3; French, 1) 4
Mechanics (American) 4
Cooks (American, 2; French, 1) 3
Drivers (American, 24; French, 2) 26
Privates 4
Total (enlisted) 41
All other departments of the Army Ambulance Service were considered
auxiliary to the ambulance section as this was the branch which directly
served wounded. It was a development of four years of war. and was
adapted to both trench and open warfare. This section must not be confused
with the ambulance company or with the evacuation ambulance company of
the American Army nor with the section sanitairc of the French Army.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 249
Although based on the plans of the Service de Sante of the French Army, a
section of the Army Ambulance Service was by no means the exact duplicate
of the French Section Service Sanitaire. 70 The duty of such of our sections
as were assigned to the American Expeditionary Forces was analagous to
that of an evacuation ambulance company when it was serving armies or
corps, and to that of the motor transport section of an ambulance company
when it was assigned to a division.
ADMINISTRATION
The administration of a section was effected through several offices or
departments. 71
Department of 'personnel and paper work. — This department was under
the immediate supervision of a sergeant, first class, and had to do with
everything that concerned the personnel and paper work of the section.
Department of transportation. — The department of transportation was
under the immediate supervision of the sergeant in charge of transportation.
He advised and watched carefully the work of the mechanics, made inspec-
tions of materials, kept account of the expenditures of tubes and casings,
inspected the general condition of the cars, made reports on transportation
to the section office, investigated accidents and saw that reports were handed
in concerning them, checked up on the number of kilometers traveled and
on the number of wounded earned, made sure that the cars were filled with
gasoline and oil, checked litters and blankets, and arranged for the washing
and fumigating of cars.
Department of supply. — The department of supply was under the im-
mediate supervision of the quartermaster sergeant, who was in charge of
the supply of rations, gasoline, oil, grease, etc. He made out all requisitions
for medical supplies, litters, and blankets. He looked after the clothes of
the men and saw that they were properly supplied.
Department of food and sanitation. — The department of food and sani-
tation was under a sanitary sergeant, who also had in his charge that part
of the duties of a mess sergeant which had to do with the preparation of
food. Upon the arrival of the section in camp he searched out a good supply
of water and chlorinated it. Lyster bags, for use in chlorinating water,
were provided for each section. After this he arranged for latrines and
established the kitchen. He inspected the kitchen and had under his super-
vision the whole kitchen force ; the kitchen police and the cooks were
responsible to him for the cleanliness of the kitchen as well as for the
preparation of the food. He kept the medical kit. He reported on the
general cleanliness of the camp and quarters.
KQDIPMENT
The average section had five different kinds of equipment, as follows:
Transportation: spare parts and tools; paper and office work; medical; and
individual.
250 FIELD OPERATIONS
The transportation of a section was as follows: 20 ambulances; 1 touring
car; 1 two-ton truck: 1 three-fourths ton truck or camionette; and 1 rolling
kitchen.
Ambulances
The ambulances used by the Army Ambulance Service were of the Ford
type. 72 The standard chassis, with a few changes and additions (none being
radical), was adapted to perform the heavy work incurred in the transporta-
tion of wounded.
There were two types of ambulance bodies. One, the fiber body, modeled
in America, according to specifications furnished at the beginning of the war,
was not wholly a success. The other, made in Paris, was on the pattern of the
old American Field Service ambulance body. This was made of wood and
was excellently planned, so that it contributed to the comfort of the wounded
men as well as to that of the driver. All ambulances were painted an olive-
drab color. 72
Touring Cars
The touring car was of the standard Ford type. 73 A few additions were
made, such as tire racks, and an arrangement (generally by the use of three
5-liter bidons) for carrying extra gasoline. The touring car was painted the
same color as the ambulances, and bore the number and insignia of the section.
A red cross was sometimes painted on the windshield to facilitate the passing
of sentries, and to obtain the priority of the medical service, which was granted
to ambulances. 73
Trucks
Two kinds of trucks were used. 74 One, the %-ton Ford camionette, was
of the standard make. The other truck was usually of some well-known
American make of from li/o to 2 tons capacity. The type most used was the
White, while the Packard was a close second, with the Garford third. 74
Rolling Kitchen
Practically every section was equipped with a rolling kitchen. 74 Two
types were used, one an inheritance from the American Field Service and the
other a gift from the American Red Cross. The American Field Service
rolling kitchen was a large boxlike kitchen, equipped with a good range and
with shelves and drawers for rations; completely inclosed, it protected the
cook from the weather. While many advantages were gained by this arrange-
ment, it is believed that the weight of the vehicle lessened its value, especially
during the very active period in the last year of the war. It was towed behind
the larger truck, to which it was fastened by means of an apparatus which
took up the shock. 74
The Red Cross kitchen was lighter and more practical for an army mov-
ing in the field. 75 It was planned from observations made by a member of
the Army Ambulance Service, who was aided by the practical advice of men
on active duty in the field. Perfected bv the Red Cross, it gave excellent satis-
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATK )N 251
faction on every front. The oven and the arrangement for heating water were
features not usually found in a field kitchen. 75
MEDICAL SUPPLIES
The medical equipment of a section was limited. Unlike that of an am-
bulance company, it included few bandages or medicines, and those supplied
were intended primarily for the use of the section personnel. 70 The attending
surgeon, early in 1918, perfected a medical kit, for the special use of the serv-
ice, which could be used intelligently by nonprofessional men. Though the
kit contained only the simplest remedies, it was an entire success. The litter
which was part of the medical equipment was the French folding litter. 70
There were 3 litters to each car. or GO to the section. The ambulances were
planned to carry the litters of all the allies, though some trouble (later cor-
rected) was experienced at first with the long-model truck litter. 77
With the litter were the two blankets used to cover a wounded man on
his trip from the front to the rear. These blankets, generally of a good qual-
ity of wool, were carefully safeguarded and were considered a part of the am-
bulance equipment. Three extra gas masks were always carried in the ambul-
ance, and on special occasions one or more French Tissot masks were added
for the use of the driver during a heavy gas attack. 77
Each section was supplied with a regulation venereal prophylaxis outfit.
An attendant, properly instructed and trained, administered the treatment
and was responsible for the material as well as for the records. These records
were inspected by Army Regulations. The percentage of venereal diseases
was exceedingly small in the Army Ambulance Service. 77
INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT
The equipment of the individual soldier in the section was the regulation
Equipment C, provided by Army Regulations. 78 In periods of great stress, this
equipment was reduced to Equipment A, the surplus being stored at the parks
for the time being. A supplement to the clothing allowance was made by cer-
tain additional garments, such as the leather jerkins, authorized by General
Headquarters. American Expeditionary Forces. All of the personnel were
equipped with the regulation French helmet and gas mask. Sections operating
in the Vosges and other cold sections were furnished waterproof and sheep-
skin lined coats. 78
INSTRUCTION
Instruction in all phases of the work of the Army Ambulance Service
was necessary and was amply provided for by means of various schools, such
as the base camp school. Centre d 'Instruction Automobile, Meaux; motor trans-
port service school: and also by instruction in the ambulance sections. 79
EVACUATION OF WOUNDED
Transportation ami care of patients in transit differed considerably accord-
ing to proximity to the front and to other considerations. The first zone which
252 FIELD OPERATIONS
a patient traversed was the forward part of the advanced zone, and here trans-
portation was accomplished by litter bearers. The second, just in the i - ear of
the first, comprised the remainder of the advanced zone; through this the
wounded were removed by motor vehicles. This part of the advanced zone,
began at the first-aid station, or the regimental dressing station (poste de se-
COWT8 of the French), and ended at the held hospital or triage. It was in this
territory especially that the sections of the Army Ambulance Service usually
operated. 80
In this part of the advanced zone the transportation of the patient under
the French system was completely divorced from his treatment. 81 Statistics
have shown that while delay for treatment, or for any other reason, might
mean comfort for some individuals it meant infection for a large number of
others. 81 Evacuation in this part of the advanced zone was exceptionally diffi-
cult, for it was here that the time factor was most variable, and it was here
that contact must be maintained with the units served. It was found that a
section should operate with one division, and should at no time be removed
from the division to which it was attached, unless in the greatest emergency.
Knowledge of the exact organization of a division and personal acquaintance
witli its sanitary service were of the highest importance to the efficient operation
of a section. If frequently transferred from one division to another, it was
impossible for the commander of a section to orient himself without great loss
of time and under circumstances when no time whatever should be lost. 81
In order to administer first-aid during transportation, access to the patient
was necessary. Both the French and English ambulances at first had passages
between the litters to facilitate treatment of patients en route, but this arrange-
ment proved to be impractical, and was discontinued early in the war. 81 It
was found that, instead of aiding the patients, many cases of infection oc-
curred as a result of interference with wounds in transit. The extra space
which allowed access to the patient could not be spared when wounded had
to be cared for in great numbers. The continuing stream of vehicles would not
permit an ambulance to stop and thus block them all. As early as the winter
of 191;"), ambulances were completely closed and rules prohibited the treat-
ment of patients en route except at special stations. The results proved the
success of this method. 82
From experience on the Western Front, where delay of evacuation under
normal conditions seldom occurred and the whole transport could be accom-
plished in perhaps two hours, it was learned that stations between the first-
aid station and the field hospital, except for the sorting of wounded, were not
practical. 92 The dressing station of the American Army organization was
but an additional stop which delayed the patient on the trip to the rear. It was
believed that it was better to rush the wounded back to a formation where
proper facilities for their treatment were available than to delay the trans-
port by feeble efforts at treatment en route." Furthermore, the drivers, while
enlisted in the Medical Department, were not trained in more than elementary
first-aid work, and to have an ambulance section saddled with medical and
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 253
surgical equipment in addition to that of their cars was contrary to the dictates
of efficiency. 83
It was found that the particular requisite for effective results was to have
the drivers under the constant supervision of an officer trained for this pur-
pose. This proved to be very difficult, if not impossible, in a command larger
than the section. The difficulties would have been increased if there had been
mounted, as well as dismounted, personnel, such as litter bearers, as is actually
the case in ambulance companies. sa It was believed very unwise to have
mixed types of vehicles in an ambulance section. As each section of the am-
bulance service had one type of car, with one type top, so as to obviate having
multiple stocks of repair parts and multiple tools and equipment, it was not
necessary to depend upon different parks for different supplies and main-
tenance, nor was it necessary to have mechanics and drivers trained in the up-
keep and repair of more than one type of car. 8 '
DUTY WITH FRENCH DIVISIONS
The duty to be performed by the sections serving with the French army
was very definitely fixed. In the advanced zone, one section was assigned to
each division of 10,000 fighting men. This section remained with the division
while it was in line and went with it when it came out to rest. In no case was
it detached, as was often done in the American Army ; but, if applied for
through the proper channels, it could be loaned to another division for an en-
gagement. 84 The decision in this case rested with the directeur, service auto-
mobile, who considered the use to which the section was to be put and whether
it was fit to go into another action. 8 "' This officer also controlled all move-
ments of the section when in convoy: but upon entry of the division into the
line, the allocation of the cars and their immediate supervision fell under the
division surgeon. 85
While on active duty a little village was chosen for the headquarters of
a section. The choice was based on proximity to the scene of its future work,
and for this reason the location was almost inevitably in a destroyed village.
From this point the section functioned through its posies des secours, where
cars were stationed, or which they visited to collect the wounded. The dis-
tance between these posies and the hospital d 'evacuation was never very
jrreat, but varied according to the front. For instance, a section serving with
a division holding part of the line north of Verdun (Verdun l>eing at the
time a comparatively active area, with the divisions close together and each
holding a short line) had a restricted geographical area for its operations.
The runs in this case were thus comparatively short. The contrary was the
case with divisions in less active sectors. In fact, the more active the sector
the more wounded, but the shorter the runs ; the less active the sector, the less
wounded; but at the same time when the divisions concerned were less con-
centrated the runs were longer. Some sections evacuated only to the triage,
at which point the wounded were picked up by the larger cars of the French
ambulance sections, while in other instances the sections of the Army Ambu-
lance Service evacuated all the way to the hospital d 'evacuation. 8 *
254 FIELD OPERATIONS
SERVICE OF THE ENTRENCHED CAMP OF PARIS
In addition to front line duty with French combat divisions, it was
agreed between the French and American authorities that the ambulance
service of the entrenched camp of Faris. which had previously been carried
on by volunteers attached to the Ambulance Amerlctiine at Xeuilly. should
be assumed by the United States Army Ambulance Service. 8 * Accordingly.
when the first contingent of 20 sections arrived in France, two sections (tin*
was on September 16, 1917) were ordered overland to Faris to take over this
service"" They, with two other sections which were destined for the base camp,
arrived in Versailles September 18, 1017. establishing what is believed to be nn
enviable record for convoy work with inexperienced drivers. Tins convoy
was composed of 80 ambulances. 8 trucks. 4 touring cars, and 4 motor cycles.
About one-half of the drivers had never driven a car at the time of their
leaving the camp at St. Xazaire, but despite this and running as a solid
convoy, the detachment reached Versailles on time, the convoy complete with-
out losing a car or having to tow one. The last car drew into line -20 minutes
after the pilot car had stopped. The two sections, which were intended for
Faris. reported to the American Fed Cross Military Hospital No. 1 {Ambu-
lance Amerirninc) . Nenilly-sur- Seine, and immediately took over the duties
of the old volunteer organization. 86 (About 30 men from the old volunteer
service were still on duty at this hospital, and. desiring to come into the new
service, were enlisted and organized into a third section.) Service here was
concerned primarily with the evacuations of French sick and wounded from
the large unloading stations in Faris to which points they had come by hos-
pital train or by boat from the hospitals in the zone of the armies. Later,
however, the Faris sections were used extensively to evacuate all allied
wounded arriving at that city. Dining the German drive to the Marne in
1918. 40 of the ambulances of the Faris detachment were sent to evacuate
wounded from points as far as 50 kms. (31 miles) from Paris. The Paris
detachment at this time numbered 2.~>0 drivers and had 165 ambulances of the
large type, carrying 4 lying or sitting cases each. The organization was
designated "The Provisional Battalion," having a captain in command of
the battalion and a first lieutenant in command of each of the three sections.
In Paris, during the volunteer days from September. 1014. to August. 1917.
50495 cases had been transported; from September, 1017. to November, 1918.
inclusive, the provisional battalion. United States Army Ambulance Service,
transported 132,683 cases."" The number of wounded carried climbed from
7G6 in September. 1917. to a total of more than 30.000 during the month of
October. 191*. These figures include a numl>er of air raid casualties and
German long-range gun ("Big Bertha") victims, resulting from the 191S
attacks. The provisional battalion, during the late days of the war, was
moved to the Long Champs race course and detached from the American
Red Cross Military Hospital No. 1. Xeuilly. Gasoline and tires for Paris
were furnished by the French Army as was the case for the rest of the Arm?
Ambulance Service.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 255
From time to time, sections on Paris duty were replaced by recently
arrived sections from the United States and sent to the front for duty with
the French divisions, the service for which they were originally organized
and intended. This relief of sections prevented the tiresome and onerous
duty in Paris from becoming any more so. 86
DEMOBILIZATION
Within five months after the signing of the armistice, over one-half of
the United States Army Ambulance Service had been demobilized, and plans
had l>een made for the demobilization of the remainder." Yet the work of
the sections by no means ended on November 11. 1918. Many of the sections
moved into Germany and some crossed the Rhine with the French army of
occupation. But within a few months it was possible to call in those which
had accompanied French divisions into Germany. They were replaced by
new sections which had arrived in France late in November. Through such
replacement it was possible to arrange that all sections which had seen war
service were assured of a speedy return to America. Plans were also worked
nut with the French so that the new sections were relieved by French >c Regular
Army" units late in the spring of 1919. allowing even the sections which had
come over after the armistice to return before midsnmmer of that year. 87
Flans for demobilization were made so that all preparations for transport
to America and for discharge were made within the ambulance service itself.
The has* 1 camp proved to be a place ideally fitted for demobilization purpose*,
and it was there that the sections from the front were prepared for discharge.
Ambulances, however, were turned over locally to the Motor Transport
Corps of the American Expeditionary Forces, which corps also took over
all the other transportation of the ambulance service. 87
Sections, relieved of their automobile equipment, arrived at the base
camp with only personal property and the section records. Here the men
were put through the disinfesting process and issued standard Medical De-
partment equipment.* 7
All individual records and section records were straightened out at the
base camp at the same time the men were being put through the various
processes prescribed for all units previous to embarkation. When the sections
left the camp, they did so with a clean bill of health and with all the section
funds and records attended to. Here, efficient work by sections was in great
measure responsible for the smoothness with which the ambulance service's
demobilization program worked ovit in conjunction with the embarkation
system of the American Expeditionary Forces. 87
On January 30, 1919. it was announced that 10 sections would be sent
home in February and 20 sections each month thereafter until the whole
-ervice had been demobilized. Before the end of March. 5f> sections either
had pone through the base camp, homeward bound, or they were ready and
awaiting transportation at Brest. Demobilization was hastened very largely
hwause it was apparent that the sections could be prepared for going home
256 FIELD OPERATIONS
much more quickly than had been expected. The real need for them at the
front had ceased as soon as the French demobilized their temporary divisions
and were thus enabled to handle their own transportation problems to a much
greater extent than had previously been the case. After the middle of April.
1919, no sections remained in the field that had seen service at the front
previous to the signing of the armistice. The newer sections continued to
serve until May, most of them being located with the French divisions along
the Rhine. The character of the work changed after the armistice, sickness
being practically the sole cause for evacuation. 87 With the lessening of the
need for transportation of patients it was now possible in some cases for
one ambulance section to do the work for two divisions. Withdrawal from
the French Army was carefully carried out by the sections, and in no case
was interruption in the transportation of patients permitted to occur. 88
Many of the men who entered the Army Ambulance Service in France
took advantage of a general order which permitted them to be discharged in
Europe. 88 These men, with their completed records, were sent from the base
camp to the St. Aignan discharge camp. As a matter of fact, the old volunteer
sections all had a limited number of their original personnel still in the
service when they arrived at the base camp, and many of these men desired
to stay in Europe. Relatively, more men in the United States Army Ambu-
lance Service were affected by the order permitting discharge in Europe
than was the case with any other organization of the American Expeditionary
Forces. 88
The first contingent to leave for America sailed from Brest on March
15, 1919. 88 Ten sections, five of them from the first Allentown units and five
more from the old volunteer service, were included in this contingent. They
were those numbered: 501, 509, 546, 586, 594, 627. 629, 631, 635, and 642. 89
The second returning contingent, composed of the following 10 sections,
left Brest only 5 days later, on March 20 : 517, 523, 539, 551, 558, 592, 593,
628, 630, and 641. 88
On March 26, a contingent, composed of the following 14 sections, left
the same port : 504, 510, 512, 525, 552. 553. 625, 626, 632, 633, 634, 636, 638, and
646. 88
The remainder of the veteran sections sailed in contingents varying in
size from 10 to 25 sections, and all were out of France before the end of
April, 1919. 88
Parks were called in as rapidly as the decreasing number of sections
at the front permitted, and their personnel was sent back with the returning
sections. The chief of service effected arrangements whereby the remaining
repair parks would be disbanded at the same time their sections were released
from divisions. The Chalons park was the last to be discontinued, for be-
cause of its advantageous location, it afforded excellent repair facilities to
sections en route to the base camp for demobilization. 88
As previously stated, after the veteran sections had been released, it was
found that it would be possible to demobilize the new sections, which had
been utilized to replace the old ones, earlier than had been previously
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 257
scheduled, so this was done. Ten of these sections were released on April '25.
10 on May 1, and the remaining 10 on May 5. This permitted the United
States Army Ambulance Service to be practically out of France by the last
of May, 1919. 8S
REFERENCES
(1) Memorandum from the chief surgeon. A. E. P., to the commanding general, A. E. F..
July 1, 1917. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section
(Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
(2) Memorandum from the chief of U. S. Army Ambulance Service to the commanding
general, A. E. F., August 17. 1017. On file. A. G. O., World War Division. Medical
Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
(3) Letter from the chief of the U. S. Army Ambulance Service with the French Army
to the Adjutant General, A. E. F., December 5, 1017. On file, A. G. O.. World War
Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
(4) Report of activities of the U. S. Army Ambulance Service, by Col. E. E. Persons,
M. C, undated, 2. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(5) Ibid., 3.
(6) Ibid., 4.
(7) Ibid., 5.
(8) Ibid., 6.
(9) Letter from the chief of the U. S. Army Ambulance Service, to the Surgeon General,
U. S. Army, August 25, 1917. On file, A. G. O., World War Division. Medical
Records Section, (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.32111.
(10) Letter from the chief of the V. S. Army Ambulance Service, to The Adjutant
General of the Army, November 13, 1917. On file, A. G. O., World War Di-
vision, Medical Records Section, (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
(11) Cable 528-8, from commander in chief, A. E. F., to The Adjutant General of the
Army, August 28, 1917.
(12) Memorandum from the chief of the U. S. Army Ambulance Service, to the com-
manding general, A. E. F., August 17, 1917. On file, A. G. O., World War Di-
vision, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 322.3211).
(13) Memorandum from the chief, U. S. Army Ambulance Service to the command-
ing general, A. E. F., September 21, 1917. On file. A. G. (>.. World War Division.
Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files. 322.3211).
(14) Cable from General Pershing to The Adjutant General of the Army, September
20, 1917. On file. A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section
(Surgeon's Files. 322.3211).
(15) Letter from the commanding general, A. E. F.. to (he chief, TJ. S. Army Ambulance
Service, A. E. F„ January 4, 1918. On file. A. G. O., World War Division, Medical
Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
(16) Letter from the chief of the Army Ambulance Service to the commander in chief.
A. E. F., January 4. 1018. On file, A. G. O.. World War Division, Medical Rec-
ords Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
(17) Letter from the commander in chief, A. E. F., to the chief of the Army Am-
bulance Service. January 11, 1918. On file. A. G. O.. World War Division, Medi-
cal Records Section. (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
(18) Letter from the commander in chief, A. E. F., to the under secretary, Service de
Sante, April 30, 1018. On file, A. G, O., World War Division, Medical Records
Section (Chief Surgeon's Files. 322.3211).
(19) Cable No. 1591, from the commander in chief, A. E. F„ to The Adjutant Gen-
eral of the Army, August 13, 1918. On file, A. G. O, World Dar Division, Medi-
cal Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
1.3576—25 17
258 FIELD OPERATIONS
(20) Letter from the commanding officer. Camp Crane, Allentown. I'm., to the Surgeon Gen-
eral, August 26, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records
Section (Chief Surgeon's Piles, 322.3211)
(21) Letter from the Surgeon General to the chief surgeon, A. B. F.. August 27, 191$. On
file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's
Files. 322.3211).
I 22 1 Letter from the chief, U. S. Army Ambulance Service, to the chief of staff, A. E. F.,
September 10, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Sec-
tion (Chief Surgeon's Files, 322.3211).
(23) Report on activities of G^l-P. medical group, fourth section, general staff,
G. H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31,
1918, S6. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(24) Report on activities of the U. S. Army Ambulance Service with the Italian Army,
by Col. E. E. Persons, M. C, undated, 4. On file, Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(2. r >) Report on activities at Camp Crane, Allentown, Pa., by Col. E. E. Persons, M. C,
undated, 6. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(20) Report on activities of the U. S. Army Ambulance Service with the French Army,
by Col. Percy L. Jones, M. C. chief of service, undated, 206. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(27) Ibid., 207.
(28) Report on activities G-4-B. medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. II. Q.,
A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31, 1918, 00. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(29) Letter from the chief, U. S. Army Ambulance Service, to the commander in chief.
A. E. F., October 31, 1917. Subject : Additional ambulance sections from the
United States. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section
(Chief Surgeon's Files. 322.3211).
(30) Report on activities G-^l-B, medical group, fourth section, general stall'. G. H. Q-
A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams. M. C, chief of section, December 31, 1918, BT.
On tile, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(31) Report on the activities of the U. S. Army Ambulance Service with the French Army.
by Col. Percy L. Jones, M. C. chief of service, undated, 21. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(.".21 Ibid.. 22.
(33) Ibid., 24.
(34) Ibid.. 25.
(35) Ibid.. 26.
(36) Ibid., 27.
(37) Ibid., 28.
(38> Ibid.. 30.
CHI) Ibid., 33.
(40) Ibid.. 34.
(41) Ibid.. 35.
(42) Ibid.. 36.
(43) Ibid.. 37.
(44) Ibid.. 38.
(45) Ibid., 39.
(4ti) Ibid.. 40.
(47) Ibid.. 45.
(48) Ibid., 46.
(49) Ibid, 47.
(50) Ibid.. 147.
(51) Ibid.. 148.
(52) Ibid., 152.
(53) Ibid.. 149.
(54) Ibid.. 50.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 259
(55) Ibid., 51.
156) Ibid.. 52.
(57) Ibid., 53.
(58) Ibid., 63.
(59) Ibid., 05.
(60) Ibid., 54.
(61) Ibid., 55.
(62) Ibid., 56.
(63) Ibid., 66.
(64) Ibid., 67.
(65) The Battle of the Aisne; A study by the Second Bureau, general staff, French
G. H. Q., undated. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.
(fl6) Report on the activities of the U. S. Army Ambulance Service, with the French Army,
by Col. Percy L. Jones, M. C, chief of service (undated), 68. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(67) Ibid.. 69.
(68) Ibid., 70.
(69) Ibid., 73.
170) Ibid., 74.
(71) Ibid., 78.
(72) Ibid., 86.
(73) Ibid., 89.
(74) Ibid., 90.
(75) Ibid.. 91.
(76) Ibid.. 95.
(77) Ibid., 96.
(78) Ibid., 97.
(79) Ibid., 105.
(80) Ibid.. 129.
(81) Ibid.. 130.
(82) Ibid.. 131.
(83) Ibid., 132.
(84) Ibid.. 139.
is.". i Ibid.. 140.
(86) Service of the entrenched camp of Paris, by CoL Percy L. Jones, M. <'.. chief of the
U. S. Army Ambulance Service with the French Army (undated). On file. Histori-
cal Division, S. G. O.
(87) Report <>n the activities of the U. S. Army Ambulance Service with the French
Army, by Col. Percy L. Jones. M. C. chief of service. April 15. 1919. 203. On tile.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
1 88) Ibid., 204.
CHAPTER VII
PRIMARY EVACUATIONS FROM THE ZONE OF THE ARMIES
The transport and hospitalization of the sick and wounded of the Ameri-
can Expeditionary Forces, after these sick and wounded had heen evacuated
from the zone of the armies, presented difficulties which differed in many
respects from those which had confronted the French Army during three
and a half years of warfare, and also from those of the British, whose system
of evacuation was similar to that of the French though modified by geographi-
cal conditions. The French and British systems involved no long lines of
communications to home ports. The short route to England made it possible
for British wounded to reach home bases rapidly.
The American Army, however, was compelled to hospitalize in France,
and to some extent in England, almost all its sick and wounded, since it
was impracticable to send home any except a relatively small number, who
were permanently (from a military viewpoint) disabled. To meet the needs
imposed by this situation and to economize on personnel and materiel, the
American Expeditionary Forces had recourse to the use of large hospitals
and hospital groups into which patients could be received by the trainload.
These organizations necessarily were situated on supply lines of the American
Expeditionary Forces.
HOSPITAL TRAINS
The plan in question involved long hauls as patients were moved from
the front into variously located base hospitals, and early in the history of
the American Expeditionary Forces it was appreciated that ample hospital
train service was one of the prime requisites of a successful evacuation service.
The method for the procurement of hospital trains for the American Expedi-
tionary Forces has been given briefly in Chapter I. Being sanitary forma-
tions, hospital trains were under the general jurisdiction of the chief surgeon,
A. E. F., as regards personnel, supply, and maintenance of their equipment,
but they were under the orders and immediate control of the regulating officer
to whom they were assigned, 1 save for those operated in the Services of
Supplv. which remained under the immediate control of the chief surgeon,
A. E.*F.
REGULATING STATIONS
Our regulating stations were modeled on those operated by the French
when the United States entered the war. and their methods were modified
little if any by us. To a degree, one of these stations corresponded to a divi-
sion point with a train dispatcher according to American railway service
practice, and also to a collecting and distributing point for supplies. Each
261
2(52
FIELD OPERATIONS
of these was a large railway yard, situated preferably at a railway junction
where railroads converged from the rear and diverged to the front. Here
cars were received and assembled into trains for the divisions, securing to
SCHEMrfT/C D/#GgrfM
Or /V05P/TrtUZAT/ON & EWCU/IT/O/V
\ „ ! <-/
■S.VA
r/^tM^OSPI-TGl-S Si/en* J;
/ s ^
\ A#OULAHCe£>
\ i /
OlIAItT II
each of these its daily automatic supply and providing for its emergency
needs as well. Through such stations passed all the men. supplies, and animals
needed by the army which they served, and, in retrograde movement, all men.
materiel, and supplies evacuated from it. 2 These stations were the funnel.
PLATE I.
RAILWAY
EVACUATION ROUTES
A. E. F.
FRANCE
Scale i n Kilometers
100 200
K*d I mrs /ieprtaent Amtnemn Route* of £v*cu.*lit
Dr*wn. from. Official Rtifvty M*f> cf~ />dit<7C!
tWOWAVSO <M[J WikTEL »'TH( U.SMOid*IUU.Miri
J03
264
FIELD OPERATIONS
so to speak, through which passed everything, or, to change the figure, they
were the valves controlling and directing the flow through appropriate
channels. They permitted the maintenance of depots and hospitals at a safe
distance to the rear, yet secured to troops sufficient supplies to meet daily
needs, and relieved them of their sick and wounded. The main purpose was
to meet changing conditions at the front and to move speedily backward and
forward with the army. Thus, in the early part of the. war, during the
retreat of the French and the first battle of the Marne, one regulating station
on the left of the French Army jumped backward four times and forward
twice. 3
Only two regulating stations were actually constructed by us, viz, at
Is-sur-Tille (Cote d' Or) and at Liffol-le-Grand. The latter was not com-
pleted until after the signing of the armistice. In addition to these, however,
we used the French stations at Creil and Le Bourget during operations along
the Marne, and later those at Nantes, Noisy-le-Sec, St. Dizier, Connantre,
Grey, and Dunkerque. 2
ARMIES HI
RAILHEADS 'I 2 3
REGULATING
STATIONS
12 H. 3ZQT 231
Tz" 13 14 15 16 17 18 '19 20 21 '
DEPOTS
Chaw IV. — Supply-control installation of French Army in the winter of 1917-1S
The subjects of supply and evacuation, in reference to regulating sta-
tions, are so intimately connected that the two will be discussed together.
Both were under control of G-4, the supply, coordinating, and evacuating
section of the general staff, G. H. Q. (See Chart III.)
At the time of greatest activity at the front, when demands upon
G-4 for supplies, particularly for ammunition and engineering material, were
the heaviest, the demand for hospital trains for evacuation of the wounded
also reached its highest point. It was essential, of course, that forward move-
ment of the necessary supplies and rearward movement of the disabled should
not result in hopeless confusion. For this reason both these responsibilities
were charged on the same division of the general staff, and the regulating
office was immediately under its control. 2
Chart IV illustrates the supply-control installation of the French Army
in the winter of 1917-18. 3 It was the model we used both for control of sup-
plies and for hospital train service, since both operations necessarily were over
railway lines under French control and operation and, in addition, evacua-
tions were conducted to a considerable extent on trains rented from the French.
In this chart Roman numerals represent armies; the Arabic, railroads.
Capital letters represent regulating stations. Each small letter represents a
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 265
group of depots. The straight lines represent railroads. The railroad "A"-
"G," connecting regulating stations, represents a rocade (shuttle) line.
Operation of this installation can be illustrated as follows: If division
No. 1 moves to the position No. 3, the regulator at "A" switches its supply
trains to No. 3.
If division No. 1 moves to the position No. 6 while its supplies are at
"A," the regulator at "A" sends its supply train over the rocade line to " 13,"
who switches it to No. 6.
In a like manner supplies could be switched from No. 1 to 21.
The rocade line made supply very flexible. By its use any railhead could
be reached from any regulating station or from any depot, and this proved
a valuable agency for rectifying mistakes, for any shipment missent to a
regulating station could be directed to its proper destination by the rocade
line. It was especially useful in an emergency. 3
Intensive use of railw T ay lines in the zone of the armies made clocklike
regularity in their train service essential, and this regularity of movement had
constantly to be coordinated with changing battle conditions.- As intelligent
priority also had to be established, the authority for this was vested in the
regulating officer, who received all calls from the armies for supplies and
transportation and made the necessary requisitions on depots toward the rear.
In order that shipments, both front and rear, might be controlled absolutely,
they were made to pass through the regulating station yard, where they were
checked, recorded, and their destination verified. The regulating station was
thus a checking point upon the number and kind of cars and the personnel
and freight carried. Being thoroughly conversant with the military situation
and needs for supplies and evacuation, the regulating officer could route trains
or change their composition as conditions required. 2
Under G-4, G. H. Q., the regulating officer was charged with delivery of
supplies of all kinds to units at the front and also with the duty of relieving
the army of materiel, men and animals no longer in use. Being in close
touch with our high command, G-4. G. 11. Q., of necessity had full knowledge
of all plans and projected operations and was therefore in a position to
estimate the approximate number of casualties to be expected in the different
sectors of the front, and consequently could allot hospital trains in a way
best calculated to meet the situation. In point of fact this was effected
through the Medical Department subsection of G-4 (G-4-B) during the entire
period of the war. The trains available were apportioned to the different
regulating stations and, once assigned, could be changed only by order from
General Headquarters. Each having been assigned the number of trains which
a particular situation demanded, regulating stations were in a position to
meet the requirements of G-4 of the several armies. 3
The agencies primarily concerned in evacuation were the evacuation
hospital (an army formation), G-4 of the army, the regulating station, G-4,
6. H. Q., and hospital trains. 3
When American divisions served in French armies in the earl}* part of
our participation in the war it was the practice for the officer in charge of
13576—25 18
266 FIELD OPERATIONS
an evacuation hospital to notify the chief surgeon of the French army in
whose zone his hospital was located, that American evacuation was desired.
The latter then requested the coordinating officer, at the head of the fourth
bureau of the French general staff controlling the zone, to summon a hospital
train. When our troops were incorporated in French corps and armies, we
necessarily followed their method, but after we organized our own corps
and armies, with independent supply and evacuation, it became the duty of
an American regulating officer, who was attached to the office of the French
regulating officer and allowed to have an assistant to himself solely concerned
with the movement of hospital trains. 4 The two sets of officers, French and
American, worked side by side in the same station, our regulating officer
making his requests on the French for the actual movement of trains. The
French regulating officer, similarly to the American, had on his staff a French
medical officer who was charged with control and supervision of hospital
trains movement.
To promote the service of the regulating station the regulating officer
divided his duties among several subdepartments, each under an officer respon-
sible for his own department. The chief was responsible for the work of
all and for its coordination. To cany out this plan so far as the Medical
Department was concerned an officer of the Sanitary Corps was assigned to
duty with the regulating officer at Le Bourget and was charged with the
movement of hospital trains. 5 As requirements increased, it became evident
that a medical group should be organized in every regulating station to control
(he movement of hospital trains and to keep records and other data concern-
ing evacuations. The Medical Department subsection of the regulating office
was governed by the following instructions issued by G^, G. H. Q.. August
•29, 1918, giving in full the plan of evacuation by train:
1. Hospital trains are Medical Department organizations. As regards personnel,
materiel, supply and maintenance of their equipment and disinfection, they are adminis-
tered under t he direction of the chief surgeon, A. E. F. As railway units they are oper-
ated under the direction of the officer to whom they are assigned, and are repaired by the
Transportation Service.
2. Assignments of hospital trains are made by G-A; G. H. Q., to regulating officers
and to the T. M. B. at headquarters, Services of Supply.
3. An officer of the Medical Department will be assigned to each regulating station
as part of the staff of the regulating officer and as a representative of the chief surgeon
to whom commanding officers of hospital trains assigned to that station will be directly
answerable in matters pertaining to Medical Deparment administration. He will be
charged by the regulating officer with the duty of seeing that trains are at all times
ready to answer calls and are kept properly provisioned and stocked.
4. The chief surgeon. A. E. F., will allot a requisite number of beds daily to each regu-
lating officer, advising him by telegraph as to their number and location. These beds will
be reserved for the exclusive use of the regulating officer to whom allotted, and daily notice
of any changes in these credits will be furnished him. In all questions arising as to bed
credits, their sufficiency, etc.. the chief surgeon and regulating officers are authorized to
communicate direct. The latter will assign destination to hospital trains, in accordance
with the information furnished, as provided for above, and the traffic conditions at the
time of evacuation. Information regarding transportation or combat conditions which
might affect the allotment or location of beds reserved for him will be promptly commu-
nicated to the chief surgeon at headquarters. S. O. S.. by the regulating officer.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 267
5. G— i. Army, will furnish the regulating officer daily with all data bearing upon
evacuations in order that the latter may judge the sufficiency of trains and heds at his
disposition and take the necessary steps to correct a shortage in either.
6. Evacuation hospitals will report daily, or as often as may he necessary, to G— i.
Army, the following information:
(a) Number of evacuahle wounded, sitting and lying cases.
(b) Number of nonevacuable wounded.
(c) Number of evacuable sick, sitting and lying cases.
(d) Number of nonevacuable sick.
(e) Number of vacant beds.
Evacuation fkom Zone of the Ajkmies
7. G-4, Army, considering the data furnished him as provided for in paragraph (i, to-
gether with such information regarding intended operations as might have a bearing on
the evneuation situation, calls upon the regulating officer for a hospital train, giving sta-
tion and time it is desired to have the train placed. He will at the same time advise
the commanding officer of the evacuation hospital concerned of the action taken.
8. The regulating officer upon receipt of a call from G-4, Army, for a hospital train
will assign a train and arrange a necessary schedule, advising the evacuation hospital and
G-4, Army, of the probable time of arrival and the period of time allotted for loading.
The commanding officer of the evacuation hospital will be charged with seeing that the
necessary steps are taken in order that the train may be promptly loaded in the time
allotted.
i). The regulating officer will notify the commanding officer of the receiving hospital
of the contents of each train, showing the number of officers, soldiers, and enemy prison-
ers; number of sitting and lying patients; the number of contagious cases; together with
any other information which would facilitate unloading the train.
10. When American troops are operating in conjunction with French units and not
under G-4. Army, information as called for in paragraph 6 will be communicated directly
to the fourth bureau of the French army with which the American units are serving. This
bureau will call upon the French regulating officer for the necessary evacuation, and the
latter will, in consultation with the American regulating officer, arrange the schedule and
dispatch the train.
Evacuation in Zone or the Rear
11. Evacuation from hospitals in the rear of the zone of the armies will be provided
for by the T. M. B. at headquarters, S. O. S., in accordance with -requests made upon him
for this purpose by the chief surgeon, A. E. F.
Of the foregoing instructions, an especially important item was this noti-
fication to the evacuation hospital of the time allowed for loading, for failure
to complete this in the time specified prevented the train moving out on sched-
ule and resulted either in disturbing the movement of other trains or in hold-
ing the one directly concerned until another schedule could be arranged.
Later, these instructions were modified in some details, but only one need
be noted here, the others being of minor importance. It was found that in
periods of great activity at the front, communication between evacuation hos-
pitals and G-4. Army, and l>etween the regulating officer was difficult and often
much delayed through the urgent demands on the limited telephone and tele-
graph lines which were available. Authorization w^as therefore given to
modify the mechanism of evacuation by permitting hospitals to communicate
direct with the regulating officer. 3
268 FIELD OPERATIONS
In order to perform the duties with which it was charged, it was neces-
sary that the medical section of the regulating office should know, first, where —
i. e.. in what evacuation or other army hospital — there were patients to be
evacuated, together with the number, and, second, in what hospitals of the
Services of Supply there were vacant beds for patients, and the number of
beds in each of these hospitals available for the several classes of patients. For
the former regulating station received as often as necessary, by telephone or
telegraph from the hospitals it served, appropriate information concerning;
number and classification of those to be evacuated, and the possible moment
of all such movements. 3 On occasion, the evacuation officer called for extra
trains, though a need had not been shown by figures last reported by him.
During the Meuse-Argonne operation, trains were sent regularly, irrespective
of call, to each evacuation center ; e. g., two by day to Vadelaincourt, four by
day and two by night to Souilly, Froidos, etc., and these were supplemented by
other trains when reports of evacuables showed that additional trains were
needed.
The destination of a train was determined as follows : To each regulating
station was alloted, according to its needs, a certain number of beds in speci-
fied hospitals or hospital centers of the interior. Daily, or twice daily in peri-
ods of activity, each of these hospitals telegraphed to the regulating offices
the number of vacant beds remaining — medical, surgical, etc. — the telegram
giving also the number of the last hospital train received at the particular
hospital. This information having been charted, it became a simple matter
to deduct from the number of vacant beds shown on the last report the number
of patients subsequently sent and thus to determine the number of vacant beds
actually available. 8
In selecting the destination of a train the medical regulator also consid-
ered the kind of cases to be evacuated; i. e., he sent medical cases to a medical
base hospital, surgical cases to a surgical base hospital, and so on. To hospital
centers he could usually send all the classes of cases.
Preoperative trains were supplied as required to relieve overtaxed evacua-
tion hospitals and then were dispatched to the nearest base hospital. Their
use rapidly diminished as operative technique and administrative methods were
perfected, evacuation of preoperative cases falling from 11,370 in the first
phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation to 293 in the second phase. 7 Postoper-
ative cases usually were sent on American trains to base hospitals in the inter-
mediate and base sections. Mixed trains were necessary at times for preopera-
tive cases, but the development of evacuation centers did much to obviate the
necessity for resorting to this undesirable expedient.
As soon as trains were called for, destinations and schedules of marches
for them were arranged with the railway technician. The regulating officer
telephoned the evacuation hospital or evacuation officer concerned, giving the
exact load for each train, the number and type of cases, time of arrival and
departure of train at loading point, destination and stops at other evacuation
points — in case there were any — and directed the number of rations to be put
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION '2G9
on the train when rations were necessary. In case other evacuations were to
be made farther along the route, each evacuation point or collecting station
was notified in the same manner. 8
Ration orders for American trains were usually unnecessary, as these
trains commonly carried a supply of 2,000 rations and replenished them as a
routine matter; hut French trains routed by the American Expeditionary
Forces frequently needed rations. When required, they were drawn for the
train by the evacuation officer from the railhead officer nearest the loading
point. 9
The regulating officer confirmed by telegram his telephone call to the
hospitals or evacuation officer. He also sent telegrams concerning train move-
ments and evacuations to the following: G^, hospital evacuations, army;
commanding officer of base hospital at destination: other regulating officers
through whose areas trains moved; statistical department, adjutant general's
office, G. H. Q., and chief surgeon, A. E. F. A copy of each telegram sent to
the evacuation officer or commanding officer of hospital was given to the com-
manding officer of the train concerned. 9
The evacuation sending hospital took necessary measures for loading a
train in the allotted time and with only the number of patients and the type
of cases prescribed by the regulating officer. If this course was not adhered
to closely, considerable delay and probable suffering ensued, as a train some-
times was scheduled to stop for a second or third evacuation convoy and space
had to be reserved. Then, were a train to be loaded with other classes of
patients than those designated in orders, the base hospital at destination might
not l>e equipped for their care. 9
During inactive periods collecting patients from two or more evacuation
centers was possible, but the total loading time from all evacuation centers
was not allowed, as a rule, to exceed four hours, including time spent en route
from one loading point to another. 9
The regulating officer kept the chief surgeon. A. E. F., and G^, G. II. Q.,
informed daily concerning the number of available beds allotted to him after
all his trains were dispatched. 8
The army surgeon consulted the regulating officer concerning the location
of proposed train evacuation points. Reconnaissance of such points was made
by the regulating officer in conjunction with the evacuation officer of the army
and the railway technician when an important movement of the army was con-
templated. 10
The regulating officer was charged with the responsibility of making suit-
able provision for keeping trains properly stocked and provisioned at all
times. When trains were garaged at points distant from the regulating station
it was necessary to convey food and materiel to them by trucks from the depot
of the station concerned. 11
The regulating officer established a hospital train depot at some convenient
point where trains stopped in passage. Here they were supplied according to
their needs. This depot carried, among other things, special diets, medicines.
270 FIELD OPERATIONS
comforts, and the like. Personnel, food, coal, mail, packages, and articles of
train equipment arriving at the regulating station for distribution to hospital
trains were sent to this depot. When trains were garaged at points where the
services of no such depot were available and whence they would not pass a
depot, rations were drawn from the nearest railhead officers under the direc-
tion of the regulating officer. 11
Trains arranged for the exchange of litters, blankets, and other supplies
at base hospitals to which they carried patients, as directed by the chief sur-
geon. A. E. F. 12
ORGANIZATION OF MEDICAL SERVICE AT A REGULATING STATION
The following detailed description of the Medical Department organiza-
tion at a regulating station is derived from the Medical Department historical
report of the station at St. Dizier, which handled more patients than did any
other, and the history of which is most complete. The general organization
of the medical service there will be considered first, before discussing in detail
the routing of hospital trains and the office technique by which this was
effected.
Personnel of the Medical Department at a regulating station was charged,
under the station's commanding officer, with the operation of hospital trains,
maintenance of the station hospital and infirmary and emergency medical
supply dump, control of any local Medical Department reserve replacements,
care and operation of medical motor transport, and sanitary supervision of
the area.
The. senior officer of the Medical Department present, known as the medi-
cal regulator, was in charge of the movement of hospital trains and super-
vised other Medical Department activities pertaining to the station. He dis-
charged his most important duty — operation of trains — in conjunction with
the railway technician. In order to facilitate this, the train movement bureau
which was maintained in the medical regulator's office at St. Dizier was
divided into three parts: (1) Evacuation and movement of hospital trains:
(2) record of bed space available at the rear; and (3) personnel and supply
service for trains. 13 The medical regulator was in constant touch with the
army surgeon, the latter conferring with him on the selection of sites for
evacuation centers in so far as their railway facilities were concerned.
Similarly, he was in liaison with the chief surgeon, A. E. F.. who allotted
bed credits in various hospitals to the rear, with the commanding officers of
hospitals which made evacuations, with the evacuating officers of evacuation
centers, and with the railway technician. This medical regulator was respon-
sible for the efficiency of evacuation to the commanding officer of the regulat-
ing station, to the Medical Department representative with G-4 (G-4— B).
and to the chief surgeon. A. E. F. 13
The assistant to the medical regulator also had certain definite responsi-
bilities. While his chief was occupied largely with general supervision and
liaison, the assistant's interests were more local. He received reports from
ovacuation hospitals and of daily bod allotments in the rear, supervised
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 271
(with the railway technician) the movement of trains, making request of the
re<nilatin<i officer in command of the station for movement of these as needed,
and cared for the proper transmission of all orders, telegrams, and instruc-
tions, and the formulation of records. He carried out the orders of his chief
and his general policies as determined by the strategical situation at the
front and hospitalization at the rear. When day and night service was
necessary he alternated with his chief in 12-hour shifts. He had as technical
assistants a sergeant who was in charge of office routine, a corporal who
received, listed, and kept up to date the daily bed allotments, and two army
field clerks who attended to telegrams and general correspondence. 13
The hospital train supply officer was in charge of the distribution of
the materiel shipped to these units in care of the regulating officer and had
supervision of the medical supply depot if one were organized at the station.
Such a depot was stocked with rations, special diets, blankets, and miscel-
laneous medical supplies, and met emergency calls for supplies from, the
hospital trains and from sanitary formations in the regulating station district.
This officer also had charge of the laundry exchange for trains operated by
the depot, distributed mail for hospital train personnel, and issued proper
orders concerning individuals on duty with trains. In short, his duties
were similar to those of an adjutant, personnel and supply officer combined.
He was assisted by a supply sergeant, two privates, and details as required
from the casual camp. He delivered by Medical Department truck all sup-
plies required by trains and the mail of those on duty with them. 14
The total personnel on duty with the hospital train movement bureau
at St. Dizier was 3 officers, 2 field clerks, 3 noncommissioned officers, and 5
privates, including a chauffeur who drove the supply truck and the motor
car assigned to the chief of medical service for his use in visiting hospital
trains garaged at a distance from his office and depots established at railhead
for hospital trains. 13 This personnel dispatched H28 hospital trains carrying
196.018 patients from September 5 to December 1. 1918. 15
The station hospital constituted a small evacuation unit for the hospitals
of the district, and provided needed accommodation for those on duty at the
station. It was located near the railroad and the casual camp. Usually its
personnel was small — 3 officers, 2 nurses. 4 noncommissioned officers, and 10
privates — and it accommodated only 100 patients. An infirmary was operated
in connection with it, which received from hospital trains patients unable
to continue the journey and sent them to hospitals in the district. At St.
Dizier the infirmary had 106 beds and a personnel of 2 medical officers, 4
nurses. 4 noncommissioned officers, and 16 privates: it also treated casuals
and detachments in the regulating district but not attached to the station. 15
A Medical Department replacement depot for the Army, the regulating
station, and the train service was considered advisable, this to be located in
the regulating area, but no record has been found showing that such a depot
was established.
The motor transport of the station consisted of 1 touring car, 4 ambu-
lances, and 1 one and one-half ton truck. 18
272 FIELD OPERATIONS
One or more sanitary squads attached to the station supervised sanitary
conditions, including the establishment of prophylactic stations, care of watei
supply, construction and maintenance of disinfecting stations, refuse-disposal
plants, and kindred activities. 10
ROUTING OP TRAINS
Supplied with information concerning bed credits, the medical regulator
could make immediate choice of routes, the greatest latitude being allowed
him in this matter and in the selection of the destination of patients subject
to bed credits. It was greatly to his advantage to have hospital credits
widely scattered geographically, as this arrangement allowed the use of the
least congested routes and the fastest schedules, but this advantage had to
be Aveighecl carefully against possible disadvantage to patients. The problem
was thoroughly worked out by the medical regulator, who took into considera-
tion the type of sick and wounded; that is, whether the cases were pre-
operative or not. the length of time which must elapse before they could be
got to a hospital, and the hospital accommodations at destination. Considera-
tion was given also to the hospital personnel available — whether or not it
was adequate to meet the situation and also whether it was being overworked.
Unless the number of such personnel justified the eight-hour shift system,
the arrival, one after another at close intervals, of hospital trains carrying
sick and wounded, would break down any hospital, regardless of its bed
space. 17
Another consideration in routing trains and in selecting their destina-
tion was their adequacy in number. In times of great emergency at the
front, e. g., during the Meuse-Argonne operation, hospital trains were al-
ways short of the number needed. If. under these circumstances, the medi-
cal regulator had beds available at Bazoilles and Bordeaux and at several
intermediate points, he first sent his trains to hospitals at the former place
because it was nearest, the round trip to Bazoilles taking less than 24 hours,
while the round trip to Bordeaux consumed several days. French trains
were more commonly used near the front, as they could be garaged more
easily, did not need such long loading quays, and their accommodations were
more suitable for short trips; Avhile the heavier, larger American trains
carried patients farther toward the rear. As a matter of fact, in the early
part of the Meuse-Argonne operation, prior to October 15, American trains
were employed chiefly in moving patients from hospitals in the advance
section to those in the intermediate and base sections.
The strain upon hospital train service was aggravated by the fact that
large numbers of slightly sick and wounded men who should have been retained
in the army zone were sent to the rear. They had slipped through triages and
field hospitals at a time when pressure was so great that they could not be given
more than the most casual examination there and had been given the benefit
of any doubt as to their condition. Then, when these patients once reached
evacuation hospitals there was no place to which to send them except to the
base hospitals. 17
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 273
During the Meuse-Argonne operation, when a constant succession of sup-
ply trains was moving through the regulating station at St. Dizier, and when
67 hospital trains were in constant service, there was never a time when rear-
ward movement of the latter was obstructed by railway congestion, although
there were many occasions when the shortage of engines and hospital cars
caused the deepest anxiety. So heavy were the demands made upon hospital
trains that at this time the French complained that their technical railway per-
sonnel had no opportunity to inspect or to oil and make minor repairs to the
rolling stock borrowed from them, and that they feared breakdown of the
evacuation service if demands did not lessen soon. Fortunately, the armistice
followed very shortly. 3
In the following discussion the term " train " is sometimes used in the
sense of a train trip ; that is, its round trip from the garage to the front to the
destination in the rear and return to the garage. Whenever used in this sense
the exact meaning is made clear by the context.
In view of the fact that regulating stations were new in our service, and
also because of the great exactitude with which trains schedules had to be ar-
ranged, the most important details in the operation of the medical regulator's
office are given below. 18
Control of evacuations by railway transport was essentially technical and
required minute attention to details. Close liaison was necessary between army
sanitary formations, railway authorities and the hospitals of the advance,
intermediate, and base sections. To carry out its purpose in the simplest and
most effective manner, the medical regulator's office at St. Dizier instituted a
daily routine and a system of special form and records. While a copy of each
of the forms which will now be mentioned was made a part of the historical
report of that office, these are not reproduced here, a mere statement of their
designation and a very brief description of their purport being considered
sufficient. 18
(Jrottp 1. — Preparation for evacuation :
Form 1. Daily evacuation chart.
Form 2. Daily garage list.
Form 3. Trip slate.
Form 4. Area map.
Form 5. List of trains regulated.
(troup 2. — Choice of destination:
Form 6. Daily average bed allotments.
Form 7. Individual hospital bed records.
Form 8. Current vacant bed list.
Form 9. Load and destination sheet.
Form 10. Daily report of beds allotted, used, remaining.
Ctrottp 3. — Dispatch of trains:
Form 11. Request for movement of trains.
Form 12. Telegrams from regulating officer.
Form 13. Dispatching slate.
274 FIELD OPERATIONS
Group 4. — Reports:
Form 14. Telegrams from commanding officer of train.
Form 15. Detraining slate and train report.
Form 16. Ten-day report.
Form 17. Permanent record book, by months.
Group 5. — Filing system:
Memorandum.
As noted above, each evacuation hospital reported twice daily, or oftencr
if necessary, by telephone or telegraph, the number of recumbent and sitting
cases evacuable, classified as follows : Preoperative, postoperative, sick, gassed,
allies, prisoners, contagious cases, and neurological. From all these reports
an " evacuation chart " (Form 1) was made up. Hospitals were then evacuated
as the chart indicated, without requests on their part. If any evacuation hos-
pital had special need for a train, request was made to the regulating officer,
with the information as above. A train would be sent, the number of evacu-
ations deducted, and the chart balanced. 1 ' 1 A large map also was used, and
each day the evacuable cases, recumbent and sitting, were indicated for each
evacuation hospital. This map showed also trains in garage as per daily
garage list. A new map was needed daily, showing location of all railheads,
evacuation hospitals, railways and garages. 2 " The central idea was that the
medical regulator should keep evacuation hospitals clear of evacuables without
waiting for requests for their removal. With him the service became rather
routine, an accumulation of evacuable cases calling automatically for evacua-
tion. A daily garage list was made up and corrected every morning. It
showed the location of trains actually in garage, at what points they were, and
trains expected in during the day. These trains were then indicated on the area
map. Trains en route were shown on what was called a " trip slate," loaded
trains in red, returning trains in blue. All trains in advance of the regulat-
ing station ran at the same speed and became part of a continuous stream.
Hospital trains could move no faster than freight trains, each having to keep
its place in line. 21
The destination of trains required another set of reports. Every morn
ing — and oftener during active periods — the regulating officer received a tele-
graphic statement of the number of vacant beds in each base hospital or hospi-
tal center at the disposition of the regulating station. The chief surgeon, A. E.
F., sent this information, consolidated, concerning hospitals in the base sec-
tions, but the hospitals and hospital centers in the advance and intermediate
sections telegraphed it direct to the regulating officer, giving the number of
beds available for the next 24 hours, medical, surgical, and contagious, also
the number of the last train arriving with patients. An officer had charge
of this " bed space " and kept a chart for each hospital, deducting subsequent
arrivals from the last report. He was prepared to give the bed status of any
hospital at any hour of the day. 22 A combined chart showed at a glance the
status of all the hospitals, and the net balance gave the total beds available.
Before asking the railway authorities for a train it was necessary to give its
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 275
destination. In rush times, when minutes had to he saved, the train depart-
ment merely asked the bed space department for a destination for a train car-
rying a certain number of medical and surgical cases, specifying whether a
point in the advance, intermediate, or base section was preferred. A daily
report of beds allotted and evacuations made was sent to the chief surgeon,
A. E. F., and to G-4, Gr. H. Q., A. E. F., at Chaumont. A permanent record
hook with complete records of each day's evacuations was kept. 23
When patients were to be evacuated a request was made to the technical
service (French) of the railway company, showing places to be evacuated,
train desired, number of recumbent and sitting patients and destination.
This request was made on French blank, Form No. 11. If approved, notice
was given to the evacuation hospital concerned, so that loading could com-
mence as soon as the train reached the platform. When the train schedule
was furnished a telegram was sent immediately to each of the following:
Chief surgeon's office; troops movement bureau of section concerned; com-
manding officer of train; commanding officer of hospital to be evacuated:
commanding officer of receiving hospital: regulating officer of area through
which train was to pass; and G-4, G. H. Q., statistical bureau. These tele-
grams followed established forms and gave the number of the train, the
place of loading, date and hour of departure, destination and hour of arrival,
number of patients, recumbent, sitting, wounded, gassed, medical, insane,
and so on, number of rations to be furnished, and instructions as to whether
patients were to be fed before loading or at certain points en route. 24
The commanding officer of a hospital train en route sent a telegram to
his regulating officer, confirming it by mail, giving complete detailed infor-
mation regarding the evacuation. The blank 15-A gave detailed information
as to classes of cases, nationality, rank, hours of movement and time of de-
training. A separate slate was kept for each day's evacuations, showing
every train sent and giving exact information in detail concerning each
movement. Every ten days a report was sent from the regulating officer
to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., to G-4, G. H. Q., and to G-4:. Army, showing
the trains moved each day and the patients carried. A complete daily record
for statistical purposes was also kept of each day's evacuations.-"'
When the St. Mihiel operation was projected, the chief surgeon. First
Army, had estimated that our casualties would be 33,000. In point of fact
there were less than 7,000 during the actual operation. In anticipation of
this operation, garage and entraining points and supply agencies were estab-
lished, and 45 French trains of different types were obtained similar to those
used later in the Meuse-Argonne operation (see description in earlier portion
of this chapter), for French trains to this number were considered adequate
in view of the short hauls necessary to base hospitals in the advance sec-
tion. 28 After these hospitals were filled, secondary evacuations were made
from them to hospitals farther in the interior, the better equipped but more
unwieldy American trains being used for this purjxtse. The latter trains
were also used for long hauls from the front into the interior. Trains
276
FIELD OPERATIONS
evacuating the army area were routed by the regulating station at St. Dizier,
others by the regulating station at Is-sur-Tille. Bed credits given the former,
however, could not always be used, for during this period all railways were
so badly congested that there was very little choice of routes. This resulted
in an unequal distribution of patients, some hospitals being overcrowded,
while others had considerable empty bed space. 17
Similar arrangements were made during the Meuse-Argonne operation,
but casualties were so numerous then that transportation facilities were taxed
to the utmost. During this operation, 154,898 casualties from the American
First and Second Armies were transported on American trains and on those
rented from the French. 4 Until October 14, Is-sur-Tille regulating station
was charged with only secondary evacuation. On and after the 15th it par-
ticipated in evacuations from the front. 27 During this operation, 11 American
trains made 114 evacuations in 47 days; each train averaged a round trip in
four and one-half days. 28
The time in hours required for trains to make runs from evacuation points
in the Meuse-Argonne operation to the various hospitals is shown in the fol-
lowing table :
Table 5. — Number of hours required for trains to make runs from evacuation points to
hospitalization points, Meuse-Argonne operation"
Evacuation
t ,oint Chau- Vit-
mnnt tel
Toul 6
Froidos 10
Souilly 9!"
Argoiice front— . 8
Dijon
5) ■,
14
14
12'j
Alle-
i ey
Paris
10
12
14
161,
L5
14
18
]•>'.,
13' 2
I6«
15> 2
Hospitalization point
Clrr-
ves
' ™;;; m «» I *r *»»-»
2(11.,
IK'.., 2fi
20 2V 2
17?-,,' 22 2.5 > ,
21! 2 32H 29
21 ' j 2li' 2 27' 2
Limo-
ges
24
Peri- Bor-
gueox deaux
25)2
22! i 30
26!* 30W
The following tables and notes pertain to evacuation from the front only
and do not take cognizance of " secondary " evacuations, i. v.. evacuations
which cleared advanced base hospitals into hospitals farther to the rear:
Table 6. — Evacuations by hospital trains, regulating station, Oretl, Oise, February 17 to
July IS, WIS, 1st and 26th Divisions
Month
En-
Officers listed
Total Kn ' m ' h Limited Tliua French Effectives
trains evacuations trains
Position
F e b r u a r y.
March.
April
May.
June.
July..
Grand tohil
■304
71
304
71
22 1,287 1,300
1,580 1,012
" 340 340
10 Feb. 17-Apr.
10
3
10
Apr. 18-July
17.
401
3, 325
54 I 3,672 3, 726 » 95 .3,726
12 26th Division. .. Soissons (AJsneJ
area.
83 1st Division Cantigny, Pieardy,
area.
Two divisions.. . On detached serv-
ice with French
Army.
05
■Classifications as to officers and enlisted men not given in French reports; therefore monthly totals carried tf
enlisted men to balance totals,
h Forty-nine of these trains carried less than 25 Americans.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
277
NOTE ON TAHLK 0, BY MEDICAL REGULATOR
All evacuations by hospital trains regulated l>y the medical regulator. American
regulating station at Creil, were made on French hospital trains. The medical regulator
worked in liaison with the "Service de SantS " French regulating station, by whom the
records contained herein were furnished. The records are complete in the period from
May 18 to June 18, when careful record was kept by the regulating officer. After June 17
the French and American regulating stations for the Picardy area moved from Creil to
N'antes, Seine, due to the severity of the nightly air raids, and as the medical regulator
remained at Creil as regulating officer until the end of the month, the records furnished
later by the " Service de SanteV' Nantes, were not complete as to classification, entraining,
ami detraining stations. Before May 17 the records in the same manner are incomplete, as
the American regulating station, a new function of the Army, was not fully organized.
Several hundred American wounded from the 1st Division were discharged from French
evacuation hospitals and sent by passenger trains to the replacement depot at Noyers
and St. Aignan. Of these, records were unavailable. Upon completion of duty at Creil
( the end of June) the medical regulator was assigned to Le Bourget (Seine) regulating
station in charge of evacuations by hospital trains from the army known as the " Paris
Group."
During the Cantigny offensive, t lie American wounded and sick on leaving the di-
visional (1st Division) sanitary formations were hospitalized in French evacuation hos-
pitals at Beauvais, Poix, Crevecceur, etc., whence they were evacuated in French hospital
trains to French base hospital centers in the rear. In so far as possible, trains carry-
ing American and French patients were directed to hospital centers containing American
and French base hospitals. As often as railroad conditions permitted, trains were directed
through St. Germain, Seine (near Paris), where they were stopped, and the district
surgeon (Paris) transported by ambulance such cases as were transportable to American
hospitals in Paris. The Paris surgeon hospitalized in Paris, 1.SS0 Americans, regulated
through Creil on 32 French trains.
In order to hospitalize American patients in American hospitals, plans were made to
install an American evacuation center at Beauvais to receive American divisional wounded
from the area, from which center American hospital trains might evacuate the wounded
direct to American base hospitals. As the division was temporarily on detached serv-
ice with the French Army and as the Chateau-Thierry operation started about the time
the plans were formulated, they did not materialize.
Table
-Evacuations by hospital trains, regulating station, Connantre, Marne, October .}
ro November 5. 1918, 2d and SGth Divisions
Monti;
Cases
(un- French
classi- trains
fiod)
October - 8,307
November 75
Total - 8.442
Limits of evacua-
tions
Oct. 4-N'ov. 5.
Effectives
Position
2nd Division; 36th Divi-
sion.
Champagne sector.
NOTE ON TABLE
HY BEGULATINO. OFFICER '
The 2d and 30th Divisions were on detached service with the French Fourth Army
and were in the lines in front of St. Etienne above Suippes (Marne). The limits of opera-
tions refer to the evacuations only, for although both divisions were moved to the Argonne
area after a successful operation ending about October 10 the evacuations continued t<>
November 11. The attack started October 2.
The evacuations were all made on French hospital trains loaned to the American
regulating officer at Connantre by the French (Service de Snnte. Regulatriee) Connantre.
278
FIELD OPERATIONS
The records (unclassified), as shown herewith, were furnished by the French. Hos-
pitalization in the "bases" was furnished (by telephone) by the regulating station, St.
Dizier, which at that time received all the available bed space in the advance, intermedi-
ate, and base section hospitals for trains dispatched from the front. No American trains
were available for the Connantre evacuations, as the need in the Argonne section was so
great.
Table 8. — Evacuations by hospital trains, regulating station, Dunkerque, ~Nord, October
29 to December 25, 91st and 37th Divisions
Month
October
November. .
December . .
TotaL
Offi-
cers
38
Total offi- F h
ccrsanden- t m
listed men
647
2, 953
1.011
Limits of operations
Effectives
Oct. 29-Dec. 12-.
91st Division; 37th Di- Ypres sector,
vision.
Position
-NOTE ON TAULE S, BY REGULATING OFFICER
These divisions were on detached service with the French Army in Belgium. Although
all fighting had ceased on November 11 (the armistice), the evacuations continued through
December 24. as shown by the attached records. The evacuations were made on French
trains loaned by the French regulating station, Dunkerque. The French furnished these
reports for the American regulating officer, Dnnkerqae, and they are included herewith to
make the figures of all evacuations by hospital trains from the front complete.
Tari.e !). — Evacuation bit hospital trains, regulating station, he Bourijct. Seine. June .) to
October 25, 1918, Paris Group Army
Month
Wound
ed
Juno 2,577
July 25.4H3
August 13,072
.September 2,445
October.. 28
Total 44.205
Classification (per 7X
cent).
Enemy Ameri-
Stck Gassed ,„7„, Allies prison- can
ers officers
763
4,813
3, 71*;
317
w, raw
IS
007
2. 04!)
1. 186
1,002
4, 844
total
3, 947
32, 34.".
18,574
3, 764
28
58, 058
100
105 103
,
I I)
11
592
507
42
103 1,152
H 2
Ameri-
can en-
listed
men
3, 030
31, 545
18,067
3, 722
28
, 298
»7H
A meri-
Ameri-
French
Total
total
t rains
trains
trains
3,947
11
3
14
32, 137
56
84
140
18,574
45
55
i.
3,764
4
34
38
28
5
58, 4.50
116
181
297
Table 10. — Separate operations in the Chateau-Thierry operation
Limit of evacuations
Effectives
Position
Juno 4-Oct. It.
Total
French
July 17-Aug. 28 1st Division; 2d Di- Soissons area, Aisne... 10,456
vision.
Aug. 28-Sept. 14 | 32d Division.,. Juvigny, Aisne, Sois- 2,295
sons area.
Paris group army Chateau-Thierry, 58,658
SoissODS area.
Total Chateau-Thierry evacuations, including ambulances, 71,409.
NOTE OX TABLE 10. BY REGULATING OFFICER 1
Ameri-
can
trains
Total
trains
French
trains car-
rying less
than 25
Americans
117
8
125
75
31
5
36
24
181
116
207
121
At the beginning of June, when the 2d Division went out into the lines, west of
Chateau-Thierry, a large number of divisional wounded were hospitalized in evacuation
GENERAL VIEW OP MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 279
centers at Juilly and Meaux (Seine et Marne) and in French evacuation hospitals in that
area. The chief surgeon (Paris district) relieved the pressure at the evacuation center,
Juilly, by evacuating in ambulances 2,177 cases to the Paris hospitals, a distance of 20
kilometers. Other ambulance evacuations were made to French hospital centers, the
figures for which are not available.
The official limits of operations differ from the limits of evacuations in that evacua-
tions usually commenced the day the operations started, but continued until the evacua-
tion centers closed, which was sometimes several weeks after operations had ceased. For
(sample, the 1st and 2d Divisions started their offensive near Soissons about the 17th of
July and were out of the lines within five days. The evacuations from that area started
the day the offensive began and continued until August 27, a great many Americans hav-
ing remained in American and in French hospitals in that locality, although the divisions
had moved to another area. Likewise, the 32d Division started operations at Juvigny
(Aisne) near Soissons on August 28 and evacuations continued until September 15.
although the division was taken out of the lines after the first week. A large number
of French trains during the whole Chateau-Thierry operation carried only 1 to 2."
Americans from French evacuation hospitals. They are reported herewith to make
reports complete, but should not be counted as full trainloads of Americans.
The records on French trains were furnished by the French medical regulator, at Le
Bourget, who generously loaned French trains during the intensive period of the Soissons
operation, at which time there was a shortage of American trains and a pressing need for
French trains for French evacuations. The 17 American, 3 British, and 35 French trains
on duty at the Le Bourget regulating station were in constant circulation for several
weeks, and on several occasions the supply of trains on hand was exhausted. From
September 7 to October 14, all evacuations from the Chateau-Thierry area were made on
French trains, every American train having been dispatched to the St. Mihiel area pending
the attack by the First Army. The French generously provided French trains to take their
place at Le Bourget.
During the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons operation, the wounded for the most part were
transported on American hospital trains. Up to July 17, 7 American trains were ga-
raged in 1 central garage. Pantin, near Le Bourget, and 10 more with the 3 British trains
arrived shortly after. Trains were dispatched from Pantin to the evacuation hospital
centers as indicated by G— 1, Army (Paris group) who placed the calls for trains. This
system of calling for trains through G— 4, Army, was unsatisfactory, in that trains were
called for in anticipations of loads at the evacuation centers which sometimes never ar-
rived. For example, two trains called for at Coulommiers (Marne) and one at La Ferte
Gaucher (Marne) were dispatched from those points only half filled, the hospitals not
having enough to complete the loads. The trains left on the scheduled time as designated,
for the railroad traffic was very heavy and could not be blocked pending the arrival of
more patients. Furthermore, every available bed space on trains was in urgent demand and
several hundred wounded from the 1st and 2d Divisions needing transportation were ly-
ing without cover at Crepy-en-Valois (Oise). In one day during this period, as many
as 4!) French and American hospital trains were dispatched by the regulating station. Le
Hourget, on French and American evacuations. These with troops, supply, and ammuni-
tion trains created stupendous traffic on the railroad lines.
The difficulty was chiefly in faulty telephone connections between the evacuation
centers, which were some distance from (G— 1. Army) La Ferte-sous-.Touarre, Marne, and
between (G-4, Army) the regulating station, Le Bourget. It took so long to transmit
calls that conditions at the evacuation centers oftentimes changed and trains already
dispatched could not be diverted. G-4, Army, had no telephone connections at the be-
ginning of the attack with the evacuation centers (1st and 2d Divisions) located in the
vicinity of Crepy-en-Valois, so that the medical regulator prepared his evacuations direct
with the evaluation centers and received the necessary information on evacuables with
greater efficiency and in shorter time. The same system was finally used for the evacua-
tion centers at Coulommiers, La Ferte Gaucher, and Chateau-Thierry and proved more
satisfactory.
280
FIELD OPERATIONS
Daily available bed space (5,000) at base hospital centers in the rear was furnished
by telegram from the chief surgeon's office, S. O. S., and the medical regulator thus co-
ordinated the evacuations from the evacuation centers at the front direct to the rear.
At first, bed spaces were furnished by the chief surgeon, Paris district, and the primary
and secondary evacuations from the Paris Group area were coordinated through his office.
They worked well, the telephone conditions being good, but the system required at best
the passing of necessary information through another bureau and necessitated further
delays. The bed reports (base hospitals) were finally telephoned direct to the regulating
officer after July 24, so that with number of evacuable cases, the bed reports at the bases
and the regulation of trains in one bureau, the regulating officer was enabled to direct
the evacuations with greater efficiency and in shorter time.
Table 11.
-Evacuation by hospital trains, regulating station, St. Dizier,
September 5 to December 1, 1918, (First ArmyV 2
Ilaute Marne.
Month
1 1
Wounded 1 Sick Gassed
Grand
total
|Enemy i Amer-
Allies : prison- ican
ers officers
Ameri-
can en-
listed
men
37, 412
105,932
Amer-
ican
total
Amer-
ican
trains
52
72
40
French
trains
.54
228
83
Total
trains
September __
22, 907 1 15, 619 1, 083 39, 609
55,568 1 38,712 1 16,079 110,359
17,434 25,745 , 2,871 , 46,050
380 , 928 1 889
739 1 1,019 2,669
234 753 ' 970
38, 301
108. 601
100
300
Xovember.
44, 093 45, 063
123
Total
95,909 | 80,076 20,033 ,196,018
1, 353 2, 700 4, 528
187,437 191,968
164 , 365 j 529
Percentage
48.9 40.9 10.2 inn
. 7 ' 1. 4 2. 3
95. 6 97. 9
Table 12. — Operations in the St. Dizier, regulating station figures'-
Effectives
Limits of evacuations
September 12-26.
September 26-Novcmber 12.
October 10-25
September 5- December 1
Positions
First Army.-- St. M ill iel sector 21,009
Totals
.do i Meuse-Argonne sector..
Second Army--.- Toul sector _
First Army, Second Army St. Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne sectors.
150,350
4, MS
196, 018
NOTE ON TABLE 12, BY REGULATING OFFICER
The Second Army was formed October 12 and occupied the Toul sector. The regulat-
ing station, St. Dizier, continued to make evacuations from the Second Army evacuation
center, Toul, until October 25, after which these were made by the regulating station.
Is-sur-Tille.
Table 13. — Record of evacuations made by trains regulated at St. Dizier**
Operations
United
States
trains
French Total
Daily
average
St. Mihiel (Sept. 12-25)--.
Argonne (Sept. 26-Nov. 11)
Before St. Mihiel (Sept. 5-11)
After Argonne (Nov. 12-30)
Total evacuations (Sept. 5-N'ov. 30)
29
28
57
4
114
304
418
|
6
6
1
15
33
48
JM
365
529
During the St. Mihiel operation 7 United States trains were on duty dur-
ing 14 days, making 28 evacuations. One train made 7 trips. The aver-
age number of trips per train was 4; the average length of round trips.
31/2 days.
During the Argonne operation 11 United States trains were on duty dur-
ing 47 days, making 114 evacuations. One train made 14 trips. The
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 281
average number of trips per train was 10.36; the average length of round
trips, 414 clays.
The average load for French trains was about one-half that of American
trains. For this reason the latter, in the St. Mihiel operation, made more
evacuations than were made by French trains, but they made short trips into
the zone of the advance, just as did the French. On the other hand, in evacua-
tions from the Argonne, American trains were used on long trips into inter-
mediate and base sections, while French trains were used for short trips, the
numbers carried thus balancing more nearly those carried on French trains. 28
One of the essential features which made for the success of evacuation
through St. Dizier during the Meuse-Argonne operation was the excellence
of telephone communication between that station and the evacuation points,
on the one hand, and the office of the chief surgeon. A. E. F., on the other,
thus enabling it, with the least possible delay, to coordinate evacuations direct
to bases from the front. An officer from G^4, G. H. Q., and the evacuation
officer representing the army surgeon, at Souilly, controlled movement of
evacuables from evacuation centers and coordinated them through an officer
at every such center charged solely with control of evacuations and loading of
patients on trains. These officers represented both the army surgeon and
the fourth section of the general staff. This system obviated the necessity
for sending calls through another bureau. 33
In order to avoid the mistake of calling for hospital trains when they
were not actually needed, or of dispatching trains not fully loaded, and
for the purpose of furnishing more accurate information for the evacuation
department so that equipment at the disposal of the regulating officer could
be used to the maximum advantage, the system of evacuation, as outlined
herewith in brief, was adopted at St. Dizier in preference to that used during
operations in the Chateau-Thierry sector. 32
Evacuation centers at Souilly, Toul, Fleury, Yaubecourt, Froidos, etc.,
telephoned the regulating officer daily (8 a. m. and 8 p. m.) or as often as
necessary, the number of patients to be evacuated, classified. They did not
call for any specific number of trains, simply giving the number and type of
patients to be evacuated. Supplied with these data the medical regulator
arranged for a sufficient number of trains completely to evacuate all trans-
portable patients, telephoning the evaluation centers information as to the
nwrche of trains, the time allowed for loading, and the number and types
of patients to be loaded. Trains best equipped for carrying particular loads
were chosen. This was important because the equipment of the station consisted
of 43 French trains, varying in carrying capacity from 86 to 700 places, be-
sides 14 American trains. Officers at the evacuation centers saw to it that
trains were loaded within the allotted time, though the personnel engaged
in this work often labored 48 hours without rest. Each train was loaded
with the type of patients specified and was dispatched to hospitals prepared
to care for the kind of patients delivered to them. Upon completion of
evacuations, trains were immediately ordered back to garage.''-
282
FIELD OPEKATIONS
Table 14. — Daily record of trains sent from each evacuation center, served by St. Dkier
regulating station, St. Mihiel and Mcusc-Argonnc operations**
Evacuation centers
September
5
6
7
8
1
9 10
1
11
1
12
3
13
4
1
M 15
3 3
... 1
16
4
17 , 18 19
44 4
20
21
1
22 23
2 1
24
4
25
1
211
27
1
28
29
30
Toul
1
1
1
1
1
...
1 .
---
1 .1.1
1 1
3
1
1
1
3
2
2
2
2
5
3
2
2
2
1
4
1
1
1 ... 2... 1 ... 1
1
1
1
3
1
4
1
1
2
1
2
3
6
3
7
4
6
4 7
3 3 3
8
3
5
6
11
II
U
Evaluation
October
November
centers
1
'-'
3 4
5
6
:
8
9
10
2
1
3
4
1
3
11
1 :
11 12 13
11
5 3 3
3 3..
12 2
4 2 2
14
"i
3
1
2
1
15
1
5
2
1
2
1
16
'5
2
1
3
17
2
5
2
1
2
2
1
15
18
1
4
3
2
1
1
1
13
19
"4
2
1
1
1
1
10
20
2
3
2
I
"I
13
21
1
4
2
1
"I
9
22
1
1
2
2
1
1
8
23
3
3
2
1
1
10
24
?.
25
1
5
26
1
3
2
2
"i
9
27
2
3
3
2
3
13
28
2
2
1
2
1
1
9
29
3
1
1
1
30 31
9 9.
1
2
3
4
1
5
3
1
2
2
6
3
2
2
2
1
7
3
1
1
1
8
2
2
1
1
2
1
9 10
3 1
11
Toul
Vadclaincourt..
Souillv
1
5
2
2
1
1
15
'I
3
2
3
2
11
1 ..
5 3
1 6
2 1
3 2
.. 1
1213
2
3
3
4
1
13
"5
2
1
2
2
10
"5
4
1
2
2
11
"2
2
2
2
8
2
1
2
1
9
3 2
3
Vaubecourt
1 1
9.
3..
1
3 1, 3 2
lL.
2 2 3 1
1
1
1
1
3
2
1
2
14
2
1
1
3
1 1
Villers Daucourt
Revigny..
14
1 ..
1
1
'l 1
1
1
1
Total loadings
13 7
1
11
12
11
6
9
!l
6 12
7
s
111
(i
9
S
ii
Table 15. — Number of trips made by hospital trains in the performance of evacuation 37 '
Regulating station
American
trains
116
164
French trains
carrying less
5JJ* AnSs
tralns and included
in total
trains
Total
Creil
95 49
181 121
365
34
16
us
»;
m
}4
Dunkcrque
M
Total
280
691 171)
k\
Table 16. — Summary, classified by officers, enlisted men, and types of patients evacuated*
Chateau-Thierry
St. Mihiel
Argonne °
Total
Per
cent
2
97'-2
H
Evacua-
tions
Percent Evacua-
leriem tions
1W 1 400
Per cent
Evacua-
tions
Per cent
Evacua-
tions
1,001
2
%' i
!'■>
3,752
118, |.-,7
2,989
2
m
5. 151
43,385 96 19,865
209 2H 1 "44
211.407
Others
3.W2
Total
100
44,595
100 21,009 100 1.54,898
100 | 220.502
78
15
7
34,741
53 11.246 51
79,415
56, 015
19, 468
60 ' 125,402
Sick
Total
6,913 45 9,501 36
2,941 2 262 13
32 i 72,429
8 22. BTl
100
44,595 i 100 21,009 1 100
154, 898
100
220, 502
38.700
Grand total L.
259.202
"Second Army evacuations from Toul, October 10 to 25, 4,548. Total Argonne First Army evacuations, 150,350 on W*
hospital trains.
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 283
Table 17. — Hospital trains employed*
3sssH"t.Mii*i
Argonne
Total
Between Grand
offensives total
78 29
135 28
114
304
221
467
42 263
118 586
Total -.
213 57
418
688
161 849
Table IS. — Evacuations by trains from First Army, September 5 to December 1 (includ-
ing both St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations)*
Month
Wound-
ed
Sick
Gassed
Total
Allies
Prison-
ers
Amer-
ican
officers
Amer-
ican
enlisted
37,412
105, 932
44, 093
Total
Amer-
ican
French
trains
Amer-
ican
trains
September - -
October
22,907
55, 568
17, 434
15,619
38,712
25, 745
1,083
16,079
2,871
39, 609
110, 359
46, 050
360 | 928
739 1,019
234 753
889
2, 669
970
38, 301
108.601
45,063
52
72
40
54
228
83
Total. ..
95, 909
80, 076
20,033
196,018
1, 333 2. 700
4,528
187,437
191,965
164
365
NOTE ON TABLE 1 S
The incidence of influenza in the last week in September, the rising curve in October,
and the fall in November are indicated by the column of " sick." This epidemic was re-
sponsible for a large number of evacuations, as the First Army lacked a convalescent
camp within its area and possessed small hospitalization in its immediate rear ; the con-
verse holding for the Second Army, based upon Toul, with Its numerous barracks.
Table 10. — Summary of evacuations from the front by hospital trains"
Regulating stations
Departments
Positions
Soissons and
Picardy.
Chateau-Thierry
sector, Soissons
sector.
[St. Mihiel
■1 Meuse-Argonne.. .
[Toul Sector
Champagne Sector.
ypres Sector
Troops
26th Division, 1st Divi-
sion.
Paris group army ...
First Army.
Second Armv
do*
2d Division, 36th Division.
91st Division, 37th Divi-
sion.
Time of
evacuations
CreiJ
Feb. 17-July 10.
June 4-Oct. 26.
Haute Murne
['Sept. 5-Dec. 1.
i
Oct. 4-N'ov. 4.
Oct. 29- Dec. 25.
Regulating stations
Creil
Le Bourget .
St. Dizier...
Connantre_.
Duakerque.
Wounded
"3, 726
44, 205
95,909
« 8, 442
•4,611
Percentages by classes
(approximate)..
156,893
00
Sick
80. 076
1,685
32
Gassed
4,844
20, 033
24, 877
8
Grand
total
3, 726
58,658
196, 018
8,442
4,611
Prison-
ers
Allies
271, 455
100
103
2,700
105
1,353
Enlisted
men
3,672
57,298
187, 437
8,442
4,522
2,803
1
1,458 261,371
Officers
Total
Ameri-
cans
'54
1, 152
4.528
(»)
'89
3.726
58. 1.50
191,965
8,442
4,611
5,823
2
267, 194
98H
•SecoDdArmy evacuations from Toul, October 10 to October 25.4,548 on six American and three French trains,
included. With American grand total. 267,194 and 2,177, transported by ambulance to Paris in June, gives grand total of
2f»,371 Americans.
' Classified as wounded (battle casualties from front) . Records of sick, wounded, and gassed, unclassified, in French
train reports.
■ Records of officers incomplete in French train reports. Records of allies and prisoners unclassified, as wounded,
«ick, and gassed, and as to officers and enlisted men in French train reports. Thus officers and enlisted men refer to
Americans only.
284
FIELD OPERATIONS
The most important facts concerning the activities of the regulating sta-
tion at Is-sur-Tille are given in Tables 20, 21, and 22. The first evacuations
made by hospital trains operated by this station occurred in March, 1918. 27
The number of hospital trains at the disposition of the regulating officer
was at first considered inadequate to meet anticipated demands, but, as it
proved, evacuations during the active four days of the St. Mihiel operation
were far less than had been expected. The Meuse-Argonne operation, how-
ever, during the first, second, and third weeks of October, together with the
epidemic of influenza, which spread rapidly throughout the army at the time,
caused double the number of evacuations which would have been required with
a normal sick rate. 32
From September 26 to October 14, 1918, the regulating station at Is-sur-
Tille controlled many of the secondary evacuations, by which is meant evacua-
tions from base hospitals in the zone of the advance to others nearer base
ports. 27 It was the practice during that period to send patients by train from
evacuation hospitals to base hospitals in the zone of the advance, whence, as
opportunity offered, other trains took them farther to the rear. Hospital train
equipment at this time was inadequate and it was only by the utmost care and
by the narrowest margin that trains were able to keep the evacuation hospitals
cleared. Hospital trains were sent preferably to forward base hospitals, be-
cause of the shorter hauls, and then, during lulls in fighting, they cleared
those hospitals in turn, in preparation for later short hauls from the front
when heavy fighting was resumed. A round trip between the front and the
hospitals in the advance section required some 24 hours or less, while between
the front and the hospitals in the base sections a round trip required about
a week. Had trains been employed frequently in the first instance for the
long hauls congestion in evacuation hospitals would have been inevitable.
Only during intermissions in the conflict and when casualties diminished in
the latted part of October did long hauls become practicable. After October
14, when the demands for hospital trains at evacuation hospitals diminished,
it became possible to move patients direct from the front to base hospitals
well toward the rear, and then the former system, with the secondary evacua-
tions incident thereto was discontinued. 27
In selecting garages for hospital trains, four considerations were taken
into account by the Is-sur-Tille regulating station: Sufficiency of siding space,
engine terminals, location of base hospitals, and base of supply. The follow-
ing garages were used by the Is-sur-Tille regulating station for trains assigned
to it : "
Table 20. — Hospital train garages
Location
Capacity
(trains)
Capacity
i
2
1
1
1 !
1
]
Vittcl
Capacity
(trains)
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 285
The following evacuations were effected from base hospitals in the ad-
vance section to hospitals in intermediate and base sections: 27
Table 21. — Evacuations from l>a-«c hospitals in advance section, A. E. F.
Month 1918
French American
trains trains
March 3
April ... 4
May 3
June - - _.- - 3
July.... 2
August - 16
September 9 36
October 66 . 33
November 16 | 7
Total, patients : ...
Taisle 22. — Evacuations effected by regulating station at Is-sur-Tille 21
Patients
1,128
1, 396
1,080
1,300
610
5,780
16, S52
31,777
8,198
67, 821
Types and locations of hospitals concerned in the evacuations
Number
of trains Kindoftrain
used
Patients evacuated from evacuation hospitals to hospitals in the advance section from
Sept. 26 to Oct. 14, 1918, inclusive - —
Patients evacuated from evacuation hospitals to base hospitals in the near intermedi-
ate section (Dijon, Bcaune, Allerey, Mesves, and Mars)
Patients evacuated from evacuation hospitals to distant intermediate and base section
hospitals _
Patients evacuated from evacuation hospitals in the advance section from Oct. 15 to
Nov. 11, inclusive.-
Patients evacuated from evacuation hospitals in the near intermediate section
Patients evacuated from evacuation hospitals to hospitals in the far intermediate
section
Patients evacuated from evacuation hospitals to hospitals in the base section
Number of secondary evacuations from base hospitals in the advance section to dis-
tant hospitals in the intermediate section base
Secondary evacuations from base hospitals in the advance section to hospitals in the
base section
Total
26 American.
84 French
28 American.
56 French
3 American..
42 French.
127 do..
5
52
49
16
2
American.
do
American-
French
293
Patients
II. l.T.
28,806
12,472
17,947
1,260
15,282
39, 074
2,453
28,246
15, 110
7,945
560
108, 770
Tart.e 23. — Assignment of hospital trains to regulating stations, September 26 to
November 11, 1918
Regulating station ' Kind of train Number
1918
Sept. 26-Oct. 14 Is-sur-Tille.
do
St. Dizier ..
1 do
Oct 15-Xot. 11 Is-sur-Tille .
do
St. Dizier.
American.
French
American.
French
American -
French
American .
11
34
in
i In
.do...: French.
I
• The report of St. Dizier states that its equipment consisted of 14 American and 43 French trains.
While the station at Is-sur-Tille was concerned for a brief period with
secondary evacuations from the zone of the advance, other secondary evacua-
tions were conducted directly by the office of the chief surgeon, A. E. F., at
Tours. Trains operated in the zone of the armies were assigned by G— 4, G. H.
Q. to the several regulating officers; on the other band, those assigned and
operating in the Services of Supply were directly under the jurisdiction of
the chief surgeon and were controlled by bis office. 27
286 FIELD OPERATIONS
TCEFEKENCES
(1) Report of the activities of the chief surgeon's office, A. E. F.. to May 21, 1910; compiled
by the chief surgeon, A. E. F., undated, 104. On file. Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(2) Report of the fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.. prepared by the assist-
ant chief of staff, G-4, June 1. 1910, 65-70. Copy on Hie. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(3) The French supply control installation for the field forces, by Lieut. Col. J. \V.
Beacham. Inf. ; The French control of evacuation, by Lieut. Col. S. H. Wadhams,
M. C. (Remarks delivered at the General Staff College. Washington, March Z\,
1921.) Copy on file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) The evacuation system in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. X. Stark, M. C, undated.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(5) Report on activities of G^l-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H.
Q.. A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31, 1918, 59.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(0) Exhibit " U " to report on activities of G-4- B, medical group, fourth section, gen-
eral staff. G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Evacuation of sick and wounded, from the com-
mander in chief G-4, G. H. Q., A. E. F.. to all regulating officers. August 29, 1918.
On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(7) Evacuation of the wounded in the Meuse-Argonne operation, by Col. H. II. M. Lyle.
M. C, May 10, 1921, 25. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(8) Exhibit "S" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, gen-
eral staff. G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of hospital evacuation section, Regulating Sta-
tion " B," St. Dizier. undated, Part III, 55. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(9) Ibid., I'art III, 56.
(10) Ibid., Part III, 58.
(11) Ibid., Part III, 53.
(12) Ibid., Part III, 54.
(13) Ibid., Part I, 1.
(14) Ibid., Part I, 2.
(15) Ibid., Part V, 2.
(16) Ibid., Part V, 4.
(17) Evacuation of wounded into fixed formations, by Col. R. M. Culler. M. ('., undated.
On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(18) Exhibit "S" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section.
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of hospital evacuation section. Regulating
Station " B," St. Dizier. undated. I'art I, 3. On file. Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(19) Ibid., Part II, 5.
(20) Ibid., Part II, 11.
(21) Ibid., Part II, 7.
(22) Ibid., Part II, 16.
(23) Ibid., Part II, 20.
(24) Ibid., Part II, 28, 29.
(25) Ibid., Part II, 35.
(26) Medical activities in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C, chief sur-
geon, First Army, February 15, 1919. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(27) Exhibit "S" to report on activities of G-4-B medical group, fourth section, gen-
eral staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Iteport of hospital train evacuation, American
regulating station, Is-sur-Tille, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(28) Exhibit " S " to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section gen.
eral staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of hospital evacuation section. Regulating
Station " B," St. Dizier, undated, Part IV, 5. On file. Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(29) Ibid., Part IV, 31.
(30) Ibid., Part IV, 36.
(31) Ibid., Part IV, 20, 21.
(32) Ibid., Part IV, 7.
(33) Ibid., Part IV, 8.
(34) Ibid., Part IV, 4.
(35) Ibid., Part IV. 2.
CHAPTER VIII
THE VETERINARY SERVICE
In Volume I of this history, it was related that the Veterinary Corps
had been established and had become a part of the Medical Department by
an act of Congress approved June 3, 1916, and that at the time of our entry
into the World War, the organization of the Veterinary Corps had not been
completed. In the absence of prescribed organization for the Veterinary
Corps, General Pershing, in forwarding his project of the rear, in the late
summer of 1917, made the Veterinary Corps, A. E. F., a part of the Remount
Service, 1 which in turn was a part of the Quartermaster Corps. Simul-
taneously, organization of the Veterinary Corps was being effected in the
United States. A War Department order published in October, 1917, author-
ized the organization of a Veterinary Coi*ps, to consist of 1 commissioned
officer and 1G enlisted men for each 400 animals in service. 2
In November, 1917, two selected officers of the Veterinary Corps were
sent to France, to be placed at the disposition of the commander in chief,
A. E. F., with the view of organizing the veterinary service of those forces,
on lines similar to those in the United States." These two veterinary officers
took with them to France an advance copy of Special Regulations. No. 70,
War Department, 1917, which comprehensively outlined the organization of
the veterinary service with a view of providing a simple, direct, and efficient
means for the evacuation of sick and inefficient animals from combatant
forces to veterinary hospitals in the Services of Supply, where organized and
specially trained units might care for them. The regulations also provided
for the evacuation of cured animals, from hospitals in the rear, to the remount
depots, from which, when received, they could be either re-issued or otherwise
disposed of.
The provisions of Special Regulations, No. 70, were not immediately
adopted in the American Expeditionary Forces. The veterinary service con-
tinued to operate under General Orders. No. 39, referred to above, until
July 26, 1918. General Orders. No. 122, G. H. Q., A. E. F., July 20. 1918,
revoked General Orders, No. 39. By the provisions of General Orders. No.
122. an officer of the Veterinary Corps was detailed as assistant to the chief
of the remount service and as chief of the Veterinary Corps. A. E. F.
In August, 1918, the Veterinary Corps, A. E. F., was reorganized in
accordance with Special Regulations. No. 70, War Department. 1917 : 4 and
it was transferred from the office of the chief quartermaster, A. E. F.. to the
office of the chief surgeon, A. E. F. A chief veterinarian was designated
who was charged, under the chief surgeon, with the administration of the
veterinary service. A. E. F.
287
288 FIELD OPERATIONS
The veterinary hospitals were placed under the command of officers of
the Veterinary Corps, and steps were taken immediately to collect scattered
companies and half companies of such hospitals into whole working organ-
izations. 3 The issue of convalescent animals from veterinary units back to
organizations was stopped, and the policy of passing all convalescent ani-
mals through remount depots for reissue was instituted. 3 The prompt
rendering of weekly animal sick reports, and their accurate compilation, were
insisted upon.
The veterinary service of the theater of operations, as provided by Special
Regulations. No. 70, comprised the following personnel : A chief veterinarian,
the adviser, under the chief surgeon, of the commander in chief, on all matters
pertaining to the health and efficiency of the animals of the forces in the
field; assistant chief veterinarians, one for each army, with duties and re-
sponsibilities similar to those of the chief veterinarian, but confined to the
army to which each was assigned; corps and division veterinarians; and
veterinarians assigned to mobile organizations.
Special Regulations, No. 70, provided for mobile veterinary sections, for
base veterinary hospitals, and for veterinary convalescent depots. The
veterinary hospitals, as evolved in the American Expeditionary Forces, how-
ever, comprised corps mobile veterinary hospitals (evacuation), base veteri-
nary hospitals (stationary), and veterinary hospitals (stationary). They were
subsequently authorized in Tables of Organization by the War Department. 5
Though the utilization of railheads for evacuation of sick animals for
mobile organizations was contemplated in Special Regulations, No. 70, their
use for this purpose was refused at first in the First Army, without reference
to General Headquarters." While the question was being solved at General
Headquarters, hundreds of animals were lost through being evacuated lon«
distances overland when in a debilitated condition and often suffering from
serious wounds. Literally thousands of animals were retained with divisions
because of the inability of division veterinarians to cope with the require-
ments of long overland evacuation. 6
The necessity of evacuating sick and wounded animals by railroad from
the front was conceded eventually, but again a difficulty arose. Instead of it
being appreciated that this was a veterinary service, it was considered to
come directly under the general staff of the army concerned. It meant that
the railroad portion of the veterinary evacuation mechanism was out of
the control of the army veterinarian; therefore, adequate arrangements could
not be made to send trainloads of sick animals to the hospitals prepared to
receive them.' - ' On the contrary, they were evacuated to the hospitals deemed.
by the general staff of the army, most suitable, when there was not always
adequate knowledge of the receiving capacity of such hospitals, available to
the section of the general staff directing the evacuation. Presently, this
obstacle to a smoothly operating evacuation system was removed. Veterinary
evacuating hospitals (sections), commanded by veterinary officers, then re-
ceived evacuated animals from divisions and removed them by railroad to
allotted hospitals."
GENERAL VIEW OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 289
Because of the military necessity for their retention at the front, it was
impractical to evacuate all animals affected with disease." To have done so
would have made our armies immobile, in so far as animal transportation
was concerned, for animal replacements were not available in sufficient num-
bers. However, it was possible markedly to increase the efficiency of the
remaining animals by evacuating the major portion of the sick."
In the fall of 1918. when the opportunity presented adequately to evacuate
sick and wounded animals from the combatant organizations, they had been
retained for such a long time in divisions and had in consequence accumulated
in such great numbers that the evacuation had to be on a very large scale.
This large evacuation, although essential, threw a tremendous strain on all
veterinary hospitals. Under this strain, some of them perilously approached
collapse." In a measure, this collapse was prevented by the timely arrival of
additional veterinary hospitals from the United States, and by the use of
labor companies to assist the personnel of the Veterinary Corps.
On November 1, 1918. 15 veterinary hospitals had been established; how-
ever, not all of them had been completely constructed. At this time, the
veterinary hospital capacity was 12,000; but it was necessary to hospitalize
a greater number of animals than this. To do so. necessitated the use of picket
lines, corrals, paddocks, etc."
A determined effort was made to obtain new hospital sites, and to have
more labor troops assigned to the Veterinary Corps to assist in the evacuation
and care of sick and wounded animals. The hospital capacity was increased
as rapidly as possible until standing room for 26,664 animals was obtained.
This was exclusive of the veterinary hospital capacity in the armies.'
The final result of the effort gradually to bring the animal efficiency of
the United States Army up to a standard equal to that of the armies of our
Allies was not reached until November 11. when hostilities ceased. 7
REFERENCES
II) G. 0. No. 39, 6. H. Q., A. E. P., September 18, 1917.
(2) G. 0. No. 130, W. D., October 4, 1917.
(3) Annual Report of the Surgeon General, U. S. Army, 1919, Vol. II, 1303.
(4) G. 0. No. 139, G. H. Q., A. E. F., August 24, 1918.
1 5) Tables of Organization and Equipment, U. S. Army, Series B, Table 109, February 12,
1918, and Series D, Table 330, March 10, 1918, and Table 331, December 31, 1917.
ffi) Annual Report of the Surgeon General, U. S. Army, 1919, Vol. II, 130.
(7) Ibid., 1365.
13576—25 19
SECTION II
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES (OC-
TOBER 20, 1917, TO SEPTEMBER 17, 1918)
CHAPTER IX
THE 1ST DIVISION IN THE SOMMERVILLER, ANSAUVILLE, AND
CANTIGNY SECTORS. IN MONTDIDIER-NOYON OPERATION
SOMMERVILLER SECTOR
After a period of intensive training' in the Gondrecourt area, the 1st
Division, with its artillery, which had been in training at "Valdahon, entered
the Sommerviller (also spoken of as the Luneville) sector on a front of about
10 km. (6.21 miles) southeast of Nancy. On the night of October 20-21, 1917,
it began to occupy the front by battalions, each attached to a corresponding
French unit, 1 one battalion from each of the four infantry regiments of the
division serving in the lines at a time, interspersed with French troops. 1 They
remained in the lines about 10 days under tactical control of the French 18th
Infantry Division whose headquarters was located at Sommerviller. 2 The sec-
tor was quiet. The first American shot in the war was fired by Battery C, 6th
Field Artillery, at 6.05 a. m., on October 23, from a position 400 meters (437
yards) east of Bathelemont. 1 The first German prisoner captured by Ameri-
cans was taken by the 1st Division October 27, 1917. The first American
casualties suffered in actual combat occurred on November 3, 1917, in a night
raid by the enemy against a part of the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, north of
Bures, in which three men were killed and seven wounded. 3 " On the night of
November 20, 1917, the division was withdrawn from the line to the Gondre-
court area to continue training. 1
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Ambulance Company No. 13, the only American ambulance company
which then operated in this sector, furnished litter bearers for duty in the
trenches, and evacuated patients to Field Hospital No. 13 and from it to Base
Hospital No. 18 at Bazoilles-sur-Meuse, and to Camp Hospital No. 1 at Gon-
drecourt. 4 It did not establish a dressing station, as patients were moved
•The first fatality in the American forces due to enemy action occurred on September 4. 1017,
*hen enemy air forces bombed a British hospital group at Dannes-Camiers, of which American Base
Hospitals No. 5 and No. 12 were a part. Of those on duty, First Lieut. William T. Fitzsimons, M. C,
and three enlisted men were killed. Three officers, one nurse, and six enlisted men, one of whom
w»s a member of tbe Royal Army Medical Corps, were wounded. Among the patients, 22 were
• minded, all of whom belonged lo the British service.
291
292 FIELD OPERATIONS
direct by litters and by vehicles from the battalion aid stations to the field
hospital. Because of road conditions the ambulance head was some distance
in the rear of the aid stations. The wounded were carried through the trenches
to the battalion aid stations and thence back of them a distance of 3 km. (1.8
miles) to Batheleniont, the ambulance head. 5
Field Hospital No. 13 was the only field hospital established for the serv-
ice of the division in this sector. Half of it, with an X-ray plant and other
necessary equipment, was located in a residence and two pavilions at Einville;
the other half occupied part of a hospital at Dombasle. 5 As the base and camp
hospitals to which this hospital was to evacuate were 81 km. (50.3 miles) dis-
tant by road, patients were retained with greater comfort at Einville. 5
ANSAUVILLE SECTOR
After a second period of training in the Gondrecourt area, where it per-
formed extensive and prolonged maneuvers, the 1st Division (less the 2d In-
fantry Brigade), on January 15, 1918, began its movement to relieve the 1st
Moroccan Division in the Ansauville sector. Here it remained until February
5, under tactical command of the French 69th Division, 6 when it took over control
of the sector. On March 9, the 2d Infantry Brigade, which had remained in
the Gondrecourt area, relieved the 1st Infantry Brigade. This sector, near
Toul, had a frontage of about 7.5 km. (4.6 miles) and a depth of twice that
distance. The most available road was that of Beaumont — Mandres — Ansau-
ville — Menil-la-Tour, though other roads were used when necessary- 7 The
enemy held well constructed trenches which had been occupied since 1914,
running parallel to the Flirey — Bouconville road about 1 km. (six-tenths of
a mile) north of Seicheprey. 7 The sector was generally quiet, though there
were occasional active days characterized by raids, artillery bombardments,
and gas attacks. 5
MEDICAL DEl'AKTMENT ACTIVITIES
The division surgeon's office, headquarters of the sanitary train, and
headquarters of its field hospital and ambulance sections were at Menil-la-
Tour.
Medical Department personnel established an aid station at each regi-
mental headquarters and battalion aid stations in battalion areas. 7 A station
list of the area reads as follows: Regimental headquarters 16th Infantry.
Mandres; 18th Infantry, Beaumont: 26th Infantry. Bouconville; 28th In-
fantry, Beaumont; 1st Engineers. Boucq, with battalion aid stations vari-
ously situated at Beaumont. Mandres. and Ansauville, and in dugouts south
of the Flirey — Beaumont road; 5th Artillery, Cornieville, with battalion aid
stations at Le Faux Bois and at Mandres; 6th Field Artillery, Ansauville.
with battalion station in that vicinity; 7th Artillery, woods west of Mandres:
1st Supply Train, Raulecourt; 1st Ammunition Train, Troussey and Sanzey:
Machine Gun Battalion units, Ansauville, Beaumont, and Xivray. 8 The most
advanced battalion aid stations were located in dugouts at Seicheprey, and
as this village was under direct enemy observation and was shelled frequently.
PLATE II
/
FIRST DIVISION
ANSAUVILLE SECTOR
JANUARY 15 - APRIL 3 , 1918
•Scale i/i Kilometers
LEGEND
Firet Aid Station
+ D.S. Dressing Station
+ AC. Ambulance Company
FA. FUU Artillery
Inf. Infantry
± F.H. Field Hospital
© EH. Evacuation Hospital
Reference*
Drawn from of fecial mops Commercy -£ ',
Mort-Mare , St Mihiel-C , Toul -A .
Positions of Me</,ical Units from re/oort
of the Divisional Surgeon .
fUtllc tines, taken from existing orders and maps, are approximate.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 293
evacuation thence had to be carried on at night, when ambulances could
travel the road from Beaumont. Removal to the regimental aid station at
that point was accomplished under difficult and trying circumstances, for
it was necessary that patients be carried a kilometer (0.6 mile) or more
through trenches which often were knee deep in mud and water. Evacuations
usually were of medical cases, of a moderate number of men suffering from
shell wounds, and, at times, of a fairlj- large number of gas cases. 10
Infantry regimental aid stations Avere established at first at Beaumont
and Mandres. but on March 1 the station at the latter place was moved to
Bouconville. 11 These stations at Beaumont and Bouconville were in cellars
of partially destroyed buildings and were made as nearly bombproof as
possible by coverings of logs, sandbags, and stone. They were equipped only
for first aid. The road between Beaumont and Mandres was especially
dangerous, as it was shelled day and night, many casualties resulting. The
regimental aid station of the 16th Infantry at Mandres had at first functioned
also as a dressing station, but on March 1, 1918, this service was taken over
by Ambulance Company No. 2. On March 27 this unit was relieved by
Ambulance Company No. 8. M This station took care of gassed cases as well
as of other cases and to a limited degree acted as a triage. 12 It was on the
axial road and occupied a building whose walls had been protected by thick
sandbags, but occasionally during shell fire it utilized a dugout which it had
constructed near by. 12
Ambulance Companies
Ambulance Company No. 13, at Menil-la-Tour, operated ambulances and
provided details of litter bearers for service with the lines, until relieved, on
March 21, 1918, by Ambulance Company No. 12. 13
The ambulance company serving the front (Ambulance Company No.
13 until March 21, thereafter Ambulance Company No. 12), augmented by
vehicles from other companies, maintained headquarters and an ambulance
park for its own vehicles with some from other companies, at Menil-la-Tour.
dispatching ambulances to the dressing station at Mandres and to forward
stations. Other ambulances were attached to troop aid stations at important
points in rear areas of the sector. 14
Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 1 (Services of Supply) maintained
two ambulances at Field Hospital No. 13 for evacuation to Sebastopol, where
twenty ambulances were available for a rear circuit in times of stress. 14
The different ambulance circuits, viz, front and rear, were established
for dealing with battle casualties, with a third circuit for the routine sick.
The front circuit was maintained by Ford ambulances working forward from
Mandres and returning to deliver patients to the dressing station there. Per-
taining to it were emergency ambulances stationed at Beaumont, Rambu-
conrt, and Bouconville. and at times at Seicheprey, with reserve at Mandres.
The advance point to which ambulances could go by daylight was on the
Beaumont-Bouconville road paralleling the front line and 2 km. (1.2 miles)
from it. 14 At night ambulances could be sent forward to Xivrav-Marvoisin and
294 FIELD OPERATIONS
Seicheprey, 1 km. (O.G mile) from the front line. 15 When circumstances war-
ranted the risk, emergency ambulances stationed at Seicheprey could evacuate
from Seicheprey by day, but this could not be practiced as a routine measure.
The rear circuit of heavy G. M. C. ambulances began at Mandres, whence
patients were carried to a fixed evacuation hospital. In order to cut down
transportation, patients who were deemed able to stand the longer trip to
Toid or to Sebastopol were sent directly from Mandres and were not required
to stop at the triage at Menil-la-Tour. 14 Patients were distributed from
Mandres as follows: (1) Seriously wounded and sick who could not stand
long ambulance transportation, to Menil-la-Tour; (2) gassed, to Menil-la-
Tour; (3) surgical cases, to Sebastopol; (4) sick and contagious diseases, to
Toul. 15 A few ambulances for this circuit were maintained at Mandres, with
reserve at Menil-la-Tour. At times of expected stress the ambulance park
was advanced to Hamonville, and ambulances and trucks were dispatched to
Mandres as needed.
In quiet times a routine circuit of ambulances was maintained, daily calls
being made at all stations, front and rear zones that could be reached for the
collection of sick and slightly wounded to be triaged at Menil-la-Tour. This
measure permitted retention of a certain number of ambulances posted at
outlying stations, for emergency use. 15
Field Hospitals
Field Hospital No. 13 was established on January 17, at Menil-la-Tour.
in 14 Adrian barracks taken over from a French field hospital and equipped
for the care of 200 patients. 12 This establishment was conducted at first
as a divisional hospital and, later, after hospitals in the rear began function-
ing as a triage, for the reception of gassed patients and some current sick,
until relieved about March 31 by a field hospital of the 26th Division. 12 The
location was unsuitable for a hospital because of its proximity to a large
dump and railhead subject to bombing attacks. Several such attacks occurred,
missiles being dropped within a hundred yards of the hospital, but no artil-
lery fire ever disturbed its neighborhood. 12
Patients began to be received here immediately after arrival of the divi-
sion in this sector. Seven wounded were admitted on January 21, and sixty-
two gassed cases on the 26th, the latter being the first casualties of this char-
acter in the division. 14 Of the 674 patients received here by Field Hospital
No. 13, the disability of 323 was due to gas. 14
Field Hospital No. 12, after being held in reserve, was established on
January 23 at Sebastopol in large, permanent, stone barracks. 12 It functioned
as an evacuation and surgical hospital until relieved on February 4 by
Evacuation Hospital No. 1, which then assumed responsibility for care of
the seriously wounded. 12 The field hospital personnel had been previously
augmented by details from Ambulance Companies No. 3 and No. 13. Field
Hospital No. 12 moved February 6 to large stone barracks — Caserne la
Marche — at Toul, where it established a 400-bed hospital for the divisional
sick. 12 As these barracks were large and commodious, and readily adapted
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 295
to hospital purposes, the field hospitals here supplemented their normal
equipment by the addition of large quantities of supplies suitable for the
proper maintenance of a semipermanent hospital. 12
Field Hospital No. 2 arrived at Toul on February 18 and established an
annex to Field Hospital No. 12 for the care of contagious cases. It operated
until April 2, when it was turned over to a hospital of the 26th Division. 12
Field Hospitals No. 12 and No. 13 evacuated by train from Toul to base
hospitals in the rear such cases as did not require surgical attention at Evacu-
ation Hospital No. I. 10 This evacuation service was maintained until about
April 3, when the field hospitals concerned wei'e turned over to corresponding
formations of the 26th Division. 15 In this sector Field Hospital No. 13
received 889 patients (not including those triaged directly to other hospitals)
and Field Hospitals No. 12 and No. 2, 2,482 patients. 15 As Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 1 received most of the wounded, these figures represent chiefly sick
or gassed patients. 15
The sick rate of the division at this time was three times that for battle
casualties. More than two-thirds of these cases were of a minor character,
and most of the patients were returned to duty in a short time direct from
field hospitals. 10 The prevailing diseases in the division while in this sector
were respiratory or intestinal. Sporadic cases of cerebrospinal meningitis,
diphtheria, scarlet fever, mumps, and measles occurred, but no epidemic de-
veloped. A camp for venereal cases was established southeast of Raulecourt,
and its occupants who were able to do so were compelled to labor on road
making and similar heavy work. 16
Medical Supply Unit
The Medical Supply unit of the division, with a large stock, was main-
tained at Demange-aux-Eaux in the area of the rear echelon of the division. 15
An advance medical supply depot was operated by Field Hospital No. 13
at Menil-la-Tour for issue, upon request, to all organizations in advance
areas. 15 An advance subdepot w-as maintained at the dressing station at
Mandres, for the distribution of supplies, by ambulance or runners to front-
line aid stations. 15
The 1st Division was relieved April 1-3, 1918, by the 26th Division and
proceeded to the neighborhood of Chaumont-en-Vexin, where headquarters
were established April 8. Then for the next 10 days the division was trained
in open warfare, activities consisting chiefly of brigade and division
maneuvers. Regiments now evacuated the disabled direct into the French
hospitals at Gisors. 17
CANTIGNY SECTOR, AND MONTDIDIER-NOYON OPERATION
The offensive launched by the Germans on March 21, 1918, against the
British Third and Fifth Armies, involving the French Army on the right when
the British Fifth Army retired, placed the Allies in a desperate situation.
The lack of complete cooperation among the Allies on the Western Front had
been appreciated, and the question of preparation to meet the crisis had al-
296 FIELD OPERATIONS
ready received attention of the supreme war council. It had been planned that
reserves would be provided and would be under the direction of a member of
the supreme war council, but these were not available. On April 3, Marshal
Foch was made commander in chief of all the allied forces in France. In
consequence of the grave crisis caused by the German offensive the building
up of a distinctive American army as a tactical unit in Lorraine was post-
poned, though at this time there were some 300,000 American troops in France,
and American divisions were ordered as expeditiously as possible into active
sectors. 18 Four combat divisions were then available, the 1st and 2d, then in
line, and the 26th, and 42d, just withdrawn therefrom after one month's train-
ing. Also one regiment of the 93rd was with the French in the Argonne. the
41st was in the Services of Supply, and three divisions were arriving. On
March 28, the 1st Division was placed at the disposal of the allied high com-
mand, and on April 17 commenced its movement toward the battle front. On
April 25 it took over the Cantigny sector 4.9 km. (3 miles) west of Montdidier.
there relieving French troops and becoming a part of the French First Army. 17
No other American troops were in its vicinity. Its sector extended from
Mesnil-St. Georges to north of Cantigny, an important position whose reduction
was desirable in view of a contemplated allied offensive. 17 The defenses taken
over by the division were not the more or less elaborately constructed trenches
such as it had occupied in other sectors, but consisted merely of shell holes
or shallow " fox holes " dug in the open wheat fields. 10 There was no complete
barrier of barbed wire to protect the lines, and there were no communicating
trenches, but construction of the front line and communicating trenches was
pushed as rapidly as possible under supervision of the Engineers. 19 This con-
struction between the front line and the Bois de Villers — a distance of some
6 km. (3.7 miles) — was practically completed in one night with very few
casualties, though the troops often were subjected to heavy shellfire. 20 During
the first six weeks that the division remained in this line the sector was very
active; the remaining period was active. Battery positions were made un-
tenable by high-explosive and gas shells. Towns where the different unit
headquarters were established were heavily bombarded, while roads leading
to them often were under interdiction fire. On the night of May 3, a very
heavy bombardment was concentrated on Villers-Tournelle, where approxi-
mately 12.000 shells struck the town at the rate of 50 to 100 a minute, causing
900 casualties, including 50 killed. 21 The villages of Broyes, Villers-Tour-
nelle, Coullemelle, Roquencourt. and Serevillers were entirely destroyed and
their sites constantly subject to shelling and bombing. Air raids were fre-
quent and severe.
CANTIGNY OPERATION
On May 27, 1918, the Germans attacked Chateau-Thierry, and when the
French appreciated how serious and how successful was the onslaught they
began to withdraw both their air squadrons and the supporting artillery from
the Cantigny sector. On the 28th the 1st Division made the first American
offensive of the war — as contrasted with a raid — and captured the village of
Cantignv.-- This was very strongly situated on rising ground in front of a
PLATE III.
FIRST DIVISION
CANTIGNY SECTOR
AND
MONTDIDIER-NOYON OPERATION
APRIL 25— JULY 7, 1918
Scale in Kilometer s
2 4 6 8
. „Ha]livillcr3- ( i§aoM-Z4>vardefyo2_
JgS^lafavilleM Griv«i3| S
locquendSurSViUera 1 '"^
/le fiaulchoy-
"fGtlJet
EOEUS.
«. „ * 16 Int.
ge Crocq / A , r 24jj2y !
\ Hu-dSnllerJ^^FHL .
Veooeu. 1
".rffira
|lu.cky
Chauage'e- 1
dic^r^dLd Ecu
v ^,i. "•
MSD
tj^61nf.
&a NeuviUe-
) Apr25
Tiirnlfiiiii
Beauvoi:
r...
Apr. 22 - July $Bon'
Vf Eusoye
ryers-.rf.AriS
TMeuST*
MuidargeM^, /H2 jBg-sipifm
/ May^unrt^+ACli-AprZe
Juv^iiiesp^^ l?AbbeviUe^S(MdBi+ AC2-Apr20
Verderel VFontaiiw^ ifefea'oiresiwre
Gu.iin.e&purU^' Hau/iv\lers
i4tf»«iTux]) ^" Vellej»*es
kfeZl-MayrW
¥AC3 ani^aHerelle
Caunquempoixi
Idnies
yaucourtj
HBAgnmfl4^
FA
N
Buca
jut irechct
le Pleas;
,, , r 3uiyS le Me%iul
[urard-
tmi
8T-
Cn Chausso
I
Tidy
r*5
Fouauerolles
\
raLaverains
£onde
fCjuentin
lemeran^.s j, . AJd jf tition>
AC + - Ambulance Company
FH± -Held Hospital
© - French Hospital
ARCH * - American. Bed Cross Hospital
?Bresles "*"~ MSV D " M'dieal Supply Depot
References - Drawn from Official Maps Mohtdjdier * [i«hv»i:
Positions of Medical Units from Reports of I>t sision
Jurtfeo/i first* Division*
Battle lines, taken from existing orders and maps, are approximate.
MMrMJWQMWin wvthe u.mcok*iji eg»viv
AMERICAN DIVISION'S WITH FRENCH ARMIES
291
wood which afforded protection to enemy reserves. It lay within a small sali-
ent of the German line, was well equipped with machine guns, and protected
by trenches some 637 meters (700 yards) to its front.
The 28th Infantry attacked at 6.45 a. m.. and along a front of 2,002 meters
(2,200 yards) advanced its lines from 273 to 1.456 meters (300 to 1,600 yards),
taking all objectives. Seven strong counter attacks, beginning May 28 and
ending May 30, were delivered by the enemy in a vain attempt to regain the
"■round lost. This rejriment was then relieved by the 16th Infantry." Be-
Fig. 47. — Regimental aid station, ^sth Infantry, 1st Division, near Cantigny, May 28, 101N
cause of determined German efforts to retake the salient, losses were greater
after the attack than during it. Beauvais. where a Bed Cross hospital was
located, though 3K.4 kilometers (24 miles) to the rear, suffered very severely.
Hospitals were not immune from attack, and operation of the evacuation
service, particularly at night, was very difficult. 23
M< )NTI IIDIE K-N< >Y< >.\" < 1PERATN )N
The infantry attack launched by the Germans on the night of June 8-9.
1918, between Montdidier and Xoyon. included the left of the French division
which was on the right of the 1st. Though the latter was not directly en-
gaged, it was subjected to intense artillery preparation and its units partici-
i 357< ; — 25 -j( >
298
FIELD OPERATIONS
pated both defensively and offensively in several raids. 6 The German lines
were halted from 2 to 5 km. (1.2 to 3.1 miles) in the rear of the front which
they attacked, and continued the assault during the next five days. 2 Activi-
ties then diminished rapidly, relatively speaking, but from the time that the
1st Division captured Cantigny until it turned that sector over to the French,
there was continuous heavy shell fire, with gas attacks and many raids,
though all of the last mentioned were repulsed successfully. Service in this
sector proved to be typical active trench warfare. It was conducted under the
general direction of the French. 24
Flo. 48.— Evacuation of wounded from regimental aid station, 28th Infantry, near Cantigny, May
28, 1918
In the latter part of June, orders were received for the relief of the 1st
Division by the French 152d and 166th Divisions, whose commanding officers
took over command of the sector on July 7 and 8. 6 The 1st Division was
gradually withdrawn from the Cantigny sector and arrived in an assembly
area near Beauvais on July 7. the sanitary train being near St. Omer-en-
Chaussee.**
.MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The history of the service of the Medical Department while in the Can-
tigny sector is of peculiar interest for the reason that here were applied,
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 299
for the first time, certain innovations in organization, equipment, and meth-
ods which eventually came to be utilized along our entire front. Among
these the following were important: Designation and equipment of individual
field hospitals to perform triage service and to care for nontransportable
wounded, gassed, and sick, as the case might be; assignment of operating
teams and a groupe complementaire (made available by the chief surgeon,
A. E. F.) to the hospital for nontransportable wounded; establishment of a
field medical supply depot in the immediate rear of the division; replenish-
ment of supplies at the front by ambulances which carried forward such
articles as splints, blankets, and litters which they had exchanged for those
they had brought with patients to hospitals; assignment to the regulating
station which served the area in which this division was operating of a
medical officer charged with railway evacuations of American casualties
and related duties, and appointment of a medical officer who represented in
the field the medical group attached to the fourth section of the general
staff. This group, after the reorganization of the American Expeditionary
Forces in February, 1918, represented the chief surgeon with that section
and became vested with responsibility for the medical service of troops in
the zone of the armies. One of its members was now directed, on April 9,
to carry out, in reference to the medical service of the First Division, the
verbal orders given him by the commander in chief. 20 His orders were
made of the broadest character, for it could not be foreseen exactly what
questions would arise nor how they should be met. He was also accredited.
May 8, to the commanding general of the French Army, to which the 1st
Division would be attached, as liaison officer for all questions dealing with
its medical service. His duties were, on a small scale, those of a corps or
army surgeon, and pertaining to supervision of medical department activities
within the division, evacuation of its casualties, provision of supplies, and
maintenance of contact between the divisional medical service, on one hand,
and the medical group at General Headquarters, on the other. He was also
the liaison officer between that service and the chief surgeon of the French
Army to which the division was attached. Duties assigned him at this time
and services performed by him forecast those later discharged by corps and
army surgeons and formed a step in their evolution. Further allusion to
them will be found at appropriate points in the following text.
The division surgeons office was located at Chepoix until June 5, 28
when it moved to Breteuil, where it remained until July 7, when the division
left the sector. 26
Service with Regiments, Etc.
Great difficulty was experienced in establishing aid stations in positions
that would provide sufficient space and reasonable safety. Deep cellars,
covered with debris from destroyed superstructures, generally were utilized,
though in some localities, notably Broyes and Mesnil-St. Firmin, it was
necessary to excavate, the, labor being performed by regimental medical per-
sonnel, assisted as opportunity permitted by the Engineers. 20 Battalion aid
300 FIELD OPERATIONS
stations were rough dugouts in the sides of the hills behind the trenches or
holes in semiprotected positions in the woods.- 1 Back of the most advanced
positions regimental and battalion aid stations were located in houses and
barns, in various stages of dilapidation except those in the extreme rear of
the area. From 10 to 20 men from the several ambulance companies were on
duty with each Infantry regiment. 27 During the Cantigny operation all
available members of the ambulance companies were thus attached to the
Infantry, and when, early in May, the detachment of Medical Department
men with the 18th Infantry was severely gassed, it was for a time completely
replaced by a detachment from Ambulance Company No. 2. 27
This sector having a narrow front, the division was in echelon, one
brigade at a time occupying the lines, with brigade headquarters at Sere-
villers. 21 The two regimental post control stations (at first the only ones
employed) and the aid stations near them were located at Droves and Villers-
Tournelle. with the battalion post control and aid stations between those
points and the front-line trenches. 21 When, in June, the line was extended
northward, additional regimental aid stations were opened at Quiry-le-Sec
and Eselainvillers. 2s Other regimental aid stations in this sector were located
as follows: Folleville, Breteuil. and for the Engineer regiment. Varmaise."
Other aid stations were located for the ammunition train in Bois Renault,
for the Artillery at Mesnil-St. Firmin. Tartigny. and Serevillers, and for
Machine Gun Battalions at Folleville, Breteuil. Belleassise Ferine, and
Chepoix. 1 "
Medical personnel with troops were occupied day and night caring for
the disabled. "The regimental medical personnel not only gave all possible
attention to the wounded arriving at the stations, hut generally accompanied
squads of combat tn>ops in sorties and raids. Until communication trenches
were established, evacuation was necessarily in the open. Because of visibility
and the activity of enemy artillery, aided by aeroplane observation, it was
almost impossible to remove wounded from the advance stations until after
dark, though frequently in the daytime individual ambulances would rush
down the road to B roves or Yillers-Tournelle. in response to an urgent call
from an overcrowded aid station or to remove some desperately wounded
soldier."" The Signal Corps bad connected all parts of the sector by tele-
phone, and this made it possible for the Medical Department to receive prompt
notification of the location of wounded, and in spite of the fact that roads
were heavily shelled they were transported to hospital in the shortest possible
time.' 5 "
A M FH'L.x NCK < 'DM PA NIKS
The director of ambulance companies was located at Bacouel." With
the exception of Ambulance Company Xo. 2 (horse drawn) all ambulance
companies were motorized by April 1. 8S On April 26, additional transport
was provided by United States Army Ambulance Section 0-10. with 20 Ford
cars. 31 This unit established headquarters at Bacouel and evacuated patients
from all parts of the sector.
AMEBICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 301
Ambulance Company X<>. 13 established an advance dressing station a(
Mesnil-St. Firmin on April 23, but this was discontinued three days later
when the unit moved to Convillers. 83 Here it was engaged in evacuating
the wounded of the division and in supplying litter bearers to regiments
until June 8, when it took over the dressing station at Bacouel from Ambu-
lance Company No. 3 and operated it until it was closed a month later."''
Ambulance Company No. 12 had established an advance dressing station
at Bacouel on April 25 and operated it until May 17. when it turned over to
Ambulance Company No. 3, this unit, as mentioned above, giving place in turn
to Ambulance Company No. V.).- 7 Ambulance Company No. 12, however, re-
mained attached to the station until July 4. detailing litter bearers and assign-
ing ambulances to the several regiments. 3 *
Ambulance Company No. 3 was stationed at Bonvillers on April 21,
whence it furnished litter-bearer contingents to regiments to 30 per cent of its
strength, while its ambulances evacuated patients to Beauvais. 35 On May
17 it took over the dressing station and medical supply depot at Bacouel
and also conducted there, until June 8, a hospital for the slightly wounded.
This latter formation then had to l>e discontinued because of constant bomb-
ing by enemy airplanes. 35 On June 8 the company returned to Bonvillers
and resumed its evacuation service of Field Hospital No. 12. 3<1
Ambulance Company No. 2 also was stationed at Bacouel and operated
in connection with Ambulance Company No. 12 from May 28 to 31. 8 '
Bacouel was 7 km. (4.3 miles) from the front line. 1 km. (six-tenths of
a mile) south of the axial road, Le Mesnil-Breteuil, but adequately supplied
with roads to make it a good evacuation relay point. 88 The place was sub-
ject to occasional enemy shell fire, but as it was not occupied by other troops
and was not the center of much traffic or enemy interest, it was better adapted
to dressing-station purposes than any other available location. 88 The station
occupied a building protected by sandbags. It was expanded, when neces-
sary, into neighboring houses. In addition to its other duties it operated
an infirmary and, until June 8, when protracted bombing and shelling neces-
sitated its discontinuance, a hospital for the slightly wounded. 35 The village
of Bacouel was made the station of reserve of ambulances regulated from
that point, but the main reserve of ambulances was at Bonvillers, where one
ambulance company was held in reserve. 3 * The remainder of the ambulance
companies stayed well to the rear, at La Neuville'-St. Pierre, but as many of
their vehicles as were needed were attached to forward units. 38 Evacuations
were made habitually sit daybreak and at nightfall except when, during the
Cantigny offensive, the enemy concentrated attention on attacking troops, thus
l>ermitting constant ambulance operation during full daylight. When the
line was extended northward after that operation a reserve ambulance park
was established at Paillart and ambulances were advanced as needed to the
Iwttalion aid stations in front of Quiry-le-Sec and Esclainvillers. 2 ''' The
slightly sick were retained at Paillart; the others were sorted and sent farther
to the rear.
302 FIELD OPERATIONS
In the sector west of Montdidier the 1st Division employed the follow-
ing evacuation system: 30 Ford ambulances, including some of those from
the United States Army Ambulance Section 649, were permanently posted
at aid stations in all towns within 7 km. (4.3 miles) of the front, two or
more being kept at the more active centers, Broyes and Villers-Tournelle.
More ambulances as needed were obtained by dispatching a runner to the
station in a neighboring town or by telephone or runner to Bacouel, where
a reserve of cars was kept. A number of cars belonging to the evacuation
ambulance company from time to time also served the French.
Three ambulance circuits, front, rear, and evacuation, were maintained.
The front circuit, conducted by Ford cars regulated from Bacouel, took
patients from the ambulance heads to the Bacouel dressing station, where
all patients were inspected, and given emergency treatment and stimulating
drinks, and where they underwent a tentative triage and were transferred
to rear circuit ambulances.
The rear circuit took patients in heavy ambulances! to the divisional
hospitals. Nontransportable surgical patients who had been sorted out at
the dressing station were taken direct to Field Hospital No. 12 at Bonvillers;
all others were sent to Field Hospital No. 13 for distribution according to
the following schedule, prescribed April 20 by the surgeon of the Sixth
Corps (French) under which the 1st Division was operating:
.39
(a) Wounded: Destination
Slight and moderate cases Crevecceur, distant 18 km. (French hospital).
Serious Beauvais (Felix farm hospital, later Ameri-
can Red Cross hospital), distant 25 km.
Very serious and nontransportable Bonvillers.
(6) Sick:
Slight and moderate cases Froissy.
Serious eases CrSvecoeor.
(c) Gassed:
Slight cases Froissy and La Neuville-St. Pierre.
Moderate cases Cempuis (French gas hospital).
The evacuation circuit was that in rear of the divisional hospitals. It
conveyed patients from divisional hospitals to evacuation hospitals farther
in the rear. 30 Serious cases were sent in ambulances, but when necessary the
lighter cases were sent in trucks.
During the operations against Cantigny, May 28, the following disposi-
tion was made of the sanitary train. At Villers-Tournelle, Ambulance Com-
pany No. 13 maintained a station for slightly wounded who were then con-
veyed to the rear on trucks held at that town for this purpose. 28 This place
became the main center of evacuation and ambulance control, as after com-
pletion of the attack the wounded transport could reach Cantigny and the
ravines in its rear. 28 Prior to the Cantigny offensive the dressing station at
Bacouel then operated by Ambulance Company No. 3 was augmented by Am-
bulance Company No. 2, one of the companies on duty there then serving by
day, the other by night. 28 It also operated as a preliminary triage, sending the
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES
303
slightly wounded on trucks directly through to Froissy, La- Neuville or
Crevecceur, seriously wounded to Field Hospital No. 13 at Bonvillers. for hos-
pital care, and all others to the same point for further distribution. 28
Field Hospitals
The director of field hospitals was located at Bonvillers. With the ex-
ception of Field Hospital No. 2 (horse drawn) all field hospitals had been
motorized by April 17. 34
One of the earliest duties devolving upon the medical liasion officer and
the division surgeon in this sector was the location of the field hospitals. This
was difficult, for not only did such locations have to meet tactical requirements
but also had to conform to resources for shelter. Buildings at all suitable
Fig. 40. — Field Hospital No. 13, near Vendeuil-Caply, July 2, 1918
were few 7 and tentage was scarce. Field Hospital No. 13 was established, in
an orchard near Vendeuil-Caply, on April 24, in six United States Army
ward tents, four French Dixon tents, and two turtle tents, and admitted the
first patients received in hospital in the sector. 40 Until July 5, 1918, when it
was closed, it operated as a triage and gas hospital, receiving 4,418 patients,
including most of the wounded. 40 One part of this unit conformed, to a de-
gree, to the triage of the French, which was a formation where patients were
sorted, segregated, and recorded, but received no professional service other
than bathing and necessary changes of dressings. The French stressed the im-
portance of this procedure, which was an innovation in our service. The sick
and wounded not requiring immediate operation were sent by the French im-
mediately to base hospitals in the interior, while those requiring immediate
operation were sent direct to a specified hospital. In this sector the latter
were sent to an auto-chir at Grandvillers where they were kept seven days or
304 FIELD OPERATIONS
longer.* 1 Field Hospital No. 13, performed the duties of a triage; for in-
stance, it sent to the hospital for nontransportables the most serious cases
(some equally serious cases reached that unit direct from the dressing station)
and other patients to other appropriate hospitals, but it also, unlike the French
triage, rendered actual hospital service to a large number of patients. -V large
j)ercentage of the latter were gassed patients, special arrangements having
been made and special equipment provided for their treatment. In addition,
some sick and slightly wounded were cared for. During the 24 hours which
ended at 2 p. in.. May •">. it received 634 cases, most of them coining from the
lHtli Infantry.- 4 This was the first large group of gassed cases admitted to
one of our field hospitals. Some of these were transferred to Field Hospitals
No. 2 and No. -'5 and others to the French gas hospital at Cenipuis.' 2 At this
time no American uniforms were available for issue to these patients after
bathing, and so, until May 10, when such uniforms were received, our con-
valescent gassed patients wore French clothing. 43 The French turned over to
this unit a bathing center at Vendeuil, and after May 16, it was served by a
portable laundry unit.
Although the position of the hospital was clearly indicated by huge red
crosses, air raids against it were frequent, and on June 14, when the hospital
was bombed, four men were killed and three wounded. 40 Later it was shelled. 40
The French had begun to place an ammunition dump near this hospital on
April 25, but when their attention was called to it by the medical liaison officer
it was moved a few days later.
Field Hospital No. 2, at first in reserve, was opened on May 5 at La Neu-
ville-St. Pierre to care for the sick of the division. 4 " It remained at this place
until June 4, when it moved to Beauvoir and operated there until July 4. 40
This unit cared for most of the sick of the division, recording 1,134 admissions
in this sector. On June 4 it had 42S patients under treatment. 4 "
Field Hospital No. 3 operated at Froissy, opening there on April 22 in a
building (used for operating purposes) and in tentage. 40 It was designed to
care primarily for gassed cases- AVhile at Froissy it received 4Go such cases
and some slightly wounded. In June G it moved to Paillart. where it cared
for gassed patients and some seriously wounded. 4 " While at this point it
operated also as a triage for the left flank of the division, whose lines were
then extended northward." 1
Field Hospital No. 12. after three other locations had proven impractica-
ble because of lack of accommodations, arrived at Bonvillers on April 22 and
opened in a large chateau- 4 " This building had been assigned by the French
as division headquarters, but when the division commander learned that it
was needed for the care of the gravely wounded he promptly relinquished it
and located his headquarters elsewhere. The hospital augmented its housing
space by Army ward tents so that sufficient accommodations were provided for
all cases sent to it. On April 28 the personnel of this hospital was increased
by Surgical Teams No. 2 and No. 8, including their Army female nurses, and
Mobile Surgical Fnit No. 2, which joined the division. 40 A second similar
unit which had joined was held in reserve. Field Hospital No. 12 cared for
!
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 305
the nontransportable wounded, of whom it admitted 1.220 between April 26
and July 2. 4 "
After the C'antignv operation five surgical teams operated in the field
hospitals, as the evacuation hospitals in the rear, with the exception of that
at Beauvais. suffered from a shortage of operating teams and. consequently,
could care for operated cases only. 41 Mortality among nontransportable
wounded averaged about "25 per cent, though this varied considerably from
time to time. The mortality in passed averaged 1.7 per cent. 45
Field Hospital Xo. 12 was (lie first unit of that character designed in
our service for the care of nontransportable wounded, and it was equipped
accordingly. It was also the first to be supplemented by a groupe complemcn-
taire and by surgical teams from outside sources. In emergencies this hos-
pital also cared for a number of the seriously gassed.
It should be noted that though field hospitals were specialized, each of
them, if circumstances required, was expected to care also for patients suffer-
ing from conditions other than those, they were especially designated to
receive. A certain elasticity in this matter was found essential. Thus, on
May 16. Field Hospital No. 2 was treating ."> sick and 18!) gassed: Field Hos-
pital Xo. 3, 85 sick, 159 gassed. ."58 wounded; Field Hospital No. 12, 8 sick.
•43 gassed, and 10 nontransportable wounded: and Field Hospital No. 13,
29 sick, 37 gassed, and 8 wounded. 4 " Field Hospital admissions in this sector
totaled 7X)89. 43
Medical Supply Unit
An advance medical supply depot for the division was located first at
La Xeuville and later at Bacouel. 29 During the first month of service in this
sector its supplies were very limited, as the amount carried by the division
was insufficient and it was impossible to replenish supplies as contemplated,
because of the inability of regulating stations to forward materiel north
of Paris. 47 Supplies, including bedding and tentage. were obtained from
local French depots, but as these depots were small the amounts of supplies
and of other materials obtainable were inadequate. Also, the French did
not carry in stock a number of articles listed on our medical supply tables,
and our large requisitions could be filled only after being referred to Paris,
and with consequent delay. After the first month supplies in large amount
were obtained from the American Red Cross, needed articles being brought
to Beauvais by truck and thence forwarded by the divisional Medical Depart-
ment trucks- 47 On April 6 the Medical Department representative of G— 4
reported that it was essential that an advance supply depot on trucks be
established and that this be replenished by rail. When he visited Fleury on
April 30 he secured almost all medical supplies then needed by the division. 48
By May 4 the medical supply unit had arrived and was serving satisfactorily.
After May 16 two movable disinfesting plants, each capable of serving
16 platoons in 12 hours, and one " sterilab " water purifier with an output
of 1,200 gallons per hour, arrived. 40 On May IS needed dental outfits were
received and distributed. 49
306 FIELD OPERATIONS
Evacuations to the Rear
On April 13 the medical representative of G-4, G. H. Q., wired as follows
to the head of the fourth section of the American general staff: 50 "French
evacuation hospitals will be situated so far in rear that it is necessary to
amplify one field hospital, or perhaps two, for the care of nontransportable
wounded. Recommend two groupes oomplementaires (mobile surgical units)
and two operating teams without female nurses be held in reserve. One auto-
chir probably will be required later but not recommended now."
According to orders from the French mission to the chief surgeon French
Fifth Army, evacuation of American casualties in rear of the field hospitals
was to be effected by the medical representative of the fourth section, general
staff, though the French offered to furnish such ambulances for that purpose
as might be available. 51 Fearing that these would be inadequate, the medical
representative, G-4, G. H. Q., requisitioned a United States Army ambulance
section, which was promptly furnished. 51 In effecting this evacuation the
liaison officer was requested to comply with the French system, which did
not vest in the army surgeon responsibility for care of casualties, until these
had arrived in the evacuation hospitals. 51 The division surgeon, under this
system, was responsible for all evacuations to the French evacuation hospital,
which was not more than 16 or 24 km. (10 or 15 miles) from the front. At
this time it was decided that nontransportable cases, and these only, should be
operated on in the divisional hospitals, and that only one of these field hospitals
should be equipped for that purpose. 51
Evacuations to the rear of divisional units were made to the French hos-
pitals mentioned above in the discussion of the ambulance service, there being
available at first neither an American evacuation hospital nor facilities for
evacuation by rail directly in rear of the division. 52 While the need for addi-
tional motor transport had been met by the assignment of United States
Army Ambulance Section No. 649. efforts to provide American Army hos-
pitalization in rear of the division were not at first successful, though the
need was stressed for several reasons. Differences in language, for instance,
had caused inevitable misunderstandings which, despite the best efforts on
the part of the French, had delayed ward service in some cases and led to
mutual embarrassments. 52 A very serious administrative difficulty arose
through the fact that French hospital trains, under their method of allocating
casualties, were distributing American patients to numerous French hospitals
scattered throughout the country and thus they were lost to our authorities
for months at a time. 52 Some deaths occurred which were not reported for
very long periods. 52 Nothing but an emergency of the gravest nature was
deemed justification for the continuance of the existing methods.
With a view to their remedy, permission was requested of the French
to install an American evacuation hospital at Beauvais. 53 While no such hos
pital was available in the American Expeditionary Forces at that time, some
evacuation hospitals were expected daily from the United States, and it was
hoped that one or more of these would arrive in time to meet the needs of the
1st Division. The matter was settled temporarily, however, by the decision
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 307
of the French that no American evacuation hospital could be established in
the rear of the 1st Division. 53 This ruling was unavoidable, in fact, in view
of the limited facilities for railway evacuations near the 1st Division's sector:
an evacuation hospital at Beauvais served by American hospital trains, to
move patients from that point to American base hospitals in the interior,
would have set up an additional current of travel and necessitated a prac-
tically separate line of communication for the service of a single division,
which comprised but one part of a French army. Manifestly this arrange-
ment was impossible. On May 5, it was suggested to our general staff that it
learn from the French whether they w T ould approve the location of an
American Red Cross hospital at Beauvais under command of an officer of the
Medical Corps. 42 It was proposed, also, that this hospital be essentially for
Americans, but otherwise be operated and evacuated as a French hospital. It
was desirable that such a hospital admit surgical cases from the 1st Division
and provide an annex for mumps and measles. Gas cases were to continue to
be sent to the French gas hospital at Cempuis. At this time, too, difficulty
was being experienced in having patients admitted to French evacuation hos-
pitals, though this was corrected as soon as it was called to the attention of
the French army surgeon. 54 In view of the proposed establishment of a
Red Cross hospital for the 1st Division, the liaison officer recommended
(May 12) that an evacuation hospital which had now become available be held
in reserve for the 2d Division, which he understood would soon enter a
sector adjoining that of the First, or would relieve it. On May 13, it was
arranged that the Bed Cross hospital in question be under command of a
French officer and that it occupy the Ecole Normale at Beauvais. 55 Consider-
able excess Bed Cross personnel had accumulated in Paris at this time as a
project for the establishment of a Bed Cross hospital at Chalons had been
abandoned. The medical group with G-4 was also arranging for groupes
compUmentaires and for supplementary teams to be sent up when the situa-
tion demanded it. Later, it was decided that the Bed Cross hospital should
occupy the Ecole Professionelle at Beauvais, which was well adapted to hos-
pital purposes and accommodated 230 beds, with ground space for 200 more
in tents if necessary. 50 It had been used for some two weeks by the French
for hospital purposes. The Bed Cross personnel was reenforced by others,
including officers of the Medical Department; supplies furnished by the Bed
Cross were installed and the unit began to operate on May 28, as American
Red Cross Hospital No. 104. 44 The first evacuation by French hospital train
from this hospital was arranged for on May 30. 57
At this time the direct transfer of American patients to American Ex-
peditionary Forces base hospitals was not practicable, but this establishment
insured them initial care in rear of the division by personnel, most of whom,
commissioned and enlisted, belonged to the Medical Department, and all of
whom, except the commanding officer, were Americans. An agreement was
made later whereby all French hospital trains carrying American casualties
were halted near Paris so that these patients might be removed and transported
by ambulances to American hospitals in that city. 58
308 FIELD OPERATIONS
Location of this militarized Red Cross hospital at Beauvais was the first
occasion when a unit of this kind had been established in our /one of the
armies. Such use. of course, was a radical departure from the formerly
accepted sphere of activity for Red Cross units, but under the circumstances
it was a welcome innovation.
Beauvais was heavily bombed on a number of occasions, especially on May
31, when one French hospital was so badly damaged that it had to be aban-
doned. 80
REFERENCES
(1» outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War College.
(2) Memorandum, brief history of operations, 1st Division. On file. Historical Section.
the Army War College, 201-11-4.
(3) Report of the Medical Department activities, 1st Division. 1917-101S. prepared
under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part III. 41. On file, His-
torical Division, S. (J. O.
(4) Ibid.. Part III. :?.
(5) Ibid.. Part I. 40.
(6) History of 1st Division. April t>. 1017. to September 20. 1919, compiled by the staff
of the 1st Division. On tile. Historical Section, the Army War College.
(7) Report of the .Medical Department activities. 1st Division, 1917—1918, prepared
under the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 2. On tile. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(8) Ibid.. Part II. 3.
(01 Ibid.. Part II, 5.
(10) Ibid.. Part II. 4-.">.
(11 ) Ibid., Part I, 40-41.
(12) Ibid., Part I. 41.
(13) Ibid., Part III. 4.
(14) Ibid., Pnrt I. 42.
(15) Ibid.. Part I. 4:?.
(10) Ibid.. Part II. o.
(17) Ibid.. Pint II. S.
(18) Final Report of Gen. John .1. Pershing. September 1. 1910. 30-32.
1 10) Report of the Medical Department activities. 1st Division, 1917—1918, prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 12. On file, Historical
Division. S. ('.. O.
(20) Ibid.. Part II, 13.
(21) Ibid.. Part II. 14.
I 22 i Pinal Report of Gen. John .1. Pershing. September 1, 1010, 32.
(23) Report of the Medical Department activities. 1st Division, 1917—1918, prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. I'art II. 10. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(24) Ibid.. Part I. 22.
(25) Par. 8. S. O. No. 90. G. H. Q.. A. K. F.. April 9. 1918.
(20) Report of the Medical Department activities. 1st Division. 1917-1918, prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 40. On file, Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(27) Ibid.. Pnrt I. 44.
(28) Ibid., Pnrt I. 48.
(29) Ibid.. Pnrt II. 11.
(30) Ibid.. Part II. 1."..
(31) Ibid.. Part III. 0.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 309
(32) Ibid., Part III, 5.
133) Ibid., Part III, 31.
(34) Ibid., Part III, 29.
(35) Ibid., Part III, 26.
136) Ibid.. Part III. 27.
(37) Ibid.. Part III, 24.
(38) Ibid.. Part 1, 45.
(39) Ibid., Part I, 47-48.
(40) Ibid., Part II, 9-10.
i4l) Memorandum from the medical representative of G-4-B, G. H. Q., A. E. F., to
the chief surgeon, A. E. I'.. April 20, 1918. On file, A. G. O.. World War Division.
Medical' Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 319.2).
142) Memorandum from the medical representative of G-4-B. G. H. Q.. A. E. F.. to
the chief surgeon, A. E. F.. May ."., 1918. On file. A. G. O.. World War Division,
Medical Iteeords Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 319.2).
(4.">) Report of the Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. F„ 1917-1918, pre-
pared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part III. 7. On tile.
Historical Division, S. G. ().
(44) Memorandum from the medical representative of GM-B, G H. Q., A. E. F., to
the chief surgeon. A. E. F.. .May 29. 1918. On file. A. G. O., World War Division,
Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 319.2) .
(45) Memorandum from Hie medical representative of G— 4—1?, G. H. Q„ A. E. P., to
the chief surgeon, A. E. F., May 25, 1918. On file, A. G. ()., World War Division,
Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 319.2).
(46) Memorandum from the medical representative of G— 4-1?. G. H. Q., A. E. F.. to
the chief surgeon. A. E. F. May 16, 1918. On file. A. G. O.. World War Division,
Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 319.2).
147) Report of the Medical Department activities. 1st Division, 1917-1918, prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 17. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(48) Memorandum from the medical representative of G-4-It. G. H. Q., A. E. F„ to
the chief surgeon. A. E. P., April 30. 1918. On file, A. G. ().. World War Division.
Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 319.2).
(49) Memorandum from the medical representative of G— 4-B., G. H. Q., A. E. P., to
the chief surgeon. A. E. F.. May 18, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division,
.Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files, 319.2).
1 30) Telegram from the medical representative of G— 4— B, <I. H. (.}.. A. E. P., to the
assistant chief of stall. G-4, G. H. Q„ April 13, 1918. On file. A. G. <>.. World
War Division, Medical Record Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 319.2).
151) Letter from the medical representative of G— 4-B, G. II. Q., A. E. P., to the
chief surgeon, A. E. P., April 13. 1918. Subject: Needs of Medical Department,
1st Division. On tile, A. G. O., World War Division. .Medical Records Section
(Chief Surgeon's Files No. 319.2).
(52) Report on the activities of G— 4—1?, medical group, fourth section, general staff,
6. H. Q.. A. E. F., for the period embracing the beginning and end of American
participation in hostilities, December 31. 1918. 30. On file. Historical Division.
S. G. f).
(53) Ibid.. 51.
(54) Memorandum from the medical representative (!— 4-P>. G, H. Q., A. E. P., to the
chief surgeon, A. E. P., May 0, 1918. On file. A. G. O.. World War Division,
Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 319.2).
135) Memorandum from the medical representative G-4— B, G. H. Q., A. E. F.. to the
chief surgeon, A. E. F.. May 13. 1918. On file, A G. O., World War Division,
Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 319.2).
310 FIELD OPERATIONS
(56) Memorandum from the medical representative G-4-B, G. H. Q., A. E. F., to the
chief surgeon, A. E. F„ May 26, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division,
Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 319.2).
(57) Memorandum from the medical representative G-A-B, G. H. Q., to the chief
surgeon, A. E. F., May 30, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical
Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 319.2).
(5S) Report on the activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff,
G. H. Q., A. E. F., for the period embracing the beginning and end of American
participation in hostilities, December 31, 191S, 37. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(59) Memorandum from the medical representative G-4-B, G. H. Q., to the chief
surgeon, A. E. F., May 31, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical
Records Section (Chief Surgeon's Files 319.2).
CHAPTER X
AISNE OPERATION, MAY 27 TO JUNE 5, INCLUDING VAUX AND
BELLEAU WOOD, JUNE 6 TO JULY 15, 1918; THE 2D AND 3D
DIVISIONS •
On May 27, 1918, the German Army began another great offensive, this
time on the line between Soissons and Reims. Overwhelming the French
divisions along the Chemin des Dames, the Germans advanced southward
until, on May 30, they had reached the Marne between Mont-St.-Pere and
Brasles. 1 Turning eastward the next day they pushed forward some C
miles along the Ourcq, and on June 2 and 3 continued their advance, though
at a considerably slower rate, the offensive then soon spending its force.
The great salient made by this German offensive had a western front
extending from a point on the Oise River about 4 km. (2.4 miles) southeast
of Noyons southward to Chateau-Thierry, a southern front extending east-
ward from Chateau-Thierry, along the Marne to Dormans, and a southeast
front extending from Dormans to the old German line north of Reims.
It was during this offensive, when Paris was again menaced, that Ameri-
can divisions entered the Marne region in increasing numbers to operate
under tactical command of the French as part of their corps and armies.
The 2d and 3d Divisions were hurried into the lines at the apex of the salient,
the former to the west of Chateau-Thierry, 2 the latter, after participating
in the defense of the bridgeheads there, to the oast of that town. 3
Strictly speaking, the Aisne operation occurred between May 27 and
June 5, 1918. 4 It was the first phase of the German drive toward Paris,
and the 2d and 3d Divisions were, as a matter of fact, the only American
divisions engaged here between the dates in question. Between the close
of this operation (Aisne operation) and July 15, the 2d Division took the
towns of Bourescbes, Vaux, Belleau Wood, and Bois de la Roche. 2
On June 19, 1918, a fourth section of the general staff, known as G-4,
Paris group, was organized and functioned as the fourth section of an army
at that place. This section was charged with the supervision of the supply
and evacuation, except the supply of artillery ammunition, of the American
troops engaged in the operations of that period against the Marne salient
with the French Seventh Army. 5
THE 2D DIVISION
On May 30, 1918, the 2d Division was suddenly ordered from Chaumont-
en-Vexin to an area northwest of Meaux, leaving early the next morning. 6
Moving 50 miles by truck to a location near its future position, the Infantry
• Brief mention will be found of the 4th, 26th, and 28th Divisions, which entered the Maine
irea during the period covered in this chapter.
311
312 K1KU> OPERATIONS
reached Meaux and soon thereafter took position near Montreuil-aux-Lions.
where it relieved exhausted French troops on a 12-km. (7.4 miles) front,
blocking the Paris-Mete highway west of Chateau-Thierry. 2 The Germans
held the commanding 1 1 ill "204 and a line running through Vaux, along the
railroad to Bouresches and thence through Bois de Belleau. Torcy, and
Bussiares to Chezy-en-Orxois. They had been opposed by two depleted
French divisions, worn out by five days of battle. On the right the French
Thirty-eighth Corps had one division north of the Marne, and on the left
was the French Seventh Corps. 7
On June 1. French Army orders directed the concentration of the 2d
Division around Montreuil-aux-Lions. in support of the two French divi-
sions which held a line in the rear of Bussiares. Torcy, Hill 183, south of
Bouresches, and Hill 1:58." The French had orders to drop back through
the American lines.''' Early on the 2d day of June the 23d Infantry, with
some other companies, was sent to the left to fill a gap between (landelu and
Bois de Yen illy."
Command was taken over officially by the Americans June 4. the two
French divisions going to the rear on the night of June 3^1. s
By June 5, the remainder of the organization of the 2d Division had
arrived.''' and the division commenced a series of vigorous attacks on the
following day." The line then extended from the southwest corner of Bois
de la Marette on the right, through Bois des Clerembauts. Triangle Ferine.
Lucy-le-Bocage, woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage, Hill 142 (a point on
the Champillon-Bussiares road), 800 meters (872 yards) north of Cham-
pillon." Triangle Ferine was the dividing line between the two brigades.
Early in the morning of June 0. the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines,
in conjunction with the French 167th Division, attacked toward Torcy.
The. attack was successful and the enemy line penetrated to a depth of 1 km.
At 5 p. m.. the 4th Brigade attacked on the line Bouresches-Torcy. The
town of Bouresches was captured, but the advance was stopped in the Bois
de Belleau. On June 7. 8. and 9 attacks were continued, without artillery
preparation. A little progress was made each day, but it was slow and
expensive." On the morning of June 10. after thorough artillery prepara-
tion, the 4th Brigade again attacked in the wood and gained a line through
Hill 1(59.° Another attack, on the 11th. gained all of the wood except the
northwest corner."
French troops having taken over a part of the line of the 3d Brigade,
that brigade extended its left northward to include Bouresches on the night
of June 13-14. leaving the 4th Brigade only Belleau Wood. 9
On June 15, the 7th Infantry. 3d Division, was brought into the sector
of the 4th Brigade., and marines holding the line were relieved for rest.
On .June 23, the 4th Brigade attempted again, but unsuccessfully, to take
the northwest tip of the woods, but on June 26th, with the aid of concen-
trated artillery fire, they finally cleared Belleau Wood of Germans."
July 1. the 3d Brigade, after a 12-hour preparation by artillery, attacked
and captured Vaux and Bois de la Roche." The enemy counterattacked next
PLATE IV.
CHATEAU *-* THIERRY
SECOND DIVISION, MAY 31
THIRD DIVISION, JUNE 1
SECTOR
JULY 9, 1918.
JULY 14, 1918.
Scale ii\ Kilometers
id 15 uo
Battle tin**, taken from ciitlinK order* and man*, are apnroilmale
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 313
day against the 9th Infantry, but without success. From July 7 to 9, the
26th Division relieved the 2d, which had met most desperate resistance from
Germany's best troops. 8
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
As explained, the infantry and marines left the concentration area
around Chaumont-en-Vexin early on the morning of May 31. They were
transported in trucks, and by noon of that day their motor trains were under
way to Meaux. They included almost all the motor transport of the division,
and moved slowly.
Upon arrival in the lines regimental and battalion aid stations were
established, with their respective headquarters, as the troops moved into
original or new positions. These stations, for the most part, were in stone
buildings in abandoned villages or in farm groups which did not offer much
protection against enemy artillery fire, though some were fairly well located
In stone-vaulted cellars. 10 During the latter part of the operations many of
the battalion aid stations were in the woods, and some dugouts were con-
structed, but at the best these were only splinter-proof. 10
Each station had one or more ambulances with it, or within call, as
conditions required and permitted. Supplies were delivered to the stations
by the ambulance companies or from the ambulance head by returning or
special ambulances. 10
Ambulance Companies
No sanitary train headquarters had been organized, but each section
(field hospital and ambulance) functioned under the direct orders of the divi-
sion surgeon. 11 These sections — less the Field Hospital and No. 16 Ambulance
Company (both animal-drawn) — arrived at Meaux about 7 p. m. on May
31, and proceeded to their several destinations the same night. 10 Because
of lack of evacuation ambulances during the first few days, those of the
division had to make evacuations to rear of the field hospitals in addition
to performing the long haul from the front. 10 United States Army Ambu-
lance Section No. 502, with 20 Ford ambulances, arrived June 4, and work-
ing from the ambulance park at Bezu-le-Guery, evacuated from battalion
and regimental aid stations, thus relieving the larger General Motor Companv
ambulances for the longer runs to the rear. 10 By June 6, three United States
ambulance sections, with 60 ambulances, were on duty with the division,
in addition to its own vehicles (41 in number), not including 19 animal-
drawn. 11 Transport service within the division was also supplemented by
trucks from supply and sanitary trains, and by touring cars, but despite
all these the tax upon the evacuation service was severe. 10
On June 1 Ambulance Company No. 15 proceeded to Dhuisy, where it
established a dressing station and dispatched ambulances to the battalion aid
stations near Marigny-en-Orxios, which served the troops on the left front,
namely, the 4th and 6th Marine Regiments. 12 On the following morning it
commenced evacuations to Meaux. Owing to the great number of wounded.
314 FIELD OPERATIONS
ambulances of this company were insufficient and they were reinforced by
several from Ambulance Company No. 1, which had taken station at Bezu-le-
Guery. 13 On June 3, the station at Dhuisy was closed and Ambulance Com-
pany No. 15 moved to Coupru. and thence, on June 5, to Domptin, establishing
a dressing station at each place, while its ambulances continued to serve
the left front. On June 11, the company was ordered to Villiers-sur-Marne.
and there operated a station for the slightly wounded, which it maintained
until the division was relieved. 14
Ambulance Company Xo. 1 had moved to Bezu-lc-Guery on June 1 and
established liaison with the front, but on June 2 it moved to Vendrest, where
it established a dressing station at a place then occupied by a battalion aid
station of the 23d Infantry. 13 It distributed ambulances to the aid stations of
this regiment and to those of other troops on the left front. On June 4 it
returned to Bezu-le-Guery, and there remained during the rest of its stay in
this sector. 13 On July 1, in preparation for the offensive against Vaux, it
sent ambulance dressing station personnel and equipment to the 9th Infantry
to reinforce its aid stations. 15 An advance medical supply dump was provided
in front of the regimental aid station on the route of evacuation from bat-
talion aid stations, and returning ambulances were utilized to carry needed
material forward. 16
In anticipation of needs that would develop when the attack should have
progressed sufficiently, two large vaulted cellars in Monneaux were made ready
for use as battalion aid stations.
Ambulance Company No. 23 began operating an ambulance post at Meaux
on June 1, but the next day, leaving four ambulances to serve the 23d Field
Hospital, it moved to Bezu-le-Guery. where it remained until the division was
relieved. At this point it operated in conjunction with Ambulance Company
Xo. 1."
Ambulance Company No. 16 (animal-drawn) reached Cocherel by march-
ing, on June 3. The next day it proceeded to La Sablonnieres and to La Longue
Ferine, where it established a dressing station at 7 p. m. on June G. This was
moved next day one-half kilometer (0.31 mile) up the road to Vertelet Ferme,
making it more accessible to the walking wounded. It remained at this loca-
tion until the division was relieved. 14 On June 4 the 19 animal-drawn am-
bulances of this company were distributed among the artillery regiments and
permanently attached to the several batteries, thus securing them ambulance
service when in positions not accessible to motor vehicles. These ambulances
accompanied the batteries in their frequent shifts of position. 10
The ambulance head was established at Bezu-le-Guery on June 3 and all
ambulances were pooled for service directly under the orders of the director
of ambulance companies. 10 Location of the triage here also facilitated coor-
dination and conservation of the ambulance service, both to forward points
and to the rear. During attacks in which ambulances were insufficient for
rapid evacuation of all wounded, trucks of the sanitary train were utilized,
and if these did not suffice trucks from the supply train were called for. 10
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES
315
As all telegraphic communication had to he in code, a system of numbers
was used to designate regiments, battalions, or places and their needs. Each
regiment was given blocks of ten. sol that the 1st regiment had Nos. 11 to 19,
the 2d Xos. 20 to 29, and so on. A simple telephone call, "42 — three Jones,"
indicated that the 4th Regiment, 2d Battalion aid station, desired three ambu-
lances. 10
From the outset ambulance company litter bearers were sent to the front
to supplement regimental litter bearers as circumstances required and as the
number available permitted. As many as 1(50 at one time were detached from
Fig. ."0. — Church at Benzu-IeGuery
Fiance, used as a ward for wounded by Field Hospital No.
I'd Division, June 1G, 191S
their companies for this duty. 17 They were usually sent forward in ambulances
returning toward the front. Relay litter-hearer posts were established between
battalion aid stations and ambulance posts when litter portage was long and
ambulances could not reach forward stations. 17
Field Hospitals
Field Hospital Xo. 1 established a triage at Bezu-le-Guery, where it re-
mained, occupying the church, a neighboring school building, and tentage. It
cared for the seriously wounded (until Field Hospital No. 23 was established
at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre) and gassed cases, bathing, treating, and dressing
the latter at the rate of 100 an hour. 18 This location was from 1 to 8 km.
316
FIKLD OPERATIONS
(0.0 to 5 miles) from the battalion aid stations, which were evacuated to it
through two dressing stations about midway between it and the front. 18
Field Hospital No. 15 established a dressing station at Cocherel, but as
only a few patients were received there, it moved on June 4 to Chateau la Rue
on the La Ferte-sous-Jouarre — Chateau-Thierry road. 19 Here it operated an
auxiliary triage and then, on alternate days, took over that duty entirely from
Field Hospital No. 1 with a view to relieving the overdriven personnel of that
unit; but this arrangement, proving unsatisfactory, was discontinued. 19 On
wounded by truck from Field Hospital No. 15, near Montreuil. France, June
T. 1018
June 16 the unit moved to Luzancy, where it remained until Julv 6, operating
a hospital for sick and gassed patients. 10
Field Hospital No. 23 and. at first. Ambulance Company No. 23 utilized
f, large chateau in Meaux. 10 Here a hospital was established which, with
the addition of two Bessonneau tents, gave a capacity of 150 beds. This
hospital received patients, especially the sick and slightly wounded, from the
main sorting station at the front, Field Hospital No. 1. and evacuated them
to the hospitals located at Juffly." l t was . in fact? a relay station for a ll
slight cases, and it rendered first aid to those en route to Juillv, the point
farthest forward where definitive surgical treatment could then be given. 10
As the distance from the various points at the front to Meaux was 40 to 50
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES
317
kilometers (24.8 to 31 miles) and an additional 25 km. (15.5 miles) intervened
to the nearest evacuation hospital, this second sorting or relay station proved
very valuable for dressing, resting, warming, and feeding the disabled. 10 This
hospital was joined here on June 4 by Field Hospital No. 16 (animal-drawn),
the two companies continuing to operate the hospital until they were sent to
more forward stations on June 9 and 11, respectively. 10
Cases received at this point were: 10
Field nospital No. 23.
Field Hospital No. 16.
Total
Gassed
Wounded
Shell con-
cussion
Injured
Sick
Total
41
250
797
2.500
20
22
88
50
968
2,800
291
3.297
20
22
138
3,768
On June 6, Field Hospital No. 23 sent half of its personnel to Bezu-le-
Guery to assist Field Hospital No. 1. There they remained until June 10,
when the personnel was reassembled and the unit moved to La Ferte-sous-
Jouarre, where it operated a hospital for nontransportable wounded. This
hospital was well equipped with surgical appliances, including an N-ray plant,
and within a few days extra officers for surgical teams and 18 female nurses
joined. From two to five surgical teams operated until the service here was
taken over by the 26th Division on July 7. 10 This hospital at La Ferte-sous-
Jouarre admitted a total of 963 patients, classified as follows: Gassed, 4;
wounded, 923; psychoneuroses, 9; injured, 30; sick, 17. 10
Field Hospital No. 16 (animal-drawn) reached Meaux on June 4, operat-
ing there with Field Hospital No. 23 until June 11, then moving to Luzancy. 10
Here a building, formerly used by the French for hospital purposes, was
supplemented by tentage, and shelter was thus provided for 800 beds. 10
Conjointly with Field Hospital No. 15, this unit operated a divisional hos-
pital for gassed and sick. Admissions here were as follows: 10
Gassed
Field Hospital No. 15 I 858
Field Hospital No. 16 1,500
I
Total 2.358
Wounded
Psycho-
neuroses
45
Injured
Sick
52
BOO
40
840
Total
1,777
1,540
3,317
Of the foregoing, some 500 were returned to duty.
Mr.Dic.w. Supply Unit
The divisional medical supply unit arrived at Meaux on June 1 and
began immediately to issue materiel which was sent forward on returning
ambulances. 10 Its supplies were obtained in part from Meaux, where ma-
teriel brought from Soissons had been stored by the American Red Cross
Mission after its retreat from the latter point. Other supplies came from
the advance medical supply depot at Coulommiers, to which large quantities
318 FIELD OPERATIONS
of arm} - supplies had been sent by truck trains from Cosnes and Is-sur-
Tille. 1 " During the first part of the operations there was shortage of blankets,
litters, and pajamas in divisional hospitals because of inadequate organiza-
tion and facilities for distribution. 10 After the establishment of a medical
supply depot at Lieusaint, with excellent truck service distribution, less
difficulty was experienced. 10 On June 9 the divisional supply unit was moved
to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. and distribution to forward organizations was
further facilitated. 10
From June 15 until the division was relieved, no changes were made
in the location of the sanitary units, and the same system of evacuation
was maintained. 10 Patients were removed by regimental and ambulance com-
pany litter bearers from battalion and regimental aid stations to ambulance
posts, and thence to the triage at Bezu-le-Guery, where gassed cases were
bathed and reclothed before being sent to Field Hospitals No. 15 and No.
16, at Luzancy, whither also the sick were sent. Nontransportable wounded
were sent to Field Hospital No. 23 at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and after June
14 all others Avere sent to Mobile Hospital No. 1 and Evacuation Hospital
No. 7 at Chateau Montanglaust, near Coulommiers. 19
THE 3D DIVISION
On May 27 the Germans began their offensive between the Aisne and
the Marne, and within the next few days elements of the 3d Division, which
had been placed at the disposal of the French, began their move toward
Chateau-Thierry. The 7th Machine Gun Battalion was the first organiza-
tion of the division to enter the lines, reaching the defenses of the bridge-
head at Chateau-Thierry late in the afternoon of May 31, there reinforcing
a battalion of the 10th Moroccan Division at a very critical moment.-" The
main body of advancing German troops reached the Marne the next day,
but were prevented from crossing at Chateau-Thierry. 2 The prompt ar-
rival and stubborn defense of this important point by untried troops (May
31 to June 1), are well worthy of special mention. Continuing operations
through the following days, the 7th Machine Gun Battalion was relieved
by the 9th Machine Gun Battalion on June 4. The first battle casualties of
the 3d Division occurred here.-' 1 Meanwhile, the main body of the division
had reached the Marne and was posted in Chateau-Thierry and eastward
therefrom to Dormans. From June 1 to 5 it took an active part in the Aisne-
Marne operation. 21
On June 15, the 7th Infantry was detached and placed in the sector
of the 4th Brigade (2d Division), where it relieved the 5th and 6th Marines
(4th Brigade). 21 Withdrawn on the night of June 23-24, it then rejoined
its division. 3 From June 4 to July 14, the remainder of the division held
the south bank of the Marne. 21
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
When the 7th Machine Gun Battalion began its participation in the de-
fense of the bridgehead at Chateau-Thierrv, its battalion aid station was
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 319
located in a cellar 200 yards to its rear, the next day (June 1) moving to a
less exposed position across the street. Some of the American wounded be-
longing to the 3d Division were cared for in French sanitary formations. 22
Ambulance Companies
Ambulance Company No. 5 was located at Essises on June 3, with its
main dressing station and ambulance park at that point. An advance dress-
ing and ambulance station, with 1 medical officer, 1 noncommissioned officer,
and 8 men, functioned at Courboin-les-Alloix. 23 This company dispatched
ambulances from both these points to the following: The 4th Infantry at
Petit Heurtebise Ferme, Nesles, and Les Evaux, the 7th Infantry at Le
Kocq Ferme, and the 6th Engineers at Bocage. It also evacuated sick and
wounded at Viffort. There was a daily schedule of 4 ambulances at Courboin,
2 ambulances at night and 1 during the day at Les Evaux, and 2 during the
night at Le Rocq Ferme and of 1 both day and night at Petit Heurtebise
Ferme and at Nesles. 23
Ambulance Company No. 7 had its main dressing station at Conde en
Brie on June 3 and on June 4 at Pertibout. 24 Ambulance Company No. 26
was located at Verdelot, 25 Ambulance Company No. 27 was stationed at La
Ferotterie, where it was occupied solely with transportation, employing all
its available ambulances for evacuation service .from Field Hospital No. 27
to Field Hospital No. 26 at Coulommiers and to the Army Red Cross hospital
at Jouy-sur-Morin. 20
Field Hospitals
The divisional field hospitals reached the Marne on June 1 and began
operations on June 3. Field Hospital No. 27 was designated as the triage
and located at Verdelot, about 17 km. (10.5 miles) back of the lines. Field
Hospital No. 5, used as the gas hospital, was located at Ville Chamblon, about
10 km. (6.2 miles) south of Chateau -Thierry. Field Hospital No. 26 was
located at Coulommiers, 30 km. (18 miles) from the front, to operate for a
few days as an evacuation hospital, Avhile Field Hospital No. 7 was held in
reserve near St. Barthelemy. So far as possible the personnel of these units
was divided into two shifts, each working 12 hours. About the middle of
June, 1 shock team, 4 surgical teams, and 9 nurses joined Field Hospital No.
27. 27 The mobile divisional laboratory operated in conjunction with the
field hospitals. 28
Supply Unit
The medical supply unit established a depot June 2, with two truck loads
of supplies, at Verdelot, but until July 14 there was no great demand for
supplies other than medicines, dressings, etc. The American Eed Cross estab-
lished a divisional storeroom in the same building and worked in cooperation
with the supply officer. 29
320 FIELD OPERATIONS
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT SERVICE IN REAR OF THE DIVISIONS
The Medical Department subsection of the Fourth section — i. e., the co-
ordination of transportation section, of the general staff — supervised and in
general terms directed the activities of the Medical Department in the field,
while a medical representative of this subsection was locally in charge of the
field activities of the Medical Department, and performed the duties incum-
bent upon a chief surgeon of the forces in question.
As noted in Chapter IX, this officer had been detailed to act as liaison
officer for the Medical Department between the 1st Division and the French
Army, and also as liaison officer for the Medical Department between that
division and our General Headquarters. On May 21 he was also appointed
by General Headquarters as liaison officer for the Medical Department be-
tween the 2d Division and the French Sixth Army, to which that division
would be attached. 30 In this position he was to discharge duties altogether
similar to those which he already had performed for the 1st Division, viz,
to maintain contact between the divisional medical service and the French,
and also between the division and our General Headquarters. On May 31,
after the Cantigny offensive, this officer proceeded to the Chaumont-en- Vexin
area, just south of Beauvais, where the 2d Division had been located, but
learned there that it had suddenly moved to Meaux. 31 Here he joined it the
next day and learned that it might enter the line at any moment, behind such
hastily constructed trenches as could be improvised. 31 His arrival relieved
the surgeon of the 2d Division as well as the 3d Division, of the necessity of
providing for hospitalization and evacuation in rear of their respective com-
mands. On the other hand, as these divisions had been thrown into the
sector in question suddenly to meet an emergency, our General Headquarters
had had no opportunity to provide hospitalization in their rear. 31
The arrival of American divisions in the Marne area created a new-
problem for our Medical Department in their immediate rear, and also in
providing base hospital facilities for their casualties. In their retreat, as
mentioned elsewhere, the French had lost all their evacuation hospitals in that
region, totaling some 40,000 or 45,000 beds, 32 and were not in a position to
care for their own wounded and to assume the additional burden of caring
for casualties in American divisions, though they undertook to do so to the
limit of their resources. 32 This being the situation, the French, for the first
time, permitted us to take charge of medical service to the rear; furthermore,
having so decided, they assisted in every way in the establishment of American
military hospitals behind our divisions, and in their evacuation by means of
our own hospital trains to fixed American hospitals in their rear. 33 Putting
this plan into actual operation, however, was encompassed by almost insuper-
able difficulties. The number of our evacuation hospitals was far below the
authorized quota, and as the sector originally selected for occupation by
American troops was that facing Lorraine, some 256 km. (160 miles) to
the east of Meaux. our efforts to construct base hospitals had been concentrated
largely in that area and in rear thereof. The Medical Department of the
18576—28 21
321
322
FIELD OPERATIONS
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 323
American Expeditionary Forces had been ordered not to establish military
hospitals in Paris or its vicinity. 3 ' Under such conditions the only recourse
for the American medical service was to utilize the Red Cross institutions in
Paris as base hospitals, with such expansion and additions as were possible. 34
In anticipation of the great need for American hospitals in Paris, plans
already started were continued and intensified to increase the Paris hospitals
to their maximum capacity. These efforts were successful to the extent of a
capacity of 10,000 beds. 33
The entire period of our service in the Marne area was one of peculiar
difficulties in the evacuation service from the divisions and in hospitalization
to their immediate rear. Open warfare increased enormously the burden
placed on the Medical Dej^artment, and only by the utmost endeavor to utilize
every hospital available, as well as all transport, plus such assistance as the
French could give- in ambulance service, could the situation be met. The diffi-
culties were greatly augmented by the fact that our methods, in rear of the di-
visions, had to be correlated with a system different, from ours, operated by an
ally speaking a different tongue and exercising tactical control. During the
early phase of these battles in the Marne area our medical service was confronted
by shortage of personnel, hospital equipment, and ambulances. 33 The rapid
German advance had so demoralized the railways that it was impossible to
operate hospital trains in the early part of this period. Consequently, evacua-
tion by ambulance, and, in lieu of ambulances, by truck, between the evacua-
tion hospitals and the hospitals in Paris — a distance of from 40 to 100 km.
(24.8-62 miles)- — was at first necessary. By concentrating all our available
resources, and borrowing from the French, some 200 ambulances were provided
for the evacuation service of the 2d Division ; but, owing to the great length
of the route to be traversed, this number was barely sufficient to meet the
needs. 33
In view of our shortage in hospitals in rear of the 2d and 3d Divisions,
our medical liaison officer immediately made arrangements with Medecin
Inspecteur General Lasnet, chief surgeon of the French Sixth Army, to which
these divisions were now attached, that American wounded be admitted to
the French evacuation and other hospitals. 35 Also, he undertook to provide
hospitalization of our own for our troops in the area. A hurried survey
showed that the only American hospital available was a Red Cross unit which
was operating at Juilly-Domartin under the supervision of the commanding
officer of Red Cross Hospital No. 1 at Paris. 31 The Juilly hospital had bed
space for 280 wounded, though its personnel was inadequate to care for that
number. 31 Efforts were made to increase its bed capacity at once to 800. To
assure delivery of needed material, the liaison officer hurriedly 7 visited Red
Cross headquarters in Paris, and within 48 hours the supplies needed began
to arrive at Juilly. 31 Eventually this hospital, which was designated to care
for the seriously wounded, was taken over by the Army, becoming Army Red
Cross Hospital No. 7. 36 Meanwhile, the liaison officer had wired to the chief
of G-4, G. H. Q., that there was no adequate provision for our wounded, arid
urged that operating teams, a mobile surgical unit, hospital trains, ambulance
1
324 FIELD OPERATIONS
transportation, and miscellaneous personnel be placed at liis disposal. 35 As
Juilly was on the left flank of the Chateau-Thierry salient at a distance which
would require a haul of 50 or 60 km. (31-37 miles) from the right flank of
the American sector, it was decided that hospitalization should be provided
also farther to the east. 35 This need became even more apparent when, on
June 2, it was learned that the 3d Division was at Viels Maisons. 30 The liaison
officer at once called up the Red Cross in Paris and asked that it establish a
600-bed hospital at Montmirail. 35 For this Red Cross supplies, being stored
in Paris, were much more quickly available than were those of the army, which
were stored at Cosne. 35 The Red Cross immediately undertook to supply the
materials required and shipped them by truck on June 4, but the medical
liaison officer was informed on that date that as Montmirail was outside the
Sixth Army sector he would have to select another site for the hospital which
these supplies were to equip. He then selected for it a chateau at Jouy-sur-
Morin, about 20 km. (12.4 miles) south of Viels Maisons, and the Red Cross,
at the latter point, directed its stream of trucks to the newly selected loca-
tion. This chateau was in excellent condition and provided ample space for
a surgical clinic, shock rooms, sterilizing rooms, kitchens, and rooms for per-
sonnel. 37 Fortunately, the number of casualties from the 3d Division had been
relatively few and had easily been accommodated in French hospitals, most
of them entering the evacuation hospital which the French were operating
at Coulommiers. 38 On June 5, the hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin, American Red
Cross Hospital No. 107, was ready to receive patients. Later it expanded to
a capacity of 700 beds, and was operated by personnel from the army and from
the Red Cross, its commissioned personnel coming from the former. 39
On June 4 and 5 arrangements were made for evacuations by ambulance
from the hospital at Juilly. As the personnel at that time was becoming
physically exhausted, and as the X-ray equipment for the hospital for non-
transportables of the 2d Division, now established at Meaux, had not yet
arrived, the surgical teams which reached the latter unit on June 4 were
transferred to Juilly. 37 On the same date the officer in charge of the army
medical supplies, which had now arrived, was directed to establish the advance
depot for the Medical Department at Coulommiers. Information was received
that two evacuation hospitals that had been asked for would join as soon
as possible. 37
On June 5 three United States Army Ambulance Service sections, with 20
cars each, which the liaison officer had requested, reported, but they were placed
in the service of the 2d Division and not under his immediate control. 38 On
the same date, as it appeared that the hospital at Juilly would be overtaxed,
the liaison officer called up the chief surgeon, district of Paris, and asked that
he have all available space and operating teams ready to receive wounded the
following morning and that he send all available ambulances to Juilly for
their transport. 38 The chief surgeon of the French Army was asked that he
make arrangements to have American wounded received in all French hos-
pitals, and he renewed his assurance that this would be done. On the morning
of June 6 all available ambulances and numerous trucks were evacuating from
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ABMIES 325
the front of the 2d Division into Juilly, where additional operating tables had
been installed. 38 Though the surgical teams there worked day and night, they
were insufficient to care for all wounded received. As a matter of fact, not
more than a fourth of the personnel needed by this hospital could be furnished
it. Therefore incoming patients were carefully triaged here, and those able to
stand the journey were sent on to Paris hospitals in several ambulance con-
voys. 38 The next day the first hospital train arrived at Juilly. On June 6
and 7, by ambulance and train, 1,183 patients, practically all of whom had
come from the 2d Division, were sent from Juilly to Paris. 40 Of this total
all but 199 were evacuated by ambulance. 40 On the dates mentioned the
small hospital at Juilly had received about 1,700 patients, and for a period of
four days its personnel worked 20 hours a day. 40 The litter bearers — most of
whom were French soldiers unfit for front-line service — worked even longer
hours. 40 Their labors were supplemented by ambulance drivers. Finally all
were too weary to lift a litter to the level of the upper tier of an ambulance.
A detachment from the 2d Division then relieved them until the personnel of
Evacuation Hospital No. 8 arrived — on June 8. 40 This unit, then the only
evacuation hospital in France, was assigned to assist the Red Cross hospital at
Juilly until its own equipment arrived. For evacuation hospital service to the
3d Division, which was relatively inactive at this time, the divisional field
hospital at Verdelot, caring for nontransportable wounded, was supplemented
by a mobile surgical unit. 41 The Red Cross hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin was on
a good working basis and competent to take care of all the wounded of this
division. 41
On June 10 arrangements were made that the three Army Ambulance
Service sections heretofore in the service of the 2d Division be placed at the
disposal of the medical liaison officer. 42 As soon as the order concerning this
arrangement was received, one of these sections was ordered to remain with
the 2d Division, one was sent to the 3d Division, and one was attached to
Evacuation Hospital No. 7 43 (which arrived at Chateau Montanglaust June
12), with the understanding that it would be available for front-line work
if required.
On June 11 information was received that the Quartermaster Corps
contemplated the establishment of a large depot at Lieusaint and that the
advance depot of the Medical Department at Coulommiers would soon be
transferred there. 44
The 2d Division moved its field hospital for nontransportables from
Meaux to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, where it was operating to capacity by June
12, with greatly increased personnel. 43
Evacuation Hospital No. 7, which had reached Chateau Montanglaust on
June 12, was joined the same day by Mobile Hospital No. 1, and thereafter,
so long as they remained in this locality, they operated as a consolidated
unit, under control of the commanding officer of Evacuation Hospital No.
7." As soon as they coidd be installed — June 14 and June 13, respectively —
these units were worked to capacity, receiving among others the evacuable
patients from the hospital for nontransportables of the 2d Division at La
326 FIELD OPERATIONS
Ferte-sous-Jouarre. The}' admitted more than 2.700 patients from that hos-
pital during the next six weeks. 45 By the use of tentage the number of operat-
ing tables for the consolidated formation in question was rapidly increased
from 8 to 16 and later to 26, but because of the limited number of operating
teams available the latter number was seldom utilized. On June 13 an X-ray
team joined American Red Cross Hospital No. 107 at Jouy-sur-Morin. 40
The medical supply depot at Coulommiers, meanwhile, was very active,
its two autotrucks being constantly engaged in delivering materiel, especially
litters and splints. 44
On June 12, word having been received that other divisions had been
ordered to this area, an inspection was made with a view to locating sites
for the evacuation hospitals necessary to serve them should such hospital?
become available. 44 Suitable sites, however, were few for the reason that
only a few railroad sidings were long enough to accommodate our hospital
trains, and even when tracks were long enough, they might not be available
for Medical Department use because of other military needs. After some
delay a tentative selection of sites was made, but final decision was reserved
until the last moment. Alternative locations were also selected, to be oc-
cupied in case our lines fell back. 44
All Medical Department formations in rear of divisional formations as
they became available were assembled in a semicircular disposition on either
side of Chateau-Thierry. So far as possible, these hospitals occupied build-
ings, but frequently they employed tentage. On June 15 arrangements were
made with the regulating officer at Le Bourget for the service of these hospitals
by hospital train at Coulommiers. 47
The 4th Division had now arrived in this area without ambulances and
was centered around Meaux. evacuating to Juilly.
Casualties in the 2d Division from June 2 to 15. inclusive, had been
2.385 wounded, 345 gassed, 244 sick, and about 600 killed. All casualties
from this division were now being received by Evacuation Hospital No. 7 and
Mobile Hospital No. 1 at Chateau Montanglaust. 47
By June 16 the liaison officer had requested six additional operating
teams for Evacuation Hospital No. 7, as those of Mobile Hospital No. 1 with
it were working day and night. 48 Pending their arrival, American Eed
Cross Hospital No. 107, being relatively quiet, assisted in caring for the
wounded of the 2d Division. At this time it was decided to expand the lat-
ter hospital's bed capacity, and within 48 hours it was equipped to receive
500 and later 700 patients. 43 The hospital at Juilly (Red Cross Hospital No.
7) was still working to capacity, but it was proposed that as soon as the
operating teams and equipment requested for Evacuation Hospital No. 7
arrived, it would care for most of the patients from the 2d Division. Bed
space in the former hospital now totaled 700 beds, and it was planned to
increase it to 1,000. 49
Though former experiences indicated that marking hospital sites by the
Red Cross invited attack by enemy airplanes, evacuation hospitals and Red
AMERICAN DIVISION'S WITH FRENCH ARMIES 327
Cross units acting as such were now ordered thus to designate their premises
by red crosses, 104 feet, in diameter, on a white base. 48
The first hospital train evacuation from Evacuation Hospital No. 7 was
made on June 17."'° On June IS the medical supply depot moved to Lieu-
saint, where supplies to replenish its stock were expected. Such supplies as it
still had at Coulommiers were left with Evacuation Hospital No. 7 for issue
to the divisions, and the division surgeons wore so notified. From June 4 to
•Tune 20 the hospital at Juilly received 3.274 patients, of whom it evacuated
2.863. The great majority of these were sent to Red Cross Hospitals No. 1
and Xo. 2, at Paris. Except in extremely active periods all these patients
were given the necessary surgical treatment before being transferred."' 1 Mean-
while the capacity of Evacuation Hospital No. 7 had been increased to 850
beds, but its operating equipment had not yet been received. Mobile Hospital
No. 1, attached to the latter, had been conducting four operating tables night
and day in order to compensate for this deficiency. 49 This delayed equipment
was received on June 20. 52 On June 2o the army surgeon. French Sixth Army,
made available to American Red Cross Hospital No. 107 radiological equip-
ment until its own, which had broken down, could be repaired. 63
As the 28th Division had now arrived at Gonnesse, in the area of the
Marne, some distance back of the lines, instructions were given its division
surgeon concerning evacuation of his sick and the obtainment of supplies.
To each division newly arrived in this area a divisional gas unit was sent
without requisition. 51
By June 24 American Red Cross Hospital No. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin, was
sending patients to Coulommiers by convoy, whence they were either sent out
at once by hospital train, of whose arrival the unit was notified, or they were
admitted to the hospital there to await the arrival of a train. 54 Arrangements
were made at this time with the French for the ambulance service of the 28th
Division which, like the 4th Division, had reached the Marne area quite
without these vehicles, and provision was made for the service of the division
(should it enter a relatively distant section) by Mobile Hospital No. 1, which
it was now possible to detach from Evacuation Hospital No. 7 for this
purpose. On the 2Gth of June information was received that the sanitary
trains of both the 4th and 2Sth Divisions were en route."' 5 At this time the
United States had only 16 hospital trains in France, and it had become
evident that if gassed cases were to be evacuated prone, as ordered, additional
transportation, both trains and ambulances, would be required. 54
When, on June 26, the 2d Division again attacked, the number of casualties
became so great that the slightly wounded had to be transferred by ambulances
and trucks from Evacuation Hospital No. 7 and Mobile Hospital No. 1 to
Red Cross Hospital No. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin. 56 The latter unit had sent
out several trainloads of patients by this time, while in the interval from
June 17 to 26, inclusive, Evacuation Hospital No. 7 had evacuated 2.271
patients, including some sent for evacuation from Red Cross Hospital No. 107
when that unit did not have enough evacuables in its own wards to warrant
328 FIELD OPERATIONS
call for a train for its service alone. The medical liaison officer estimated at
this time that one operating table should operate 25 cases in 24 hours/' 7 This
was a general working average based on experience, but mutable according to
the missile, the nature of the wounds operated, and the speed of the team
concerned. In point of fact, it was greatly exceeded by some teams. It was
found that wounds caused by shell usually required longer attention than
those made by bullets. 57 In the successful drive which the marines concluded
June 26 in Belleau Wood 199 of the seriously wounded were operated within
22 hours in the evacuation hospitals, the others being cared for in the hospital
of the 2d Division for nontransportables. 53
The 26th Division came in during the night of June 29 and reported some
ambulances lacking, but its transportation was much better than had been
those of the 4th and the 28th Divisions when they entered the area. 59 Arrange-
ments were made at this time to have the laundry from evacuation and other
hospitals sent by truck to Paris. Shortage of fresh linen had become a
serious problem. 58 With the assistance of the surgeon of the French Sixth
Army, efforts were continued to hold the chateau at Meaux for the future use
of the Medical Department. 56
By July 1, Evacuation Hospital No. 8, at Juilly, was receiving but few
patients. Enemy wounded, received in some numbers on the following day,
were treated habitually with the American wounded, unless there was a rush
of patients, in which case they were sent to the French evacuation hospital at
Coulommiers. 50
On July 2, the liaison officer for the Medical Department reported as chief
surgeon for the Paris group, as the divisions operating in the Marne area
were now designated. 00
When the 26th Division was ordered to relieve the 2d Division in the line
on July 3, United States Army Ambulance Section No. 502 and four additional
ambulances, together with a gas outfit, surplus blankets, and litters, were
turned over to the 26th by the 2d Division. 00 All divisions were handicapped
at. this time by lack of transportation. Available trucks were just sufficient
to transport the field hospital equipment as authorized before the war, but
were insufficient for the portage in addition of the large numbers of extra
blankets, litters and splints, and for the gas treatment equipment now carried.
Arrangements were made with the French whereby they would supply trans-
port for the 4th and 28th Divisions if they became engaged before their am-
bulances arrived. 61
The medical supply depot, which had moved to Lieusaint, was ordered to
assemble equipment for a 500-bed hospital, and on July 8 arrangements were
made for parking a truck train there for the purpose of moving this unit and,
if necessary. Mobile Hospital No. I. 02 Chief of a number of anxieties was
that caused by shortage of ambulances. Despite frequent requisitions, the
number furnished had been very limited because of limited supply, but on
this date (July 8) a newly arrived evacuation ambulance company reported
to Evacuation Hospital No. 7 to assist a similar unit already on duty there.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 329
The latter had been loaned twice to the 2d Division and served both Evacua-
tion Hospital No. 7 and the hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin. Until this time the
shortage of ambulances had been very acute. 02
The Red Cross hospital at Juilly was now placed at the disposal of the
army, and orders were received concerning the establishment there of Evacua-
tion Hospital No. 8 as soon as its equipment was received. Of the total beds,
225 were ordered reserved for the French. 62
On July 11, consideration was given to the establishment of a hospital at
Villiers-sur-Marne and the use of hospital barges, a few of which were idle
at Meaux. 63 In view of the expected German offensive, all hospitals were
cleared as rapidly as possible, supplies replenished, and similar preparations
made. Quest was continued for sites for additional hospitals, but definite
selection was difficult because of lack of motor transport and of railroad facili-
ties, and also because of the possibility of an advance by the enemy in the
attack known to be impending. An exhaustive estimate of the situation led
to the tentative selection of Jouy-sur-Morin and Meaux as the sites best suited
for the establishment of additional evacuation hospitals. 64
CRITICISM
The story of the Aisne defensive and the succeeding operations might now
be considered to have been completed save for the fact that the Medical De-
partment was severely criticized and, in justice to all concerned, account must
be taken of the criticisms and the investigation which followed.
A certain newspaper correspondent prepared a cablegram to his paper
in which he bitterly scored the handling of the wounded of the 2d Division
in the early days of June, 1918, stating, in substance, that " the Medical De-
partment of the Army failed to meet its responsibilities." 65 The cablegram
was held up by the censor and immediately, when its contents were brought
to the attention of the chief surgeon, A. E. F., he asked for an investigation
by the inspector general's department. This was made between July 1 and 7.
The senior representative of the Medical Department, with G-4, G. H. Q.,
made the following official statement to the inspector general :" 5
*******
In order to understand what the responsibilities of the Medical Department were
at this time it is necessary to know the agreement made by the American G. H. Q. and
the French G. H. Q. when the American troops were turned over to the French to serve
in the French armies. Under the terms of the original agreement the Medical Department
was obliged to furnish the personnel and equipment of the sanitary units belonging to
the division. All matters of supply, hospitalization, and evacuation were to be taken care
of by the French. It became immediately apparent that the question of medical sup-
plies for our divisions serving with the French could not be handled In a satisfactory
manner by the latter. For this reason the agreement was modified to the extent that
medical supplies and gas defense materiel would be furnished by the Medical Depart-
ment, A. E. F., but the hospitalization and evacuation still remained for the French to
accomplish.
When the 2d Division was withdrawn from the line and sent to the west of Paris
it was originally understood that it would ultimately take position in the sector occupied
hy the 1st Division. Acting on this belief, a medical officer attached to G-4, G. H. Q...
13576—25 22
330 FIELD OPERATIONS
visited the 2d Division, then in the vicinity of Chaumont-en-Vexin, to make sure that the
arrangements for hospitalization and evacuation were satisfactory. On the last day of
May information was received which indicated that (he destination of the division might
lie changed. Therefore, the same officer was sent to visit the division to see if other
arrangements were necessary for hospitalization and evacuation. This officer was Lieut.
Col. A. D. Tuttle, Medical Corps, and his last visit covered the days of June 1 and June 2.
On Sunday, June 2, word reached the A. C. of S., G— 1, that the 2d Division's orders
had been changed and that it was moving from the area it had occupied northwest of Paris
to the vicinity of Meaux, northeast of Paris, and that it might be expected to come in con-
tact with the enemy at almost any time. It was also learned that the movement had been
made in great haste, and that the sanitary train of the division had been very widely
separated, and that it had been impossible to entirely reassemble it as late as the 2d
of June.
On the 2d of June Colonel Tuttle visited the headquarters of the 6th French Army,
with which army the 2d Division was incorporated, and was informed thai due to the
military situation it would be impossible for the French to do much in the way' of
discharging their obligation to hospitalize and evacuate the battle casualties from the
American division, and, moreover, it was requested that the A. E. F. medical authorities
do what they could in this respect.
Owing to the shortage of Medical Department personnel in France the situation
presented many difficulties. Nevertheless, the following steps were immediately taken :
(1) Operating teams were ordered by telegraph to report at once to the Red Cross hos-
pital at Juilly, near Meaux, and two operating teams were ordered at the same time to
report to the division surgeon at Meaux; (2) 10 large Bessonneau ward tents belonging
to the Red Cross, which were in storage at Camp de Mailly. were ordered by the A. C. of S.,
G-4, to be sent overland by truck transportation to the vicinity of Meaux. This order was
telegraphed personnally by the A. C. of S., G-4, at 11 o'clock at night (June 2d) to the
commanding officer at Mailly; (3) on the morning of June 3d 10 truck loads of emer-
gency medical supplies were ordered by telephone to be sent from the Medical Supply
Depot at Cosne to Meaux; (4) a mobile surgical hospital in storage in Paris was ordered
sent to the division surgeon at Meaux by automobile truck on the morning of the 3d of
June; and (5) the A. C. of S., G-4, ordered a truck train to Is-sur-Tille to be loaded there
with various reserve supplies, this also on the morning of the 3d of June. Included in
these supplies were all the necessary drugs and appliances for the caring of gas patients,
as well as 1,000 extra uniforms for both the 2d and 3d Divisions, the latter to be used
for changing clothing of gas patients.
Col. Paul C. Hutton, Medical Corps, attached to G-4 was ordered in the latter part of
May to report to the chief surgeon of the French Army with which it served. He was
instructed to make all possible arrangements for the procurement of hospital facilities
to meet the needs of this division.
On the afternoon of June 3d, an order was issued directing Lieut. Col. R. U. Patterson,
Medical Corps, to report to the division commander, this for the purpose of placing the
services of this most experienced officer at the disposition of the division surgeon. The
chief surgeon, A. E. F., at Tours was notified by telephone of the disposition taken, and
he was acquainted with the situation which existed regarding this division. I left G. H. Q.
at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of June 3d and met the chief surgeon (General Ireland) in
Paris on the morning of June 4th. Together we proceeded to Meaux and examined, with
the chief surgeon, the disposition he had made to meet the situation. He went on to the
division headquarters and had a personal interview with the chief of staff, the division
commander being absent, who expressed himself as thoroughly well satisfied. On our re-
turn from division headquarters, we called on Medecin Inspecteur Lasnet. chief surgeon of
the French Sixth Army. We then proceeded to the Red Cross hospital at Juilly, where the
wounded were beginning to arrive. We found that there was a shortage of personnel
although part of the personnel which was ordered on June 2d had arrived, and this personnel
had been augmented by certain officers detached from the division sanitary personnel. It
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 331
was, however, perfectly apparent that steps should be taken to evacuate this hospital in
the immediate future. The .luilly hospital, it might he well to state, had at that time
facilities for only 225 patients, hut a request had been made to the Red Cross to furnish
the materiel to expand it to its maximum capacity, approximately 700 beds, and this was
going on. Immediately upon his return to Paris (June 4), the chief surgeon requested of
6. H. Q. that Evacuation Hospital No. S, the only one available in France, and then en
route from Brest where it had landed, be sent immediately to Juilly to furnish the neces-
sary personnel. Upon our return to Paris, effor s were at once made to secure permission
from the French authorities to send a hospital train to Juilly for the purpose of evacuat-
ing that hospital. This operation was attended with some delay, but a hospital train was
sent on there the following day and relieved the congestion. However, it developed that
owing to the limited amount of personnel at Juilly it would be impossible for the wounded
to be evacuated by hospital train, inasmuch as this method of removing patients necessi-
tated the handling of patients twice, placing them in the ambulance and carrying them
to the station, and there handling the litters to place them in the trains. For this reason
it was decided to make this secondary evacuation from Juilly to Paris by means of
ambulances.
Colonel Bingham, Medical (Jorps, the medical officer of the hospital center of Paris,
was informed of the general situation and instructed to organize the ambulance service
to meet this need, Col. Percy L. Jones, Medical Corps, chief of the United States Army
Ambulance Service, with headquarters in Paris, had been communicated with, and every
available ambulance in Paris was placed by him at the disposition of the A. E. F. in this
emergency. For the next four days the Ambulance Service, between Juilly and Paris,
was very heavy and a considerable part of the personnel worked continuously night and
clay to keep the Juilly hospital evacuated. As has been shown by the statements of officers
connected with this operation, there was at no time any lack of ambulance transportation,
and neither was there any undue congestion of patients either at Juilly or at the Paris
hospitals.
As stated above, the greatest difficulty experienced was in the shortage of personnel
at the Juilly hospital. This was partially relieved by the early arrival of 45 army nurses.
The evacuation hospital which was anticipated would arrive by June 5, did not reach
Juilly until June 8. This delay was due, first, to the fact that the request for railroad
transportation could not be filled by the French. On June 5, an urgent plea was made
by A. C. of S., G-4, to the chief of the French mission to expedite this movement. On
the morning of June 6, the necessary cars were made available at Bazoilles-sur-Meuse,
but owing to the congested condition of the railroads the unit did not reach Juilly until
45 hours later, or the morning of June 8. The arrival of this unit made it possible to
relieve the overworked personnel of this hospital. It was also made possible to detach
from this unit certain of the enlisted personnel to assist the overworked personnel of the
hospitals of Paris.
The 3d Division, which was in the line close to the 2d Division and only a little to the
east of Chateau-Thierry, also required hospital facilities. The needs of this division were
met by the installation of a hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin. This hospital was opened in
some buildings which had formerly been used as a French hospital and was placed at the
disposal of our army by the chief surgeon of the 8th French Army. The Red Cross
furnished the materiel and part of the personnel, the balance being made up of casual
Medical Department personnel of the A. E. F. By the addition of tent wards the capacity
nf this hospital was greatly augmented until it reached 600 beds. It was very well
located for the 3d Division and received a few cases from the 2d Division. As it was
about 20 km. from Coulommiers, the evacuation through the evacuation hospital established
there presented no difficulties.
I remained on duty supervising the general problem of evacuation and hospitalization
of the wounded for this division until the 12th of June, when the flow of wounded had
become very small. During the 10 days I visited every sanitary formation, and every
request for materiel and personnel was forwarded to the chief surgeon's office. Every
332 FIELD OPERATIONS
such request received immediate attention with the exception that there was a limit on
the available personnel which could be furnished. Surgical operating teams, which had
been organized in anticipation of just such emergencies, were ready and available, and it
only required a telephonic request to have them started for any given destination. The
establishment of an advanced supply depot by shipping the materiel referred to above
from Cosne prevented any shortage of the absolutely essential supplies.
Mr. refers to the Paris hospitals as in no sense emergency institutions and not
prepared to meet such a situation as was presented. In this connection it seems desirable
to state that this situation as it developed had been foreseen, and that on the 8th of
April, about two months before the emergency arose, the commanding officer of the
A. R. C. Military Hospital No. 1, with his second in command, the commanding officer of
American Red Cross Military Hospital No. 2, and Major Lambert, M. R. C, attached to
the Red Cross, were requested to meet the writer in Paris. On that date I informed these
officers that it was my belief that at any time the hospitals of Paris might be called upon
to act as evacuation hospitals, and that they could expect to receive their wounded from
the front directly. Moreover, it was stated that with this contingency in view both of
these hospitals should be augmented to the maximum limit consistent with safety and
so organized that a large part of the patients could be rapidly handled and cared for.
At the same time a request was made of the Red Cross through Major Lambert that a
tent hospital of 500 beds with a view to expansion to 1,000 beds to make ready on the
Auteuil race track. It might also be stated that the Red Cross began the erection of sucli
hospitals as soon as permission from the proper authorities could be obtained, and that a
hospital was ready to operate and very materially assist in meeting the emergency which
existed between June 4 and July 12. At the same time the question of automobile trans-
portation was discussed and every possible contingency foreseen and provided for.
Criticism has been made that the selection of Meaux as a clearing point for the
wounded of the 2d Division was a mistake, for the reason that it was too far from the
front. I do not know who selected Meaux, but at the time it was chosen it was undoubt-
edly the best possible choice, for the reason that the enemy was approaching Meaux very
rapidly, and to have placed the clearing point for the wounded nearer, until it was
evident that the enemy could be held, would have been a most serious mistake. After
the flow of wounded had become established, and because of the large number involved, it
was impossible to immediately arrive at any other solution of the problem. However, as
soon as this time arrived, which was about June 10, the establishment at Meaux was
moved forward to La-Ferte-sous-Jouarre, where possession was taken of a small civil
hospital. One of the division field hospital units was installed here and provided with
first-class surgeons, electric lights, X-ray apparatus, etc. The nearest point where hospital
trains could reach for the purpose of evacuation was at Coulommiers. This place had
been visited several days prior by General Ireland and myself with a view to the possi-
bility of moving hospital trains in and out. It was found that the French had no objec-
tion, as they were using it as an evacuating point for their own wounded. The question
of sending our wounded to the French evacuation hospital at Coulommiers was also dis-
cussed with the French authorities. We were informed that this number (the total
French resources in Coulommiers comprised about 1,300 beds) was not adequate to meet
the probable needs of the French ; and while it was stated that any American sent there
would be given the best possible care, it was believed highly desirable that the A. E. F.
establish Its own hospital. A survey of this locality showed that the chateau of
Montanglaust, about 2 km. north of the city, was the most desirable site. Possession was
taken of this chateau and the surrounding ground. The Evacuation Hospital No. 7 was
ordered to proceed there at once. At the same time Mobile Hospital No. 1, then in Paris,
was directed to proceed to Coulommiers. However, as it had no transportation, it was
necessary to provide approximately 30 trucks for this purpose. The A. C. of S., G-4, G. H.
Q., was communicated with, and I was instructed to request the commanding general in Paris
to furnish any truck transportation which might be available. It was found that there were
ample trucks at the aviation camp a few kilometers south of Paris, but there were no
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 333
drivers. After considerable delay French drivers were borrowed, and the unit was finally
started on its way. On the 12th of June both the mobile hospital and the evacuation
hospital had reached Coulommlers, and on the 13th they were receiving patients. Within
the three weeks this formation handled over 4,000 cases, the great majority of which were
evacuated by hospital train from Coulommiers. The establishment of this hospital im-
mediately relieved the overtaxed Paris hospitals and the hospital at Juilly and at the same
time reduced by nearly one-half the automobile transportation of the wounded.
As has been indicated above, the Medical Department found itself faced with a difficult
situation when on the 2d of June it was learned that the 2d Division had been shifted
from the west of Paris to the northeast. At that time it was already coming in contact
with the enemy and casualties were beginning to grow. Contrary to expectation, the
French were able to do little or nothing toward evacuating and hospitalizing our wounded.
While it had been mutually agreed that, when an A. E. F. division was serving with
the French, the latter would evacuate and hospitalize our sick and wounded, experience
had shown that, for reasons which it is not necessary to detail here, the gaining control
of our wounded at the earliest possible moment was so highly desirable that it must be
considered as a necessity. Consequently, no effort has been spared to get our wounded
into the A. E. F. hospitals at the first opportunity.
On June 2d the available hospital facilities which could be counted on consisted of:
Juilly hospital, of 225 beds ; A. R. C. M. H. No. 1, in Paris, of 1,000 beds ; A. R. C. M. H.
No. 2, in Paris, of 400 beds ; A. R. 0. M. H. No. 3, in Paris, of 75 beds ; A. R. C. M. H.
No. 5, in Paris, of 500 beds.
It was necessary to provide for increasing the capacity of Juilly and the rapid evacua-
tion of the Juilly hospital to Paris hospitals. In addition it was necessary to provide
for rapid evacuation of the Paris hospitals by hospital trains into the interior of France,
where the base hospitals exist. This latter movement was under the direction of Colonel
Bingham, Medical Corps, and never at any time created the slightest difficulty. Hospital
trains were moved with smoothness and dispatch. The increase of the capacity of the
Juilly hospital was accomplished by the Red Cross. This organization, having its own
transportation and ample material, was able to deliver the necessary supplies at Juilly
in the course of a few hours. Due to the difficulty of transportation, the Medical Depart-
ment was not prepared to obtain this result in the same length of time.
The question of evacuation of Juilly was most difficult. As stated above, insufficient
personnel prevented the use of hospital trains at first, and it became necessary to rely on
ambulance transportation. Fortunately, ambulances in sufficient number were available,
due to the fact that all of the available resources of the U. S. A. A. S. were placed at
our disposition by the chief of that service, Col. Percy L. Jones, Medical Corps. In this
connection it might be well to state that in addition to the measures taken on June 2, and
noted above, three complete sections of the United States Army Ambulance Service were
requested of the chief of the service, and were immediately dispatched by him to report
to the division surgeon at Meaux. These three sections provided GO additional ambulances
for the use of the division surgeon. The work performed by these sections was of the
highest order, and without them the transportation of the wounded from the front to the
clearing point could not have been accomplished.
As statements have been obtained from a number of the officers who were directly
concerned with the evacuation and hospitalization of our wounded, no detailed comment
on this phase of Mr. * * * criticism is necessary. An attempt has been made merely
to outline the measures which were taken to meet an existing emergency. If there was a
failure to provide proper care for our wounded, then the responsibility rests entirely
with the officers of the Regular Corps (Medical), as it so happened that all the planning
to meet this emergency and the greater part of the execution of measures adopted rested
with officers of the regular Medical Corps.
The value of an investigation such as the one in hand would appear to consist in the
detection of mistakes made, and to learn how to correct them in the future. Whether
better results could have been obtained in the present instance with the available resources
334 FIELD OPERATIONS
is not for me to decide, but whether a similar emergency can be better met in the future
is pertinent, particularly as such an emergency is apt to develop at any moment. Tin-
French have recently lost many of their best hospitals, totaling many thousands of beds.
What is of greater importance, however, that they have lost large quantities of materiel,
which could be replaced only with great difficulty. Due to this loss they are seriously
hampered in meeting the needs of their own service, and have been compelled to change
their whole system of evacuation and hospitalization. It seems probable, therefore, that
the A. E. F. will be forced to assume this responsibility for its own casualties. As to
whether the A. E. F. is in a position to satisfactorily discharge this obligation, the answer
must be in the negative.
In explanation of this statement the following points may be developed :
(1) Hospitalization. — The number of hospitals in Ifrance is insufficient at the present
time to care for the sick alone at the sick rate of last winter. The rapid arrival of
troops is steadily reducing the ratio of hospital beds to the total strength of the A. E. F.
In case each of the divisions now in the line should sustain one-half of the casualties which
have recently occurred in the 2d Division, it would require every A. E. F. hospital in
France to take care of these cases, and there would be nothing left for the sick.
(2) Personnel. — The sanitary personnel, as has been developed above, is insufficient.
The ratio of sanitary personnel to combat troops was fixed nearly a year ago. The figure
adopted at that time was lower than that believed to be necessary. In addition, the
shipment of sanitary personnel has never kept pace with the arrival of combat troops, with
the results that at present there is a shortage of many thousands in the different ranks
and grades. In endeavoring to meet the needs of the present situation it is necessary
to shift the personnel from point to point, and in so doing to break up trained sanitary
units. This personnel shortage is urgent, has become chronic, and is now becoming acute.
(3) Material. — The situation regarding material is fairly satisfactory, with the
exception of automobile ambulances. The situation in this regard has become more
acute, owing to the recent arrival of several divisions with no equipment for the sanitary
trains. However, the allowance of ambulances is inadequate. This was illustrated in the
matter under consideration. The division has a complete equipment of 41 motor ambu
lances. In order to move the wounded it was necessary to reinforce this number by 60
additional vehicles in order to keep the battle front clear of wounded. Even with this
very large increase it was necessary to supplement the ambulance transport by usin;.'
motor trucks for the movement of the more slightly wounded patients.
The secondary evacuations from the field hospitals have to be accomplished by 1
ambulance company of 12 ambulances. Actually 100 motor ambulances were required
during the height of the fighting near Chateau-Thierry. There was therefore a total of
120 ambulances serving this one division. Even with this large number many drivers
worked for 48 hours and some even longer without rest or sleep.
At the present time it has been necessary to rely to a considerable extent upon our
ability to borrow from the French sections of the U. S. A. A. S. organized for duty with
the French Army. Within 48 hours the chief of the United States Army Ambulance Service
has received a telegraphic request from G. H. Q., A. E. F., to furnish more sections, and
at the same time the French commander in chief, through the French mission, has asked
for additional sections of this ambulance service. By using all of his replacement
materiel and personnel the chief of this service will be able to furnish three sections to
meet both demands, while no less than 40 are needed by the A. E. F. alone.
(4) Transportation. — In a situation such as the one under investigation, transporta-
tion from the Medical Department point of view becomes the crux of the matter. If
ample truck transportation had been available and under the control of the Medical
Department, the shortages of materiel and personnel would have been no serious obstacle.
While on the whole there was excellent cooperation and a manifest desire on the part of all
concerned to facilitate the care of the wounded, the fact remains that there was insuf-
ficient transportation and none nt the disposition of the Medical Department.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 335
The difficulties and delay in securing the movement of Mobile Hospital No. 1 from
Paris to Coulommiers was mentioned above. As further illuminating this point, the diffi-
culty in moving the Evacuation Hospital No. 7 to Coulommiers may be cited. This unit,
with part of its equipment, was shipped direct from the medical supply depot at Cosne.
This shipment was 10 days in reaching Coulommiers. It was urgent that this hospital
should be put into operation, but as all the beds and bedding were included in the Cosne
shipment nothing could be done until this shortage was made good. This was accom-
plished by requesting the Red Cross to furnish the supplies. Trucks were promptly sent
from Paris and the necessary material was delivered at Coulommiers within a few hours.
It is believed that the Medical Department, If it is to meet satisfactorily emergencies
of this kind, must be in a position to accomplish the same results.
(5) Organization. — This has been discussed in a memorandum to the commander in
chief submitted some months ago. It has not been considered necessary to take up this
question here further than to observe that it is not believed that the Medical Department
will ever be able to function satisfactorily, or to meet emergencies of this nature, so long
as it is considered simply as a supply department. Under the existing organization of
the A. E. P. the Medical Department functions under the same rules and regulations as
a purely supply department, while as a matter of fact supply is only a comparatively
minor part of its duties.
(6) Red Cross. — The criticism of Mr. makes numerous references to the Red
Cross, and it is clear that Mr. was under the impression that the evacuation of
the wounded and their hospitalization was entirely handled by the Red Cross. Due to
the designation of the Paris hospitals as Red Cross hospitals, and the use of the Red Cross
insignia on Medical Department material, the line of demarcation between the two is
naturally confused in the public mind.
The Medical Department has the highest appreciation of the value of the Red Cross
iind the service which it can render. There is a most commendable spirit of cooperation
on the part of the Red Cross officials, as is shown by Major Perkin's statement. The
Bed Cross is considered a part of the Medical Department. There is no spirit of rivalry
or competition, and all the Red Cross operations of a military nature are initiated and
controlled by the chief surgeon, A. E. F. There are many things which the Red Cross,
through having ample funds, material, and transportation, can accomplish more rapidly
and efficiently than is possible for the Medical Department. It is hoped that the Red Cross
resources will continue to be utilized to the maximum to the advantage of the sick and
wounded.
It is believed that the sphere of activity of the Red Cross should be limited to the
zone of the rear. This belief is founded on the basic principle of military organizations,
that only military personnel should be permitted in the zone of active operations. Because
of the existing conditions in France, it has been necessary to make exceptions to this
generally accepted rule, and Red Cross hospitals have been established well toward the
front.
As illustrating the necessity of making such exceptions, the requirements of the 1st
Division, A. E. F., may be cited. When this division went into the line near Beauvais
the sick and wounded, in conformity with our agreement with the French, were to be sent
to French hospitals in the rear of the division. It soon became apparent that the arrange-
ment was unsatisfactory due largely to the difference in language and the difficulty of
communication between hospital personnel and American patients. A request that the
establishment of an evacuation hospital be authorized from which American patients
could be evacuated by A. E. F. hospital trains was disapproved by the French. Permission
was, however, secured to establish a Red Cross hospital at Beauvais. This hospital has
lieen placed in operation. It is manned entirely by A. E. F. personnel, but a French
laMecm-chef is nominally in control, inasmuch as the evacuation must take place by
French hospital trains. Due to the congested condition of the railways, it was stated
by the French that an attempt to move A. E. F. hospitnl trains in this area would seriously
interfere with the movement of supply trains.
336 FIELD OPERATIONS
The result has been eminently satisfactory. Our patients are received in this mili-
tarized Red Cross hospital, cared for by A. E. F. personnel, and evacuated by French
hospital trains. An agreement was made With the French Fourth Bureau, whereby it was
made possible to stop French hospital trains outside of Paris, remove any American
patients, and place them in Paris hospitals. This getting our wounded under our own
control and in the care of A. 10. F. personnel could have been accomplished in no other
way than through the agency of the Red Cross.
Note. — In addition, 3 sections of the U. S. A. A. S. of 20 ambulances each, were
ordered to report to the division surgeon at Meaux to augment the divisional ambulance
transport. One evacuation ambulance company, which had just arrived at St. Nazaire,
was ordered to proceed overland to Paris, there to be held in reserve.
(Signed) : S. H. Wadhams,
Colonel, Medical Corps.
The conclusions of the inspector general were as follows: 66
5. Conclusions. — First. That in no particular does this investigation, based either
upon the sworn testimony of witnesses or the facts elicited by the inspector general and
those associated with him, substantiate the statements made by Mr. ■ in his cable-
gram. Mr. ■ himself acknowledged this both in his testimony and in his letter
attached hereto (incl. 2). It is only fair to say that Mr. made a very frank
acknowledgment of this, that he, being ignorant of the facts, had been misled by persons
who were equally ignorant of conditions under which the evacuation of the wounded took
place.
Second. That no incompetence was shown on the part of the Regular Army Medical
officers, but on the contrary their work, as well as that of the Medical Reserve Corps
officers and the Red Cross, is worthy of commendation. The situation was a very difficult
one and I believe was well handled.
Third. That the conditions were aggravated by the inability of the French to provide
the necessary hospitalization agreed to owing to a tremendous loss in beds of their own.
the absence of available hospitals nearer than Juilly and Paris, congestion of the railroad
lines, etc.
Fourth. I concur with Lieut. Col. Fred T. Murphy, M. C, N. A., that the care received
by the wounded during the period in question was as good or better than that received
by the soldiers of the other allied armies under similar battle conditions.
Fifth. That it can not be deduced from the evidence or from a study of the situation
that reserve officers, had they been in complete charge of the preparations, would have
improved the situation, and that If they had been in entire charge the results would not
have been so satisfactory on account of their lack of experience as to military
administration.
Sixth. I also concur in the opinion of Colonel Murphy that the statement of the Red
Cross commissioner for Europe, Maj. J. H. Perkins, that a United States Army Red Cross
militarized hospital represented a cooperative effort between the Medical Department and
the American Red Cross to provide for the care of the sick and wounded, begun always
at the suggestion of the Medical Department and administered by them and modified by
mutual agreement to meet the special demands of local needs would seem to answer as
satisfactorily as possible the question raised in third section of paragraph 4, in first
indorsement (on Mr. 's cablegram) of the chief surgeon.
Seventh. That the Red Cross rendered valuable aid in this emergency. In doing so
they fulfilled in a very satisfactory degree their duties in the premises.
Eighth. That the relations existing between the regular and reserve members of the
Medical Corps are harmonious and satisfactory.
Ninth. That differences of opinion as to the number of surgical teams and the amount
of personnel necessary to take care of the wounded developed, but it was a matter of
opinion, and did not, as it turned out, cause any loss of life or suffering.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 337
Tenth. That the Paris hospitals were not emergency institutions, and that their
facilities had been increased to meet just such emergencies.
Eleventh. That the French have recently lost many of their base hospitals, totaling
many thousands of beds, and they have lost large quantities of material ; that they are
seriously hampered in meeting the needs of their own service, and that the A. E. F. is
forced to assume the responsibilities of the entire hospitalization for its wounded; that at
present it is not in a position to carry this out satisfactorily ; that the number of hospitals
in France is insufficient at the present time to care for the sick alone at the sick rate of
last winter ; that with the growing strength and increase of our sectors in the line and
the casualties which may be expected after big operations the hospitals in France could
not take care of all sick and wounded; that the sanitary personnel is insufficient; that
this personnel has not been increased in proportion to the increase of combatant personnel ;
and that if this shortage is not made up it will be impossible to take care of the wounded
as our people expect them to be cared for; and that grave situations will arise.
6. Recommendations. — (1) That the Medical Department be more fully represented on
the general staff, to the end that it be more fully advised on the military situation in
order to more intelligently meet its obligations.
(2) That further provisions be made for emergency reserve surgical teams to be held
at such points where they will be available for use in active sectors; at present Paris is
believed to be the proper point.
(3) That provisions be made for emergency transportation of personnel and material
to move reserve medical personnel and material to the required points.
(4) That steps be taken to secure an increase of the sanitary personnel, both commis-
sioned and enlisted, and establish more hospitals. These needs are believed to be urgent.
(Signed) A. W. Brewster,
Major Oen'l, I. O., A. E. F.
The correspondent in question withdrew his charges, in testifying before
the inspector general, as follows: 07
I assure you this is an unique experience in my career. I have never, as Colonel
Murphy knows — I have done a great deal of frank writing, but never have I seemed to
have gotten so far from the facts as I have in this case. It has been a most enlightening
morning and shows me how impossible it is to depend always on people who otherwise
are entirely trustworthy, and with that information it is evident that they were quite
as ignorant of the actual situation as I was; and it has also convinced me that never
again shall I undertake to transport any facts or transmit any facts without going to
headquarters to be sure that I am dead right ; it also shows me the value of censorship.
And I should like to add to that on record that I am very much pleased that — I am very
thankful that cable of mine did not go to the editors of the , because there is nothing
that I should more deeply regret than to transmit any facts or statements that could
not be borne out entirely and fully by investigation, and I certainly was as convinced of
these things as I ever have been in my life. I have never received such a surprise as
sitting in this chair this morning, because I didn't suppose there was any question that
the situation was thoroughly understood ; the matters were given to me, stated positively,
and I could not misunderstand them, and I am very sorry — also very glad — to have had
this experience.
The following is a letter received from the correspondent: 03
Paris, July 6, '18.
My Dear General Bkewsteb:
I have been these two days getting in touch with the sources of my information — to
whom I have given fully such enlightenment as I received concerning the circumstances
controlling the situation at Chateau-Thierry (except, of course, such data as you gave me
confidentially). But they prefer not to have their names further connected or revealed.
338 FIELD OPERATIONS
I should like to say over my signature how appreciative I am of the opportunity you
afforded me of thoroughly understanding a situation which were statement of facts or
partial facts — misjudged.
I am grateful to have heen saved from doing what would have been an obvious
injustice — not because of the consequence which might fall upon my head — but because
I value above all else on this earth straight and fair speaking and writing.
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) — .
Major General Andre Brewsteb,
Room 11. 'i, 45 Ave. ilontaipnc.
REFERENCES
( 1 ) The Battle of the Aisne : A study by the second bureau, general staff, French G. H. Q.
On file. Historical Section, the Army War College.
(2) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War
College.
(S) Eeport of operations, 3d Division, May 30 to June 20, 1918, by Lieut. Col. Raymond
Sheldon, general staff, chief of staff, 3d Division. On file with records G-3.
General Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington, D. C.
(4) Circular No. 188. W. D., May 20, 1920.
(5) Report of G— 4, First Army, by Col. J. L. DeWitt, assistant chief of staff, First Army.
On file. General Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington, D. C.
(6) Special report 2d Division, May 31 to July 9, 1918: Operation around Chateau-
Thierry, by Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune, U. S. M. C. On file, with records G-3.
General Headquarters, A. E. F.. Washington, D. C.
17) F. O. No. 7, Headquarters 2d Division, A. E. F., June 3, 1918.
(8) Journal of operations. 2d Division, May 30 to July 2, 1918.
(9) Report of action of the 3d Brigade, June 1 to July 15. On file, with records G-3,
General Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington, D. C.
(10) Report of operations, Medical Department. 2d Division. May 31 to July 10, 191S.
prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(11) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B medical group, fourth section, general
staff, G. H Q.. A. E. F. : Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and
vicinity, June 1 to September 10. 191S. by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C. undated. 4.
On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(12) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division. A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I. 22. 23. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(13) Ibid., Part I, 23.
(14) Ibid., Part I, 24.
(15) Ibid., Part I, 25. 26.
(10) Ibid., Part I. 20.
(17) Ibid., Part I, 25.
(18) Ibid.. Part III, 10. 17.
(19) Ibid., Part I, 26, 27.
(20) Outlines of Histories of Divisions. U, S. Army, 1917-1018. prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College, undated. On file. Historical Section, the Army
War College.
(21) Report of Medical Department activities, 3d Division, A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part V, 2. On file. Historical Division
S. G. O.
(22) Ibid.. Part IV. 164.
(231 Ibid.. Part I. 48.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 339
(24) Ibid., Part I, 50.
(25) Ibid., Part I, 51.
(26) Ibid., Part I, 52.
(27) Ibid., Part IV, 73.
(28) Ibid., Part II, 108.
(29) Ibid., Part IV, 70.
(30) Letter of instruction from commander in chief to Lieut. Col. Paul C. Hutton, 11. C,
May 21, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section
(Chief Surgeon's Files, 211.01).
(31) Exhibit " O " to report on activities of G-4^-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918. by Col. Paul C. Hutton. M. C. undated.
1. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(32) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. II. Q.
A. E. F., for the period embracing the beginning and end of American participation
in hostilities, prepared by Col. S. H. Wadhanis. M. C, chief G-4-B, December 81,
1918, 38. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(33) Ibid., 53.
(34) Ibid., 35.
(35) Exhibit " O " to report on activities of G-4—B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity. June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, undated,
2. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(36) Military history of the American Red Cross in France, by Lieut. Col. C. C. Burlin-
gnme, M. C, undated, 43. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(37) Exhibit " O " to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10. 1918. by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, undated,
3. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(38) Ibid., 4.
(39) Military history of the American Red Cross in France, by Lieut. Col. C. C. Burlin-
game, M. C, undated, 40. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(40) Exhibit " O " to report on activities of G 1 B, medical group, fourth section.
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, undated,
5. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(41) Ibid., 6.
(42) Ibid., 7.
(13) Ibid., 8.
'44) Ibid.. 9.
(45) Report of Medical Department activities. Evacuation Hospital No. 7. A. E. P., by
Col. W. H. Tefft, M. C. commanding officer, undated, 1. On file. Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(46) Exhibit " O " to report on activities of G— 4-B, medical group, fourth section.
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton. M. C undated,
10. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(47) Ibid., 11.
(48) Ibid., 12.
(49) Memorandum from Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., June
16, 1918. On file, A. G. O.. World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief
Surgeon's Files, 319.2).
'50) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. II. Q., A. E. F. : Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, undated.
13. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
340 FIELD OPERATIONS
(51) Ibid., 14.
(52) Memorandum from Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., June
20, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief
Surgeon's Files, 319.2).
(53) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth, section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report on medical operations at Chateau-
Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 19IS, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C,
undated, 15. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(54) Ibid., 1.
(55) Memorandum from Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, to the chief surgeon, A. E. F.,
June 26, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section
(Chief Surgeon's Files, 319.2).
(56) Exhibit " O " to report on activities of G^— B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report on medical operations at Chateau-
Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M.
C, undated, 17. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(57) Ibid., 18.
(58) Memorandum from Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. G, to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., June
27, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief
Surgeon's Files, 319.2).
(59) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G^-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, undated,
19. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(60) Ibid., 20.
(61) Ibid., 21.
(62) Ibid., 23.
(63) Ibid., 24.
(64) Ibid., 25.
(65) Exhibit " K " to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of investigation concerning charges of
inefficiency on part of the Medical Department, from the inspector general, A. E
F., to the commander in chief, July 17, 1918, 84-93. On file, Historical Division
S. G. O.
(66) Ibid., 5, 6.
(67) Ibid., 59.
(68) Ibid., 60.
CHAPTER XI
THE CHAMPAGNE-MARNE OPERATION, JULY 15-17, 1918. THE
FIRST CORPS (AMERICAN 26TH AND FRENCH 167TH DIVI-
SIONS); THE AMERICAN 3D, 28TH, AND 42D DIVISIONS"
The great German offensive, begun March 21, 1918, had resulted in the
enemy's capture of Bapaume, Peronne, and a number of other communities
of similar size and importance, and the establishment of a German salient
toward Amiens and Compiegne- AVest of Reims, between May 27 and June
5, the Germans had launched another attack — the Aisne operation — and had
driven in a salient extending toward the southwest, which had reached the
Marne and had its approximate apex near Chateau-Thierry. They had thus
established another salient east of that mentioned above. Between June 9
and 13, in order to connect the apices of these salients they had attempted to
widen this salient to the west, in the Montdidier-Noyon operation. 1 Failing
in this effort they attacked again on the night of 14-15, both east and west
of Reims.
When, on July 15, the enemy began this his final offensive, the first
phase of the second battle of the Marne — usually spoken of as the Cham-
pagne-Marne defensive — American troops were interspersed with the French
on the front attacked. The American First Corps, under control of the
French Sixth Army, held a sector 7 km. (4.2 miles) in length between Torcy
and Vaux, both inclusive, 2 having under its command the French 167th Divi-
sion and the American 26th Division. East of the 26th Division was the
French 39th Division, with the 56th Brigade, 26th Division, in support, and
beyond it was the American 3d Division holding the south bank of the Marne
for 12 km. (7.5 miles) east from Chateau-Thierry. Continuing the line
eastward was the French 125th Division, with the 55th Brigade, American
28th Division, in support. 3 The American 4th Division was in reserve, di-
vided between the French Second and Seventh Corps. 4 East of Reims the
42d Division, French Fourth Army, was in support of French troops in the
Champagne sector. 1
The brunt of this offensive, so far as American troops were concerned,
fell upon the 3d Division, while the French were attacked to the right of
that division and in the Champagne sector. Some small units of the Ameri-
can 4th and 28th Divisions gained front line service with our troops or with
the French, 1 the 26th Division had a moderate number of casualties, 5 and five
of the battalions of the 42d Division and all of its artillery soon became en-
gaged. 1
The enemy had encouraged his soldiers to believe that the attack of
July 15 would conclude the war, with a German peace. Although he made
" Our troops at this time were elements of French armies.
341
342 FIELD OPERATIONS
elaborate plans for the operation, he failed to conceal fully his intentions,
and the front of the attack was suspected at least one week ahead. On the
Champagne front the actual hour for the assault was known. 1
After a violent artillery preparation by both explosive and gas shells
lasting four hours in the Marne area, the German infantry attacked early
in the morning of July 15.° The right wing of the French Sixth Army met
the attack between Dormans and Fossoy, on the front of the French 125th
and the American 3d Divisions.
Southwest of Reims and along the Marne to the east of Chateau-Thierry
the Germans were at first somewhat successful, a penetration of 8 km. (4.8
miles) beyond the river being effected against the French division immedi-
ately to the right of the 3d Division. 7 The attack continued on July 16 and
17, but on the latter date it became evident that the Germans had been stopped
with heavy losses, and the next day began the great counteroffensive which
was to continue until the enemy was compelled to sign the armistice. 5
FIRST CORPS
The First Army Corps was created by an order dated January 15, 191S. S
Its first headquarters were at Neufchateau, and until July 4, 1918, it exercised
administrative command over the divisions assigned to it, tactical command
being vested in the French units with which these divisions served. On
July 4, however, this corps, under control of the French Sixth Army, assumed
tactical command of the American 2d and 2Gth and the French 167th Divi-
sions, and of the front held by the two last mentioned. Corps headquarters
were then at Chateau de Lagny. In the Champagne-Marne operation, tactical
command of the First Corps consisted of the American 26th and the French
167th Divisions, and 2d then having been assigned to the Third Army Corps,
preparatory to the offensive of July, 1918. 9
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
With the creation of the First Corps its surgeon began so to organize
his office that it would include departments corresponding to similar elements
of the offices of the division surgeons, with a view to promoting coordination.
Though the frequent changes of the divisions assigned to the corps inter-
fered very considerably with the full development of this plan, it never-
theless proved efficacious. 10
As at first contemplated and as later developed, the corps surgeon's office
included the corps surgeon, the assistant corps surgeon, an executive officer,
a sanitary inspector, consultants in medicine, surgery, urology, orthopedics,
and psychiatry, a corps medical gas officer, and the commanding officer, corps
sanitary train. 10
The first mentioned of the professional staff joined on July 17, others
joining at irregular intervals thereafter. 11
The surgeon of the First Corps had moved, with corps headquarters, to
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, on June 30, where the following plan for evacuation
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 343
of sick and wounded was published in secret Orders No. G, Headquarters,
First Army Corps, dated July 0. 1D1S. 12
1. Sanitary organization. — (a) Battalion aid stations, relays of litter bearers, and
regimental infirmaries will be established by regimental surgeons under supervision of the
division surgeons. Additional sanitary personnel from divisions not in action may be
obtained on application to the corps surgeon.
(b) Collecting stations (triage) will be established as follows: 26th Division, Bezu-le-
Guery; 167th Division ( French), Cocherel.
(c) Stations for slightly wounded. Personnel to be taken from an ambulance com-
pany : 26th Division, Ventelet Ferme.
{d) Divisional field hospitals will be established as follows:
For treatment of gassed cases: 26th Division. Luzancy; 167th Division (ambulance),
Cocherel.
Gassed cases get only preliminary treatment here, and cases will be evacuated as soon
as possible to evacuation hospital from Luzancy to Montanglaust and from Cocherel to
Coulommiers.
For treatment of ordinary sick, including venereal and skin diseases: 2d Division.
Jouarre; 26th Division, Luzancy; 167th Division. Coulommiers.
For nontransportable wounded: 26th Division. La Ferte-sous-Jouarre; 167th Division.
Perreuse.
(e) All military police should be advised as to location of the station for slightly
wounded and the collecting stations, and will direct slightly wounded men and litter bearers
to these points.
(f) Movement of sick and wounded: By the assignment of one S. S. U. unit in addition
to the authorized allowance of ambulances, divisions are responsible for transportation of
sick and wounded from the front line to the field hospitals and from field hospitals to
evacuation hospitals.
Divisions requiring sanitary transportation additional to this will apply to the corps
surgeon.
Movement and routes. — From station for slightly wounded: Those able to return to
duty will be returned at once to the line. All others will be evacuated, by truck, if pos-
sible, to Evacuation Hospital No. 7, at Montanglaust, by the road Ventelet Ferme —
Bezu — Caumont — Chamigny — La Ferte — Montanglaust.
From collecting stations (triage) : From Bezu-le-Guery (26th Division), ordinary sick
to Luzancy ; gassed to Luzancy. Route, Bezu — Caumont — Courcelles — Luzancy. Ordinary
wounded to Montanglaust ; nontransportable wounded to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. Route,
Ventelet Ferme — Bezu — Caumont — Chamigny — La Ferte-sous-Jouarre.
From Cocherel : Ordinary sick to Coulommiers ; gassed to Coulommiers ; ordinary
wounded to Coulommiers (H. O. E. 52/B) ; nontransportable wounded to Perreuse.
From field hospitals: 2d and 26th Divisions, all cases requiring and able to stand
evacuation to Evacuation Hospital No. 7, at Montanglaust. 167th Division, to H. O. E
02/B at Coulommiers.
Only nontransportable cases will be held at the field hospital designated for nontrans-
portable wounded. These will be evacuated, as soon as their condition will permit, to
Montanglaust for the 26th Division and to Coulommiers for the 167th Division.
Contagious diseases will be evacuated : 2d and 26th Divisions to Evacuation Hospital
No. 7, at Montanglaust ; 167th Division to Mauperthuis.
Mental cases will be evacuated : 2d and 26th Divisions to Evacuation Hospital No. 7,
at Montanglaust; 167th Division to Coulommiers, but will be immediately transferred to
Mauperthuis.
(g) All evacuations for corps troops will be as prescribed for the nearest division.
THE 26TH DIVISION
When the enemy attacked on July 15, the line of the 26th Division ran,
roughly, from Vaux northwest to a point on the northeast edge of Triangle
344 FIELD OPERATIONS
and one-half kilometer south of Bouresches; thence along the west edge of
Bouresches to the east edge of the Bois de Belleau, to a point about one-half
kilometer south of Belleau, and thence north of west to a point one-fourth
kilometer west of Torcy. 13 Though the Germans attacked this portion of the
line, it was not the part that was most heavily involved, although it was sub-
jected to harassing artillery and machine-gun fire. Some of tbe enemy took
a part of the line by infiltration, but were repulsed.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Aid stations were established preferably in cellars of farm buildings, but
if these were not available they were opened at suitable locations under stone
culverts, in dry water courses, or in small, shallow excavations. 14 The regi-
mental and battalion aid stations of the 101st Artillery were set up at
Montreuil and at D'Issonge Ferine, respectively. 15
Battalion aid stations of the 102d Artillery were located in Domptin and
one-half kilometer (0.9 mile) east of it. 18 Supplies were replenished by
ambulances and bearers.
Ambulance Companies
Dressing stations were established by Ambulance Company No. 104 at
la Voie-du-Chatel and by Ambulance Company No. 103 at Villiers-sur-Marne.
The former was very active, the latter only slightly so. 17 United States Army
Ambulance Section No. 502 evacuated to these stations from the ambulance
head. At Bezu-le-Guery, just beyond the enemy artillery zone. Ambulance
Companies No. 101 and No. 102 were stationed. 17
Field Hospitals
Field Hospital Xo. 102 operated a triage at Bezu-le-Guery. Field Hos-
pitals No. 101 and No. 104 together cared for the slightly wounded, gassed, and
sick in a large school building at Luzancy, while Field Hospital No. 103, at La
Ferte-sous-Jouarre, received the seriously wounded. This hospital, with 6
operating teams and 35 female nurses, was completely equipped and was favor-
ably established in a large convent, well lighted for its purpose. 18
All field hospitals were evacuated by G. M. C. ambulances and by trucks
of the sanitary train to Evacuation Hospital No. 7 at Chateau Montanglaust. 18
THE 3D DIVISION
The 3d Division occupied a frontage of almost 12 km. (7.4 miles) on the
south bank of the Marne, from the eastern outskirts of Chateau-Thierry to
the bend of the river about 2 km. (1.2 miles) east of Charteves. The front
line of defense consisted of isolated pits and machine-gun emplacements dug
near the river's edge. Close in rear of this line, about 364 meters (400 yards)
from the river, was the high embankment of the Paris-Metz Railway, which
provided a much stronger defensive position and gave a continuous line of
protection from rifle fire. Beginning at midnight July 14-15 the divisional
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 345
Infantry and all auxiliary troops stationed in the front line were subjected to
bombardment by both high-explosive and gas shells. 10 This bombardment
was directed for a period of 10 hours against the areas along the crest of the
hills, and for a shorter period against the foreground nearer the river. 19 The
enemy infantry attack commenced about 3.20 a. m., July 15, regiments seeking
to cross the river by means of boats and pontoon bridges. 19 The most violent
attack was that between Fossoy and Moulins. The 6th Brigade, consisting of
the 30th and 38th Infantry, defending the right flank, effectually frustrated
the enemy's contemplated advance to the south along the valley of the Sur-
melin Eiver. 20 "Although the rush of German troops overwhelmed some of
the front-line positions, causing infantry and machine-gun companies to
suffer in some cases a 50 per cent loss, no German soldier crossed the road from
Fossoy to Crezancy except as a prisoner of war, and by noon of the following
day there was no German in the foreground of the 3d Division except the
dead." 21 "On this occasion a single regiment of the 3d Division wrote one
of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It prevented the Germans
crossing at certain points on its front while on either flank the Germans who
had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions,
met the Germans with counterattacks at critical points and succeeded in
throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600
prisoners." 7
From July 16 to 19 the division remained in its sector on the Marne, with
the right flank regiment facing to the east, as a measure of protection against
the German line which had crossed the Marne. 21
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Evacuation of patients was facilitated, as the sector had good roads and
this despite the fact that they were damaged to a certain extent by the enemy
artillery barrage on the night of July 14-15. 22 This was placed as far back
as Pertibout and Essises. 22 Besides the casualties involved in the present en-
gagement, 382 which had occurred in the infantry between June 4 and 14 were
evacuated by the same route as that maintained during the engagement in
question. 23
The division surgeon directed the location of the various dressing stations
and other Medical Department formations and moved them forward as occa-
sion required. 24
With troops the regimental aid station of the 4th Infantry was located
at Grand Ballois Ferine, and those of its battalions at Blesmes, Etampes,
Chierry, and in the woods neighboring Nesles. Total casualties taken care of
in the five days, July 15 to 20, approximated 275. Ambulance service was
prompt and patients were evacuated quickly. 25
The regimental aid station of the 7th Infantry was established at Cour-
boin, while battalion aid stations were placed at Le Houy Ferine, 910 meters
(1,000 yards) northwest of La Rocq Ferine, and at a point 273 meters (300
yards) north of the latter farm. The wounded began coming in almost imme-
diately, but were evacuated quickly as soon as the first shock of the attack was
346 FIELD OPERATIONS
over. Motor trucks, escort wagons, and other vehicles supplemented the am-
bulance service of the regiment. 26
The regimental aid station of the 30th Infantry was located in Bois
d'Aigremont below Crezancy. with the three battalion aid stations in the
same woodland or in Crezancy. Of the 450 casualties (approximately) which
the regimental stations cared for, the majority were seriously wounded, the
slightly wounded and gassed making their way unassisted to the rear. 27
The regimental aid station of the 38th Infantry was at St. Eugene, while
those of its 1st and 2d Battalions were at Connigis. with an advanced aid
station for the 2d Battalion at Moulins. 23 A station was also operated at
Paroy. 23 The stations at Connigis and Paroy were located in wine cellars
which afforded ample space and some protection: that at Paroy accommodated
70 patients. 23 On the 10th of July, as this part of our line was drawn back,
the last named station fell into the hands of the enemy. 28 Meanwhile a medi-
cal officer who had gone for assistance secured the aid of an infantry patrol
party, two ambulances, and a Y. M. C. A. truck. The station was then soon
recaptured and held until all patients had been evacuated. 23 The aid stations
of the 1st and 2d Battalions were then established at St. Eugene and the regi-
mental station at Courboin. that of the 3d Battalion remaining at Connigis. 2 "
On the night of the 17th the medical officer who had evacuated the station at
Paroy returned there with his battalion, where he was killed on the following
day. 2 ' 8
The aid station of the 8th Machine Gun Battalion was operated some-
times independently, sometimes in conjunction with those of other troops. On
July 15, when located at Bochage Ferme, it was operated independently. 29
That of the 0th Machine Gun Battalion was at Montbazen. where it gave re-
freshments as well as treatment to all wounded received. 30 The 7th Battalion,
on July 15, was ordered east of Courbon, where an aid station was established
in an old farmhouse. 31
The aid station of the 1st Battalion of the 10th Field Artillery was
located at Le Moussete, 1 km. (0.621 mile) northwest of St. Eugene. As the
road to the place was blocked during the 15th (until late at night), it was
impossible to evacuate all the wounded that came in. 32 They were carried
by litter to St. Eugene and thence by ambulance or truck. Disabled from
Battery B were evacuated more easily through the aid station of the 2d Bat-
talion at Greves Ferme. which was directly accessible by ambulance and was
fairly well protected against shells and gas. 32
Ambulance Companies
Headquarters of the ambulance company section was at Yerdelot from
July 15 to 24. 24 The excellent roads allowed ambulances to make good time
in going to and in returning from the front. Although GO ambulances were
available, it soon became apparent that the number was insufficient and divi-
sion trucks were secured for transporting the slightly wounded, as many as
80 of these vehicles being used at one time. 23 During the period of intense
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES
347
activity, beginning July 15, the sanitary train evacuated approximately 8.000
patients. 24
' Ambulance Company No. 5 was stationed at Essises. where it had been
located since June 3. Here it operated a main dressing station, maintaining
also an advance dressing station at Courboin, with 1 officer, 1 noncom-
missioned officer, and 8 privates. 24 Its ambulance schedule, mentioned in the
preceding chapter, was temporarily interrupted by this offensive, during
which it evacuated all wounded to Field Hospital No. 27 at Verdelot and
all gas cases to Field Hospital Xo. 5 at Ville Chamblon. 24 One medical
Fio. 54. — Dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 5. at Courboin
officer and 20 enlisted men of this company reinforced the regimental
aid station of the 38th Infantry from July 15 to 17, when the regiment was
relieved. 24 One medical officer and 10 men were also sent on July 17 to
the regimental infirmary of the 38th Infantry at Connigis. Of these, 10
became casualties. 24 From July 15 to 22, when Ambulance Company No. 5
moved from Essises to Blesmes. it evacuated approximately 2,700 patients,
of which number a little more than one-half were transported recumbent. 24
One ambulance driver was killed, two were Avounded, and four ambulances
were put out of use by enemy shell fire. 24
Ambulance Company No. 7 was located on July 15 at Pertibout, where
it operated a dressing station until July 22. 33 On the loth it assigned 1
348 FIELD OPERATIONS
medical officer, 1 noncommissioned officer and 10 enlisted men with the 38th
Infantry, working between Courboin and Crezancy. 33 Ambulance Company
No. 26 was located on July 15 at Verdelot, where it remained throughout
the month, occupied solely with transportation. 33 Ambulance Company No.
27, parked at La Ferotterie from July 15 to 20, evacuated with all available
ambulances from Field Hospital No. 27, at Verdelot, to Field Hospital No. 26,
at Coulommiers, and to Red Cross Hospital No. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin. 34
United States Army Ambulance Section No. 524, from July 15 to 31, assisted
in evacuating the wounded from dressing stations to field hospitals. 35
Field Hospitals
From July 15 to 29 headquarters of the field hospital section was at
Verdelot. 34 The field hospitals had reached the Marne area on June 1 and
had begun operations on June 3. 30 Field Hospital No. 5, equipped as a gas
hospital, was located at Ville Chamblon, about 10 km. (6.2 miles) behind
the lines. 34 Field Hospital No. 7 was in reserve at Chateau Villiers, near
St. Barthelemy, with the following personnel on detached service with the
organizations mentioned : 1 officer, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 4 privates
with the 6th Engineers; 1 noncommissioned officer and 15 privates with the
4th Infantry; 1 officer with the 10th Field Artillery; 1 noncommissioned
officer and 12 privates with the 7th Infantry. 37
Field Hospital No. 27, at Verdelot, worked with a French hospital in
a school building at that place, studied the triage system of the latter and
so developed one of its own. 30 At this hospital were treated nontransportable
and slightly wounded, neuroses, sick (except contagious cases), and some
others, including some gassed cases sent to it through error. 35 About the
middle of July it was reinforced by 1 shock team, 4 surgical teams, and 9
nurses. 30 From July 15 to 28 it admitted 4,512 patients, of whom about three-
fourths came from the 3d Division, the remainder from the 28th. 35 Field
Hospital No. 26, at Coulommiers, 30 km. (18.6 miles) from the line, had
functioned at first and prior to this defensive as the divisional evacuation
hospital, 30 there being none near the sector until Evacuation Hospital No.
7 and Mobile Hospital No. 1 were established and began to receive patients
at Chateau Montanglaust, 2 km. (1.2 miles) from Coulommiers, on June 13. 38
This it will be noted was a month before the Champagne-Marne defensive
action began.
To the rear of the 3d and other divisions near Chateau-Thierry, evacua-
tions were effected through the Red Cross hospital at Juilly, Evacuation
Hospital No. 7 and Mobile Hospital No. 1, at Chateau Montanglaust, and
Army Red Cross Hospital No. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin. 39 The hospitals at
Chateau Montanglaust had a total capacity of 1,100 beds, with good facilities
for evacuating by train. The hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin had some 800
beds and effected its train evacuation from La Ferte-Gaucher, 4 km. (2.4
miles) distant. 40
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 349
THE 28TH DIVISION
When the enemy attacked on July 15, in the fifth and last German
offensive, the 28th Division was in the general support line back of the
French, one of its brigades being to the east, the other to the west of the 3d
Division. 41 Only small elements of the command actually participated in
front-line service as tactical units. Four companies of the 109th and 110th
Infantry were especially engaged in repelling the attack on July 15, 41 and the
2d Battalion of the 111th Infantry attacked in the Bois D'Aigremont on the
16th. All troops in the support lines had been subjected on the night of
July 14—15 to intense bombardment. As troops were forced back during the
German assault, the support line became the front line, in which American
and French troops were intermingled. 41
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Amdulance Companies
The Champagne-Marne defensive was the first action in which medical
units of the 28th Division were actively engaged. As a matter of fact its
ambulance companies, Nos. 110, 111, and 112 (motorized), did not receive
their vehicles until July 19, when 41 ambulances were hurriedly brought up
from St. Nazaire. 42 Ambulance Company No. 109 (animal-drawn) did not
receive its transportation until August 13. 43 During this defensive, the three
motorized companies were held in reserve at Le Rousset. To serve the ele-
ments of the division engaged, Ambulance Company No. 110 established a
dressing station at Union Chateau, near Allonges. 41 Wounded, both French
and American, were cared for here in large numbers. 44
Field Hospitals
Field Hospital No. 109 was moved from Marlande on July 17 to La
Ferotterie, where it immediately opened in a school building, but no patients
were received. 45 Meanwhile, on July 16, Field Hospital No. 110 moved to
Fontaine Tige, where Field Hospital No. Ill had been located since July
12. 40 The former unit loaned certain personnel to the latter, which had
established an operating room and shock ward in an abandoned building,
pitched tentage and begun receiving patients on July 16. 48 On that date,
Field Hospital No. 112 moved up from Marlande to a chateau on the out-
skirts of Artonges and established three ward tents in a cleared space in the
wood surrounding it. 47 Ambulance Company No. 110 utilized the first floor
of the same chateau as a dressing station, and other parts were occupied by
brigade headquarters. Patients began to arrive on the same day. 47 Three
additional ward tents were pitched, carefully camouflaged, and piped for
water from springs on an adjacent hillside. 47 Shower baths for mustard gas
cases were improvised in the basement of the chateau, and great quantities of
clothing made available for these patients. 47 Only gas cases were sent to
this point, other casualties in this vicinity being sent to Field Hospital No
350 FIELD OPERATIONS
27, at Verdelot, with the result that from mid-afternoon of July 1G to July
23, inclusive, this hospital received but 59 patients. 47 These were evacuated
from time to time to Field Hospital No. Ill, at Fontaine Tige."
THE 42D DIVISION
On June 21 the 42d Division was moved to a position east of Reims, in
the Champagne sector, where it became a part of the French Fourth Army
and occupied the support lines during the German offensive of July 15.
With other troops, the division was subjected to intense preliminary bom-
bardment. All of the artillery was engaged, and after the German infantry
had penetrated the front lines, five battalions of the infantry in the support
lines also became involved.' 13
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The division surgeon's office was located at Vadenay, but receiving a
direct hit which caused several casualties, including three officers killed, it
was moved to Ecury-sur-Coole. 40
On July 15 the division surgeon secured the detail of 12 litter bearers
from each company and battery to aid Medical Department personnel assigned
to them. These men, who wore a blue brassard marked with the letters
" L. B.," served as litter bearers in all subsequent engagements. 50
Battalion and regimental aid stations of Infantry organizations were
well protected and were able to operate satisfactorily, but those of the Artil-
lery were not so fortunate. Personnel at the latter points was compelled
to work practically in the open, in Adrian barracks, shallow trenches, or
improvised splinter-proof shelters. 51 The intensity of the bombardment
caused heavy casualties at the beginning of the attack, and removal of
the wounded became difficult. Back areas were so heavily shelled that the
withdrawal of several Medical Department formations in the rear was necessi-
tated, as noted below. 51 The length of haul to these was thereby increased
and evacuation proportionately retarded. It proved difficult to maintain
proper liaison between ambulance companies and aid stations. 51 Because
of the damage to telephone lines, runners were used to maintain communica-
tion with battalion and regimental command posts. By 11 o'clock on July
16, the initial force of the attack had been spent and casualties then de-
creased. 51 Thereafter evacuations proceeded more promptly, numerous and
good roads facilitating removal of the wounded. 61
Concerning the service of aid stations, special allusion is made in the
divisional medical report to the value of light trestles which were brought
up on the battalion medical carts. 5 - These Avere used to support litters, both
in the open and in the narrow dugouts, and a " three-way fold " of blankets
reaching to the ground allowed them to be used as shock tables. The carts,
after delivering their supplies, withdrew to the echelon of horse-drawn
vehicles in the rear. 52
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES
351
1
>
3& «4|
it
Wm* " ' '^'r : •*&*••.
***§!* > *- -£_ fc«
^— St-*""
IT.-' f^ ?'
fifcU
"■if
~~[
> 88IJ '^-'
i
S'
Jd ■ * "tit "BUI
r
II ? *
i
NOT
. "alf
i -- ; j*$*G>
|
♦** ►w. . .-■■
jjp$^£|r^ "■
3SPw*^**» .
Hfe^'
Fig. 55. — Aid station, 167tli Infantry, 42d Division, Souain, France, July 17, 1918
Fig. DC. — Triage, 42d Division, near Suippes, France, July 17, 1918
352
FIELD OPERATIONS
Ambulance Companies
Dressing stations had been previously established at Miomandre and
Suippes, but up to July 15 they functioned chiefly as regulating points for
the ambulance service. 03 One ambulance was stationed with each battalion,
except in the case of two battalions intermingled with the French, and these,
by mutual agreement, were served by United States Army Ambulance Sec-
tion No. 580 through the French poste de secours. Four litter bearers were
detailed at each battalion aid station. 5 " As Suippes was heavily shelled on
July 15. the dressing station withdrew from that place to a point just above
1'iii. 57. — French and American wounded being received at the dressing station at Epieds, operated
by 117th Sanitary Train, 42d Division, July 27, 1918
Bussy-le-Chateau." 4 When the field hospitals at Bussy-le-Chateau were forced
to vacate that locality, this station collected and sorted patients, sending the
most serious cases promptly to the rear, but sheltering, feeding, and treating
the others until such times as more transportation became available. 54 Trucks
were used to move the slightly wounded, and all available vehicles in the
train, as well as those of an evacuation ambulance company which reinforced
this service, were used to work between Busy and Ecury-sur-Coole. 55 The
station at Miomandre remained at its former site. 54 From time to time ad-
ditional and relief litter bearers were dispatched to the front, where they
served at battalion aid stations and also removed patients from the lines. 55
amkrican divisions with fliknc ' 1 1 akmikr 353
Field Hospitals
Field Hospitals No. 165 and No. 167 had taken over a French barracks
hospital at Bussy-le-Chateau. 18 km. (11.1 miles) behind the line, on July 7,
and in conjunction with Mobile Hospital No. 2, at Vatry, had made prepara-
tions on a large scale for the treatment of wounded and gassed. 50 During the
morning of July 15 the hospital group at Bussy-le-Chateau received five direct
hits, which killed some of the personnel and wounded many patients. The
latter were moved to nearby trendies and abri and thence to Ecury-sur-Coole,
where the hospitals had moved. 411 As this move considerably increased the
difficulty of evacuating from the lines, a detail from Field Hospital Xo. 168
and American surgical teams were sent to a French hospital at Chalons-sur-
Marne, where nontransportable American wounded were received ; but per-
sistent bombing of this town rendered it a very unsuitable location for the
accumulation of patients." On July 10 Field Hospitals No. 166 and No. 168
had been ordered to Ecury-sur-Coole to cooperate with Evacuation Hospital
No. 4 in the establishment of another hospital group, and they operated here
during this defensive. 41 ' Enemy aviators frequently bombed this point, but
hospital service was carried on uninterruptedly. A total of 2,949 cases were
received here, of whom 2,519 were gassed. ,r The sick and slightly wounded
were sent by ambulance to a camp hospital at Mailly. and evacuations were
made from Evacuation Hospital Xo. 4 and Mobile Hospital Xo. 2 by hospital
trains to base hospitals in the interior/' 8
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES IX BEAB OF THE DIVISIONS
The medical organization which had gradually been built up in rear of our
divisions has been described in some detail in the latter part of Chapter X.
An officer representing the medical department with the fourth section of the
general staff, as noted, had been appointed chief surgeon of the Paris group,
as our divisions operating in the Maine area were now designated. The fol-
lowing units were under his jurisdiction on July 15, 1918 :
Evacuation Hospital Xo. 7. at Chateau Montanglaust.
Mobile Hospital Xo. 1, at Chateau Montanglaust.
Army Eed Cross Hospital Xo. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin.
Evacuation Hospital Xo. 8, at Juilly.
Army Red Cross Hospital No. 105, at Juilly.
Wounded from the 3d Division flowed naturally into the hospital at
Jouy-sur-Morin, wdiile Evacuation Hospital Xo. 7. at Chateau Montanglaust,
received all cases from the 26th Division. 59 The 28th evacuated to both
points. 50 United States Army Ambulance Section No. 578 reported to the
28th Division, which was assisted also by the French. 59 Practically all the
battle casualties from the 3d Division were wounded, while the majority of
those from the 26th were gassed. 59 As a result of the many wounded of the
3d Division, the hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin began to fill and unoperated
wounded to accumulate there. One hundred and fifty of these slightly
wounded were transferred to Evacuation Hospital No. 7 for operation. 50 The
13576—25 23
354 FIELD OPERATIONS
evacuation hospital at Juilly not being so situated that it could receive
patients direct from the front, all its available surgical teams were sent to
Evacuation Hospital No. 6, at Chateau Montanglaust, and to Red Cross Hos-
pital No. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin. 60 Every unib and every individual was
now working to capacity, the latter securing only about 4 hours rest out of
the 24. Those who suffered most were not the operating teams, hard driven
as they were, but the litter bearers. 00 At 11 p. m. of July lo, enemy aviators
bombed the hospitals at Chateau Montanglaust and at Jouy-sur-Morin, without
casualties at the former but killing 1 and wounding 18 patients and personnel
at Jouy-sur-Morin, including 1 nurse. 00 Four of those wounded by this
attack died. 61 The enemy volplaned downward toward the unit at Jouy-sur-
Morin before releasing his bombs. 61 Concerning this occurrence, the chief
surgeon of the Paris group reported : " That the assassination of these wounded
soldiers was premeditated, planned, and cruelly executed there can be no
doubt. * * * Both hospitals were clearly marked by the large red cross,
which must have been clearly evident on the night in question. Enemy planes
had been over the place frequently, and it is safe to conclude that the hospitals
were the direct objects of attack, for both were isolated from near-by
villages." 61
By July 7 16, hospital trains, mostly American, were constantly loading
at Coulommiers, whose need of ambulances was alleviated by a French ambu-
lance section of 20 cars. 01 By morning of the 17th more than 3,000 patients
had been evacuated, most of them from the 3d and 26th Divisions. 02 On
that date a trainload of unoperated cases was sent to Paris after due notice
had been sent the hospitals there so that all would be in readiness for prompt
treatment. 02 By r 6 p. m. of July 17 all evacuable wounded had been cleared
from the field hospitals and all operations at the evacuation hospitals were
up to the minute. 02 During July 16 and 17. 3,564 patients were evacuated by
Evacuation Hospital No. 7. 03
Two new evacuation hospitals were now en route to this area, and sites
for them were sought in the vicinity of Dammartin. 63 No information con-
cerning future troop movements was obtainable. 08 The hospitals were secured
and supplies replenished, and arrangements were such that with rapid supply
of hospital trains and provision of more operating teams it appeared that
requirements of the troops could well be met. 63 About midnight of July 18
the chief surgeon, Paris group, was informed of the removal of the 1st and
2d Divisions from Dammartin to the vicinity of Soissons. 64
REFERENCES
(1) Final Report of Gen. John ,T. Pershing, Sept. 1, 1919, 34.
(2) Summary history of the First American Army Corps from its creation January 15,
1918, to cessation of hostilities, November 11, 1918, edited by G-2, First Army
Corps, November 15, 1918, 3. Copy on file, Historical Section, the Army War
College.
(3) Situation Map, First Army Corps, July 12, 1918.
(4) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army. 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. 10. On tile, Historical Section, the Army War
College.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 355
(5) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, Chateau-Thierry
operations, by Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 50. On rile,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(6) Service de Sante pendant Los Operations de la VI ArmOe dans la Region de Chateau-
Thierry du 15 au 31 juillet, 1918. On rile. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(') Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1. 1010, 35.
(8) G. 0. No. 9, G. H. Q., A. E. F., January 15, 1918.
(9) War Diary, First Army Corps ; F. O. No. 8, First Army Corps ; Operation report
2nd Division in the attack of the Twentieth Army Corps, French Tenth Army. On
rile, Historical Section, the Army War College.
(10) Report of Medical Department activities First Army Corps, Chateau-Thierry opera-
tions, by Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, Corps Surgeon, undated, 11. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(11) Ibid., 12.
(12) Ibid., 42.
(13) Map front line, 26th Divisios, July 10-20.
(14) Report of Medical Department activities. 28th Division, A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I, 03. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(15) Ibid., Part II, 40.
(16) Ibid., Part II, 50.
(17) Ibid., Part II, 20, 21.
(18) Ibid., Part II, 21.
(19) Report of operations, 3d Division, July 14 to August 1. by Col. Robert H. C. Kelton,
General Staff, chief of staff, 3d Division. On file, with the Records of G-3.
General Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington. D. C.
(20) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, The Army War
College.
(21) Operation report of the commanding general, 3d Division, for July 15-17. On file,
Historical Section, The Army War College.
122) Report of Medical Department activities of 3d Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part V, 2. On tile, Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
(23) Ibid., Part V. 1.
(24) Ibid., Part IV, 1.
(25) Ibid., Part IV, 49.
(26) Ibid., Part IV, 58.
(27) Ibid., Part IV, 75.
(28) Ibid., Part IV, 82.
(29) Ibid., Part IV, 111.
(30) Ibid., Part IV, 113.
(31) Ibid., Part IV, 109.
(32) Ibid., Part IV, 90.
133) Ibid., Part IV, 2.
134) Ibid., Part IV, 3.
(35) Ibid., Part IV, 5.
(36) Ibid., Part IV, 41.
137) Ibid., Part IV, 4.
(38) Report of Medical Department activities. Evacuation Hospital No. 7, by Col. W. H.
Tefft, M. C, commanding officer. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(39) Exhibit "C" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1-September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, undated,
26. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
356 FIELD OPERATIONS
(40) Memorandum from Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, to the cliief surgeon, A. E. F., July
15, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section, (Chief
Surgeon's Files, 319.2).
(41) Special report of the operations of the 28th Division for the period July 15-31,
1918, by Maj. Gen. W. H. Hay, commanding officer, 28th Division. On file, General
Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington, D. C.
(42) Report of Medical Department activities. 28th Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 4. On file, Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
(43) Ibid.. Part I. 15.
(44) Ibid., Part, I, 6.
(45) Ibid., Part I. 21.
(46) Ibid., Part I. 2.
(47) Ibid., Part, I, 14.
(48) Outlines of Histories of Division. U. S. Army. 1917-1918, prepared in the Historical
Section. The Army War College, undated. On file, Historical Section, The
Army War College.
(49 Report of Medical Department activities, 42d Division. A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I, 74. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(50) Ibid.. Part I, 14.
(51) Ibid., Part I, 15.
(52) Ibid., Part I. 1C.
(53) Ibid., Part I. 45.
(54) Ibid., Part I, 46.
(55) Ibid., Part I, 47.
(56) Ibid.. Part I, 73.
(57) Ibid., Part I, 75.
(58) Report on activities of G-4-B. medical group, fourth section, general staff. (!. H.
Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhanis, M. C, December 31, 1918, 55. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(59) Exhibit "C" to report on activities of G-4-U medical group, fourth section, general
staff, G. H. Q.. A. E. F., : Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and
vicinity, June 1 to September 10. 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, undated. 26. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(60) Ibid., 27.
(61) Ibid., 28.
(62) Ibid.. 29.
(63) Ibid., 30.
(64) Ibid., 31.
CHAPTER XII
THE A1SNE-MARNE OPERATION; JULY 18 TO AUGUST 6, 1918.
DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING WITH THE FRENCH: ■ " 1ST, 2D, 3D,
4TH (JULY 18-22 AND JULY 28); 32D (JULY 30 TO AUGUST 2);
FIRST CORPS, 26TH, 42D, AND, FROM AUGUST 3, 4TH; THIRD
CORPS (FROM AUGUST 3), 3D, 32D, AND 28TH
The following extracts are quoted from the Final Report of General
Pershing : 1 2
The Marne salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity for a counter-
offensive that was obvious. If successful, such an operation would afford immediate relief
to the allied defense, would remove the threat against Paris, and free the Paris-Nancy
Uailroad. But, more important than all else, it would restore the morale of the Allies
and remove the profound depression and fear then existing. Up to this time our units
had been put in here and there at critical points as emergency troops to stop the terrific
German advance. In every trial, whether on the defensive or offensive, they had proved
themselves equal to any troops in Europe. As early as June 23 and again on July 10.
at Bombon, I had very strongly urged that our best divisions be concentrated under Amer-
ican command, if possible, for use as a striking force against the Marne salient. Although
the prevailing view among the Allies was that American units were suitable only for
the defensive, and that at all events they could be used to better advantage under allied
command, the suggestion was accepted in principle, and my estimate of their offensive
fighting qualities was soon .put to the test.
* * * * * » *
The selection by the Germans of the Champagne sector and the eastern and southern
faces of the Marne pocket on which to make their offensive was fortunate for the Allies,
as it favored the launching of the counterattack already planned. There were now over
1,200,000 American troops in France, which provided a considerable force of reserves.
Every American division with any sort of training was made available for use in a counter-
offensive.
General Petain's initial plan for the counterattack involved the entire western face
of the Marne salient. The First and Second American Divisions, with the First French
Moroccan Division between them, were employed as the spearhead of the main attack,
driving directly eastward, through the most sensitive portion of the German lines, to the
heights south of Soissons. The advance began on July 18, without the usual brief warning
of a preliminary bombardment, and these three divisions at a single bound broke through
the enemy's infantry defenses and overran his artillery, cutting or interrupting the German
communications leading into the salient. A general withdrawal from the Marne was
immediately begun by the enemy, who still fought stubbornly to prevent disaster.
The First Division, throughout 4 days of constant fighting, advanced 11 kilometers (6.8
miles), capturing Berzy-Ie-Sec and the heights above Soissons and taking some 3,500
prisoners and 68 field guns from the 7 German divisions employed against it. It was
relieved by a British division. The Second Division advanced 8 kilometers in the first 26
hours, and by the end of the second day was facing Tigny. having captured 3.000 prisoners
" From the standpoint of medical service the attack of the 1st and 2d Divisions toward Soissons
separates naturally from the later stages of the Aisne-Marne operation. This, as will be noted, 'has
been taken into account in preparing this chapter.
•Activities of the 3d, 32d, and 28th Divisions, for convenience of description, are considered
under the Third Corps.
357
358 FIELD OPERATIONS
and GO field guns. It was relieved the night of the 19th by a French division. The result
of tliis eounteroffensive was of decisive importance. Due to the magnificent dash and
power displayed on the field of Soissons by our First and Second Divisions, the tide of war
was definitely turned in favor of the Allies.
Other American divisions participated in the Marne eounteroffensive. A little to the
south of the Second Division, the Fourth was in line with the French and was engaged
until July 22. The First American Corps, Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett commanding, with
the Twenty-sixth Division and a French division, acted as a pivot of the movement toward
Soissons, capturing Torcy on the 18th and reaching the Chateau-Thierry — Soissons road on
the 21st. At the same time the Third Division crossed the Marne and took the heights
of Mont St. Pere and the villages of Cliarteves and Jaulgonne.
In the First Corps the Forty-second Division relieved the Twenty-sixth on July 2.">
and on the 26th extended its front, relieving the French divisions. From this time until
August 2 it fought its way through the Forest de Fere and across the Ourcq, advancing
toward the Vesle until relieved by the Fourth Division on August 3. Early in this period
elements of the Twenty-eighth Division participated in the advance.
Farther to the east the Third Division forced the enemy back to Roncheres Wood,
where it was relieved on July 30 by the Thirty-second Division from the Vosges front.
The Thirty-second, after relieving the Third and some elements of the Twenty-eighth on
the line of the Ourcq River, advanced abreast of the Forty-second toward the Vesle. On
August 3 it passed under control of our Third Corps. Maj. Gen. Robert D. Rullard com-
manding, which made its first appearance in battle at this time, while the Fourth Division
took up the task of the Forty-second Division and advanced with the Thirty-second to the
Vesle River, where, on August 0, the operation for the reduction of the Marne salient
terminated.
In the hard fighting from July IS to August G the Germans were not only halted in
their advance hut were driven back from the Marne to the Vesle and committed wholly
to the defensive. The force of American arms had been brought to bear in time to enable
the last offensive of the enemy to be crushed. 2
DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING WITH THE FRENCH
THE 1ST DIVISION
On July 15, 1918, orders were received from the French Tenth Army,
placing the 1st Division under the French Twentieth Army Corps, and the
same date orders from the latter corps directed the movement of that division
in the direction of the sector held by the French Twentieth Corps, southwest
of Soissons. This movement began during the night of .Tidy 15-1G. the numer-
ous elements of the division being carried in trucks. On July 10. the division,
P. C was established at Mortefontainc. During the night of July 17-18 the
division marched to its position, on the extreme left of the Twentieth Corps
southwest of Soissons. *
For four days the division advanced against determined resistance, finally
crossing the Soissons — •Chateau-Thierry road and bringing Soissons itself
under American guns. The division advanced 11 km. (6.8 miles), captured
3.S00 prisoners, GH guns, and quantities of other materials. 4
The following extracts from the divisional report of operations describe
its activities here in greater detail: 3
July 17 orders were received from the 20th C. A. that the 10th Army French would
make an offensive to break the enemy's front between the Aisne and the Ourcq and would
AMERICAN l>I VIRIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 359
push in the direction of Fere-en-Ti"'<1<'Moix. * * The attack was ordered for 4.45 a. m.
July IS. It was not to be preceded by artillery Are, but the advance was to be covered by
a rolling barrage. * * *
All troops were in place in sufficient time to begin the attack at 4.35 a. m. At 5.30
a. in. the 1st objective had been attained by all troops, with comparatively few losses,
and there was little resistance encountered—" mostly on the right. At 7.15 a. m. the right
of the attack had reached the 2d objective. The left of the division was on the west side
uf the Missy ravine. Shortly afterwards the 2d objective was reached by all troops. The
I'd Brigade had heavy fighting in (:h(> Missy ravine. After the halt at the 2d objective, the
I'd Brigade was unable to continue the advance to the 3d objective on this day.
The 1st Brigade advanced to th e 3d objective and pushed patrols out in front of the
Objective. * * * At the end of the dny the situation was: 2d Brigade on 2d objec-
tive * * *, 1st Brigade on 3(1 Objective, with left flank extended to establish liaison
with the 2d Brigade. * * *
On the night of July 18-19 ( »r(l el s w e re received from the 20th C. A. that the 10th
Army would continue the attack lit 4 a. m. July 19th. * * *
In conformity with these orders ,iie division attacked at 4 a. m. * * * In liaisou
with the Moroccan Division, the l*i ; Brigade was able to advance and to occupy a line
extending from the head of the OhMelle I'uvine to its junction with the 2d Brigade, on the
Soissons— Paris road. The 2d Brigade continued to suffer heavily from machine-gun fire
and was unable to advance beyond, the Soisgoos — Paris road at this time. * * * At 5.30
p. in., in liaison with the 153d J), r on the left, the division again attacked. * * *
This operation was successful, although inany casualties were suffered from machine-gun
fire from strong points to the north. At night the front of the division was marked by
Ferme de Mt. de Courmelles — edjv <>f ploisy ravine — Chazelle. The casualties suffered in
this day's operation were heavy; i' r f»lni'> ] .V 3,000 for this day and 4,500 for the two days.
* * * On July 20th orders wej* received from the 20th C. A. that on account of the
difficulties the 153d D. I. had encountered in its progress the 1st Division would be charged
with the taking of Berzy-le-Sec, foi' nl erl.y in the zone of the 153d D. I., and that the
zone of action of the 1st Division >V°iii(l extend to the north of the village. In compliance
with the above orders the division a tt;i'' k <'<l at 2 p. m. for the purpose of taking Berzy-le-
Sec and heights to the north and stfaisbfoning the front of the division on the general
line Berzy-le-Sec — Buzancy. * * * The 2d Brigade suffered very heavily from ma-
chine-gun nest to north, which hail iiof Jet been taken and was not able at this time to
take Berzy-le-Sec. The 1st Brigade, in Unison with the Moroccan Division, crossed the
railroad and advanced to the viciii'tj- J'ois Gerard, Visigneux, and Aconin farm, retiring
its left flank to connect with the iM JtriSnde. The situation at nightfall was: 28th In-
fantry on plateau in front of Boi' z .V-ic-S(>c ; 20th Infantry dug in along road between
Herzy-le-Sec and Chazelle ; 1st Brigade in liaison with the 2d Brigade, and with Moroccan
Division at Visigneux. Casualty* (•('"tinned heavy; approximately 1,000 for the
day. * * *
During the night of July 20-21 (» - di >,-s w-ere received from the 20th D. I. that the corps
would attack on the morning of .Iii'.v - 1 »t 4; * * *. The first objective was given
as Berzy-le-Sec (inclusive) the heights north and east of Buzancy-Buzancy (exclusive 1.
In conformity with these ordet'S th e division attacked at 4 a. m., July 21. * * *
The 1st Brigade was sent forward * * * at 8.30 a. m. * * * the 2d Brigade
advanced * * * and at 0.15 t<)Ok Bei-siy-ie-Sec. * * *
The line at nightfall was the iH'j^lits north of Berzy-le-Sec, the Chateau-Thierry—
Soissons road, south of the Sucreric iin'l 1 he heights north of Visigneux. Casualties con-
tinued heavy. * * *
On July 22 the 2Gth Infantry o('''"bio(l the Sucreric. * * * Casualties were
lighter. » * * Orders were reeded f°t the relief of the division by the 15th Scottish
Division, beginning the night of July ~2- 23 * * * ancl ending July 23-24. * * «
360
FIELD OPERATIONS
In accordance with the above orders all elements of the division except the
Field Artillery brigade, the ammunition trains and the sanitary units were
relieved and withdrawn from the sector on the night of July 22-23. 3
MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The division surgeon's office was located at Pierrefonds-les-Bains before
the attack and was then moved to Mortefontaine and finally to Cceuvres-et-
Valsery. 5
Fig. 58. — Advance post and aid station, 1st Division, Missy-aux-I»ois, France, July 20, 191S
Regimental aid stations with troops were located as follows: 5
16th Infantry: Gutry, Missy-aux-Bois.
18th Infantry: Dommiers, Chaudun.
2fith Infantry: Cutry, Missy-aux-Bois, woods in front of Berzy-le-Sec.
28th Infantry : Mortefontaine. Cutry, Missy-aux-Bois. Berzy-le-Sec.
5th Field Artillery : Mortefontaine, St. Agnan Ferme. Cceuvres-et-
Valserv, Cutry, Missy-aux-Bois.
6th Field Artillery : Mortefontaine, Cceuvres-et-Valsery.
7th Field Artillery: Cceuvres-et-Valsery, Missy-aux-Bois.
1st Engineers : Cceuvres-et-Valsery, Cutry, Paris — Soissons road.
During the entire advance battalion aid stations were located in shell
holes, old gun emplacements, in caves or cellars, and behind hills, within
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES
361
their shelter. These stations were very mobile, being almost constantly on
the move, and keeping in as close touch as possible with the troops they
served. 5
The medical personnel of the regiments served with their organizations,
regimental surgeons establishing their stations in the vicinity of regimental
headquarters; while battalion surgeons, with their enlisted personnel, ac-
companied their units and established aid stations and collecting points as
close to the fighting line as the terrain would permit." At first there was
Fig. 59. — First-aid station, 1st Division, Immediately back of the front lino trenches, Missy-aux-Bois,
July 17, 1U1S
a shortage of medical supplies at the front, as they were not being brought
forward rapidly enough, and in an effort to meet deficiencies German material
of this character was hunted for on the field.
For the first two days, siq^plies were carried in Hospital Corps pouches
and in sacks, or " feed bags," as they were called by the enlisted men." Not
only was there a shortage in dressings, splints, and bandages, but the number
of litters available was very limited. 6 After the second day ambulances
carried to the collecting points for wounded, litters and other supplies that,
had been brought up by truck from Paris. Regimental medical personnel
was taxed to its limit to keep the advancing line cleared of the wounded.
13576— L>3
-24
362 FIELD OPERATIONS
Litter bearers worked constantly in the open, under machine-gun and shell
fire, and a number of them were killed or wounded. 7 Every medical organi-
zation at the front impressed German prisoners into service as litter bearers;
by this means it was possible to keep more of the enlisted men of the Medical
Department with the combatant line. There they rendered prompt first-aid
service. The number of such men assigned to regiments was inadequate, and,
contrary to Field Service Regulations, men of the line in a number of instances
carried their wounded comrades toward the rear. 7
First-aid dressings and bandages and, when advisable, splints were
applied, at the first point behind the firing line offering comparative pro-
tection from fire. As long as a supply was available, strychnine or mor-
phine was administered hypodermically, by means of the Greeley unit tubes,
whenever such medication was indicated. Antitetanic serum was not ad-
ministered until the wounded reached a dressing station or a field hospital.
From the first point where they were, given attention the wounded unable to
walk were carried by litters to the farthest forward location reached by
ambulances. In many cases no issue litters were available and improvisa-
tions of all kinds were utilized, the most popular of these being made of
blouses or ponchos with rifles for side bars. The wounded often had to be
kept in the protecting shell holes until after nightfall, on account of the im-
possibility of transporting them with safety across the shell and bullet swept
stretches intervening between them and sheltered points farther toward the
rear. 7 No hot drinks or food were available until the wounded reached the
dressing stations, and many men arrived at these points in much worse condi-
tion than would have been the case otherwise. During the advance the troops
lived on the two days' reserve ration which they had with them when the
attack began. As it was impossible for rolling kitchens or water carts to get
close enough to the line to supply the troops, the dressing stations had to
care for wounded who not only had been exhausted by severe fighting in rain
and mud but whose physical resistance had been further lowered by lack of
sufficient nourishment. 8
Ambulance Companies
During the march toward Soissons the sanitary train had been removed
from the control of the division surgeon, and for some time he was unable to
locate it. 9 Apparently, from some oversight, he had not been consulted regard-
ing the location of Medical Department formations, his first information con-
cerning lines of evacuation and the location of dressing stations coming from
G-l of the French Twentieth Corps. 10 This was verified as soon as communi-
cation could be established with G-l of the 1st Division. 10 The only dressing
station established at first was located at Haute-Fontaine, about 9 km. (5.5
miles) in rear of the line of departure, in a barn used also by the French. 10
Nearer the front were stationed a medical officer, a few enlisted men, and a few
trucks, but the rapidity of the ntoveinent and the promptitude of the attack
were such that there had been no time to designate evacuation routes, to post
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 363
men, to direct the slightly wounded, or to perform similar duties. 10 Within a
few hours after the attack the above-mentioned station was moved to Copuvres
and another was established at Cutry. 10
Ambulance Company No. 2 operated a dressing station at Cutry July
18-19 and there cared for 1,653 patients. On the morning of July 19 the
station moved to Dommiers where, in a mined building', it dressed and evacu-
ated 1,900 patients daring the ensuing 36 hours. On July 20 the station again
moved forward, this time to Chaudnn, about 2 km. (1.2 miles) behind the line,
where it remained until July 23, when it was relieved by a medical unit of the
15th Scottish Division. Our station at this point cared for some 1,200
wounded. 11
Ambulance Company No. 3 opened a dressing station at 6 a. m. on July
17 in a large cave near Cceuvres and sent 40 men to serve the Infantry as
litter bearers, employing its vehicles to evacuate from the advance dressing
stations to Field Hospital No. 3. at Mortefontaine, and to Field Hospitals
No. 2 and No. 12 at Pierrefonds-les-Bains. The company operated here until
July 24, passing 500 patients through its stations and evacuating a much
greater number. 12
Ambulance Company No. 12 established a dressing station July 18 at
Cceuvres, but was moved daily as the front advanced, until, when the division
was relieved, it was operating in a cave at Missy-aux-Bois. Fourteen hundred
and seventy-seven patients passed through the stations of this company. 13
Ambulance Company No. 13 operated a dressing station at Haute-Fon-
taine July 18, but the next day moved to Cceuvres, where it operated until
July 23. It furnished litter bearers to the 16th and 18th Infantry. While
in this sector the company evacuated some 2.000 patients. 14
United States Army Ambulance Section No. 649 supplemented the division
ambulance companies, transported the wounded from the various collecting
points and dressing stations to the field hospitals, but the number of wounded
was so great that despite its assistance ambulances available were insufficient
to evacuate the Avounded expeditiously. The local representative of the
American Eed Cross obtained from Paris 40 additional ambulances, 15 which
joined on the morning of July 19 and began operations at once. Trucks of
the divisional sanitary train, supply train, Eed Cross, Salvation Army, and
Young Men's Christian Association were also employed to remove the
wounded, but though each could carry eight recumbent cases at a time they
were too unwieldy and too hard riding to lend themselves satisfactorily to
this purpose. 9 The animal-drawn ambulances with the division proved un-
suitable and were not used ; the personnel of the company served as litter
bearers. 16
At the beginning of this operation 96 men of the sanitary train had been
sent to reinforce the Medical Department detachments of the regiments, but
the brigade commanders to whom they were reported assigned them, appar-
ently because of immediate needs, in such a manner that some regiments
received none, thus necessitating the use of some line troops in those regi-
364 FIELD OPERATIONS
merits in order to remove the wounded. 10 Casualties among medical officers
were so great that it was necessary to call in and assign to regiments all the
medical officers on duty with certain noncombatant elements, e. g., the ammu-
nition and supply trains. 10
Even after they had been placed in ambulances the wounded were not
out of danger from shells or gas, for the roads were shelled and bombed
frequently. 8 The enemy was thoroughly acquainted with the terrain and its
places of possible shelter. " Whether by accident or design, approaches to
dressing stations and field hospitals seemed to be the favorite targets. In the
spacious caves used as dressing stations (that near Cceuvres could shelter
500 men) the wounded were protected from battle and from weather, and
all sounds of battle were excluded. Though patients remained here but a
short time, the relaxation the}' enjoyed for the first time in many days, in
quietude, aided greatly in preparing them for the trip to the field hospitals." 8
Field Hospitals
Field Hospital No. 12 arrived at Pierrefonds-les-Bains at 6 p. m. on
duly 17, established itself in an old hotel, and began caring for surgical cases. 17
The location was poor in the extreme, but it was the only place available, as all
of the good locations had been occupied by the French. 9 During the first few
days of combat this hospital expanded enormously to include all the neigh-
boring buildings and streets and was augmented by personnel from Field
Hospital Xo. 2, by several surgical teams sent up from the rear, and by X-ray
equipment from Mobile Surgical Unit Xo. 2. 17 The first casualties at this
hospital were admitted at about 7 a. m. on July IS, and thereafter it continued
to give emergency surgical aid until after the relief of the division, including
among its patients some from the Scottish division which relieved our 1st
Division. 17 It cared here for 3,385 patients, evacuating to Crepy-en-Valois.
whence patients were to be moved by hospital trains. 18
Field Hospital Xo. 3 proceeded to Mortefontaine at about 11 a. m. on
July 18, establishing the next day in tentage a triage hospital, which functioned
as such throughout the remainder of the operation. 17 It received and evacu-
ated approximately 5,000 patients, 10 including 3,417 slightly wounded. 20 The
division surgeon made request of G— 1 that Field Hospital Xo. 3 be ordered to
Cceuvres-et-Valsery, but this was disapproved on the ground that the site
was too far forward and would be in danger of shell fire. This site was then
used for four days as a collecting point. 10 A calculation made after the
engagement showed that had the hospital been located there some 6.400 km.
(■1.000 miles) of ambulance travel over crowded roads would have been
saved at a time when ambulances were in great demand. 10 The event showed
that the danger from shell fire had been overestimated.
Field Hospital Xo. 13 was established in tentage on July 18 at Sery-
Magneval, where it operated as an improvised evacuation hospital, there beinir
no evacuation hospital at first in rear of the division. It remained in this
location throughout the operation, relaying patients to French hospitals at
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 365
Senlis and Chsuitilly and to hospital trains at Crepy-en-Yalois. until this
service was taken over by Evacuation Hospital No. 5 on July 20. 17 It received,
among others, 2,987 slightly wounded patients. 20
Field Hospital Xo. 2 did not function as a unit. Part of the personnel
supplemented Field Hospital Xo. 12 at Pierrefonds-les-Bains. The remainder
of this hospital was inactive, with skeletonized personnel at Trumilly. 17
The field hospitals not only admitted the wounded of the 1st Division but
also some patients from the 2d Division, as well as others from French, British,
and Moroccan divisions and some disabled German prisoners. Throughout
the operation the field hospitals supplied hot food and hot coffee day and
night to men who had become separated from their commands, including some
who through ignorance of troop movements had remained after the division
had withdrawn, as well as to many military wayfarers. 21
Evacuation
Evacuation was operated under very serious handicaps, viz, large numbers
of wounded; roads enormously congested, frequently blocked completely for
hours by the great amount of forward-moving traffic, especially of ammuni-
tion and artillery; very long evacuation routes, for the divisional evacuation
service extended from the battle front to Senlis and Chantilly, 55 km. (34
miles) to the rear. 22 Three wounded transport circuits were established: (1)
Front, (2) rear, and (3) evacuation. 22 The front circuit of all the Ford and
many of the G. M. 0. ambulances, regulated from the dressing stations, ex-
tended as far forward as traffic, terrain, and combat conditions permitted and
evacuated to the dressing stations and to the triage at Mortefontaine. 22 Great
difficulty was experienced in making this circuit adequate and in getting am-
bulances to battalion aid stations, on account of the congestion of forward
roads. All available ambulances, including those of United States Army Am-
bulance Section Xo. 649, were placed on this circuit to clear the field of
wounded. 22 Dressing stations were very active in making emergency dressings
and in relaying patients to the rear. 22
At Mortefontaine patients were triaged, given emergency treatment, and
evacuated to the rear circuit. Seriously wounded were sent to Field Hospital
Xo. 12 at Pierrefonds-les-Bains by G. M. C. ambulances, and all others to
Field Hospital Xo. 13 at Sery-Magneval by trucks. 22 Very few ambulances
could be spared for this rear circuit. Animal-drawn ambulances, useless in
front circuit, were used in the rear circuit to help evacuate patients from
Mortefontaine. 22
At Pierrefonds-les-Bains several surgical teams operated, providing
emergency aid to the seriously wounded. From there all who could be moved
and for whom transportation could be found were evacuated to Sery-Magne-
val, where they were received at first by Field Hospital No. 13 and later by
Evacuation Hospital Xo. 5. 22
From Sery-Magneval an evacuation circuit became necessary. This was
made up chiefly of field hospital trucks. Patients were sent to the French
evacuation hospitals at Senlis and Chantilly, which also soon became over-
366 FIELD OPERATIONS
crowded. 22 About July 20 patients began to be sent from Sery-Magneval to
Crepy-en-Valois, whence they were moved by hospital train. On July 19
several sections of Red Cross ambulances (Fords) were attached to the ambu-
lance section at Mortefontaine, whose headquarters were located with Field
Hospital No. 3 and were used on both front and rear circuits, releasing some
heavy ambulances from the rear and evacuation circuits. 22
Evacuation in the early part of this operation was exceedingly difficult
and beset with hardships. There was no American evacuation service in
operation behind the division to relieve divisional units of patients and to
permit the divisional medical service to confine its activities to the divisional
area, which by itself was an enormous responsibility. For this reason all
field hospitals rapidly became overcrowded, with no means or place for their
evacuation. The French hospitals at Senlis and Chantilly had been desig-
nated by the French high command as evacuation points for the 1st Division,
but these were very far in the rear and soon were unable to receive more
patients. 23
Before the engagement the French had assured the division surgeon, 1st
Division, that they would evacuate the field hospitals, and that American
divisions would be expected to do only what is prescribed for divisional
service by our regulations, viz, work within the division, but as the wounded
accumulated it became evident that our field hospitals could not be cleared
under this arrangement. 24
The 1st Division therefore moved many patients to Senlis, a distance of
90 km. (55.8 miles), and cared for the remainder to the extent of its limited
resources, until the French brought up hospital trains and moved patients to
Paris. 24
On July 20 the division surgeon was informed by the French corps
surgeon that he was to evacuate all his wounded to Crepy-en-Yalois. where
there would be ample hospital train service to care for them. 1 "' This was
done, but several days later it was learned that hospital trains had not arrived
there and that the wounded had received little attention. 15 As soon as Ameri-
can headquarters had located the division, several operating teams arrived
and rendered great service. Many patients had been at the field hospitals
two days and were urgently in need of surgical attention. "
So far as the division surgeon could ascertain no wounded remained upon
the field or in the dressing stations more than six or eight hours. When the
division was relieved there were no wounded on the field or in the dressing
stations, for evacuation from the front had been carried on with vigor, but
in field hospitals patients were compelled to remain 48 hours, as for a time
there was no adequate means of evacuating these units. 25 Evacuation Hospi-
tal Xo. 5. which began to function at Sery-Magneval on July 20, relieved
this situation, as described later.
Medical Supplies
This engagement brought out the fact that a division conducting active
field operations required very considerable quantities of medical supplies,
much greater indeed than had been anticipated.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 367
As the 1st Division had been engaged in trench warfare and in con-
sequence had abandoned its standard field medical equipment or had re-
placed it •with that suitable for use in the trenches, it proved to be inade-
quately equipped for this operation. It went into- action with about GOO
litters and the usual number of blankets, but in five or six hours the supply
was exhausted. 24 Taking several trucks, the medical supply officer hurriedly
visited Senlis, Neuilly, and Paris, and in three days obtained and delivered
at least 3,000 litters and as many blankets, but even these proved insufficient,
for as evacuation from the field hospitals was retarded and they were over-
crowded they were obliged to use litters as beds. 24 Because of the military
situation no telegrams designating location were permitted, and as the medi-
cal representative of the American general staff, who was charged with super-
vision of the medical service of the divisions in the Marne area and with
supply and evacuation in rear of them, had not been informed (in the in-
terests of military service) of the location to which the 1st and 2d Divi-
sions had so suddenly been moved, his services in both these capacities were
for a time unavailable. Consequently wounded accumulated in the field hos-
pitals and required more materiel for their service than they otherwise
would have needed. The local representative of the Red Cross went to Paris
as soon as the need of supplies became evident, and on the night of July 18
returned with several truck loads of materiel, including much-needed dress-
ings. 24 He also notified the officers of the Paris group of the division's loca-
tion, thus permitting them to effect evacuation and to supplement its Medical
Department personnel. 13
The division medical supply unit was located at Pierrefonds-les-Bains.
with an advance unit at Mortefontaine." 3
When the 1st Division was relieved its medical personnel had been work-
ing continuously for five clays, but when it was learned that the Scottish
division effecting its relief had but eight ambulances the 1st Division am-
bulance companies all volunteered to remain and assist in evacuation of its
wounded. 2 "' The divisional artillery also remained to assist in the Scottish
division's attack. The helpful service of the Medical Department was ac-
knowledged by the commander of the latter division, who wrote in part as
follows: 2 "' "Without the help of Colonel Mabee and his establishment of
ambulance cars I have no hesitation in saying that at least 400 of our wounded
would still be on our hands in this area."
THE 2I> DIVISION
The 2d Division, with the American 1st and the Moroccan 1st Divisions,
made the main attack from the west, south of Soissons. As was the case
with the other divisions in this operation, there was no artillery preparation,
this being a surprise attack. 20 ' The division advanced 8 km. (4.9 miles) in
26 hours, captured the powerfully organized positions of Beaurepaire Ferine,
Vauxcastille, and Vierzy, and by the close of the second day was facing
Tifrny. On the night of July 19-20 the division, less its artillery, was re-
lieved by the French and withdrew to an assembly area near Pierrefonds.
368 FIELD OPERATIONS
The divisional artillery supported the French until July -25, when it also was
relieved. 26
The following extracts from the report of operations of the 2d Division
describe its activities in this offensive in greater detail as follows:- 7
On the morning of the 17th of July the troops debussed in the vicinity of Pierrefomls,
Retheuil, and Taillefontaine. Division headquarters was established at Carrefour de
Nemours (2% miles north of Villers-Cotterets) . It then became known that the 2d
Division was to participate in a surprise attack. * * * In the attack, the 1st Division
(French) Moroccan was placed between the 1st and 2d United States Divisions. * * *
The three objectives for the division were generally marked by a north-and-soutli line
through Beaurepaire Ferine, the ravine east of Vauxcastille, and the eastern edge of
Vierzy. * * *
The attack was made by the following troops in line from right to left : 23d Infantry.
9th Infantry, 5th Marines. The 6th Marines were corps reserve. The direction of the
attack to the first objective was generally northeast. Then its course turned to the south-
east. * * *
The surprise was a complete success and by 1 p. m. most of the third objective had
been taken. The town of Vierzy was not taken until later in the day. Another attack
late in the evening carried forward the line to a point about 1 km. east of Vierzy.
Early on the morning of the 19th the Ctli Marines passed through the front east of
Vierzy and occupied the line running just west of Villemontroire and Tigny. The regi-
ment had been in reserve until now, its advance from Beaurepaire Ferme to the " jumping
off " line east of Vierzy was under hostile shell fire. * * * Many casualties were
suffered before the front lines were reached. * * * This attack caused 40 per cent
of losses.
The division was relieved from the front lines on the night of July 19-20 and then
moved back to the forest, where they had jumped off on the 18th ; thence was marched
back to a new area for billeting.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
During the night of July 17-18 battalion aid stations were set up very
near the enemy's trenches, in one case within 50 yards. Regimental aid
stations were slightly farther back, some at Maison Neuve and others in the
forest. 28 Locations were the most suitable that could be found near positions
assigned the troops at the line of departure, but reconnaissance was imperfect
because of darkness, rain, mud, and road congestion. 29 The attack advanced
so rapidly that thereafter no battalion aid station, definitely organized as
such, could be established, but collecting points for the wounded were desig-
nated at the various crossroads, in buildings, and at other points which afforded
some shelter. 29 These, in the order of advance, were at Maison Neuve, Verte
Feuille Ferme, Beaurepaire Ferme, Vauxcastille. and, finally, in the late
afternoon, Vierzy, which, on the 19th, became a concentration point for the
battalion and regimental aid stations of practically all the division except
the Artillery. 29 Some battalion aid stations were also farther forward in the
field wherever there was any protection. 29 At this time the Artillery had aid
stations in Vauxcastille and along the railroad between Longpont and Vierzy. 29
The latter town was badly shelled a great deal of the time, but numerous large
caves and the stone quarries there gave absolute protection. On July 19 many
Ld
<
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 369
gas shells were poured into the town, which, because of encircling hills, be-
came a veritable gas pocket, thus hampering greatly the work of the medical
personnel. 28
Sanitary Tkain
Field Hospital No. 15, a detachment from Ambulance Company No. 1 of
1 officer, 36 litter bearers, and 4 ambulances had accompanied the Artillery
brigade, which began its movement into the sector on the night of July 14-15. 20
One-half the personnel of Field Hospital No. 16 remained at Jouarre. where it
cared for the divisional sick in a convent previously used by the French as
a military hospital. The remainder of the sanitary train started on the even-
ing of July 16 for an all-night ride to Honneuil-en-Valois, Oise, arriving on
the morning of the 17th. 30
The transportation section of the 16th Ambulance Company (animal
drawn) arrived in the area on July 17, except the dismounted members of the
company, who, overlooked in the distribution of trucks, proceeded by rail and
rejoined the other sections on the 19th at a point in the forest one-half kilo-
meter (0.31 mile) west of Haramont. 29
Contact with the French corps surgeon could not be made until night of
July 17, and the only instructions then given by him to the division surgeon
were that a field hospital be established as a triage at Taillefontaine and that
one be located at Sery-Magneval to reinforce the French hospital there. Owing
to traffic congestion these instructions could not be carried out until the next
morning. 2 " At 9 p. m., July 17, orders were received for the location of ambu-
lances and dressing stations, but on account of the great amount of traffic the
detachments concerned were unable to reach their destinations until the fol-
lowing morning. 29
Ambulance Companies
Ambulance Company No. 1 sent 3 ambulances to the 23d Infantry, 3 to
the 9th Infantry, 1 to the 5th Marines, and 7 to Field Hospital No. 23 at Hara-
mont. Because of road conditions, the ambulance ordered to serve the ma-
rines did not reach its destination until noon of the following day. though
the distance traveled was only 20 km. (12.4 miles). 20
Ambulance Company No. IT), with personnel and equipment for two dress-
ing stations, was ordered to establish them on the Montgobert— Longpont
road, north and south, respectively, of the main road between Soissons and
Villers-Cotterets. Though the distance to be traveled was but 18 km. (11.1
miles) the unit did not reach its destination until 7 a. m. on July 18. As
wounded came through these points, the company established a dressing sta-
tion at Maison Neuve, the crossroads of the highways mentioned, where
wounded were beginning to collect and where Infantry regimental surgeons
were gathered. This became the main dressing station. At 3 p. m.. on July
19, Ambulance Company No. 15 established an advance station at Verte Feuille
Ferme, but this was soon closed and the detachment returned that night. 20 On
the following day the unit moved to Vivieres. 31
370 FIELD OPERATIONS
Ambulance Company No. 16 established a station at its assembly point
one-half km. (0.31 mile) west of Haramont, but only 75 wounded were
received. 29
Ambulance Company No. 23 sent three ambulances to Field Hospital No.
23. at Haramont. 29
At 4 a. m. on July 18 all available ambulances and litter bearers were
sent forward, hut as the former were soon blocked on the congested roads the
latter proceeded on foot. On the same date all the ambulance companies
(with the exception of the 15th) moved their headquarters to Taillefontaine.
where they remained until withdrawn from the sector. 29
Evacuation was very difficult, for the sanitary train arrived in the area
with depleted transportation. Only 32 serviceable G. M. C. ambulances and
21 trucks were available in the train at this time, and these were not supple-
mented by any United States Army ambulance sections. During the 18th the
greater part of the evacuations were made by ambulances, sanitary-train
trucks, and returning ammunition trucks. On the following day all these,
and supply-train trucks as well, were used for evacuating the wounded. On
the latter date French troops relieving the division provided five Ford ambu-
lances, but only one trip was made with these. 29
Two other circumstances conspired to aggravate evacuation difficulties,
viz, road conditions and the necessity for evacuating field hospitals by divi-
sional transport. The Soissons — Villers — Cotterets road — a very narrow,
paved highway, with borders of soft mud — was noted on commercial road
maps as " impracticable for autos.' ? Innumerable trucks " skidded " into the
ditches and had to be pulled out by tanks. Traffic moved either at snail's
pace or was stopped completely, until, on the 19th, military police were charged
with its control. After that date blocking of the road was practically
eliminated. 23
As provision for the prompt removal of the wounded from field hospitals
by other than divisional transport did not meet requirements, divisional
transportation had to be used to clear these hospitals to the rear. This situa-
tion required that trips from 20 to 34- km. (12.4—21.1 miles) in length be
made, until, on July 20, Evacuation Hospital No. 5 was established at Sery-
Magneval. Despite all difficulties, battalion aid stations had all been cleared
at 2 a. m. on July 20. 2!>
On July 22 the division having been withdrawn, a detachment from
Ambulance Company No. 23 was assigned to the 2d Artillery Brigade, which
was to remain in line. This detachment consisted of three officers, a dressing-
station party, and four ambulances. An ambulance dressing station was
established at Verte Feuille Ferme and operated there until July 25, when it
was withdrawn with the Artillery. During these three days it cared for many
wounded men. mostly from the Scottish and British troops sent into line to
relieve the 1st Division. 29
Field Hospitals
Field Hospital No. 1 had been ordered to Haramont. but after finding, on
the 18th, a suitable location and beginning to open up, it was ordered to Sery-
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 371
Magneval, where it arrived at 2.30 p. m. and immediately set up tentage.
It functioned as an evacuation hospital for the division and operated on non-
transportahle cases, hut was unahle to care for all of these, its overflow being
received by French hospitals at this place and at Crepy-en-Valois. When the
hospital left this location on July 24 it had cared for 200 gassed patients,
1.034 wounded, 45 psychoneurotic cases, and 81 injured, a total of 1,360. 29
Field Hospital No. 23 reached Haramont at 7 a. m. on the 18th, having
been delayed all night on the road, though it had had a march of only 5 km.
(3.1 miles). Here it operated a sorting station until noon of the same date,
then moving to Taillefontaine, where it reestablished its triage and cared for
patients until they could be removed. Facilities were limited; one small
building was used for dressing purposes and another for gassed cases. After
being treated, patients were cared for in tents or on litters in the open.
Assisted by personnel from Field Hospital No. 16, the unit here cared for 75
gassed cases, 966 wounded, 13 psychoneurotics, 12 injured, and 180 sick, a total
of 1,246 patients. When the division moved to this sector the other half of
Field Hospital No. 16 had been left, as noted above, at Jouarre to care for
divisional sick left behind in the sector formerly occupied. 29
Field Hospital No. 15, which had arrived in this area on July 16 with the
Artillery, moved to a point in Bois de Brassois, near the crossroads iy 2 km.
(0.93 mile) north of Emeville, where, until, July 24, it operated a sorting
station. It treated 607 patients, including 48 gassed, 369 wounded. 7 psycho-
neuroses, 31 injured, and 152 sick. 29
On July 20 all forward field hospitals were cleared and all ambulances
and Sanitary Train trucks sent to Sery-Magneval, where Field Flospital No. 1
was cleared as rapidly as hospital trains could evacuate it. Here Evacuation
Hospital No. 5 also was cleared by ambulances and trucks of the division
during the following two days, as was also the 1st Division field hospital
operating at the same place. Ambulances of the 2d Division likewise assisted
in evacuating great numbers of French wounded from the French hospital
there. 20
As noted elsewhere, the Medical Department representative of the general
staff who was charged with evacuations from the divisions in the Marne
areas had received no information of the intended attack toward Soissons
and for military reasons the division surgeon was not permitted (until after
the attack developed) to telegraph him concerning the need for an evacua-
tion hospital and for operating teams. 29 The division surgeon had been
assured by the French that they would evacuate American wounded from
the division and provide evacuation hospital facilities for them. This service
included the evacuation hospitals at Pierrefonds-les-Bains, Sery-Magneval
and Crepy-en-Valois, but during the first days these hospitals were filled
to overflowing and so were unable to admit more patients. French evacuation
hospitals were located also at the following points: Senlis, for all classes
of cases; Chantilly, for slightly wounded; Ognon. for fracture cases. 29
Some patients were admitted to these hospitals but soon, because of the needs
of their own wounded, further admissions were refused, and this difficult extra
trip of from 22 to 34 km. (13.6-21 miles) from Field Hospital No. 1— the
372 FIELD OPERATIONS
evacuation hospit.il of the 2d Division — and return was made to no purpose.
Owing to the fact that preference on the railroads was given to ammunition
and supplies, the arrival of French hospital trains was delayed many hours.
^Shelter being insufficient, many wounded men, mostly belonging to the 1st
and 2d Divisions, were left for hours in the railroad yards at Crepy-en-
Yalois, where they had been sent from overfilled French hospitals. Upon
arrival of Evacuation Hospital No. 5, on July 20, the situation was immedi-
ately relieved. 29
Medical Supply Unit
The divisional medical supply unit remained at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre.
but during the night of July 17 sent up two sanitary-train trucks with litters,
blankets, gauze, cotton, bandages, etc., which had been previously loaded
and were awaiting orders. On July 19, the division surgeon asked for 500
litters, 500 blankets, Thomas splints, etc. The message was telegraphed to
the medical supply depot at Lieusaint, and supplies were delivered at La
Ferte-sous-Jouarre at 3 a. m. on the 20th. 29 They were forwarded at once
and reached Taillefontaine at 11 a. m. on the same day. Though too late
to be of service to the 2d Division, they were of great value to the 1st Division,
to which they were delivered. 29
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT SERVICE IN REAR OF THE DIVISIONS
One or more representatives of the medical group attached to the fourth
section of the general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F., was constantly in the field
during the more important operations on the Marne, submitting recommen-
dations for coordination by the general staff, and at times actively directing
the operations of the medical service at the front. The Medical Department
representative of the general staff previously sent to the Chateau-Thierry
front acted as and was later assigned as chief surgeon of the " Paris group/'
The. chief surgeon of the Paris group was in general charge of Medical De-
partment activities in this area." 2
Such great secrecy had been maintained concerning the offensive toward
Soissons that no information regarding it had been given the acting assistant
chief of staff, G— 1, of the Paris group, under whom functioned the medical
service charged with evacuation of the disabled from the divisions, medical
supply, assignment of evacuation hospitals, and operating teams and related
duties. 33 In point of fact, since American troops were operating in this
offensive as a part of a French corps, were under its tactical command, and
the latter had assumed responsibility for the removal of wounded, this group
was supposed to have no official duty in the matter. 33 Nevertheless the
Medical Department felt that an obligation existed and feared that hospi-
talization which the French could provide would be inadequate. Such, in
fact, proved to be the case, and as soon as the division's location was ascer-
tained, relief was expedited. Concerning this episode the medical group
operating under G-4, G. H. Q., reported as follows: 34
Divisions were hurriedly withdrawn from one part of the line and thrown into an-
other alongside the French without advance notice to the medical representatives in the
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 373
field and at times evidently without due notice being furnished the tactical headquarters
of the Paris group, then established at La Ferte-sous-.Touarre, under which title all Ameri-
can divisions operating in that region functioned. This condition of affairs created a
situation on the Soissons front that evoked considerable unjustifiable criticism of the
.Medical Department. The 1st and 2d Divisions were thrown into battle there without
advising the American headquarters, and as we had no hospitalization established in
that sector the heavy casualties sustained were not promptly or well cared for. As it
developed, moreover, the French were no better prepared to meet the hospitalization obli-
gations that this new situation imposed upon them. This incident was regrettable in
that we had, packed and available for quick transportation, a mobile and an evacuation
hospital to meet an emergency of this nature. Had we been given notice of this impend-
ing tactical change we could have established hospitalization of our own behind the
troops engaged on the Soissons front. The French Medical Department was greatly
embarrassed by the large number of wounded that flowed into their organizations from
our two divisions engaged there, and while the responsibility for the care of our sick
and wounded devolved upon them, events showed that they were woefully unprepared
to receive them. The evacuation of our own men from that sector was eventually carried
out under direction of our G-4 representative, on our own trains hurriedly sent up on
his call.
Iii all fairness it should be added that the great loss of beds in evacua-
tion hospitals — some 40,000 or 45,000 3r ' — which the French had recently suf-
fered during the German advance in this area, prevented their giving the
assistance promised. Also, their tactical officers maintained that the move-
ment of an evacuation hospital and other medical formations to a prescribed
destination would have jeopardized the success of a very important military
operation. 30
The following description of the efforts of the chief surgeon, Paris group,
to meet this emergency is abstracted from his report. His representative
had left headquarters on the afternoon of the 17th of July, instructed to select
sites for evacuation hospitals to serve the 1st and 2d Divisions in the Dam-
martin area, where it was understood that they were to be located. 37 The
regulating officer at Le Bourget informed the chief surgeon by telephone
that these divisions had been removed from Dammartin on the preceding
night and placed in the line south of Soissons for an offensive which had
occurred on the morning of the 18th. He stated that losses had been heavy
but could give no figures. The chief surgeon, Paris group, then requested
a medical officer from General Headquarters, who was inspecting the area
informally, not to return to General Headquarters until early the next morn-
ing, it being probable that he would wish the latter to go to Soissons to take
charge of the situation there. Early on the morning of the 19th, it being
impossible for the chief surgeon to leave, he assumed authority to direct this
officer to proceed with all haste to the vicinity of Soissons, take such steps
as might be necessary to meet the needs there existing, and to acquaint him,
the chief surgeon, by telephone, telegram, or special delivery, with the situa-
tion. The officer so assigned left at once. 3S The chief surgeon then called up
the regulating officer at Le Bourget and asked him to inquire of the French
railroad authorities as to the nearest point to Soissons where a hospital train
could be "spotted." 39 About noon of that day the latter reported that
hospital trains could go no nearer Soissons than Crepy-en-Valois, and a little
374 FIELD OPERATIONS
Inter that clay the assistant to the chief surgeon above mentioned reported
that lie had covered the ground on the west flank, that Crepy-en-Valois was
the hest location for an evacuation hospital, and that the French were caring
for American wounded at Senlis, Chantilly, and Ognon. 30 Accordingly.
Evacuation Hospital No. 5 was routed through to Crepy-en-Valois and its
early delivery urged. 30 The American Red Cross, learning of this offensive,
iiad hurriedly sent officers, nurses, and enlisted men from Paris and from
American Red Cross Hospital No. 104 at Beauvais to the ambulance St. Paul
which it was conducting at Chantilly where it established an evacuation
hospital. It also rushed supplies here for a 300-bed hospital which was soon
expanded to 400 beds. 40
About 1 o'clock on the morning of July 20, the representative whom
the chief surgeon had sent to reconnoiter the situation in the vicinity of
Soissons returned and reported a deplorable state of affairs. He estimated
casualties at 10,000, but gave these figures with uncertainty. The French
were transporting the wounded to Senlis and Chantilly, and a few were
drifting into Juilly. Reliance, had been placed entirely upon hospitals al-
ready established; and though roads were poor and terrain rough and dif-
ficult, no hospitalization had been provided by the French at any convenient
point. This officer reported evacuation service as most unsatisfactory.
many wounded yet remaining at the front. Shortage of transportation,
difficult terrain and lack of roads all contributed to the existing chaos. He
had not seen the hospitals at Senlis and Chantilly. but had heard that they
were overcrowded and utterly unable to meet the situation. 39 He was directed
(o return at once and establish Evacuation Hospital No. 5 at Crepy-en-
Valois (the regulating officer having reported to the chief surgeon that it
would arrive during the night), and was authorized to take such action as
he might deem necessary. He was to order hospital trains direct from the
regulating officer, and. for the time being, to send all preoperative cases to
Paris for operation. He returned immediately to earn 7 out these instruc-
tions. 41
Without delay the chief surgeon, Paris group, telephoned the regulat-
ing officer requesting him to send two trains to Crepy-en-Valois with all
possible speed and to be prepared to send additional trains when called for.
About G a. m. six surgical teams which arrived by automobile from the
vicinity of Chaumont were sent forward in the same car to Crepy-en-Valois.
and, upon arrival there, were directed to report to the chief surgeon's repre-
sentative. The personnel of Field Hospital No. 120, which had arrived incom-
pliance with the chief surgeon's request, were sent immediately to the same
destination. 41 One United States Army ambulance section, also ordered to
Crepy-en-Valois under the same instructions, promptly left the area but
was intercepted by the French and not allowed to proceed. It was some
24 hours later before the chief surgeon learned that this ambulance section
had not reported at Crepy-enValois. and upon being informed of its hold-up
he registered an official complaint through the French liaison officer on duty
with headquarters, Paris group. Evacuation Hospital No. 5 reached Crepy-
en-Valois at 10 a. m. on July 20, then moving to Sery-Magneval, about 5
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 375
km. (3.1 miles) distant. 41 The site proved to be a vacant field of 10 or 15
acres, adjacent to a French mobile hospital. 42 Field Hospital Xo. 13, 1st
Division, was also in operation near the same place. The site was poor and
surroundings very insanitary. 42
After some delay in obtaining truck transportation to carry the equip-
ment of Evacuation Hospital No. 5 (some of this transportation was loaned
by the French) the first of its property arrived at the camp site at 3 p. m.
During the afternoon the work of establishing the hospital went on actively.
In the midst of tent pitching the surgeon of the Third Corps came to the
camp and importuned the commanding officer to detail 10 officers and 30
enlisted men to care for some three or four hundred wounded who were
reported to be lying uncared for on the other side of the railway track. Four
officers and ten men were detailed for this duty, with orders to remain with
these wounded until they had been properly cared for. 42
By 9 p. m. of July 20 the hospital was functioning, its surgical staff
was at work, and the portable electric-light plant working satisfactorily.
This light plant, with the X-ray apparatus, proved of inestimable value.
Hardly had the work begun when appeal was made for shelter for 200
wounded men then at the railhead. These wounded — actually about 400 —
were waiting for a hospital train which failed to arrive. All night wounded
men were coming in, and the surgical staff worked without a pause until
noon of the next day, when a number of operating teams began to arrive. 42
During the night 477 wounded Mere, formally received, cared for, and
sheltered. They were evacuated the next morning. Admissions were reported
as follows: Gassed patients, 253; medical, 302; surgical, 2,071; total. 2.G26.
The chief surgeon, First Army, reported that though the hospital arrived
too late to be of much service to our troops, " it was a veritable godsend
to British and Scottish divisions which came in to relieve the American
troops in such haste that their sanitary trains were left far behind." 42 On
August 1 the hospital left by truck train for La Ferte Milon, Aisne. 42
The Soissons experience led to the following letter from the chief surgeon
of the Paris group to the assistant chief of staff, Paris group : 43
Office Chief Surgeon, Pakis Gkolp,
22 July, la.
From: Chief surgeon, Paris group.
To: A. C. of S., Paris group.
Subject : Medical Department operations.
1. It is known to you that the 1st and 2d Divisions were withdrawn from the front
lines and placed in rest near Danmmrtin. After entering the rest area they were suddenly
moved northward by the French to the vicinity of Soissons, and without warning to this
office quickly thrust into a line back of which we had no hospitalization. Under such
circumstances the French, of course, always hospitalize and care for our wounded, but
events have proved that they were, in this case, unprepared to do this, and as a result
there has been much suffering and probably deaths. Such hospitalization as the French
had at their disposal has been as open to the Americans as to the French themselves,
hut the amount in the Soissons vicinity was utterly inadequate to meet the needs, and
we had no opportunity to better the situation.
376 FIELD OPERATIONS
2. This office was in a position to supply hospitalization, and had it been notified of
the contemplated movement northward much suffering that has occurred might easily have
been prevented. In view of this incident, this office wishes to recommend that the chief
surgeon of the Paris group be kept informed of contemplated troop activities, which step
it is thought will prevent repetitions of this unfortunate occurrence.
Paul, C. Hutton,
Col. M. C, N. A.
As a result of this letter and the experience of the 32d Division at
Juvigny, the commander in chief, on August 31, addressed the following note
to the French Mission : 4i
GHQ, AEF, 4th Sec, G. S.
31 August, 1918.
From : C. in C.
To : Chief of French mission.
Subject : Hospitalization and evacuation of American sick and wounded.
I. Every effort is now being made by the A. E. F. to so organize and distribute its
Medical Department personnel and equipment as to assure that adequate hospitalization
and evacuation facilities will be provided for the sick and wounded, wherever and irre-
spective of the conditions under which they may be called upon to serve.
II. In the past the French have kindly shared with us all their resources, even when
the aid extended has resulted in some embarrassment to their own service. We feel deeply
grateful for the assistance so rendered. However, owing to the difference in language
and the consequent difficulties encountered by our soldiers in making their wants known
when hospitalized in French formations, it becomes desirable and necessary that as far
as possible we provide them the necessary hospital accommodations in our own units.
III. Therefore, in view of existing agreements and customs which are more or less
in conflict with the propositions below set forth, it is requested that this matter be given
favorable consideration by the French, to the end that whenever American divisions are
i let ached for combat purposes with the French Army the following principles shall be
mutually recognized:
1. That the American Medical Department is authorized to establish its own hospitali-
zation behind any of the divisions serving with the French and direct or assist in, according
to circumstances, the evacuation of A. E. F. wounded.
2. That the French, in devising their tactical plans for a battle in which they expect
to utilize the services of American divisions, designate and communicate to proper Amer-
ican officials, for the information of the American Medical Department, suitable sites
for at least two American evacuation hospitals for each American division operating with
the French.
3. That the French arrange details necessary to permit access of American hospital
trains to any American evacuation hospitals so established.
4. That the French furnish timely information to the immediate headquarters of the
American army, corps, or "group" from which a division or divisions are detached for
service with the French, as to the contemplated use and movements of these divisions
while they remain under French control, in order that the A. E. F. Medical Department
may make preparations necessary for the hospitalization and evacuation of American
wounded, and in case the A. E. F. is not in a position to provide the necessary facilities
to furnish proper notification to that effect to the French.
IV. In connection with Section III, paragraph 4, above, the recent activities of the
32d American Division are cited as an example of the necessity for this information.
This division, forming part of the Third American Corps, was suddenly detached from the
Vesle sector and assigned to the Tenth French Army for combat purposes on the Sois-
sons sector. The chief surgeon (American) of the "Paris group," with headquarters at
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, who is directly charged with the provision of proper hospitalization
• Tills occurred after Soissons ; it is discussed later.
AMEBICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 377
and evacuation for A. E. F. troops in that region, had no information as to the move-
ments of this division upon which lie could act intelligently in the matter of locating
sanitary units for their care. Immediately upon the departure of the division ho ordered
a mobile (tent) evacuation hospital to pack, proceed, and reestablish somewhere in the
rear of the line this division might occupy. In the absence of authoritative information
the location selected was a mere matter of guesswork on his part. However, as events
have proven, his selection, due to good fortune more than anything else, resulted happily.
It appears that there are times when even the French medical service is not informed
as to the advent, for combat purposes, of American divisions in their midst, and conse-
quently has not been in a position to meet the additional hospitalization and evacuation
problem thrust upon them by tactical commanders.
By direction.
Geo. Van Horn Moseley,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-.',.
The French acceded to these requests and complied with them after the
attack of the 32d Division against Juvigny. From this time the care and
evacuation of our wounded in rear of the divisions moved very smoothly,
though our Medical Department continued to be greatly embarrassed by the
great shortage of personnel and of evacuation hospitals. In this connection
it should be noted that though the American Expeditionary Forces shortly
thereafter were largely concentrated in our own sector, a number of our divi-
sions continued to operate exclusively with our Allies.
On July 22 the chief surgeon, district of Paris, reported that his hospitals
in Paris were full and that he was unable to obtain trains for their evacua-
tion. At the same time the regulating officer at Le Bourget reported that he
had heard from Crepy-en-Valois that there were 1,000 patients there to be
evacuated and cared for. 40 Though trains were very scarce, it appeared that
the situation could be met within 48 hours. Hospital trains again being made
available on the 24th. Crepy-en-Valois was entirely cleared except for a feAv
nontransportable cases. Many American wounded had been evacuated on
truck trains, but the French hospitals at Senlis. Chantilly, and Oguon were
still filled to overflowing with our wounded. 40
On July 29 figures were received from the railway transport office which
showed that 10,578 patients from the 1st and 2d Divisions had been moved
by train principally from Crepy-en-Valois and Senlis, together with some 200
wounded prisoners. 47 These figures did not take cognizance of nontransport-
able cases still in French hospitals. 47 Of the number mentioned, 3.393 had
been evacuated in American trains and G.792 in French trains. 40
The Medical Department of the Third Corps was in a peculiar situation
in this operation as that corps at the time did not have tactical command.
The corps headquarters staff had officially the status of " observers," 4S but
concerning its activities here the corps surgeon wrote as follows : 49
Although the official entry of the 3d Army Corps into battle is given in the reports
as August 3, 1918, the days immediately following July 18 were among the most stirring
in the career of the organization. Whether the staff officers of the 3d Corps were ob-
servers or administrators or tactical advisers has never been quite clear, but certainly
the part they played was active. * * *
378 FIELD OPERATIONS
Efforts made by the corps surgeon to ameliorate the situation in rear
of the 1st and 2d Divisions will now be described.
While the 1st and 2d Divisions were at this time under administrative
control of the American Third Corps, though under tactical command of
the French, the corps surgeon endeavored to learn from the officer in charge
of G-l of the corps what was the general scheme of evacuation, believing,
because of his experience with the dissimilar American and French systems,
that he could promote their coordination. He was informed, however, that
the scheme of evacuation was a military secret which G-l would not divulge. 50
The corps surgeon then visited a number of points in the evacuation area of
the 1st Division, and on July 19, learning that additional personnel was
badly needed by the divisional hospital at Pierrefonds-les-Bains, succeeded
in having members of the corps headquarters troops sent to its relief. 51 Two
hours later he reported this congestion of field hospital to G-l of the corps
and recommended that the Paris group be advised of the situation and that
ambulances and personnel be requested. He then visited corps headquarters
and reported to the chief of staff the situation concerning the wounded. The
officer commanding the United States Army Ambulance Service arrived in
response to a message sent him and provided additional ambulances. 52 Operat-
ing teams, also, were arriving. On July 20, the corps surgeon visited the
surgeon of the French Tenth Army and was told that representatives of
the French Corps had conferred with the surgeons of both the 1st and the 2d
Divisions and had described the French system of evacuation." 2 It was
understood in his office that the surgeon from the 1st Division had under-
taken to evacuate back of Pierrefonds-les-Bains to Sery-Magneval, but from
Sery-Magneval it was acknowledged that the French plan was to evacuate
to Senlis: by ambulance for the seriously wounded, by trucks for the slightly
wounded, and by trains from Crepy-en-Valois. 52 The surgeon of the French
group of hospitals from Crepy-en-Valois received orders for French per-
sonnel to attend to the entrainment at Crepy-en-Valois. 52 The French medi-
cal officer in the office of the medical representative of the general staff was
of the opinion that neither side was familiar with the system of the other
and that American division surgeons had arrived too late for effective work;*'
that the French system of classification was not followed, that no one had
asked the French for help on July 18 and 19, and that if bis help had been
asked for it could have been furnished. 02
At Crepy-en-Valois, where the surgeon of the Third Corps had been told
that there was French personnel to attend to entrainment, he found about
250 wounded American soldiers on litters, exposed to wind and dust, and
without personnel except one medical officer, some line officers, and other
volunteers in attendance — all Americans, who were doing what they could.
Conditions were pathetic. 53 As already mentioned, he arranged with the
commanding officer of Evacuation Hospital Xo. 5, just arrived at Sery-Ma-
gneval but not yet ready to receive patients, to send assistance to the wounded
at Crepy-en-Valois railroad station. All these facts were reported to the
commanding officer of the Third Corps as soon as possible on July 20, and
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 379
the fact emphasized that conditions at Crepy-en-Valois would continue and
would tend to become worse as the congestion of wounded increased. The
corps commander directed the corps surgeon to proceed to the lines and find
medical personnel to cover the emergency at Crepy-en-Valois. 53 Medical
officers of the 9th Infantry were the first to be found, and several of them
were sent by ambulance to Crepy-en-Valois to assist in relieving the situa-
tion. 53 Through the work of the officer representing the chief surgeon, G-4,
Paris group, which supervised the supply and evacuation of American troops
engaged in the Marne salient, the timely arrival of hospital trains and an
ambulance company with personnel sufficient to man the entrainment station
at Crepy-en-Valois and the establishment at Sery-Magneval of Evacuation
Hospital Xo. 5, the difficult situation was overcome by the afternoon of
July 21.
The chief surgeon, Third Corps, reached the conclusion that when Ameri-
can troops were here put into action with the French all departments of
importance, except the medical, were in contact, through officers skilled in
such work, with the corresponding departments of the French Army."' 4 The
French took pains to inform the American division surgeons of their plans,
but (lid so in a general way and did not associate medical with specific mili-
tary plans. These latter were kept secret. On the other hand, American
division surgeons failed to bring to the attention of the French the urgency of
their situation. 54 Several officers, including the representative of the medical
group of the general staff, the corps surgeon, and the division surgeon, worked
along independent lines, not so coherently as would have been possible with
better organization and information; but by their several efforts a great
catastrophe was narrowly averted. 54
THE 4TH DIVISION
Activities of the 4th Division in the reduction of the Marne salient and
immediately thereafter in its operations along the Vesle may be divided into
two phases, the first from July 18 to July 22, and the second from August
3 to August 12. Yet between these dates certain units of the division also
came into action for short periods. 55
During the former of these two phases (which is that described at this
point), the division continued to be brigaded with the Second and Seventh
Corps of the French Sixth Army, a little to the south of the 2d American
Division. Its 7th Brigade served with the French Second Corps, the rest of
the division serving with the French Seventh Corps, chiefly in support,
though some elements saw front-line service. 55 None of these larger than
a regiment operated as a tactical unit during the period of the division's
service in the French Sixth Army, and as a rule battalions went into action
with French regiments. 55 Three Infantry regiments were in the front line
when the allied counter-offensive began on July 18, while the foui'th (the
47th Infantry) was in immediate reserve with the 11th Machine Gun Battalion
and two companies of the 4th Engineers, defending a position from Varinfroy
to Riviere. 55
380 FIELD OPERATIONS
From left to right the French Sixth Army consisted of the French
Second and Seventh Corps, the American First Corps, and the French Thirty-
eighth Corps. 00 On July 17 the Second Corps front extended to a point
south of Dammard and that of the Seventh Corps from this point to southeast
of Hautevesnes. 55
* * * In the sector of the Second Corps the 39th Infantry was placed under orders
of the 33d Division (French), and on the afternoon of July 16, 1918. received orders to
relieve French troops then in line. This relief was nearing completion on the night of
.July 17-18, when orders were received to attack at 8 a. m. July IS. The attack was made
in accordance with plans, and all objectives were taken by 3 p. m., after which the
regiment took Norroy, which, according to plans, was to have been taken by the French.
At 4 a. m. July 19 the regiment again advanced, taking its three successive objectives
as ordered. At about 5 a. m. July 19 the regiment received orders to withdraw from the
line, upon its relief by French troops, which was done during the night of July 19-20.
* * *
* * * In the sector of the French Seventh Corps the 58th and 59th Infantry and
12th Machine Gun Battalion were attached to various elements of the 164th French
Division.
The 58th Infantry was placed with the attacking troops. Two battalions of the 59th
were placed as safety garrison of the position of resistance and one battalion in reserve
for the army corps at Marmon-la-I'oterie. These reserve battalions were sent forward
on July 19. On July 18, at 4.35 a, m., without artillery preparation, the French and
American troops advanced to the attack after a fire of smoke shells. Hautevesnes was
taken at 5 a. m.. Courchamps about 11 a. m. The American troops * * * took the
village of Chevillon, then advanced very rapidly to the Sept-Bois (southeast of Mont-
men jou), and passed through it. * * * The French and American units acting in
conjunction took Priez and La Grenouillere Farm on July 19. * * * On the 20th
Sommelans was taken, but Petret Farm on the south was not taken until July 21. Bois
de lionnes was entered on this date. On the 22d Bois de Bonnes was taken and Bois de
Chatelet entered. On the nights of July 22-23 and 23-24 the elements of the 4th Division
were relieved from the line. * * *
On July 28 the 4th Division came under control of the First Corps and
assembled the next day in Bois de Chatelet. 55
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
When the 4th Division entered on the first phase of its activities in the
Aisne-Marne operation, the following plan was adopted for regimental aid:
Two privates of the Medical Department and 8 bearers from the line were
assigned to each line company. One officer, 1 sergeant, and 3 privates of
the Medical Department, with 14 bandsmen as litter bearers, were assigned
to each battalion in the front line; 1 officer, 1 sergeant, and 2 privates to each
regimental aid station ; the surgeon and 1 private to regimental headquarters.
A relay bearer section was formed when the distance from the front line
to the battalion aid station was more than 800 yards. 57
Evacuation of regimental and battalion stations was to be made by
ambulances when possible. In spite of the assignment of additional per-
sonnel from the line, it was soon learned that the medical personnel, though
thus reinforced, was insufficient for prompt portage of the wounded. The
division surgeon was constantly receiving requests for more litter bearers.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 381
and details of 30 to 40 men were made from ambulance companies to aid
the regimental service. 57 Early in the first engagements it was demonstrated
that only vigorous and courageous men should be assigned to the medical
detachment of a regiment. Men reporting for duty at the front, brought up
hurriedly at night, knowing nothing of the terrain, having had no experience
with explosives, and without regimental esprit, might easily become lost or
panic-stricken when sent out into strange territory to collect wounded men.
It was recognized that only men of the highest type obtainable, after
intensive training, could do this work satisfactorily."
During the first few days of battle a considerable number of men of
the 4th Division returned to the rear, assembled around the kitchens or
wandered about, claiming to have been gassed, lost, or thrown down by
shell concussion and left behind. The number of men claiming to have
been gassed was large. Medical officers of the division, having theoretical
hut not practical knowledge of the effects of toxic gases, gave these men
the benefit of the doubt and evacuated them to the rear. Later, this mistake
was corrected. 07
As American troops in the line were here interspersed with the French,
it was decided to combine the evacuation service with that of the nearest French
divisions and thus avoid duplication of effort. In conformity with an agree-
ment between the Medccinc Divisionnaire of the French 33d and lC4th
Divisions and the surgeon of the American 4th Division, our Field Hospital
Xo. 19 was attached to the French triage at Mary-sur-Marne, functioning as
a triage for troops of the 8th Brigade. M Ambulances having been furnished
the ambulance section of the sanitary train, 8 G. M. C. ambulances and
United States Army Ambulance Section No. 584, with 26 Ford ambulances.
5 medical officers, and 40 litter bearers reported to the French 164th Division
at Vendrest for work with the evacuation service. 58
In the Tth Brigade area, during this period of service with the French
33d Division. Field Ilosjntal No. 33 and Ambulance Company No. 33 were
attached to the French triage and hospital for nontransportable wounded at
Acy-en-Multien. 58
Special surgical operating teams with equipment and personnel were
hurriedly sent by the American First Corps to the hospitals at Gue-a-Tresmes
and Acy-en-Multien. All gassed patients were evacuated and treated at the
hospital at Mary-sur-Marne. Evacuations were made to Juilly and Mon-
tanglaust. and later to Meaux. 58
THE FIRST CORPS
At the beginning of the Aisne-Marne operation the First Corps con-
sisted of the French 167th and the American 26th Divisions. 515 In the opera-
tion of July 18 its first objective was the line of woods southeast of Haute-
vesnes — Torcy — Belleau. 59 The initial attack resulted in the capture of
Torcy, Belleau. and Givry on that date. 00 Next day the advance was dela}'ed
by the network of machine-gun nests on Hill 193, south of Monthiers. 01 On
July 20 the objective assigned to the corps by the Fren-h Sixth Army
382 FIELD OPERATIONS
embraced the entire corps sector. In pursuance of the plan to straighten
out the pocket formed between Chateau-Thierry and Soissons, the French
107th Division advanced this day farther than did the American 26th Divi-
sion. For the moment the operation pivoted on the wooded crest of Hill
204, which hitherto had resisted all attacks and had dominated Chateau-
Thierry and the line of the Marne. By evening of the 20th the pocket had
been straightened out and the French Tenth and Sixth Armies had advanced
their lines to the outskirts of Le Plessier-Huleu and Oulchy-la-Ville. Latilly,
Bonnes, and Monthiers had fallen. 01
From this point the axis of the corps, which hitherto had been nearly
due east, swung to the northeast in a gradual parabola, and after crossing
the Ourcq River ran in an almost northerly direction to the Vesle. It was
incumbent on the First Corps and the French Thirty-eighth Corps on its
right to make the greatest daily advance in conformity with elements on
the left. 61 On July 21 the corps made a maximum advance of 7 km. (4.3
miles), but for two days it was held up on the ridges to the northwest and
south of Epieds, where the line stood on the 23d. 01 On July 24 there was
another advance of 5 km. (3.1 miles) , when the corps was halted again south
of Beuvardes. During the next three days an average advance of 1 km.
(0.6 mile) per day was made. 01
Meanwhile, on July 26, the French Seventh Corps on the left was
withdrawn, as the wedges driven into the salient gradually closed in and
the frontage diminished. Another result of this reduction of units and of
the movement pivoted on the left was displacement of the limits of the
corps sector to the west. 01 On July 25 the 26th Division, which had been in
line since July 10, was relieved — except its field artillery and engineers — by
the 42d Division. The 101st Engineers and the Artillery brigade remained
in line until August 3 and 4, respectively. 02 On July 26 the 42d Division
relieved the French 167th Division also. From that time until the Vesle
was readied the First Corps had but one division in the line. 61
On July 28 a maximum advance of almost 5 km. (3.1 miles) was made,
the 42d Division crossing the Ourcq the following day, on a 3-km. (1.8 mile)
front and capturing Meurcy P^erme and Sergy. 61 On July 28 the French
Tenth Army had captured all the crests to the west of the Crise. Hartennes-
et-Taux and Grand Rozoy had been liberated, so that the Chateau-Thierry —
Soissons road was inside allied lines to within less than 4 km. (2.4 miles) of
Soissons. 63 The entire line of the Marne had been cleared. As was learned
later from German prisoners, it was here that the German command decided
to make a last stand while it withdrew its divisions and supplies beyond
the Vesle. 63 Therefore along the Ourcq occurred the most stubborn fighting
on the corps front during the entire operation. 63 On the yellow wheatfields
sloping gradually eastward from Meurcy Ferme; on the heights of Hill 184,
and along the little mud road rising steeply from Sergy to the Peuplier disk
on the crest, remained innumerable evidences of the stubbornness of the
fighting. 63 " Bodies of our men often lay in rows not 20 yards from the
German fox holes: the opposing lines were often within a stone's throw of
PLATE VIII.
AISNE-MARNE
OPERATION
FIRST CORPS
4 Ul -26 th & 42". d DIVISIONS
& 56* INFANTRY BRIGADE OF THE 28 ,h DIVISION
JULY 18 - AUGUST 12 , 1918.
S
i Louppijw*
IJujiic VuUMpfstt
/
7 S'f-% wThfTY (Itanrpiiw
jftl.;ilv!i!l avWlc
Scale in Ki lorrteters
Gmnipjiy
f^HU Coulqjnl*
5:
CHATEAU-
MontrnriU,
B tAClOl '
I ac i03 + \j ; fh.i€5jud: , .27£
Wltenpuv?
IT F*W ,,
Et jft*"--v''i l " '
,/ Etajrar
k «EH.e
\ JULY £9 •%.
FNoAnt\j
\
Vitr
J\6ZV BUT Mariw
Nojjfnt TArl-nod
FPavaitt
+ D." DmMng i
+ AX AmJmLvu-? Canpwv
± FH Fi*Ul Hospital
B LI! '.'■* Hospital
• EM LVcuiuAtint HMpttal
• Mil Mobil* Hospital
FIELD HOSPITALS WD AMBULANCE COMT*\N!Efl
4'" Dtv 2C 1 ." Dtv. 42'.* Div
No. 19 No 101 NolCS
21 108 Iff
28 103 teT
33 104 168
Pirtd MntptAl No ME ol th/ ZV* Dtv atUrhw! to lh» ESV Div
Draft from artttlmt «no: CnAteau-Tf u *"y . Cvnd* rn S-..I , Cc**lommt.in .
f*vm*n-i , &rttn-T*'tiUiOu, , flirrw .A&firti -GaucJitr . Satnt* • AuitU , fatUy .CvuStfifJuOm
Autfionj of MtdtfAL Uti's 'tm rrporta V fir S^rgtcf. ""
and DivutonaL 5ur(*<*i3 of tfit -»™ , ^6" and ■41'? Iki
BattJe lines, taken from existing orders and maps, are approximate.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 383
each other, and the bodies of German and American dead in the same machine-
gun nests were a further testimony of the mutual stubbornness of the
conflicts." ° 3
From July 28 to August 2 the First Corps was held again north of the
Ourcq. During this period, however, its line formed a flattened salient, and
it was natural, therefore, for the corps to hold its position until the corps on
the left and that on the right had advanced their lines in conformity with its
front. 63
By August 1, wdien this rectification had been made, the German com-
mand apparently had decided to fall back immediately to the Vesle. On
August 2, the corps advanced 3 km. (1.8 miles). Xext day the 4th Division
relieved the 42d and pushed forward almost without opposition through Bois
de Dole to the Vesle, where it took over the sector of the French Second
Corps, which included the French 02d Division. 63 On the 6th a crossing was
effected and the outskirts of Bazoches readied. 03 The engagement along the
Vesle was sustained and severe, so that casualties suffered by the 4th Division
were numerous. On August 12 the 77th Division relieved the 4th, and on
the 13th the First Army Corps was withdrawn and sent back to La Ferte-sous-
Jouarre. 63
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Though the 26th Division, the first division of the first corps to be en-
gaged, had many casualties during the early part of this operation, and evacua-
tion service was arduous, roads were excellent, hauls were comparatively short
at first, and there were no very severe difficulties in the corps evacuation serv-
ice. 04 By 10.40 p. m. of July 18 the enemy had been driven to the line Xoroy,
east of Courchamps, east of Licy-Clignon, Torcy, Belleau, Bouresches. 6 *
Evacuations had been made in accordance with recommendations formulated
by the corps surgeon and published in Secret Orders, Xo. 6, July 9, 1918, con-
cerning evacuation of sick and wounded. This order is quoted in Chapter XL
In this connection, and in connection with the history of the First Corps,
it should be explained that as the war progressed the corps surgeon's imme-
diate responsibilities for the evacuation of sick and wounded became somewhat
less than the foregoing order quoted in the chapter on the Champagne-Marne
operation indicates that they were at that time. This was especially true with
reference to the location of division field hospitals, which, except for the
initial location, were later placed by the division surgeon after consultation
with the corps surgeon. In preparation for an attack the initial location was
generally selected by the corps surgeon, as he had knowledge of road condi-
tions and supply points which the division surgeon usually did not possess.
Later also the corps surgeon, through the commanding officers, corps sanitary
train, took over evacuation from field hospitals to evacuation hospitals and
relieved the division surgeon of all responsibility back of the field hospitals.
This could not be done in these earlier engagements because of lack of trans-
portation belonging to the corps. The corps surgeon then had only sufficient
transportation for his own office purposes and had no sanitary train. 65
384 FIELD OPERATIONS
As it was evident that the sanitary personnel of a division was inadequate
to care for the casualties of active operations, the foregoing order contem-
plated that additional personnel be obtained by division surgeons through the
corps surgeon from Medical Department personnel in reserve. The expedient
was unsatisfactory, for such men needed all the rest they could obtain, but
the order mentioned above was secured in default of better measures, with a
view to meeting what appeared to be an impending shortage. In point of fact
it did not prove necessary to call on the sanitary troops of other divisions, in
reserve during this operation, and adequate assistance in removing wounded
from the field was soon made available in a more satisfactory manner by tem-
porary assignment to this duty of selected men from each line company. 65
The corps order directing this practice was published July 30. GC
As the situation changed, the provisions concerning evacuation prescribed
by Order No. G, published July 9, were modified from time to time. On July
18 the following was issued: 07
(a) After the advance lias passed the road Etrepilly — Grande Picardie Ferme — I^es
Rochets Ferme — Vaux, an advance dressing station will he established by the Sanitary
Train, 26th Division, at Bouresches.
Evacuation route : Bouresches — Lucy-le-Bocage — Montgivrault — Petit-Paris road—
Ventelet Ferme — Bezu-le-Guery.
From latter point as per par. 1 (f), Part II, Order No. 6, First Army Corps, July
9, 1918.
(b) For 107th Division (French) after the advance passes the road as above, a triage
will be established at Marigny-en-Orxois.
Evacuation will be by Cocherel and the axial road of the division.
On July 19 and 20 there was no change in the plan of evacuation. By
10.40 p. m on July 21 the French Sixth Army had passed the Chateau-
Thierry — Soissons road between the Ourcq and Clignon and had reached the
road Bezu — Epieds — Charteves. 08
Field Order No. 19, July 21, published the following concerning evacua-
tion of sick and wounded: 119
No change except as follows:
(«) When the 26th Division (U. S. ) has advanced beyond Trugny it will establish
a triage at Bouresches. An advance dressing station will also be established at La Sacerie
at this time.
Evacuation route: Boad La Sacerie south to Point 190, thence northwest via Gde
Picardie Farm to Point 22f>. thence via La Gonetrie Fme to Bouresches. From this point
as prescribed in previous orders.
(6) The 167th D. I. (French) will continue to maintain a triage at Marigny-en-
Orxois. The chateau at this station will be left vacant for the post of command of the
Sixth Army.
Evacuation route : Road Marigny-en-Orxois to Paris road, thence via La Ferte.
Field Order No. 21, dated July 23, made the following change in plan
of evacuation : 70
(ft) The 167th D. I. (French) has moved its triage from Marigny-en-Orxois to Belleau
and will establish at Cocherel a station for nontransportable wounded.
Evacuation route: From Belleau — the axial route of the division.
From Cocherel road Cocherel — Porte Ferree to main Paris road ; thence on the axial
road of the division.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FBEKCH ARMIES 385
The line of evacuation was becoming long. This condition, which con-
tinued to grow worse during the operation, later caused great difficulty. It
was due to the inability of headquarters of the Paris group to bring evacua-
tion hospitals nearer to the front. That organization fully realized the
situation and used every effort to meet it, but before relief could be effected
the lines had advanced so far that ambulances were covering as much as
112 km. (70 miles) on a round trip. 71 Another unfortunate result was that
eases were operated at the hospital for nontransportable wounded which would
have been sent for operation to the rear had evacuation hospitals been within
reach- The only mobile surgical hospital available at this time was No. 1,
and this was placed at Montanglaust with Evacuation Hospital No. 7. 71
Relief of the 26th Division by the 42d was promptly accomplished, the
mission of American troops remaining unchanged. 72
Field Order No. 24, July 25, 3 p. m., contained the following pertaining
to the plan of evacuation : 73
As previously prescribed for the 167tli (French) Division and the 26th (U. S.)
Divisions :
The 42d Division (U. S.) will establish an advance dressing station and a sorting
station at points now existing for the 26th Division.
The 56th Brigade, 28th Division, will evacuate through the sanitary units of the
26th Division.
As the advance progresses, new advance dressing stations and sorting stations will
he established under the direction of the corps surgeon.
The entire front of the First Corps was now held by the 42d Division,
which met stiff resistance at first, especially at the crossing of the Ourcq, and
suffered many casualties. The 26th Division fell back to the vicinity of Etre-
pilly for rest and re-forming. The 167th (Fi'ench) Division passed to the
army reserve. The 42d was ordered vigorously to pursue the attack, which,
on account of the narrowness of the sector, was often made on a battalion or
company front. 74
Part II of Field Order No. 25, July 2G, 1 p. m., prescribed the following
changes in the evacuation service: 75
167th Division (French). Upon relief of this division it will withdraw its triage
at Belleau.
42d Division (U. S.). Has established an advance dressing station at Trugny and a
sorting station at Farsoy Fme near Point 100 on the Chateau-Thierry road and is estab-
lishing a station for nontransportable wounded at Villiers-sur-Marne.
26th Division (U. S.). Upon relief of this division it will withdraw its advance
dressing station and its sorting station. * * *
56th Brigade, 28th Division (U. S.). Will evacuate through the evacuation system
of the 42d Division (U. S.).
There was no important change at this time in the general plan. Evacua-
tion hospitals had not yet been brought forward, and the strain on trans-
portation imposed by the necessarily long hauls was terrific. The 42d Divi-
sion now established a hospital at Villiers-sur-Marne for nontransportable
wounded, but this relieved the situation to only a limited extent. 74
13576—25 25
386 FIELD OPERATIONS
July 27 the advance continued, the First Corps attacking in the direction
of Sergy and Villers-sur-Fere. T0
Field Order No. 27, dated July 28, announced that the enemy had evacu-
ated Fresnes and Courmont, and it was thought that he had taken up a posi-
tion to the north of the Ourcq. The 42d Division was ordered to attack. 71
A memorandum from corps headquarters, dated July 28, 1 p. m., directed
the 42d Division to establish an advance dressing station at Beuvardes.
Field Order No. 30, July 29, 1918, at 23 hours, directed the following
changes in the evacuation service : 78
4th Division (U. S.). Station for slightly sick, skin and venereal diseases, to a field
hospital established at Bussiares. Only cases will be sent to this hospital as will be ready
for duty in four days. All other sick and wounded will be sent to Evacuation Hospital
No. 7 at Montanglaust, near Coulommiers.
Evacuation route: By the main Soissons — Chateau-Thierry — Paris road to La Ferte-
sous-.Touarre. Thence direct on the main road to Coulommiers.
42d Division (U. S.). Advance dressing station at Beuvardes. All sick and wounded
of whatever character, except nontransportable wounded, to Evacuation Hospital No. 7,
at Montanglaust, near Coulommiers. Seriously wounded (nontransportable) to Chateau-
Thierry.
Evacuation route as previously prescribed.
Corps and Army troops and attached French troops will be evacuated as prescribed
for the division to which attached or the division nearest to which they are functioning.
***** * *
From this order it will be noted that the wounded were still to be sent
to Evacuation Hospital No. 7, at Montanglaust. This was one of the worst
periods in the evacuation service of the First Corps in this area. Hauls were
almost more than could be accomplished, with all the assistance that could
l>e given by United States Army Ambulance Service sections, corps ambu-
lances, and ambulances from the sanitary trains of divisions not then in the
line. 7 " The .'5'2d and 3d Divisions aided materially by the use of their ambu-
lances during this period. The 42d Division now established a hospital for
nontransportable wounded in Chateau-Thierry which helped considerably. 79
Both this hospital and the one at Villiers-sur-Marne were required to operate
on too many patients, but, owing to the length of the haul to evacuation hos-
pitals, this was unavoidable. 7 " By July 30, the 42d Division had suffered
2.454 casualties, which fact gives some idea of the amount of evacuation car-
ried out over these tremendous hauls. Roads .were also badly congested, thus
aggravating the difficulty of transportation. Though always given right of
way and aided in every possible manner, ambulances often were detained un-
avoidably en route, but not to so great degree as later in the Meuse-Argonne
operation. 79
Field Order No. 32, dated July 31, 1918, contained the following con-
cerning the evacuation service : so
No change in plan of evacuation of sick and wounded except as follows:
(n) Evacuation of seriously wounded (nontransportable cases onlu) :
4th Division : To Evacuation Hospital No. 3 at La Ferte-Milon.
Evacuation route: Beuvardes — Beuvardelle — Brecy — Bezu-St. Germain — Autrecourt:
thence north on Chateau-Thierry — Soissons road; thence northwest on the main highway
via Orisolles — Latilly — Neuilly-St. Front: thence west to La Ferte-Milon.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 387
Jfitli Division : To Evacuation Hospital No. T, at Montanglaust, near Coulommiers.
Evacuation route: As prescribed previously.
4th Division: To Evacuation Hospital Xo. 5, at Etampes, just south of Chateau-
Thierry.
Evacuation route: As prescribed previously.
Corps troops: To Evacuation Hospital No. 7. at Montanglaust, near Coulommiers.
Evacuation route : As prescribed previously.
ib) Slightly wounded of the 42d Division will be sent to Evacuation Hospital No. 4
•it Chateau Perreuse, just west of Jouarre (which is on the main La Ferte-sous-Jouarre —
I'uulciiiiiiiiers road). Any overflow will go to Evacuation Hospital No. 7. sit Montanglaust,
near Coulommiers.
(o) AH other sick and slightly wounded of the other divisions and corps troops will
he sent to Evacuation Hospital No. 7 at Montanglaust. near Coulommiers."
The location of Evacuation Hospital No. 3, at La Ferte-Milon, on
July 29, for nontransportable wounded only, was of some help, but as the
hospital was well off the left flank it did not relieve matters materially in
this corps, and it was too far away for the more serious nontransportable
cases. * 1
Evacuation Hospital Xo. 4 had also been established, on July 22, at
Chateau Perreuse; but as this was south of La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. neither
was it of much benefit. 81
On August 2-3 the 4th Division relieved the 42d. the latter becoming
corps reserve. 82
Field Order Xo. 34, dated August 1, 101 8, prescribed the following
changes in evacuation methods : 83
I'M 4th and 42d Divisions:
Evacuation of seriously wounded (nontransportable cases only). Extreme cases
only to the field hospital of the 42d Division, located at Bezu-St. Germain.
Oilier seriously Wounded cases to Evacuation Hospital No. 6, at Etampes. just south
at Chateau-Thierry. Overflow to Evacuation Hospital No. 3, at La Ferte-Milon.
Slightly wounded and other cases to Evacuation Hospital No. 4. at Chateau Perreuse.
Overflow to Evacuation Hospital No. 7, at Montanglaust, near Coulommiers.
Evacuation routes : As prescribed previously.
(6) 20th Division and corps troops: As prescribed previously.
Field Order Xo. 36, August 3. announced that the enemy was retiring
across the Vesle and that troops on the left had already reached that river,
with troops on the right in close pursuit. Orders were issued to establish
bridgeheads across the Vesle. 84 The Chateau-Thierry salient had been
completely eliminated.
On August 6, field hospitals of the 4th Division, then in the line, were
grouped at Chateau de la Foret, as described in the history of the 4th Divi-
sion. Evacuations were now effected from the division by the corps sanitary
train, this method proving so satisfactory that when, on August 12, the
77th Division relieved the 4th it carried on the same arrangements. Activi-
ties thon were lessened somewhat, and evacuation, conducted under the same
plans as those mentioned for the 4th Division, presented no great difficulties. 85
Tlie First Corps AV as withdrawn from the line on August 12 and its
headquarters returned to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, where it remained until
388 FIELD OPERATIONS
August 18. 83 The American Third Corps then took over the First Corps
sector, under control of the French. 30
Several developments in the Marne area were of especial interest to the
Medical Department in connection with service of the First Corps and its
component divisions :
(1) Inadequacy of ambulance transportation. — -While sufficient for
trench warfare, the number of ambulances in the division sanitary train
proved entirely inadequate to care for casualties arising in active, open war-
fare. For slightly wounded and slightly gassed cases it was necessary to
use all the trucks that could he procured. In addition, all the United States
Army Amhulance Service sections that could be ohtained, plus ambulances
of the corps sanitary train, were required, working to full capacity, to meet
the need when casualties were heavy. Except for following troops on the
march, animal-drawn ambulances proved of little value. S5
(2) Long hauls. — The long hauls impaired transportation greatly. For
a considerable period, evacuation hospitals could not be brought forward
within a reasonable distance from the front, and there were times when the
round trip of an ambulance covered 96-112 km. (60 to 70 miles). This was
a feature of open warfare which could be met only by the establishment of
additional evacuation hospitals to receive patients from divisional units. 85
(3) Road congestion. — Great road congestion prevailed. In the First
Corps, in spite of the fact that ambulances always had the right of way,
delays were frequent and distressing. Yet in the Aisne-Marne operation,
where but one American division was in the line at one time, the problem
was not nearly so difficult as it proved later in the Argonne. 85
(4) Inadequacy of sanitary personnel. — The sanitary personnel attached
to regiments and other units proved very inadequate during periods of
activity. This difficulty, as previously noted, was overcome in the First
Corps by an order detailing men from the line companies to serve as litter
bearers. This, the necessary and only possible solution during the war, was
but a makeshift measure. The use of bandsmen as litter bearers proved
inadvisable; even when they were employed their assistance amounted to
relatively little in great emergencies. Furthermore, music was of such value
in maintaining the morale of troops that it was believed skilled musicians
should not be subjected to the dangers attendant upon litter bearing. 37
(5) Position of division surgeon during battle. — In only one division
in the First Corps during the activities in the Marne area was the division
surgeon located at the divisional post of command, and this only for a brief
period. Normally he was with the field hospital section of the sanitary
train, detailing to the division command post a subordinate officer who kept
him advised concerning tactical changes. When at the former, the division
surgeon was in touch with all elements of the medical service and, in the
opinion of the corps surgeon, could direct evacuations infinitely better than
if relatively isolated, well forward, with the division commander. 87
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 389
(6) Burial of the dead. — This painful duty became a most serious
sanitary problem and one intimately connected with the question of morale.
It was decided that divisions should not be called upon to perform this work,
on the ground that, though prompt burial of the dead was essential, during
combat their line troops could not be spared from the front for this purpose:
and after combat such troops would bo mentally and physically exhausted.
Moreover, the effect of this kind of service was found to have a most in-
jurious effect upon the morale of combatant troo2)s; on the other hand, if,
when returning from the battlefield, they saw no evidences of the recent
engagement they were not so depressed as otherwise they would have been.
Prompt clearing of the battlefield by removing and caring for all the wounded
and decently burying all dead had a powerful effect on maintaining the
esprit of troops. 88
As the corps advanced over this front many dead bodies of men and
animals were found scattered over the terrain, numbers of them having lain
there apparently for 10 days or longer. This was especially remarked around
Fere-en-Tardenois, where many French and German dead lay just outside
the town. The stench from these bodies was intolerable. Dead horses lay at
short intervals along the way, many having died from exhaustion. The
weather was hot and the bodies of both men and animals had become black,
swollen, disorganized masses of organic matter, alive with maggots. Flies
bred in millions and soon became an intolerable nuisance as well as a more or
less serious menace to health. Other insanitary conditions existed, and there
was much reason to apprehend an outbreak of intestinal diseases. 89
The corps surgeon prepared a request, which was forwarded approved by
the corps commander, that a labor organization of 500 men be assigned to the
corps for the sole purpose of burying the dead. They were to work with the
Graves Registration Service, so that proper identification of the dead and the
care of their effects might be assured. This request was returned from
(ieneral Headquarters disapproved. The corps surgeon then recommended
that Pioneer Infantry be allotted for this purpose. This recommendation was
approved and thereafter applied in the First Corps, with striking improve-
ment in its battlefield sanitation. Fields were promptly cleared of the dead,
and the bad conditions about Chateau-Thierry never occurred again. 00 The
men assigned to this work did faithful service, often so close to the front that
several of them were killed on one occasion. Their work was arduous. In
this connection it should be explained that incineration was impossible, both
on account of lack of fuel and from the danger of attracting enemy fire by
smoke by day or flame by night. 01
At first these Pioneer Infantry troops were detailed to work under the
division quartermaster, but this was soon found to be an unsatisfactory
arrangement, as the quartermaster was generally near the railhead and
preoccupied with other duties. The corps surgeon then recommended that
these troops be placed under the division sanitary inspector for the sole duty
390 FIELD OPERATIONS
of burying dead men and dead animals. This plan was approved and was
ordered in paragraph 11, annex 9, " Plan of communications, supplies, and
evacuation," of Field Order No. 57, First Army Corps. September 22, 1918,
as follows : 9 -
Burials :
'(«) Every effort will be made to promptly and properly bury the dead and to secure
proper identification.
(6) Dead animals will be promptly buried.
(c) To bury the dead and to promptly dispose of dead animals each front-line division
lias been furnished with one company of Pioneer Infantry. These companies will he
dispatched so as to arrive not later than noon of D-l.
These troops will be reported to and will work under direction of the divisional
sanitary inspector.
(7) Mobile surgical hospitals. — These, in the opinion of the surgeon of
this corps, should be readily movable and should be placed under the corps
surgeon's immediate control. 9 " Two of these, he concluded, were adequate
for a corps under usual circumstances.
(8) Standard plan for evacuation. — The need for a plan of evacuation
applicable to all divisions in the American Expeditionary Forces, the proper
carrying out of which could be made feasible by early information concerning
the military situation, had already been recognized. This war of movement
had shown that this plan should be elastic, yet comprehensive enough to cover
all probable conditions. 93
(9) Hospital Corps belt. — In the opinion of the corps surgeon this belt
proved almost useless. The 42d Division substituted for it pouches similar
to the old Hospital Corps pouch. These, obtained through the Red Cross,
proved very satisfactory. An effort was made to procure them for every divi-
sion in the First Corps, but this did not prove practical and, in any event,
the changes of divisions in the corps were so frequent that it would have been
difficult to supply all the divisions in the short time available. 93
Upon their return from the front line and into the army reserve it was
immediately evident that the troops were utterly exhausted, both mentally
and physically. While camps were established in shelter tents in the woods,
the simplest camp sanitary precautions sometimes were disregarded. Thus
in some instances no latrines were provided, or. if dug, were left uncovered
and uncared for. The result was the breeding of more flies. Some of tlhe
troops too were disposed to drink water from any supply available, such as
in shell holes or from other questionable sources. In one battalion which had
lost every officer as a battle casualty there was notable sanitary disorganiza-
tion, and similar conditions existed in other onranizations. It is true the
camps were regarded as temporary, but actually they remained established
longer than had been anticipated and soon were very insanitary. 89 With in-
different food, bad water (many Lyster bags had teen lost in the advance),
myriads of flies, and lowered physical and mental vitality, many cases of
intestinal disease developed. A sanitary inspector from the central laboratory
reported true Shiga, Flexner. and paratyphoid bacilli, as well as certain
aberrant types. Fortunately, the infection was mild, for there was no mor-
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 391
tality and patients were sick for a few days only; on the other hand, cases
were very numerous, and there was reason to fear that a serious epidemic
might supervene. Previous antityphoid and antiparatyphoid inoculations
apparently saved the troops from what would have been a severe epidemic
(if these diseases, but their administration does not explain the escape of the
corps from a serious outbreak of dysentery. Conditions called for vigorous
action, and effective sanitary measures based on accepted methods were soon
ordered and enforced."
THE 26TH DIVISION
The 26th Division had relieved the 2d Division July 10 and held 5 km.
(3.1 miles) of front between Belleau and Vaux. 59
The 52d Brigade, on the left, attacked at 4.35 a. m. July 18, with three
battalions in line. Objectives were the railway from Givry to Bouresches,
Belleau, and Givry. and the town of Torcy. This was taken by 5.40 a. m..
Belleau and Givry by 8.30 a. m., and the railroad at about the same time. The
line was consolidated and held. 04
On the 19th the 26th Division, awaiting the division on its left (French
167), which was delayed, remained in place and so continued until 3 p. m.
on the 20th of July. An attack was then made along the entire front, in con-
junction with the French 39th and 167th Divisions. The first objective was
gained, and the line was as follows : Givry — Woods one-half kilometer north of
les Brasses Ferme — Les Brusses Ferme — Hill 190 — La Gonetrie Ferme —
Hill 201. 94
At 4 a, m. on July 21 the advance was resumed, the two brigades moving
abreast. The enemy fell back and was pursued closely until troops reached
the vicinity of Epieds and Trugny. In the woods near the latter place he had
strong defenses. 9 *
At 6 o'clock on the morning of July 22 the advance was resumed, and in
spite of severe enemy fire, Epieds and Trugny were taken, but later the troops
were withdrawn because of heavy artillery fire. 01 At 3 p. m. on the same date
another attack was launched by a battalion of the 103d Infantry and a bat-
talion of the 102d Infantry, but the advance was slight. The 101st Infantry
was then directed to break through on the division front on a line east of
Trugny. This attack, made next day, gained some ground. 94 During the
night of July 23-24 the 56th Brigade (28th Division) relieved the 52d
Brigade. 94
On the 24th, after some delay, another advance was made, and occupied
a line in the Foret de Fere west of the Fere-en-Tardenois — Jaulgonne road. 94
During the night of July 24—25, the 42d Division passed through and relieved
the 26th, the latter remaining in reserve near La Ferte. 94
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
In the lines, men sheltered themselves as best they could in individual
excavations, and in farm houses, villages, and behind the banks of water-
courses. As villages were often shelled, the heavily built cellars of farm-
392 FIELD OPERATIONS
houses proved the best sites for aid stations. When these were not available,
the stone culverts of dry watercourses, or shallow excavations, usually covered
with logs, were utilized. The prescribed aid station equipment and other
supplies were replenished by bearers and ambulances. 05
Sanitary Train
Dressing stations were established at La Voie du Chatel (Ambulance
Company No. 104) on the north and at Villiers-sur-Marne (Ambulance
Company Xo. 103) on the south, with ambulance heads as far forward as
cover permitted. 95 The natural drift of wounded men made the former sta-
tion very active, the latter only slightly so. 05
About midway between, at Bezu-le-Guery, and just beyond the usual
range of enemy shells, a triage and gas station were operated by Field Hos-
pital Xo. 102. Ambulance Companies Xo. 101 and Xo. 102 were also located
here. 95 Well to the rear, but not beyond extreme artillery range, at Luzancy,
Field Hospitals Xo. 101 and Xo. 104 were established in a large schoolhouse,
where they operated, together, a hospital for the slightly wounded, gassed,
and sick. 95 Ah La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, several miles in the rear, Field Hos-
pital Xo. 103, reinforced by operating teams and 35 nurses, operated a
hospital for severely wounded, in a large convent converted into a well-
equipped surgical hospital. 95
United States Army Ambulance Section Xo. 502 evacuated from the
ambulance heads to dressing stations, and divisional ambulances from the
dressing stations to the triage and field hospitals. 95 Trucks of the sanitary
train and such ambulances as could be spared evacuated patients from the
field hospitals to Evacuation Hospital Xo. 7, at Montanglaust, near Coulom-
miers. (More than 2,000 patients had been evacuated by the sanitary units
in the two weeks prior to July 18. ) 90
During the evening of July 17, in rain and inky darkness, Ambulance
Company Xo. 102 moved up to reinforce Ambulance Company Xo. 104, at
La Voie du Chatel. whence litter bearer sections were sent to reinforce the
regimental bearers, in anticipation of the coming offensive. 00 At 4.35 a. m.
July 18, the artillery opened fire, and the infantry attack began at 6 a. m.
Thereafter for days the entire medical personnel worked continuously, rest-
ing only when an occasional lull permitted. The wounded accumulated in
some numbers at all stations, but only for short periods. During the first
day of the offensive 1.2S0 cases passed through the dressing station at La Voie
du Chatel, and 1,648 through the triage at Bezu-le-Guery. 00
By July 20. the Infantry had reached a line from Monthiers to Vaux.
Following this Infantry advance a dressing station was established on the
same day at Bouresches. 90 As the division still pressed forward, a station
was opened farther in advance, at Farsoy Ferme, near the Chateau-Thierry —
Soissons road, and still later another station was established at Trugny. This
was in a farmhouse in front of a wheat field, still bestrewn with the bodies
of American and German dead. 00 All the ambulance companies participated
in operating these dressing stations, advancing by the "leapfrog" method;
PLATE IX.
AISNE-MARNE OPERATION
26th. DIVISION
July 17-24, 1918
LEGEND
▲ -Triage
+ AC ~ Ambulinca Co.
± FH -Field HoapitU
REFERENCES) '■ Drawn fmm Maps - Meaux and 5oisjo#-3.
Positions of Medical Units frorr Reports of
Division .burgeon, twenty sixth. Division,
Battle Lines, taken from existing orders and maps, are approximate.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 393
i. e., one company from the rear passed the one in operation and began
work farther forward, the station left in the rear now closing and going
into reserve, to be advanced again when needed. 00 This method worked so
well in this offensive that, modified as circumstances required, it was used
by the 26th Division throughout the war. 06
The sanitary train of the 26th Division was equipped with the following
transportation for evacuation of the wounded : 07
G. M. C. of the three ambulance companies of the division 39
G. M. C. of the lG2d Ambulance Company from the 1st Corps 12
Total G. M. C 51
Ford TJ. S. Army Ambulance Section No. 502 20
Total motor ambulances 71
Three-ton trucks from sanitary train 28
Three-ton trucks from 101st Supply Train 12
Total 3-ton trucks 4n
Even with this large transport, the wounded accumulated at Bezu-le-
Guery and Luzancy faster than they could be removed, for vehicles were
obliged to carry the wounded from the hands of litter bearers at the front,
through dressing stations, triage, taking the overflow at Luzancy, to the nearest
evacuation hospital — No. 7, at Montanglaust, near Coulommiers — a distance
all told of 60 or more kilometers (37.2 miles) . This rear service was, of course,
one which our regulations for the operation of the medical department of a
division had never contemplated. Fifty to sixty hours' continuous duty was
not unusual for ambulance drivers, no vehicle standing still longer than was
necessary to load, unload, grease, gas, water, and repair. At no time was there
any avoidable delay in the evacuation of casualties. Koads were often crowded
and occasionally were blocked by impassable shell fire, but even then they
were soon opened. 07
The f2 animal-drawn ambulances of Ambulance Company No. fOl were
posted with the Field Artillery, which, due to its location farther to the rear,
was more readily served by animal-drawn vehicles. 08 These vehicles were
assigned to like duty throughout subsequent operations. They could sometimes
get over ground impassable to motors. 08
During this operation, liaison between the ambulance heads (" cab
stands") and battalion aid stations was defective. Normally, this would have
been etfected by the litter-bearer sections of ambulance companies operating
the dressing stations, but in this operation the litter-bearer sections of the
ambulance companies were distributed for duty with regiments, where they
either collected wounded or assisted at battalion aid stations. 98 Ambulance
drivers found difficulty in locating the rapidly moving battalions. 08
Realizing the total inadequacy of litter bearers at the disposal of regi-
mental and battalion surgeons, and the consequent necessity of depleting ambu-
lance companies by reinforcing battalion bearers with ambulance company
13576— 25 26
394 FIELD OPERATIONS
litter bearers, the commanding officer of the sanitary train on July 3 strongly
recommended and urged the immediate assignment of line company bearers
at the rate of 12 to each line company or corresponding unit. This request
was complied with on July 28, by which time the necessity for the measure
in question had been demonstrated to the satisfaction of all concerned. 00
In accordance with the division surgeon's request, this order specified
that company commanders were to select for litter-bearer service only men
of the strongest physique, best intelligence, and courage. No weaklings, mental
or physical, were to be included.™
Medical supplies were brought up by ambulances in compliance with re-
quests sent back by them. Information concerning conditions at the front
which orderlies of these ambulances brought back w ? as of inestimable value
to the officers and formations toward the rear. 06 Prompt bihourly reports
of casualties from the triage kept both division surgeon and division com-
mander informed of battle conditions. They indicated the places where great-
est resistance was occurring. "
An effective method for bath treatment of gas casualties was developed
at the triage, although equipment and water were scarce. Under convenient
shelter, rows of inclined planes were constructed by placing litters on wooden
trestles of unequal height. These litters were covered with rubber blankets
and drained into buckets at their lower ends. Above, suspended from wires,
were douches for the eyes, nose, and ears. Watering pots containing strong
soap solution were utilized for the face. Attendants were protected by gas-
proof clothing and gloves. The Red Cross assisted in promoting the comfort
of patients. 1 "
When the sector was taken over many unburied bodies of both men and
animals were found, and during the first day's occupancy 50 of these were
buried in one wood alone. 90 Numerous casualties occurred among burial par-
ties. 00 Many of the bodies had been but slightly covered with earth in the
shallow holes that had been dug for shelter, and frequently an extremity
protruded. 00 As the troops in exposed positions kept close in their shelters the
soil in and near these became polluted. Enemy locations were subsequently
found to be nearly as bad. 100 Latrines often contained moving masses of
maggots, and flies appeared in enormous numbers. Food, when obtained, was
often sour from long carriage. 100 Practically 100 per cent of the command
was attacked by diarrhea. The disease was so mild, however, that not more
than 2 per cent of those affected had fever or required hospitalization. The
French civilian population suffered more severely than did the troops. 100 With
improved sanitation, this epidemic, attributed to bacteria conveyed by flies,
disappeared.
On being relieved the division spent two weeks in reserve and then moved
to the twelfth rest area, in the vicinity of Chatillon-sur-Seine. 100
THE 42(1 DIVISION
On July 25 the 42d Division relieved the 26th in the Epieds area, and
next dav the French 164th and 167th Divisions. 101
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 395
On July 26 the 84th Brigade attacked in the direction of La Croix
Rouge Ferine and captured the buildings, with heavy losses. 102
On July 28, in spite of strong resistance, both brigades crossed the river,
captured Sergy, and established themselves on the northern banks of the
stream. The enemy launched a heavy counterattack and recaptured Sergy,
but was again driven out. 102
On the morning of July 29, Sergy was definitely occupied. In the
iifternoon, despite stubborn resistance, the 83d Brigade took Seringes, and
at 8 that night the division held the line Seringes — Meurcy Ferine — Sergy —
Hill 212.
On July 30 the division again attacked. The 83d Brigade advanced to
the southwest ed^e of Foret de Nesles, the 84th Brigade to 1 km. north of
Serpy. 102
On July 31 the 84th Brigade atacked on the right, without success.
On August 1 the 84th again attacked, hut was unable to advance on
account of its exposed right flank. On August 2 the advance continued.
The enemy was withdrawing and pursuit was active, reaching a line south
of Mareuil-en-Dole — Chery-Chartreuve, an advance of 15 km. (0 miles). 71
On the nipht of August 2-3 the division was relieved by the 4th. 72
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
As before. 1 enlisted man of the Medical Department to render first
aid. and 12 litter bearers from the line were assigned to each company or
battery, the remainder of the Medical Department detachment on duty with
a battalion being held at its aid station. 1 "* Whenever possible such stations
were located at command posts, often in the same building with them.
Shelter was of a superficial nature, detachments often caring for the wounded
under direct enemy observation and shell fire. 103
Because of road congestion, the large number of casualties, and the long
distance to evacuation hospitals, the removal of patients to them was re-
tarded, with the result that the wounded accumulated at all sections. 10 '' At
the aid stations the walking wounded were tagged and started, unaccom-
panied, to the dressing stations, only litter cases being held for ambulances.
Trucks, escort wagons, and United States Army Ambulance sections gave
material aid in relieving these stations near the lines. Doubtful cases at-
tributed to gassing were held until definite diagnosis could be made, thus
preventing some unnecessary evacuation. 103
As the battalions advanced, aid station detachments left one or two
Medical Department men at the old station until patients were removed,
while the remainder of the personnel advanced to establish the new station. 104
Men (Medical Department) on duty with front-line companies were relieved
at intervals by other men from the aid station personnel, and in a similar
manner medical officers were sent forward from the ambulance companies
to relieve exhausted battalion surgeons. 104
396 FIELD OPERATIONS
Ambulance Companies
At 10 a. in. on July 25 a dressing station was opened at Epieds, when
a few patients came in at once, but it was not until after nightfall that they
arrived in considerable numbers. As Epieds was on the axial road of the
division and was well situated for the collection of the wounded from the
whole front, the only dressing station operated by the 42d for several days
was that located here. This station also functioned as triage — the first at-
tempted by this division. 1 " 5
Whenever it was practicable to do so the personnel of this station was
changed every 12 hours, but during very active periods this was impossible,
though all four ambulance companies cooperated in its service. 106 Owing
to the remoteness of the supply dumps, the large number of wounded, and the
failure of some hospitals to exchange equipment, there was a shortage of
litters and blankets. 100
The most noticeable defect in the evacuation service was inadequacy of
contact between aid stations and dressing stations. Officers were ordered
forward to connect with the regiments and battalions, but the policy of hav-
ing one ambulance officer on duty with each regiment had not yet been
adopted. 107 Ambulances ran continuously for 8 days and evacuated all wounded
as soon as located. During the 14 days from July 25 to August 7. the 11
vehicles of one ambulance company transported 2.527 persons (including some
litter bearers going forward) and traveled a total of 15.546 miles. 107 This
activity was typical of all. Each company employed its drivers under a sys-
tem of shifts providing 16 hours on duty and 8 hours off. 107
United States Army Ambulance Service Section Xo. 502 Avas assigned to
the division, but many of its cars were in poor condition, thus restricting the
value of its service. 107 An evacuation ambulance company was ordered to
the service of the division, but was two days late in arriving and was then
assigned to work in rear of the field hospitals. Trips in this circuit varied
in length from 33 to 140 km. (20.4-S6.9 miles). 01 The divisional ambulance
service was thus thrown largely on its own resources for intradivisional work,
which required the evacuation of a total of 5.506 patients. 108
Toward the end of the first day patients accumulated in such numbers at
the front that evacuations by ambulance from Epieds were stopped, and by
midnight approximately 400 patients were in and around the station at that
place. 1 " 3 At this time every motor ambulance was working in advance of
Epieds behind the front. Many of the wounded were in a serious condition,
but it was decided that clearing the aid stations — in many cases badly over-
crowded and subject to shell fire — was of first importance. 103 For the service
in rear of this station ration trucks were employed and sitting cases trans-
ported to Chateau-Thierry. 103 A station for the slightly wounded was opened
at Bezuet, where ambulance company reserves were stationed. To this point
patients wei-e transported from Epieds by the animal-drawn ambulance com-
pany hitherto held in reserve. As soon as congestion at the front was relieved,
division ambulances again evacuated to the rear. 103
PLATE X.
AISNE-MARNE OPERATION
42B£l DIVISION
July 25 -Aurfust 3. 1918.
«FH 168-165
)/±#Ju\yZ7
fjtvnTiera-.
A TRIAGE
+ AMBULANCE CO.
± FIELD HOSPITAL
fRznkZNCEs:- Drawn from. Maps ,,-.«
MEAUXand SOIJSOMS. Positions © EVACUATION HOJP.
of Medical Units from Reports of Pivi-
sion Surgeon, Forty-second Division
Battle lines, taken from existing orders and maps, are approximate.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH TRENCH ARMIES 397
On July 28, as a result of the attack against Sergy, there was another
great influx of wounded. In this emergency the light trucks of the 149th
Machine Gun Battalion rendered valuable service by evacuating many
wounded from Sergy to Epieds. los On the same day, the line being advanced,
a relay dressing station was established at Beuvardes. As a collecting point
this station was poorly located, for it lay bewteen an ammunition dump and
a signal station, both under constant shell fire. 103 After 36 hours it was with-
drawn : it had then become apparent that it was of no particular value. 108
Following the capture of Sergy, Seringes, Nesles and Fere-en-Tardenois.
the line moved forward rapidly, clearing the Xesles — Fere-en-Tardenois
road. 100 The battalion aid station cleared or gained this road, which then be-
came the logical evacuation route leading to Fere-en-Tardenois. A dressinc
station was opened at Villers-sur-Fere, where, it operated until August 3. 109
During this engagement every available litter bearer from ambulance
companies had been sent forward to aid the sorely pressed regimental bearers,
overwhelmed by the number of patients and the long carries. Six officers
belonging to ambulance companies also were ordered forward to assist battalion
surgeons. 109
When the division was relieved, on August 3, the field had been cleared;
4,408 patients had been evacuated in eight days. Two ambulances were then
assigned to each Infantry regiment to care for the sick, who now began to
appear in considerable numbers. Twelve ambulances were assigned to the 4th
Division for temporary duty, when this division relieved the 42d. The
remaining ambulances were kept busy for another five days evacuating
patients from field hospitals to mobile and evacuation hospitals or to hospital
trains. 100
Field Hospitals
The field hospital section of the 42d Division arrived at Luzancy on July
•23. 110 From this point Field Hospital No. 165 moved to Villiers-sur-Marne on
the 27th, and thence on the day following to Chateau-Thierry, where it opened
in a park near the Jean Mace School and received gassed patients. On July
29 it turned over its apparatus and standing tentage to Field Hospital No. 126
of the 32d Division, and advanced to Epieds to relieve the crowded dressing
station there to perform triage duty and to care for slightly wounded patients.
The next day, as the line was advancing rapidly, it moved to Bezu-St. Germain
and began operating at once. 110
Field Hospital No. 168 moved on July 27 to Chateau-Thierry, there
taking over a site in an old convent building shortly before utilized by the
Germans as a hospital and capable of accommodating 500 patients. Within
4 hours the building had been cleaned and equipped, 350 patients had been
admitted, and five operating teams were at work. Within 12 hours the hospi-
tal was crowded to the limit of its capacity. A mobile hospital ordered to
serve the division had been held at Coulommiers and, as a result of this
the divisional hospitals, especially Field Hospital No. 166, in addition to
their normal duties, had to perform for a few days those usually discharged
by mobile or evacuation hospitals. As they filled rapidly when evacuation
398 FIELD OPERATIONS
was obstructed, Field Hospital No. 166 here performed more surgical opera-
tions than are usual for a divisional hospital. 110
Field Hospital No. 167 moved on July 26 to Bezu-le-Guery to relieve
a field hospital of the 28th Division operating there; 110 thence, on July 28,
to Chateau-Thierry and. on the 31st. to Bezu-St. Germain, where it received
gas cases. This unit had been designated for gas service before the engage-
ment and was especially organized and equipped for that purpose; but as a
result of its activities at this time its arrangements were further developed
into what proved to be their final character. 111
Field Hospital No. 168 moved on July 27 to Villiers-sur-Marne. 110 After
July 80, with two field hospitals at Bezu-St. Germain, one at Chateau-Thierry,
and one at Villiers-sur-Marne, the ground was well covered, and there were no
further changes in the location of these units until August 12, when the
division moved out of the sector. The large number of casualties, with fre-
quent moves necessitated by the rapid advance of the line, had required
incessant labor and had demonstrated the fact that in open warfare extreme
mobility was a most essential attribute for divisional hospital units. 111
Evacuation
The problem of evacuation in this sector was replete with difficulties, and
there were in consequence temporary accumulations of patients at the various
stations. 100 One of these difficulties was due to the large number of wounded.
A second difficulty was the relative inaccessibility, at first, of field hospitals,
and a third was the distance to evacuation hospitals in rear of the division. 106
On the night of July 27, when delayed information was received that the
division was about to attack, two field hospitals had been ordered to Villiers-
sur-Marne to take over hospitals there, one had moved for the same purpose
to Bezu-le-Guery, and only one was in a position to move forward. 110 'When,
a little later, two of the field hospitals were in Chateau-Thierry, these quickly
became overcrowded, and it was necessary to evacuate to Villiers-sur-Marne
and to Neuilly on the outskirts of Paris, 108 rear evacuations varying in length
from 33 to 140 km. (20.4-86.9 miles). 107 This delay in the forward movement
of the field hospitals was due in part to the fact that evacuation units in rear
of them had been delayed in clearing patients and moving up, that an inade-
quate number of evacuation hospitals was available, and because the field
hospitals of the division had taken over patients from the division preceding
them in the sector. However, by means of ambulances, trucks, barges, and
later of trains with favorably located evacuation hospitals, the situation was
rapidly ameliorated. 111
Certain conclusions reached by the division surgeon as a result of this
operation were the following: (l)The triage or sorting station is indispensable
and should lie able to give extensive care to nontransportable patients; (2) a
designated ambulance officer should be assigned to each regiment for liaison
purposes and should at all times be on duty with it; (3) the divisional ambu-
lances, if unaded by evacuation ambulance companies, are hopelessly inade-
quate to meet the needs incident to a severe engagement in open warfare. 108
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 399
THE 4TII DIVISION, JULY 2S TO AUGUST 12
The 4th Division, withdrawn from the French Sixth Army, came under
control of the American First Corps on July 28 and assembled next day in
Bois dti Chatelet preparatory to entering upon the second phase of its activi-
ties in this area. 50
Two battalions of the 47th Infantry, placed at the disposal of the 42d
Division, participated in the operation of July 30, crossed the Ourcq, and
attacked Sergy, with losses amounting to about 50 per cent of their strength.
The 89th Infantry, which relieved them on July 31, operated with the 42d Divi-
sion until August 2. 56
During the night of August 1-12, the 4th Division moved to Foret de Fere
and on the 2d made reconnaissance with a view to taking over the line held by
the 42d Division. 56 On August 3 the 4th Division, as a division, took over a
sector for the first time, its line running east and west through Foret de Nesles;
the 7th Brigade on the left near Seringes and the 8th Brigade on the right
near Xesles. During the night of August 3-4 and the following day the divi-
sion advanced to the south bank of the Vesle, where it was held by intense
enemy fire. 50 The Germans had begun to retreat and to withdraw to the lino
of the Vesle River, leaving rear guards, composed chiefly of well-concealed
and efficiently manned machine guns, to prevent a too-rapid advance of allied
troops. At the Vesle they had taken position in strongly entrenched lines, at
St. Thibaut on the left bank, and at Bazoches on the right bank of the river.
Upon the high bluffs on either side of the Vesle machine guns were placed
advantageously for command of both towns, and from his vantage points the
enemy had direct observation of the river and of the movement of allied
forces. 57
In the face of strong opposition, one regiment of each brigade was pushed
forward to the river, where, during the ensuing night, they were subjected to
heavy gas attacks. 56 While American Artillery carried on interdiction and
harassing fire in towns and crossroads north of the Vesle, the enemy retaliated
with many high-explosive shells. 50 On the night of August 4-5 small detach-
ments crossed the river, but progress was slow and difficult, the enemy offering
strong resistance to all such attempts. 5 " During the night of August 5-(>
troops that had crossed were withdrawn to await artillery preparation. 56 On
August 6 the Infantry, preceded by a barrage, advanced at 4.30 p. m. ; the 58th
Infantry, on the right, crossed the Vesle and reached the Soissons — Reims
road, later repulsing counterattacks. On the left the 39th came under intense
lire and was unable to cross, but next morning two of its companies succeeded
in doing so. 50 During the day and night of the 7th. 8th. and 9th troops were
heavily engaged in both offensive and defensive operations. They entered
Bazoches. but were repulsed by airplane bombs and artillery and machine-gun
tire.' On the 10th, in the sector of the right brigade, the line of the railroad
north of the Vesle was held and patrols of the 59th Infantry were pushed to
the front. 5 " Except its Artillery brigade, which remained in action until
Aiisrust 17, the division was relieved by the 77th on the night of August 11-12.
400 FIELD OPERATIONS
In this operation the 4th had advanced the line to a depth of Qy 2 km. (5.8
miles) . 50
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
In this, the second phase of the 4th Division's activities, regimental
surgeons, in general, were allowed to exercise their own initiative in locating
their aid stations and in the distribution of their personnel. It had been
found, as previously explained, that in any severe action this personnel, even
when supplemented by details from the ambulance companies, was totally
inadequate in numbers to clear the field of a regiment's casualties. In order
to meet to a degree this emergency, the details from ambulance companies to
regiments were made so large that the companies were reduced below the
strength absolutely necessary for the prosecution of their work, and the con-
sequence was a destruction of the efficiency of these commands, which had
been especially trained for their peculiar duties. It was demonstrated, fur-
thermore, that the ambulance men brought hurriedly to a new field of action
could not work to their fullest efficiency when suddenly confronted by the
unfamiliar conditions thus encountered. 112
Bandsmen divided between the three battalions were distributed as litter
bearers at whatever points their services were required. Frequently it was
found necessary to establish relay stations between front-line aid posts and
the battalion aid stations. It became evident that the regimental aid station
could be replaced with advantage by the dressing station of an ambulance
company, thus releasing the regimental surgeon and his personnel for more
valuable supervisory and administrative work and facilitating liaison. Prior
to this time the system in general use had been to have two enlisted men of
the Medical Department with each line company and six men at each battalion
aid station. Usually one medical officer was on duty at this station, while the
other accompanied the advancing troops. 112
In the early days of this offensive it was necessary to remove by litter
all patients requiring litter transportation from the aid station to some point
a kilometer (0.6 mile) or more to the rear which could be reached by ambu-
lances. 112 As soon, however, as ambulances could evacuate directly from aid
stations congestion of the wounded at these points was overcome. Aid stations
were established in banks of earth, in abandoned cellars, or in dugouts, for
there was no time to construct more elaborate shelter. These stations Avere
small, poorly lighted, and with but little ventilation. The personnel on duty
in them was continually exposed to gas brought in on the clothing of gassed
patients, and their diminished numbers were reduced further by casualties
occasioned thereby. 112
Sanitary Train-
Rapid advance made difficult the efficient care and evacuation of the
disabled from aid stations, though ambulance companies were brought up to
keep in touch with the advancing lines. 113 On July 24 headquarters of the
sanitary train and Field Hospital No. 19 advanced to Crouy-sur-Ourcq, where
a hospital was established in conjunction with a French triage already in
PLATE XI.
AISNE - MARNE
OPERATION
4th. DIVISION
AUGUST 2-12, 1918.
Aug 3
FH18U1&33
««±±±
28±Au.£3
CHATEA
References:- Drawn from. M&ps SOI S SONS A.nd
MEAUX. Positions of Medica.1 Units from. Reports
of Division Surgeon, fourth. Divisions.
Battle lines, taken from existing orders and maps, are approximate.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 401
operation for the reception of the wounded. 113 The other field hospitals re-
mained at their former stations. On July 29, when the 4th Division was in
the Foret de Fereand Bois du Chatelet, Ambulance Company No. 19 advanced
to Epieds and established a forward dressing station in connection with the
triage of the 42d Division already in operation ; this had been caring in part
for wounded of the 4th Division. 113 The numerous casualties which occurred
among certain troops of the 4th Division when they were assigned tempo-
rarily to the 42d (July 30 to August 2) were cared for in the field hospitals
of the latter division. 113 Ambulance Company No. 19 also functioned as a
triage and to August 3 evacuated about 540 patients. 83 Sanitary train head-
quarters then advanced to Epieds and Field Hospitals No. 19, No. 21, and No.
33 were ordered to Epaux-Bezu for station. 113 Field Hospitals No. 19 and
No. 33 opened for the reception of seriously wounded and sick and No. 21
was held in reserve. Simultaneously Field Hospital No. 28 was advanced to
Bezu-St. Germain to receive gassed patients. 113
The remainder of the ambulance section advanced on August 1 co Epieds.
Two days later, the line having advanced rapidly again, the entire ambulance
section was moved to Villers-sur-Fere, where a dressing station which func-
tioned also as a triage was established. Because of continuous rains, bad road
conditions, and deplorable lack of motor transportation, evacuations both
from front and rear became impeded at this time. Ambulances were forced
to evacuate all case as far to the rear as Chateau-Thierry, La Ferte-sous-
Jouarre, and Coulommiers, 30 to 50 km. (18.6-31 miles) to the south. 113
On August 4 the entire ambulance section was advanced to Mareuil-en-
Dole, where an advance dressing station was established. As the line became
somewhat stationary along the Vesle casualties increased rapidly in number
and severity, and to meet this condition the dressing station was expanded
until it became a triage. 113 Specially constructed shock rooms and a station
for slightly wounded were added, and under the division medical gas officer a
ward was equipped for the initial treatment of gassed patients. Here, also, the
division psychiatrist maintained a ward for examination and treatment of war
neuroses. 113 In so far as was possible, collection, sorting, and evacuation of all
cases directly to the proper hospitals were effected at this station. Continued
rains made roads deep and heavy, thus causing delay and increasing the shock
from which wounded were already suffering through exposure to cold and wet
on the field. Except for intermittent shelling of surrounding roads, there was
no firing or bombing of the village where this triage was established, but on
account of the character of the terrain in the battle area and its exposure to
incessant enemy fire many of the wounded remained on the field until darkness
fell, in shell holes or under other slight cover. 113
On August G, 1918, all of the field hospital section advanced to Chateau
de la Foret, just south of Fere-en-Tardenois, where it was well concealed in a
wood of the same name. The chateau was in good repair and served admirably
as a hospital for nontransportable wounded, and there Field Hospital No. 19
opened for the reception of cases of this character. 113 Ward tents were erected
402
FIELD OPERATIONS
in the grounds around the chateau, with Field Hospital Xo. 21 for neurologic
cases, Xo. 28 for gassed cases, and No. 33 for the sick. 113 The triage was trans-
ferred from the dressing station to the site of these field hospitals. Three
additional surgical teams, two shock teams, and seven nurses were furnished
by the corps. 113 A portable X-ray plant was established. A very complete
hospitalization center for the reception of sick and wounded was thus created.
It was located on the main axial road, was accessible and within easy hauling
distance from the front, was concealed from aerial observation, and com-
pletely free from danger, thus allowing its personnel to operate and work
Fig. GO. — Field hospitals of tile 4th Division at Chateau de la Foret, August 10, 1918
without nervous strain other than that incident to fatigue. 113 In accordance
with orders, only truly nontransportables were operated upon here, viz, cases
of hemorrhage, abdominal wounds, aspirating chest wounds, and severe com-
pound fractures of the long bones. 113 Here, too, was learned the economic
lesson of holding all psychopathic cases instead of evacuating them to the rear.
AVith complete rest in bed in a quiet area, sufficient food, and no treatment
other than suggestive therapeutics, from 25 to 40 per cent of all cases of this
character were returned to their organizations in from three to five days, well
rested and restored. 112
Patients were evacuated from this point by sections of the United
States Armv Ambulance Service and bv the sanitary train of the First
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 403
Corps, which was now functioning. This train had joined the corps on
August 9. The corps Burgeon in his report emphasized the advantages con-
sequent on the grouping of held hospitals, when tactically possible, through
the saving thereby effected in personnel and transportation. 112
The Medical Department of the 4th Division, which functioned for the
first time as a unit in the operations toward the Vesle, learned from its new-
experiences the necessity for the following provisions: A selected, trained
personnel of not less than 100 men with each regiment: discontinuance of
the regimental aid station and its replacement by the dressing station of
an ambulance company; relief of the regimental surgeon from all respon-
sibility for evacuation to the rear of his battalion aid stations; increased
motor transport for ambulance companies; treatment of all cases of shock
by specially trained personnel before evacuation : facilities for giving, as
promptly as possible, rest, heat, and morphine, as required, in the treatment of
shock, hemorrhage, and depressed vitality due to exposure ; facilities for the
early treatment of gassed patients by undressing and bathing them at the
battalion aid station if possible, or, if this were not practicable, at the dressing
station; and advancement of the field hospital sections as far forward as possi-
ble, even to a point of some danger, in order to give the wounded the earliest
possible rest and care. 112
During the period from August 1 to 12 an epidemic of gastroenteritis
occurred in which practically 80 per cent of the division Avas affected. This
epidemic was fully described by a research committee appointed by General
Headquarters and was found to be due entirely to lack of sanitary facilities. 112
After 27 days had been spent in fighting and marching, the 4th Division
moved to the Rimaueourt area for a period of rest,, reorganization, and
training. 112
THE THIRD CORPS
The formation of the Third Army Corps was announced in General
Orders. No. 102. General Headquarters, A. E. F., June 25. 1918.
The corps headquarters moved to Meux on July 12 and assumed ad-
ministrative control over the 1st and 2d Divisions operating under the French
Tentli Army. On July 15 the corps headquarters moved to Chateau Chanoye,
and on the following day the advanced echelon moved to Taillefontaine. 114
The corps surgeon's office remained with the 2d echelon at Chateau Chanoye. 11 "'
After the attack against Soissons, headquarters of the Third Corps was
moved, on July 24, to Mortefontaine with the 1st and 2d Divisions, remaining
there in rest until July 30, when it returned to the front. The 1st echelon
remained at Mont St. Pere from August 1 to 5, with the 2d echelon installed
in the little village of Gland. 116 The 3d, 28th. and 32d Divisions were assigned
to the Third Corps at this time, the corps commander taking over technical
command from the French Third Corps on August 5. when the corps entered
fully organized into the battle line and for the first time exercised tactical
control of its front. 117 The western limit of the corps's sector was: Villers-en-
Prayeres (exclusive) — Barbonval (exclusive) — Blanzy-les-Fismes (inclusive) —
Perles (exclusive) — Mont St. Martin (inclusive) — Chery-Chartreuve (ex-
404 FIELD OPERATIONS
elusive) — Ferine <le Camp (exclusive) — Sergy (exclusive) — Fresnes (in-
clusive) — La Croix Rouge Ferme — Maison Boutachs — Brasles — Chateau-
Thierry (north bank exclusive) — Marne River from Chateau-Thierry to Azy.
Eastern limit was: Concevreux (inclusive) — Roman (exclusive) — Huit-Voisins
(exclusive) — Ormont Ferme (exclusive) — Courville (inclusive) — Areis-le-
Ponsart (inclusive) — eastern edge de Bois Dormont — Bois de Lanaux — Vil-
lers-Agron-Aiguizy (inclusive) — La Temple Ferme (inclusive) — Passy
(inclusive) — Verneuil (inclusive). Dividing line between sectors of 32d
Division (United States) and 4th Division (French): Maizy (to 4th Di-
vision) — Glennes (to 32d Division) — Baslieux-les-Fisnies (to 4th Division) —
St. (iilles (to 4th Division) — Longeville Ferme (to 32d Division) — Cohan (to
32d Division) — Coulonges (to 32d Division) — Roncheres (to 32d Division) —
Barzy-sur-Marne (to 4th Division). 117 The 3d and 28th Divisions were in
rest billets in the rear.
A part of the French 4th Division, which had been occupying the right
half of the sector, was relieved by the 6th Brigade of the 3d Division on
August 6. On the following day the remainder of the French 4th Division
was relieved by the French 164th Division. The latter was relieved from the
Third Army Corps on August 13. 118 On August 6 the 4th Division, as a part
of the First Corps, and the 32d Division reached a line which was approxi-
mately that of the Vesle. lis
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On August 1 the corps surgeon established his office at Gland. 119 As long
as the French division above mentioned remained in this sector, a matter of
only two days, its evacuation and hospitalization plans were uninterrupted.
Three field hospitals of the 32d Division were at Chateau-Thierry, and one.
Field Hospital Xo. 128, was farther to the rear, receiving the sick at Azy.
On August 2, Field Hospital Xo. 125 was advanced to Jaulgonne to act as a
triage. Before this unit was installed there evacuation had been made to
Juoy-sur-Morin and Coulommiers through a triage established by the 42d
Division at Chateau-Thierry. Two of the field hospitals of the 3d Division
were at Chierry, one farther to the rear and one at Mezy. Those of the 28th
were at Brasles, or coming up from the rear. Evacuation hospitals had not
then been placed at forward positions, and for a day or so field hospitals left
behind by divisions withdrawing from the neighborhood of Chateau-Thierry
received some gassed and some wounded. Although the army hospitals soon
made evacuations to distant points unnecessary, for a short time it was neces-
sary to make these as far back as Coulommiers. Hospital trains coming into
Chateau-Thierry cleared the congestion in that town, and by August 4 both
evacuation and hospitalization facilities were ample. 119
The Paris group headquarters was in control of the sector until August
10, when organization of the First Army was officially accomplished and com-
mand of the Third Corps turned over to it. American Red Cross Hospital
Xo. Ill arrived and was established in Chateau-Thierry August 10. Evacua-
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 405
lion Hospital No. G and Mobile Hospital No. 1 were established at Chierry
on July 29. Evacuation Hospital No. 5 arrived at Chierry on August 2 and
Evacuation Hospital No. 3 at Crezancy on August 5. 110 As soon as the posi-
tion of the battle line permitted, American Red Cross Hospital No. 110,
Evacuation Hospital No. 4, and Mobile Hospital No. 2 were placed in well-
chosen sites at Coiney, but this last addition to the evacuation service did
not become effective until August 9. 120
The corps had no sanitary train until the latter part of August, when
Field Hospital No. 332 and Ambulance Company No. 332 arrived at Gland
to form the nucleus of such an organization. Being newly organized, they
could do little more at that time than serve corps troops. All other evacuation
service for the sector was performed by divisions direct to evacuation hos-
pitals or by ambulance companies under the supervision and assignment of
the Medical Department representative of the general staff with headquarters
of the Paris group. Habitually these units were attached to the different
evacuation hospitals as occasion required. During part of the time evacua-
tion was effected to a certain extent by canal boats and barges, which also oper-
ated under the supervision of the above Medical Department representative.
During the first few daj-s most of the wounded in the corps came from the
32d Division, the only part of the 3d Division then in line being the Artillery.
By August 2, Field Hospital No. 125, of the 32d Division, was established
at Jaulgonne to function as a triage and to receive nontransportable wounded.
By August 4, a field hospital (No H 127) was placed at Reddy Ferine and
Evacuation Hospitals No. 5 and No. G established at Chierry and Etampes. 120
THE 3D DIVISION
From July 1G to 19 the 3d Division remained in its sector on the Marne,
with the right flank regiment facing to the east as a measure of protection
against the German line which had crossed the river. On the morning of July
20. three French divisions attacked this line, only to find that the enemy had
retired to the north side of the Marne during the preceding night. On the
same day orders were received to assume the offensive and cross the river.
Material was prepared and bridges built during the night of July 20-21. A
part of the Infantry had managed to cross the river in boats. By the 22d, the
3d Division was well across and had its leading elements above the towns of
Jaulgonne, Charteves, and Mont St. Pere. 121
From the 22d to the evening of the 25th very bitter fighting took place
on all the wooded slopes leading up to the town of Le Channel. By evening
of that date American troops had fought their way, little by little, into
the town, and on the following morning were in possession of the first crest,
parallel to the river and approximately 3 km. (1.8 miles) north of it. The
Ourcq was reached on July 26, and from that time until morning of July 30
the 3d Division, together with French units on its left, slowly advanced. 121
The 3d Division was relieved by the 32d on July 30 and assembled south
of Chateau-Thierry. On August 2, the 6th Brigade was dispatched to sup-
406 FIELD OPERATIONS
port the French Third Army Corps operating toward the Vesle. It was
relieved from this duty on August 10 and rejoined the division, which had
gone into the rest area near Gondrecourt. 122
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On July 22, the division surgeon's office moved from Viels Maisons,
Seine-et-Marne, to Chateau la Dultre, remaining at the latter place until
August 1G. During the period which intervened the division surgeon was
occupied chiefly in locating and inspecting hospitals, supervising the evacua-
tion of the wounded, and inspecting the regimental medical service. 123 Six-
teen men of the line had heen selected from each battalion and trained in
first aid and in litter bearing. 124 The division surgeon's other duties were
those incident to replacement of casualties in the Medical Department, re-
placement of officers and men at the front who would have become inca-
pacitated from exhaustion had they not been relieved from duty there, and
provision of supplies. 123 Service of the medical supply unit, supplemented
by the Red Cross representative, was such that medical materiel was ample
throughout this operation. The supply officer collected property abandoned
by formations as they moved forward, and one of the duties of the sanitary
inspector was to determine whether medical units were fully equipped. Sani-
tation of the command was exceedingly poor, but this was cared for as far
as the existing tactical situation permitted. 124
Amistt.ance Companies
Headquarters of the ambulance section of the sanitary train was located
at Verdelot from July 15 to 24. then moving to Crezancy, where it remained
until August 14. It then moved to Bonnet. 125
On July 22. the division having crossed the Marne, Ambulance Company
Xo. 5 advanced its dressing station from Essises to Blesmes, where it opened
in a chateau. In the interval from July 15 to 22 this company evacuated
approximately 2,700 patients, of which number more than half were recum-
l>ent cases. Over 2.000 of these patients were redressed or received antitetanic
serum or other treatment at the main dressing station at Essises. On July
23 this company established an advance dressing and ambulance station at
Jaulgonne, with 2 officers. 1 noncommissioned officer, and 10 enlisted men.
It posted two ambulances at Le Channel, one at a point 0.8 km. (one-half mile)
northeast of Le Channel, at the regimental aid station of the 76th Field
Artillery, and one Avith the 4th Infantry post control at Villardelle Ferine. 125
Wounded were evacuated through the station at Blesmes to Field Hospital
Xo. 27, at Verdelot, until July 28, on which date that unit moved to Chateau-
Thierry. On August 2 the advance dressing station at Jaulgonne was with-
drawn and on the following day a medical officer, with two ambulances of
Ambulance Company Xo. 5, was detailed to make, each morning at 8 o'clock,
the rounds of the 7th Infantry at Viffort; the 1st Battalion. 4th Infantry.
PLATE XII.
B»trle lines, taken from existing orders and maps, are approximate.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 407
and 8th Machine Gun Battalion, at Montharmeaux; 2d Battalion. 4th Infantry,
at Auclaine; 3d Battalion, same regiment, at Montlevon; 2d Battalion. 76th
Field Artillery, at La Grande Bordeaux Ferme; 18th Field Artillery, at
Xesles; 10th Field Artillery, at Les Evaux ; 2d Battalion, 10th Field Artillery,
near Chateau-Thierry station; and of 1st Battalion, 10th Field Artillery, at
Mont de Blesmes. 12 '"' At 4 p. m. every day two ambulances without an officer
again covered this route. The service of these "sick call" ambulances was
discontinued on August 7, and the 5th Company began to evacuate patients
from Field Hospital Xo. 7 at Cohan to Evacuation Hospitals No. 3, No. 5.
and No. 6. For three days a detail from this company assigned to Field
Hospital No. 7 assisted it in this evacuation, but was withdrawn when that
hospital moved, on August ll. 120 From July 22 to August 11 xVmbulance
Company No. 5 evacuated 1,860 patients and the medical department personnel
suffered the following casualties: Killed, 2; wounded, 7 (of whom 2 died);
gassed. 4. From August 12 to 15 the company remained at Blesmes awaiting
orders, moving on the 16th toward Bonnet near Gondrecourt. 120
Ambulance Company No. 7 had established its main dressing station at
Pertibout on July 15. but when the 3d Division assumed the offensive it moved
on the 22d to Courboin and to Crezancy on the 24th. On July 31 and August
1 its dressing station was located at Jaulgonne; on August 3 at Roncheres.
The next day the station here was closed and the company moved to Cohan,
where, on August 5, it reestablished its dressing station. This was again
moved, the same day to Dravegny and the next day to Areis-le-Ponsart. 120
From time to time throughout this period the company furnished litter
hearers to regiments. In the interval from July 15 to August 8 Ambulance
Company No. 7 evacuated 3,627 patients and experienced 1 fatality and 15
other casualties among its personnel. 120 On August 11 the company closed its
dressing station, and then moved to a rest area with the remainder of the
division. 127
Ambulance Company No. 26, stationed at Verdelot from July 15 to
August 1, left that location on the latter date and moved to Courboin, where,
on August 7 it established a dressing station. 126 It remained there until it left
the sector on August 16. meantime keeping one ambulance in the routine
service of the 4th Infantry and another for the 7th. During this period five
of its men were wounded in an air raid. 128
Ambulance Company No. 27 was stationed at La Ferotterie from July
15 to 20, all of its available ambulances evacuating from Field Hospital No.
•27. at Verdelot. to Field Hospital No. 26, at Coulommiers, and to Army Red
Cross Hospital No. '107, at Jouy-sur-Morin. From July 21 to 29 it was at
Verdelot, its ambulances operating as before ; and from the latter date until
August 16 it was at Chierry, its ambulances evacuating from neighboring
points into Field Hospital No. 27 and also from that unit into others farther
to the rear. 128 United States Army Ambulance Section No. 524 was em-
ployed to evacuate the wounded from dressing stations to field hospitals and
proved an important supplement to divisional resources. 127
408 FIELD OPERATIONS
Fiklu Hospitals
Headquarters of the field hospital section was located at Verdelot from
July 15 to 30, and thereafter at Crezancy, remaining in this location until
August 16. 125
Field Hospital No. 5, at Ville Chamblon, received gassed cases of the
3d Division, but only a few of these cases were severely affected. Most of
those first received were suffering from intoxication by gases which induced
sneezing or vomiting; later casualties were attributed to phosgene and, when
the enemy began his retirement, to mustard gas. On July 31 the hospital
was bombed by a low-flying airplane, 6 men being hit, 4 of whom were
killed. This unit was located at Mezy on August 1, but because of air raids
it moved to a position on the St. Eugene — Crezancy road, D/> km. from
Crezancy. remaining in this location until August 1G. 129
On July 21, Field Hospital No. 7, which had been stationed at Chateau
Villiers. near St. Barthelemy, was moved to Ville Chamblon, and on July 27
to Courboin, where it remained until August 5, receiving gassed patients at
both these locations. It then moved to Cohan, where it operated a field
hospital until August 11, when it returned to Courboin. On August 16 the
unit began its movement toward the Gondrecourt rest area. 130
Field Hospital No. 2G, at Coulommiers July 15 to 25, acting as divisional
evacuation hospital, admitted 1,157 patients. 131 It then moved to Verdelot.
where it received 300 neurotic, sick, and venereal patients. From August 1
to 13 it was established at Chierry, in connection with Field Hospital No. 27.
admitting 5G9 patients of the same class as those it had received at Verdelot; 129
but at Chierry. because of an epidemic of dysentery, 350 cases received were
medical. On August 13 this unit turned over its patients to Evacuation
Hospital No. 5, located in the same town, and began preparations for a move
to the rest area. 131
Field Hospital No. 27 operated at Verdelot until July 28, receiving
patients from the 3d and other divisions. Of the 4,512 cases admitted be-
tween July 15 and 28, about 75 per cent came from the 3d, the remainder
from the 2Gth Division. 129 Cases received included nontransportables, slightly
wounded, scabies, genitourinary, war neuroses, sick (other than contagious),
and some gassed patients. This unit also served as the triage hospital, record-
ing all admissions and evacuations. From July 28 until August 1G, Field
Hospital No. 27 was located at Chierry, operating there most of the time as
a triage and as a camp hospital. 129 During this period it received 645 patients,
including nontransportables, slightly wounded, and miscellaneous medical
cases, especially those suffering from an acute enterocolitis of infectious origin.
This unit temporarily assimilated Field Hospital No. 26, including its per-
sonnel and equipment. 132
The principal evacuation point for all the field hospitals of the 3d Division,
was Chateau Montanglaust, near Coulommiers, where Evacuation Hospital
No. 7 and Mobile. Hospital No. 1 had been established on June 12. Army
Red Cross Hospital No. 107 was stationed at Jouy-sur-Morin near La Ferte-
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 409
Gaucher from June 15 to August 11. when much of its personnel and material
were transferred to the newly organized American Red Cross Hospital No. Ill
at Chateau-Thierry. The first mentioned of these places was 20 km. (12.4
miles to the southwest of Ville Chamblon and some 30 kin. (18.6 miles) or more
from the line of the Marne.
On August 16 the sanitary train proceeded to Bonnet, near Gondrecourt.
for rest and training. 133
THE 32D DIVISION
The 32d assembled near Soissons on July 26 as a reserve of the French
Tenth Army, but immediately moved to the vicinity of Chateau-Thierry,
where it entered the French Thirty-Eighth Corps of the Sixth Army. 134 On
July 29-30, it relieved the 3d Division in the vicinity of Koncheres on the
Ourcq, and on August 4 passed under control of the American Third Army
Corps. 134 The commanding general of the 32d Division assumed control of
the front, in the sector occupied by his division, at 11 a. m. on July 30; at
2.30 p. m. of the same day an attack was launched which took Bois de
Grimpettes and the edge of Bois de Cierges. The 28th Division on the left
advanced to the edge of Cierges. On the night of July 30-31 the 28th Divi-
sion, on the Ourcq, was relieved by the 63d Brigade of the 32d, thus extend-
ing the front of the 32d Division to the left toward Sergy. On July 31 the
village of Cierges was captured. Strong resistance at Beddy and Bellevue
Fermes stopped the. advance, but the enemy was forced to abandon the latter
position next day, when American troops gained Bois de la Planchette and
Hill 230. The German forces now withdrew rapidly, and on August 3 the
32d Division reached the hills overlooking the valley of the Vesle. 134 The
following description of the offensive from this point is taken from the report
of the division commander: 135
About midnight of August 3 an order was received from the corps commander to
press forward with all possible haste to the Vesle River and to provide means, if pos-
sible, for crossing the river * * *. The order contemplated the capture of Fismes
with the right column and the railroad yards and large ammunition dumps in left of
sector by the left column. When the columns moved forward they met with stubborn
resistance and failed to reach the river. * * *
The two columns again pushed forward at night. The left column, upon reaching
the river, succeeded in getting two small patrols across, but they could not maintain
themselves there and were driven back. The right column attempted to enter Fismes,
but met with a determined resistance by a considerable force. They held to a position
*nuth of the village; but the next day. after artillery preparation, Fismes was taken by
assault and held by our troops. During these operations along the south bank of the
river, covering a period of three days, fighting was severe and very difficut. * * *
The casualties sustained by my Infantry in these two days according to the best
information (August 10) available approximated 2.000 in killed and wounded, and,
upon inquiry by the corps commander (Third United States Corps), I gave it as my
opinion that my troops were too much exhausted and too depleted to make further at-
tempt for an immediate crossing. He thereupon gave the order for the relief of my
division by the 28th United States Division during the night of August 0-7, which was
accomplished in accordance with the order.
410 FIELD OPERATIONS
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Litter bearers serving with the regiments were reinforced by details
from the line and from ambulance companies and by bandsmen. Await-
ing developments of the attack, eight motor ambulances were assigned to
each infantry brigade and four horse-drawn ambulances to the artillery.
When the attack commenced, dressing stations were established as far for-
ward as possible and ambulance heads pushed out in front of them as circum-
stances indicated. Aid and dressing stations were advanced as required by
troop movements. This offensive demonstrated the need of better contact
between battalion aid stations and the ambulance companies and also that
the Medical Department be furnished good maps, with prompt information
concerning troop movements. 130
Begimental and battalion aid stations were located near their respective
control posts, in cellars, dugouts, or behind protecting embankments. In
some instances regimental aid stations were operated in the immediate vicinity
of advanced dressing stations established by ambulance companies. Medical
Department personnel as reinforced by bandsmen and details from ambulance
company litter l>earers was adequate except in a few emergencies. 13T
Sanitary Train
From advance stations to the field hospitals Medical Department trans-
portation proved adequate, except that on a few occasions between the dressing
stations and the field hospitals trucks of the supply train were utilized, as well
as some belonging to the sanitary train. On July 28 and 29 the sanitary
train furnished 19 ambulances for the service of other divisions. None of
its motor ambulances was out of service during this time except occasionally
for very brief periods while undergoing necessary repairs. 136
This movement to the Ourcq was so rapid that the division was in action
before its rear medical formations had established themselves and had begun
to operate, for which reasons during its early activities it was assisted by
medical department units of the 42d Division previously in action here.
As evacuation from the front was toward Chateau-Thierry, the triage
for the 32d Division was at first operated by Field Hospital No. 166 of the
42d Division, which was not in a position to leave the sector when the 32d
arrived, some of the wounded of the 42d being still in its wards. 136 Field
Hospital No. 125, at first in reserve near Chateau-Thierry, had been established
and was in operation on the night of July 31, when its immediate vicinity
was bombed and it was sprayed by machine-gun bullets from an airplane. 135
On August 2 it was established at Jaulgonne, where it operated the triage
and received nontransportable wounded. Its patients were received from 5
to 24 hours after they had been hit. In only a few cases was the administra-
tion of antitetanic serum indicated here, because of its omission further for-
ward, but. generally speaking, readjustment of splints and dressings of the
slightly wounded was necessary. Patients suffering from fractures, large shell
wounds, or wounds of the chest or abdomen suffered greatly from shock, and
PLATE XIII.
AISNE-MARNE OPERATION
THIRTY-SECOND DIVISION
JULY 30 - AUGUST 6 , 1918 .
Scale in Kilometers
Battle lines, taken from existing orders and maps, are approximate.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 411
despite liberal use of blankets their vitality became much lowered during
transit from the dressing stations to this hospital. During this operation this
unit admitted 312 slightly wounded patients, 181 seriously wounded, 140
slightly gassed, 32 severely gassed, and 7 sick. At Jaulgonne it buried 36
dead and returned 31 casualties to the division. 138
Field Hospital Xo. 126 opened under tentage on July 28 in Chateau-
Thierry, functioning as an overflow ward for Field Hospital No. 165 of the
42d Division, located near the Jean Mace School. Next day it took over the
equipment and standing tentage of that unit and operated until August 7,
receiving gassed, exhausted, and psychoneurotic cases. 139 Its bed space,
originally 200, was later expanded to 300 by taking over empty wards in the
Jean Mace School. 140 In addition to the overflow mentioned, of the 42d
Division, it received 757 patients from the 32d Division, classified as follows :
Slightly gassed, 27 ; moderately gassed, 369 ; seriously gassed, 101 ; psycho-
neurotic, 90; wounded, 77; sick, 57; exhausted, 20; injured, 16. 139 About 10
per cent of these cases were transferred to Field Hospital Xo. 128 to be re-
turned shortly to the ranks. All gassed cases were bathed, but on account of
shortage of water and the exhaustion of bathing squads, this practice was
later modified, and only selected cases were bathed and given special treat-
ment of mouth and eyes. 140 Cases were kept from 2 to 24 hours, an average
of 10 hours, the period of detention being determined by evacuation facilities.
As evacuation hospitals were well to the rear, trucks were used as conveyances
to them, supplemented on the last day of activity in this sector by an evacu-
ation ambulance company. 140 The unit moved later to Eeddy Ferme.
Field Hospital Xo. 127 reached Chateau-Thierry on July 28, and until
August 1 operated in conjunction with Field Hospital Xo. 166 of the 42d
Division in the Jean Mace School, but by noon of the hitter date it began to
receive patients from the 32d Division. 141 The unit here had a bed capacity
of about 500 and an operating capacity of 80. 142 Prior to August 3 it received
113 wounded patients and operated upon 21. 141 On August 4 the hospital
moved to Eeddy Ferme. where it functioned as a triage and received non-
transportable and gassed cases. 130
Field Hospital Xo. 128 moved to Azv. opening there on July 31 and
receiving 409 sick, 43 gassed, 45 psychoneurotic, 50 injured, and 17 wounded
patients. On August 14 it moved to Barzy-sur-Marne." 8
At the close of this offensive Field Hospital Xo. 125 was in reserve at
Jaulgonne. Field Hospitals Xo. 126 and Xo. 127 at Keddy Ferme, and Xo.
128 at Barzy. 144
The position of these hospitals at the beginning of this operation approxi-
mated what was called in this division the " diamond formation." which it
employed whenever practicable. According to this plan one hospital, ad-
vanced as far forward as possible, acted as a triage and cared for nontrans-
portable wounded. Two other hospitals, farther to the rear, cared for gassed
nnd slighter surgical cases, respectively, while the fourth, yet farther to the
rear, took over such cases as would be fit for return to dutv in a few davs. 145
412 FIELD OPERATIONS
Based on its experience in this campaign, the division developed what
was practically a separate triage unit, composed of officers and enlisted men
selected from all the field hospitals. This group was engaged solely in the
examination, sorting, and registration of patients. 145 Every six hours it sent
by courier to the division surgeon a report of its activities, thus enabling him
to give the division commander a daily statement of casualties, showing the
number of Avounded admitted, the organizations to which they belonged, and
the missiles causing the wounds. This report was thus of some value to the
division commander in determining the tactical situation. As the triage
operated continuously, the group conducting it was divided into two shifts. 144
Almost all the wounded of the 32d Division passed through its own field
hospitals, though a few were cared for in the hospitals of other divisions.
Hospitals of the 32d treated approximately 40 per cent of casualties admitted
and operated upon 358 patients. They evacuated 60 per cent of those received
direct to evacuation hospitals or to hospital trains. 138
At the commencement of this offensive evacuations from the 32d Division
were through the triage operated by Field Hospital No. 16C of the 42d Di-
vision at Chateau-Thierry and hospitals of the 32d established in the same
place. From Chateau-Thierry patients were sent to Army Red Cross Hospital
No. 107 at Jouy-sur-Morin and to Evacuation Hospital No. 7 and Mobile
Hospital No. 1 at Coulommiers. 136 From duly 28 to August 2, when patients
were being sent to Coulommiers, the haul was so long that evacuation was
unsatisfactory. After Field Hospital No. 125 was established at Jaulgonne,
to serve as a divisional triage and receive nontransportable wounded, evacua-
tions to Coulommiers continued, though some patients were sent by train
direct from. Chateau-Thierry. After August 4, evacuations were made to
Evacuation Hospitals No. 5 and No. 6 which had been established at Etampes
and Chierry. about 2 km. (1.2 miles) distant from Chateau-Thierry. There-
after, with two evacuation hospitals close at hand, with hospital trains in serv-
ice and barges on the Marne available as required, evacuation facilities
were ample. 130
Methods for using motor trucks of the field hospital train for evacuation
purposes were considerably developed in this campaign. Trucks were ar-
ranged to carry 12 recuml>ent patients, 6 longitudinally on the floor and G
transversely on litters which were lashed by litter slings to the hooks on the
side boards of the truck which nomially engaged the fastenings of its canvas
cover. 145 Provisions Mere made also by which a truck could carry 24 sitting
patients. Thus equipped, these vehicles were reasonably comfortable on fair
roads and their use prevented the congestion that otherwise would have
occurred. They were used especially between the field and evacuation hos-
pitals, thus relieving the ambulances in this circuit of all but the graver cases. 145
Because of the tactical situation, sanitary conditions throughout this
operation were very unsatisfactory. Every shell hole was polluted, bodies
lay undiscovered and unburied for days, and flies were incredibly nmneroua
Not a mouthful of food escaped their visits. To these insects were attributed
enteric diseases which attacked almost all of the division at this time. 1 * 4
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 413
THE 2STII DIVISION
The 28th Division, which had been operating in support of the French
and furnishing « number of small elements for front-line service, entered
the advance line as a unit on the night of July 27-28, the 55th Brigade re-
lieving the French 39th Division and the, 56th Brigade was in reserve in
the Bois Vente Jean Guillaume. Bridges were constructed across the Oureq
by the engineer troops, and the 55th Brigade advanced in the face of sustained
and severe machine-gun and artillery fire. On July 30, with the 32d Division,
it attacked through Grimpettes Wood and reached Cierges, but on account
of gas the town was not occupied and the line was established on the high
ground just south of the town. The 28th Division was relieved on the night of
July 30-31 by the 32d. 14<!
medical department activities
Ambuiaxck Companies
Headquarters of the ambulance company section moved from Le Rousset
to Chateau-Thierry on July 24, and thence on August 11 to Cohan. With
it moved the motor repair park and an ambulance subsection of the medical
supply unit maintained to expedite supply of the dressing stations. 147
Ambulance Company No. 109 moved, on July 26, from Le Rousset to
Chateau-Thierry, where it remained until August 13. From, that point its
personnel was sent out as litter squads to a number of advance points — Le
Channel, Fresnes. Courmont. Cierges, and Roncheres — to aid infantry units.
From July 29 to 31 it maintained a dressing station at Mont St. Pere. 14S
Before the allied counteroffensive began. Ambulance Company No. 110
had moved with the 55th Brigade of the 28th Division to Charly, but on
July 27 returned to Artonges, where it had operated during the German
offensive. On the same day it opened at Mont St. Pere a dressing station
which it operated until July 29. 140 From that date this company was occupied
exclusively in evacuating the wounded to a dressing station at Le Channel
operated by Ambulance Company Xo. Ill, thus relieving a United States
Army Ambulance section which had previously performed the evacuation
in question. While at work in this area ambulances made frequent trips to
the Ourcq. 6 of these vehicles evacuating 620 patients in 12 hours. On August
3 the company moved from Le Channel and established, on the 9th. a dressing
station at Chery-Chartreuve which it operated until August 13. 150
Ambulance Company No. Ill moved on July 22 to Chateau-Thierry,
where it opened a dressing station, a detachment from the company setting
up another station at Charly. On July 24 the company moved to Bezu-St.
Germain, where it maintained, until July 28, a dressing station which cared
for wounded from the 26th, 28th, and 42d Divisions: from this point the
company moved to Le Charmel, where it operated a dressing station until
August 3. During the period from July 29 to 31, inclusive, this station cared
for 2,481 patients. 151 On August 3 it was moved to Dravegny, where it re-
mained until the 13th, serving the 32d and 28th Divisions, and the artillery
414
FIELD OPERATIONS
stationed between Dravegny and St. Gilles. An advance dressing station
established at the latter place on August 8 had to be abandoned next dav
localise of shell fire, but ambulances continued to evacuate from that point.
This station was reestablished on August 12, although it continued to be
harassed by artillery fire. The remainder of the company, which moved to
Courville on the 12th, had similar harassment from enemy fire. 152
Ambulance Company No. 112 was ordered, on July 21. to Chateau-
Thierry, where it opened a dressing station and for the first 24 hours per-
formed what was virtually the work of a battalion aid station, having pre-
ceded the infantry of the division. Patients began to arrive before the station
was fully established, and many were brought in from different parts of
the town. Shelling and gas attacks continued heavy and interfered con-
[•'iii. 61. — Entr
dr.
; station, operated by Ambulance Company No. Ill, 28th Division, near
St. Gilles, France, August 15, 1918
siderably with its work."* The station was well located, however, and cared
tor disabled of the 1st, 3d. 26th, 28th, and 32d Divisions, as well as for
numerous French wounded. Meantime litter details operated with the 112th
Infantry in the field. Ambulances cleared the triage— Field Hospital No.
HL-estabhshed here on July 25. which cared for wounded of the troops
mentioned above, and also for those of the 42d Division. 1 '* On August 12 the
company moved to Cohan and remained there until the 20th. Evacuation
from the triage was taken over partly by its ambulances, and a dressing station
was operated at Mont St. Martin. 154
Field Hosi
'ITALS
Field Hospital Xo. 109 was moved from Marlande to La Ferotterie on
.Inly 1, and prepared to receive wounded in a deserted school building and
m tentage erected for the purpose: 155 but as no patients arrived, it moved
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 415
on July 21 to Rieux, in the vicinity of Montmirail, where it opened again in
Chateau Lamartine and its adjoining grounds. It was joined here by oper-
ating teams. 150 Four days later the unit moved to Charly, receiving there its
first patients, 10 in number. It was as yet operating in reserve. On July 30
it moved toward Le Channel, but as that point w r as undergoing heavy bom-
bardment it did not enter the toAvn until next day. 157 It operated here as a
triage until August 7; then, as its distance behind the front was increasing,
it moved to Cohan, where for a month it operated a triage in the church
building, which proved well adapted to the purpose. 158
On July 16, Field Hospital No. 110 received orders to move to Fontaine
Tige, where Field Hospital No. Ill had already opened. On and after July
22, it sent 3 officers and 59 men to assist Field Hospital No. 112 at Chateau-
Thierry. The remainder of the unit moved to Chateau-Thierry on August 2
and on the 4th to Courmont, caring at. the latter place for gassed and psychi-
atric cases. 159
Field Hospital No. Ill was established on July 12 at Fontaine Tige, there
equipping a vacant house and pitching tentage for the treatment of shock and
surgical cases. 100 The first patients arrived July 16. and the hospital con-
tinued to function actively until August 8. On the latter date it was moved
to Jaulgonne, but not finding a suitable location for a hospital, proceeded next
day to Courmont, nearing the advancing division. At Courmont it set up
15 tents and began to receive patients at once. 101
Field Hospital No. 112 opened on July 10 on the grounds of a chateau
near Artonges, camouflaged its tents, and improvised baths. 102 At this point
it received only 50 gassed patients, evacuating these to Fontaine Tige. 103 On
the 24th it moved to Chateau-Thieny and occupied the partly ruined build-
ings of the Hotel Dieu. 164 While there its personnel was supplemented by
details from outside sources; i. e.. medical officers, surgical, shock and X-ray
teams, and 32 nurses. It received slightly and seriously wounded patients. 165
On August 9 the unit was relieved by Red Cross Hospital No. Ill and moved
to Cohan. 16 " There it expanded rapidly, developing from a triage into a
iiospital of more than 300-bed capacity. Evacuation was effected by ambu-
lances, trucks, trains, and barges to Coulommiers, Coincy, Jouy, Cocherel,
and Paris. The functions of Field Hospital No. 112 at this point were those
of triage, and of a surgical and an evacuation hospital." 17
.MEDICAL DEPARTMENT SERVICE IN REAR OF THE DIVISIONS
At suitable points in the foregoing text allusions have been made to the
arrangements for care of the disabled in rear of the divisions, but in order
that a more comprehensive idea of such service in the Marne area, may be
gained by the student, what follows has been abstracted from the report of
the chief surgeon of the troops operating there, the Paris group. So much
of his report as pertains to provisions made in the operation against Soissons
has, however, already been given almost entirely in connection with the his-
tories of the 1st and 2d Divisions there engaged, and this need not be re-
peated here.
416 FIELD OPERATIONS
During the Soissons operation, evacuation hospitals in the vicinity of
Chateau-Thierry and in rear of it retained their former locations. Although
the railhead at Crepy-en-Valois was given priority rights in obtaining hos-
pital trains, enough were available for the hospitals at other points to insure
a reasonable number of vacant beds to meet sudden emergencies. 108 On the
morning of July 20 all wounded were cleared from the field hospitals in
preparation for the offensive which was slated for 3 p. m. on that date, yet
by 2 p. m. of the following day Evacuation Hospital No. 7, at Chateau
Montanglaust, was nearly full. 100 Information was received that the 4-Jcl
Division had arrived and that the 32d would enter the area at an early date,
but attempts to ascertain their probable destination with a view to locating
evacuation hospitals to the best advantage were unsuccessful. Nevertheless,
arrangements were made to have an evacuation hospital established at Meaux
and another at Chateau Perreuse. near La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. 100 Medical
units were assigned as follows: Evacuation Hospital No. 4, which reached
its destination on July 22, to Chateau Perreuse; Evacuation Hospital No. 6
to Meaux, where it arrived July 20; and Mobile Hospital No. 2 to Chateau
La Trousse, near Lizy-sur-Ourcq, where it arrived July 23. 100
On the 22d, the chief surgeon, district of Paris, reported that the hos-
pitals in Paris were full and that he was unable to secure trains to evacuate
them. 100 The situation was further complicated by the fact that there were
still 1,000 patients awaiting evacuation at Crepy-en-Valois and the evacuation
hospitals at Montanglaust and Jouy-sur-Morin were running to capacity; but
with 800 vacant beds at Juilly, despite the long haul to that point it appeared
that the situation could be met, especially in view of the arrival of the hos-
pitals mentioned above. 1T0 Evacuation Hospital No. C was ready to receive
patients on the 22d and promptly admitted a large convoy direct from the
front. During the following night another convoy was sent to Evacuation
Hospital No. 4, for the 26th Division had suffered many casualties, and its
wounded were coming to the rear in trucks as well as in ambulances. As our
divisions were advancing, forward areas in their vicinity were inspected for
hospital sites nearer the front, and barge evacuation on the Marne received
consideration for the first time. By July 24 hospital trains were again
available. 170
From July 16 to 24, Evacuation Hospital No. 7 evacuated by train 8.689
patients, several hundred of whom had come from the Red Cross hospital at
Jouy-sur-Morin. 171 From July 17 to 24, Evacuation Hospital No. 8, at Juilly.
sent out 1,199 patients and the hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin about 1,000. 171
Total evacuations, wounded and gassed patients, to date were about 20,000.
Selection of advanced sites for hospitals was delayed despite increasing needs
that these units be moved forward, because of limitations imposed on railway
service to several points which otherwise would have been satisfactory.
Evacuation Hospital No. 6 was ordered to prepare for a quick movement. 171
On July 26, the stream of wounded which had been flowing since early
morning of July 15 showed no signs of diminution. 171 On July 27 the Paris
group was replaced by the First Army. On July 28, Evacuation Hospital
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 417
Xo. 6 was ordered to the vicinity of Chateau-Thierry, Mobile Hospital No. 1,
which arrived there July 29, was ordered to discharge with Evacuation
Hospital Xo. 6 the same consolidated service that it had previously performed
with Evacuation Hospital No. 7. 172 On the following day United States Army
Ambulance Section No. 578, assigned to the 28th Division, was withdrawn
and attached to Evacuation Hospital No. 6. 173
On July 29, most of the wounded came from the 42d Division, but a
number were also received from other organizations. Arrangements were
made with hospitals in Paris to receive one trainload of patients, and
preparation was begun for the prompt docking of hospital barges in that
city. 173
By July 30, Evacuation Hospital No. 7 had evacuated 15,871 patients,
including some sent by ambulance from Jouy-sur-Morin. Juilly had evacu-
ated 1,499 patients and Jouy-sur-Morin 924 by train. The total for the area
to date was 28,882, exclusive of those from the 2d Division when first struck
by the German advance early in June. 173
Evacuation Hospital No. 6 and Mobile Hospital No. 1, which had ar-
rived at Chierry, near Chateau-Thierry-, on July 29, were established by the
31st, but only the seriously wounded w T ere to be received in them. Slightly
and moderately wounded patients were to be sent to evacuation hospitals
farther to the rear. 174
Evacuation Hospital No. 3 was ordered to go with all speed to La Ferte-
Milon, where it arrived on July 29. The litter-bearer service at Evacuation
Hospital No. 7 had again become a source of grave concern. The Artillery
of the First Corps, in reserve, had furnished that unit on July 22 with 100
men who served as litter bearers for three day's, relieving the personnel of the
hospital, who were utterly exhausted, to that extent. A few days later
Ambulance Company No. 120 had arrived, but now both its bearers and those
with Evacuation Hospital No. 7 were greatly fatigued. The rest of the
hospital personnel likewise Mas showing the severe strain they had undergone.
None of them had had time to sleep for three weeks except occasionally during
the late hours of the early morning, and even this had been interrupted by
frequent demands. 174
At about this date 4 ambulance companies with 12 G. M. C. cars each
arrived. This relieved the situation, for until these ambulances reported
trains had had to be spotted at a given place at a given hour, in order that,
ambulances might be there ready to load them. Thus if trains arrived at
Jouy-sur-Morin and Coulommiers the same morning, the number of am-
bulances was so small that the trains could not be loaded simultaneously. It
was necessary to load at one point, then to make due allowance of time for
ambulances to reach the other point before spotting a train there. 175
On August 1, Evacuation Hospital No. 5 was ordered from Crepy-en-
Valois to Chateau-Thierry, where it arrived on August 2. On the same date
territory in advance of that point was inspected with a view to selecting
advance sites for evacuation hospitals, and one at Coincy was selected.
1357G— 25 27
418 FIELD OPERATIONS
Recommendations were made that labor troops follow combatants and care
for sanitation of the rear.
A floating dock, at Azy, near Chateau-Thierry, was now completed,
and the first wounded to be sent by steam barge to Paris left there on
August 2. 176 This convoy, made up of seriously wounded, included fracture
cases and many patients who would have been nontransportable except by boat.
The capacity of these barges varied, the largest carrying 84 patients. They
were reported by the patients as being very comfortable, as the engines, being
small and located well astern, caused little vibration. Bunks were placed
in the hold, and the general appearance of the interior was similar to that
of an ordinary hospital ward except that it was broader and the bunks
cruder. 170 Personnel assigned to each barge consisted of 1 medical officer,
6 enlisted men of the Medical Department, 4 Red Cross workers, and a
variable number of French litter bearers. The time required for a trip
averaged 14 hours to Paris and 18 hours for the return. 177
Evacuation Hospital No. 5, after opening at Chateau-Thierry on August 2,
received seriously wounded from one corps, while those from the other corps
engaged were sent to Evacuation Hospital No. 6 and Mobile Hospital No. 1.
at Chierry. Their work was coordinated and their evacuation effected by a
representative from the army surgeon's office. Slightly wounded patients
were sent to the hospitals at Chateau Perreuse, near La Ferte-sous-Jouarre.
Montanglaust. and Jouy-sur-Morin. At this time a survey was made with a
view to establishing at Chateau-Thierry the medical supply depot heretofore
operating at Lieusaint, 50 Inn. (31 miles) to the rear. 177 This depot had been
able to meet most demands promptly, the most serious shortages having been in
instruments and tentage. Blankets, litters, antitetanic serum, pajamas, cots,
and other essentials for front-line service had always been in stock. On
several occasions the supply of splints had been well-nigh exhausted, and it
was only by extra efforts that they were procured in time to meet all needs. 179
Requisitions from division surgeons had come direct to the property desk in
the office of the liaison officer for the Medical Department (chief surgeon,
Paris group), later to that in the array surgeon's office, where they were
approved, to be forwarded twice daily to the depot which delivered supplies
at the front by truck. 178
Evacuation Hospital No. 3 moved on August 3 to Crezancy, a small village
about 8 km. (4.9 miles) east of Chateau-Thierry, and tentative arrangements
were made to move Red Cross Hospital No. 107 from Jouy-sur-Morin to
Chateau-Thierry. 178 The hospitals at Montanglaust filled during the night
of August 4—5, but were cleared promptly by trains. 179 Inspection for a
suitable location for an evacuation hospital near Fere-en-Tardenois was made
at this time. By August 6, some slightly wounded patients were being re-
ceived by Evacuation Hospitals No. 5 and No. 6 and Mobile Hospital No. 1.
but the majority of such patients continued to be sent as before. 170 Arrange-
ments were now made for the immediate movement of Red Cross Hospital
No. 110 from Chantilly to Coincy. to which point Evacuation Hospital No. 4
was also ordered from Chateau Perreuse. The latter arrived at Coincv on
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 419
August 6. 180 Evacuation Hospital No. 3, established at La Ferte Milon on
July 30, had moved, on August 5, to the vicinity of Chateau-Thierry, when
fighting in that neighborhood assumed such unusual proportions. Devasta-
tion north of the Marne left little option in the choice of sites nearer the
front, and the selection of Crezancy had been made only after some hesi-
tancy. 181 This location was so far forward there was danger that it would
be bombed or bombarded, but the only alternative at this time was the group-
ing of all the forward evacuation hospitals at Chateau-Thierry — a disposition
which appeared inadvisable.
On August 11, orders were received that the First Army move to the
vicinity of Neufchateau. A report was received that the Paris group would
be revived. This proved true, and upon departure of Colonel Stark to his
new station Colonel Hutton resumed his former duties as chief surgeon of
troops in the Marne area (Paris group). 182 The personnel of Ambulance
Company No. 120, which up to this time had been assisting Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 7. was now sent to assist Bed Cross Hospital No. 110 at Coincy, and
much of the personnel and equipment of Red Cross Hospital No. 107 was
moved from Jouy-sur-Morin to American Red Cross Hospital No. Ill, newly
established at the Hotel Dieu at Chateau-Thierry. 132 Though this building
had been greatly damaged by artillery fire, it lent itself well to hospital pur-
poses and, by erecting tents in the neighboring grounds, the unit soon had
about 600 beds set up. The site was a good one, being near the river and
also near a railway spur. 182
On August 12 Evacuation Hospitals No. 6, No. 7, and No. 8 and Mobile
Hospital No. 1 were ordered to move with the First Army to the vicinity of
Neufchateau, but the other evacuation units were to remain in the Marne
area. 182 Information was received that the First Corps would move with the
First Army, but that the Third Corps would remain in line along the Vesle.
where it would pertain to the Paris group. As no further movement of our
troops was contemplated at this moment, the medical units transferred,
and probably others, could well be spared. By this time Evacuation Hospital
No. 4 and Red Cross Hospital No. 110 were functioning at Coincy. 133
Evacuation by steam barges was on a fairly systematic basis by August 14.
Ambulance Company No. 41, which had joined recently, had been directed to
establish a camp at Azy, where it received patients preparatory to their
removal by boat. This camp was furnished with materiel sufficient to equip
a relay station of some 150 beds. Patients usually were received here in the
afternoon, placed on board a barge the next morning, and arrived in Paris
on the same day. Personnel of Evacuation Hospital No. 6, which heretofore
had cared for patients here, now rejoined their own organization. An annoy-
ing but unavoidable feature of this barge service was the irregularity of its
-chedule, due to the fact that these vessels required frequent repairs. Never-
theless they proved of material assistance both by the relief which they
afforded the congested railroads and by the greater comfort which thev pro-
vided for the seriously wounded during transport. 183
420 FIELD OPERATIONS
A report rendered by Evacuation Hospital No. 7 before it left this area
showed that it had evacuated 27,055 patients from July 17 to August 8. 184
Some of them had been treated in the hospitals at Jouy-sur-Morin and at
Chateau Perreuse and were merely transferred to Evacuation Hospital No. 7
for evacuation. 131 Mobile Hospital No. 1 had supplemented the latter unit
during most of its service here; but nevertheless the amount of work accom-
plished, taking this into account, was considered remarkable, especially in
view of the fact that neither organization had had prior service in campaign. 184
The medical supply depot at Chateau-Thierry supplied troops at the front
for some days prior to August 16, replenishing its stock from the depot at
Lieusaint, which was still in operation. This provision of a forward depot
not only effected a considerable saving in transportation but it also accelerated
delivery at the front. Divisions in need of supplies either sent for them by
their own transport, or the articles requisitioned were sent up by truck from
the depot. 184
Red Cross Hospitals No. 110 and No. Ill were staffed by army personnel,
but their supplies, except rations, usually were obtained from the Red Cross,
though it was understood that the resources of the army medical depots were
at their disposal. 184 Attempts made by the Eed Cross to furnish its hospital
at Jouy-sur-Morin with rations had demonstrated the difficulties incident to
that method of supplying food, and Red Cross units now drew rations as did
other army hospitals. These were supplemented by donations from the Red
Cross. 18 "'
Reports now compiled (August 18) showing the length of time lapsing
from receipt of wound to time of operation (bearing no reference to the hour
of arrival at the evacuation hospital) showed that at Evacuation Hospital
No. 7 the average Avas slightly less than 12 hours. Occasionally the wounded
had readied the hospital in four hours, but pressure of work was such that
with the operating teams actually available they could not always be operated
immediately. Not infrequently the wounded had been lying in shell holes for
a day or sometimes two days before they were recovered, which fact raised
the average length of time lapsing prior to operation. The average interval
prior to operation, at Chateau-Thierry, during the rush period was at first
10 hours, later 8. and at Coincy it was from 6 to 7 hours. Generally speaking,
surgery was well done, with a minimum of delay, and results obtained com-
pared favorably with those of any of our Allies. 1S0
Reserve personnel and hospitals were withdrawn from wherever they could
be spared and sent to the Marne area for duty. 187
At the height of our activities there, the hospitalization provided for our
forces was 6 evacuation hospitals, 2 American Red Cross hospitals, and 2
mobile hospitals, with a total bed capacity of approximately 7.000. 187 Their
various locations have already been given. While relatively few Ln number,
they were brought up as rapidly as possible. The greatest difficulties en-
countered in this and other respects were due to lack of transportation.
One evacuation hospital, urgently needed, through lack of motor trans-
port had to be ordered up by rail. It was four days en route from Bazoilles-
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 421
sur-Meuse to Coulommiers. Personnel in the region of Langres, also urgently
needed, could not be provided with transportation until the French were
appealed to and furnished motor camions for the movement. 187
The ambulance shortage was so acute that trucks had to be utilized in
transporting the wounded. By working the personnel night and day, often
without adequate rest, and operating hospital trains and ambulance evacua-
tions to maximum possibilities, it was barely possible to meet requirements. 188
Evacuations, at first regulated from the station at Creil and then trans-
ferred to the more centralized station at Le Bourget, were largely carried
on through the operation of American hospital trains garaged at Pantin,
Paris. Frequently trains had to be borrowed from the French, but during
the height of activities there were 16 American Expeditionary Forces trains
in operation there. 187
In marked contrast to the chaotic conditions that existed in rear of the
Soissons front because of the fact that the Medical Department had been
given no information concerning the offensive there were the smoothness and
precision with which the evacuation in rear of the divisions on the Chateau-
Thierry front were conducted and operations on thousands of American
wounded performed. For example, on the ninth day of the offensive and
counteroffensive, operations and evacuations had been carried through with a
regularity that still left 3,800 vacant beds in the evacuation hospital chain
there. American forces were operating there with the French Sixth Army
and were given unrestricted opportunity to conduct their own hospitalization
and evacuation. The work carried on there under most trying circumstances
challenged any criticism. 1SS
Eeports received August 18 concerning the etiology of the epidemic of
enteritis which had affected the troops since the early part of the month indi-
cated that the disease was of bacillary origin. Eesponsibility was not at-
tached to any one organism, though both Shiga and Flexner types were
isolated. 185 The epidemic did not begin until our troops had started their
advance. This was attended by the death of thousands of animals, whose
carcasses, being unburied, had afforded opportunity for great multiplication
of flies. There were few facilities for the protection of food from them, and
it was believed that the epidemic was largely attributable to the agency of
these insects. 182 The fact that bread received at this time was moldy was also
considered to be a possible contributory cause. 1 ""'
Portable apparatus to free men from lice were brought up back of the
lines, but these were inadequate in number. Two for a division were author-
ized, but this quota, even when supplied, did not meet all requirements. In
the absence of other delousing appliances, division surgeons improvised such
apparatus as their facilities permitted. 183
MEDICAL SERVICE OF THE FRENCH SIXTH ARMY 18 "
A large proportion of the American troops in the Marne area operated
under the control of the French Sixth Army, which occupied the region, includ-
ing Chateau-Thierry. The chief surgeon of this army did not attempt to
422 FIELD OPERATIONS
control the American evacuation service; on the other hand, he assisted in
every way possible its operation and individual development. Data furnished
by him are inserted here in order to afford some basis of comparison of the
methods of the French and American medical services which were closely
associated in this area, and to give the total casualties of their army, to which
several American divisions then belonged. The difficulties under which the
French medical service was laboring at this time are evidenced by the large
percentage of wounded which their army was obliged to evacuate unoperated.
On July 15 the front of the French Sixth Army from south of Faverolles
to the west of Dormans, passing by Troesnes, Chezy-en-Orxois, Bussiares.
Belleau. Bouresches, Vaux, and the course of the Marne, was held by the
French Second and Seventh Corps, and the American First Army Corps with
the French Thirty-eight Corps echeloned from north to south and to the
east. The military operations of the French Sixth Army following July 14,
were divided by the French into three phases: (1) The German offensive of
July 15-17, in the course of which only the right wing of the Sixth Army
was engaged. (2) The attack of the 18th and 19th by the left wing of the
Sixth Army. (3) The general attack, beginning July 19, by four corps from
left to right — the Second and Seventh (French), First (American), and
Thirty-eighth Corps (French). This, after the 27th, was continued by but
three corps, the Seventh (French) having been withdrawn.
The French medical service was disposed on July 15 as follows: On the
line of the corps — (1) One field hospital per division (assembly, urgent aid.
washing of burned cases, and detention of suitable cases). (2) A group of
surgical hospitals, by corps. (3) A center for convalescents and slightly
gassed cases, by Army Corps.
On the line of the army: Evacuation hospitals of the first line at Meaux
and Coulommiers, of the second line at Montevrain, with sections at Lagny
and Ferrieres, medical centers at Meaux and Mauperthuis, and a convalescent
center at La Iloussaye (slightly sick, gas burned, and footsore).
All these formations taken together afforded 5,250 beds, of which 1,500
were primarily for surgical cases, 850 for medical, and 1,000 for convalescents.
Surgical facilities in both the corps and the army included (exclusive of
those serving the Americans) 27 class A equipments, 14 class B equipments.
certain emergency provisions for the changing of dressings, and 24 radiologic
establishments.
The vehicles of the medical service in addition to those of divisions com-
prised 4 sanitary service sections (20 ambulances each) and 16 auto cars. In
the course of the operations they were reinforced successively by 6 Army
Ambulance sections (of which 1 was assigned to each of the 3 French corps
and 3 to the American troops) and by 36 trucks (12 per French corps).
An evacuation service by water eventually was organized, with 2 freight
barges, each carrying 40 sitting and 40 recumbent, and 3 Parisian steamships,
each carrying 200 seated. On the 23rd of July to these were added a pinnace
equipped with 94 litters; on the 25th another vessel.
During the first phase of these engagements there was no change in the
location of French medical formations, though the enemy reached the imme-
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 423
diate vicinity of the triage of the 125th Division at Moulin Eagronet. In the
second phase the divisional medical units in the Second and Seventh Corps
were advanced, and in the third phase this progression was continued, while
all the surgical groups of the several corps were advanced also. Thus the
surgical hospitals of the Second Corps were moved from d'Acy-en-Multien
to Marolles (July 21) where one hospital for nontransportables remained, the
other units of this group moving to Grisolles on the same date. Simul-
taneously the surgical hospitals of the Seventh Corps moved from Gue a
Tresmes to Crouy-sur-Ourcq. In the First Corps an American hospital re-
placed at Perreuse the surgical hospital of the 167th Infantry. On the right
the surgical center of the French Thirty-eighth Corps moved July 23 from
La Ferte-Gaucher to Charly, and the triage hospital at Verdelet moved July
28 to Chateau-Thierry.
Despite the elongation of the lines of evacuation, it was impracticable to
move the two large evacuation centers at Meaux and Coulommiers, which, espe-
cially the one at Meaux, were laboring to full capacity, and even momentary
cessation of the work of either would have greatly jeopardized the care of the
wounded. The evacuation hospital at Montevrain was held ready to move
forward, and on the 24th was sent to Charly, whence it transferred patients
by barges to Meaux. On July 30 it moved to Chateau-Thierry, where it was
held on the alert in reserve.
Relay units were established in the larger evacuation routes at Gue a
Tresmes on the road to Villers-Cotterets and at Jouarre on the route to
Chateau-Thierry. These relays utilized an army hospital, or were affiliated
with a group of corps hospitals, their mission being to liberate the vehicles
of the corps, to afford rest and nourishment to the passing casualties, and to
stop and accommodate nontransportable patients.
On July 31 the army front extended from near Saponay to Seringes and
XesleS; to descend toward Cierges and Roncheres. From left to right it
was held by the French Second, American First, and French Thirty-eighth
Corps. Surgical formations for these corps functioned respectively at Grisolles,
Bezu, and Chateau-Thierry. Wounded reached the French evacuation hospital
at Meaux by ambulances, relaying from Marolles, and by barges from Charly.
After August 10 they arrived at Meaux by train from Chateau-Thierry. The
most gravely wounded from Chateau-Thierry were operated here or sent to
Marly. American troops were served by the American evacuation formations
at Montanglaust and Jouy-sur-Morin. On the 30th the hospital of Meaux
moved to Chateau-Thierry (Chierry).
As the hospital at Meaux had but a limited number of surgical equip-
ments, it was impossible to operate all the wounded reaching this point.
Therefore a very thorough surgical triage was organized under the consult-
ing surgeon. Wounds of all recumbent and of doubtful sitting cases were in-
spected and 6 dressing tables were constantly operated by 12 alternating teams.
After several days the need for medical officers was so great that the appli-
cation of dressings, under direction of the consulting surgeon, was entrusted
to two volunteer American women doctors and to especially qualified nurses.
424
FIELD OPERATIONS
A similar triage was conducted at Couloniiniers on the 15th. 16th, and 17th
of July. Almost all operations, both at this point and at Meaux. were per-
formed on nontransportable patients. With the resources available this was
the only solution of the problem — a minute triage of patients, operation on
the -nontransportables such as required immediate care and of such others
as was possible, and the evacuation, nonoperated, of all others after rendering
them such other surgical services as was indicated and possible.
Total French losses during the period from the 15th to the 31st of July
were as follows: Wounded 14,055 (of whom 7,202 were operated in the
army area and 6,853 evacuated not operated) ; gassed and burned, 2,081;
sick, 2,554; total, 18,690. Of this number, 14,549 were evacuated by July 31;
2.145 remained in army hospitals, 285 in corps formations, and 1.710 in the
camps for slight disabilities (centers de recuperables).
Total American patients during the same period evacuated by American
formations were: Evacuation hospitals at Chateau-Montanglaust and Jouy-
sur-Morin, 21,175 ; by hospital at Juilly, 1,199 ; total 22,374.
During August, losses were as follows in the French Sixth Army:
French, wounded, 1,607; gassed, 1,102. American, wounded, 2,235; gassed, 335.
All French casualties evacuated by water went from Meaux to Charenton.
These numbered 4,047, of whom 3,899 were not operated. Train transporta-
tions of French casualties numbered 10.502, of whom 7,438 were wounded
(including 2,050 not operated), 1,621 sick, 1,443 gassed and burned. These
were moved by 44 trains. Movement by water, though slow (8 km. per hour)
was very comfortable. Sometimes hospital trains were greatly delayed, and
occasionally they arrived at evacuation hospitals as much as nine hours late.
Causes and distribution of wounds in cases examined in the hospitals of
the Sixth Army from the 15th to the 30th of July were as follows:
Num-
ber
Per
cent
Num-
ber
Per
cent
Fragments of shell or shrapnel ..
Rifle or machine gun ballets
5,195
4,206
1,043
827
1,379
981
452
320
46
37
9
7
12
8
3
2
Regions struck most frequently— Contd.
Upper limbs —
1,523
1,029
897
1,432
1,541
762
955
13
Hand
9
Regions struck most frequently:
Head
Thorav
8
Lower limbs —
Thigh _
12
Leg
Foot
Multiple wounds.
13
Spine
6
8
REFERENCES
(1) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, 34.
(2) Ibid., 36.
(3) Special report, Field Orders and Instructions, " Operations of the 1st Division.
July 18-24, 1918, South of Soissons." On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College.
(4) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the His-
torical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College.
(5) Keport of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. F., by Lieut. Col.
Wilbur M. Phelps, M. C, sanitary inspector, 1st Division, undated, Part II. 21.
On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 425
(6) Ibid., 25.
(7) Ibid., 20.
(8) Ibid., 27.
(9) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 23. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(10) Ibid., 24.
(11) Report of Medical Department activities, Ambulance Company No. 2, 1st Division,
prepared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(12) Report of Medical Department activities, Ambulance Company No. 3, 1st Division.
A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(13) Report of Medical Department activities, Ambulance Company No. 12, 1st Division,
prepared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(14) Report of Medical Department activities. Ambulance Company No. 13, 1st Division,
prepared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(15) Report of Medical Department activities. 1st Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 26. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(16) Ibid., Part I, 28.
(17) Ibid., Part I, 53.
(18) Report of Medical Department activities, Field Hospital No. 12, 1st Division,
A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(19) Report of Medical Department activities, Field Hospital No. 3, 1st Division, A. E. F.,
prepared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(20) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated, Part III, 8. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(21) Ibid., Part III, 10.
(22) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 54. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(23) Ibid., Part I, 55.
(24) Ibid., Part I, 25.
(25) Ibid., Part I. 27.
(26) Outlines of Histories of Divisions. U. S. Army. 1917-1919. prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College.
(27) Report of operations, 2d Division, in the attack of the Twentieth Army Corps,
French Fourth Army, near Soissons, July 17-21, 191S, by Maj. Gen. John A.
Lejeune, U. S. M. C. On file. Historical Section, the Army War College.
(28) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division. A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 30. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(29) Report of operations, Medical Department, 2d Division, A. E. F., July 18-24, 1918,
from the division surgeon to the commanding general. 2d Division, February 5,
1919. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(30) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 28. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(31) Ibid., Part I, 29.
13570—25 28
426 FIELD OPERATIONS
(32) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff.
G. H. Q., A. E. F„ by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31,
1918, 55. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(33) Exhibit "M" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section.
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Memorandum from Lieut. A. D. Tuttle, M. C,
representative of chief surgeon G-4, to the assistant chief of staff, G-4, G. H. Q.,
July 25, 1918. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(34) Report on activities of G— i-B, medical group; fourth section, general staff,
G. H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section. December 31.
1918, 53. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(35) Ibid., 38.
(36) Exhibit " O " to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. ; Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Button, undated, 34.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(37) Ibid., 30.
(38) Ibid., 31.
(39) Ibid., 32.
(40) Military History of the American Red Cross in France, by Lieut. Col. C. C. Bur-
lingame, M. C. (director, medical and surgical department, Red Cross), undated,
85. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(41) Exhibit " O " to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. ; Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton. M. C, undated.
33. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(42) Report of Medical Department activities of Evacuation Hospital Xo. 5, A. E. F.,
by Lieut. Col. E. F. Geddings, M. C, commanding officer, undated. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(43) Exhibit "M" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F., July 23, 1918. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(44) Exhibit " N ' : to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q.. A. E. F.. August 31, 1918. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(45) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G^-B, medical group, fourth section.
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. ; Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. O, undated.
35. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(46) Ibid., 36.
(47) Ibid., 39.
(48) Report of Medical Department activities of the Third Army Corps. A. E. P., by
Col. James L. Bevans, M. O, corps surgeon, undated, 12. On file, Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
(49) Ibid., 3.
(50) Ibid., 13.
(51) Ibid., 14.
(52) Ibid., 15.
(53) Ibid., 16.
(54) Ibid., 18.
(55) Operations report second battle of the Marne, July 18 to August 12, 1918, Head-
quarters, 4th Division, A. E. F., December 28, 1918. On file, Historical Section,
the Army War College.
(56) Summary History of the First Army Corps from its creation, January 15, 191S, to
the cessation of hostilities, November 11, 1918. edited by G-2, First Army Corps,
November 15, 1918, 3. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 427
(57) Report of Medical Department activities, 4th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 3. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(58) Ibid., 2.
(59) F. O. No. 9, Headquarters, First Army Corps, July 17. 1918.
(60) Report of operations of the First Corps, July 1S-31, 1918, by Lieut. Col. W. S. Grant,
general staff (G-3), undated. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.
(61) Summary History of the First Army Corps from its creation, January 15, 1918, to
the cessation of hostilities, November 11, 1918, edited by G-2, First Army Corps,
November 15, 191S, 4. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.
(62) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the His-
torical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army
War College (1700, 26th Division).
(63) Ibid., 5.
(64) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, Chateau-Thierry opera-
tion, by Lieut. Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 52. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(65) Ibid., 40.
(66) Memorandum from Headquarters, First Army Corps, A. E. F., July 30, 191S. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(67) F. O. No. 11, Headquarters, First Army Corps, A. E. F., July 18, 1918.
(68) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, A. E. F., Chateau-
Thierry operations, by Lieut. Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C. corps surgeon, undated,
53. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(69) F. O. No. 19, Headquarters, First Army Corps, July 21, 1918.
(70) F. O. No. 20, Headquarters, First Army Corps, July 23, 1918.
(71) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, A. E. F., Chateau-
Thierry operations, by Lieut. Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, corps surgeon, undated,
54. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(72) Ibid., 55,
(73) F. O. No. 24, Headquarters, First Army Corps, July 25, 1918.
(74) Daily operations report, First Army Corps.
(75) F. O. No. 25, Headquarters, First Army Corps, July 26, 1918.
(76) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, A. E. F., Chateau-
Thierry operations, by Lieut. Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. O, corps surgeon, undated,
57. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(77) F. O. No. 27, Headquarters, First Army Corps, A. E. F., July 28, 1918.
(78) F. O. No. 30, Headquarters, First Army Corps, A. E. F., July 29, 1918.
(79) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, A. E. F., Chateau-
Thierry operations, by Lieut. Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, corps surgeon, undated,
59. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(80) F. O. No. 32, Headquarters, First Army Corps, July 31, 1918.
(81) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, A. E. F., Chateau-
Thierry operations, by Lieut. Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, corps surgeon, undated.
61. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(82) F. O. No. 33, First Army Corps.
(83) F. O. No. 34, Headquarters, First Army Corps, A. E. F., August 1, 1918.
(84) F. O. No. 36, Headquarters, First Army Corps, A. E. F., August 3, 1918.
(85) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, A. E. F., Chateau-
Thierry operations, by Lieut. Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, corps surgeon, undated,
65, 66. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(86) F. O. No. 13, Third Army Corps, August 12, 1918.
(87) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, A. E. P., Chateau-Thierry
operations, by Lieut. Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 67. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(88) Ibid., (is.
428 FIELD OPERATIONS
(89) Ibid., 60.
(90) Ibid., 70.
(91) Ibid., 71.
(92) P. O. No. 57, Headquarters, First Army Corps, A. E. F., September 22, 1918.
(93) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, A. E. F., Chateau-
Thierry operations, by Lieut. Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, corps surgeon, undated,
72. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(94) Report of operations, offensive commencing July IS, 1919, submitted by Maj. Gen.
C. E. Edwards, commanding officer, 27th Division, undated. On file, Historical
Section, the Army War College.
(95) Report of Medical Department activities, 20th Division, A. E. F„ prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 63. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(96) Ibid., Part I, 64.
(97) Ibid., Part II, 26.
(98) Ibid., Part II, 27.
(99) Ibid., Part II, 28.
(100) Ibid., Part I, 65.
(101) Brief history of the 42d Division, submitted by the commanding general, 42d Divi-
sion, to the commanding general, First Army Corps, undated. On file, Historical
Section, the Army War College.
(102) Operations report, 42d Division, A. E. F., July 25 to August 3, 1918.
(103) Report of Medical Department activities, 42d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I, 17.
(104) Ibid., Part I, 18.
(105) Ibid., Part I, 48.
(106) Ibid., Part I, 51.
(107) Ibid., Part I, 52.
(108) Ibid., Part I, 53.
(109) Ibid., Part I, 54.
(110) Ibid., Part I, 75.
(111) Ibid., Part I, 76.
(112) Report of Medical Department activities, 4th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, 5. On file, Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(113) Ibid., 4.
(114) History of the Third Army Corps, from April 1, 1918, to September 9. 1918, undated,
Vol. I. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.
(115) Report of Medical Department activities, Third Army Corps, A. E. F., by Col.
James L. Bevans, M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 2. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(116) Ibid., 3.
1117) F. O. No. 3, Third Army Corps. A. E. F., August 4, 191S.
(118) War Diaries, Third Army Corps.
(119) Report of Medical Department activities, Third Army Corps, A. E. F., by Col.
James L. Bevans, M. C. corps surgeon, undated, 4. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(120) Ibid., 20.
(121) Special report, operations of the 3d Division, July 15-31, 1918. Resum& of the
operations of the 3d Division. TJ. S., from May 29 to July 31, 1918. On file, His-
torical Section, the Army War College.
(122) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College, 3. On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College.
(123) Report of Medical Department activities of the 3d Division, A. E. F.. prepared
under the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part V, 2. On file. His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 429
(124) Ibid., Part V, 3.
(125) Ibid., Part IV. 1.
(126) Ibid., Part IV, 2.
(127) Ibid., Part IV, 7.
(128) Ibid., Part IV, 3.
(129) Ibid., Part IV. 5.
(130) Ibid., Part IV, 4.
(131) Ibid., Part IV, 9.
(132) Ibid., Part IV, 10.
(133) Ibid., Part IV, G.
(134) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College, 40. On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College.
(135) Report on operations of the 32d Division, July 29 to August 7, inclusive, Phase
III; Brief statement by division commander. On file, Historical Section, the
Army War College.
(136) Report of Medical Department activities of the 32d Division, A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 4. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(137) Ibid., Part I, 6.
(138) Ibid., Part II, 50.
(139) Ibid., Part II, 54.
(140) Ibid., Part II, 55.
(141) Ibid., Part II, 63.
(142) Ibid., Part II. 64.
(143) Ibid., Part II, 76.
(144) Ibid., Part II, 41.
(145) Ibid., Part II, 40.
(146) Special report of operations of the 28th Division, July 15-31, 1918. On file, His-
torical Section, the Army War College.
(147) Report of Medical Department activities of the 28th Division, prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I, 16. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(148) Ibid., Part I, 15.
(149) Ibid., Part I, 6.
(150) Ibid., Part I, 7.
(151) Ibid., Part I, 11.
(152) Ibid., Part I, 12.
(153) Ibid., Part I, 13.
(154) Ibid., Part I, 14.
(155) Ibid., Part I, 21.
(156) Ibid.. Part I. 22.
(157) Ibid., Part I, 23.
(158) Ibid., Part I, 25.
(159) Ibid., Part II, 2.
(160) Ibid., Part II, 6.
(161) Ibid.. Part II, 7.
(162) Ibid., Part II, 14.
(163) Ibid., Part II, 15.
(164) Ibid., Part II, 16.
(165) Ibid., Part II, 18.
(166) Ibid.. Part II. 21.
(107) Ibid.. Part II. 20.
430 FIELD OPERATIONS
(168) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G— 1-E, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of medical operations at Chateau-
Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C,
undated, 32. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(169) Ibid., 35.
(170) Ibid., 36.
(171) Ibid., 37.
(172) Ibid., 3S.
(373) Ibid., 39.
(174) Ibid., 40.
(175) Memorandum from Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, to the chief surgeon, A. E. F.,
July 31, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section
(Chief Surgeon's Files, 319.2).
(176) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G^4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of medical operations at Chateau -
Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C,
undated, 41. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(177) Ibid., 42.
(178) Ibid., 43.
(179) Ibid., 44.
(180) Ibid., 45.
(181) Report on Medical Department activities of Evacuation Hospital No. 3, prepared
under the direction of Lieut. Col. C. M. DeForest, M. C, commanding officer,
undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(182) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-^-B, medical group, fourth section.
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of medical operations at Chateau-
Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 191S, by Col. Paul C. Hutton,
M. C. undated, 47. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(183) Ibid., 48.
(184) Ibid., 49.
(185) Ibid., 50.
(186) Ibid., 54.
(187) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff.
G. H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December
31, 1918, 55. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(188) Ibid., 54.
(1S9) Service de Saute pendant les operations de la VI Armee dans la Region de Chateau-
Thierry du 15 au juillet, 1918, by Mfidecin Inspecteur G£n6ral Lasnet, M§deeine
de l'Armee. (Translation by Col. Joseph H. Ford, M. O). On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
CHAPTER XIII
THE OISE-AISNE OPERATION, AUGUST 18 TO SEPTEMBER 17,
1918"
THIRD CORPS (28TH AND 77TH DIVISIONS; 32D DIVISION), AUGUST 29-31
On August 6, the date which oflicially marked the end of the Aisne-
Marne operation, 1 the First and Third Corps held a continuous front of 11
km. (6.8 miles) along the Vesle. 2 Between that date and the commencement
of the Oise-Aisne operation, August 18, there was but small movement of
this line, but there were several changes in thel composition of the troopsi
holding it. On August 7, the 28th Division relieved the 32d, which then went
into the corps reserve for 10 days ; 3 on August 12, the 77th Division relieved
the 4th in the First Corps. 2 From August 2 to 10 the 6th Infantry Brigade
of the 3d Division held a sector on the river line, under the French Third
Corps, which was relieved by the American Third Corps on August 5, and
then rejoined the remainder of the division in a rest area. 4 At this time the
transfer of our First Corps to the Woevre was ordered, and control of this
front was turned over to our Third Corps, whose front, now occupied by the
28th on the right and by the 77th on the left, extended from Magneux to a
point a little west of Bazoches. 5
The Corps sector was prescribed in the following field order :
Field Order P. C. Third Army Headquarters,
No. 13 12 August, 18—10.00 a. m.
*******
3. (o) Boundaries of Corps sector:
Western limit. — Pont Arcy — Vieil-Arcy — Dhuizel — Hill 175 (1,200 m. soutli of
Dhuizel)— Hill 159.4 of the P. D. (1,000 in. east of Vauxtin — Les Wattes— Le Bois de la
Bruyere (all above points to the 11th Corps) — northwest edge of L'Etang de la Graviere
(to 3d Corps) — Mont Notre Dame — Fme Mont Bani (to 11th Corps) — Mareuil en Dole — -
Seringes et Nesles (to 3d Corps) — Fere-en-Tardenois — Ferine Preaux — Beuv.irdes — Cour.
poil — Trugny — Verdilly — Brasles (to 11th Corps).
Eastern limit. — Bouconville (to 3d Corps) — Craonnelle (to 5th Corps) — Concevreux—
Meurival — Le Grand Hameau — cross roads 300 m. west of Huit Voisins — Courlandon — -
Magneux — Bond Maison Fme — Courville — Arcis le Ponsart (all of the above to the 3d
Corps) — Aougny (to 5th Corps) — Villers Agron Aiguizy (to 3d Corps) — Passy — Verneuil
(to Oth Corps).
The Corps sector is divided into a right and left sector. Boundary between right and
left sector :
.Taulgonne (to Jeft sector).
Roncheres (to right sector).
"The operations of the Third Corps (28th and 77th Divisions) in the Olse-Aisne operation are so
intimately connected so far as the Medical Department is concerned with the period between the
termination of the Aisne-Marne operation, August 5, and the beginning of the Oise-Aisne operation,
August 18, that it was doemed best to cover here the short period which intervened between these two
operations.
431
432 FIELD OPERATIONS
Oierges (to right sector).
Chamery (to right sector).
Dravegny (to right sector).
Hill 213.
Bergerie (right sector).
Mont St. Martin (left sector).
Road Fork (2047-2864).
Fismette (to right sector).
Hill 175.8.
Maizy ( right sector).
Between August 6 and 18 many raids were made and withstood by the
Third Corps, chiefly in the vicinity of Fismes and Fismette, in attempts by
both belligerents to hold the river. Machine Gun opposition was stubborn
and sustained, causing a constant stream of wounded. 5
Action of the Third Corps on the Vesle is divided officially into two parts,
the terminal stages of the Aisne-Marno operation ending August 6, and op-
erations beginning August 18, called the Oise-Aisne operation; but so far as
the Medical Department was concerned there was no intervening period, as
many casualties occurred in the meantime. 5 On August 18, General Petain
began an offensive (Oise-Aisne) between Reims and the Oise in which our
Third Corps participated. 6 On September 4, the Third Corps crossed the
Vesle with the 28th and 77th Divisions and overcame stubborn opposition on
the plateau south of the Aisne, which was reached by the 77th Division on
September 6. 6 The 28th Division was withdrawn from the line on the fol-
lowing day. and on September 9 the Third Corps was transferred to the region
of Verdun, the 77th Division remaining in the line on the Aisne River until
September 17. when it also was withdrawn. 6
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Action in front of Fismes represented a great advance in Medical Depart-
ment organization and teamwork, and this became much more apparent during
the latter part of the Oise-Aisne operation. 7
Placing the sector under American tactical command made necessary the
issuance of operations orders, by corps headquarters. Administrative orders
also were received by the corps surgeon, defining railheads, evacuation routes,
etc., for men and animals, conditions of circulation and the maintenance of
roads, salvage, and other miscellaneous matters. It became the corps surgeon's
custom to go daily to the officer at the head of G-l to give him concise informa-
tion concerning the Medical Department situation and to make definite recom-
mendations. 8 For successful relationship between the Medical Department and
the staff organization the following conditions appeared to him to be neces-
sary : (1) Full advance information for the corps surgeon concerning the
battle: (2) reference to him of all medical matters, together with instructions
for recommendations, and in case of disapproval a statement for future guid-
ance of the policy on which disapproval was based; and (3) cordial personal
relations. 8 It was the habit of the head of G-l to request the corps surgeon to
write a draft of the paragraph relating to evacuation, which always appeared
in the administrative order. 8 Before an attack or large raid or any important
PLATE XIV.
Battle lines, taken from existing orders and maps, are approximate.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 433
action which was foreseen, these officers went over the map together, the
former explaining as well as possihle the condition of roads and the require-
ments concerning food and ammunition supply. 8 Whenever possible he gave
the corps surgeon opportunity to take a battle map to his office so that he
might study the situation and draft the evacuation paragraph. 8 Medical De-
partment needs for forwarding supplies and evacuating the wounded were
always fully considered in making up the circulation map and traffic regu-
lations. 8
As an illustration of the evacuation paragraph in an administrative order
accompanying an operations order, the following is quoted : 9
(n) Men: At H hour field hospitals will be established as follows: 77th Division at
Chartreuve Fme. 28th Division at Longevllle Fme.
As advance progresses, field hospitals will be advanced as directed by the corps
surgeon.
Xontransportable and seriously wounded to Evacuation Hospital No. 4, at Coincy.
Fracture cases and slightly wounded to Red Cross Hospital No. Ill, at .Taulgonne.
All other cases to Red Cross Hospital No. 110. at Coincy.
Routes from field hospitals as follows :
77th Division by Army road to Coincy by Dole — Sergy — Counnont to Jaulgonne.
28th Division by Coulonges — Fere-en-Tardenois army road to Coincy. By Coulonges —
Cierges — Courmont to Jaulgonne.
Note. — In case road south of Dole unfinished, then 77th Division to Jaulgonne via
Dravegny — Coulonges.
To insure the drafting of sound orders for evacuation it was found
necessary for the corps surgeon to see almost daily the army surgeon or
his representative in the sector concerned, and also the division surgeons.
It was also necessary that he visit frequently the hospitals to which evacua-
tions were being made and inspect the lines of evacuation as far forward
as the divisional field hospitals, frequently going in advance of them to
the posts maintained by ambulance companies. 10 The medical service was
so subject to change and to emergency movements that it was never possible
to maintain smooth evacuation merely through administrative orders, even
though these were published daily, and it was absolutely necessary to change,
by telephone messages or personal communications, formal or other orders
given to division surgeons. 10 In the paragraph of the order quoted it will
be noted that it includes the sentence, "As advance progresses, field hospitals
will be advanced as directed by the corps surgeon." This was changed later
to read "As the advance progresses, the corps surgeon will make such changes
in evacuation and hospitalization as may be necessary." 10
The arrangement of army evacuation hospitals, on roads convenient to the
corps and on railways convenient for evacuation, had been gradually accom-
plished and was partially the result of the training in staff work which was
progressing in the general staffs of both corps and army, including the
-Medical Department members of those staffs. 7
The corps surgeon. Third Corps, reported that he recognized the fact
that during the entire Vesle campaign a constructive stage had now been
reached. 11
434 FIELD OPERATIONS
THE 28TH DIVISION
On the night of August 6-7, the 28th Division relieved the 32d Division
of the Third Corps in the Fismes sector. It participated in the Oise-Aisne
operation from August 18 to Septemher 7, during which operation severe
fighting took place in the advance north of the Vesle. 12 In greater detail
its operations here are recorded as follows :
On August 7, the 2d Battalion of the 112th Infantry attacked and suc-
ceeded in completing the occupation of Fismes and gained a foothold in the
village of Fismette, but was forced to withdraw from the latter.
On August 8, the artillery placed a destructive fire on Fismette and the
battalion, behind a rolling barrage, crossed the stream and after some heavy
fighting was able to establish itself in the southern section of the village. 13
On August 9, the division had put 11 companies and some machine guns
north of the Vesle and on the day following cleared up the woods near
Chateau du Diable. Enemy artillery was active, especially around Fismes
and Fismette, and airplanes bombed some American positions. 13
On the night of August 12-13, the 55th Brigade relieved the 56th Brigade
and the French 164th Division, establishing a liaison with the 77th Division
on its left and French 20th Division on its right. 13 During the 24 hours
ending at midnight of the 16th the enemy was active, throwing a great
number of gas shells into the front line and high explosives into Arcis-le-
Bonsart. 1 ' 4 Enemy activities increased on August 20, and during August 21
Fismes and Mont St. Martin were heavily shelled. His artillery continued
harassing fire, using mustard and sternutatory gases during August 22 and
23, and bringing larger guns into action during the ensuing week. 14
On the morning of August 27, the enemy attacked and captured Fismette
and continued to cover Fismes and roads leading thereto with machine guns,
preventing our troops from reaching the river. 13
On September 4, the 28th Division crossed the Vesle and progressed
about 3.5 km. (2.1 miles) on its entire front, capturing Fismette, Courlandon.
Baslieux, and Le Grand Hameau. By the evening of September 5, the troops
were at the head of a ravine sloping toward the Aisne, and on the two follow-
ing days continued to push the enemy back, despite strong resistance at
(rlennes, enemy airplane activity, and counterattacks in force. Hostile
artillery was now very active, using a great number of mustard gas shells. 14
The division was withdrawn on September 8, and moved to the Argonne
Forest."
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Ambulance Companies
Headquarters of the ambulance company section of the sanitary train
had been moved from Le Bousset to Chateau-Thierry on July 24, and from
that point to Cohan on August 11. At the latter place all ambulances were
pooled, to be distributed as required. Here also was established a depot for
spare parts (tires, etc.), which proved of great value. The triage at this time
was at Cohan; this situation facilitated ambulance service. The road from
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 435
St. Gilles to Fismes had been cleared and soon thereafter the road from
Fismes to Villette, just in time to meet the greatest emergency experienced
up to this time in the sector. Within 24 hours 1,094 patients were evacuated
by this road to the triage at Longeville Ferine. 10
Ambulance Company No. 109 had moved to Chateau-Thierry July 2G,
maintained a dressing station at Mont St. Pere July 29-31, and sent out litter
squads to serve the troops. On August 13 the company proceeded to Cohan
and then, having received animals and animal-drawn ambulances, was de-
tailed to the service of the artillery brigade. Because of the isolated posi-
tions the batteries often occupied, these vehicles proved of peculiar value
where motor ambulances would have been useless. The company remained
on this duty until the division was withdrawn, meanwhile sending details of
litter bearers to serve the infantry. 17
Ambulance Company No. 110 had moved from Le Charmel on August
3, proceeding to Chery-Chartreuve, where it arrived August 9. It main-
tained there a dressing station until August 13, evacuating the wounded of
the 56th Brigade under exceptionally difficult circumstances. One of the
dressing stations of the brigade was located at Fismes, from which place the
Germans had not yet been expelled and near whose western limits their
machine-gun nests continued active. 13 The enemy also occupied Fismette
and had direct observation at close range of the only evacuation route avail-
able from this station. On the morning of August 10 the ambulance company
made needed repairs to the bridge over the Ardre and advanced three am-
bulances into Fismes. 19 This precipitated artillery and machine-gun fire
directed against the building in front of which the vehicles were being loaded
with the more seriously wounded. Shelling was so heavy that it became
advisable to return patients to the protection afforded by the cellar utilized
by the dressing station, but after this had received five direct hits, patients
were removed by ambulances operating individually, until all had been
evacuated. The station then was closed. 20
On August 13, the company moved to L'Abbaye d'Igny, where, though
it was in reserve, it operated a dressing station for the 56th Brigade, also in
reserve. 20 An additional dressing station, sent out from this point to St.
Gilles, was operated from August 18 to September 6. 20 Headquarters of the
company moved to Cohan on August 20, and on September 6 an advance
dressing station was established at Magneux in conjunction with one operated
by Ambulance Company No. 112. During the latter service three members
of Ambulance Company No. 110 were gassed and two of its ambulances were
destroyed by shell fire, 21
Ambulance Company No. Ill moved from Le Charmel to Dravegny on
August 3, remaining there until August 13. 22 During this period the company
served the 32d Division and the artillery units between Dravegny and St.
Gilles, as well as the 28th Division. On August 8, an advance dressing sta-
tion was established at St. Gilles, but it had to be abandoned next day because
of shell fire. 22 During this period ambulances made daily trips into St.
(rilles and evacuated the wounded from that area. 22 The company reestab-
436 FIELD OPERATIONS
lished its station at St. Gilles on August 12, and on the following day opened
another at Courville, both of which were much harassed by enemy shells.
At the former six men were gassed. 22 On August 20 the company moved
to Cohan, a detachment from Ambulance Company No. 112 taking over the
station at Courville. 22 The company now was engaged chiefly in evacuation
from the triage operated at Cohan by Field Hospital No. 109, but it also
conducted a small dressing station on the Chery-Chartreuve — Fismes road
southeast of Mont St. Martin. 23 "When the triage moved to Longeville Ferme
the ambulances of this company continued its evacuation service and also
assisted in the evacuation of dressing stations established for the 109th and
110th Infantiy regiments. 23
Ambulance Company No. 112, with headquarters at Chateau-Thierry, had
been engaged in clearing the divisional triage at that point during the Aisne-
Mame operation, in maintaining a dressing station, and in furnishing litter
bearer details to serve the 112th Infantry. On August 12, the company
moved to Cohan, where it assisted in evacuation of the triage, meanwhile
maintaining a dressing station at Mont St. Martin. 24 It relieved Ambulance
Company No. Ill in the operation of the dressing station and a dispensary
for skin diseases. 24 For several days it operated the last-mentioned formation
and four dressing stations with but three medical officers, until, on Septem-
ber 5, the entire company moved to Courville, whence it sent out dressing-
station parties to Villette and Baslieux. 24 In conjunction with Ambulance
Company No. 110, it also conducted an advance station at Magneux. From
these stations in less than 24 hours 1,094 patients were evacuated to the triage
at Longeville Ferme. 21 On September 8, when the company was relieved, it
discontinued its stations and assembled at L'Abbaye d'Igny. 17
After participation in these engagements the ambulance units were assem-
bled at Pierry, where they arrived in the interval September 10 to 12. They
then moved to Andernay, where they remained in rest until September 28. 25
Field Hospitals
In the 28th Division, by this time, the functions of the four field hospitals
were well differentiated. One of them operated as a triage and cared for
the nontransportable wounded, another for gassed cases, a third for the sick,
while the fourth was held in reserve to "leapfrog" if need be and thus to
serve in its turn as a triage when the advance of troops made this exchange
of duties advisable. During the latter part of the attack along the Vesle
the 28th Division triage was operated in a church at Cohan and hospitals for
the sick and gassed were at Eeddy Ferme, on the road between Coulonges and
Cierges. When the advance made this possible the reserve hospital was sent
forward to Longeville Ferme to function as a triage, and the triage at Cohan,
as soon as it had disposed of its nontransportable wounded, then went into
reserve. In the final phases of the action ambulance stations were maintained
by the 28th Division at Fismes. 7
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 437
Field Hospital No. 109 had moved to Cohan on August 7, and there for
a month operated a triage despite the frequent shelling and bombing of the
town. 2 " While on this service it received 3,723 patients, utilizing a system
evolved during its previous service at Le Cbarmel, which proved adequate to
meet all emergencies. 27 After triage service was taken over by another hos-
pital of the division, Field Hospital No. 112, September 5-7, this unit then
cared for the seriously wounded until it was ordered closed. 28 On Septem-
ber 11 it was moving on trucks to Dormans and on the following day by
train to Moussy. While in this sector the American Bed Cross and the
Young Men's Christian Association were active in furnishing patients with
delicacies and comforts obtainable from no other sources. 27
Field Hospital No. 110 bad moved to Courmont on August 4 and there
for a month cared for gassed and psychiatric patients, of whom it admitted
here 1,926, returning 650 to duty. 20 On September 3 it received the divisional
sick from Field Hospital No. Ill, which was ordered to move. Two days
later. Field Hospital No. 110 proceeded with its patients to Eeddy Ferme,
remaining five days. While at this place it received 1,060 patients, returning
to duty 70 per cent of that number. 29 On September 10, this hospital, having
received orders to move to Dormans, loaded 11 trucks and was en route within
23 minutes. 30
Field Hospital No. Ill moved from Fontaine Tige on August 8 to Jaul-
gonne and thence to Courmont, where it had been preceded by Field Hos-
pital No. HO. 31 A site was selected in rear of the latter organization, tents
set up, and patients received immediately. On August 31 the unit evacuated
its remaining patients and moved to Eeddy Ferme. a group of buildings about
2 km. (1.2 miles) north of Cierges. Accommodations for 100 patients were
provided here in buildings, and tentage was pitched in an adjoining field. The
unit remained at Eeddy Ferme until September 11, when it moved to Moussy. 32
Field Hospital No. 112 operated at Chateau-Thierry in a triple capacity,
functioning as the divisional triage, caring for the seriously wounded, and
acting as evacuation hospital for the division until August 5. 33 Its admis-
sions then rapidly diminished until August 9, when it transferred its remain-
ing cases to Army Eed Cross Hospital No. 111. In the interval between July
25 and August 9 it received 4,931 patients and performed 206 major opera-
tions. 33 The hospital now proceeded to Cohan, in whose neighborhood it oc-
cupied buildings that had been but little damaged, and pitched tentage on a
line 9.1 meters (30 feet) from the road. 34 This site presented several advan-
tages — an abundance of good water, thick sod, level ground, and buildings
suitable for kitchen and operating-room purposes. In order of location from
the main road into the field occupied by the unit were the receiving ward,
shock ward, operating tent with X-ray plant, three convalescent tents, and
one store tent. Beyond and on the same line with these, but facing in the op-
posite direction, were tents for personnel. 34 Here the unit was charged only
with the care of seriously wounded patients whose condition demanded im-
mediate operation. Attached to it were four operating teams, a shock team, a
fracture specialist, nurses, and an X-ray plant. 3 "' As comparatively few pa-
438 FIELD OPERATIONS
tients were received here, on August 19 the unit broke camp and moved to
Courmont, where it remained in rest until August 31, when it advanced to
Roddy Ferine and from there, on September 4, to Longeville Ferme. 30 Here
arrangements were made to care for 300 patients and to operate the divisional
triage. Certain clerks were designated to read entries on diagnosis tags to
other clerks who recorded the required data on field medical and register cards.
respectively. 37 Daily reports were formulated of casualties admitted and of
changes. Just beyond these clerks were placed tables for surgical and shock
cases, and beyond these were tables for fracture cases. Close at hand were
splints, dressings, and other supplies appropriate for the particular work of
each section. Considerable space was equipped for sitting, slightly wounded
patients, and for patients on litters awaiting evacuation. Litter squads were
posted at the reception door, with a clerk who checked evacuations at the exit
from the building. In the evacuation service of the hospital and parked in
its vicinity were all the vehicles of Ambulance Company No. 111. Slightly
wounded patients were sent to Army Red Cross Hospital No. Ill, at Chateau-
Thierry, and to hospitals at Coincy. 38 Those needing immediate operation
were sent to Field Hospital No. 109, at Cohan, gas and psychoneurotic cases
to Field Hospital No. 110, and the sick to Field Hospital No. Ill, at Reddy
Ferme. In the 24 hours following daybreak of September 6, 1,190 patients
were received. 38 All were given suitable treatment, but evacuation facilities
being inadequate the Third Corps sent 12 ambulances to assist in this service.
The maximum rate of admission was attained on the morning of September 7,
but by noon of that day the last evacuation had been accomplished. 39 In the
24 hours following noon of September 6, 269 patients were admitted. Ad-
missions from September 6 to 9, inclusive, were 1,809, 9 cases proving fatal.
On September 8 the hospital began its movement to Andernay, via Dormans
and Moussy. 30
THE 77TH DIVISION
On August 12 the 77th Division relieved the French 62d and the Ameri-
can 4th Divisions on the front of the Third Corps, along the line south of and
parallel to the Vesle, from Mont Notre Dame through St. Thibaut and Ville-
savoye in the direction of Fismes. 40 Its frontage was about 5 km. (3.1 miles).
Though the Oisne-Aisne operation commenced on August 18, it was not until
the first days of September, when the enemy had begun to retire, that the 77th
was ordered to advance. 40 On September 4 it crossed the Vesle, and Bazoches
and Perles were taken. 40
On September 5 the line was advanced to the general line from east to
west : Le Bois de la Vicomtee, Bois cles Genettes to Bois de Mauchamp — Pierre
Laroche — La Butte de Bourmont — along Revillon — Glennes Road.
On the 6th the right flank remained practically in position on account
of resistance. The left was advanced to position on road Vieil-Arcy, Villers-
en-Prayeres.
On the 7th the division on its right (28th) was relieved by the French
62d Division, and on the following day the 77th, in conjunction with the
French 62d Division, attacked and made small gains. No attacks were made
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 439
again until September 13, when the 77th Division was to advance its right and
occupy La Petite Montagne. The advance elements of the division reached posi-
tions at La Petite Montagne, but as the French 62d Division did not make the
advance as expected, the line was withdrawn. 41 When the division was relieved
by Italian troops on the night of September 15-16 the line ran from Vieil-
Arcy through Villers-en-Prayeres southeast to point south of Glennes. 4 "
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Battalion aid stations in this sector were often scarcely established before
the troops moved forward, and it was necessary to collect the wounded at
some central point whence the ambulance companies could move them. 42
Patients in shock were given some treatment at battalion aid stations, and
this was carried out in a progressively more thorough manner at successive
stations to the rear. 43 Often, because of heavy shelling, it was impossible to
remove the wounded to an advance dressing station before dark. This was
especially so in this sector. Liaison was maintained by runners. 43
Ambulance Companies
In this, as in other sectors in which the division operated, two ambulance
companies were employed and two held in reserve, the latter " leapfrogging "
when an advance was made. 42 Ambulances were distributed to a number of
battalion posts. The time required for removal of a wounded man to a field
hospital was usually from three to eight hours. 43 In this operation the
divisional ambulances were supplemented by United States Ambulance Service
Sections No. 578 and No. 611. and by ambulances from the corps train. 44
Field Hospitals
The triage and the hospital for the seriously wounded were located at
Chateau de la Foret and at Chery-Chartreuve. 40
Two permanent triage units were organized in this division from officers
and personnel of the two field hospitals designated to receive surgical cases,
and these units alternated in this service. 42 Surgical, shock, and gas teams
were organized for service at the triage, officers and enlisted men alike being
carefully selected. Two of the latter were assigned to each officer, the group
of three remaining a permanent unit. 46 The operating capacity of the triage
hospital varied according to requirements, but two operating teams usually
were kept employed. Other selected enlisted men were permanently assigned
to certain duties in the discharge of which it was thought they would be
especially efficient; e. g., application of splints or bandages, administration of
morphine or antitetanic serum, etc. Likewise details were made and by perma-
nent assignment were used for such duties as clerical work, policing, salvage,
litter bearing, and administration of food to patients. 46 The operating room
detail consisted of men who had been hospital orderlies in civil life. During
this operation additional teams were assigned to the field hospitals, consisting
of surgeons especially qualified for treating particular types of cases; e. g.,
440 FIELD OPERATIONS
abdominal wounds, chest wounds, etc. 45 Equipment of the triage was selected
from those of two field hospitals, disregarding the supply tables, and was
supplemented by an abundance of articles which experience proved were
most needed ; e. g., litters, blankets, " front parcels '' antitetanic serum, and
splints. 40 Established in conjunction with the triage were the field hospitals
receiving slightly wounded, sick, and gassed patients, and no cases were held
at that point (the triage) except such as were considered nontransportable.
The group of four field hospitals of the 77th Division at Chateau de la
Foret was admirably organized for a relatively quiet period, but for more
active service other dispositions appeared advisable. 27 Therefore, when the
enemy stopped active shelling of Mareuil-en-Dole, the triage (a field hospital)
of this division was placed in a chateau near Chery-Chartreuve, the hospitals
for gassed and sick patients near Nesles, and the reserve hospital at Ferine
les Bons Homines. Ambulance stations were placed at Bazoches and Fismette
as soon as the advance made this possible. 7
When field hospitals operated in the specialized manner above described,
it was impossible to hold any of them in reserve. The normal capacity of each
of these hospitals was 216 beds, but on several occasions patients more than
double this number were cared for. The gas hospital accommodated 21G
patients. 48 Shock cases received especial care, with resultant saving of many
lives. Special collapsible tables, improvised from broken litters and easily
transported, were provided for their use. When en route to evacuation hos-
pitals these patients were surrounded with hot-water bottles, heated shell
cases, or any other available articles capable of retaining heat, and they often
reached their destination in better condition than they were an hour or so
after being wounded. 43 All wounded patients were evacuated immediately, if
possible, but of the 2,700 gassed patients admitted in this action along the
Vesle, 50 per cent were returned to duty. 47 All cases of gassing in this sector
were attributed to dichlorethylsulphide, and half of them evidenced burns. 47
The average time for recovery in this division of cases returned to duty from
field hospitals was from one to three days, including the gassed and the sick. 4 '
but some cases were retained one or two weeks, during relatively inactive
periods. Only two cases of psychoneurosis were received at the field hospitals.
one was returned to duty and the other evacuated, but a number of men claim-
ing to be suffering from " shell shock " appeared at the battalion aid posts. 4 '
EVACUATION IN REAR OF THE THIRD CORI'S
At the end of the Aisne-Marne operation, the evacuation route from the
Vesle near Fismes lay through the Third Corps sector by way of Jaulgonne to
Chierry or Chateau-Thierry. This long distance was shortened by the estab-
lishment of Evacuation Hospital No. 3 at Crezancy, on August 12, but as
temporary bridges had to be utilized, traffic conditions in the Marne area con-
tinued difficult and delayed evacuations. The situation was greatly improved,
however, when Mobile Hospital No. 2. Evacuation Hospital No. 4, and Army
Red Cross Evacuation Hospital No. 110 were established at Coincy. The great
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 441
east-and-west highway to that point, through Coulonges, Nesles, and Fere-en-
Tardenois, into which led the fine north-and-south roads from the battle field,
facilitated access to these hospitals. 49
On August 19 arrangements were made for expansion of the barge service,
increasing the number of barges from the three then in operation to six — the
Paris group was discontinued before these additional boats were received. In
order that barges might load at Chateau-Thierry instead of at Azy, efforts
were renewed to have removed a demolished bridge which blocked travel on the
Marne. Evacuation Hospital No. 3 and Field Hospital No. 41 were now or-
dered to report to the First Army for duty. 50
During the advance from the Vesle to the Aisne. with ambulance stations
for the 28th at Fismes and for the 77th at Fismette and Bazoches : with very
advanced stations for the 77th at Blanzy-les-Fismes and Vauxcere, evacuation
was comparatively easy to the triage of the 28th Division at Longeville Ferme
and to that of the 77th to Chery-Chartreuve. With fine, direct roads leading
to the two large evacuation hospitals at Coincy and to those at Chateau-Thierry
(for the slightly wounded), provisions for evacuation were as satisfactory as
could reasonably be desired. 9
THE 32D DIVISION
From August 7 to 23 the 32d Division had been in the reserve of the Third
Corps. On August 25 it was assembled in the vicinity of Pierrefonds, in re-
serve of the army group, and came under control of the French Tenth Army.
During the night of August 26-27 it was moved to the vicinity of Tartiers in
the reserve of the French Thirtieth Corps. 51
On the night of August 27—28 this division, relieving the French 127th
Division, took over a sector north of Soissons and approximately 2 km. (1.2
miles) west of Juvigny, and at 7 o'clock on the 28th of August was ordered to
attack. 52 No reconnaissance had been possible, 53 but the 63d Brigade moved
forward promptly and reached its objective, the railroad track west of the
town. 53
The entire French Tenth Army attacked on the 29th but no advance was
made. 54 On the morning of August 30 the French 59th Division, on the right,
advanced and at 1 p. m. the 32d Division was ordered to advance its right
Hank, in liaison with the 55th Division on its right. The Germans appeared
to be retiring.'' 5 Plans were made at once to capture Juvigny by a turning
movement of the right, while the left kept liaison with the French 66th Divi-
sion on the left. 50 When the attack was launched the left flank was held up by
heavy fire from the northeast while the right flank moved forward and forced
its way through the ravine to a position to the south of Juvigny, with its right
flank partially enveloping that town to the east. The left flank moved forward
in part along the low ground to the west of Juvigny and reached a position
to the north of the town, and in this way the two forces practically surrounded
the village. 56
The enemy's counterattack on the left was easily repulsed; troops from
the reserve of the right wing entered the town from the southwest and, after
442 FIELD OPERATIONS
severe fighting, cleared up the place of enemy. 66 In this operation the division
sustained many casualties, especially on the left. 57
On the morning of August 31 the front line of the 32d Division was in
advance of the divisions on the right and left ; that on the left had made no
advance on August 30 and was 1 km. (0.62 mile) in the rear; that on the right
about half a km. (0.31 mile). A general attack was launched at 4 p. m.,
preceded by a triple barrage covering a depth of 1.5 km. (0.93 mile). 68 The
progress of the troops continued until reports indicated that the advance had
reached the Terny — Sorny — Bethancourt road. Some of the right elements
of the division were held up by machine-gun nests. 58 Casualties, although
not light, were small considering the magnitude of the operation and the
stubborn resistance of the enemy. 59
Some improvements were made in the position of advance elements on
the morning of September 1, and on the night of September 1-2 the 32d
Division was relieved by the 1st Moroccan Division, 59 passing into the reserve
of the Thirtieth Corps and then into that of the French Tenth Army.
It was next sent to a rest area near Joinville and remained at this place
until September 22, when it again started north to join the Fifth Army Corps
for the coming Meuse-Argonne operation. 60
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
.Regimental and battalion aid stations were established at or near the con-
trol posts of the various headquarters, in cellars, dugouts, or with other cover.
In some instances regimental stations were very near the advance ambulance
dressing stations. Bearer details were supplemented by 50 men from Am-
bulance Company No. 128 (horse-drawn), then in reserve, 30 men from Am-
bulance Companies No. 125 and No. 127, by bandsmen, and by details from
the line when necessary. Instructions were now issued to the effect that bands-
men should not be used for this service if at all avoidable. 81
Ambulance Companies
On August 26 headquarters of the ambulance section and two of it?
companies were near La Vache Noire, but later, on the same day, the entire
ambulance section of the sanitary train was advanced to Vic-sur-Aisne. On
August 27 a dressing station was established in cellars at Tartiers, with
ambulance head at Bieuxy. 61 On September 2 the station at Tartiers wa?
closed and a new one opened at Valpriez Ferme, with ambulance head at the
railroad, west of Juvigny. Litter bearers went from this station to the aid
stations in and beyond that town. The largest number of wounded transported
in one day was 1,429, during the 24 hours ending September l. 81 Because of
the great number who had to be cared for, some sick and slightly gassed cases
accumulated at the dressing station, but this congestion was overcome by the
aid of 12 trucks obtained from the division quartermaster. All ambulance?
were unloaded at the triage at Montois and thus released for immediate return.
With the exception of one ambulance damaged by shell fire on August
29. all these vehicles were operated continuously. 81
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES
443
Motor Ambulance Companies No. 125, No. 126, and No. 127 were all on
duty during the entire period, none being held in reserve. The 128th Com-
pany (horse drawn) had two ambulances with each artillery regiment and
four at the triage, for short hauls to field hospitals. After August 29 the
commanding officer of this company, with the remainder of its personnel,
was stationed at headquarters to render emergency service at a relay, sorting,
and dressing station for troops in reserve. During this period upward of
3.100 cases from the 32d Division and other troops were transported by the
Ambulance Section. 02
Field Hospitals
On August 27, at the beginning of the operation, the divisional triage
was established at Montois by personnel from Field Hospital No. 127, and
was operated as an entirely distince formation. About 182 meters (200
yards) from it Field Hospital No. 127 cared for seriously^ wounded cases,
these two institutions together having some 500 beds. In the same locality
Field Hospital 126 received gas cases. Field Hospital No. 128 remained at
St. Etienne, received the sick, psychoneurotic, slightly gassed, and slightly
wounded. Field Hospital No. 125 was held in reserve at Vic-sur-Aisne, its
commissioned and enlisted personnel assisting in the services of other
hospitals. 62
The duties of the triage were described as follows :
(1) Classification and grouping of casualties into two categories, trans-
portable and nontransportable.
(2) Further classification and distribution as follows : 63 Gunshot wounds,
(a) slight, (b) severe; psychoneuroses; gassed; injured; sick.
(3) Rendition of minor surgical service and emergency medical treatment
in order to make transportable those patients who otherwise could not be
moved.
(4) Readjustment of splints and bandages when necessary-. (At least one
officer and frequently two were assigned to this duty.)
(5) Administration of antitetanic serum if there was no evidence on the
patient's tag or forehead that this already had been given.
(6) Preparation of hot drinks and food and their administration as
indicated.
(7) Preparation of accurate and complete records.
In this engagement the admissions recorded by the triage were the fol-
lowing: 62
Gunshot wounds :
Severe
Slight
Gassed
Sick
605
1,103
573
329
Psychoneuroses
Injured
Dead when received.
116
43
7
Total _
776
The average time consumed in transporting patients to the triage was
approximately three hours, and the time from this point to hospitals in the
rear was from one-half to two hours, according to the distance. 04
444
FIELD OPERATIONS
Field Hospital No. 127 treated only nontransportable surgical cases, its
personnel being reinforced by Naval Surgical Team No. 1, Shock Team
No. 116, and an X-ray team, with five other operating teams organized from
the medical personnel of the division. Of 284 patients sent to this hospital. 7
died before arrival, 40 died before operation, and 39 subsequent to operation.
The remaining 215 patients, presenting 419 wounds, were operated. 62 The
classification of these injuries, which typify those incurred in open warfare,
was reported by the surgical consultant for the division as follows : 6ri
Soft parts...
Soft parts, associated with injury to
large blood vessels
Fractures:
Femur _.
Humerus
Radius, ulna, tibia or fibula
Other bones
Knee joints
Elbow joints _
Combined chest and abdominal
Chest, aspirating
Abdomen, with injury to hollow vis-
cus
Wounds
Wounds
in 34
in 215
deaths
treated
which
occurred
170
17
7
1
14
IS
1
37
9
46
1
5
5
1
6
4
41
5
25
10
Abdomen, without injury to hollow
viscus
Head and brain
Amputation —
Cord injuries:
Partial
Complete
Symptoms present but no injury to
cord found
Collapsed eyes
Total
Few patients were kept in this hospital more than three days; habitually
they were evacuated as soon as transportation was available. One of the
greatest difficulties encountered here was that of caring for the continuous
stream of patients which arrived at nifrht, for this unit was without exterior
lights and harassed by frequent air raids. 63
The triage was closed on September 5, and on the day following Field
Hospital No. 127 was cleared and closed in preparation for movement to
the Joinville area. 64
Field Hospital No. 126 received 460 gassed cases, none of which was fatal.
In marked contrast to conditions experienced in the preceding operation, prac-
tically all of these cases presented positive evidence of gassing, and some
were affected severely. Slight cases were transferred to Field Hospital No.
128. The latter admitted 498 cases of sickness, neuroses, slightly gassed, and
slightly wounded. 60
EVACUATION IN REAR OF THE 32D DIVISION
Evacuation from Montois to St. Remy was effected by 10 motor ambu-
lances from Evacuation Hospital No. 5 and by trucks of the sanitary train.
On August 29 an American hospital train arrived at La Vache Noire and re-
moved 249 slightly wounded, gassed, and postoperative cases. On September 1
a French train in American service at the same point received 44 postopera-
tive cases. 68
As an instance of the difficulties encountered by the chief surgeon of the
Paris group, in his attempts to provide hospital facilities for prospective battle
casualties of a division presumably going into action, and especially when the
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 445
destination of the division could not be discovered by him, the following ac-
count is given : ° 7
On August 23 the chief surgeon. Paris group, noticing that many trucks
were passing through La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. inquired of G-4 and of the
French whether an American division was to move. No information was
then obtainable, but that night it was learned that the 32d Division had been
loaned to the French and would leave at daybreak for an unknown destina-
tion. As French hospitalization in rear of the divisions, though made as read-
ily available to our wounded as to their own, had proved inadequate in the
offensive toward Soissons, the chief surgeon made every effort to learn the in-
tended destination of the 32d Division in order that an evacuation hospital
might be sent with it, and an officer representing him was ordered to join the
division with instructions to accompany it and to inform his chief by tele-
phone, telegram, or courier as soon as he could ascertain the probable sector
which the division would occupy. 08 The division surgeon reported on the same
day that the division was moving toward Compiegne, but he could furnish
no other information, nor was any obtainable from any other source." Evac
nation Hospital No. 5 at Chateau-Thierry was directed to transfer its pa-
tients without delay to Red Cross Hospital No. Ill, to pack and to prepare
for a rapid movement. 70 The following day efforts were made to obtain trucks
for this movement, only 15 then being available, but no others could be se-
emed until daybreak on the 27th, when 60 more were furnished by the French. 71
Meanwhile, on August 25, the chief surgeon learned from his assistant whom
he had ordered to accompany the 32d Division that it had halted in the Com-
piegne forest west of Soissons and would probably remain there for a day or
two. The chief surgeon reported as follows: 70 "Taking a large war map I
tried to reach some conclusion concerning the place in the line which the 32d
probably would occupy'. The subject was discussed with nearly all the staff
officers present, but no two opinions were alike. All we could do was guess."
Communications with the French Tenth Army disclosed nothing, and no in-
formation was obtainable whether the division would enter the lines east or
west of Compiegne or near Soissons. After a careful estimate of the situation
in the light of such information as he had received from his representative
with the 32d Division, the chief surgeon, Paris group, ordered Evacuation
Hospital No. 5 to Villers-Cotterets at daybreak on the 27th. 71 On the after-
noon of the same date he learned that the 32d had entered the line near Soissons
and that Evacuation Hospital No. 5 had reached its destination and was pre-
paring to receive patients. 71 The representative of the chief surgeon, A. E. F.,
at G-4, G. H. Q., had been authorized to order hospital trains to Villers-Cot-
terets as required, and arrangements were now made to have two sent promptly
the following day if requested. 71 On August 28 Evacuation Hospital No. 5.
which had reached its destination on the night of August 27, was operating
800 beds which were being filled rapidly, thus seriously taxing the available
hospital beds, but a hospital train arrived and relieved apjn-ehension of
hospital congestion. 71 Surgical service was prompt for the hospital had
erected its operating and X-ray tents first and had most of its ward tents ready
446 FIELD OPERATIONS
when patients began to arrive. 71 In advance of this hospital, work was rapid,
and evacuation to it prompt, for, though there was some road congestion, the
movement of ambulances was so well controlled that casualties were quickly
cleared from more advanced formations. 72 In the rear the hospital train serv-
ice continued adequate, though after the first train had arrived others could
be obtained only through the chief surgeon of the French Tenth Army. 72 On
the 29th patients iarrived in unexpectedly large numbers, and by the 30th
the operating teams in Evacuation Hospital No. 5 were greatly fatigued, al-
though the chief surgeon of the Paris group had supplied a mobile surgical
unit, two operating teams, and one shock team to the 32d Division, to be used
with the hospital for nontransportable patients. 72 Several fresh teams, includ-
ing a shock team, were therefore sent from Evacuation Hospital No. 4 at Coincy
and Red Cross Hospital No. Ill at Chateau-Thierry. Evacuation Hospital
No. 5 was now working to capacity, but very satisfactorily. 72 It was learned
that French resources were limited, and had not an evacuation hospital arrived
it would have been necessary to send our patients to the rear for operation,
as were French patients from a neighboring hospital, with consequent danger
of increased mortality from gas bacillus infection. 72
At Villers-Cotterets, Evacuation Hospital No. 5 admitted 2,167 patients
from the 32d Division, of whom 1,388 were surgical, 411 gassed, and 368 medi-
cal. Patients operated here numbered 676 and the number of deaths among
those admitted was 12. 73
By August 31 the facilities for care of the wounded in the Medical
Department units draining its field hospitals (which averaged about 100
a day) were amply sufficient. 74 Evacuation Hospital No. 4 and Red Cross
Hospital No. 110 were at Coincy and Red Cross Hospital No. Ill at Chateau-
Thierry. An occasional train was required for the two first mentioned units,
but barge service was adequate for Red Cross Hospital No. 111. 74 After a
few days' rest, Evacuation Hospital No. 5 moved to the vicinity of Neuf-
chateau. Shortly afterwards Evacuation Hospital No. 4 transferred its
patients to Red Cross Hospital No. 110 and likewise prepared to move,
followed by Red Cross Hospital No. Ill a few days later. 74
On September 8 word was received that the Paris group would soon be
broken up. The same date the chief surgeon of the group received orders
assigning him to Headquarters First Army. His work was then turned over
to an assistant. A few days later all American troops were withdrawn from
this area. 74
REFERENCES
(1) G. O. No. 16. W. D., April 5, 1921.
(2) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1910, 36.
(3) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, TJ. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College, 40. On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College.
(4) Ibid., 7.
(5) G-3 Journal, Headquarters, Third Army Corps, A. E. F., from April 1, 1918. to
December 12, 1918.
16) Fiiml Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1. 1919. 37.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH FRENCH ARMIES 447
(7) Report of Medical Department activities, Third Corps, A. E. F., by Col. James L.
Bevans, M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 22. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
Ibid., 23.
Annex 4 to P. O. No. 18, Headquarters, Third Army Corps, A. E. F., undated.
Report of Medical Department activities, Third Army Corps, A. E. F., by Col. James
L. Bevans, M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 24. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
Ibid., 21.
Outlines of Histories of Divisions, TJ. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College, 33. On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College.
Report of operations, 28th Division, undated.
Extracts from General Pershing's Cabled Communiques, relating to the 28th Division.
Copy on file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
Special report of operations, 28th Division.
Report of Medical Department activities, 28th Division, A. E. P., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 17. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
Ibid., Part I, 15.
Ibid., Part I, 7.
Ibid., Part I, 8.
Ibid., Part I. 9.
Ibid., Part I, 10.
Ibid., Part I, 12.
Ibid., Part I, 13.
Ibid., Part I, 14.
Ibid., Part I, IS.
Ibid., Part I, 25.
Ibid., Part I, 27.
Ibid., Part I, 2(>.
Ibid., Part II, 2.
Ibid., Part II, 3.
Ibid., Part II, 7.
Ibid., Part II, S.
Ibid., Part II, 21.
Ibid., Part II, 22.
Ibid., Part II, 23.
Ibid., Part II, 24.
Ibid., Part II, 25.
Ibid., Part II, 27.
Ibid., Part II, 28.
Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College, 58. On file. Historical Section, the Army War
College.
Special report, 77th Division, September 3-17, 1918. Advance from the Vesle to Aisne.
undated. On file, General Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington, D. C.
Report of Medical Department activities, 77th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, 12. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
Ibid., 14.
Ibid., 25.
Ibid., 20.
Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 15.
Ibid.. 16.
448 FIELD OPERATIONS
(49) Report of Medical Department activities, Third Corps, A. E. F., by Col. James L
Bevans, M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 4. On file, Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(50) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G— 4-B, medical group, fourth section.
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10. by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, undated.
51. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(51) Exhibit to report of Third Army on the participation of organization in battles.
affairs, combats, skirmishes, and the like ; undated, 39. On file. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
(52) Special report of operations of the 32nd Division, August 27 to September 2, 191s.
Northeast of Soissons. with the French Thirtieth Army Corps, French Tenth
Army, undated, 2. On file, with Records of G-3, General Headquarters, A. E. F .
Washington, D. C.
(53) Ibid., 8.
(54) Ibid., 4.
(55) Ibid., 5.
(5(i) Ibid., 15.
(57) Ibid., 16.
(58) Ibid., 22.
(59) Ibid., 23.
(60) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the His-
torical Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army
War College.
(61) Report of Medical Department activities, 32d Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 6. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(62) Ibid., Part I, 7.
(63) Ibid., Part II, 65.
164) Ibid.. Part II, 64.
(65) Ibid.. Part I, 9.
(66) Ibid., Part I, 8.
(67) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section.
general staff. (1. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton. M. ('.. undated,
53. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(68) Ibid.. 53, 54.
(69) Ibid., 54.
(70) Ibid., 55.
(71) Ibid., 56.
I 721 Ibid.. 57.
(73) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital 5, A. E. F., by Maj.
T. F. Eeary, M. C, commanding officer, undated, 6. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(74) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G^-B, medical group, fourth section.
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry
and vicinity, June 1 to September 10. 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, un-
dated. 59. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
SECTION III
THE ST. MIHIEL OPERATION
CHAPTEB XIV
THE FIRST ARMY"
While General Pershing's original instructions contemplated the forma-
tion of a separate American army, the German offensives of the spring of
1918 had postponed this from day to day. The German March attack first
interfered; then, although an agreement was reached, on May 19, looking to
an early American concentration in the Woevre, the offensive of May 27
prevented this. On July 14. another conference was held, but without definite
result. The German attack, then expected, opened on the 15th, the counter-
attack on the 18th. and the conference was renewed on the 21st, after the
favorable opening of these operations. The final success of these operations
was then uncertain, hut it was now arranged that two American armies should
be formed, the First Army for temporary service between the Marne and the
Aisne, the Second in the proper American region about Toul.
On July 24, the Bombon conference of commanders was held, which
decided that all the allied forces should take the offensive. Certain definite
operations were agreed upon. These were : (a) Continuation of operations
on the Maine, with a view of securing, as a minimum result, the release of the
Paris — Chalons railway; (b) the reduction of the Amiens salient by the
British, securing the release of the Paris — Amiens railway; (c) release of the
mining regions in the north, and elimination of the menace to Dunkirk and
Calais: (d) reduction of the St. Mihiel salient by the Americans.
At a conference on September 2, at which there were present Marshal
Foch, General Petain, and General Pershing, it was decided that the Ameri-
cans should undertake two major operations. The first was the reduction of
the St. Mihiel salient, to be carried out by the middle of that month; the
second, now known as the Meuse-Argonne operation, was to be launched
between the 20th and 25th of the month in conjunction with the French
Fourth Army, both armies under the direction of General Petain.
The St. Mihiel salient was very strong, both naturally and artificially.
Its western face lay on the Cotes de Meuse; on its southern face were Loup-
mont Ridge and Montsec, offshoots of the main heights, and the wooded and
hilly ground east to the Moselle near Pont-a-Mousson. Still, it was a salient,
with the inherent weaknesses of salients.
•Abstracted from Major Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, 1017-1!)18.
Prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College.
13576— 25 20 449
450 FIELD OPERATIONS
Its offensive value to the Germans lay in the fact that it interrupted com-
munication on the main Paris — Nancy railway, threatening at the same time
the entire region from Nancy to Bar-le-Duc, and from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun.
For defensive value, it directly covered Metz and the Briey iron country:
furthermore, it would have to be reduced before an offensive could be started
between the Meuse and the Argonne against the German lateral com-
munications.
The reduction of the salient itself, then, had become necessary; how
success should be exploited, whether directly toward Briey or by a separate
operation toward Mezieres, was not for American, but for the allied head-
quarters to say. But the first step, the local operation itself, would mean not
only a moral but a material gain, in restoring communications and territory,
and in substituting a threat against the German communications for the
existing one against the French.
At the beginning of the operation, the enemy line, which had held with
few changes for four years, ran along the woods and hills just north of the
Pont-a-Mousson — St. Mihiel highway, touching the Meuse at St. Mihiel, then
turned north, crossed the Cotes de Meuse, and dropped off into the Woevre
plain at Combres, just under Les Eparges; from here it followed the foot of
the heights north past Verdun. Behind this line was the fighting area called
the Wilhelm zone, following, in a general way, the shape of the salient. The
Schroeter zone filled the interior of the salient, behind an organized line from
Harville, east of Fresnes, around by Buxieres, northeast of St. Mihiel, to
Rembercourt, northeast of Thiaucourt. On the line Harville — Rembercourt
l>egan the withdrawal position, which here consisted of two zones, called
Michel I and Michel II. The Michel I zone contained an organized position
which was connected with the front-line defenses by a switch line at the
Braquis salient, north of Fresnes, and on the other flank ran into the outer
defenses of Metz. The Michel II zone, behind this, showed little preparation.
Wire was a prominent feature of the defenses everywhere; the chief of stall
of the American Fourth Corps, after a reconnaissance, characterized the
whole salient as a " sea of wire." It was believed, however, that much of the
wire was rusted and in poor repair, which proved to be the case.
The general plan for the reduction of the salient called for two simul-
taneous attacks, one from the south through the wooded country east of
Montsec, and one from the west, across the Cotes de Meuse south of Les
Eparges. Between the two were to be follow-up and exploitation attacks,
amounting to a holding attack against the tip of the salient. Finally, certain
exploitation was planned, to be undertaken only on orders from the army
commander. The southern and western attacks were divided into three phases.
Divisions were to advance as rapidly as possible to the first phase line, re-
gardless of units on their flanks, bringing forward artillery into the captured
ground to support further advance. Each corps was then to advance, regard-
less of the other corps, to the first day line. The second day line was the
army objective, and the advance to it was to be made only on army orders.
PLATE XV.
Rattk linec, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, are approximate.
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 451
The intermediate attack was to neutralize the garrison at the point of
the salient; follow-up the enemy's attempts to withdraw; prevent his assem-
bling in the Foret de la Montagne, and otherwise protect the flanks of the
main attacks; and finally, in conjunction with the flank guards of those
attacks, to clear out the whole salient when cut off.
The southern attack was to be made by the American First and Fourth
Corps, in order from right to left. The American Fifth Corps was charged
with the western attack, and the French Second Colonial Corps with the
intermediate, which was to commence after the southern attack had started.
In conjunction with the western attack, the French Second Army was to
attack on the left of the American First Army and protect the flank.
The front from Port-sur-Seille to a point opposite Verdun was turned
over to General Pershing's command on August 30, and the assembly com-
menced. It involved not only the moving of 600,000 troops, with great quan-
tities of artillery, but putting together for the first time all the elements of
the First Army, and providing for its maintenance directly by our own
Service of Supply.
For supply, each of the two attacks was treated as an independent group,
with its own system of hospitals, depots, and railheads. The areas involved
were new to us, and all army installations had to be planned and placed
during the concentration and prior to the actual passing of the command in
the front line. This required many arrangements which would have been
finished already had the area been occupied by our troops before.
Hitherto, supply had been handled through our regulating station at
Is-sur-Tille. But this was 180 km. (111.7 miles) from the south face of the
salient, and so was not suitable for forwarding supplies by truck. Besides,
that station was much congested at this time, and it was apparent that one
such station could not handle the supplies for the army for this operation
and at the same time take care of the troops in the advance section of the
Service of Supply, and the French Seventh and Eighth Armies south of
Nancy. Arrangements were made, therefore, to place an American regu-
lating station at St. Dizier. The capacity of the regulating station here
was 1.000.000 men. and it could supply both the American First Army and
the French Second Army of 400.000 men.
The right of the American line was held by the First Corps, General
Liggett. It extended from Port-sur-Seille east of the Moselle to Limey,
crossing the river just north of Pont-a-Mousson. The 82d Division, east of
the river, was merely to follow up the attack on the west, which was made
by the 90th, 5th. and 2d Divisions, with the 78th Division in reserve. From
Limey to Kichecourt was the Fourth Corps, General Dickman, with the 89th.
42d, and 1st Divisions in line and the 3d Division in reserve. The French
Second Colonial Corps occupied a very broad front, from Richecourt all the
way around to Mouilly, with only three divisions, the French 39th. 26th, and
2d Light Infantry Divisions, in line and none in reserve, since their attack
was only a follow-up. From Mouilly to Watronville was our Fifth Corps,
General Cameron, with the American 26th, French 15th Colonial, and part
452 FIELD OPERATIONS
of the American 4th Divisions in line, and the rest of the 4th in reserve; the
attack was to be made by the 26th and French 15th Colonial, the 4th serving
to connect with the French Second Army on the left.
The artillery preparation began at 1 a. m. on September 12, 1918. Though
the Germans had commenced their withdrawal from the salient, nevertheless
the attack came as a tactical surprise, and they were thrown into the utmost
confusion by long-range artillery tire upon the roads. Fire directed against
the defenses proper was very effective in tearing up trenches and wire, and
driving the enemy under cover. The American superiority was overpowering,
especially as the enemy already was in process of withdrawing his guns, so
the reaction was very light.
The southern attack started at 5 a. m., September 12, preceded by a rolling
barrage, and assisted by French tanks, manned partly by French and partly
by Americans. Also engineer detachments went ahead to cut wire. To the
infantry the wire did not prove as great an obstacle as had been anticipated.
In many places it was old and in bad condition; some gaps had been cut by
the artillery, others were made by the tanks and engineers; and the enemy,
demoralized by the volume of fire and by the suddenness of the attack, was
unable to make a stubborn defense. All initial objectives were taken on
schedule time.
The western attack started at 8 a. m. and was equally successful. The
French corps in the center moved up as intended, connecting the two attacks
and cleaning out the point of the salient.
The entire attack was so evidently successful that the schedule was ad-
vanced, and the salient was cut off by a junction of the Fourth and Fifth
Corps at Vigneulles early in the morning of the 13th. The advance was halted
on the army objective. Artillery was brought up, defense of the line was
organized, patrols were pushed ahead, and the lines became stabilized alon^r
the front of the Michel I zone, above described. Many units were transferred
to the theater of the next operation, the Meuse-Argonne.
The purpose of the operation had been fully accomplished. The salient
had been eliminated; and, though the Germans could claim that they had
retired " according to plan," nevertheless, they had the distinct impression of
'• a serious defeat."' But more than this, the American Army was now an
accomplished fact. For the first time, wire entanglements ceased to be re-
garded as an impossible obstacle; open warfare training became the preemi-
nent consideration in all forces. The complete success with such small loss
gave such a spirit to our troops that they became immediately available for
employment in the heavy fighting of the next operation.
The strength of the First Army in the St. Mihiel operation was approxi-
mately 660,000 men, of whom about 110,000 were French. 1
MEDICAL DEl'AKTMEXT ACTIVITIES
During the period from the reduction of the Marne salient, with gradu-
ally lessening American participation there, to the time of our preparations
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION 453
for the St. Mihiel operation, shipments of materiel from the United States
had relieved somewhat, although far from satisfactory, our critical shortages.
In other words, Medical Department personnel and materiel were constantly
arriving, but not in proportion to meet initial shortages and at the same
time keep pace with the increased needs resulting from augmentation in
strength by the arrival of combat troops. 2
The medical department, through its G— 4 representatives, immediately
took steps to cooperate with the chief surgeon of the First Army in providing,
so far as possible, adequate hospitalization for the large number of casualties
that were anticipated in the forthcoming St. Mihiel operation. As the num-
ber of casualties apprehended happily was not realized, we found ourselves
for the first time facing a comforting situation of overhospitalization. Had
the number of casualties that we had every reason to expect actually devel-
oped, the Medical Department would again have found itself short in resources
and embarrassed in meeting its obligations. At this time our critical shortages
were in personnel, hospital equipment, ambulances, and hospital trains. The
shortage in personnel was particularly acute, as we had already withdrawn
from base hospitals all the personnel that could be spared without seriously
jeopardizing their efficiency. To help out in this emergency, it was necessary
to secure authority for the assignment of 1,200 men of the line from the
orthopedic training battalion to our mobile sanitary formations. These
men suffered from flat-foot, or other joint infirmities, but their acquisition at
this critical time tided us over another difficulty. 2
The medical service of the American Expeditionary Forces at this time
was short thousands of personnel, hundreds of ambulances, and many evacua-
tion hospitals. These conditions necessitated the adoption of dangerous ex-
pedients, such as the use of nonmedical personnel, employment of field
hospitals as evacuation hospitals, borrowing of ambulances from the French,
Italians, and from base hospitals, and the depletion of divisions in training,
base hospitals, and other organizations of all the personnel that could be
spared. Nearly all such reserves of the Medical Department were placed at
the disposal of our First Army, but all it was possible to secure were inade-
quate for the needs expected. 3
Our borrowing resources were exercised to the utmost possibilities.
Ambulances and hospital trains were borrowed from the French, who loaned
freely. The situation seemed so acute that 15 United States Army ambulance
sections sent to Italy direct from the United States for the Italian Govern-
ment were, through its prompt cooperation, detailed to our service and brought
up for use in the engagement. 2
The order of battle having been issued, it became evident that separate
hospitalization and evacuation facilities would have to be provided for the
Toul and Verdun fronts of the salient, respectively. Provision had to be made
also for evacuations from the French Second Colonial Corps (now a part of
the American First Army).
The tripartite nature of the hospitalization and evacuation required that
while the army chief surgeon remain at Neufchateau, both in order to co-
454 FIELD OPERATIONS
ordinate the Medical Department service of the entire army and to utilize
trunk-line telephone service to front and rear, he be represented on each
front by officers assigned for that and related purposes. Four medical officers
were therefore assigned to the Toul front, one as representative of the army
chief surgeon, one as assistant to that officer, while a third was in charge of
evacuation from all points west of Toul, and a fourth was director of am-
bulances. Similar services were performed by two medical officers on the
Verdun front. 4
Because of difficulties, which would have resulted in communication and
liaison between the American and French contingents, and because the sur-
geon of the French Second Colonial Corps was thoroughly acquainted with
his sector, no American represented the army chief surgeon on that front.
Instead, the surgeon of the French Second Colonial Corps was charged with
all duties incident to its evacuation service. Evacuations from the French
Second Colonial Corps were to be made to the following points, where French
hospitals already were in operation : Pierrefitte. Menil-la-Horgne, Loxeville.
Revigny, Void, Vaucouleurs, Commerce*, and Lignieres. Also sections of our
Evacuation Hospital No. 14 and of our Toul-Justice hospital group were re-
served for casualties among French artillery in the Toul area. 4
Estimates of the number of casualties that would be incurred in this op-
eration varied on the part of the different officers concerned from 30,000 to
75.000. That of the chief surgeon of the First Army was 33,000. For these
were provided G,000 beds in rear of the French Second Colonial Corps, 15,000
in the Toul area, and 4,500 in the Verdun region. 5
The French Department of Armies in the East was requested to signify
what fixed sanitary formations could be turned over to the American First
Army by the French Eighth and Second Armies for the Toul and Verdun
fronts, respectively. In addition to certain buildings previously assigned —
i. e., those occupied by Evacuation Hospital Xo. 1 at Sebastopol — the French
now turned over the following for American use : On the Toul front the
entire Justice group of barracks, the Perrin-Brichambault and Luxembourg
barracks and French Evacuation Hospital No. 10, all of these at Toul : the
French evacuation hospitals at Pagny-sur-Meuse, Trondes, Chaligny, and
La Malgrange. On the Verdun front were turned over the evacuation hos-
pitals at Souilly, Petit Maujouy (locations only), Vaubecourt, Benoite Vaux
Convent. Rambluzin, La Morlette. and Recourt. 6 The base hospitals at Neuf-
chateau. Bazoilles-sur-Meuse, Vittel, and Contrexeville were to be reserved
for preoperative and serious postoperative cases from the area east of St.
Mihiel, and the base hospitals at Chaumont, Rimaucourt, and Langres were
reserved for the same class of casualties from the area west of that point. The
base hospital at Dijon was to be reserved as a preoperative hospital in the
event of the other hospitals becoming overcrowded. 7
Before troops were mobilized for this offensive, a few army medical units
had been installed, as follows, to serve American needs: Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 1, Sebastopol Barracks, 3 km. (1.8 miles) north of Toul; Mobile
Hospital No. 39, Aulnois-sous-Vertuzey ; Convalescent Unit No. 1, Toul.
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 455
Medical formations mobilized for this offensive, including the foregoing,
were located at the points now to be mentioned: 5
Tool Front, Southern Front :
Sebastopol Barracks.— Evacuation Hospital No. 1, Mobile Hospital No. 3,
Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 8.
Aulnois-sous-V ertuzey . — Mobile Hospital No. 39.
Toul, Justice group. — Base Hospital No. 45, arrived August 20; Base
Hospital No. 51, arrived August 27. These units were established under the
jurisdiction of the Service of Supplies and technically were not under Army
control. They functioned, however, as evacuation hospitals. Evacuation
Hospital No. 14, at Perrin-Brichambault Barracks, arrived August 16. Evac-
uation Hospital No. 3, same location, arrived August 22. Gas Hospital con-
ducted by personnel from Base Hospital No. 45. Battalion of reclassified
soldiers, arrived August 24.
La Marche barracks annex. — Neurologic unit No. 2 (from Base Hospital
No. 117) in Favier Barracks, arrived August 25. Army Eed Cross Hospital
No. 114, in Luxembourg Barracks, arrived September 4. Contagious dis-
ease hospital, operated by Contagious Unit 1, already on duty in this area.
Ambulance Companies 132 and 319, arrived September 3. Evacuation Ambu-
lance Company No. 7, arrived September 1 ; Company 10, arrived August 31 :
Companies 11 and 12, arrived September 9; United States Army Ambulance
Section 599, arrived September 1.
Ghaligny. — Evacuation Hospital No. 13, arrived August 23; Field Hos-
pital 162, 1st Corps, established August 2.
La Malgrange (near Nancy). — Field Hospital No. 163, established August
22. United States Army Ambulance Section 601, arrived September 6.
Trondes. — Field Hospital No. 161, 1st Corps, established August 27.
-Mobile Hospital No. 4, arrived August 24. Ambulance Company No. 310,
arrived September 3.
Pagny-sur-Meuse. — Evacuation Hospital No. 12, arrived August 29.
Field Hospital No. 117, established August 28. Evacuation Ambulance Com-
pany No. 4, arrived August 28.
Sorcy. — Evacuation Hospital No. 11, arrived September 11. Field Hos-
pital No. 41 and Ambulance Company 41, established August 28.
Western Front:
Vaubecourt. — Evacuation Hospital No. 9, arrived August 29.
SouUly. — Evacuation Hospital No. 6, arrived August 25, and Evacuation
Hospital No. 7, arrived August 24. Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 2,
arrived September 13. United States Army Ambulance Service Section No.
521, arrived August 29, United States Army Ambulance Service Section No.
530, arrived September 6.
Petit Maujouy. — Evacuation Hospital No. 8, arrived August 26. Evacua-
tion Ambulance Companies Nos. 1 and 6, arrived August 28.
La Morlette. — Mobile Hospital No. 1, arrived September 5.
Recourt. — Mobile Hospital No. 2, arrived August 28.
Benoite Vaux Convent. — Neurological Unit No. 1 (from Base Hospital
117), arrived September 2.
456 FIELD OPERATIONS
Rambluzin. — Gas hospital operated by personnel of Ambulance Com-
pany No. 108. arrived August 28.
Froidos. — United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. G02, ar-
rived September 6. s
The medical supply dump for the Western Front was located at Souilly,
and for the Southern Front at Tonl. The French general hospital at Bar-
le-Duc provided 2,200 beds for an overflow of American casualties. 5
The ambulance companies which were attached to all evacuation hospitals
were reinforced by busses, both ordinary and sight-seeing."
Ten army ambulance sections were promised by the French, but only three
reported. Of these, one was held in reserve and the other two were used for
French casualties. 9
United States Army Ambulance Service Sections No. 520 and No. 570
served the First Army Corps sanitaiy train : Nos. 542 and 604 served the Fifth
Army Corps sanitary train. 8
Though it was appreciated that the wounded should be moved from the
front to hospitals as rapidly as possible, it was evident that their condition
upon arrival would be gravely impaired if their transport was hurried or if
they did not receive treatment to prepare them for the ambulance journey.
This was particularly true of the severely shocked and of those intoxicated by
phosgene. Orders wei'e therefore given directing that facilities be provided
for preliminary treatment of shocked and gassed cases near the front, and
forbidding the speeding of ambulances. 10
The following order, prepared by the army surgeon, gives such direc-
tions as were transmitted to the First, Fourth, and Fifth Corps.
Headquarters First Army,
American Expeditionary Forces,
September 6, 191S.
Annex No. 6 (Field Order No. 9) .
Subject: Plan of evacuation of sick and wounded and supply.
i. evacuation of sick and wounded
(a) 1st Corps, 4th Corps, and Army Troops
Severely wounded:
Army and corps troops in 1st Division Mobile Hospital No. 39 at Aulnois-sous-Vertuzey,
sector, including 1st Division. J^ km. south of Aulnois on Aulnois — Vertuzey
Road.
All other troops west of Moselle River. Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at Sebastopol, 5 km.
north of Toul on Toul— Menil La Tour Road.
All troops east of Moselle River Evacuation Hospital No. 13 at Chaligny, 10 km.
southwest of Nancy.
Evacuation Hospital No. 3 in the Justice group
of barracks just south of Toul will receive the
overflow from the above hospitals.
A careful sorting must be effected at the divisional
sorting stations so that these hospitals are not
overwhelmed with slight or gassed cases
necessitating a secondary evacuation to hos-
pitals to which they should have been sent
originally.
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION 457
Slightly wounded:
Army and corps troops in 1st Division Provisional hospital, Sorcy R. R. station, about
sector (including 1st Division). 1J^ km. north of Sorcy. Reached by one-way
road leaving Aulnois — Sorcy Road just north
of bridge over R. R. and crossing over canal.
4th Corps and army troops adjacent Provisional evacuation hospital at Pagny-sur-
to 4th Corps (less 1st Division). Meuse railroad station.
Provisional evacuation hospital, 1J^ km. north
of Trondes, on Trondes — Menil — La Tourroad.
1st Corps and army troops adjacent Evacuation Hospital No. 14 in the Perrin-
to 1st Corps. Brichambault section of the Justice group of
barracks just south of Toul.
All troops east of Moselle River Provisional evacuation hospital at La Malgrange,
1 km. south of Nancy on Nancy — Richard —
Menil road.
Gassed: All troops Gas hospital, La Marche section of Justice group
of barracks just south of Toul.
Contagious: All troops Hospital for contagious diseases in Justice group
of barracks just south of Toul.
Sick, nervous and shell concussion: Base Hospital No. 45, La Marche section, and
All troops. Base Hospital No. 51, Favier section of Justice
group of barracks just south of Toul.
Army artillery: U. S. and French Evacuation ambulance companies will be sta-
tioned; one at Dieulouard, one at Domevre-en-
Hayc, and one at Cornieville, subject to call of
regimental or battalion commanders of army
artillery units for transportation of wounded
from first aid stations to evacuation hospitals
as designated above.
(6) 5th Corps
Severely wounded: All troops Evacuation Hospital No. 8, at Petit-Maujouy,
1J^ km. cast of Senoncourt on Senoncourt —
Ancemont road.
Mobile Hospital No, 2, at Rccourt.
A careful sorting must be effected at divisional
sorting stations to preclude the danger of
these hospitals being overwhelmed with slight
or gassed cases necessitating a secondary
evacuation to Souilly, where they should have
been sent originally.
Slightly wounded and sick: All troops Evacuation Hospitals Nos. 6 and 7 at Souilly.
Evacuation Hospital No. 9 at Vaubecourt.
Gassed: All troops Gas hospital, Rambluzin, 3 km. east of Hcippes,
on Heippes — Recourt road.
Nervous and shell concussion: All troops. Benoite-Vaux, 7 km. southeast of Souilly on
Reeourt-Neuvillc road (selected cases).
(c) 2d Colonial Corps (French)
As prescribed by Corps Commander.
II. EVACUATION OF ANIMALS
1st and 4th Corps To army evacuation stations at Jeanne d'Arc
Caserne, 3 miles east of Toul, on Toul — Nancy
road.
5th Corps To army animal evacuation station at Souilly.
2d Colonial Corps (French) As directed by corps commander.
13570—25 30
458 FIELD OPERATIONS
III. RAIL HEADS
1st Corps:
82d Division Belleville.
90th Division Belleville.
5th Division Gare-de la-Ferme-Boy er.
2d Division Gare-de la-Ferme-Boyer.
78th Division Toul.
Corps troops Belleville.
4th Corps:
89th Division Manoncourt.
42d Division Manoncourt.
1st Division Sorcy.
3d Division Toul.
Corps troops Manoncourt.
5th Corps:
26th Division Rattentout.
4th Division Rattentout.
Corps troops Rattentout.
2d Colonial Corps (French) As directed by corps commander.
Army reserve:
35th Division Champigneulles.
91st Division Sorcy.
Army troops As separately assigned.
*******
Note. — The hospitals at Trondes, operated by Field Hospital 161, Ambulance Com-
pany 101, and Mobile Hospital No. 4 were omitted from the battle order and were but
little used in comparison with others. However, had any severe resistance been en-
countered by the center divisions they would have been our foremost evacuation center.
From this point, in contradistinction to others, any required number of hospital trains
could have been dispatched.
The activities of certain army units of the Medical Department will be
discussed below, after the histories of the several divisions engaged have
been given .
An agreement was made with the French for placing 45 of their hospital
trains at the disposal of our regulating officer at St. Dizier. These, with the
20 American trains already available, it was thought would bo sufficient. 4
American hospital trains were to be employed for the long hauls to base
hospitals in the intermediate and base sections which required travel from 8
to 24 hours, and the French trains were to be used for evacuations to the base
hospitals in the advance section. 7
The plan of train evacuations was essentially that adopted and issued
as an order by General Headquarters on the 29th of August, 1918. The regu-
lating station at Is-sur-Tille was to receive reports concerning bed space direct
from the base hospitals in the advance section and from the chief surgeon.
S. O. S., for the base hospitals in the intermediate and base sections. This
regulating station then allotted beds in all base hospitals to the regulating
station at St. Dizier, which handled the train evacuations from the First
Army area. 7
Secondary evacuations — that is, from one base hospital to another — were
regulated by the Is-sur-Tille station
7
ST. MIH1EL OPERATION 459
As the battle developed, the vast majority of the casualties drained into
the evacuation and base hospitals in and about Toul. Train evacuations were
immediately begun as the casualties arrived, but as the operation succeeded
even beyond the highest hopes, the number of these happily was so small
that the system of train evacuations adopted for this engagement was never
actually given a thorough trial. 7
As mentioned elsewhere, there were only 17 hospital trains dispatched
from the Toul front, which evacuated 6,539 cases, including a large number
of sick to make room for battle casualties, and only 5 trains from the Verdun
front, evacuating 725. 7
REFERENCES
(1) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1. 1919.
(2) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q.,
A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31, 1918, 56.
On file, Historical Divison, S. G. O.
(3) Medical activities of the American Expeditionary Forces in the Zone of the Armies,
by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C, chief surgeon. First Army, undated, 11. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Final report of chief surgeon, First Army, upon the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne
offensives, undated, 4, 5. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(5) Medical activities of the American Expeditionary Forces in the Zone of the Armies,
by Col. A. X. Stark. M. ('.. chief surgeon, First Army, undated, 9. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(6) Final Report of chief surgeon, First Army, upon the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne
offensives, undated, 2. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(7) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C, chief surgeon,
Second Army, undated, 27. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(8) Letter from chief surgeon. First Army, to assistant chief of staff, G-3, February C,
1919. Subject : Report of Medical Department units, First Army. On file. His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(9) Final report of chief surgeon, First Army, upon St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne
offensives, undated, 5. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
110) Evacuation system in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. X. Stark. M. ('.. chief
surgeon, First Army, undated, 1. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
CHAPTER XV
THE FIRST CORPS (82D, 90TH, 5TH, 2D, AND 78TH DIVISIONS)
As has been stated in the preceding chapter, the First Corps in the
St. Mihiel operation, comprised the 82d, 90th, 5th, and 2d Divisions, with the
78th Division in reserve. 1
On September 11, 1918, the First Corps held a 19-km. (11.8 miles) sector,
from Limey to Port-sur-Seille. The 82d Division held the sector from Port-
sur-Seille to Bois le Pretre, the 90th Division from the eastern edge of Bois le
Pretre to Limey. The 5th and 2d Divisions were disposed in depth behind
these detachments, the 5th Division from Mamey to Remenauville, the 2d
Division from Kemenauville to Limey. 2
Artillery preparation for the attack began at 1 a. m., September 12. The
infantry attack began at 5 a. m. the same morning, on a front extending from
Limey to Fey-en-Haye. 2
The advance to the first phase line was made according to schednle.
Progress to the army objective was rapid, and by 3 p. m., September 12, this
objective had been attained. 2
The second day of the operation, September 13, the position of the 2d
and 5th Divisions was organized. The 90th Division exploited its advance
of September 12, took the town of Vilcey and the Bois de Presle, and estab-
lished outposts 0.5 km. (0.31 mile) south of Norroy. 2 The 82d Division,
maintaining contact with the right of the 90th Division, captured Norroy.
On September 14, further exploitations by the 90th Division advanced
the line beyond Villers-sous-Preny. 2
On September 15, conditions were stabilized and the sector was fairly
quiet. 2
Throughout the operation, transportation of supplies and traffic control
were the greatest problems. Previous to the attack, all movements were made
at night to maintain secrecy of movement. As it had been generally cloudy
;ind rainy for the week preceding the attack, the nights were exceedingly
dark. 2 After the advance across No Man's Land, secrecy of movement was
no longer essential, but traffic over the destroyed roads moved slowly, even
by day. 2
For the routes of communication, supply, and evacuation of the divisions
of the corps, during the St. Mihiel operation, the following order was issued:
G-l-107 Headquarters First Army Corps,
6 September, IS— 11.00 a. m.
Annex 7 (to P. O. 49)
PLAN OK COMMUNICATIONS, SUPPLY, AND EVACUATION
8. Plan of evacuation of sick and wounded :
1. Sanitary organization.
(n) Battalion aid stations, relays of litter bearers, and regimental aid stations will
be established by regimental surgeons under tlie supervision of their respective Division
461
462 FIELD OPERATIONS
Surgeons. In no case will a battalion or regimental aid station be located at the same
place as the regimental P. C.
(6) Sorting and advance dressing stations (triages) will be established as follows:
2d Division, Noviant-aux-I'ros.
oth Division, Martincourt.
90th Division, Griscourt.
82d Division, Dieulouard.
These stations will be located oft' the main traffic route, preferably just outside of
the town. This to avoid congestion and traffic blocks.
Regulations governing evacuation from triages as prescribed in Memorandum
G-l— 18. these headquarters, September 3, 1018.
(c) Evacuation points:
Seriously sick and gas cases. — Evacuation Hospital No. 45, Justice barracks, Toul.
All surgical cases (wounded and civil surgery), Evacuation Hospital No. 1, Sebas-
topol, just north of Toul.
(d) Evacuation routes:
2d Division, via its axial road as far as Iloyaumeix ; thence on the Menil-la-Tour —
Toul road to destination.
5th Division, via its axial road to Villiers-en-Haye ; thence S. E. to the Dieulouard —
Toul road, and on that road to destination.
90th Division, via its axial road to Dieulouard; thence on Dieulouard — Toul road to
destination.
82d Division, direct from Dieulouard on the Dieulouard — Toul road to destination.
(c) Army and corps troops (both French and American) will use the evacuation
system and units of the nearest division.
(f) The sanitary units of the 78th will be held subject to the call of the corps
surgeon for use where needed. If this division reinforces the line it will use the sanitary
organizations and system of evacuation of the division it reinforces or relieves.
(<7) If additional transportation is needed, call will be made on the corps surgeon,
who has at his disposition the ambulance companies of the 78th Division and those of the
corps. If conditions warrant it the corps surgeon may use two ambulance companies of
the 82d Division.
( h ) The corps surgeon will make every effort to use returning empties on the narrow
gauge line to assist in evacuation. Triages have been located with this in view, and as
far as practicable in making forward locations of triages this point should be considered
by division and the corps chief surgeons.
9. Evacuation of animals:
1. Corps advance collecting point.
In point of woods just south of the Rau d'Esch. between Gezoncourt and Griscourt.
Tlie corps veterinarian will have charge of this station and the corps mobile
veterinary hospital located there.
'-'. Emergency evacuations may be made direct on proper notification to the corps
veterinarian. For other evacuations and evacuation of large numbers, arrangements will
l>e made with G-l. these headquarters.
*******
Paragrapli 8, plan of es'acuation of sick and wounded, changes and additions:
(a) Seriously wounded of all troops east of Moselle River: To Evacuation Hospital
No. 13 at Chaligny, 10 kilometers, southwest of Nancy.
Note. — Overflow of seriously wounded from Evacuation Hospitals No. 1 at Sebastopol
and No. 13 S. \V. of Nancy go to Evacuation Hospital No. 3 in the Justice group of barracks
just south of Toul.
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION 463
(6) Slightly wounded:
1st Corps and army troops adjacent to Evacuation Hospital No. 14, in the Perrins-Richam-
lst Corps. bault section of the Justice group of barracks
just south of Toul.
All troops east of Moselle River Evacuation hospital at La Malgrange, 1 kilometer
south of Nancy on the Nancy — Richard — Menil
road.
(c) Gassed :
All troops Gas hospital, La Marche section of the Justice group
of barracks just south of Toul.
(d) Contagious:
All troops Hospital for contagious diseases in Justice group of
barracks just south of Toul.
(e) Sick, nervous, and shell con-
cussion :
All troops Base Hospital No. 45, La Marche section, and Base
Hospital No. 51, Favier section of Justice group
of barracks just south of Toul.
(/) Evacuation route: For troops east of the Moselle River, Atton — Bezaumont —
Autreville — Millery — Custines — Bouxieres — Nancy.
*******
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The Medical Department problems of the First Corps during the St. Mihiel
operation were relatively simple of solution. There was a limited objective,
distances were comparatively short, transportation was sufficient, and hos-
pitalization ample, casualties being far below what had been anticipated and
prepared for. The only real difficulties were those incident to road obstruc-
tion and consequent congestion. Prior to the opening of this operation, no
traffic beyond what was normal had been permitted by day. Night traffic,
however, was enormous, and as several nights were rainy, especially the night
preceding the attack, roads became much congested and progress often was
distressingly slow. However, there was no alarming check such as occurred
later in the Meuse-Argonne operation. 3
For transportation, in addition to the division ambulances and trucks, the
First Corps had its sanitary train of three motor ambulance companies, and
seven additional ambulance companies supplied by the First Army and placed
under the control of the corps surgeon. This supply was ample. The three
field hospitals belonging to the corps sanitary train w 7 ere borrowed by the
First Army and used by it as evacuation hospitals at Chaligny and La Mal-
grange during tins operation. After the operation they were returned and
functioned as an important part of the corps evacuation system during oper-
ations in the Meuse-Argonne. 4 Evacuation worked smoothly. As the enemy's
resistance was feeble, battle-field conditions were at no time very insanitary.
The corps medical service was faced with the same problems as in the oper-
ations near Chateau-Thierry, but they gave much less concern and their solu-
tion was less difficult. 4
464 FIELD OPERATIONS
On August 26 the following circular was published by the corps surgeon : 5
Memorandum to all division surgeons, First Army Corps :
For the purpose of securing uniformity in splinting and the best results in fracture
cases, the following instructions are issued :
1. All fractures are to be splinted at the earliest possible moment. This means where
the man falls, if possible. If this is impossible, the splint should be applied at the bat-
talion aid post. No fracture should pass through the advanced dressing station unsplinted.
2. The Thomas full or half ring extension splint will be used for all fractures of the
lower extremities from the pelvis to the ankle.
3. The Cabot posterior wire splint or wire ladder splint is to be used for all wounds
of the ankle and foot and of the knee joint without fracture of the long bones.
(Note. — All wounds of knee are to be splinted, no matter how slight they may be.)
4. The hinged traction arm splint will be used for fractures of the humerus, elbow,
and upper forearm.
5. Ladder and wood splints will be used in fractures of the long bones where traction
splints can not be efficiently applied and also to supplement such splints.
6. The fact that traction is the Immobilizing factor in all traction splints should never
be lost sight of, and the utmost care should be taken to apply the proper degree of traction
to obtain fixation.
7. Bring this to the attention of the division orthopedist and see that these instruc-
tions are carefully followed.
When Field Order Xo. 49, September 6, 1918, was issued it was not known
that ambulance companies mentioned under subparagraph " g," paragraph 8
above, would be available. Subparagraph "h" of the field order in question
was added by A. C. of S., G-l, of the corps after consultation with corps sur-
geon. The latter notified G-l of his desire to use these narrow-gauge railway
lines if practicable and stated that triages had been placed with their utiliza-
tion in mind. G-l concurred and added the subparagraph to the order. As a
matter of fact these " empties " were not used, ambulance transportation hemp
ample and more practicable. 6
One company of Pioneer Infantry to make burials was assigned to each
division participating in the advance, except with the 90th Division. Only
one-half a company was allotted to it, as this division had not been assigned as
active a part as had others and it was not expected that it would suffer many
casualties, its special mission being to protect the right flank of the southern
advance. Xo Pioneer Infantry was assigned to the 82d Division, as it was
simply to hold its position and it was not anticipated that the number of dead
on the battle field would be large, and these the division could inter without
assistance.
The following was inserted as paragraph 12 of Annex 7. Field Order Xo.
49, September 6. 1918 : 7
12. Burials:
(a) Every effort will be made to promptly and properly bury the dead and to secure
proper identifications.
(6) Dead animals will be promptly buried to avoid pollution of water sources,
(c) To assist in the burial of the dead and for salvage work within divisions the
Corps Engineer will furnish labor as follows :
To the 2d Division, 1 company of Pioneer Infantry.
To the 5th Division, 1 company of Pioneer Infantry.
To the 90th Division, one-half company of Pioneer Infantry.
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION 465
These troops will work with divisional graves registration units and salvage units
under the supervision and direction of division quartermasters.
Burial troops, it will be observed, were detailed to work under the division
quartermaster. This plan did not prove entirely satisfactory, and they were
detailed later to work under the division sanitary inspector, an arrangement
which proved more so. T With these special burial details available, battlefield
conditions were much improved over those previously existing. The dead were
buried promptly, and though dead animals were not disposed of as satisfac-
torily as was desired, conditions never became actually insanitary.
In addition to their burial duties, these Pioneer Infantry troops were
required to do salvage work ; but this was soon found to interfere consider-
ably with prompt disposition of the dead, and later the troops in question
were detailed for burial work exclusively during battle activities. During
quiet periods they were utilized for other duties. 7
The corps sanitary inspector was especially concerned in the supervision
of burial groups and in examination and purification of water supplies.
The consultants, now well organized and familiar with their work, pro-
moted appreciably the professional services within divisions. While, as
hauls were short, no surgery was performed in advance of evacuation hospitals,
the surgical consultant had little to do at the front. In other specialties,
however, the consultants were very active in divisions and by continued
inspections were able to discover and correct defects, to recognize and
encourage good work, and to keep the corps surgeon accurately and promptly
informed concerning professional service.
The prevention and treatment of surgical shock and hemorrhage were
thus made the duty of medical officers generally in order that operating
surgeons might devote themselves exclusively to surgical interference. 8
THE 82D DIVISION
Commencing on the night of August 15-16, the 82d Division relieved the
2d Division in the Marbache sector astride the Moselle River and held this
sector in the St. Mihiel operation, September 12 to 16. During this operation
it advanced the left of its line, to maintain connection with the 90th Division,
at the same time retaining contact with the French 125th Division on the
right. It captured Norroy, September 13, and Vandieres on the 15th.
medical. department activities
Ambulance Companies
Headquarters of the ambulance company section and of Ambulance Com-
pany No. 325 had been established at Millery, on August 15. The latter at
once established a dressing station at Pont-a-Mousson, where it remained
throughout the St. Mihiel operation. Subsequent to that action it assumed
the character of a triage. 10 United States Army Ambulance Section No. 647
466 FIELD OPERATIONS
was also stationed at Millery during this operation. Ambulance Company
No. 32G was placed in reserve at Champigneulles. 10
Ambulance Company No. 327, with headquarters at Dieulouard, estab-
lished a dressing station at Blenod-les-Pont-a-Mousson, and after the operation
located another at Norroy on the afternoon of September 16. there taking
over tlie regimental aid station of the 328th Infantry. 10
Ambulance Company No. 328 and United States Army Ambulance Service
Section No. 647 also established headquarters at Millery. 10 Before the
action, ambulances were pooled, the light ones being ordered to work between
regimental or battalion aid stations and the ambulance company dressing
station, and the heavy vehicles to work from this point to the triage. Patients
were removed from the triage by evacuation ambulance companies. 10
Field Hospitals
Field Hospitals Nos. 325, 326, and 327 were stationed at Millery in a
large French hospital which had been turned over to them for the care of
sick, gassed, and seriously wounded patients, respectively.
Field Hospital No. 328 was located at Dieulouard. where it established
a triage for troops on the left bank of the Moselle. This unit occupied a
tannery which afforded ample housing facilities and was situated beside a
good road so that it was readily accessible to ambulances. The location was
shelled during four nights and on the morning of September 17 was struck
by a shell which killed 6 and wounded 4 of the personnel on duty. No patients
were injured, there being but few in hospital at the time. 11
Casualties did not begin to arrive at the triage until about eight hours
after the preparatory barrage had begun, September 12. During this offensive
the enemy used phosgene and mustard gases, and about 600 men affected by
them were received. Many of these were evacuated to the rear, but some were
held for 48 hours and then returned to duty. Apparently only a few were
badly affected, though it was difficult to estimate delayed effects, as a number
of these patients were evacuated very shortly after admission to hospital. 12
The largest number of casualties in this division during the St. Mihiel
operation came from the 328th Infantry. This was because the 328th In-
fantry was the only regiment of the division west of the Moselle and the only
one involved in the attack.
THE OOTH DIVISION
On the morning of September 12. 1918, the 90th Division held an irregu-
lar front line which extended from a point west of Fey-en-Haye to a point
northwest of Montrichard."
At 5 a. m., the division attacked, with its two infantry brigades side by
side, the 179th Brigade on the left and the 180th Brigade on the right. The
right of the 180th Brigade did not advance on the first day. 14
The advance of the 357th Infantry. 179th Brigade, kept well up with the
barrage, and reached the first day's objective at 1 p. m. The advance of the
PLATE XVI
ST. MIHIEL
3 2 nd DIVISION
Scale In Kilometers
References - Drawn fr
Fre?£h Map COMMCRCY.
Positions of Medical Units
from Reports of Division
Surgeon, 82— Division.
■r?N9l
Battle lines, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1,1919, are approximate.
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 467
358th Infantry was frequently checked by enemy machine guns and snipers.
but at 11.27 a. m. the first clay's objective was reached. 14
In its operations, September 12-14. the division occupied Vilcey-sur-Trey,
Neuf Moulin Ferine, and Villers-sous-Preny ; and from September 15-16 it
advanced to and occupied Les Huit Chemins, and captured Hill 827, northwest
(if Vand ieres. 13
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
All sick patients had been evacuated from the field hospitals on the night
of September 11-12. 15 The divisional supply unit was located at Griscourt at
the triage (Field Hospital No. 357), with instructions concerning exchange
of litters and blankets, both at the triage and at the dressing stations. During
the succeeding busy days there was very little complaint of litter shortage. 1 "'
During this offensive the division surgeon's office was located at Villers-
en-Haye in the rear echelon of division headquarters, in close touch with G-l. 10
Collecting stations for advance companies and battalions aid stations were
estahlished by regimental surgeons after consultation witli the division sur-
geon, but after the advance began they were located by battalion surgeons in
accordance with their needs. 16 The companies were served by two enlisted
men of the Medical Department attached to each and by litter bearers detached
from the line. Battalion aid stations were kept well supplied with medical
department materiel- All regimental aid stations moved forward to their
organization control posts. 16
When, as was the case, a shortage of bearers in the battalions was reported,
litter bearers from Ambulance Companies No. 357 and No. 359 were sent
forward and assigned to the battalion surgeons in greatest need of their
services. 17 Ambulances returning to the point carried food and canteens
full of hot coffee to the wounded and to litter bearers of organizations at the
front. The battalion surgeons and their personnel worked under the most try-
ing and exhausting conditions, with no rest, and, at times, little food. 17
During the offensive, dental surgeons and their assistants were attached
to regiments, where they performed first-aid service under the same con-
ditions as other Medical Department personnel. 17
Owing to the rapid advance and to bad roads, the medical carts could
not go forward with their battalions, and supplies had to be carried to aid
stations by enlisted men. For this reason much property was temporarily
discarded: later it was collected by the supply officer. 18
Liaison was maintained by means of runners, between dressing sta-
tions and regimental surgeons, who were relied upon to maintain communi-
cation with the battalion stations. Five selected men from Ambulance
Company No. 357 and an equal number from Ambulance Company No. 359
were detailed for this duty with the surgeons of the 179th and 180th Brigades,
respectively. Each of these groups was under the direction of one of its
members, who was held responsible for results. The arrangement proved
satisfactory and was continued throughout subsequent operations. 15 Bicycles
salvaged after the initial advance were of considerable assistance in main-
468 FIELD OPERATIONS
taining contact between forward stations, while between dressing stations,
triage, and field hospitals, motorcycles and ambulances were employed for
this purpose. 15
Ambulance Companies
Ambulance companies were distributed as follows : Company No. 357,
with a dressing and degassing station, at Jonc Fontaine, served the 179th
Brigade. Next day (September 13) it established an advance station at Fey-
on-llaye. 15 Until the road through Norroy was opened on the afternoon of
September 14, only one road, that through Fcy-en-Haye, was available for
ambulances, and after the initial advance all forward roads were almost im-
passable because of barricades, wire entanglements, and other obstacles. 15 As
the road through Norroy was under enemy balloon observation and subject
to direct shell fire, it soon had to be abandoned. 1 "' On the 14th this company
and Ambulance Company No. 359 were each aided by six ambulances from
Ambulance Company No. 358. 10
Ambulance Companj* No. 358, with a dressing station at Gezoncourt,
served the Artillery, furnishing vehicles to other companies, as above noted. 16
Ambulance Company No. 359, which had established a dressing and de-
gassing station at Jezainville, served the 180th Brigade on the right of the
line. The next day it advanced its station to Montauville. 10
Ambulance Company No. 360 was located at Joli Ferme near Griscourt,
where it was technically in reserve though actually occupied in the removal
of the sick. 15 On the night of September 11-12 it sent forward half its
bearer section to reinforce Ambulance Company No. 359. 15
On the morning of September 12 the litter bearer sections of Ambulance
Companies 357 and 359, supplemented by 80 men from Ambulance Company
360, went forward to battalion aid stations, and by 8 o'clock patients were
arriving at the triage. From that time the flow of casualties was constant,
most of the first day's patients coming from the 358th and 359th Infantry
Regiments. During the first few days there were comparatively few gassed
patients, but subsequently the percentage was high. 15
Throughout the occupation of the Toul sector, ambulances drove directly
to battalion aid stations, almost without exception, and carried the wounded
to the triage. Much tedious drudgery was thus saved the litter bearers, and
wounded men reached the triage from one to three hours earlier than other-
wise would have been the case. In one instance patients loaded near Norroy
reached Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at Sebastopol barracks within three hours
after being wounded. 20 On an average, patients received at battalion aid
stations were at the triage an hour and a half later. The average time con-
sumed in getting a patient from the place where his wound was received to
the triage was not more than four hours. 20
During operations in this sector all truck transport for the ambulance
companies was pooled under the supply officer of the sanitary train, subject
to G-l, section headquarters. 90th Division, and trucks were sent where needed.
Ambulance companies furnished drivers but were not assigned trucks except
upon requisition. 20
PLATE XVII.
Battle lines, taken from Final Report, CJen. John J Pershing, September 1 , 1919, are approximate.
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION
469
During September 12 it became necessary to call on G-l of the division
for additional transportation to evacuate the triage. Several touring cars
were furnished in addition to those in use by the division surgeon and the
sanitary train; trucks were also used to transport slightly wounded men to
Sebastopol. At 3.30 p. m. an appeal was made to the corps surgeon for ambu-
lances and trucks, but none were available. At 1 a. m., on the 13th, 15 large
trucks were furnished by G-l of the division, for one trip only, to be returned
in five hours. This necessitated evacuation of patients to Field Hospital No.
359 at Rosieres-en-Haye instead of to Toul. 20
Field Hospitals
Field hospitals were located as follows: No. 357 at Griscourt operated
the divisional triage, its personnel being supplemented by the consultants in
surgery, orthopedics, and psychiatry and by the divisional gas officer. 21 Field
Hospital No. 358 at Rogeville, received the gassed and slightly sick. 21 Field
Hospital No. 359, near Rosieres-en-Haye, had been designated as the unit to
care for severely wounded patients, but owing to a corps order forbidding
major operations in field hospitals, it received only minor cases. 21
Field Hospital No. 360 was ordered to transport its equipment to Camp
Jonc Fontaine, but its personnel was on duty at Field Hospital No. 357, where
it assisted the triage personnel by serving as night relief. 21
Patients passing through the triage were evacuated as follows: Gas and
slight medical cases to Field Hospital No. 358 ; surgical cases to Evacuation
Hospital No. 1, Sebastopol ; psychoneuroses and serious medical cases to Base
Hospital No. 45, Toul, for further distribution.* 1 Except for limited trans-
portation facilities, evacuation was easy, for roads were direct, in good condi-
tion, and free from shell fire. 21
THE 5TH DIVISION
Commencing on September 8. the 5th Division took its place on a line
running from just southeast of Remenauville to about 1 km. (0.6 mile) north-
east of Regnieville, on the southern face of the St. Mihiel salient. 22
The divisional order concerning the plans of communication, supply and
evacuation read as follows :
Secret Field Order
No. 41.
Maps: Commercy, 1/80000
5th Division, Sept., 18 — 12 hours.
Chambley
Bois de Prete
* *
1/20000
Annex No. 7 to Field Orders #41
PLAN FOB COMMUNICATION. SUPPLY, AND EVACUATION
*******
Z Roads.
(o) Corps axial road: Saizerais — Villers-en-Haye — Griscourt — thence northwest
through the Foret de Puvenelle to Mamey — Regnieville — Thiaucourt — Ohnrey.
470 FIELD OPERATIONS'
(6) Axial rond of the Fifth Division: Ferine Boyer — north to the Manoncourt — Roy-
aumeix road — east to Manoncourt — Tremblecourt — nortlieast to Villers-en-Haye — Gris-
court — northwest through the Foret de Puvenelle — Mamey — Regnieville — northwest to
cross roads one kilometer east of La Griziere Farm — one kilometer east of La Griziere
Farm — thence to Vievllle-en-Haye — northwest to Jaulny, thence north to Rembercourt
and northeast along railroad.
*******
9. Evacuation of sick and wounded.
(a) Battalion and regimental aid stations will lie located in the rear of their organi-
zations at places designated by regimental surgeons after consultation with regimental
commanders.
(ft) Regimental surgeons will keep in touch with the units of the sanitary train in the
rear. Upon location of the regimental dressing stations, they will notify the officer in
charge of the ambulance dressing station as to its whereabouts. Routes from regimental
aid stations will be marked by the regimental medical personnel.
(c) An ambulance dressing station will be located on the Metz road near the bridge
crossing the Ache River. Those who are wounded during the early part of the engage-
ment will be brought to that point.
(d) As the advance is made it may be found that a number of casualties occur and
that the litter bearer force is insufficient for their transportation to the rear. Regi-
mental surgeons will then establish collecting stations for twenty (20) or more wounded
making use of such shelters as are available, preferably near roads, and will notify the
ambulance dressing stations where the wounded are to be found.
(e) Upon receipt of such notification, ambulances will be sent to evacuate the wounded
or, if the number of wounded is sufficient, an ambulance dressing station will be estab-
lished by the director of ambulance companies at the place.
(f) The first ambulance dressing station will be established by personnel of Ambu-
lance Company #17 on the Metz road. The second ambulance dressing station may be
established in the vicinity of Regnieville-en-Haye. The third ambulance dressing station
a point about two kilometers in advance of the second. As soon as the first dressing
station is cleared, its personnel will be available for establishment of another dressing
station. This work will be conducted by the director of ambulance companies under
supervision of the commander of the sanitary train.
({>) The triage will be located at Camp-de-Cirque. eight hundred (S0O) meters north
of the cross roads at St. Jean. Messages to the commander of the sanitary train and the
director of ambulance companies will be sent to the triage by returning ambulances.
The following information will be sent :
(1) The number and location of wounded and gassed to be evacuated.
(2) Notification of establishment of advanced ambulance dressing stations.
(3) Requests for splints, dressings, and other material.
(4) Such other data as may be necessary to enable the commander of the sanitary
train to promptly furnish required transportation and assistance.
(ft) Tetanus antitoxin will ordinarily be administered at regimental dressing stations,
notation being made upon the diagnosis tag of the patient. Administration of morphine
will likewise be noted.
(i) Severe casualties will be evacuated by ambulance, preference being given as
follows :
(1) Severe hemorrhage.
(2) Abdominal wounds, not in shock.
(3) Severely gassed.
(4) Wounds of thorax.
(5) Fractures.
(}) Slight casualties who are not returned to the line will be evacuated by truck. Al!
wounded will pass through the triage at Camp-de-Cirque, near St. Jean, one kilometer
PLATE XVI 1 1.
ST. MIHIEL
5 th DIVISION
Scale In Kilo meters
Battle lines, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing. September 1 . 1919. are approximate.
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 471
northwest of Martlncourt, where they will be given such immediate treatment as may
lie required.
No casualty will be evacuated from a divisional area without a diagnosis tag.
(fc) Vehicles used for evacuation will follow the routes and directions of the circula-
tion map furnished herewith.
(J) In addition to troops of the 5th Division engaged in combat at the front line,
medical attention will be given to troops of the French Tank Service, troops of the divi-
sions operating on each flank, and enemy wounded. Casualties occurring among other
troops will follow the same routes of evacuation as those prescribed for troops of this
division.
(m) A station for slightly wounded will be established at St. Jean. Considerable de-
lay is anticipated in opening truck roads in advance of the present front line positions, as
barbed-wire and road obstructions must be removed. For this reason, it is desirable that
as many of the slightly wounded as are able to walk return to the rear on foot. None
will be allowed to pass the military police who are not marked with a diagnosis tag.
(») Tetanus antitoxin will be administered at the triage and station for slightly
wounded to all wounded who have not already received it.
(0) A reserve of medical officers and medical department personnel from ambulance
I'ompany #30 will be held at the triage at Camp-de-Cirque, near St. Jean, to replace casual-
ties in regimental medical department personnel.
Request for personnel to replace casualties will be made to the commander of the
sanitary train at the triage.
(p) The commander of the sanitary train will render reports to the division surgeon
at Martincourt, viz:
(1) The approximate number of casualties reported.
(2) The report of casualties in Medical Department personnel.
(3) The number of patients evacuated to the field and evacuation hospitals.
{q) The surgeons of artillery organizations operating in the Oth Division area will
report to the division surgeon of the 5th Division at Martincourt —
(1) The name and location of the organization with which they are on duty.
(2) Its approximate strength.
(3) The medical department personnel, officers and enlisted men attached.
(4) Request for necessary transportation and material.
The initial report on these subjects will be rendered as soon as possible after receipt
of this order and additional reports regarding casualties to be evacuated and service re-
', -<m1 will be made as occasion demands.
(r) At the triage at Camp-de-Cirque, near St. Jean, will be stationed Field Hospital
#25 and Ambulance Companies #17, 25 and 30, with such part of the additional ambulance
transportation furnished by the corps surgeon as may be required for service in the ad-
vanced section. Trucks belonging to the sanitary train and trucks furnished for evacua-
tion service by the commander of trains will be sent to St. Jean to report for service under
the direction of the director of ambulance companies. The director of ambulance com-
panies and the A. P. M. will together select the place at St. Jean for the park of waiting
ambulances.
(«) Ambulances and trucks will be parked off from the usual traveled road in such a
way i hat traffic will not be obstructed.
(t) Evacuation from St. Jean will lie via Martincourt. Manonville, Domevre-en-Haye.
Tremblecourt. Manoncourt, Avrainville, to Dieulouard — Toul road, and thence to evacuation
hospitals located in or near Toul.
(«) Hospital for nontransportable wounded and gassed and for slightly sick.
(1) The hospital for nontransportable wounded and gassed and for slightly sick will
be located south of Domevre-en-Haye on the western side of the Manonville — Tremblecourt
road. At this place there will be located Field Hospital #17 and operating team #17 for
treatment of nontransportable wounded.
472 FIELD OPERATIONS
(2) Field Hospital #29 for treatment of gassed.
(3) Field Hospital #30.
(4) The division medical supply depot.
(5) The field laboratory.
(G) Ambulance Company #29.
(7) Ambulances of the 1st Corps, designated for evacuation service, together with
trucks allotted to this hospital by the commander of the sanitary train. The director of
field hospitals will be stationed at Domevre. He will supervise the hospitalization, triage,
and evacuation service for the corps and army. Artillery operating with the division,
as well as evacuation from hospital to Domevre to evacuation hospitals.
These hospitals will make use of the buildings and bathing facilities which are avail-
able at that place. In addition it will be necessary to make use of hospital tentage.
Tents will not be pitched until after dark on the night before the attack.
(v) Evacuation service for army and corps artillery :
An evacuation service for army and corps artillery will be established from the hospi-
tal at Domevre-en-Haye. Ambulances and trucks starting from Domevre-en-Haye will
proceed via the route to Tremblecourt, thence northeast to Rogeville, thence to Griscourt
to Gezoncourt, thence west to Martincourt, from Martincourt to Manonville, thence south-
east, returning to Domevre-en-Haye.
Surgeons of artillery organizations operating in the 5th Division area exclusive of
5th Artillery Brigade will establish collecting stations for wounded and gassed along this
road. They will notify the director of field hospitals at Domevre-en-Haye of the number
of casualties and location of these collecting stations.
(to) The director of field hospitals will keep the division surgeon informed with re-
gard to casualties and evacuations as prescribed in paragraph 16 of this order.
(x) A collecting place for casuals and soldiers who have become separated from their
organizations will be established by the military police at Avrainville. These men will
be used for furnishing details for laboring parties, burial parties, and additional litter
bearers. Bequests for additional litter bearers may be made to the commander of military
police, at Avrainville, by the commander of sanitary train at Camp-de-Cirque, at St. Jean,
or by the director of field hospitals at Domevre-en-Haye.
(y) Evacuation service for 5th Artillery Brigade:
Surgeons of the 19th, 20th, and 21st Field Artillery will utilize their own ambulances
for evacuation so far as possible. Should additional ambulance service be required, they
will send request for same to the director of ambulance companies at Camp-de-Cirque.
near St. Jean. There is a short road, one kilometer north of Martincourt, connecting
St. Jean with the Martincourt — Mamey road. This road may be used for quick evacua-
tion of patients from 5th Artillery positions.
(z) On the morning of the day before the anticipated action, all ambulances except
those belonging to the 19th, 20th, and 21st Field Artillery, the ammunition train, and the
motor supply train will be sent to report to the director of ambulance companies at St.
Jean.
(a-7) Evacuation hospitals.
(1) At Sebastopol barracks, about four kilometers northwest of Toul ; Evacuation
Hospital #1, for treatment of wounded. (Capacity about 8,000).
(2) At La Marctae barracks, "The Caserne," just south of Toul. Hospital for gassed.
(3) At Justice group of barracks, just south of Toul. Hospital for contagious
diseases.
(4) Hospital for sick, nervous, and shell concussion. Base Hospital #45, at La
Marche section, and Base Hospital #51, at Favier section of Justice group of barracks,
just south of Toul.
Note. — Overflow of seriously wounded from Evacuation Hospital #1, at Sebastopol.
go to the Evacuation Hospital #3 in the Justice group of barracks, just south of Toul.
In the service of the evacuation of wounded, effort will be made to load vehicles so
that as little loading and unloading as possible will be required at the triage and at the
field hospital.
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 473
Vehicles which are filled with patients destined for the same hospital may thus be
enabled to pass the triage with no longer delay than that incident to examination of
diagnosis tags.
Gassed and wounded patients will not be loaded in the same vehicle.
(a-2) While it is understood that ambulances carrying wounded are to be given all
of the right of way possible on the roads, when they are not actually transporting
wounded, they must clear the road for traffic the same as other vehicles. The parks of
waiting ambulances must be on side roads off of the main route of travel.
At 5. a. m. on September 12, the division moved to the attack and, meet-
ing little resistance, rapidly advanced its lines to north of Vieville-en-Haye.
When relieved on the night of September 16-17, it occupied a line about
southeast of Rembercourt. 22
MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Prior to the attack the division surgeon had held repeated conferences
with his medical officers, defining in detail the duties of each. 23
On September 9 the sanitary train was at Villey-St. Etienne, 20 km. (12.4
miles) in the rear, and because of troop movements and road conditions it was
impossible to bring more than a small part of it forward at that time. 24 On
September 10 Field Hospital No. 25 (triage) and Ambulance Company ~No. 30
(animal drawn) were advanced to St. Jean, giving opportunity for the estab-
lishment of the triage and for feeding the animals before the engagement
began. The hospital here consisted of two barracks and a ward tent. 24
During the night of September 11-12 the remainder of the sanitary train
moved from Villey-St. Etienne to Domevre, arriving next morning. One
motor ambulance company was sent forward to the dressing station at Metz
bridge. The other companies which were also posted there were held at the
disposition of the director of the ambulance company section, then at St.
•lean. 25
Medical department personnel with advancing troops accompanied the
units to which they were assigned, rendering service as planned. In order
to preclude shortage of supplies, so far as possible, regimental detachments
carried pouches filled with surgical dressings. 20 As it was impossible for the
battalion medical carts to go forward, medical officers replenished their
supplies, by means of litter bearers, from the advance medical supply depot
on the Metz road. 28
In the early part of this engagement the wounded were removed entirely
by litter, but there were not enough litters at first to meet requirements. Their
inadequacy was due to the fact that bearers detailed from the companies threw
away their litters on the march during the night of September 11 ; to the
inability of battalion medical carts to get forward through other traffic; and to
the impossibility of the ambulances moving beyond the points where roads
were cut by trenches or obstructed by wire entanglements, until the way had
been made passable. Shortage of litter bearers was met by using in that
capacity a large number of German prisoners. 27
474 FIELD OPERATIONS
Regimental surgeons reported every afternoon whether or not the field
had been cleared in order that additional searching parties might be sent out
if needed to complete this service before nightfall. If necessary, these parties
continued their work through the night until the field was reported by them
to have been cleared. 23
Roads were fairly good to within 4.8 km. (3 miles) of Regnieville; from
that point they had been practically obliterated. North of this belt were the
roads which the Germans had used, and these were found to be fairly good,
except that all roads were deep with mud. 25 Advance information concern-
ing enemy hospital sites proved of value by facilitating the discovery and use
of their supplies, especially by regimental detachments. Information obtained
from road maps taken from captured German officers showed what roads the
enemy had improved, and this knowledge facilitated the effective disposition
of ambulances. 24
The Sanitary Train
The projected disposition of Medical Department formations is given
in the order above quoted. On the evening of September 11 Ambulance Com-
pany No. 17 established a dressing station on the Metz road, 200 meters (216
yards) west of the bridge over the Ache, while the other companies were still
moving from Villey-St. Etienne to Domevre-en-Haye. By 10 o'clock on
September 12 the troops had advanced 4 km. (2.4 miles), and orders were
given that Medical Department organizations move forward. Those at
Domevre-en-Haye were advanced to St. Jean, and ambulance company dress-
ing stations were established at Regnieville-en-Haye, Bois-des-Saules, Vieville-
en-Haye, and later in the former German dressing station at Bois de Gerard. 20
Ambulance Company No. 17 organized its station as follows : One officer
was in general charge and in immediate control of the degassing section, which
was operated by one sergeant and two privates ; two men were detailed to ad-
minister antitoxin; one officer, one sergeant, and six men applied dressings,
and four of the personnel were cooks. 30 Of the rest of the company, 12 were
assigned as ambulance drivers. 12 as ambulance orderlies, 2 as mechanics, 2
noncommissioned officers (alternating) in charge of evacuation, 2 privates as
truck drivers, 2 as orderlies, and the remainder as litter bearers. In the last
days of the offensive the kitchen staff was composed of 3 regular cooks and 10
assistants, who ministered not only to the company and its patients but also
to a large number of line troops, especially runners, exhausted men, and men
who had lost their way. 30 Advanced dressing stations established by this com-
pany were usually in line with the majority of the battalion and regimental
aid stations, but occupied as central a position as the terrain permitted. It
was appreciated early that a dressing station would not function unless placed
on a natural evacuation route, for litter bearers would turn to some other sta-
tion more conveniently located. Usually the litter-bearer squads brought in
the wounded to dressing stations direct from the front lines, but sometime?
from aid stations only. 30 Whenever possible, ambulances cleared the aid sta-
tions, and if the route of evacuation was long, as in the later stage of this
operation, after stopping at the dressing station continued on to the triage.
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION 475
In Ambulance Company No. 17, as in other companies, ambulances were sent
on demand to any aid station accessible to them. 30
Ambulance Company No. 25 was at first kept in reserve near Camp-de-
Cirque, later "leapfrogging!;" Ambulance Company No. 17, and established
a dressing station in the woods near Vieville, close to a regimental dressing
station. Within 2.5 km. (1.5 miles) of this site were all the aid stations of
Infantry, Artillery, and machine gun battalions, and this dressing station was
located at a point which all incoming and outgoing transportation had to pass.
Here a medical supply " dump " was maintained and issues were made largely
on requests brought in by ambulance drivers or on information they conveyed,
though runners also were employed by regimental personnel to carry requests
for supplies. 31
Ambulance Company No. 30 was the animal-drawn unit of the ambulance
section. It was impossible to get any vehicles past enemy trenches until these
had been filled in, but by noon of September 12 animal-drawn ambulances
could be advanced to the immediate rear of the front. As road improvement
progressed these ambulances were replaced by motor vehicles ; and of the 1,500
sick and wounded transported, only 60 were removed by animal-drawn ve-
hicles. At this time, on account of the few animals and their poor condition,
it was possible to operate only 7 of the 12 vehicles available. During the opera-
tion the company was stationed at St. Jean, Metz bridge, and Vieville. 32
During this operation Ambulance Company No. 29 was held in reserve
at the triage, its personnel loading and unloading ambulances and serving as
military police, while its ambulances operated with those of other companies. 33
The following units were supplied the 5th Division by the First Corps:
United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 59S. — Not being
needed by the corps in the rear, it was sent to the front where, on September
12 and 13. it evacuated wounded from the 2d, 5th, and 90th Divisions ; then,
being no longer needed, it was relieved at noon of the 13th.
United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 570. — Rendered serv-
ice on September 12, after which it returned to its station at Liverdun.
United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 603. — Rendered serv-
ice during the entire offensive, returning to its station at Liverdun on Sep-
tember 16.
Field Hospitals
During the night of September 11-12, Field Hospitals Nos. 17, 29, and 30,
Surgical Operating Team No. 17. and the division supply unit were moved
to Domevre-en-Haye. 23 Field Hosjiital No. 25 was located at St. Jean to func-
tion as a triage. There was also a station for slightly wounded at St. Jean
and a reserve of medical officers from Ambulance Company No. 30. On
the morning of the 12th, the other field hospitals reached Domevre-en-Haye,
where No. 17 received the nontransportable cases. No. 29 the gassed cases, and
No. 30 the slightly sick.
The hospital for the nontransportable wounded had one operating team
attached. Here also were the medical supply unit, the division laboratory,
476 FIELD OPERATIONS
and additional United States Army Ambulance Service sections from the army
and corps, as well as the trucks belonging to the division sanitary train.
At 10 o'clock on the morning of September 12 the triage was advanced
to Metz bridge and the other field hospitals were brought up to St. Jean, retain-
ing their sites there through the remainder of the operations. 29 The sanitary
train served in the field two days after the line troops had been withdrawn.
in order to maintain hospitalization for incoming troops until new medical
organizations were established. 34
Among other items in the medical history of the oth Division, the fol-
lowing should be mentioned here :
In the early part of the engagement wounded were transported entirely
by litter."
Gas casualties received were comparatively rare, for the area was too
large to be drenched with gases, the weather too cool for their rapid spread,
and our troops were too seasoned to suffer from gas fright. 35
Dental surgeons and their assistants on duty with the various organiza-
tions assisted throughout the operation in rendering first aid and helping in
the evacuation of the wounded. Several of these officers accompanied
advancing troops and served at battalion aid stations. 36
As only 2 of the 12 medical carts reached their battalions at the front on
the 13th of September, it was at first necessary that all regimental supplies be
carried forward by the medical personnel. 29 This had been anticipated and
was met as far as possible by having the division medical supply maintain
"dumps" at the dressing stations. These in turn were replenished from the
dump at Metz bridge. 34
A feature of the work of the Medical Department was the establish-
ment of kitchens at all dressing stations and field hospitals, where hot meals
were served to any soldiers needing food. These meals were prepared from
Army rations, of which two truckloads were used for the purpose, and were
supplemented by delicacies furnished by the Young Men's Christian Associa-
tion. 34 Food was supplied day and night during the period of greatest ac-
tivity, when between 3.000 and 4.000 men were served. 34 Soldiers reporting
without authority at the dressing station were instructed to get a good meal
before seeking medical attention. As a result most of them, after being fed,
returned on their own initiative to the front line for duty. 34 The food service
produced a considerable increase in efficiency in the fighting force and mate-
rially reduced the sick rate.
On the afternoon of each day the fact that the field had been cleared
was verified by searching parties. Thus, on the morning of September IT,
after a night engagement, the field was reported clear at 8.30 a. m., though
the sanitary units remained at Metz bridge and assisted units of the 78th
Division in the evacuation of their wounded. 34
THE 2D DIVISION
On September 11. the front line of the 2d Division extended from Reme-
nauville to Limey (both inclusive). 37
PLATE XIX.
ST. MIHIEL
2 nd DIVISION
Scale In Kilometers
Xa,m mes
nieville
-en&Haye
emen&uville
Bernecour
References : Drawn from, Fren.ph.-~*
Map COM MERCY. Position* of -< 3'
Medical Units from Reports of <
▲ TRIAGE
± FIELD H05PITAL
+ AMBULANCE CO.
a MEDICAL 5UPPLY
DEPOT
NOVIANT-aux-Pres
+-AC 1-15-16-23
M&nonv.lle
inorville
Division. Surfeon 2** Division, ljtt FH.I5H6-23
*\\\ I ITM
Battle lines, taken from Final Report. Geo. John J. Pershing. September 1, 1919, are approximate.
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION 477
The Infantry of the division attacked promptly at 5 a. m., September 12,
preceded by an artillery barrage. Although the ground was wet and heavy
underfoot, the troops pushed forward rapidly, encountering very little opposi-
tion, except, occasionally, an enemy machine-gun nest made a stubborn
resistance. The first phase objective was reached at 9 a. m."
The Infantry advanced from the first phase line at 11 a. m.. September 12,
the hour set in the division attack order. By noon it was in possession of
Tliiaucourt, only slight enemy resistance having been encountered. By 2.50
p. in. the army objective, the line Jaulny — Xamrnes, was reached. 37
During the succeeding three days the division consolidated its gains; on
the nijrht of September 15-16 it was relieved by the 78th Division and with-
drew on September 20-21 to the Toul area. 38
MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Battalion aid stations were established in the trenches on the night of
September 11, and as the attack progressed others were opened close to the
lines. Stations left behind by the advancing Medical Department personnel
were taken over by the corresponding formations of support and reserve
troops. Through this system, battalion surgeons kept near their men and
the troops they served, and litter bearers from line companies had to trans-
port patients but short distances. 39
Mindful of the delays in the removal of wounded which had occurred
during the offensive against Soissons, when litter-bearer companies were re-
tarded in reaching the front on account of road congestion and because of
imperfect liaison, certain innovations were now introduced into the evacua-
tion service. An active lieutenant (Medical Department) was appointed
litter-bearer officer for the division, and two others, similarly designated, were
selected from each ambulance company to work with their litter-bearer sections
under his direction. 40 These officers, in their respective jurisdictions, knew
the exact location of battalion aid stations at the jump-off and had located
the points where such stations would probably be found later and where dress-
ing stations should be established in case the attack progressed as expected.
They acquainted themselves with paths from battalion aid stations to the
ambulance posts and with the roads which vehicles would use. Their squads
were at the battalion posts before the jump-off in order that they might begin
to function immediately. These litter-bearer officers were required to cover
many miles afoot before and during an advance in order that they might locate
stations to the best advantage through personal examination of roads and
terrain, but the results proved well worth the effort. This system of evacua-
tion for the regiments and in their immediate rear was very successful and
a noteworthy improvement on previous practice. 41
Ambulance Companies
Headquarters of the ambulance company section was located at Noviant-
aux-Pres. 41 At daybreak of September 12 a dressing station was established
by Ambulance Company No. 23 at Limey, about 273 meters (300 yards) back
478 FIELD OPERATIONS
of the front line, while the other companies in reserve evacuated to the triage
at Noviant-aux-Pres. 4 -
Roacls through No Man's Land were in a frightful condition, but a
dressing station and three ambulances of Ambulance Company No. 23 followed
the attacking lines. 43 That road conditions were so bad was not surprising,
as the Germans depended largely upon narrow-gauge railways, using the roads
but little and repairing them still less. In addition, many "tank pits" had
been dug in the roads. 43 Nevertheless, by 4.30 o'clock Ambulance Company
No. 23 had established a dressing station at Thiaucourt. 43
A little later the same evening seven ambulances of Ambulance Company
No. 15 arrived with the company's dressing station equipment. The mule-
drawn vehicles of Ambulance Company No. 16 arrived the same day and
evacuations began. 43 Animal-drawn ambulances proved of great value when
roads were at their worst, but as each ambulance had only two mules and roads
were very rough and heavy, a single trip nearly exhausted the animals for
a day.
On September 13 Ambulance Company No. 15 took over the station of
Ambulance Company No. 23, at Thiaucourt, and the following day established
a station at Jaulny in a chateau which the Germans had used as a hospital. 43
This place was shelled several times during the night, and wounded were re-
moved only after several interruptions and with considerable danger. On the
same date, Ambulance Company No. 16 established a station at Xammes, about
1.5 km. (0.93 mile) behind the trenches. 42 During this period the roads were
being repaired with material taken from the ruined villages of Limey and
Remenauville, and evacuations became progressively less difficult. 43 After
September 14 the dressing station of Ambulance Company No. 23, at Limey,
became the rear limit of evacuation by the Fifth divisional train; from that
point patients were carried to the rear by the ambulances of the 78th
Division. 44
Field Hospitals
At the commencement of this offensive Field Hospital No. 1, the triage,
was at Noviant-aux-Pres, while Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23, for non-
transportable surgical cases, and Field Hospital No. 16, for gassed and sick,
were on the Minorville — Itoyaumeix road, 2 km. (1.2 miles) from Minorville. 41
At noon of the 13th, Field Hospital No. 1 was closed and was moved to Thiau-
court during the night, Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23 joining it the next
day. and the medical supply unit on the 15th. Field Hospital No. 16 remained
near Minorville. 43
By this time the several field hospitals of the division had been specialized.
No. 1, the permanent triage, carried portable baths, both tub and shower, with
gas soap, soda, extra pajamas and underwear, and a large supply of splints,
litters, blankets, and dressings. 45 Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23, combined
into one. for the nontransportable wounded, were augmented by a mobile sur-
gical unit which afforded X-ray facilities and electric lights. 45 This consoli-
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION 479
dated unit had a capacity of 250 beds. Field Hospital Xo. 10 was equipped
to care for gassed and ordinary sick, carrying no surgical equipment. * s
While stationed at Thiaucourt frequent shelling obliged Field Hospitals
No. 15 and No. 23 to seek shelter underground. They utilized vaulted cellars,
which made good and safe operating rooms. 44 Because of their proximity to
die lines and the efficiency of the new method of evacuation, the wounded were
often in this combined hospital within half an hour after they had been
wounded. 44 This prompt but unhurried removal doubtless saved many lives,
especially among those suffering from abdominal wounds. On account of its
more central location this consolidated unit here relieved Field Hospital Xo. 1
of triage duty. 44 That organization, with the litter bearers of Ambulance
Company Xo. 3, which had been on duty here, left for Ansauville on the night
of the 16th. The next day Field Hospitals Xo. 15 and Xo. 23, and the dressing
stations, turned over their sites to units of the, 78th Division and withdrew to
Grand Mesnil, where the train was reunited. 44
The chateau at Thiaucourt, with numerous barracks of the Adrian type,
had been a German medical and surgical hospital. Its equipment included
a portable X-ray outfit, blankets, dressings, many paper bandages and sponges,
and two completely equipped medical wagons. These wagons were unpacked
and their contents stored in the chateau. On the 20th four officers went with
a truck to salvage X-ray outfit and supplies, and, in spite of enemy bombard-
ment, succeeded in removing them. Two German ambulances, with litter
trailers, were captured in this sector. Only the rear wheels had rubber tires,
the front wheels being provided with spiral springs. Trailers had but two
wheels each, with pneumatic tires. The capacity of these ambulances was
three litter cases placed lengthwise, and four sitting patients, placed vis-a-vis,
amidships. All these vehicles had canvas tops and side curtains. 40
THE 7STII DIVISION
During the St. Mihiel operation the division was in the reserve of the First
Army Corps and was in support of the 2d and 5th Divisions, with headquarters
at Kosieres-en-Haye. It remained in reserve until the nights of September
15-16 and 1G-17, when it relieved the 2d and 5th Divisions, respectively (less
Artillery). The organization of this sector, just taken from the enemy, and the
frequent raids carried out to divert the attention of the enemy from the ap-
proaching Meuse-Argonne operation, made its occupancy a particularly active
one. 47
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On September 10 and 11 almost the entire sanitary train concentrated in
the woods in the rear of the 2d Division.
On September 12, the 78th Division furnished 12 ambulances, which evacu-
ated to Toul patients of the 2d, 5th, and 89th Divisions. On the 13th and suc-
ceeding days, these ambulances were used to transfer patients to Toul from the
480 FIELD OPERATIONS
dressing station of the 2d Division at Limey. The sanitary train was now
stationed in Bois de Mort Mare until September 16. 48
Field hospitals were located at St. Jacques, where No. 309 received surgical
cases, No. 310 gassed, No. 312 general, medical, venereal, and psychoneurotic,
and No. 311 was held in reserve, part of its personnel assisting other units. 40
REFERENCES
(1) Battle Instructions No. 1, Headquarters First Army, A. E. F., September 2, 1918.
(2) Operations report, First Army Corps, St. Miliiel operations.
(3) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps in the St. Miliiel opera-
tion, by Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 7. On file Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(4) Ibid., S.
(5) Memorandum from the corps surgeon. First Army Corps. August 26, 1918. On file
with report on Medical Department activities of the 90th Division, A. E. F., His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(6) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, in the St. Miliiel opera-
tion, by Col. J. W. Grissinger. M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 3. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(7) Ibid., 14.
(8) Ibid., 17.
(9) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army. 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College,
1700 (82d Division).
(10) Report of Medical Department activities, 82d Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 9. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(11) Ibid., 31.
(12) Ibid., 24.
(13) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919. Prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.
1700, (90th Division).
(14) Operations report, 90th Division, St. Miliiel operation.
(15) Report of Medical Department activities. 90th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part II ; (i. On file. Historical Di-
vision, S. G. O.
(16) Ibid., Part I. 11.
(17) Ibid.. Part I, 14.
(18) Ibid., Part I, 15.
(19) Ibid.. Part I, 13.
(20) Ibid.. Part II. 7.
(21) Ibid., Part I, 12.
(22) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, V. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War College.
(23) Report of Medical Department activities, 5th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part V, 22. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(24) Ibid., Part I, 24.
(25) Ibid.. Part I, 30.
(26) Ibid., Part I, 32.
(27) Ibid.. Part I, 37.
(28) Ibid.. Part I. 39.
(29) Ibid., Part I. 31.
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 481
(30) Ibid, Part IV, 2.
(31) Ibid.. Part IV, 12.
(32) Ibid., Part IV, 10.
(33) Ibid., Part IV, 10.
(34) Ibid., Part I, 33.
(35) Ibid., Part I, 38.
(36) Ibid., Part I, 34.
(37) Journal of Operations May 1 to November 30, 1918 (2d Division).
(38) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, XL S. Army, 1917-1019, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College,
1700, (2d Division).
(39) Operations report, Medical Department, 2d Division, A. E. F., from the division sur-
geon to the commanding general, 2d Division, September 17, 1918. On file, Histori-
cal Division, S. G. O.
(40) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon (undated), Part I, 34. On file, Historical Di-
vision, S. G. O.
(41) Ibid., Part I, 35.
(42) Ibid., Part II, 4.
(43) Ibid., Part I, 36.
(44) Ibid., Part I, 37.
(45) Ibid., Part II, 14.
(46) Ibid., Part I, 39.
(47) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, V. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College,
1700, (78th Division).
(48) Report of Medical Department activities, 78th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 25. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(49) Ibid., 2.
13576—25 31
CHAPTEE XVI
THE FOURTH CORPS (89TH, 42D, 1ST, AND 3D DIVISIONS)
The Fourth Corps in the St. Mihiel operation, it will be recalled, com-
prised the 89th, 42d, and 1st Divisions in line, with the 3d Division in reserve.
On September 6 the 89th Division held the entire Fourth Corps front line,
with the 1st, 3d, and 42d Divisions in the back areas. The 1st Division was
moved into the line, as the left division of the corps, on the nights, September
&-7 and 7-8, and the 42d Division on the night, September 10-11. The ad-
vance post of command of the corps was established in Menil-la-Tour, Sep-
tember 10. The 3d Division moved into the Foret de la Reine on the night of
September 11-12, as corps reserve, and on September 12 moved up behind
Beaumont Ridge, and continued to act as corps reserve. 1
The corps attacked at 5 a. m., September 12, after an artillery prepara-
tion of four hours, which was followed by a rolling barrage which moved
at the rate of 100 meters (109 yards) in four minutes up to include the hostile
intermediate position (trench Bailly, trench Moulin-Maizerais, trench
Euvezin). The corps attacked at H hour in spite of very unfavorable weather
conditions. The first objective was reached at a mean time of 11 a. m. This
pierced the enemy's outpost position, broke through his position of resistance,
and seized the heights of the Madine brook and heights southeast of Bouillon-
ville. Orders were at once given to proceed to the first day's objective as soon
as the divisions were ready for the new phase of the operation. The first day's
objective, second phase, was the position : Eastern edge of Etang de Lambe-
pinot — northern tip of woods north of Etang de Lambepinot_ (point 49.73) —
Xonsard (inclusive) — Lamarche (exclusive) — southern tip of Bois de Thiau-
court — crossroads 700 meters southeast of Beney (point 08.155) — point 700
meters (763 yards) south of Xammes (point 255.265, point of junction, First
Corps). 1
During the afternoon of September 12 the enemy withdrew some of his
troops through Vigneulles and points north, but his withdrawal was hampered
to a great extent by the rapid advance of the Fourth Corps.
Field Order No. 21, Headquarters, Fourth Army Corps, issued at 4.30
p. m.. September 12, directed that the advance to the first phase objective,
second day, be made. The front line divisions also were ordered to assure
the defense of the first day's objective. The 1st and 89th Divisions continued
to advance during the night of September 12-13. The 42d Division continued
the advance at 6 a. m., September 13. To effect a junction with the Fifth
Army Corps, the 1st Division was given a reserve of two battalions of the
42d Division and one brigade of the 3d Division. At 3.15 on the morning of
September 13 the 2d Brigade, 1st Division, advanced, and between 8 and
10 a. m.. September 13. occupied all routes leading north and east from llat-
483
484 FIELD OPERATIONS
tonville and Vigneulles. Complete contact with the 26th Division, Fifth
Corps, in the vicinity of Vigneulles, was obtained at about 9 a. m.., September
13, by the provisional squadron, 2d Cavalry, and detachments, 2d Brigade,
1st Division. This contact completed'the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. 1
The army objective, which was on the general line, Vieville (inclusive) —
Hattonville (inclusive) — northern edge of Chaufour B. — Chateau St. Benoit —
center of Bois de Dampvitoux — Xammes (inclusive), was reached at a mean
time of 11 a. m. September 13. 1
On September 15 the corps sector was held with two divisions in line, the
89th on the right and the 42d on the left. The 1st Division, in support, as-
sembled in the area Bois de la Belle Oziere — Nonsard — Etang de Pannes; the
3d Division continued in reserve behind the Beaumont Ridge. 1
Annex No. 4— P. O. No. 14. (Sept. G, 1918)
IV Army Corps
PLAN OF COMMUNICATIONS, SUPPLY AND EVACUATION
Maps : Jlort Mare — 1 : 20000
Commercy — 1 : 80000
Chambley — 1 : 20000
5-6
Part I. — Communications
1. Railroad and Light Railways:
(a) Standard gauge. Supplying the IV Army Corps:
Main line: Paris — Toul — Nancy. (Serves the railhead at Sorcy and Toul.)
Branch lines: (a) The Woevre line, an elbow of which branches at Pagny-sur-JIeuse
and touches at Trondes — Andilly and Villey-St. Etienne, with extensions as follows:
1. To the Foret-de-la-Reine. (Serves Army and Corps troops in Foret-de-la-
Reise.)
2. To the vicinity of Avrainville.
3. To the Bois-de-Minorville.
*******
(e) General instructions:
1. Divisions, the general commanding the corps artillery, and units of corps troops
will make application daily before 4.00 p. m. to G-l, these headquarters, for transport de-
sired by narrow gauge for the following day. The request will state kind of material to
be transported, bulk in cubic yards, and point to which material is to be transported.
The following is the order of priority:
(a) Ammunition.
(6) Engineer material,
(c) Rations.
(<Z) Other supplies.
*******
2. Roads.
(a) Corps axial road. Toul — Menil-la-Tour — Bernecourt — Flirey — Essey — Pannes—
Beney — St. Benoit.
(6) Division axial roads.
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 485
1st Division
South to north. — Pagny-sur-Meuse — Mon Forre — Charriere I^a-Belle — Raulecourt —
Broussey — Rambucourt (by arrangement with commanding general 2d French Colonial
Corps) — Beaumont — Seicheprey — St. Baussant — Essey — (western outskirts) — Pannes —
Nonsard — Vigneulles.
North to south. — Axial road to Broussey — Gironville — Jouy (by arrangement with
commanding general 2d French Colonial Corps) — Cornieville Mon Forre — Boucq.
Ifid Division
SoutJi to north. — West of Toul — Lagney — Sanzey — Tuilerie — road south of Etang —
Rome — Grange-en-Woevre Etang — road east of Etang Neuf-de-Mandres — Mandres — St.
Dizier — Flirey — Essey (eastern outskirts) — Pannes (road to be constructed from Essey
to Pannes parallel to main road) — Beney — St. Benoit.
North to south. — Axial road to road junction at Grange-en-Woevre Etang — road south
thru Bois-de-Boucq — thence east and south to road junction near Leonval — south thru
Bois-le-Foncel — thence to road thru southern edge of Bois-de-Lagney — Croix Juree —
Lagney.
89th Division
South to north. — Corps axial road from east of Toul to Flirey — Limey — unimproved
road along corpses east boundary to center of Bois-D'Euvezin — Euvezin — point 246 — Bouil-
lionville — point 2S3 — Xammes.
North to south. — Same route.
3d Division
Corps road to area. When ordered forward will use axial road of the division in
whose sector they move.
Axial roads will be marked by signboards bearing numerical designation of division.
The road Eoyaumeix — Minorville — Noviant — Limey is given to 1st Corps for axial
road of 2d Division. This road may be used for evacuation of sick and wounded.
(c) Lateral roads. Euville — Vertuzey — Troussey — Pagny-sur-Meuse — Lay St. Remy —
Foug — Toul ; Cornieville — Boucq — Meuil-le-Tour — Manoncourt ; Bouconville — Beaumont —
Limey.
Empty horse-drawn vehicles and horses will use the roads and tracks other than axial
roads as far as possible.
(d) Army and corps. Will use the axial roads of the division nearest their line for
supplies and evacuation.
(e) Road circulation:
1. The road system of the corps is divided into two zones :
(a) The corps zone covers all territory within the corps sector between the roads:
Euville — Vertuzey — Troussey — Pagny-sur-Meuse — Lay St. Remy — Foug — Toul (inclusive).
Cornieville — Boucq — Sunzey — Menil-le-Tour — Andilly ( exclusive) .
(6) Division zones include all territory within their respective sectors, north of
Cornieville — Boucq — Sanzey — Menil-le-Tour — Andilly (inclusive).
(c) Regulations covering traffic within divisional zones will be prepared by divisions
but must conform to G. H. Q. traffic regulations.
(d) Corps axial road is free for all vehicles both ways.
(e) The circulation maps for corps zone showing the corps and division axial roads
will be furnished each division.
3. Traffic control :
(a) By the corps within the corps zone. By the divisions within their respective
zones.
486 FIELD OPERATIONS
Railheads :
Manoncourt, by 89th Division.
Sorcy, by 1st Division.
Toul, by 3d Division.
(b) Organization of traffic control.
In the A. C. and in each division, the P. M. and his assistants will supervise the
whole service.
The control will be effected by stationary posts of dismounted police and patrols of
mounted police.
The stationary posts will be placed on the principal crossroads and at the entrance
of dumps. They must see that the rules concerning the direction of traffic are observed
and prevent any blocks. They must prohibit access to roads which are temporarily
shelled and direct the traffic to other routes previously determined. They must enforce
a strict observance of the prescribed measures of safety when vehicles are obliged to pass
through a portion of the road under bombardment.
In order to carry out the above, the head of each post will be given written orders
prepared by the P. M. for the corps zone and by the A. P. M's for the division zones.
A copy of these orders will be sent to G-I IV A. C.
(e) Traffic regulations for D day.
Traffic on the axial roads of the 1st, 42d, and S9th Divisions :
1. Those belonging to the division on its own road.
2. Those of the Signal Corps.
3. The ambulances.
4. The staff cars.
Until H plus 8h (in order to hasten the repair of the axial roads) no traffic will be
allowed on these roads from the line Bouconville — Beaumont — Limey (inclusive), save
for vehicles for repair of roads, those of Signal Corps, ambulances, messengers, Artillery.
and those carrying ammunition.
Upon capture of first day's objective the responsibility for traffic control is as follows:
1. IV Corps will be responsible from present dividing line forward to a boundary
which will be fixed from time to time in orders. This boundary will be Beaumont —
Limey road, inclusive.
•_'. The 1st, 42d. and 89th Divisions will be responsible in their own area beyond the
above boundary as far as the battle line.
(d) Stragglers.
Straggler post Unci. — Each division in the front line will establish the following lines:
1st line, approximately 100 yards in rear of the line of regimental aid stations.
2d line, approximately 3 kilometers in rear of the first line.
Corps will establish a third line across corps area approximately kilometers from
the front.
(c) Instructions.
1. The first two lines will cover all first-aid stations, roads, paths, and trails leading
from the front, and no enlisted man will be permitted to pass to the rear without written
authority, except the walking wounded. In case of walking wounded they will be required
to bring with them their full equipment.
2. All posts will be instructed in the location of first aid stations, near-by headquarters,
location of their divisional collections station, destination of roads, near-by water sources,
and traffic regulations.
3. Each division will establish a collecting station for stragglers with an officer in
charge whose duty is to return stragglers to their organizations. This station should l>e
provided with water and some reserve rations.
4. The corps provost marshal will have charge of the 3d stragglers' line and of the
1st and 2d lines for purposes of coordination. He will also effect liaison with the corps
on our right and left.
5. As the above progresses the straggler lines will be moved forward. In each cnse
well-defined roads should be selected for the 3d line.
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 487
6. The posts and patrols of mounted police will arrest any man going to the rear
without a pass signed by the C. O. of his unit or a medical officer, except as provided in
Paragraph I. These passes shall be valid for one day only. They will indicate the object
of the mission, its duration, and the itinerary to be followed by the bearer. Written
orders to be delivered, the receipted envelope signed by the addressee, will be valid as a
pass for the bearer. They will stop the sick and wounded and direct them to the proper
field hospitals.
7. Civilians.— The circulation of civilians will be strictly observed. It will be for-
bidden from 7 p. m. to 5 a. m. All the stationary posts, and patrols of mounted police.
will be given orders to that effect.
Part V. — Evacuation of sick and wounded
-MAPS: COMMERCYj
NANCY i : 800 00.
WOEVRE
1. Organization of sanitary units, etc.
Battalion aid stations, litter bearers, and regimental aid stations will be established
by the various regimental surgeons, under direction of their respective division surgeons.
In no case should a battalion or regimental aid station be located at the same place as
the regimental P. C.
2. Sorting and advanced dressing stations (triage) will be established as follows:
1st Division, Raulecourt.
42d Division, Ansauville.
89th Division, between Minorville and Royaumeix off road to northeast of the
road about 1,400 meters S. W. of Minorville.
3d Division.
These stations must be located off the main routes of traffic, in order to avoid conges-
tion and blocking.
All cases go to the division triage, where they are given such preliminary treatment
as is found to be needed and then will be distributed and evacuated, as per the table
below and over the routes specified in that table.
The corps surgeon and division surgeon will notify their respective corps and
division provost marshals of the location of their sanitary units as soon as it is possible
to do so.
The divisional medical gas officer, psychiatrist, and orthopedist will take station at the
triage. The medical gas officer will examine nil gas or suspected gas cases and advise
such preliminary treatment as is required, recommending the return to the front of such
cases as he deems fit for duty, and to the rear such cases as be deems require hospitaliza-
tion. The psychiatrist will examine all cases of shock or simulated shock or other
nervous conditions, recommending their disposition as in the case of the gas cases. The
orthopedist will examine fractures and joint injuries and will see that no cases are sent
to the rear improperly splinted.
3. The sanitary units of the 3d Division will be held subject to the call of the corps-
surgeon for use where needed. If this division should reinforce the line, it will then use
the sanitary organizations and system of evacuation and the triage laid down for the
division it reinforces or relieves.
4. Divisional ambulance companies will be used as far forward of their triage as the
military situation will permit and to evacuate their triage to both field and evacuation
hospitals, but especially to the former, and in the case of the latter only to assist the
evacuation ambulance companies. If additional transportation is needed, call will bo
made on the corps surgeon, who will have at his disposition the ambulance companies
of the division in reserve and those of the corps, if the latter are then provided, or, if
the conditions warrant it, the corps surgeon may use ambulance companies from any
one division to help out another division under stress.
488
FIELD OPERATIONS
5. Chief surgeon of the divisions will he held responsible that sill roads and hospitals,
aid stations, etc., are plainly marked so as to facilitate ambulance traffic.
6. Wherever the narrow-gauge lines run in contact with any of the evacuation
points, the corps surgeon will use returning empties to assist in evacuation. Effort will
be made to locate the triage with this point in view, and, as far as practicable, in making
forward locations of triages, this point must be considered by division surgeons and by
the chief surgeon of the corps.
7. Cases will be evacuated as follows and over the routes indicated :
Type of cases and whore evacuated
A. Severely wounded. — All severely
wounded of corps troops on the extreme left
Hank and of the left flank division will be
evacuated to Mobile Hospital No. 39 at
Aulnois sous Vertuzey, V2 kilometer south
• >f Aulnois, on the Aulnois — Vertuzey road.
For all other troops west of the Moselle
River, to Evacuation Hospital No. 1, at
Sebastopol ; 5 kilometers north of Toul on
the Toul — Menil-le-Tour road.
Evacuation Hospital No. 3, in the H. O. E.
of the Justice group of barracks, just south
of Toul, will receive the overflow from the
above hospitals. A careful sorting must be
effected at the divisional triage, so that
these hospitals are not overwhelmed with
slight cases or gas cases, necessitating a
secondary evacuation to hospitals to which
they should have been sent originally.
B. Slightly wounded. — Corps troops on the
extreme left flank and the left flank divi-
sion to Provisional Evacuation Hospital
(F. H. No. 41) near Sorcy — Gare, iy 2 kilo-
meters north of Sorcy on the Aulnois —
Sorcy road. (The road to this hospital is a
one-way road only. All other divisions of
the IV Corps and the corps troops adjacent,
to Evacuation Hospital No. 3 at Toul Jus-
tice.)
Evacuation Hospital No. 14, in the Perrin
Brichambault section of the Justice group
of barracks, just south of Toul, will receive
the excess of slightly wounded of all divi-
sions and corps troops, except the left
division.
C. Oassed (for evacuation). — For all
troops: To gas hospital at La Marcbe sec-
tion of the Justice group of barracks, just
outside of the city of Toul.
All gas cases which are not to be evacu-
ated to be taken care of in field hospital
which is equipped as a gas hospital.
Routes of evacuation
1st Division. — Raulecourt — S. E. fork —
south — R a n g e v a 1 — Cornieville — Aulnois.
And if and when necessary to overflow to
Evacuation Hospital No. 3, in Toul (Toul
Justice ) via Vertuzey — Troussey ■ — Pagny-
sur-Meuse — Lay St. Remy — Foug —
Ecrouves — Toul.
Jf2d Division. — Ansauville — division axial
r o a d — Tuilerie — Boucq — Lagney — Bruley —
Evacuation Hospital No. 1 (Sebastopol),
crossing corps axial road just before reach-
ing destination.
89th Division. — Triage — Royaumeix — divi-
sion axial road.
Sebastopol.
From Mobile Hospital 39, via Trondes Lay
St. Remy — Foug — Ecrouves — Toul Justice.
From Evacuation Hospital No. 1 to road
east of Bruley — Toul Station — Toul Justice.
1st Division . — Raulecourt — S. E. fork
south — Rangeval — Cornieville — Aulnois—
Vertuzey — Sorcy.
J/2d D ivision . — Ansauville — Tuilerie —
Boucq — Lagney — Bruley — Toul.
89th Divis i o n . — Royaumeix — Andilly —
Menil-la-Tour — Toul Justice.
T r o n (1 e s — L ay St. Rem y — Foug —
Ecrouves — Toul Justice (Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 14).
1st Division . — Raulecourt — S. E. fork
s o u t h — Rangeval — Cornieville — Troussey—
Pagny-sur-Meuse — Lay St. Remy — Foug—
Ecrouves — Toul Justice (gas hospital).
.'t2d Division . — Aunsau ville — Tuilerie —
Boucq — Trondes — Lay St. Remy — Foug —
Ecrouves — Toul Justice.
ST. MirilEL OPERATION
489
Type of cases and whore evacuated
D. Contagious, venereal and skin. — For
nil troops : To the contagious hospital of the
Justice group of barracks just outside of the
city of Toul.
E. Sick, nervous and shell concussion (for
evacuation) . — For all troops: Base Hospital
No. 45, La Marche section of the Justice
sroup of barracks, just outside the city of
Toul, and Base Hospital No. 51, Fabvier, of
the same group of barracks.
F. Nontransportable cases. — Will be taken
care of in the field hospital designated by
the division surgeon for that purpose.
G. Wounded prisoners, as far as it is pos-
sible to sort same, will be evacuated to
Evacuation Hospital 1.
H. French wounded will he evacuated to
Evacuation Hospital No. 14, Justice, Toul.
Routes of evacuation
S9th Division, — Minorville road — Royau-
meix — Menil-la-Tour (corps axial road) —
Toul Justice.
Same as above.
8. Corps consultants attached to the office of the chief surgeon, IV Army Corps, will
receive definite verbal instructions from the chief surgeon from time to time as the
situation develops.
9. Evacuation of animals.
1. The corps will establish an advance collecting point at Menil-la-Tour.
2. Divisions will establish a central collecting point, where corps will send necessary
personnel to secure animals to be evacuated.
S, Divisions having animals to be evacuated will make application to G-l of the corps
THE S9TH DIVISION
Prior to September 11, 1918, the 89th Division held the Lucey sector on
a front of approximately 16 km. (9.9 miles) to the north of the Metz road from
west of Bouconville to east of Limey. A small v^ortion of the western end of
the line was taken over by the French Second Colonial Corps, on the night
of September 8-9. Some units on the position of resistance were relieved by
the 1st Division on the nights of September 6-7 and 7-8, by units of the 2d
Division on the nights of September 9-10 and 10-11, and by units of the 42d
Division on the night of September 10-11. The advanced post positions were
held, however, by the 89th Division on the night of September 11-12, when
these were taken over west of Flirey by units of the 1st and 42d Divisions.
The 2d Division was scheduled to relieve the outposts east of Limey on the
night of September 11-12, but did not do so. 2
The artillery preparation began at 1 a. m., September 12. H hour was
5 o'clock. On the right, the 177th Brigade of Infantry advanced in good order
and on schedule time. At 11 a. m. the brigade was halted on a line designated
as the objective of the first phase, the limit of the independent action of the
13570—25 32
490 FIELD OPERATIONS
division, rectifying the position by a slight advance, where it remained until
4 p. in. The advance of the 178th Brigade was not so favorable, as it did not
reach this line until 3 p. m. 2
By dawn of September 13 the division was occupying substantially the
army objective, 2 having featured in the capture of Bois de Mort Mare. Bouil-
lonville. Euvezin, Beney, and Xammes. 3
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Battalion surgeons advanced usually in the support lines, attempting to
keep contact with the battalion commanding officers, and at various times
collected the wounded at designated points where they were picked up by
ambulances from the 353d Ambulance Company.* Similarly, regimental
surgeons established aid stations, but these did not function so actively as did
those of the battalions. 5 In smaller units, such as Machine Gun Battalions or
field signal battalions, the Medical Department enlisted men were distributed
among the several companies and the wounded were evacuated to the aid
stations of the regiment to which the battalion Avas attached or near which it
was operating. 5 During this operation the removal of wounded to aid stations
or collecting points was greatly facilitated by the fact that line companies
furnished an adequate number of bearers, an expedient prohibited later in
the Meuse-Argonne operation. Liaison between forward stations was main-
tained by runners, and between these and the dressing stations by telephone
or by returning ambulances. It proved difficult at times to get word back
and, when delivered, messages were sometimes distorted."
Ambllance Companies
On September 13 four ambulances of Ambulance Company Xo. 353 got
through to Bouillonville. where they overtook the regimental surgeons. The
company headquarters moved to that point the same day and established a
dressing station in an old German hospital: but on account of mud. bad road?
across Xo Man's Land, and congested traffic, it could not evacuate patients to
the triage that night. 4 Ambulances were therefore engaged in collecting the
wounded from the forward area; these were cared for at an improvised hos-
pital operated by the dressing station. Next day 4 ambulances carried 16
litter patients to Bernecourt, and by evening of the 14th this company had
transported 600 cases. 4 Ambulance Company No. 355 also moved forward to
this point. The congested condition of roads greatly delayed evacuations,
but for this there was no remedy. Ambulance Companies Xo. 354 and Xo. 356
were used to clear field hospitals. The former soon moved to Euvezin. Flirey.
and Bouillonville and the latter to the vicinity of Manonville. 4
Field Hospitals
When the divisional front was contracted in preparation for the offensive.
Field Hospital Xo. 355, the divisional gas hospital, retaining its position near
Royaumeix, was designated as the divisional triage. 7 It operated in the latter
PLATE XX.
ST. M I H I E L
85 th DIVISION
Scale In Kilometers
(H-A.C3fkl2
*Grosrouvre^A03^H^ H
Ans&jjvilleSMtf V.
\\ Minorville^
H05PITAL ^H rfe AC354-Tr« (f
+AC AMBULANCE CO. xrtanki™ «
Peferences- Drawn from Map CCAfAffftCY p i_i o c C-J- J7
Positions of Med'C&J Units from Hearts ' • H. OOOZt^^^^
of Division Surgeon Q 9*- Division. 12 iff
near andilly on i2™-F. H.353-354f-356-AC356
Hal tic lines, UK tin from Final Report. Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, arc approximate.
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION
491
capacity until September 15, evacuating most of the cases it received direct to
Evacuation Hospital No. 1 or to the base hospitals at Toul. and remaining
in this location until it left the sector. 7 Field Hospital No. 353, just outside
of Andilly, was prepared to receive nontransportable cases, but none was sent
to it there. 7 It then took station at Bernecourt. moving later for one day
to Flirey, after which it returned for station to Bernecourt. 8 This unit was
well equipped with an X-ray plant and other facilities for operations. 9 Field
Hospital No. 354, at first in reserve at Andilly, moved to Euvezin on September
14, when it received some GO patients, using the church as a hospital ward.
Fig. 62.-
-Field Hospital No. 353, 89th Division, at Bernecourt, France, during the St. Mihiel
operation
On the afternoon of that same day it moved to a point 2.5 km. (li/o miles)
east of Euvezin, there operating the triage until the ll)th, when it was placed
in reserve. 8 Field Hospital No. 356, originally in reserve at Andilly, moved
to Bernecourt on the afternoon of September 12 and began to receive patients
the same day. On September 19 it became the divisional triage and received
an average of 119 cases daily during the remainder of its stay in this sector. 8
When the lines became established, a detachment of Field Hospital No.
354 was detailed to the emergency hospital at Bouillonville, where emergency
and nontransportable patients were received. At this point a degassing sta-
tion was put into operation, and later a delousing and bathing plant. By
these means the incidence of skin diseases and lice infestation was kept low
until the division was relieved from the sector earlv in October."
492 FIELD OPERATIONS
THE 42D DIVISION
On September 11 the 42d Division was assembled in the Foret de la Reine.
with the exception of one battalion of the 83d Infantry Brigade and one
battalion of the 84th Infantry Brigade, which had relieved battalions of the
89th Division on the night of September 10-11. 10
On tbe night of September 11-12 the elements of the division moved up
to the vicinity of their attack positions, the 83d and 84th Infantry Brigades
each sending one company forward to relieve elements of the 89th Division in
the front-line trenches. 10
At 5 o'clock on the morning of September 12, after a four-hour artillery
preparation, the division moved to the attack. 10
Upon the arrival of the leading elements at the enemy's first-line trenches,
the artillery fire, which had been concentrated on these trenches from the
time of the jumping oft' of the Infantry, started to roll forward at the rate
of 100 meters (109 yards) in 4 minutes. The Infantry followed the barrage
closely, and on the left experienced very little difficulty after breaking through
the enemy's first line of defense. On the right the enemy defense was more
vigorous. However, this was shortly overcome and by 12 o'clock both the
83d and the 84th Infantry Brigades had reached the objective of the first
phase, first day, and were advancing beyond it. 10 The advance from this
point was very rapid, and by 2.10 p. m., on September 12, both brigades had
arrived on the first day's objective. Late that afternoon orders were received
directing an advance to the objective of the first phase, second day. However,
because of impending darkness, the advance was not made to this objective
until 6 o'clock the next morning.
At 10 a. m., September 13, both brigades had taken their portion of the
first phase, second day's objective, and were consolidating it. Shortly after-
wards orders were issued to advance to the army objective. This merely
consisted of advancing the left of the line, as the right was already resting
upon this objective. No resistance was met in this operation. 10
This division remained in the front lines on the St. Mihiel front until
September 30, 1918, when, beginning on that date, it was relieved by the 89th
Division and started moving to the vicinity of Souilly (Meuse). 11
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
( )u September 10 the division surgeon's office had reached Bruley and the
field hospital section was assembled in Foret de la Reine. 12 At zero hour.
September 12, a dressing station was in operation at Hamonville, where re-
serves of all the ambulance companies were assembled. 13 Other stations were
later established at Pannes, Lamarche, and Beney. The divisional triage,
operated by ambulance company personnel, was established at Ansauville. and
two field hospitals (No. 166 and No. 168) prepared to receive patients. 13 These
formations occupied a large barn which lent itself readily to their purpose and
afforded facilities for a receiving ward, shock and recovery wards, and operat-
ing room, etc. 12 During the 24 hours following the attack, evacuation of the
wounded was practically impossible because of the destruction of roads where
PLATE XXI.
Bat Me lines, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1 91 9. are approximate.
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION
493
they crossed No Man's Land, and the consequent blockade of traffic. 13 At
this time German prisoners were employed in numbers for the portage of the
wounded, especially across No Man's Land. Fortunately, casualties were few,
but on the 13th, after the 42d had attained its objective in front of strong
enemy positions, the number of wounded increased considerably. 13 As the
line moved forward, Field Hospitals No. 165 and No. 167 moved to Mandres
where they were held in reserve. 12 On September 13 the ambulance com-
panies opened a. triage at Essey, through which, during the ensuing 24 hours,
584 cases were evacuated." The two field hospitals which had been located at
Mandres (No. 165 and No. 167) moved up to Essey on the 14th to cooperate
*>3. — Dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 167, 42d Division, at Essey, Fram-
with the triage. Though not required to function as hospitals, they took
charge of the shock and operating rooms of the triage, and thus the wounded
received prompt and efficient surgical care within 10 kms. (6.2 miles) of the
front. 12 The hospitals at Ansauville (No. 166 and No. 168) were ordered to
Beaumont on the 21st and there functioned until the 28th. Field Hospital
No. 167 moved on September 26 to Nonsard. 12
Ambulance service was so organized at this time that each ambulance
company evacuated casualties from the infantry regiment of corresponding
number, detailing an officer and a sergeant to the regiment for liaison service.
Similarly a liaison officer, assigned to the artillery as a whole, was charged
with the duty of locating all its aid stations and arranging for evacuations
494 FIELD OPERATIONS
from them by cooperation with the ambulance companies evacuating the near-
est Infantry regiments. Casualties from Machine Gun Battalions and smaller
units were evacuated by the ambulance companies serving the Infantry to which
they were attached. This proved to be an extremely satisfactory method. By
maintaining constant communication between liaison officers and the ambu-
lance company bases as well as the triage, accurate information was promptly
available concerning conditions at the front, with the result that emergencies
and rapid movements to and from the line were covered more readily than had
been the case previously. 14
In this division the medical supply unit was always established with the
triage, and when conditions demanded, an auxiliary supply station was sent
forward to the advance ambulance company dressing station. From the triage
and the dressing station, supplies were carried forward by ambulances and
litter bearers, respectively. As written or verbal requests from surgeons with
the troops were promptly filled, it was seldom that an emergency arose which
demanded a special trip by ambulance. Vehicles bringing patients to the
rear returned to the front with supplies. The following is quoted from the
medical history of the 42d Division : 15
The difficulties to be met and overcome by the medical supply unit of a division are of
a unique character. A fairly comprehensive idea of them may be formed if one will draw
a mental picture of managing the only drug store in a city of 30,000 people, operating it
day and night, and frequently, sometimes daily, changing its location. There are only
eight clerks, for no more can be obtained, and transportation consists of two 3-ton trucks
operating over congested roads. The community of which the unit forms a part is fre-
quently bombed and shelled.
THE 1ST DIVISION
On September 0, 1918, the 1st Division commenced the relief of troops on
the line of resistance in the western part of the sector held by the 89th
Division. The relief was completed on the night of September 7-8. The post
of command of the division was opened at Rangeval, 9 a. m., September 8. At
this time the commanding general of the division assumed command of the
new Beaumont sector, held by one battalion of the 89th Division on the line of
surveillance and by the 1st Division with attached units on the line of
resistance in the northern part of the Foret de la Reine."
The division attacked at 5 a. m. September 12, passing through elements
of the 89th Division on the line of surveillance. The division was the left flank
division of the Fourth Corps and had the mission of covering its own advance
as well as the advance of the divisions on its right. 10
Despite very unfavorable weather conditions, all infantry of the division
was in place at the jumping-off line, Seicheprey — Marvoisin. and attacked on
time. 10
The first objective was reached on time at a mean hour of 5.40 a. m. This
objective, from east to west, was the southeast bank of the Rupt de Madt to
Hichecourt. thence a box inclosing Richecourt and the open ground on the
northwest. Up to this point few casualties were suffered. These were mainly
from artillery fire. 18
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 495
The second objective was taken on time also, with few losses. This ob-
jective was an arbitrary line passing north of the enemy position northwest of
the Kupt de Madt. 10
The most serious resistance of the day was encountered between the second
and third objectives at the southern edge of the Quart de Reserve. The
enemy's principal line of resistance was through this woods, and much oppo-
sition was encountered here. 1 ''
The third objective was reached between 9.30 and 10 a. m. The division's
third objective was the first phase of the first day's objective, as prescribed
by Fourth Corps orders, and passed through the northern edge of the Bois
Kate. 10
The Infantry went forward at 11 a. in. and took the first day's objective at
about 12.30 p. m. This objective was the defensive position marked by the towns
of Lamarche — Xonsard, and included the occupation of a defensive left flank
running from Nbnsard south to a junction with troops of the French Second
Colonial Corps at the Bois de Gargantua. This position also was taken with-
out serious losses, and consolidation was begun. 10
At 5.45 p. in., September 12, the infantry advance was resumed, and at
7.45 p. m. the objective bounded by the Decauville railroad was reached. At
10 p. m. on September 12 one company of the 28th Infantry was astride the
Vigneulles — St. Benoit road, with its left protected by the ICth Infantry and
its right protected by the 26th Infantry. 10
During the night of September 12—13 exploitation by the division was
continued. To insure the safety of the rapid exploitation to the north, in an
endeavor to effect a junction with the Fifth Army Corps, the division was
given, as reserve, two battalions of the 42d Division, which were ordered to
be in the vicinity of Lamarche by 4 a. m. September 13. The division also
was given one regiment (eventually one brigade) of the 3d Division as division
reserve. On the arrival of the troops of the 3d Division the two battalions
of the 42d Division were released from the reserve of the 1st Division. 16
Thus reinforced, the 1st Division extended its left flank, whose protection
was assured by the 1st Infantry Brigade. The 2d Infantry* Brigade advanced
in force at 3.15 a. in., September 13. and occupied all routes leading north and
east from Hattonville and Vigneulles between 8 and 10 a. m. the same day.
Complete contact with the 20th Division, Fifth Army Corps, in the vicinity
of Vigneulles, was obtained at about 9 a. m. September 13, when the pro-
visional squadron, 2d Cavalry, passed through that town for further exploita-
tion. At noon, September 13, the division post of command was established
at Nonsard. 10
The division was then regrouped in the vicinity of Nonsard, September
14. where it remained in reserve of the Fourth Corps until September 20.
1918. 16
MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Litter-bearer details from the ambulance companies were attached to the
several regiments, and battalion and regimental aid stations were established
496 FIELD OPERATIONS
in close liaison with the regimental headquarters of the organizations they
served- 17 -Battalion medical personnel established aid stations as close to the
lines as possible, and all such stations moved forward with the advance. 17
Ambulance Companies
Dressing stations were established on September 11 at Beaumont by Am-
bulance Company No. 12 and at Rambucourt by Ambulance Company No. 13,
but these organizations moved forward so rapidly that they held one location
only a short time during the day. 18 At 9 a. m. Ambulance Company No. 12
moved to Richecourt and then to Nonsard, where it remained until the 20th.
Ambulance Company No. 13 also moved on the afternoon of the 12th to Non-
sard, where two regimental stations were operating. 10 Ambulance Company
No. 2 took station at Xivray et Marvoisin, while Ambulance Company No. 3
located its station first at La Hayville but later — September 13 — advanced it
to Lamarche. 19 On account of the congested and obstructed condition of the
roads, which delayed evacuation to hospitals, a dressing station with extra
supplies for a large number of wounded was established at St. Baussant. to
operate until the roads could be opened. 20 Dressing stations w r ere kept very
close to the front during the advance, often ahead of regimental aid stations.
The wounded, collected by advancing battalion personnel, were quickly located
by dressing station parties, given emergency treatment, and taken to the rear
by any means of transport available. As several hours' work was necessary
before the engineers were able to repair the inqjassable roads across No Man's
Land, patients were at first carried by litter-bearer detachments to the dress-
ing stations and hospitals, and later by German prisoners. 1 " After several
hours a few ambulances worked their way across and patients were carried
by them to the break in the road. Thence they were carried by litter to a
point where they could be placed in ambulances operating between that point
and the triage. 19 On the 12th of September, particularly, roads across No
Man's Land were crowded with delayed traffic and but few vehicles got across.
Among these, however, were a few Ford ambulances, which were thus made
available for a front circuit. 10
Field Hospitals
All the field hospitals took station at Rauleeourt September »>. Field Hos-
pital No. 3 pitched tentage and operated the triage and cared for the slightly
wounded. Field Hospital No. 12 and Mobile Surgical Unit No. 2 cared for
the seriously wounded. The medical supply unit, located at the same place,
winch forwarded materiel (especially litters) to points close to the firing line.
Field Hospitals No. 2 and No. 13 were in reserve. 19 On the 13th, Field Hos-
pital No. 2 advanced to Richecourt, remaining there until September 20, and
caring for the divisional sick. 10 Field Hospital No. 13, moving on this date
toward Nonsard, was delayed by a damaged bridge across Rupt de Madt. By
the time the damage was repaired the hospital was no longer needed at Non-
sard and it therefore remained in reserve. 20
PLATE XXI
Battle lines, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919. are approximate-
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION 497
Evacuations from the triage were made as follows : Nontransportables to
Field Hospital No. 12, at Raulecourt; severely wounded to Mobile Hospital
No. 39, at Aulnois (9 km. (5.5 miles) distant) ; slightly wounded to Field
Hospital No. 41 (a provisional evacuation hospital), at Sorcy Gare. 12 km.
(7.4 miles) distant, and gassed patients to the appropriate hospital of Justice
group, at Toul, 20 km. (12.4 miles) away. 19 From September 23 to October
1 no divisional hospitals were established, the sick being evacuated direct to
evacuation hospitals. 21 Unsuccessful efforts were made to obtain authority to
utilize for evacuation purposes the narrow-gauge railroad between Raulecourt
and Aulnois. 22
After withdrawal of the division from the line the sanitary train was
encamped in the vicinity of Nubecourt until September 27, moving on that
date to the vicinity of Julvecourt. There it remained during the two days
prior to the entrance of the division into the lines near Charpentry. 20
REFERENCES
(1) Operations report, Fourth Army Corps, St. Mihiel operations.
(2) Operations report, 89th Division. St. Mihiel operation.
(3) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army. 1917-1019, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War Col-
lege, 1700, (42d Division).
(4) Report of Medical Department activities, 89th Division. A. E. P., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon (undated), 21. On file. Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(5) Ibid., 10.
(0) Ibid., 11.
(7) Ibid., 20.
(8) Ibid., 22.
(9) Ibid., 23.
(10) Operations report. 42d Division. St. Mihiel operation.
(11) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War Col-
lege, 1700, (42d Division).
(12) Report of Medical Department activities, 42d Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon (undated). Tart I, 79. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
<13) Ibid., Part I, 55.
'14) Ibid., Part I, 56.
(15) Ibid., Part I. 107.
'10) Operation report, 1st Division, St. Mihiel operation.
(17) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon (undated). Part II, 33. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
'18) Ibid., Part I, 58.
'10) Ibid., Part I. 59.
'20) ibid.. Part I, 32.
'21) Ibid., Part II, 37.
•22) Ibid., Part I, 31.
CHAPTEE XVII
THE FIFTH CORPS (26TH DIVISION, THE FRENCH 15TH COLONIAL
DIVISION, AND 4TH DIVISION)
On September 11, the day before the attack, tbe Fifth Corps sector, ex-
tending from Mon illy on the south to Watronville on the north, was held by
the 26th Division on the right, the French 15th Colonial Division in the
center, and the 8th Brigade of the 4th Division on the left (the remainder
of the 4th Division being in reserve). 1 - 2
The mission of the Fifth Corps was to attack on the western face of the
St. Mihiel salient .simultaneously with the First and Fourth Corps on the
south. In detail the zone of action of the Fifth Corps was as follows : - Right
(south) : Genicourt-sur-Meuse (inclusive) — Mouilly (exclusive) — St. Remy
(exclusive) — Etang de Lachaussee (inclusive). Left (north): Dieue to
Ilawlinmont Road (inclusive) — stream running east (inclusive).
The infantry attack was launched at 8 a. m.. September 12. after an
artillery preparation of seven hours. 2 In this connection it will be recalled
that the army plans for the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, discussed
in Chapter XIV, provided for the southern attack to start at 5 a. m., and for
the western attack at 8 a. m.
Very little resistance was encountered in the advance of the Fifth Corps,
except from a few machine-gun nests, which, with one or two exceptions,
were speedily reduced. 2
At 9 p. m.. the 26th Division extended along Tranchee des Hautes
Ornieres, thence south and east to the western edge of Dommartin. thence
northwest to the 26th Division sector limit. 2
Field Orders No. 10. Fifth Corps, issued September 12. ordered the
divisions of that corps to advance to the army objective. It ordered the French
15th Colonial Division not to advance beyond the line Hannonville — Longeau
Ferme. Tin's division was to organize the captured front from Montgirmont
to Herbeuville (inclusive), and transfer to the 26th Division the captured
territory lying between the line Herbeuville — Dommartin and the line Hannon-
ville — Longeau Ferme. The 26th Division was ordered to continue its ad-
vance to the line Thillot-sous-les Cotes (exclusive) — Dompierre-aux-Bois
(inclusive), maintaining close liaison with the French 2d Light Infantry
Division on the south, and paying particular attention to the protection of its
ri«ht flank. 3
During the night of September 12-13 and during the morninir of the 13th
the attacking forces of the French loth Colonial and the 26th Divisions ad-
vanced their line to the army objective with very little resistance from the
enemy. The line established at the end of the day, September 13. may be
499
500 FIELD OPERATIONS
roughly described as running through Ville-en-Woevre, southeast through
Iiiaville — Marcheville — Wadonville— Avillers — Hattonville — Vigneulles, inclu-
fiive. 2
The plan of evacuation in the corps was prescribed in the following set
of instructions, neither dated nor numbered, but issued the first part of Sep-
tember, 1918:
PLAN OF EVACUATION OF SICK AND WOUNDED
1. Divisional organization :
(a) Battalion aid station, relays of litter bearers and regimental aid stations will be
established by regimental surgeons, under the supervision of the division surgeon. Addi-
tional sanitary personnel from divisions not in action may be obtained upon application
to the corps surgeon.
(6) Station for slightly wounded: 2Gth Division, Genicourt; 15th Division (French),
Dieue.
The American division in reserve will establish both of these stations.
Those able to return to duty at once will be returned to the line.
All other cases will be evacuated to Evacuation Hospital No. 6, at Souilly.
(c) Division Hospitals will be established by division surgeons as follows:
Collection and sorting stations (triage) — 26th Division, Genicourt; 15th Division,
Fontaine Brillante.
For treatment of gassed cases — 26th Division, Genicourt; 13th Division (French).
Fontaine Brillante.
Gassed cases get only preliminary treatment at these hospitals and will be evacualeil
as soon as possible to the corps gas hospital at Rambluzin. American division in reserve
will establish field hospital at Kambluzin to assist in care of gassed cases. A careful
sorting must be effected at these hospitals to prevent the necessity of a secondary
evacuation from mobile surgical and special hospitals.
For treatment of ordinary sick (except contagious cases), skin and venereal cases,
the division surgeon, 20th Division, will establish a field hospital at the chateau at Le
Petit Monthalrons for all units east of the Meuse. Overflow from this hospital will he
evacuated to Evacuation Hospitals Nos. 6 and 7 at Souilly.
2. Evacuation.
(a) Severely wounded, all troops: Americans to Mobile Hospital No. 1 at La Mor-
lette, 1 k. west of Ancemont, Evacuation Hospital No. S at Petite Maujouy, IV. k. east
of Senoncourt and Mobile Hospital No. 2 at Recourt. French to H. O. E. Hospital at
Grande Maujouy immediately east of Evacuation Hospital No. 8.
(6) Slightly wounded, all troops: Americans to Evacuation Hospitals Nos. 6 and 7. at
Souilly and Evacuation Hospital No. at Vaubecourt. French to H. O. E. nospital at
Grande Maujouy and H. O. E. Hospital at Vaudelaincourt.
(c) Sick, skin and venereal cases, all troops: To Le Petit Monthalrons and Evacuation
Hospitals Nos. and 7, at Souilly.
(d) Contagious cases, all troops: To French contagious hospital at Benoite Vaux.
(e) Gassed, all troops : To gas hospital at Rambluzin, 3 k. east of Heippes on Heippes —
Recourt road.
(/) Psychoneurotic cases, all troops: To psychoneurotic hospital at Benoite Vaux.
(//) All evacuations for Corps Troops will be to the nearest medical unit.
*******
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The chief surgeon of the corps reported that at this time the 4th and 26th
Divisions were fairly well equipped, but that in the latter division there was
shortage of Medical Department personnel, both commissioned and enlisted.
ST. MIIIIEL OPERATION 501
The corps surgeon's office had no transportation and no sanitary train, except
that, pursuant to army orders. United States Army Ambulance Service Sec-
tion No. 004 was attached to it. Provision for the care of wounded made
by the army in rear of the corps consisted of the establishment of 4 evacuation
hospitals, 2 mobile hospitals, 1 pas hospital staffed by army personnel assisted
by 1 field hospital of the 4th Division, 1 French contagious disease hospital.
1 psychoneurotic hospital and 1 medical supply dump. 4
The corps surgeon anticipated that there would be a large number of
casualties, and he made as thorough preparations as possible for their care
while under his jurisdiction. Hospital sites for triage and for gas treatment
of American casualties were taken over from the French at Fontaine Brillante
and Oenicourt, but when the French 15th Colonial Division went into line
toward the left it was assigned the former site. 4
THE 26TH DIVISION
Beginning on the night of September 6-7, 1918, the 26th Division, as a
part of the Fifth Corps, entered the line in the Rupt sector east of Mouilly
on the western face of the St. Mihiel salient, relieving the French 2d Light
Infantry Division. 4
On September 12, at 8 a. m., the infantry attacked eastward from south-
west of Les Eparges. The enemy was driven from Saint Remy and Dommar-
tinda-Montagne; and after 10 p. m. Longeau Ferme — Dompierre-aux-Bois
road, south of Dommartin-la-Montagne was reached. 4 ' 5
During the night of September 12-13 the division occupied Hattonchatel
and Yigneullesdes-Hattonchatel. 4
On the morning of the 13th the division made connection with the 1st
Division, which was operating on the south, on the left flank of the Fourth
Army Coi^s. and by this junction of the two divisions the St. Mihiel salient
had ceased to exist. On the night of September 13-14 the 26th was relieved
by the French 2d Light Infantry Division ; and on the night of September
14-15 it took over the general front, extending southeast from a point near
Combres to a point near Thillot-sous-les-Cotes. At daylight on the morning
of September 15 the enemy attempted a raid against St. Hilaire, which the
division repulsed. 4
MEDICAT, DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
During the advance evacuation of wounded was greatly facilitated
by 12 litter bearers detailed from each line company, who carried the wounded
as far as the battalion aid stations. (Regimental stations were not utilized.)
Without the aid of these companj^ litter bearers evacuation would have been
greatly retarded. The wounded had to be removed at this time by hand
carriage, as ambulances could not cross the roadless belt of No Man's Land,
and long portage by litter bearers was therefore necessary. Liaison was
maintained by runners detailed to the. several regimental detachments from
ambulance companies until the distance became so great that they could not
maintain contact in the absence of motorcvcles and saddle animals. 7 The
502 FIELD OPERATIONS
division surgeon in his report emphasized the fact that had the motorcycles
prescribed in Tables of Organization been available they would have made
it possible to maintain liaison after contact by runners became impracticable,
and consequently would have promoted cooperation and efficiency in the re-
moval of wounded. 7
Ambulance Companies
In preparation for the advance. Ambulance Company Xo. 101 established
a dressing station behind the right of the division at Mouilly and Ambulance
Company No. 102 another at Noyon, behind the left flank.
Ambulance Companies No. 103 and No. 104 were in reserve at Rupt-
en-Woevre, where a detachment of Field Hospital No. 104 operated a station
for walking wounded. 8 As the troops advanced, the last mentioned companies
passed the others, and in cooperation established a station at La Cloche. 9
The greatest difficulty encountered by the divisional medical service in
this operation was that incident to advancing the dressing stations, as roads
across No Man's Land were impassable until repaired by the Engineers.
As a result of this experience, an engineer squad was organized by each
ambulance company and provided with material for making a certain amount
of road repairs — an expedient which hastened considerably the movement
of their motor transport in subsequent operations. 10 At this time also all
trucks belonging to the sanitary train were pooled to form a provisional truck
company, with resultant improvement of service. 7 As signaling between ambu-
lance posts by some form of mechanical apparatus was considered advisable,
the signal corps furnished material for that purpose.
Field Hospitals
The triage operated by Field Hospital No. 101 was located at Genicourt-
sur-Meuse. and here also was Field Hospital No. 104 prepared to treat gas
cases. 8 While a detail from the latter operated a station for the slightly
wounded and the sick at Chateau Petit Monthairon. west of the Meuse, on
the road to the railroad at Souilly. Field Hospital No. 103, with Mobile
Surgical Unit No. 7 attached, was held there in reserve. 8 The medical supply
unit was at Genicourt-sur-Meuse. From the triage at Genicourt-sur-Meuse the
wounded were transferred to Evacuation Hospital No. 8, Petit Maujouy,
and to Mobile Hospital No. 2 at Recourt ; and to Evacuation Hospitals No.
6 and No. 7 at Souilly. gassed cases to the gas hospital at Eambluzin, psychi-
atric cases to Benoite Vaux. Other hospitals in rear of the division were also
available to receive cases as required. 11 ' 12 After the infantry advance and
the establishment of a dressing station at La Cloche, the triage was advanced
to Mouilly. where it was operated by Field Hospital No. 104: there were
only a few admissions while it was located at that point. 9
AVhen the division took over the general front on the night of September
14-15 redisposition of medical department units proved necessary. A dressing
station was opened at Les Eparges on the left by Ambulance Company No.
1()4. with the 103d in reserve, and another at Dommartin-la-Montagne on the
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 503
right, by Ambulance Company No. 102, with the 101st in reserve. 9 The triage
(Field Hospital No. 104) was established at Vaux les Palanieix. Field Hos-
pital No. 103 then cared for the seriously wounded at Troyon-sur-Meuse, and
Field Hospital No. 102, at Petit Monthairon, cared for the sick. Field Hos-
pital No. 101 remained in reserve at Genicourt-sur-Meuse. 10
The following extracts are taken from a report made by the division sani-
tary inspector concerning matters of interest to the Medical Department in
the St. Mihiel operation : 13
Ambulance service was nil in advance of the front line for nearly 24 hours, due
I'liiefly to impassable roads.
Company litter bearers and Medical Department enlisted personnel were generally
with their companies and functioned properly.
Observation showed it to be desirable that these two things be reported back to the
ambulance dressing station for transmission to the division surgeon: (a) Captured medi-
cal stations, with a description of them: (6) water supplies, also with a description.
Guards should be placed in charge of captured stations until taken over by the proper
departments or until their probable usefulness is no longer apparent.
Medical stations taken from the Germans showed the following noteworthy conditions:
(a) Construction. — Proof against shell fire; generally almost absolutely fireproof.
(b) Access to stations was either on a level, as in dugouts on hillsides, or by runways
ipf gradual slope.
(c) A general scheme in stations of —
(1) Officers' quarters.
(2) Office and dispensary combined, with lavish but no unnecessary equipment.
(3) Ample storage room for patients, with beds generally in tiers of three, each pro-
vided with comfortable mattress and two blankets, the arrangement showing economy and
ample space.
(4) Wheeled litters, botli for use on roads and with car wheels for use on 00-cm. rail-
Hays. Cars fitted for the reception of litters for use on CO-cm. railways. Wooden beds
»f light weight and wire bottoms and with handles at each end so that they can be used
as litters.
(5) Storage of concentrated food in stations; usually canned goulash and compressed
peas and rice in paper cartons. Storage of water both in cisterns and in bottles, more
senerally the latter.
(6) Electric or acetylene lighting.
(7) Gas masks in the shape of a hood, to be tied around the neck of unconscious
wounded. Extra masks.
(8) Portable individual oxygen sets in cases.
(9) Portable medical and surgical equipment completely filling and economically
fitting into a knapsack.
(10) Auto-ambulances for four recumbent and no sitting cases, lighter in weight
and with proportionately greater motor power than our G. M. C. ambulances.
(11) Medical wagons; light, four-wheeled, two-horse, cut-under type, with compart-
ment for equipment, hooped roof and tarpaulin cover.
(12) Diagnosis tags with data spaces similar to our field medical card, but without
inclosing envelope.
THE 4TH DIVISION
During the operations in the St. Mihiel salient, the 4th Division held the
subsector des Hures, extending from Watronville to Cote 372, inclusive. 14
The 59th Infantry had relieved elements of the French 10th Colonial
Division and the French Light Infantry Division September 5 to 7, 1918, and
held this sector throughout the operation. The 12th Machine Gun Battalion
504 FIELD OPERATIONS
was in the front line with the 59th Infantry. The 58th Infantry remained
in support in a position of concealment north of the Sommedieue — Haudio-
mont Road. The remainder of the 4th Division (less the 4th Field Artillery
Brigade) constituted the Fifth Army Corps Reserve. The 4th Field Ar-
tillery Brigade had heen temporarily detached from the division on September
7 and was attached to the 26th Division and the French 15th Colonial Division.
The 4th Division did not take part in the attack. 14
Activities on September 14 took the form of an attack on Fresnes and
Manheulles. The formation was taken up at 10.30 p. m. and both places were
occupied before 2 p. m."
During the night of September 14-15 part of the 59th Infantry was re-
lieved in the front line by the French 15th Colonial Infantry Division. The
58th Infantry also moved back from its position in support. 14
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
At the beginning of this operation the use of bandsmen as litter bearers was
prohibited by general orders, but litter-bearer service to Infantry troops was
increased by the detail of the following number of men from each organization :
Rifle company. 10; machine-gun company, 8; headquarters company, 12; supply
company 7 , 6. This arrangement provided 146 such bearers to a regiment of
infantry. These men were ordered to report to their respective medical officers,
without rifles, at the beginning of the operation. 15
Sanitaky Train
The sanitary train, less Ambulance Company No. 33, which had pro-
ceeded to Sommedieue, was advanced to Haudainville and its vicinity. There
Field Hospital No. 28 opened for the reception of all classes of cases and also
as divisional triage, while Field Hospital No. 33, detached for service with
the Fifth Corps, moved to Rambluzin to reinforce the gas hospital there.
Elaborate and complete preparations were made by 7 the corps (q. v.) for
evacuation from the triage, and there is no record in the divisional history
that divisional hospitals, other than Field Hospital No. 28, were established.
A total of 522 patients passed through the triage while the 4th Division was
in this sector. When the division moved to the vicinity 7 of Lemmes, Field
Hospital No. 21 was opened near that town for the reception of divisional
sick, and the remainder of the train was held in reserve. 15
REFERENCES
(1) Keport of assistant chief of staff, G-3, General Headquarters.
(-) Special report of recent operations, Fifth Army Corps. September 25, 19LS.
(3) F. O. No. 19, Fifth Army Corps, A. E. F., September 12, 1918.
(4) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War Col-
lege, 1700 (26th Division).
(5) Map 2Gth Division, St. Mihiel operation.
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION 505
(6) Roport of Medical Department activities. 26th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon (undated). Part II, 25. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(7) Ibid., Part II, 33.
(8) Ibid., Part II, 30.
(9) Ibid., Part II, 31.
(10) Ibid., Part II, 32.
(11) Annex 6, F. O. No. 9, Headquarters First Army, September C. 101S.
(12) Report of Medical Department activities, Fifth Army Corps, by Col. W. R. Eastman,
M. C, corps surgeon (undated), 2. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(13) tteport of Medical Department activities, 26th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon (undated). Part II, 74. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(14) Operation report, 4th Division, St. Mihiel operation.
(15) Report of Medical Department activities of the 4th Division, A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of the division surgeon (undated). Part I, 6. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
CHAPTER XVIII
ARMY HOSPITALS
Casualties were moved by corps and army ambulances from the division
hospitals to the army hospitals, as prescribed in the Secret Orders No. 6. July
9, 1918 (quoted in Chapter XI, p. 343). On the southern face of the salient the
majority of the wounded went to Evacuation Hospital No. 1 and to Mobile
Hospital No. 3, at Sebastopol Barracks, 1 ' 2 or to the hospitals grouped in and
near Toul. A considerable number, especially from the 1st Division, were
taken to Mobile Hospital No. 39," at Anlnois, and to the hospitals at Sorcy.
while the hospitals at Pagny, Trondes, and on the right at Chaligny and La
Malgrange were but little used.'- 5 ' ° Most of the wounded on the western face
of the salient were taken to Evacuation Hospitals No. 6 and No. 7 at Souilly. 7
Some of these hospitals were new and had not seen active service in combat
before this time. Most of the mobile hospitals had been organized and equipped
in Paris during July and August, and several of the evacuation hospitals did
not reach France until shortly before the St. Mihiel operation. Equipment of
certain units, e. g., Base Hospitals No. 45 and No. 51, was relatively limited. 5
Though every available hospital unit in France was assembled for this opera-
tion, the inexperience of some and the limited equipment of others was the
source of considerable apprehension concerning the adequacy of Medical
Department provisions should the operation prove protracted. Fortunately,
the ordeal was brief and patients comparatively few, thus affording valuable
experience to new organizations without breaking them down by overwork
and without overtaxing their resources.
Evacuation Hospital No. 1, established February 4 at Sebastopol Barracks,
some 11.2 km. (7 miles) from the battle line and 3 km. (1.8 miles) north of
Toul. immediately before this operation increased its bed capacity from 900 to
2.800, its personnel now consisting of 97 officers, 92 nurses, and 674 enlisted
men. As shown by the evacuation order, this unit, reinforced by Mobile Hos-
pital No. 3, was designed to serve as one of the principal evacuation hospitals
for wounded from the south face of the salient. 1 Between September 12 and
1.") the two units taken together admitted 2.750 wounded. 2 The daily admissions
from September 12 to the end of that month varied from 460 to 570. 1
There is nothing special to record in respect to the operation of these
hospitals, as their procedure was essentially that of all similar hospitals. Upon
arrival of a patient all data were taken from his diagnosis tag or field medical
card and his name and official status verified from his identification tag.
Valuables were placed by the registrar in the hospital safe and the patient,
clothed in pajamas, went to the preoperative ward. Here morphine, strychnine,
and antitetanic serum were administered if indicated and the patient was pre-
507
508 FIELD OPERATIONS
pared for operation, except that shock cases were sent immediately to the
special ward provided for them. Radiographic examination was made in cases
of probable bone injury or retained missiles. These patients then went either
to the operating room or to a surgical ward, according to the decision of the
operating surgeon based on radiographic findings. A separate operating room
was provided for patients with injury to the eye or ear, while appropriate jaw
injuries were treated by the dental surgeon. It was not found practicable,
however, to assign special types of cases to certain operators ; the several teams
attended to all cases admitted during their respective tours of duty. 1
Cooperating with Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at Sebastopol Barracks dur-
ing the St. Mihiel operation, Mobile Hospital No. 3 maintained 200 beds and
brought up to a total of eight the number of operating teams there on duty. 1
JUSTICE HOSPITAL GROUP
The group of hospitals at Toul, where later a hospital center was or-
ganized — Justice hospital group — was formed in part to meet needs imposed
by the St. Mihiel operation. Numbers of extensive permanent barracks were
taken over by the Medical Department, and medical organizations were
installed in them as follows: 9
Bpds
Base Hospital No. 45, Caserne La Marche 2,300
Base Hospital No. 51, Caserne Fabvier 2,000
Evacuation Hospital No. 3, Caserne Perrin-Brichainbault 1,000
Evacuation Hospital No. 14, Caserne Perrin-Brichambault 1,000
Army Red Cross Hospital No. 114, Caserne Luxembourg 1,500
Provisional Gas Hospital, Annex Caserne La Marche 650
Contagious Hospital, Caserne A. R _ 601)
Neurological Unit No. 2, Caserne Fabvier 700
With the exception of Caserne Luxembourg, these barracks were situated
close together on the Rue Justice, about 1.6 km. (1 mile) from the center of
the city of Toul. 9
Twelve hundred reclassified enlisted men of the line from the 1st Depot
Division at St. Aignan were ordered to Toul for distribution to the various
hospitals on both sides of the St. Mihiel salient; most of them were then sent
to Souilly for further distribution. These men were quite untrained, a num-
ber were in rather poor physical condition, most were poorly equipped, and
the incompleteness of their personal records was a source of considerable cor-
respondence.
The greatest difficulties of the hospitals at Toul arose from the following
causes: (1) Inadequate personnel — officers, nurses and enlisted men: (2)
limited medical supplies; (3) delay in procuring suitable articles for diets;
(4) incompleteness of the personal records accompanying reclassified men
received from the 1st Depot Division to reinforce the personnel of the several
hospitals; (5) lack of organization of a suitable triage. 8
There was some lack of surgical instruments at first, but surgical teams
sent to help out brought their own supplies, and it was possible to keep instru-
ments in continuous use during the 12-hour tours of duty of each team. 10
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 509
A triage system, extemporized for service during the St. Mihiel opera-
tion, proved so adequate to the needs existing at that time that it was con-
tinued for several months. Almost all patients admitted to the hospitals at
Tonl were wounded who were easily classified, and numerous evacuations by
hospital train prevented congestion. It was not until later, when epidemic
diseases appeared in considerable numbers, that triage difficulties became
serious and a formal sorting station for the Toul hospital group was
established. 11
By September 14, 11,000 patients had been admitted to this group of
hospitals. In the interval September 1 and September 11, inclusive, 1,998
surgical cases incident to trench warfare had been received, while the number
of battle casualties admitted in the interval September 12 to September 20
was 8,340. Most of the work done at Toul during this period was similar to
that of field and evacuation hospitals. Simultaneously the evacuation and
mobile hospitals nearer the front were sending in operated cases, and mam-
secondary closures of wounds Avere also performed. 12
The surgical services suffered, particularly during the early active periods,
from lack of sufficient enlisted men of the Medical Department. Ultimately,
convalescent patients and Class B and Class C men accumulated in sufficient
numbers to relieve this p>ersonnel of heavy labor. Because of its situation the
inflow and outgo of patients of the hospital group at Toul was very great,
so that the physical labor involved in admission and evacuation was extremely
heavy. For weeks the admissions were over 1,000 a day, and on one day 1,544
wounded and gassed patients were received. Many of the buildings housing
surgical hospitals were four stories high and without elevators. The great
majority of admissions were stretcher patients who had to be transported
recumbent, making thousands of trips for stretcher bearers who carried them
up the stairways. Xot only patients, but all water, food, clothing, bedding,
laundry, and surgical materiel, as well as patients' excreta, were carried
cither down or up or both. The surgical service alone required a large force
of stretcher bearers. 13 The fracture cases always came to the hospital well
splinted.
Despite limited facilities the X-ray service was always efficient. Because
of the frequency with which wounds were complicated by fractures or retained
missiles, either X-ray photographs or fluoroscopic views had to be taken of
over two-thirds of the operative cases. Difficulty was experienced at first in
obtaining a complete X-ray plant for each hospital, and later some trouble
arose from the uncertainty of the electrical supply from Toul. but. despite
these embarrassments, no operative case had to be delayed on account of
deficiencies in the X-ray department. 13
Every hospital had its own laboratory, and there was also a group labora-
tory where Wassermann tests, blood cultures, and elaborate pathological work
could be performed. Autopsies were regularly performed in the hospital
laboratories. A wound bacteriological count could be made from cultures in
"24 hours, and from a smear in a few minutes. Laboratory supplies were
seant at first, and much improvisation was necessary. The group laboratory
510
FIELD OPERATIONS
prepared Dakin solution and also the gum-salt solution. Very little of the
latter was used, however, as it was decided that a citrate transfusion was pref-
erable and that its use should be adopted as a routine practice in all the hos-
pitals at Toul.
Evacuations from the various hospitals here were coordinated by one
office, which consolidated their individual statements of evacuables and made
arrangements for hospital trains.
From the time of the organization of the Toul group to the latter part
of September, 1918, personnel of the medical service was diverted to the care
of surgical and gassed patients.
Total admissions in this group during September were divided as follows:
Hospital
Medical
Surgical
(ias
73
Con-
tagions
f63
914
Neuro-
logical
Total
6,303
1.E95
123
8, 757
914
1.S87
2,225
1, 3C0
2, 2C0
800
16
3.6S8
1,300
2,200
100
824
900
1.070
1,894
117
1
117
2E0
230
8,614 | 8,237 1.159
1,577 1 353
19,940
Base Hospital No. 45 (the "Richmond unit") had reached Toul on
August 20, when it relieved Evacuation Hospital No. 14 and Field Hospital
No. 355, taking over at the same time some 350 patients in the main hospital
building assigned to it and 300 others in the annex for contagious cases, about
0.8 km. (0.5 mile) distant. There was almost no equipment available after
the former units moved and for several clays thereafter, wdien a meager supply
of essentials was accumulated; difficulties in caring for patients were there-
fore very acute at first. The buildings utilized were four stories high, with-
out light or plumbing, but in spite of these and other handicaps, especially
shortage of labor and an increasing number of patients, 2,300 beds were soon
installed. Not until September 21 did this hospital receive the equipment
which it had accumulated in the United States prior to departure for France.
During the St. Mihiel operation it furnished three operating teams to Evacua-
tion Hospital No. 3. No figures are available concerning the number of patients
Ease Hospital No. 45 admitted resulting from that operation, but the number
received during September is given as 8,757, with 142 deaths. The functions
of the hospital at this time were essentially those of an evacuation hospital. 1 "
Base Hospital No. 51 had arrived in Toul on August 27 and was located
near Evacuation Hospital No. 14 in a centralized group of four-story barracks
and other buildings. 10 By intensive effort these were prepared for the re-
ception of patients, and some supplies were received from the French stores
in the group. On September 5 the unit began to receive patients and. as its
nurses had not yet arrived, 100 enlisted men from the orthopedic battalion
and certain convalescent patients were assigned to it to assist in ward sen-ice.
Deficiencies in equipment were met to a certain extent, the surgical instruments
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 511
employed in this emergency being supplied from belts of the officers and en-
listed men. Prepared dressings were employed and a sterilizer extemporized.
The X-ray plant was installed by September 11. From September 10 to 17
admissions were: 300 medical and 807 surgical; total, 1,107; and from Septem-
ber 17 to 24, 197 medical, 501 surgical, and 2 gassed; total, 700. 17
Evacuation Hospital No. 3 was located in the Perrin-Brichambault Bar-
racks of the Justice group, 2 km. (1.2 miles) west of Toul, where it was to
care for the seriously wounded ; while Evacuation Hospital No. 14, to the west,
was to receive both the seriously and the slightly wounded, chiefly the latter.
A spur from the railway ran to the rear of the main building of Evacua-
tion Hospital No. 3, and it was from this point that all evacuations from the
hospital were made. The organization had reached its location August 24
and within one week had 12 operating tables and 1,000 beds in readiness.
An exchange for litters, blankets, and splints brought in by patients was
organized. Several additional operating and shock teams had joined, and a
splint team was organized. During emergencies the teams were on duty for
12 hours each. An adequate supply of instruments was available. Patients
entered with either diagnosis tags or field medical cards. Eventually the
latter were provided in the hospital for all cases, although at times they had
to be improvised. Of the 1,178 patients received from September 12 to 16,
inclusive, the majority arrived in the first 24 hours. During this period there
■were 693 operations and 42 deaths. 18
Patients were admitted to a receiving ward where a medical officer quickh'
sorted the cases into three classes, as follows : Walking wounded (sent to the
dressing room) ; gassed and medical cases (sent to special wards) ; wounded,
on litters (the majority), sent to a second triage or preoperative ward. These
patients received 80 per cent of the professional care given in the hospital.
At the preoperative ward the wounded were undressed and sorted. Dress-
ings were removed, wounds carefulh' examined, and decision reached con-
cerning further disposition of the individual patient. The officer in charge
of this ward proved to have great responsibility, for on the accuracy of his
decisions depended to a large degree the success of the hospital. From this
point patients passed to one of several destinations: (a) Evacuation wards:
Simple bullet wounds or other uncomplicated, relatively slight injuries.
(b) Wards for retained cases: Perforating and nonaspirating wounds of the
chest, (c) X-ray room: Fractures; retained missiles, (d) Shock ward:
Suitable cases, including all those with blood pressure below 100. (e) Oper-
ating room : Hemorrhage cases and those with perforating aspirating wounds
too serious to evacuate. 19 The majority of cases passed to the X-ray depart-
ment, but if findings there were negative in suitable cases the patient went
at once to the evacuation ward.
The dressing room constituted a third sorting station, whither ambulant
patients were sent from the receiving ward. Here also great care was neces-
sary in the classification of patients, for some with apparently slight injuries
were actually found to be seriously or even dangerously wounded. Occasion-
ally a man walked in who had received an injury to the large blood vessels of
the arm, or a compound fracture of the skull. At the dressing room all
512 FIELD OPERATIONS
patients were dressed, and those thought to require immediate operation were
sent to the preoperative ward.
Note was made at each sorting station whether tetanus antitoxin had
been given. The hour when the wound was received and the time of admission
to hospital were entered on the field medical card. The shock ward provided
for patients whose blood pressure on admission was below 100 and also re-
ceived certain cases from the operating room. 20
Briefly, the procedure in caring for patients was as follows: Waiting
patients were kept warm by the use of blankets and hot drinks. Patients were
bathed and their clothing changed — a procedure not possible at most places
whore this hospital had served. The anesthetic of choice was ether, adminis-
tered by the drop method. Thorough removal of devitalized tissue was the
rule, and there were no primary closures except in a few early cases of knee-
joint injuries. Injuries of this joint were thoroughly debrided and any foreign
body found removed in its bed of bone. If infected, free drainage was
established by lateral incision and early passive movement given, followed
in a few days by active movement. These joints were never immobilized.
Whenever possible, foreign bodies in other localities also were removed. Head
injuries were always operated under local anesthesia. Perforating rifle
wounds of the chest were usually not operated unless of the aspirating type,
but such cases were carefully observed for hemothorax and infection. Re-
tained missiles were removed at the primary operation only when superficial
in the lungs or free in the pleural cavity. Abdominal injuries were given
preference in the operating room, the operative procedure being the same as
in civil practice. Injuries to the long bones were treated by removal of all
ragged tissue and loose bone fragments and the limb was then immobilized
in either a Thomas or a posterior Cabot splint. Extensive injuries of soft
parts were debrided and immobilized. Nerves were sutured at the primary
operation. Dressings were applied loosely, as a rule, and seldom were drain-
age tubes employed, but frequently dressings were saturated with Dakin's
solution. Amputation was performed only when the nerve and blood supply
was completely destroyed, or in case of progressive gas bacillus infection.
The skin was conserved as much as possible, and the stump never closed.
Postoperative progress was corroborated by frequent laboratory examinations. 21
Arriving at Toul on August 10. Evacuation Hospital Xo. 14 was located
in the Perrin-Brichambault Barracks, a group of buildings formerly occupied
by a French regiment. After proper policing it made a very good location
for hospital purposes, except that the height of the buildings, without elevators,
incommoded service in their upper stories, and the water supply, though fairly
good, was limited in quantity. There were no facilities for storage of water,
with the result that at times the supply was entirely exhausted. The build-
ings were lighted by electricity, with special lighting facilities for the operat-
ing pavilion. 22 The personnel included: 23
Officers
Nurses
Enlisted
men
34
36
in
•
234
:t
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION
513
During: periods of greatest activity the number of nurses proved very in-
adequate. This evacuation hospital had not functioned prior to this time and
it was as yet without experience. Its equipment was not more than CO 2>er
cent complete.
As this hospital was designated for the treatment of both slightly and
seriously wounded, more particularly the former, special attention was given
to the arrangement of the receiving ward, and of the sorting and the operating
rooms, with a view to lessening the distance patients would have to be carried
by litter. Eleven operating tables were made available. As a rule, X-ray
examinations were made, if necessary, of all seriously wounded patients,
although, as only one X-ray machine Avas available, the work was much retarded.
All splinting was done by special teams, after the operators had completed
their work. Jaw cases were operated by the dental surgeon or by other mem-
bers of the surgical staff after consultation with him. Shock was treated by
specially trained medical officers.- 1
The most active period for operations was between September 12 and 18.
inclusive, during which time five teams operated during the day and four at
night. A 12-hour shift for teams was found to be satisfactory in reference
to the quantity and quality of their work and to their welfare.
As the loading platform for trains was but 182 meters (200 yards) from
the hospital, evacuation was simple, and nearly all patients were carried
directly to the trains by litter. This was very arduous work, particularly
when patients had to be carried clown the narrow stairways from the second
or third story. At first a nominal check list Avas required for all patients
sent by train, but as making this list, with the limited clerical facilities then
available, delayed evacuations, its use was abandoned.
The following table shows the classes of patients treated by this
hospital : * 8
Total admissions
Operations
Evacuations
Prisoners
Deaths
Septembcr-
13 14
6 510
99
43
64
II I
308
198
143
177
328
130
14
8
2
1
264
17!
1(50
10
1
139
86
419
1
2
18 ; Total
34
31
1, 4S9
707
1,159
97
15
Army Red Cross Evacuation Hospital No. 114 had formerly consisted of
~ medical officers and 35 nurses and nurses' aides. It then occupied 30 build-
ings and cared for French orphans and maternity cases. It was taken over
by the Army, reenforced by Red Cross personnel (McCoy unit) and by a field
hospital, and equipped by the Red Cross as a military hospital, with between
1,000 and 1,500 beds. 8
The provisional gas hospital of the Justice group was organized August
2. 1918, to meet the emergency occasioned by the St. Mihiel operation. 23 Its
personnel consisted, at first, of 3 officers permanently assigned, 6 others who
13576—25 33
514 FIELD OPERATIONS
joined, 14 nurses and 9 noncommissioned officers of the Medical Department,
and of 50 Class B men from the training hattalion depot at St. Aignan. Forty
more men from that battalion joined on September 19, and twenty French
women were employed as cooks, waitresses, laundresses, etc. The formation
occupied a part of Caserne La Marche, originally constructed for hospital pur-
poses and used in peace time by the French as a hospital for the local garrison
here. For this reason these buildings were perhaps better suited for hospital
purposes than were other buildings of the Toul group. The four buildings
made available gave adequate provision for 650 patients, with suitable rooms
for stores and service. A Bessonneau tent was used as a receiving ward and
sorting station. In one corner of this was a screened-off section for the treat-
ment of patients intoxicated by phosgene, thus providing for the immediate
administration of oxygen or treatment by phlebotomy,- etc. Mustard gas cases
were sent to a building equipped with two French portable bathing machines
supplied with running water. The marked shock of phosgene gas cases and
the sloughing of the respiratory mucosa of mustard gas cases were the most
striking clinical phenomena noted by the gas service here. Other buildings
were used for an officers' ward, for mild cases of mustard gassing, and for
convalescents recovering from the effects of phosgene. 25
The hospital administration was embarrassed by lack of stenographers,
typewriters, blank forms, bed linen, and other equipment. 25
From September 10 to October 7 the unit admitted both medical and
gas cases, 1,336 of the former and 1,351 of the latter.
Neurological Unit No. 2 was established in Caserne Fabvier to care for
psychoneurotic cases. Its personnel consisted of 4 medical officers, 10 nurses,
and 15 enlisted men from Base Hospital No. 117. The capacity of this hospital
was TOO beds, but only 259 neuropsychiatric cases were treated at Toul during
the first month of the hospital's operations there. The number admitted during
the St. Mihiel operation is not reported in the medical history of this unit, but
of the number mentioned above 63 per cent were returned to duty. Practically
all the cases received were psychoneuroses, the psychoses being exceptional.
OTHER ARMY HOSPITALS IN ST. MIHIEL OPERATIONS
Evacuation Hospital No. 13, which had landed at Brest on August 26, was
quickly transferred to Chaligny, southwest of Nancy. Here from September
2 to 23 it occupied buildings and was prepared to receive patients, but because
of its location only 105 cases were sent to it during this period.*
Mobile Hospital No. 4, assembled and organized in Paris August 13 to 31.
was rushed by rail to Trondes, where it arrived early in eptember. It here
received patients from September 14 to 30 and was then moved to the Meuse-
Argonne area. At Trondes, with Field Hospital No. 171 and Ambulance Com-
pany No. 310, it functioned as a provisional evacuation hospital. It furnished
from its own equipment hospitalization for approximately 350 patients. Field
Hospital No. 161 furnished tentage for about 200 more, but there were only 285
admissions during the period mentioned. Eighty-five operations were per-
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION 515
formed, with no deaths. Cases received, here did not include the seriously
wounded. 5
Evacuation Hospital No. 12, which had reached France August 31, 1918,
moved immediately to Pagny-sur-Meuse, arriving there September 3. Here
ten Adrian barracks and a large Bessonneau tent were found ready for its
occupancy. A section from Base Hospital No. 117 and Evacuation Ambulance
Company No. 4 were already located at the same place and a few patients had
accumulated.
Ten days were spent at Pagny-sur-Meuse by Evacuation Hospital No. 12,
during which time only a few cases were received, most of them being slightly
wounded. The hospital, however, was organized and gained much experience.
The location was a poor one for a hospital, and on the evening of September
13 preparations were begun for a movement to Royaumeix. The unit was
established in the new location on the 6th, in an old French hospital consisting
of four groups of Adrian barracks. Here it performed its first professional
services of an important character, receiving patients direct from the front,
some 24 km. (15 miles) distant. There were, however, relatively few cases,
as the operation had by this time been completed and there were not many
casualties in the sector which the hospital was serving. 8
The hospitals at Aulnois and Sorcy formed in effect one group composed
of Mobile Hospital No. 39, at Aulnois, and Evacuation Hospital No. 11 and
Field Hospital No. 41, at Sorcy Gare. Ambulance Company No. 41 carried
patients from the first named to the latter, and if necessary was to remove the
overflow to Toul.
In August, Mobile Hospital No. 39 was functioning at Aulnois with a
personnel of 15 officers, 19 nurses, and 80 enlisted men operating a hospital
of 85 beds. On the 14th of the month orders were received to increase the
hospital to its maximum capacity, yet to be prepared to withdraw at a
moment's notice. On August 15 the work of constructing six new barracks
and an enlarged operating pavilion, erecting additional tents, and other inci-
dental enlargements, including f shelter for a personnel of 150, was begun.
The work, performed by enlisted men of the medical department, was com-
pleted by September 10. A hundred casuals (reclassified) had arrived on
August 30 from special training battalions. When the work was finished
it was found that 524 beds could be installed, and the chief surgeon was
notified on September 10 that all was in readiness. An additional personnel
of 33 officers, 4G nurses, and 100 enlisted men was asked for, but not all of
these reported. The actual personnel received was: Officers in operating
learns. 14; officers in resuscitating teams, 2; operating-room nurses, 5; ward
nurses. 9; enlisted men, 180. Six additional officers also became available.
It was estimated that 144 major operations could be performed daily, this
hospital being designated to receive only the seriously wounded, though
preparations were made with a view to caring expeditiously for any slightly
wounded patients who might be received. 3
The organization and methods of this unit are discussed in the chapter
on mobile hospitals and mobile surgical units.
516 FIELD OPERATIONS
From Aulnois, evacuation to Sorcy, a railhead of the Paris — Nancy main
line, was effected by ambulances and by a narrow-gauge railway, and proved
fully adequate. Four recumbent or eight sitting cases could be evacuated by
ambulance in one hour and a quarter for the round trip. A narrow-gauge
train of 5 cars could carry 45 recumbent cases, requiring 35 minutes to load,
20 minutes to make the trip, and 35 minutes for unloading. By such a train
80 patients were evacuated in one and one-half hours, thus rendering service
equivalent to that given by 20 ambulances during one and one-quarter hours. 2 ' 5
Evacuation Hospital No. 11 moved on September 11 from Rimaueourt
to Sorcy Gare, where it was to act in conjunction with Mobile Hospital No.
39 and Field Hospital No. 41. It remained at this place about 10 days. 27
Its procedure of receiving, caring for, and evacuating patients was like
that of other similar units, for as this was the hospital's first experience in
campaign it adopted the methods of older organizations, more especially those
of Mobile Hospital No. 39.
Among the interesting professional methods adopted, the following are
worthy of mention : Abdominal cases were held 10 days and then not evacuated
unless so directed by the chief of the surgical service. In head cases where the
dura was opened, seven days' retention was the minimum. Perforated chest
wounds were evacuated as soon as complicating hemothorax permitted.
Patients with retained missiles were held 10 to 14 days. Joint cases and com-
pound fractures were held 3 to 7 days. Simple fractures were evacuated at
once. All amputations were held from 7 to 10 days. Spinal cases were held
7 days at first : as they reacted badly it was then ordered that they be evacuated
at once. 27
No statistical data were furnished by this unit.
The principal evacuation hospitals on the western front of the St. Mihiel
salient, viz. No. C and No. 7, were located at the railhead at Souilly. Here
I he Medical Department had secured possession of a French evacuation hospital
having a capacity rated by the French at 1,000 beds, by occupying both bar-
racks and tents. Passageways between buildings were floored and roofed and
there were concrete shelters (abris) instead of dugouts. With this hospital
the French turned over all equipment except instruments, yet it was far from
being thoroughly equipped from the American point of view. The French
plan of a double hospital made it practicable for Evacuation Hospitals No. 6
and No. 7 to work in conjunction here, and it was planned to increase the
capacity of the combined units by tents. The personnel was increased by a
company of class B men transferred from the Justice group, who were used
chiefly as litter bearers.
The consolidated hospital was ready for operation on August 27. but it re-
ceived no considerable number of patients until September 12-18. during which
it admitted nearly all the battle casualties of this front. At this time the
capacity of Evacuation Hospital No. 6 was 1,200 beds, and that of No. 7 some-
what greater. Lack of facilities for caring for the slightly wounded and the
sick (no camp for their proper care having been prepared) necessitated evacua-
tion to the rear of patients who could with better arrangements have been re-
turned to duty in a few days. Attempts had been made to provide such camp.
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 517
but they had failed. This caused overcrowding of these hospitals, but not to
such a degree as later during the Meuse-Argonne operation. 7
Both organizations here had the same layout, but whereas No. 7 bad more
space. No. G had the more complete equipment. The receiving station was
common to both, the two hospitals receiving alternately. A large preopera-
tive space allowed the centralization of appropriate cases, which were not
distributed to the wards until after operation. All evacuable cases were sent
through the " evacuating area," where the more rapid teams worked and
through which the slightly wounded passed. Patients were segregated at
the receiving ward into "seriously wounded," "slightly wounded," and
•'medical." Seriously wounded patients were undressed, bathed, X-rayed,
and prepared for operation. Except the shock cases, which were sent promptly
to the appropriate ward, no surgical case was sent to a ward until operation
or dressing was completed.
There were 2 operating rooms for the seriously w 7 ounded, each having 3
tables, and 1 room with 4 tables for the slightly wounded. To the latter were
assigned two of the best teams, with increased personnel. In this manner
it was possible to operate many slight cases in a day, and during the period
of most stress the average number cared for daily was 175. Splint teams,
which applied splints to all fracture cases, were notably helpful and con-
tributed materially to the output of operating rooms. The schedule for
operating teams was 7 a. m. to noon: 1.30 to 6.30 p. m., and 7 p. m. to 6.30
a. m., the teams alternating. This routine, by allowing a full night's sleep
every second night and time for meals, helped to keep up the strength of
the teams over long periods. At first chloroform was used, but later this
was discontinued and ether was the only anesthetic employed. 28
On August 27, 1918, Mobile Hospital No. 1 moved from Kouceux to
Petit Maujouy, where it had been ordered to report to the commanding
officer of Evacuation Hospital No. 8. As the latter unit was using in its
entirety the old French hospital, the former chose a site at a crossroads a
short distance to the west. After preparing this site, but without having
spread more than a minimum of canvas, the unit was ordered to La Morlette
to occupy an old French gas hospital consisting of eight semipermanent huts.
No tentage was to be erected until after the operation began, and the per-
sonnel was ordered to remain under cover during daylight. The location
was a good one for an advance hospital, with graveled roads, a good water
supply, and electric lights. It secured considerable French equipment and
supplies, including beds. To supplement the bed space, if necessary, tent
frames were erected but no canvas was spread. Shelter trenches were dug
to afford protection against bombing by airplanes or artillery fire, the loca-
tion being only 6.4 km. (4 miles) behind the lines. Gas alarms were provided
and gas drills were conducted. 20
The move to La Morlette separated the unit from Evacuation Hospital
Xo. 8. and thereafter it operated independently.
The St. Mihiel operation did not occasion the activity anticipated by
this unit. At alx>ut 11 a. m. on September 12 four American wounded were
518 FIELD OPERATIONS
brought in by ambulance, the first active indication that the offensive had
begun, no prior notice having been received. With the arrival of the
wounded, tents were hurriedly put up, but these were not needed, as the
number of patients received was only 141. Twenty-four of the casualties
died in hospital and were buried in a cemetery on top of the hill behind the
hospital. Many of the wounds were the result of bombing, a fact which
accounts for the high mortality rate. 30
On September 21 orders were received for the hospital to move to La
Claire Chene, adjoining Blercourt, Meuse, and on the 24th the movement
was accomplished.
Evacuation Hospital No. 8, which had reached Petit Maujouy by truck
on August 26, occupied Adrian barracks and tents and set up 1,000 beds. It
remained at this location during both the St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne
operations, receiving for the most part only the more seriously wounded. An
operating room was provided in an Adrian barrack and furnished with 18
operating tables, one-half the building being used for clean cases, for the
preparation of dressings, instruments, etc., and the other half for infected
cases. Patients were brought in on litters at one end of the structure, and the
litter bearers, after receiving instructions from the chief of the surgical service,
carried them to the operating tables indicated. Although the hospital was pre-
pared for work on a large scale, no great number of patients were received until
the Meuse-Argonne operation began on September 26. 31
A special department of this hospital was that in which dental surgery
for lesions of the jaw was performed. Special types of splints were necessary
to meet the needs of particular cases, and these were made of vulcanite, wire,
or metal in some other form. Primary union was the rule if patients were
seen early, and results were satisfactory in a series of 72 cases. No case of
infection by gas-forming bacilli was found among injuries of this character.
The unit sought to maintain on hand a large supply of instruments and
appliances, especially hemostats, debridement scissors, bandage scissors, gloves,
and Carrel-Dakin tubing. After teams, temporarily assigned, were advised
to bring their own instruments, the acute need for them was met. Prepared
dressings proved indispensable. One of the most difficult problems was the
provision of fresh linen, for the portable laundry employed by the French
for their evacuation hospital was inadequate for our larger units, and another
was securing sufficient personnel to perform the arduous duties of carrying
litters and digging graves. 32
The field bacteriological laboratory issued the hospital met all require-
ments and made invaluable reports on wound bacteriology. Other important
sections, in addition to the ones specially discussed, were the eye, ear, nose, and
throat department, and those pertaining to general service supply, subsistence,
and salvage. 32
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 9
On tho night of August 28 Evacuation Hospital No. 9 arrived at Vaube-
court, where it occupied a plant not yet entirely completed, but lying near a
highway and provided with a railroad loading quay. The structures taken
ST. MIHIEL OPERATION 519
over consisted of 9 wooden buildings 22 by 110 feet, 3 wooden ward buildings
of approximately the same dimensions, 24 Bessonneau ward tents, 16 by 50 feet.
2 wooden operating pavilions 45 by 45 feet, 3 Singer hangars, 40 by 100 feet,
1 wooden H-shaped building 66 by 110 feet, and a mess hall 30 by 80 feet.
Other buildings were provided for a disinfecting plant (with baths) , an engine
room, an electric service station, a gasoline storage room, and latrines. The
demands made on the hospital were constant and increased. 33
This was not the case during the St. Mihiel operation, however, as this
unit admitted but 13 surgical cases, none of which was a battle casualty, and a
small number of medical cases, only a very few of whom were seriously ill.
Immediately after this action, as other divisions entered the area, admissions
to the medical wards increased rapidly and steadily, many of the cases being
very severe.
NEUROLOGICAL UNIT NO. 1 (FROM BASE HOSPITAL NO. 117), BENOITE VAUX
Base Hospital No. 117 was a special neurologic hospital located at La
Fauche. On September 2, 4 medical officers and 15 enlisted men were trans-
ferred to Benoite Vaux to establish a temporary neurologic hospital of 200
beds for the coming St. Mihiel operation, their number being augmented
September 15 by 15 additional enlisted men sent from the parent hospital.
Xo account of the work of this detached unit is of record.
As previously mentioned, another unit from this base hospital operated
a neurologic hospital in the Justice group at Toul for the same class of
patients from the southern front of the St. Mihiel salient. 34
REFERENCES
(1) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 1, A. E. F.,
prepared under tlie direction of Col. G. H. R. Gosman, M. C, commanding officer,
undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(2) Report of Medical Department activities, Mobile Hospital No. 3, A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of Lient. Col. H. C. Coe, M. C, commanding officer, undated.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(3) Report of Medical Department activities, Mobile Hospital No. 39, A. E. P., St.
Mihiel operation, prepared under the direction of Col. T. M. Flint, M. C,
commanding officer, undated, 1. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 13, A. E. F.,
prepared under the direction of Lieut. Col. D. R. Snyder, M. C, commanding
officer, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(5) Report of Medical Department activities, Mobile Hospital No. 4, A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of Lieut. Col. M. B. Clopton, M. C, commanding officer, un-
dated, 1. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(6) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 12, A. E. F.,
prepared under the direction of Col. H. D. Bloomberg, M. C, commanding officer,
undated. 3. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(7) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 6, prepared
under the direction of Col. F. C. Baker. M. C, commanding officer, undated, 4.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
520
FIELD OPERATIONS
(8) Report of Medical Department activities, Toul Hospital Center, by Col. H. C. Mad-
dux, M. C, commanding officer, undated, 4. On file. Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(9) Ibid., 7.
(10) Ibid., 24.
(ID Ibid., 5.
(12) Ibid., 23.
(13) Ibid., 25.
(14) Ibid., 13.
(15) Report of Medical Department activities, Base Hospital No. 45, A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of Lieut. Col. S. McGuire, undated, 2. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(16) Report of Medical Department activities, Base Hospital No. 51, A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of Lieut. Col. H. W. Goodall, M. C, commanding officer, un-
dated, 4. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(17) Ibid., Table 1.
(18) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 3, A. E. F.,
prepared under the direction of Lieut. Col. R. W. Ker-. M. C, undated, 13. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(19) Ibid., 75.
(20) Ibid., 70.
(21) Ibid., 87.
(22) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 14, A. E. F..
prepared under the direction of Lieut. Col. George H. McLellan, M. C, com-
manding officer, undated, 14. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(23) Ibid., 19.
(24) Ibid., 18.
(25) Report of Medical Department activities, gas hospital. Toul Hospital Center, A. E. F.,
prepared under the direction of Lieut. Col. H. W. Goodall, M. C, commanding
officer, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(20) Report of Medical Department activities, Mobile Hospital No. 39, A. E. F., St.
Mlhiel operation, Tables I, II, III, prepared under the direction of Col. T. M.
Flint, M. C, commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(27) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 11, A. E. F.,
prepared by Col. D. F. Duval, M. C, commanding officer, undated. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(28) Ibid., 21.
(29) Report of Medical Department activities, Mobile Hospital No. 1, A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of Maj. D. Macrae, M. C, commanding officer, undated, 45.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(30) Ibid., 47.
(31) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 8, A. E. F.,
prepared under the direction of Col. J. F. Hall, M. C. commanding officer, undated,
9. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(32) Ibid., 11.
(33) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 9. A. E. F.,
prepared under the direction of Lieut. Col. R. Reynolds, M. C, commanding officer,
undated. 11. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(34l Report of Medical Department activities. Base Hospital No. 117, A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of Maj. \Y. .T. Otis, M. C, commanding officer, undated. On
file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
CHAPTER XIX
EVACUATION FROM THE ZONE OF THE ARMY
From evacuation, mobile and other hospitals at Toul, Sorcy, Trondes,
Souilly, and Vaubecourt patients were sent by hospital trains to base hospitals
located in the advance and intermediate sections.
HOSPITAL TRAINS
There were available at this time 20 American hospital trains, but these
not being considered sufficient, in addition, 45 trains were rented from the
French. 1 The latter were of various classes. A few were the regular traines
sanitaires, somewhat like the American trains but smaller. Others were
temporaires, merely assemblages of passenger coaches provided with some
medical equipment and personnel. Still others were improvises, having no
special type of cars or of equipment. The last were similar to what in Ameri-
can regulations were designated " trains for patients," and were used like them
for the transportation of the less serious cases. As the distance from the front
to base hospitals was short, it was thought that this use of these trains would be
justifiable, and this proved to be the case. French trains generally were em-
ployed for the short hauls to base hospitals near the front, and the heavy, more
fully equipped American trains for the longer hauls to hospitals farther to
the rear. 1
Heretofore Ts-sur-Tille had been the only regulating station, but on Sep-
tember 5 another regulating station was established at St. Dizier. which soon
became the more important of the two in so far as evacuation of the wounded
was concerned. It was planned to evacuate wounded from the southern face
of the salient to Neuf chateau, Bazoilles-sur-Meuse, Vittel, and Contrexeville :
and from the western face, to Chaumont, Rimaucourt, Langres, and, if
necessary, to Dijon. 2
Details of the method employed in operating hospital trains were as
follows: Reports regarding available bed space (i. e., bed allotments) in hos-
pitals in the advance section were made by the chief surgeon of that section to
the regulating station at Is-sur-Tille ; in the same way bed allotments in the
intermediate and base sections were given to that station by the chief surgeon,
Services of Supply, who was also the chief surgeon, A. E. F. The regulating
officer at Is-sur-Tille would, in turn, allot bed space in any or all sections to
the regulating station at St. Dizier. The duties of the regulating officer at
Is-sur-Tille were otherwise solely those of secondary evacuation ; that is,
evacuation from base hospitals in the advance section to other base hospitals in
the intermediate and base sections. 2
In accordance with the plan just explained, in hospital trains were
assigned to Is-sur-Tille and 41 to St. Dizier. The railheads from which trains
departed during this operation were: Toul, Sorcy, and Trondes-Pagny, on the
Toul front; Souilly, and Vaubecourt, on the Verdun front.
1357G— 25 34 521
522
FIELD OPERATIONS
As it proved, not all the trains available were needed or were utilized.
But 57 train trips in total were, necessary to evacuate all the sick and wounded,
many trains making several trips. Twenty -nine trips were made by the seven
American trains and twenty-eight by the French trains. From September 12
to 25 an average of four trains left the various railheads daily. American
trains made round trips in an average of three and one-half days. On the
57 train trips 20,998 patients were carried.
The daily record of departures of trains is given below : 8
From—
September—
12
13
14
15
16
4
17
4
18
4
19
4
20
21
1
22
2
23
1
24
4
25
1
Total
Toul
3
4
1
3
3
1
1
1
38
2
|
1
Souilly
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
1
1
1
11
1 i
5
Total
3
6
3
6
4
s|
4
6
3
3
3
8
3
57
From the foregoing it is evident that the great majority of evacuations
were from Toul, due, of course, to the fact that the majority of patients
entered the hospitals in and near there. Train evacuations were begun almost
as soon as patients began to arrive at the hospitals. During the official period
of the operation, September 12-16, inclusive, 17 trains left Toul, carrying
539 patients, while 5 trains left other evacuation points, with 725 patients.
The base hospitals to which patients were carried and the number of
trains to each are shown in the following table: 3
Advance section
Bazoilles
Beaune
Ohaumont
Dijon -
Lanpres
Neufehateau
Rimaucourt
Vittel— Contrexeville
Trains
Base hos-
pitals N'os.
18, 42, 46
47
15
17
53
66
52
23.31,32.36
Trains
Intermediate section
Allerey 6
Blois j 1
Limoges I 1
Mars I 2
Mesves I 1
Vauelaire.- 1
Vichy 1
Base hos-
pitals Xos.
25, 26, 49
43
13, 24, 2>>
14,35,48,68
50,54,67
3
1,19,115
The great majority of these hospitals were among the original 50 organized
b}' the American Red Cross.
Patients evacuated to September 19 were classified as follows : *
Wounded
Sick
Gassed
Officers
25
34
8
54
35
42
25
38
Allies
Prisoners
Total
Sept. 12 _.
862
2,503
574
1,594
1,070
1,474
244
948
224
424
436
473
317
1,140
1,026
60
1
1
2
54
14
194
11
158
51
55
31
13
1,145
13
2
1
1
33
2,733
14 „
1,077
15....
2,243
16
1,630
17
1,890
18....
1,442
19
2,112
Total
11. 269
4,060
118
_'i;i
37
527
14,272
Total to Sept. 25
11,248
9,501
260
453
131
613
22,206
ST. MIHIEL, OPERATION 523
The number of evacuations listed above is practically double the number of
casualties reported immediately after the battle, not including the dead. The
apparent discrepancy partly lies in the fact that the official dates of the opera-
tion were September 12-16, inclusive, and additional casualties occurred after
the latter date, occasioned in great part by artillery fire. Then, and this was
of more importance numerically, evacuations included the sick, and they were
about one-half as numerous as battle casualties. The influenza epidemic was
beginning, and as a matter of fact the few days following the principal
struggle saw more men in hospital because of sickness than because of wounds,
figures to September 25 showing almost as many sick as wounded. These
figures include also sick patients from the six divisions held in reserve in the
same area, and from other troops — some 200,000 men.
On the whole, evacuation by rail in this offensive was eminently satis-
factory, as more transportation was available than was actually needed. The
event proved that the 20 American hospital trains could have transported all
the sick and wounded.
REFERENCES
■ I) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C, undated, 27. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(2) Exhibit " S " to report on the activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section,
general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report on hospital train evacuations. American
regulating station, Is-sur-Tille. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(3) Exhibit " S " to report on the activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section.
general staff. G. H. Q., A. E. F. : Report of hospital evacuation section. Regulating
Station " P»," St. Dizier, Part IV, 4. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Ibid., 11.
SECTION IV
THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION
CHAPTER XX
FIRST PHASE ■
ARMY OPERATIONS
After the St. Mihiel operation, according to Marshal Foch, four things
remained to be done to drive the enemy to the Meuse. The Americans were
to attack in the direction of Mezieres; the French west of the Argonne to
cooperate in the same direction; the British on the St. Quentin — Cambrai
front to attack in the direction of Maubeuge, and the combined forces in
Flanders toward Ghent.
The American First Army was assigned the entire front from the Moselle
to include the Argonne ; but for this operation the front of attack was limited
to that part of the Meuse. That part east of the Meuse was to be held
by three corps — the French Seventeenth, with its left on the Meuse, the French
Second Colonial on its right, and the American Fourth extending the line
to the Moselle.
Keduction of the St. Mihiel salient had left the lines fairly straight, and
the Allies were forced to make frontal attacks. That portion of the line where
a break would be most disastrous to the Germans was assigned to the Ameri-
cans. Success here would deny the enemy the use of the Sedan-Longuvon
Railway, which was one of the two principal lines of supply for the German
right, drive him out of the Bricy country, his main source of iron, and break
the great lateral communication line through Carignan and Mezieres. Success
farther north would drive the enemy directly back upon his lines of com-
munication, and break direct communication between his right and center:
success here would cut off the troops in Belgium and Flanders so that their
destruction or capture would be inevitable.
The German strength was so reduced that to meet a serious attack he
would 1k> compelled to shorten and thicken his lines. To do this, he must draw
in his right, swinging on a pivot at Verdun. If the pivot could not hold,
the arnn r was lost. That the enemy realized this danger is indicated by the
order issued October 1, 1918, by General von der Marwitz, commanding the
German Fifth Army, in which he emphasized the importance of the Longuvon
railway and added, "the fate of a large portion of the Western Front, per-
haps of our nation, depends on the firm holding of the Verdun front." This
* Abstracted from Major Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, 1917-1018.
Prepared in the Historical Section, Army War College.
525
526 FIELD OPERATIONS
order referred to an expected attack east of the Meuse. The Germans ap-
parently had begun to suspect the attack about September 21, and had made
preparation to meet it about the 25th.
At this time the German force was concentrated well to the east. From
Clemery, on the Seille south of Metz, to the Meuse, he was believed to have
13 divisions in line and 10 or 12 in reserve about Metz. Between the Meuse
and the Aisno he apparently had 5 divisions in line.
The line of contact in the front of the American attack ran from Forges,
on the left bank of the Meuse, about 15 km. (9.3 miles) north of Verdun, a
little south of west to the southern point of the Bois de Cheppy, thence west
to the Aisne, with a bend southward in the Argonne. The country here divides
itself into three strips — the valley of the Meuse, the valley of the Aire, and the
Argonne forest.
The Meuse, flowing northwest, is the principal stream. Flowing between
the opposing lines and emptying into this river is the Ruisseau des Forges,
marshy and impassable in wet weather. The commanding height of Mont-
faucon. about 6 km. (3.7 miles) behind the German front, marks the divide be-
tween the Meuse and the Aire. The Aire is a small stream generally parallel
to the Meuse as far north as Grandpre, where it breaks through the Argonne
ridge and flows west into the Aisne. It has no tributaries of importance im-
peding an advance north. The principal frontline feature here is the high
hill of Vauquois, across which the opposing trenches had lain close together
so long that the whole hilltop had been fairly blown away by mining operations.
The Argonne ridge separates the Aire and Aisne Valleys. It is heavily
wooded and much cut up by deep ravines, running east or west to the main
rivers. The German front line here was on Hill 263, which, with Vauquois.
constituted a formidable barrier to any movement down the Aire Valley.
Just beyond this line, across the whole front, lay a series of wooded areas.
The German outpost zone was about 1 km. (0.6 mile) wide at the Meuse.
It had originally run west from the Meuse to the vicinity of Montfaucor;
but an abandoned element of the French defensives had been taken over by
the Germans and converted into an advance line running across the reentrant,
increasing the width of the zone to about 2 km. (1.2 miles) at the maximum.
The front line was known as the Hagen Stellung; the old front line, now
modified and treated as intermediate, as the Hagen Stellung Nord.
Behind this laj- the battle zone, 5 km. (3.1 miles) deep at the Meuse.
narrowing to 1 Ion. (0.6 mile) behind the Hagen Stellung Nord, then widen-
ing again. Its main line of resistance was the Volker Stellung and lay along
the line of crests marked by Montfaucon. The withdrawal zone was about
2 km. (1.2 miles) wide. The total depth of these three zones was about 6 to
10 km. (3.7 to 6.2 miles).
The wooded areas across the whole front were carefully organized as
artillery positions, permitting cross fire everywhere. More than this, the
guns in the, Argonne forest and on the heights across the Meuse enfiladed
the lines of any attack and possessed excellent observation.
From 5 to 10 km. (3.1 to 6.2 miles) behind these positions, north of
Grandpre gap, lay the final withdrawal position, the Kriemhild Stellung.
PLATE XXV.
MEUSE - ARGONNE OPERATION
FIRST PHASE
FIRST ARMY
I-III-V CORPS
SEPTEMBER 26 - OCTOBER 3,1918.
Drwi fmrn affiCUU maps £r-ar\-tBiu. f , Buzancj , CLtr mor\t--4 . Ctfmant-B.
Aj*((o-ia of Miiueal UruXa from raport-i of tfli Chf? ■Suj-fton , FZf-rt Arfny
A Tno*«
± F.II. FUUIfeMttal
m an gm iwifli
■ Nil Neurological l!<>wit*l
__ C.D.H ConUfcion* DUum IfaqiiTri
© KH, Fvncuntion HckihIaI
• Mil Mobil* Hnamt/il
9 HII Ifc.v H«fitTal
K M AD Mi-dirrtl Ripply Dri.ot
■A.H.CH AmtricAti RM Crow* 1- -j«tal
Battle lines, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-AEGONNE OPERATION 527
This was a continuation of the Brunnhild position which came down from the
northwest to the junction of the Aisne and Aire. It was only partly finished
west of the Meuse, hut. nevertheless, was very strong. East of the Meuse it
was more nearly complete.
The supply system of the whole region was well laid out. each German
corps having its own standard-gauge railway line. These led to railheads,
where they were continued by a network of narrow-gauge and wagon roads.
To facilitate traffic and guard against interruption by shell fire, additional
narrow-gauge lines had been built, connecting the forward systems with the
standard-gauge lines well back of the railheads and out of artillery range.
The front of the attack of the combined armies was from the Meuse to the
Suippe. The direction was Mezieres. The general plan was, first, to throw the
enemy upon the line Stenay — Le Chesne — Attigny by attacks on both sides of
the Argonne ; second, to reach the region of Mezieres, maneuvering from the
east so as to overcome the enemy's resistance on the Aisne and facilitate the
advance of the armies farther to the west. The first objective was the line
Dun-sur-Meuse — Grandpre — Challerange — Somme-Py; the second, Stenay —
Le Chesne — Attigny — Rethel. Surprise was one of the main elements of the
plan; this General Petain emphasized in instructions dated September 6,
adding: " Commanders will not hesitate to orient their participants toward
eventualities directly contrary to the real plans," and giving examples of such
false impressions as might be given out. The Americans, not yet having
appeared in force here, French troops were to continue to hold the front line
as a screen until the night before the attack.
The mission assigned to the American First Army required a penetration
of about 16 km. (9.9 miles) to reach the Dun-sur-Meuse line and 16 more to
the Stenay line. Since the Argonne was regarded as impenetrable by direct
attack, it was to be flanked out by the two armies. The main American attack,
therefore, had to be straight down the Aire Valley, penetrating the German
'ines there by frontal attack. This attacking force had to be connected with
the lines remaining stationary across the Meuse by another force acting as
pivot.
Three coi-ps, then, were placed on the front between the Meuse and the
Argonne. The Fifth Corps, in the center, from Malancourt to Vauquois, was
to reduce the Bois de Montfaucon and the Bois de Cheppy, outflanking them
from both sides, and to take the line of heights of which Montfaucon itself
was the key. The First Corps, on the left, was to swing forward its right,
keeping in touch with the Fifth Corps, then attack the Argonne ridge from
the east; its left, in the forest, to follow up the enemy's withdrawal and keep
in touch with the French west of the Argonne. The Third Corps, on the
right, was to hold a pivot on the Meuse and swing its left forward, bringing
the whole corps to the river line and keeping touch with the Fifth Corps; to
penetrate the German second line promptly and turn Montfaucon. thus assist-
ing the operations of the Fifth Corps: and organize its front on the Meuse for
defense.
528 FIELD OPERATIONS
Each corps had, at the outset, three divisions in line and one in reserve.
These were the following, counting from right to left : Third Corps — 33d,
80th, and 4th Divisions in line: 3d Division in reserve; Fifth Corps — 79th,
37th, and 91st Divisions in line; 32d Division in reserve; First Corps — 35th,
28th, and 77th Divisions in line; 92d Division in reserve. Including the
organic divisional artillery, each corps had about 600 guns of the divisional
types and from 140 to 200 heavy guns and trench mortars. The Air Service
was represented by 4 balloon companies and 4 aero squadrons in each corps,
except the Third Corps, which had 1 additional squadron. The First Corps
had 3 battalions of tanks, light and heavy; the Fifth Corps had 11 battalions;
and the Third Corps had none. The army artillery consisted of something
over 350 long-range heavy guns of various types, more than a brigade of light
guns, and a strong force of anti-aircraft artillery.
The line of corps objectives extended along the Meuse from Forges to
Dannevoux, thence to Nantillois, Cierges, Epinonville, Charpentry, Montblain-
ville. and finally looped southward through the Argonne and northward again
to Binarville. which was to be taken by the French. Each corps was to ad-
vance to its objective without regard to the others ; when all had arrived, they
were to resume the advance, regulating on the center corps, to the American
army objective. This followed the Meuse to Brieulles, then passed along the
northern edge of the Bois de Foret to Romagne, Exermont, and Apremont. and
through the forest to Binarville.
Meanwhile the French were to make a corresponding advance, bringing
their line to face northeast, with the Argonne in a pocket. A combined move-
ment was then to be made, after which the American line was expected to
run from the Bois de Foret to the north edge of the woods about Bantheville,
then southwest through St. Juvin to the northern tip of the Argonne-
The troops east of the Meuse were to make demonstrations along the entire
front, joining in the artillery bombardment and making deep raids into the
enemy's lines.
The artillery preparation was to last for five hours, and include neutral-
ization of the heights east of the Meuse, Montfaucon, and the eastern edge
of the Argonne. A rolling barrage was to follow along the whole front. Gas
was to be used in the preparation, persistent on the heights east of the Meuse.
nonpersistent elsewhere. Front-line wire was to be cut by trench mortars and
torpedoes. A mixed group, consisting of a detachment from the French 38th
Corps and a regiment from the reserve division (92d Division) of the Ameri-
can First Corps, was to maintain connection between the Americans and
the French Fourth Army.
Besides the divisions assigned to the corps, there were three in the army
reserve — the 1st, 29th, and 82d.
The troops came in from all directions from the British front to Belfort,
moving by train, by truck, or by marching, and chiefly at night. The con-
centration was complete by the 25th. Marching troops were supplied en route
from designated railheads; the others carried rations from their last stations.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 529
During the operations, the regulating stations of St. Dizier and Is-sur-Tille
were used. At the outset there were nine railheads on and south of the line
Verdun — Les Islettes. Later, refilling stations were established on 60-cm.
railways, and supplied from railheads.
The operations in the Meuse-Argonne really formed a continuous whole,
but they extended over so long a period of continuous righting that they are
considered in three phases : The first, from September 26 to October 3 ; the
second, from October + to 31; and the third, from Xovember 1 to ll. 1
On the night of September 25-26 the screen of French troops in the
American front was withdrawn and the American divisions definitely took
over the line. At 5.30 a. m., on the 26th, the advance began on a front of 33
km. (20.4 miles). Wire had been well cut and troops generally found little
difficulty in passing the enemy's front line. By night the Third Corps was
on its objective; so also were the left division (77th) of the First Corps, and
part of the center division (28th) of the same corps; and the left elements of
the 91st Division, Fifth Corps.
The center of the line, however, had failed to break the enemy's position
south and west of Montfaucon. This was due in part to the strength of the
positions themselves, in part to the cross fire of the artillery in the Argonne
and across the Meuse, and in part, doubtless, to the inexperience of many of
our staffs and troops, which interfered with full development of power and
with mutual cooperation.
On the left, connection with the French was lost. The 368th Infantry,
the American part of the connecting group, failed to connect up with the
French part; the group was thus disrupted and could not accomplish its
mission.
The attack was continued on the next three days. On the 28th the limit
objectives were dropped and the corps directed " to advance within their zones
of action * * * without regard to objectives." Montfaucon was cap-
tured on the 27th, and on the 29th the right of the First Corps advanced as far
as Exermont, but was forced to retire. On the night of the 29th the line ran
along the Meuse to the Bois de la Cote Lemont, thence by Xantillois to Apre-
mont. south along the edge of the Argonne and west across it to Binarville.
While the plans of the First Army were not fully carried out, yet a very
considerable measure of success had been attained, and the sudden strong
attack had caused the enemy to weaken other parts of his line by sending
reserves to this, the critical section. But our troops had suffered severely,
and a defensive line was selected and occupied to permit reorganization for
the renewal of the attack.
At this stage of the operations three points in the enemy's lines pre-
sented serious tactical problems. These were: (a) Cunel Heights, flanked
on the east by the hostile artillery fire from the Meuse, and on the west by
fire from the wooded area of Komagne-sous-Montf aucon ; (5) the heights
of the Bois de Romagne (the wooded area just mentioned), flanked on the
530 FIELD OPERATIONS
cast by fire from Cunel Heights, and on the west from the edge of the Ar<ionne;
(c) the east flank of the Argonne, especially in the vicinity of Chatel
Chehery and Cornay.
These three localities formed strong, mutually supporting points. In
addition, the hostile position) extending from the heights of the Bois de
Romagne to Fleville prevented infiltration between these heights and the
Aire River, and any extended flank attack against Cornay and Chatel Chehery.
In preparation for a new general attack, the 35th, 37th, and 79th Divisions
were relieved by the 1st. 32d, and 3d. respectively. The 91st Division was
withdrawn to corps reserve. The corps boundary was shifted so as to give
to the Third Corps all the Cunel Heights, narrowing the front of the Fifth
Corps. The 92d Division was placed at the disposal of the French Thirty-
eighth Corps, the right element of the French Fourth Army.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES h
The office of the chief surgeon of the army remained at Xeufchateau
until September 26, when it moved to Ligny-en-Barrois. Its personnel con-
sisted at that time of 13 officers and 19 enlisted men (including 3 hospital
sergeants, 3 sergeants, first class, and 5 sergeants) of the Medical Depart-
ment. Officers' assignments were as follows: Army chief surgeon, medical
supply officer and three assistants, sanitary inspector, directors of motor,
correspondence and statistical services, representative of the chief surgeon
at the front, director and assistant director of the ambulance service, and
superintendent of evacuation hospitals. 2
Divisional Triages
Division surgeons were instructed to arrange their field hospitals in such
way that one or two of these, as circumstances required, would be placed near
the battle line to serve as triages and to receive nontransportable cases, includ-
ing the gassed and badly shocked. The remaining divisional field hospitals,
conveniently located at the rear of these hospitals, received and treated trans-
portable cases. 3 Divisional triages were located as follows:
Third Corps : 4
33d Division — Glorieux, near Verdun.
80th Division — Fromereville.
4th Division — Sivry-la-Perche.
Fifth Corps: 6
79th Division — Les Clairs Chenes.
37th Division — Brabant.
91st Division — Brabant.
First Corps: 6
35th Division — Neuvilly.
28th Division — La Croix de Pierre.
77th Division — Florent.
6 In this connection, ns will be noted, the arrangements made pertain to the Meuse-Argonne
rporntions as a whole rather than to the first phase.
MEUSE-AEGONNE OPEBATION 531
Triages of the Third and the First Corps were on an average fully twice
as far from the front as were those of the Fifth Corps. The distance from
the divisional triages to the nearest evacuation hospitals varied from 5 to
12 km. (3.1-7.4 miles). Terrain occupied by the Fifth Corps offered no points
directly accessible to the rear in the sector of that corps where evacuation
hospitals could be located, for which reason it evacuated obliquely to Varennes.
to the southwest; a poor route, but the only one available. 7 All evacuation
points except Vaubecourt and Revigny were within 20 kms. (12.5 miles).
Rest stations were established by the Red Cross on evacuation routes, enlisted
men of the Medical Department being assigned to assist, and at these stations
all patients were given an opportunity to warm themselves, to dry their
clothing, to obtain food, and to sleep if they so desired. 7 Corps hospitals for
the reception of patients returnable to duty within a few days were estab-
lished at suitable points, as nearly as possible midway between the divisional
and army hospitals. 8 Ambulances and busses were assigned to the corps, as
indicated below, to evacuate divisional units. This provision of corps hospitals
and transport plus divisional, by making an elastic system, capable of great
extension without manifest injury to the wounded, met an emergent need, for
it was utterly impossible to advance army hospitals pari passu with the troops
until roads and railways were repaired and motor trucks released for hospital
service.
The following named ambulance companies arrived in this area : 10
Souilly, Meuse: Evacuation Ambulance Company Xo. 1; arrived
September 21.
Fontaine Rout on : Evacuation Ambulance Company Xo. 2: arrived
September 14.
Froidos, Meuse :
Evacuation Ambulance Company Xo. 5 ; arrived September 24-
Evacuation Ambulance Company Xo. 10; arrived September 23.
Rarecourt, Meuse: Evacuation Ambulance Company Xo. 11; arrived
September 24.
Vaubecourt, Meuse: Evacuation Ambulance Company Xo. 12; ar-
rived September 23.
Fleury-sur-Aire : Ambulance Xo. 132; arrived September 22 (per-
sonnel only) to serve with American Red Cross Hospital Xo. 114.
Souilly: Ambulance Company No. 318; arrived September 21.
Villers-Daucourt :
Ambulance Company Xo. 310; arrived September 21.
Ambulance Company Xo. 120 (personnel only) ; arrived Sep-
tember 26.
Fleury-sur-Aire: Ambulance Company Xo. 42 (personnel only): ar-
rived October 29.
Of these, the following were returned to duty with their divisions: 10 33d
Division. Ambulance Company Xo. 132, September 30: 78th Division, Ambu-
lance Company No. 310, October 1 ; 80th Division. Ambulance Company Xo.
318, October 1.
532 FIELD OPERATIONS
Ten Service de Smite sections, 15 cars each, were loaned us by the French
and were assigned to divisional sanitary trains. These were supplemented by
30 sight-seeing busses, with a seating capacity of 30 per car. 11 Ambulances
of the French Service de Saute sections each cai'ried 5 recumbent and 10 sit-
ting patients, while G. M. C. ambulances carried 4 recumbent and 10 sitting
patients. 12
All available vehicles, including those of evacuation ambulance com-
panies detached from evacuation hospitals, trucks, motor cycles with side
cars, etc., were pooled for use in corps and army areas. 11 This transport
pool functioned under an officer who was attached to the office of the army
surgeon and who was charged with control of the evacuation ambulance ser-
vice. In comparison with the size of the army, there was a deficiency of
750 ambulances, a circumstance which, in conjunction with the large number
of casualties, subjected the evacuation service to a severe test which was met
only by increased effort and firotracted hours of labor on the part of the
personnel. 11
Remedy of the shortage of division and corps ambulances was considered
a preferred need, and the army strained every nerve to meet their deficiencies.
This was accomplished by temporarily loaning extra ambulance sections to
the corps, which in turn assigned them to divisions while they were in action.
By this plan, instead of being assigned to a particular division, ambulances
were controlled by the army through the corps; and when an emergency
arose they were readily shifted to the point of greatest need. 11 As an illus-
tration of the inadecpiate ambulance transportation with which some of the
divisions entered the army for this offensive may be mentioned the fact that
one division in the First Corps arrived for combat at the last moment with
only 4 Ford and 8 G. M. C ambulances; that is, a total carrying capacity of
44 litter patients. Another division came in with an ambulance carrying
capacity of less than 32 patients. Pioneer regiments had no ambulances. 11
On the night of September 25 the army and corps had transport for
1.829 recumbent and 1.200 sitting patients, exclusive of divisional ambulances
and corps trucks. 12
Shortage of motor ambulances necessitated the use of returning ration
and ammunition trucks to transport slightly wounded and gassed patients. 11 "''
The plan of transporting j)atients by ambulances for the operation was
as follows: Wounded, sick, and gassed from battle line to triage and field
hospitals by divisional ambulance companies, thence to evacuation and special
hospitals by the corps ambulances, the army furnishing extra ambulance
companies and 10 sight-seeing busses in addition to those already assigned the
corps, and the corps in reciprocity evacuating any army troops in the corps
area which required this service ; the army to provide for evacuation of special,
mobile, gas, and evacuation hospitals. 13
For the. purpose of carrying out the movement of patients, the army terri-
tory was divided into seven evacuation areas according to railheads available,
viz. Vadelaincourt, Souilly, Froidos, Fleury-sur-Aire, Villers-Daucourt,
Vaubecourt, and Revigny."
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 533
One United States Army ambulance section was stationed at Fontaine
Ronton to evacuate the Vadelaincourt area, two at Evacuation Hospital No. C
to evacuate the Souilly area, one at Evacuation Hospital No. 10 to evacuate
the Froidos area, one at Red Cross Hospital No. 114 to evacuate the Fleury-
sur-Aire area, one at Eed Cross Hospital No. 110 to evacuate the Villers-Dau-
court area (this section also established liaison with Revigny), and one sec-
tion at Troyon-sur-Mcuse for the 26th Division, which was with the French
Seventeenth Corps. 14
The following disposition of vehicles (other than divisional) was made
by the chief surgeon of the First Army : 15
Right flank, Third Corps :
United States Army Ambulance Sections Nos. 560, 571, 590.
French Sanitary Section No. 63 — 15 ambulances (5 recumbent
patients).
French Sanitary Section No. 85 — 13 ambulances (5 recumbent
patients).
10 French sight-seeing busses.
Total, 64 ambulances and 10 sight-seeing busses.
Center, Fifth Corps :
United States Army Ambulance Sections Nos. 542, 602. 603, 604.
French Sanitary Section No. 131 — 13 ambulances (5 recumbent
or 8 sitting patients).
10 French sight-seeing busses.
Total, 61 ambulances and 10 busses.
Left flank, First Corps:
United States Army Ambulance Sections Nos. 520, 570.
United States Army Ambulance Company No. 41.
Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 11.
10 French sight-seeing busses (seating capacity 20 to 30).
Total, 48 ambulances and 10 sight-seeing busses.
Army Reserve:
First echelon, one hour from the line, French Sanitary Sections
5, 89, 145.
Second echelon, two hours from the line, United States Army
Ambulance Sections 554, 586, 639, 634, and 30 trucks fitted to
carry the slightly wounded (capacity 20 each).
Summary :
Army, 114 ambulances.
Army, 12 cars.
Corps, 175 cars and 30 sight-seeing busses.
Army reserve, 99 cars and 30 trucks fitted with seats.
Total, 400 cars and 60 busses and trucks.
The foregoing list does not include the following United States Army
Ambulance Sections: 10 569th. loaned to the 78th Division; 590th, loaned to the
' Twenty-sixth Division was with the French Seventeenth Corps.
534 FIELD OPERATIONS
80th Division ; 600th, loaned to the 33d Division : Army Ambulance Sections
578 and 611, loaned to the 77th Division; Army Ambulance Sections 593 and
640, loaned to the 91st Division ; Army Ambulance Section No. 647, loaned to
the 82d Division.
Movement of the Medical Department vehicles into position was not com-
pleted until the early morning of September 26. Many of the ambulance
companies and seven sections were employed in bringing up nurses, operating
teams, and other necessary medical personnel from the Toul and other centers
and distributing them to their respective hospitals, and as these were widely
scattered this proved to be a time-consuming process. 17 The army ambulances
transported 4,307 passengers (other than casualties), with baggage. One
ambulance section alone, stationed at Souilly, carried 728 pa&sengers during
the period of this operation. September 26 to November 11." The burden was
further increased by the excessive amount of baggage carried by many of the
medical officers and nurses. 17
In order to conceal from the enemy the intended offensive, it was ordered
that no nurses be brought into the area until the last moment, and that those
already in the area remain concealed during the day. 17
On September 30, French Sanitary Section No. 50 was attached to the
First Corps and No. 84 of the same service was attached to the Fifth Corps.
Nine trucks were assigned to the Third Corps. The policy was maintained
of attaching an ambulance section from the army reserve for temporary duty
only with a corps according t<> need, thus enabling these reserves to be readily
shifted from one corps to another as circumstances required. In order to keep
the sections in good working order, those having had hard, active duty were
withdrawn for short periods of rest and repair, their places being filled from
the reserves. 12
Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 5 was removed from the First Arm}'
on September 30, reducing by 12 the number of first ambulances. 12
On October 3 five ambulances of French Sanitary Section No. 63 were
shelled, one being completely destroyed- On the same day French Sanitary
Section No. 84 was subjected to severe machine-gun fire and six of its cars were
disabled temporarily. 19
During the early part of this operation it was impossible through lack
of reports to maintain an accurate check on the activities of the army ambu-
lance companies, but later the daily reports of these organizations became
satisfactory and provided a more accurate index of work accomplished. 18
These daily reports did not tell the whole story, however, for figures were not
furnished to cover all patients transported. As a result, the total number of
cases which they reported they carried does not correspond with the actual
number of sick and wounded transported during these operations. Their re-
ports, did not include those of (1) divisional ambulances, which frequently
worked in coiqis and army areas, (2) army ambulance companies (with dress-
ing station personnel) assigned to corps sanitary trains, and (3) a part of the
MEXJSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 535
ambulances working behind the French Seventeenth Corps and the French
Second Colonial Corps. 18
Passengers carried, other than casualties, were for the most part individual
medical personnel and surgical teams changing stations. 18
During the operation the United States Army Ambulance Service sections
transported individual medical personnel, teams, and baggage, furnished a'
supply truck service for the army hospitals, and maintained a courier service
for liaison purposes. Their trucks also assisted in moving army hospitals.
Many of the evacuation hospitals came into the zone of the army with truck
transportation entirely inadequate for the work it was called upon to do.
Most of the recently arrived units had no trucks, and the combined gas hospi-
tals could muster but one of these vehicles. This condition, however, was im-
proved later. In order to meet this serious situation the United States Army
Ambulance Service sections pooled their trucks and redistributed those of the
evacuation hospitals. In this way such transportation was made as mobile
as possible and the army ambulance service was able to provide truck service
for gas, neurologic, contagious, and certain evacuation hospitals, supplying
them with food, clothing, wood, the needed quartermaster supplies, and, in
addition, to carry the water supply of two hospitals. So far as it was possible
to do so, this service was run on a definite schedule. 20
On several occasions, because of the shortage of medical personnel,
ambulance personnel w r as withdrawn temporarily from the transport service
to relieve overworked and undermanned gas hospitals. The following
ambulance companies were employed in the army hospitals until called for by
their respective divisions: Nos. 41, 108, 110, 120, 310, and 318. 21
Ambulance service was successfully maintained under the most trying
conditions, and this was largely due to the splendid work of ambulance
mechanics and the hearty cooperation of the Motor Transport Corps. For
this operation the latter established a forward auto repair and supply depot at
Ferme Longues-Roies, on the Triaucourt — Souilly road, 2 km. (1.2 miles) east
of Triaucourt. This depot was well placed, ably administered, and proved to
be a potent factor in the maintenance of the G. M. C. ambulances. 22 For
French ambulances the main supply and repair depot was at Pare Bailly.
Bar-le-Duc: while overhauling and minor repairs were made at Pare Fretty.
2 km. (1.2 miles) from Souilly. The echelon American Pare C, Haute Jure.
4 km. (2.4 miles) south of Bar-le-Duc, supplied spare parts, tubes, tires, etc.,
for the Ford ambulance sections of the French Service de Sante. Later a
motor transport park at Sampigny was used for more extensive repair work. 22
Maintenance of the ambulance road service, save for ordinary wear and tear
and minor repairs, was extremely good. Five of the ambulance sections went
through the entire operation without laying up a single car. The daily average
for effective G. M. C. ambulances during the Meuse-Argonne operation was
11.25 cars per section of 12, which of itself speaks for the energy of command-
ing officers and for the spirit and skill of drivers and mechanics. The record
536 FIELD OPERATIONS
for Ford cars was not satisfactory, owing in part to the fact that these cars
were used on bad roads, where in fact the rough terrain made the use of the
heavier cars difficult; yet this did not altogether account for the difference in
their ability to meet service requirements. 23
Owing to the acute shortage of ambulances, some patients were evacuated
by the 1-m. and CO-cm. railways, their lines being convenient for the purpose.
On the first-mentioned line, which traversed the entire zone south of No Man's
Land, three trains were operated, each with a personnel of 1 officer and 12
enlisted men from Evacuation Hospitals No. 6 and No. 7. These trains carried
1,120 patients from Souilly to Base Hospital No. 83, at Eevigny. 24
When it was possible to do so, evacuations by the army and the divisions
were made over the GO-cm. railway.
In the forward areas on these railways litters were simply placed on
racks fitted on flat cars, a method which proved very satisfactory. An attempt
was made to operate a train of box cars each specially fitted with conveniences,
e. g., an oil stove and a marmite for hot coffee or other liquids; but the high
center of gravity and the poor roadbed caused such frequent derailments that
this attempt was discontinued. 25 Each train was manned by 1 medical officer
and 5 enlisted men and ran on a regular schedule. During the period No-
vember 1-5 all trains were preempted for the movement of rations and
munitions. 25
Two routes were employed for the CO-cm. line: (1) Fromereville to the
Souilly railhead. This line was well ballasted and in good condition. Eight
trips were made and 510 patients removed, the average time per trip being
about three hours. (2) Montzeville terminal to Souilly railhead, the line
passing over the Verdun battle field. Here the road was rough and ballasting
poor, so that after two trips, when 145 patients had been carried, the service
was discontinued because of derailments. 25
Increased hospitals for the operation being necessary, the commanding
general of the French Second Army, turned over the following for use of
the American forces, in addition to those which had been similarly trans-
ferred for the St. Mihiel operation : 2
French evacuation hospitals at Villers-Daucourt, Brizeaux-Forestieres.
Revigny. Froidos, Fleury-sur-Aire; gas hospital, Julvecourt; neurological hos-
pital, Nubecourt; fracture hospital, Deuxnouds-devant-Beauzee; hospital loca-
tions at Verrieres, Chateau de Salvange, La Grange-aux-Bois, Les Placys,
Les Clairs Chenes, Fontaine de Ronton, and a large triage at Glorieux, near
Verdun. 20
To insure sufficient bed space for the casualties expected, additional
evacuation, mobile, and other hospitals were transferred to the area, while
still others were provided from local resources. These hospitals were located
as follows, but certain of them did not arrive during the first phase of the
operation and certain others were moved from one point to another, as indi-
cated below : I0
MKUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION
537
Mobile Hospital No. 1 :
Les Clairs Chenes, Meuse
Fromereville, Meuse
Esnes, Meuse
Betlienville, Meuse
Mobile Hospital No. 2:
Chateau ile Salvange, Meuse—
Mobile Hospital No. 4:
Villers-Daucourt. Marne
La Grange-aux-Bois, Marne
Cheppy, Meuse
Mobile Hospital No. 5 :
Les Plaeys, Meuse
Mobile Hospital No. G :
Deuxnouds-devant-B e a u z e e ,
Meuse
Varennes, Meuse
Mobile Hospital No. 8 :
Deuxnouds-devanf-B e a u z e e ,
Meuse
Exermont, Ardennes
Neurologic Hospital No. 3 :
Nubecourt, Meuse
Field Hospital No. 41 :
Villers-Daucourt, Marne
Varennes, Meuse
Arrived —
Sept. 24
Oct. 9
Oct. 27
Nov. 12
Sept. 24
Sept. 18
Sept. 29
Oct. 27
Sept. 24
Sept. 29
Oct. 17
Oct. 15
Nov. 3
Sept. 20
Sept. 21
Nov. 4
Evacuation Hospital No. 3 : Arrived —
Fleury-sur-Aire, Meuse Sept. 21
French Army (Mont Frenet,
Marne) Oct. 2
Fontaine de Ronton, Meuse Nov. 10
Evacuation Hospital No. 4:
Fontaine de Houton Sept. 14
Fromereville, Meuse Oct. 29
Evacuation Hospital No. 5 :
Ville-sur-Cousances, Meuse Sept. 10
French Army (La Veuve, Marne) Oct. 3
Staden, Belgium Oct. 24
Evacuation Hospital No. 10:
Froidos, Meuse Sept. 21
Evacuation Hospital No. 11 :
Brizeaux Forestieres, Meuse Do.
Evacuation Hospital No. 14 :
Villers-Daucourt, Marne Do.
Les Islettes, Meuse Oct. 7
Varennes, Meuse Nov. 6
Evacuation Hospital No. 15 :
Revigny, Meuse Sept. 21
Glorieux, Meuse Oct. 13
Evacuation Hospital No. 16 :
Revigny, Meuse Oct. 15
Army Red Cross Hospital No. 110 :
Villers-Daucourt, Marne Sept. 24
Army Red Cross Hospital No. 114 :
Fleury-sur-Aire, Meuse Sept. 18
Army hospitalization as it existed in the Meuse- Argonne region on Sep-
tember 2G was as follows : 2T
Evacuation Hospital —
No. 3, Fleury-sur-Aire (in reserve).
No. 4, Fontaine do Routon (for seriously wounded).
No. 5, Ville-sur-Cousances (in reserve).
No. 6, Souilly (for seriously wounded).
No. 7, Souilly (for seriously wounded).
No. 8, Petit Maujouy (for seriously wounded).
No. 9. Vaubecourt (for seriously wounded).
No. 10, Froidos (for seriously wounded).
Xo. 11, Frizeaux-Forestieres (seriously and slightly wounded).
No. 14, Villers-Daucourt (seriously and slightly wounded).
No. 15, Revigny (sick patients).
American Red Cross Hospital —
No. 110, Villers-Daucourt (seriously and slightly wounded).
No. 114, Fleury-sur-Aire (seriously and slightly wounded).
Mobile Hospital —
No. 1, Les Clairs Chenes, near Blercourt (nontransportables).
No. 2, Chateau de Salvange (nontransportables).
538 FIELD OPERATIONS
No. 4, Le Grange-aux-Bois (nontransportables).
No. 5, Les Placys (nontransportables).
No. 6, Deuxnouds-devant-Beauzee (for head and facial injuries).
Base Hospital No. 83. Revigny (sick) .
Army Field Hospital No. 41, Villers-Daucourt (for gassed cases).
Neurologic Unit — ■
No. 1, Benoite Vaux.
No. 3, Nubecourt.
Gas hospitals:
Rambluzin. Gas Hospital No. 1, operated by Ambulance Company
No. 108, with mixed personnel, including some from Evacua-
tion Hospital No. 10.
Julvecourt, Gas Hospital No. 2.
Verrieres, Gas Hospital No. 3, operated by Ambulance Company
No. 108.
Rarecourt, Gas Hospital No. 4, operated by Ambulance Company
No. 108.
Infectious diseases and gassed :
La Morlette, annex to Evacuation Hospital No. 8.
Infectious diseases :
Verrieres, Infectious Hospital No. 1, mixed personnel.
Benoite Vaux, Infectious Hospital No. 2, French.
Between October 1 and 27 the personnel of Evacuation Hospitals Nos. 20.
21, 22. and 23 arrived and was distributed among the other hospitals, which
were being taxed to their utmost. 23
Personnel of Base Hospital No. 83 arrived on September 20 and was
assigned to other hospitals. Later it cared for the sick at Revigny, but did
not function as an independent unit until November 14. 29
All the units above mentioned taken together afforded a front hospitaliza-
tion of 18,000 beds. This was far too small for the forces engaged, but it rep-
resented the full resources of the Medical Department then available for the
purpose; for the Medical Department was still experiencing critical shortages
in equipment, personnel, hospitalization, and ambulances.
Evacuation Hospitals Nos. 1, 2, 12, and 13 and Mobile Hospitals No. 3
and No. 39 remained in the Toul sector to serve the Fourth Corps and the
newly formed Sixth Corps. 30 They were detached, however, from the First
Army and assigned to the Second when this was organized, October 12. 31
Evacuation Hospitals No. 3 and No. 5 were transferred, their ambulances
accompanying them, on October 1 from the area to Mont Frenet and La Veuve,
respectively, to serve the 2d and 36th Divisions, which had been detached
from the First Army for service with the French Fourth Army in the Cham-
pagne sector. Mobile Hospital No. 7 from Paris Avent also to Mont Frenet."
The character of the terrain in No Man's Land and the effect of artillery
fire upon the few roads necessitated the retention of these army- hospitals at
the points indicated, despite the advance of troops, until repair of roads and
railways had reduced traffic congestion. In prevision of this condition, mobile
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 539
hospitals were placed as far forward as possible, as already indicated, in order
to receive the seriously wounded. The army hospitals were placed as near as
possible to railway sidings and were expanded to their fullest capacity. 8
Assignments were made to the several corps of hospitals for severely
wounded, slightly wounded, gassed, and sick according to corps evacuation
lines. Each corps was given an equal number of these units, with the exception
of the French Seventeenth Corps, which was to be a holding force at first, its
sick and wounded to be cared for in French hospitals already in existence. 33
The First and Fifth Corps had contagious diseases hospitals each run as
an annex of the nearest exacuation hospital and operated by its personnel.
The Third Corps was served in this particular by a preexisting French unit at
Renoite Yaux. 33
The only attempt at surgical specialization by way of a special hospital
was the use of Mobile Hospital No. 6, at Deuxnouds-devant-Beauzee, for
cranial and facial injuries; these cases sustained transportations well before
operation but badly subsequent to it. Though this unit performed excellent
service, it was found that this method of specialization — a relic of trench war-
fare — was unsound. Specialization was actually accomplished by assigning
operating teams trained in head surgery to each mobile and advance evacua-
tion hospital.
Food stations were established at the receiving wards and on loading
platforms of the evacuation hospitals, and hot drinks were served to patients
as they entered and departed from the hospital. 7
Evacuation Centers
In order to clear evacuation and special hospitals which were not on rail-
roads, and to facilitate the making up of full trainloads of cases of the same
kind, it was found advisable to collect cases from these hospitals into hospitals
located on the railroad. Thus were created the evacuation centers. At each
of these centers a representative of the evacuation office of G-4 of the army
was stationed to effect evacuation of the group of hospitals in the particular
, area. These officers had preferred telephone wires to the regulating station
at St. Dizier. An evacuation center was established at Souilly for the Souilly,
Vaubecourt, Bevigny, and Vadelaincourt groups, to serve the right or Third
Corps front, and another at Fleury for the Fleury, Froidos, Villers-Daucourt,
and Varennes groups, to serve the center and left or Fifth and First Corps
front. 34 The hospitals at Souilly, Fleury, Froidos, Villers-Daucourt, and
Varennes were provided with loading platforms accommodating entire hospital
trains. 34
Evacuations by ambulance were necessary to empty into the evacuation
centers the hospitals not having railway facilities. An effort was made to
prevent the accumulation of more patients in the nonrailway hospitals than
could be cared for by the operating teams on duty. If greater accumulation
occurred, some of the patients were transferred and evacuated on preoperative
trains. 34
540 FIELD OPERATIONS
As a rule mobile hospitals were located in advance of evacuation hospitals,
to care for the seriously wounded or nontransportable cases. At other times
they were used to reinforce the operating departments of evacuation hospitals.
Their evacuation was usually made by ambulance to the evacuation hospitals. 34
If the line advanced, the hospitals which were located off the railroad were
sent forward, either complete or as tent sections, the more permanent railhead
hospitals remaining in place to care in part for evacuations from hospitals in
advance of them. 34
Evacuation Areas
As stated above, in the consideration of the First Army ambulance service,
evacuation areas for that army were designated. In determining these areas
the following facts were taken into consideration : The railhead facilities, the
character of casualties which the hospitals within the area woidd receive, the
number of trains per day assigned to hospitals in the area, and, finally, the
practicability of routes of evacuation from outlying hospitals to the rail-
head. 35
The Vadelaincourt area (1,110 beds) evacuated by Evacuation Ambulance
Company No. 2, stationed at Fontaine de Routon, included the following
hospitals : 35
Beds
Mobile Hospital No. 1 at Ees Olairs Chenes 250
Mobile Hospital No. 5 at Ees Placys 250
Evacuation Hospital No. 4 at Fontaine de Routon 000
The Souilly area (4,130 beds), evacuated by United States Army Ambu-
lance Sections No. 521 and No. 530, stationed at Souilly, included the follow-
ing hospitals: 30
Beds
Evacuation Hospitals Nos. G and 7, Souilly 2,400
Gas hospital at La Morlette 450
Gas hospital at Rambluzin 280
Evacuation Hospital No. 8, Petit Maujouy 1,000
The Froidos area (1,340 beds), evacuated by Evacuation Ambulance Com-
pany No. 10, stationed at Froidos, included the following hospitals :
Beds
Evacuation Hospital No. 10 at Froidos 440
Mobile Hospital No. 2 at Chateau de Salvange 250
Gas Hospital No. 2 at Julvecourt 1500
Gas Hospital No. 4 at Rarecourt 350
The Fleury-sur-Aire area (2,050 beds), evacuated by Evacuation Ambu-
lance Company No. 8, stationed at Floury, included the following hospitals: 30
Beds
Army Red Cross Hospital No. 114 at Fleury-sur-Aire 1, 200
Evacuation Hospital No. 11 at Brizeaux-Forestieres 600
Camp Raton 250
The Villers-Daucourt area (2,180 beds) was evacuated by United States
Army Ambulance Section No. 601, stationed at Army Red Cross Hospital
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 541
No. 110, which also established liaison with Revigny. The area included the
following hospitals: 30
Beds
Army Red Cross Hospital No. 110 at Villers-Dnucourt 1,020
Contagious hospital at Verrieres 310
Mobile Hospital No. 4 at La Grange-nux-Bois 250
The Vaubecourt area (3,060 beds), evacuated by Evacuation Ambidance
Company No. 12, stationed at Evacuation Hospital No. 9, included the
following hospitals : 16
Beds
Evacuation Hospital No. 9, ut Vaubecourt 2.000
Neurological Hospital No. 3. at Nubecourt 210
Mobile Hospital No. C, at Deuxnouds 250
French Contagious Hospital, at Benoite Vaux 300
Neurologic Hospital No. 1, at Benoite Vaux 300
The Revigny area (1,670 beds) included following hospitals: 16 Base
Hospital No. 83, functioning with Evacuation Hospital No. 15. at Revigny.
(Two ambulances from Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 12, to maintain
liiiison between Vaubecourt and Revigny.)
Evacuation Ambulance Co. No. 6 was stationed at Troyon-sur-Meuse to
provide additional evacuation for the 26th Division, which was with the
French Seventeenth Corps. 16
Until roads and railroads were repaired and motor trains freed from the
incessant transportation of ammunition, it was utterly impossible to advance
an evacuation hospital beyond No Man's Land. It was believed that unless
possessed of a multitude of motor ambulances — which the First Army lacked —
an evacuation hospital would prove useless unless located near a railroad with
loading facilities, and in spite of opposing arguments this theory was adhered
to rigidly. Otherwise, these units 'would speedily have become congested and.
having no outlet, the result would have been a backing up into corps and
divisional hospitals successively. 9
During trench warfare it had been noted that the demand for rapid trans-
port of wounded and shocked cases to a point where definitive treatment could
he given had been responsible for many unnecessary deaths, the shock of
operation being added to that of trauma and exhaustion incident to rapid
transport. The army surgeon's office was insistent that this pi-ocedure should
not be permitted, and divisional and corps units were directed to be prepared
for shock treatment and for the proper care of all cases before they were
operated or evacuated. "When this system had been developed, it was observed
that many cases which otherwise would have died were received at evacuation
hospitals in astonishingly good condition, though some of them, on account
of terrible road and traffic conditions, had been three days en route. 9
The sudden incidence of influenza, with pneumonia as a complication,
threatened completely to disrupt the evacuation system, and it was necessary
to triage cases of this disease as carefully as those suffering from battle casual-
ties. This epidemic was much more prevalent during the second phase of
this operation than during the first or third phases."
542 FIELD OPERATIONS
Supply Dumps
Large, well-stocked medical supply dumps were established at Vaubecourt,
Varennes, and Fleury, while that previously established at Souilly was en-
larged. 33 Later, a dump was established at Les Islettes and a supply unit
was proposed at Verdun. 37
Corps Regulating Officer
It was necessary for the surgeon of each corps to maintain close liaison
on the one side with his divisional hospitals and on the other side with the
evacuation hospitals draining them in order that they might work together.
In each corps, therefore, a corps regulating officer was designated to represent
the corps surgeon in this important duty. In order to expedite action, the
regulating officers were stationed at places having direct trunk-line telephone
communication with the chief surgeon of the army. In the First Corps the
officer so selected was the commanding officer of the corps sanitary train;
while in the others, other officers were designated for this service. 38 An officer
of the corps sanitary train detailed to assist the corps regulating officer
was placed on duty with each divisional triage and kept his chief informed
concerning the number and kind of patients requiring evacuation. As the
corps regulating officer was also kept constantly informed by the army evacua-
tion officer of the number of vacancies in army hospitals and was furnished
other data concerning them, he was enabled not only to determine which
divisional hospitals were in greatest need of evacuation but to route corps
ambulances from them to the evacuation hospitals best prepared at the moment
to receive patients. This routing was changed as occasion required by traffic
signs, couriers, and military police. Routing was by no means an easy task,
for it was influenced not only by the location and bed capacity of the army
hospitals concerned but also by changing traffic conditions. 38 These in fact
necessitated certain departures from the general plan.
The evacuation problem of the Third Corps differed from that of the
First and Fifth. In the rear of the Third Corps area, army hospitals were
more scattered and presented more possibilities of readjustment and shifting
of the wounded than did those of the First and Fifth Corps. 39
In the Third Corps the corps surgeon was made responsible for evacuation
from divisional triages and field hospitals, the army assuming a coordinating
control. The army furnished the corps surgeon with information regarding
the number of empty beds in the different hospitals, the corps surgeon in turn
furnishing estimates of the probable number of wounded. These reports were
not limited to daily returns, but were furnished by courier and by telephone as
often as circumstances demanded. 39
The problems of the First and Fifth Corps were very similar. The prin-
cipal army hospitals serving these two corps were grouped about two main
highways, the. Clermont — Froidos — Fleury road and the Ste. Menehould—
Villers— Dauoourt road. The former was the more active and congested. For
the first 10 days of this operation it was possible for the corps to shift
ambulances to the desired hospitals by placing directing officers in control of
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 543
roads. Then as the advance progressed, the control problem was simplified
and a single control post was established on the Grandpre — St. Juvin —
Varennes — Clermont road, a short distance above Varennes and close to the
Third and Fifth Corps rest and relay stations. At this time practically all
wounded of these corps were coming down this road, and a mutual arrange-
ment was made for the purpose of avoiding duplication of personnel. The
First Corps assumed control of this control post, the army keeping the
ambulance director of the First Corps informed concerning the bed capacity
of evacuation hospitals. At this post a large, illuminated box showed, through
removable lettered sheets inserted in its front, to which hospital ambulances
should carry each class of cases. This post was under control of the command-
ing officer of the corps sanitary train, who maintained liaison, by the use of
motor cycles, with the director of corps ambulances. 39
The designation of certain army hospitals to receive the wounded from
the individual corps facilitated evacuation, but it was sometimes necessary
to make a rapid readjustment in this respect in order to meet exigencies of
the moment. 39
Medical Representatives, General Staff
A representative of the medical department section of the fourth section
of the general staff remained at headquarters of the First Army, at Souilly,
for the purpose of coordinating Medical Department activities of the general
staff, A. E. F., with those of the army. Other representatives of that section
were also frequently at the front.*
Evacuation Officer
Regulation of the flow of casualties into evacuation and mobile hospitals
was directed in detail by an assistant of the army surgeon who was desig-
nated as evacuation officer. He also was stationed at Souilly, and under di-
rection of the chief surgeon of the army directed army ambulances and super-
vised and coordinated the evacuation of casualties by hospital train. In order
to promote coordination he was attached to the office of G-4 of the army —
not to G-4, General Headquarters, A. E. F. He received twice daily the
casualty reports of division, corps, and army troops and the classified reports
of hospitals in the army zone, which gave the number of empty beds and
the number of cases in the following categories: Sick, wounded, gassed, and
evacuables. The last named were further classified as sitting, prone, pre-
operative, and postoperative. 41 The hospitals in the army zone also reported,
at first twice daily, and later every four hours, whether patients were or were
not coming in rapidly, whether they could or could not care for patients com-
ing in, and whether they would or would not have to be evacuated within the
next few hours. In times of greatest activity even more frequent reports
were made by the evacuation hospitals concerning vacant beds and the number
of operating teams, in order that the flow of casualties from the various corps
might he changed accordingly. Tn this service the hospitalization officer
544 FIELD OPERATIONS
acted as a representative of the evacuation officer in liaison with the corps
and the various hospitals. 41
Train evacuations during the first phase of this offensive from the several
evacuation points of the First Army (including Toul, which served troops to
the east of the Meuse-Argonne sector) are shown in Chapter XIX.
Courier Service
The Souilly office of the chief surgeon, First Army, had established
courier service with evacuation hospitals, mobile hospitals, contagious and
gas hospitals of the army area on September 5, 1018. At that time one route
was sufficient and motor cycles were then supplied by Sections 521 and 530,
United States Army Ambulance Service. During the preparations for the
Meuse-Argonne operation it became necessary to establish three routes for
official mail and one additional route for special reports which were submitted
by hospitals of the western half of the area to the assistant director of ambu-
lance service. Until the corps headquarters moved north of the Clermont —
Verdun road, couriers visited also the First, Third, and Fifth Corps head-
quarters. After corps headquarters moved north, corps mail was sent through
the First Army message center. 42
To keep four motor cycles actually on the road it was necessary, because
of traffic and road conditions, to have eight on duty. Four of these machines
reported from Toul and the other four belonged to ambulance companies.
Sections 521 and 530, United States Army Ambulance Service, had three ma-
chines on duty at all times, and Sections 520, 570, 599, and 603, United States
Army Ambulance Service, had machines on duty for variable periods. 43
Couriers called at the message center, Souilly, three times a day, and mail
was left there for the. trunk line of the army courier service. Couriers from
the evacuating office took all Medical Department mail for units of the army
and corps, thereby relieving the message center of that work. Not only was
mail from the office of the chief surgeon, First Army, taken care of, but also
all mail addressed to hospitals was cared for by the com-iers of the evacuation
office of the army. 43
Courier routes averaged 60 km. (37.2 miles) in length. During Septem-
ber each hospital was visited twice daily by courier. Then because of traffic
conditions it became impossible to make two trips in the daytime, and there-
after each hospital was visited once a day. The total distance traveled by
courier from the army evacuation office was approximately 14.160 km.
(8.793 miles) between September 5 and November 11. 1918. 43
Surgical Reports
In order that botli the surgical and the evacuation services might be
better controlled, efficiency reports from surgical hospitals, surgical directors,
and operating teams were required by the army surgeon. Daily reports of sur-
gical activities were also sent by the director of surgery in each hospital to the
army consultant in surgery. 44 These reports called for the number of amputa-
METJSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 545
tions, the deaths without operation and subsequent to it, and the number of
cases, as follows : Gas gangrene at time of operation, fractures admitted with-
out splinting or improperly splinted, tourniquets applied, wounds which had
not been operated in 24 hours. In addition, patients improperly treated before
arrival were specifically reported. It was required that the name, number,
regiment, field hospital, and name signed to the field card of every case be made
of record in order that the surgical consultant should receive detailed informa-
tion, and this especially concerning this last class of patients.
An excessive number of amputations indicated faulty triage, delayed* 1
transportation, abuse of the tourniquet, undue surgical zeal, or they might be
due to uncontrollable conditions. An excessive number of deaths before opera-
tion at a receiving hospital indicated faulty and unwarranted forwarding of
nontransportable cases. From the number of gas gangrene cases at the time of
operation, it was possible to discover if there had been defects in transporta-
tion and needless detention of patients in the advance areas. From the num-
ber of improperly splinted or unsplinted cases could be measured the efficiency
of the division orthopedist and the degree of cooperation given him by the divi-
sion surgeon; cooperation between these officers was reflected in the care which
fracture cases received. By the number of cases received whose wounds were
of more than 24 hours duration could be checked delays in transportation and
unnecessary retention of patients in field hospitals. 46
Under the caption " Cases improperly treated before arrival," the surgical
directors could give much valuable information concerning the bad condition
in which patients were received. This information in turn was passed on up
through corps surgeons to the divisions. A consultant's daybook was kept
in the office of the army surgical consultant and consultants entered in this the
work done by them and each of the results accomplished. Investigations as-
signed to consultants were entered on one page of the book in question and on
the opposite page the action taken and results obtained. 47
Reports showed considerable differences between the various divisions
in the length of time elapsing after a patient was wounded and his arrival at
an army hospital. Experience showed that the best results in reducing infec-
tion and in saving life were in those divisions which, in spite of all difficulties,
managed to get their wounded to the rear in good time. The marked difference
between divisions was due to a tendency in certain divisions to hold cases for
operation. Road conditions alone did not account for the marked discrepancy
between divisions. Certain divisions, from the moment they entered the army
area until they left it, managed to get their wounded promptly to the rear,
some of them making especially fine records. 48
The following pertains to the activities of the Medical Department during
the first four days of the Meuse-Argonne operations: 49
*******
Sanitary troops. — In general the services of attached sanitary troops were satisfactory,
pxeept as affected by deficiency in numbers and difficulty and delay in bringing up the
battalion combat equipment, due to the broken terrain and roads and improper trans-
portation. Mistaken zeal was shown in some cases by making long-distance evacuation
13576—25 35
546 FIELD OPKKATIONS
of single patients by litter when the majority of patients would have fared better if the
battalion litter bearers had been used for the collection of the many patients in groups,
to be cared for by the ambulance company personnel on its arrival, and later evacuated
by wheel transport. Dressings were generally well applied, but complaint was heard
of damage done by unnecessary use of the tourniquet. Medical Department soldiers were
not greatly used as litter bearers in the advanced positions. Combat troops or in-
fantry litter bearers were doing much carrying, which fact, with other less legitimate
depletion, took many rifles from the firing line. In one case, eight riflemen were noticed
accompanying one wounded man to the rear. The provisions of the regulations prohibit-
ing combat troops taking wounded to the rear should be rigidly enforced. Supplies were
generally adequate in the advance positions owing to the small ratio of casualties on
the first day.
Ambulance and dressing stations or triages. — In these open operations the establish-
ment of a general dressing station for the entire divisional zone was the rule. Here
patients were collected, dressed, sorted, and evacuated as road conditions permitted. As
these establishments were necessarily large, they required much shelter and cover. As
there was usually only one to the division, stations were considerable distances from
battalion and regimental collecting points or aid stations. They were frequently estab-
lished on congested roads (always targets for artillery fire) and consequently were un-
necessarily exposed to fire and caused long carriage of patients to them. In open opera-
tions, difficult terrain and bad or congested roads will be the rule, and consequently
evacuation from the dressing station by ambulance will be difficult and slow. The meas-
ures to he taken to secure best care of the wounded are to move up at least two or three
dressing stations by pack mule, or by bearer detachment carriage, and distribute them
over the divisional zone in such a manner as to secure cover on lines of covered evacua-
tion from the front, away from shell-threatened villages and crossroads and near the
collecting points of wounded of the brigades or regiments they are to cover. Here the
casualties can be collected, dressed, and cared for until the roads are repaired and am-
munition train congestion has ceased. Such action will secure early clearing of the field
and collection, and the best possible care of cases until evacuation can be accomplished.
Here primary sorting can be done, and if necessary a secondary triage can be done at
an establishment located farther to the rear on a route of sanitary evacuation. While
such procedure does not bring the patient to the evacuation hospital sooner, it does permit
early clearing of the field, collection, dressing and antitetanic prophylaxis, feeding, warm-
ing, shelter and care, and relief of the attached sanitary troops for further duty with
their organizations, and maintains the patient in better condition for bis evacuation trip.
The dressing stations, particularly those under canvas, worked efficiently in general
after patients had been received. Those established in dugouts, cellars, or buildings were
cramped for room, and in many cases had not cleared out obstacles and debris sufficiently
to permit economy of effort.
Ambulance detachments. — Work excellent, in so far as spirit, interest, care, and
driving were concerned. Evacuation was much delayed in forward areas by destroyed
roads and jams.
Field hospitals. — Owing to the existence of fixed hospitals in rear areas, evacuation
was made from the triage direct, to hospitnls designated for special types of cases, and the
field hospitals were used in some cases to equip and man the triage, for slight cases, or
held in reserve.
Corps and army sanitary troops and establishments. — Generally held in reserve for
future use, a correct procedure, or were designated for special types of cases.
Evacuation. — Except as limited by road conditions, evacuation satisfactory. Cases
arriving at evacuation and surgical hospitals were held, cared for, and cleared in a satis-
factory manner in accordance with a well-ordered scheme. Some of the fixed establish-
ments were at considerable distances owing to the necessity of using buildings built by
the French for the sanitary service of intrenched positions. Several of these units had
not completed establishment until late owing to the fact, as stated, that sufficient trans-
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 547
portation was not furnished for rapid movement of equipment and because of the prohibi-
tion of erection of tentage at night before H hour.
Military police. — Military police were not noted at the sanitary establishments to the
rear. It is necessary to have at least a small squad of military police at triages and
evacuation and surgical hospitals In order to hold slightly wounded, malingerers, and
skulkers', able to return to their command, who are evacuated or wandering to these
establishments.
Salvage. — Owing to transportation difficulties and the absence of salvage troops, con-
siderable amounts of ordnance material brought in with patients collected at dressing
stations and hospitals. If properly cleaned and cared for at once this material would be
immediately available for reissue. The sanitary troops by themselves are insufficient to
care for this material, and to put it under shelter makes considerable demands on the
cover which should be reserved for personnel. It is deemed advisable to assign one en-
listed man of the ordnance or salvage department to each ambulance company, field hospi-
tal, evacuation hospital, and mobile surgical unit or hospital for the care and preservation
of salvaged property.
REFERENCES
(1) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919.
(2) Final report of the chief surgeon, First Army, November 20, 1918, (>. On file, Histori-
cal Division, S. G. O.
(3) Ibid., 10.
(4) Annex No. 5, F. O. No. IS, Third Army Corps, September 21, 1918.
(5) Report of Medical Department activities, Fifth Army Corps, by Col. W. R. Eastman,
M. C, corps surgeon, December 10, 1018. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(G) Annex No. 9, F. O. No. 57, First Army Corps, September 22, 1918.
(7) Final report of the chief surgeon, First Army. November 20. 1918, 12. On file,
Historical Division. S. G. O.
(S) Ibid.. 10.
(!)) Ibid.. 11.
(10) Report of Medical Department Units, First Army, from the chief surgeon. First
Army, to the assistant chief of staff. G-3, First Army. February 0. 1919. On file.
Historical Division. S. G. O.
til) Evacuation of the wounded in the Meuse-Argonne operation, by Col. II. II. M. Lyle,
M. C, May 10, 1921, 7. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(12) Final report of the chief surgeon. First Army, November 20, 1918, 10. On file. His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(13) Ibid.. 13.
114) Ibid.. 14.
i Ml Ibid.. 15.
(10) Evacuation of the wounded in the Meuse-Argonne operation, by Col. II. H. M. Lyle,
M. C, May 10, 1921, 11. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(17) Ibid.. 12.
(18) Final report of the chief surgeon, First Army, November 20, 191S, 18. On file.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(19) Evacuation of the wounded in the Meuse-Argonne operation, by Col. H. H. M. Lyle,
M. C, May 10, 1921. IS. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(20) Ibid., 30.
(21) Ibid., 32.
(221 Ibid., 33.
(23) Ibid.. 34.
(24) Ibid.. 20.
.25) Ibid., 27.
(28) Final report of the chief surgeon, First Army, November 20. 1918, 7. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
548 FIELD OPERATIONS
(27) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C, not dated, 31.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
/<»8) Medical activities in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N, Stark, M. C, undated, 15.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(20) Report of Medical Department activities, Base Hospital No. S3, A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(30) Medical activities in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C, undated.
12. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(31) Pinal report of the chief surgeon, First Army, November 20, 1918, 8. On file. His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(32) Medical activities in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C, undated.
14. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(33) Ibid., 13.
(34) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C, undated, 32.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(35) Evacuation of the wounded in the Meuse-Argonne operation, by Col. H. H. M. Lyle,
M. C. May 10, 1921, 9. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(36) Ibid., 10.
(37) Medical activities in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C, undated, 16.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
<3S) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds, M. C, November 20,
1918, 36. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
<39) Evacuation of the wounded in the Meuse-Argonne operation, by Col. H. H. M. Lyle,
M. C, May 10, 1921, 19. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(40) Report on activities of G— 4-B, medical group, fourth section general staff, G. H.
Q., A. B. F., December 31, 1918, 57. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(41) Evacuation system of a field army, by Col. C. R. Reynolds. M. C, undated, 37.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(42) Evacuation of the wounded in the Meuse-Argonne operation, by Col. H. H. M. Lyle,
M. C. May 10, 1921, 32. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(43) Ibid., 33.
(44) Ibid., 38.
(45) Ibid., 39, 40.
(46) Ibid., 40.
(47) Ibid., 41.
(48) Ibid., 64.
<49) Notes on Recent Operations No. 3, (Confidential Document No. 1376, G-5, G. H. Q-
A. E. F.), October 12, 1918. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
CHAPTER XXI
FIRST PHASE— Continued
THE FIRST CORPS (77TH, 28TH, AND 35TH DIVISIONS IN LINE; 1ST AND
92D DIVISIONS IN RESERVE)
On September 18, 1918, the First Corps, being relieved by the Fourth
Corps in the St. Mihiel salient, moved its headquarters to Rarecourt, leaving
behind the division which had been under its control, and established itself
there the same day, at 6 p. m. 1
On September 21, at 8 a. m., the commanding general assumed command
of the corps sector from Vauquois to La Harazee, into which were moving the
77th, 28th, and 35th Divisions (all less divisional artillery). 1
The corps was under the tactical control of the French Second Army
until noon, September 22, when the American First Army assumed control
of the sector. 1 The First Corps plan of communications, evacuation, and sup-
ply, was promulgated in Field Orders No. 57, September 22, pertinent ex-
tracts of which read as follows:
Headquarters First Army Corps,
American E. F.,
22 September, 1918.
Field Orders
No. 57.
*******
Annex 9
*******
2. Roads.
(a) Corps axial road:
Rarecourt — Clermont — • Neuvilly — Vnrennes — Baulny — Fleville — St. Juvin —
Grandpre — Briquenay — Germont.
(6) Division roads:
35th Division and corps troops —
Froidos — Clermont — Neuvilly — Varennes — Baulny — • Fleville — St. Juvin —
Verpel — Thenorgues — Buzancy.
28th Division—
Les Islettes — Bois Bachme — thence north and northwest thru the Foret
d'Argonne via la Crois de Pierre — thence thru the Bois dApremont and
the Bois de Chatel to Chatel — thence north and northwest thru Marcq
and Chevieres to Grandpre — thence north to Briquenay and Germont.
77th Division —
Les Islettes — le Neuvour — le Claon — la Chalade — le Four de Paris — thence
northeast thru the Foret d'Argonne to where it joins the 28th Division
road — thence on that road to Germont.
(c) The corps axial road follows the route which the army intends to make a
route gardee. At present the route gardee extends to the outskirts of Clermont. As
the advance progresses forward, sections of the crops axial road will he added to the
549
550 FIELD OPERATIONS
route gardee. Before such sections can be added they must be put in shape to stand
the heavy traffic. To accomplish this purpose, sections of the road will be completely
closed for engineer road work. The closing of a section will be announced as far in
advance as possible by G-l, First Army Corps, but in case of doubt or the lack of
information the C. R. A. will have an American representative (Captain Cross) with
telephonic communication at Clermont, who is charged with dissemination of informa-
tion concerning the route gardee. When closed, no traffic whatsoever will be allowed on
the closed portion. All traffic must therefore pass on the roads to the right and left.
Roads to the east are nearly all one way going north, while those to the went are nearly
all one-way roads going south. If this information is well spread there should be the
minimum of confusion and congestion.
(d) The route gardee will be closed between Neuvilly and Varennes (by order of
the 1st Army) commencing at It plus %4 hours.
(e) Division engineers should see that all roads in their respective sectors are
made passable for troops, light artillery, and ammunition. The corps engineers follows
up and improves the roads for the transportaton of heavy artillery and supplies. The
army engineer follows and puts roads in shape for all traffic.
It is imperative that road troops be impressed with their responsibility in opening
and repairing roads. Ammunition and supplies must be pushed to the front with the
greatest possible rapidity, and engineers who work with a will and an understanding
of their responsibilities can speed up the entire operation by more active road work.
Division engineers should also send out competent officers to locate new routes within
their areas with a view to relieving traffic on congested roads. Not only should the
main highways be repaired, but all roads should be opened up and used.
Every effort will be made by all concerned to construct and connect roads across
No Man's Land at the earliest practicable time, and each divison should assure itself
at least one circuit (front and rear) within its own sector, if possible.
if) Corps and army troops will use such divisional roads as may be necessary.
(it) Army artillery and tanks will not be permitted to block the roads and thereby
cause traffic congestion. For such traffic the army artillery and tanks should arrange
their routes and time of march within the corps sector with G-l of the corps.
(h) Ammunition must be given priority and must not be delayed by food supplies.
Each man in the front line has two days' reserve rations, but be can not carry two days'
ammunition. Provost marshals will therefore park food supply and baggage columns
to allow ammunition to pass. Such parks must be off the road. No baggage except
the minimum will be allowed hauled to the fighting troops until the operation has been
completed. The hauling of surplus and unnecessary baggage kills more animals and
causes more breakdowns and traffic blocks than all the ammunition hauled.
(t) Wherever a steep or long hill is encountered the division concerned will provide
a snatch team or teams to assist its traffic.
0) Each division will also provide a motor wrecking crew whose duty it will he
to remove wreckage that blocks traffic and to salvage motor vehicles.
(k\ Road circulation:
1. The road system of the corps is divided into two zones.
(a) The corps zone covers all territory within the corps sector south of the Vrain-
court — Clermont — Los Islettes — Ste. Menehould road (inclusive).
(b) Divisional zones include all territory within their respective sectors north of
the above mentioned road.
2. Regulations governing traffic within divisional zones will be prescribed by divi-
sions, but must conform to existing orders.
3. The corps circulation map (copies furnished divisions) shows the route gardee.
two-way and one-way roads. The route gardee is reserved for motor vehicles and
special application through G-l, these headquarters, to the Army C. R. A. must be made
in each case where it is necessary, or desirable, that animal and animal-drawn traffic
should be routed over that route.
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 551
Engineer road repair vehicles, Signal Corps telephone and telegraph installation,
and repair outfits, staff cars, and strictly local traffic may travel counter to prescribed
traffic. This is at their own risk, and whenever they halt (except due to traffic con-
gestion) they must clear the road. The corps and divisional provost marshals are author-
ized to require all traffic to follow the prescribed one-way routes wherever an emergency
requires such action.
*******
7. Plan of evacuation of sick and wounded.
1. Sanitary organization.
(a) Battalion aid stations, relays of litter hearers, and regimental aid stations will
lie established by regimental surgeons under the supervision of their respective division
surgeons. In no case will a battalion or regimental aid station be located at the same
place as the regimental P. C.
(6) Sorting and advance dressing stations (triages) will be established as follows:
77th Division, vicinity of Florent.
28th Division, vicinity of la Croix de Pierre.
35th Divison, Neuvilly.
These stations will be located off the main traffic route, preferably just outside of the
town. This to avoid traffic congestion. In each case they should be located west of the
main traffic route so that they may be reached by the prescribed one-way roads when the
main route is closed for repairs.
Regulations governing evacuation from triages will be as published in Memorandum
G-l-48, these headquarters. September 3, 1918.°
(c) Evacuation points:
All troops of the 1st Corps and within its sector:
Seriously wounded to Evacuation Hospital No. 14, Mobile Hospital No. 4, at
Villers-Daucourt.
Slightly wounded to Evacuation Hospital No. 9 at Vaubecourt.
Gassed to Evacuation Hospital No. 11, at Brizeaux-Forostiere.
Ordinary sick to Base Hospital 83 at Revigny.
Neurological cases to Neubecourt.
Contagious diseases to Verrieres.
French:
Sick, wounded and gassed to Evacuation Hospital No. 14, Mobile Hospital No.
4, at Villers-Daucourt.
(d) Evacuation routes:
To Villers-Daucourt, Verrieres, Revigny : Clermont — les Islettes — St. Menehould —
south to Verrieres — south to Villers-Daucourt — south via Ante — le Vicil-Dam-
Pierre — Givry — Ste. Mard — S. E. via Nettancourt and Brabant-le-Roi to
Revigny.
To Brizeaux-Forestieres : From les Islettes — south via Futeau to Brizeau. From
Clermont — south via Froidos and Waly to Brizeau.
To Nubecourt, Vaubecourt : From les Islettes — Clermont — Froidos — Fleury — Nub6-
court — Beauzee — S. W. thru Pretz to Vaubecourt.
(e) Army and corps troops (both French and U. S. ) will use the evacuation system
and units of the nearest division.
(f) The sanitary units of the 92d Division will be held subject to the call of the corps
surgeon for use where needed. If this division reinforces the line it will use the sanitary
organization and system of evacuation of the division it reinforces, or relieves.
(g) If additional transportation is needed call will be made on the corps surgeon,
who has at his disposition the ambulance companies of the 92d Division and those of the
corps.
« Quoted in Chapter II, p. 71.
552 FIELD OPERATIONS
(h) If practicable and the necessity demands it, evacuations from triages at Florent
and la Croix de Pierre may be made on returning empties on the narrow-gauge line touch-
ing those points.
***** * *
8. Evacuation of animals :
1. Corps advance collecting point : In woods just south of the railhead, les Islettes
on the les Islettes — Futeau road.
2. Army evacuation stations : Heippes, Autrecourt.
3. An application has been made to the 1st Army for a remount squadron for use
in assisting evacuations from divisional veterinary sections, from the battle field and from
the supply route. Divisional veterinary sections should render first aid wherever possible
and group evacuations and then call on the corps veterinarian at the corps advance
collecting point to evacuate. In addition the corps hopes to be able to send out a vet-
erinary searching squad in each divisional area to seek out and care for wounded
and exhausted animals and to report the locations of dead animals so as to insure early
burials. All emergency cases may be evacuated direct to the corps advance collecting
point. In case large numbers (150 or more) need to be evacuated, special arrangement
must be made by G—l, First Army Corps.
* * * * * * *
The usual order for burials was included in paragraph 11 of the annex 9:
this is quoted in full elsewhere (p. 390). It placed Pioneer Infantry troops
detailed to this duty under the exclusive control of the divisional sanitary
inspectors.
On September 25, the night before the attack, the corps held the 11-kni.
(6.8 miles) front between La Harazee and Vouquois. On the left of the corps
sector the 77th Division had all four regiments in line; in the center there
were three regiments of the 28th Division; and on the right there was one
brigade of the 35th Division. The 92d Division (less artillery and one in-
fantry regiment) was corps reserve, and the 82d Division (less artillery) was
held in the woods in the vicinity of Clermont-en-Argonne, as army reserve.'-
Liaison with the 91st Division on the right flank of the corps was maintained
by one battalion from the reserve brigade of the 35th Division, and with the
French 1st Light Infantry Division on the left, by one regiment of the 92u
Division and a detachment of French infantry and artillery. 1
On the morning of September 26, the corps attack started at 5.30. Its
advance through the Foret cFArgonne was impeded by hostile machine-gun
nests and was otherwise hampered by natural difficulties which this thickly
wooded terrain presented. On the right, progress of our troops along the
banks of the Aire River, in their movement to envelop the forest, was more
rapid. During the afternoon, the corps objective, approximately as follows,
was reached all along the line : From a point in the Bois de la Grurie, 2.5 km.
(1.5 miles) north of la Harazee. eastwardly to 1.5 km. (0.9 miles) northwest
of Petite-Bourciiilles, thence north and east to about 1 km. (0.6 miles) south-
east of Montblainville. 1 ' 2
On September 27, at 5.30 a. m., the attack was resumed. Enemy artillery,
which had been withdrawn and which was now in position, as well as an
addition to the enemy effectives, combined to prevent any but moderate
success. 1
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 553
On September 28 the corps sixain pushed forward. There was no change
in the disposition of the division of the corps, whereas two additional enemy
divisions were identified. 1
On September 29, the 92d Division (less one brigade) was detached and
relieved from duty with the corps. The 28th Division placed in line the
regiment which had been held in reserve, in order to strengthen its position
in the forest: and the 35th Division also sent forward an additional regiment.
On the enemy's front, troops of two additional divisions were identified. The
line on this day remained practically unchanged, in spite of a weak enemy
counterattack against our position in the vicinity of Montrebeau. 1
On September 30, the 28th Division took over the left portion of the
35th Division sector. In conjunction with this movement one regiment of
the 82d Division was assigned to the 28th Division and took a position at
Baulny. During the day, in the face of stubborn resistance, the corps resumed
its gradual advance in the Foret d'Argonne; while on the east bank of the
Aire our troops, subject to the harassing fire from artillery situated in the
forest, retired to the Apremont — Eclisfontaine line. This flank fire, with di-
rect observation, which was the most serious hindrance to our Infantry, was
continued until the corps flank attack on Cornay and Chatel-Chehery forced
the enemy to withdraw. 1
During the night of September 30-October 1, the 1st Division (assigned
to the corps on September 29) relieved the 35th Division, which was moved to
south of Cheppy. 1
On October 1, the enemy attempted an attack on our positions north and
west of Apremont. If prisoners' statements are reliable, complete failure of
this attack was due largely to our tanks, which inflicted heavy losses and
otherwise disorganized the enemy attack formations. 1
On the night of October 2~3 ' the regiment of the 82d Division which
hail been assigned to the 28th Division was withdrawn, and the 1st Division,
spread out on the left up to the original limit of the 35th Division sector,
having on its left the 28th Division with one regiment of each brigade and the
77th Division with all four regiments in line. 1
On October 3, the first stage of operations was brought to a close. After
the original advance, progress was slow. The corps successfully withstood
two counterattacks, and furthermore was subject to constant harassing artillerv
fire. 1
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On September 24, a conference was held at Souilly relative to hospitali-
zation for the coming campaign. This was attended by the corps surgeons
of the First, Third, and Fifth Corps, a representative of the chief surgeon.
First Army, and the chief of the medical group with G-4 of the army.
Probable shortage of ambulance transportation gave considerable concern at
'Operations report, 1st Division, Meiise-Argonne operation, October 17, 1918, Rives the night of
September 30-October 1 as the date for this change.
1357&— 25 36
554 FIELD OPERATIONS
this time, but. as it eventuated, the First Army was able to supply the First
Corps with sufficient extra ambulance companies to meet its needs. 3
Under subparagraph (c) (p. 551) the evacuation points were prescribed;
they were those determined upon at the conference at Souilly previously
mentioned. Modifications were soon made as follows: 4
Gassed : Evacuation Hospital No. 14, at Villers-Daucourt. Gas Hospital No. 4,
at Rarecourt
Nontransportable wounded: Mobile Hospital No. 2. at Chateau de Salvange.
Mobile Hospital No. 4, at La Grange aux Bois.
Ordinary sick : Evacuation Hospital No. 9. at Vnubecourt.
Seriously wounded : Evacuation Hospital No. 14 at Villers-Daucourt. Mobile
Hospital No. 4 at La Grange aux Bois. Evacuation Hospital No. 11, at
Brizeaux-Forestieres.
Sligbtly wounded : Field Hospital No. 101, at Fnteau, tbence to Evacuation
Hospital No. 9, at Vaubecourt.
The First Army established a gas hospital at Rarecourt, in a French
Adrian barracks hospital. Its personnel were inexperienced and untrained,
but by the active assistance of the corps medical gas officer were able to dis-
charge all duties imposed upon them. The number of actually gassed in the
First Corps during this operation was comparatively small.*
Mobile Hospital No. 2 was established in Chateau de Salvaiifre. This
building was in good condition; it was located about 3 km. (1.8 miles) south-
west of Rarecourt. The hospital in question was designated for nontrans-
portable wounded, though in reality it was too far back for this purpose.
It drained the right half of the First Corps advance area. 4
Mobile Hospital No. 4. established at La Grange-aux-Bois, on September
29, was located on the western side of the Argonne, on the Clermont-St.
Menehould road. Inasmuch as the operation was a flanking one (on the east
of the Argonne so far as Americans Avere concerned) casualties from this side
were not very numerous, and therefore the hospital was not occupied to the
limit of its capacity. For the care of nontransportable patients both of these
Mobile Hospitals, No. 2 and No. 4, should have been closer to the front. 4
As Revigny was too far back from the lines to receive the sick. Evacua-
tion Hospital No. 9, at Vaubecourt, was designated to care for them and was
found much more satisfactory than a more distant unit would have been. 3
The Influence of Road Congestion on Evacuation
From the standpoint of the corps evacuation service, the outstanding
feature at this time was the extremely congested condition of roads. This was
due to several causes: (1) Lack of proper road discipline. Well-conceived
orders governing road traffic were in force but were not properly carried out.
For example, the orders were that every tenth truck in a convoy should display
a red disk and that no vehicle approach within a certain number of yards of
this truck, so that in place of a solid line of vehicles there should have been
a break after every tenth truck, making it possible for ambulances and staff
cars to wind around and pass a block in the road. As a matter of fact, how-
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATIOK 555
ever, trucks continued to crowd up close so that there were miles of a con-
tinuous line of motor vehicles with practically no space between any of them.
Traffic was sometimes completely blocked for hours. (2) Few roads. One
main road, Clermont — Varennes, was supplying the entire corps with three
divisions in the line. 7 (3) Mine craters. Just south of Varennes and also of
Boureuilles, on the main road, there were two immense mine craters approxi-
mately 100 feet wide and 40 to 50 feet deep, so placed that a fill had to be
made in order to get around them while a bridge was being built. It took
many days fully to overcome this difficulty. 7
Road congestion during the early days was so great that on one occasion
ambulances were practically at a standstill for 24 hours. At one time during
the early days of this operation the corps surgeon was informed that the 35th
Division, at Neuvilly, had a number of wounded at that point and was having
difficulty in evacuating them. Thereupon he took the commanding officer of
the corps sanitary train and the corps consultant in medicine with him and
proceeded by motor to Neuvilly to see what could be done to relieve the
situation. Upon reaching a point about 0.8 km. (half a mile) from Xeuvilly
they could go no farther, the road ahead being blocked by a continuous line
of motor vehicles which appeared to extend for miles. They walked the
remaining distance, instructing: the chauffeur to follow with the automobile as
o to
soon as he could do so. During the three, or four hours spent by these officers
at the 35th Division triage their automobile had not advanced more than a
hundred yards. Though ambulances had the right of way to the rear, even
with this advantage they could make no headway against the road congestion. 7
This situation interfered many times with the work of evacuating jiatients,
but the first phase of this operation was by far the worst period. Delays were
inevitable, and nothing that the Medical Department could do had much effect
in obviating or in measurably alleviating the difficulty. 7
At this time the First Corps sanitary train consisted of three field hos-
pitals and three ambulance companies, all motorized. 5 Its work was divided as
follows: 6
Corps Rest Camp
At Futeau. a quiet, sheltered spot in the middle of the Argonne, on the
road between Les Islettes and Brizeaux, the corps sanitary train placed its
three field hospitals and established what was later called the corps rest
camp. It was far enough back to be out of range of enemy artillery, cen-
trally located so as to cover the entire corps front, and so sheltered and quiet
as to be ideal for rest. Several subjects were discussed by the corps surgeon
in this connection :
The rest camp -proper.* — It was surprising to the inexperienced to see how
many cases of simple exhaustion were sent to the rear. Many of these men
were sent back with a diagnosis of shell shock or as gas cases! when, as a
matter of fact, they were simply exhausted, mentally and physically. All
they needed was a complete rest, good food, quiet, and a bath, and in a day
or two they were usually completely restored and fit for duty again. In the
556 FIELD OPERATIONS
early days of the Chateau-Thierry compaign, due solely to exhaustion, many
men — the numbers probably running into the thousands — got back into the
base hospitals. They became a serious problem, as they were occupying beds
which were none too plentiful and which at any time might be urgently
needed for the actually sick or wounded. Establishment of this rest camp
solved the problem so far as the First Corps was concerned. Later on it was
planned by General Headquarters to establish a convalescent camp of 5,000
cots for the entire army, but before this could be accomplished the armistice
was signed. The corps rest camp served the double purpose of i*elieving
base hospitals of an unnecessary burden and of saving man power for the
front line at a time when every man was badly needed. In active operations
divisional field hospitals were quite unable to hold a patient a longer time
than was required to give him the necessary preliminary care and treatment
and to secure his transportation to the rear. Neither the slightly sick nor
those who were merely suffering from exhaustion could be retained in these
formations, since their successful operation was based on their ability to
move at a moment's notice. 8
Slightly sick. — At the corps rest camp were received the slightly sick from
divisions in the corps. If it was thought that these patients would be fit for a
return to duty within 7 to 10 days, they were held here to be returned to duty
when their condition fully warranted this action. Serious cases were never
held here, and if in a supposedly slight case the patient later developed serious
symptoms he was sent immediately to an evacuation hospital. 9
Relay for the slightly wounded. — The corps rest camp was used as a
collecting point for the slightly wounded, usually sent there by trucks from the
divisional triages. From this point the corps sanitary train carried them to
the designated evacuation hospital. No operations were permitted at this
camp. 9
Collecting -point for men returned from evacuation and gas hospitals. —
Arrangements were made with evacuation hospitals to notify the commanding
officer, corps sanitary train, of any cases erroneously sent to the evacuation
hospital from the divisional triages which should not be sent farther to the
rear. Similar arrangements were made with the gas hospital for such patients
as were not actually gassed or who were so slightly affected that they would
lie fit for duty within a few days. Upon such notification the commanding
officer of the corps sanitary train sent necessary transportation to these hos-
pitals and these cases were moved to the corps rest camp, thus providing
another check to prevent men without real disability being sent to the rear.
When such cases did get into a base hospital it meant that they were lost to
the front for a period of w'eeks, as there was inevitable delay in returning
them to the line through replacement depots. The saving of time in each
such case was therefore great. 10
Equipment. — A certain amount of clothing and equipment was kept on
hand at this camp, so that when men were returned to duty from it they would
be properly clothed and equipped. These supplies were necessary, as here
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 557
all of their equipment and frequently much of their clothing had been sal-
vaged on their journey from front to rear. 10
Destination on return. — Divisions were called upon to designate places
to which their men should be returned. This was essential to prevent them
being sent to points inconvenient for further distribution and to preclude
delay and fatigue in consequence through their wandering about in search
of their organizations. At appropriate intervals the corps sanitary train col-
lected men fit for duty and distributed them to the points designated by their
divisions. 10
Exercise. — -When fit for some exertion all patients at the camp were
given appropriate exercise in order to keep them in good condition. Care
was taken that no one was returned to his organization who was not thoroughly
fit for full duty. 10
Ambulance Companies
The commanding officer of the corps sanitary train had his headquarters
at Rareeourt, with the corps surgeon, and here he kept his three ambulance
lompanies as well as the additional companies furnished the corps by the army.
By this means he always had a reserve on hand for assignment where most
needed. From this reserve, ambulances were sent to reinforce, as required,
the sanitary train of any division in the line. When a division's needs ceased
these ambulances were withdrawn from it, cleaned, and repaired, and the per-
sonnel was given opportunity to rest. They were then available again for duty
with any division that might be in difficulties. This method enabled the corps
to meet all evacuation needs promptly during the Meuse-Argonne operation. 11
Distribution ov Wousutn
Examination of the plan of evacuation prescribed by Field Order Xo. 57
and by the later modifications, as noted, shows that there were eight widely
separated points to which sick and wounded from the First Corps were to be
evacuated. These were Villers-Daucourt, Brizeaux, Vaubecourt, Rareeourt.
Chateau de Salvange, La Grange aux Bois, Nubecourt, and Verrieres. The
number was increased later. One unfortunate result of this dispersion was
that ambulance drivers became confused with the multiplicity of directions
given them, and much difficulty in evacuation ensued. Having learned the way
to a certain hospital a driver would often concentrate on that one. taking
patients only to that point and thus causing it to become congested, while other
hospitals might be relatively inactive. The commander of the corps sanitary
train controlled this situation by the following method : J1
(a) Enlisted men were stationed at important points on the roads and
were charged with the proper direction of all passing ambulances. These
places displayed by night illuminated signs made of an ordinary box with the
front replaced by removable, perforated sheeting, and lighted by candles.
Lettering of signs for use by day was large and black. The following is an
example of the signs used: 12
" E. H. at Fleury closed. E. H. at Froidos receiving "
558 FIELD OPERATIONS
(Z>) The men acting as road guides were under the immediate supervision
of an officer of the day, appointed by roster from the corps sanitary train.
(c) The commanding officer, corps sanitary train, kept in touch with all
evacuation hospitals draining the First Corps, and thus always knew the
available bed capacity of each. This information was promptly transmitted
to the officer of the day, who passed it on to the road guides. The latter were
thus prepared at all times to direct ambulance drivers intelligently. As it
proved, however, road congestion was frequently so great and telephone service
so unreliable during active operations that it became impossible to keep the
corps accurately informed concerning the number of vacant beds in the differ-
ent evacuation hospitals, and this caused much time to be lost and transporta-
tion wasted by taking cases from one hospital to another in the search for
vacant beds. In the early part of this operation it happened on occasion that
some hospital would fill and then, without first sending notification to the corps
or division surgeon, woidd refuse to accept more cases. Under such circum-
stances a chauffeur might have to drive about for a long time in search of a
hospital where he could leave his patients. 12
(d) A medical officer from the corps sanitary train, stationed at the triage
of each division belonging to the corps, in the line, was responsible for evacua-
tion from the divisional triage. 13
(e) A medical officer from the corps sanitary train was stationed at each
important evacuation hospital, and one would have been placed at every
evacuation hospital had there been enough of such officers available for this
purpose. The duty of these officers was supervision of the unloading of
ambulances, the exchange of supplies, the instruction of drivers and orderlies
concerning their return, and the adjustment of any other matters pertaining to
the ambulance service. They also kept a record of the time when ambulances
arrived and departed. A similar record was kept at the triages by the medical
officers from the corps sanitary train, at those points, so that information was
immediately available concerning the time required by a given ambulance to
cover the distance between triage and evacuation hospital. This was an
effective check upon any ambulance driver who might be inclined to drive to
a secluded spot and rest after unloading his cases; such action, however,
was extremely rare. As a matter of fact, working against almost insuperable
difficulties, such as congested roads, long hours, driving at night without lights
over unfamiliar ground, these drivers performed their tasks willingly,
courageously, and most efficiently. 13
During the Meuse-Argonne operation the corps sanitary train developed
progressively in efficiency and formed a most important link in the chain of
evacuation. 13
THE 77TH DIVISION
During the night of September 23-24, 191 8, elements of the 77th Division
were placed in the second line, Foret d'Argonne. the French retaining the
first line as a screen to our (American) operations from the observation of
the enemv. The Artillery of the division reached the new sector on the night
MEIJSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 559
of September 24-25, and there went into position for a contemplated
attack. 14 ' 2
This attack was fixed for the morning of September 26. The division
front was about 7.5 km. (4.6 miles), extending from a point approximately
1.5 km. (0.9 mile) north and one-third kilometer (0.2 mile) west of La Harazee.
thence southeasterly through the Four de Paris and easterly to Pierre
Croissee. 14 ' 2 All four Infantry regiments of the division were in the front
line. 14
At 5 :30 a. m. on September 26. and after an artillery preparation of six
and one-half hours, the division advanced, having on its right the 28th Division
and on its left the French 1st Light Infantry Division. The artillery prepara-
tion was extremely efficacious so far as the front lines of the enemy position
were concerned, and very little active resistance was encountered therein.
This position of Foret d'Argonne had been regarded by both the French and
the Germans as a rest area; consequently material obstacles in the way of
barbed wire entanglements, deep trenches, etc., were extremely extensive and
complete. The material obstacles alone, then, rendered the task of the infantry
extremely difficult, and it was only by the most persevering efforts on the part
of our men that the advance made on this day was accomplished. At the
end of the first day's operation the left flank had advanced 1 km. (0.6 mile)
and the line extended approximately southeasterly to a point about one-fourth
kilometer (0.15 mile) south of Fontaine Four Zube, thence easterly for about
three-fourth kilometer (0.45 mile), thence northerly for about three-fifths
kilometer (0.37 mile). 142
On September 27 the division renewed the attack at 5.30 a. m., endeavoring
to keep in liaison with the allied units on the right and left. During the
course of the 27th, the strongly entrenched positions of Abri de St. Louis,
Fontaine Four Zube, and St. Hubert Pavilion were attacked. The 305th
Infantry assaulted Abri de St. Louis four times before resistance there was
overcome, and the 306th assaulted the trench position in the Fontaine Four
Zube three times before the enemy was finally driven back. At the end of
the day the division line was exactly the same as that of the day before. 14 ' 2
The attack was continued on the 2Sth, the infantry continuing its advance
at 6.30 a. m., forcing the enemy who had been entrenched at St. Hubert Pavilion
and in the Abri de St. Louis, to retire by our attack. At the close of the day
the left flank had advanced one-half kilometer (0.3 mile) north, the line
extending thence north of northeast 1 km. (0.6 mile), thence easterly V/ 2 km.
(0.9 mile), thence southwardly eight-tenths kilometer (0.48 mile), thence
easterly 2 km. (1.2 miles), thence northeasterly li/> km. (0.9 mile). 14, 2
The division continued its advance from day to day. attacking each
morning, continuing to attack and advance during the day. No organized
positions were encountered after passing the enemy first line of resistance
until the position running along the crest of the Bois de la Naza, extending
thence westward (south) along the adjacent ridge into the trench system
running south and southeast from the Bagatelle Pavilion was reached. 14
560 FIELD OPERATIONS
The enemy organized position, just referred to, was encountered on the
morning of October 1. The entire position was attacked but very little prog-
ress was made during the day. 14
On October 2, the attack was resumed at an early hour in the morning
and the position was penetrated on the left toward evening, by the 1st Bat-
talion of the 308th Infantry, together with elements of the 307th, and elements
of the SOGth Machine Gun Battalion. This detachment advanced as far as
the position near Bois de la Buironne, on La Viergette Boad. about 500 meters
(545 yards) to the east of Moulin de Charlevaux. The troops on the right of
this detachment, however, were unable to penetrate the positions on their front.
During the night the enemy forces penetrated the trenches south of the Baga-
telle position, and linked up with those trenches, by wire entanglements, the
positions on the ridge west of Bois de la Naza, in such a manner as to isolate
the detachment referred to. At the end of the day the division line extended
from a point approximately 1 km. (0.6 mile) northeast of Binarville, thence
eastward approximately 4 km. (2.± miles). 14 ' 2
On the morning of October 3 the attack was renewed, the purpose being
primarily to advance and secondly to reestablish communication with the de-
tachments which had been cut off by the enemy. Owing to the difficulties
of the terrain, the absence of adequate artillery preparation, and the thick
character of the country, no appreciable progress was made during the day
either on the right or left. At the end of the day the left flank had withdrawn
to a point approximately three-fifths kilometer (0.3 mile) south of that at-
tained the day before. Thence the line extended northeasterly to the parallel
of the day before, thence easterly to the division elements. 14 - 2
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
As a result of its previous experiences, the medical department of the
division had now adopted the following tentative plan for removal of wounded.
Two ambulance companies were to be sent forward and two held in reserve,
to advance beyond the others when the military situation warranted. One of
the field hospitals was to be used for gassed, one for general medical, and two
for surgical cases, and two triage units were organized from personnel of the
two last named hospitals. 15 How radically this plan had to be modified is
indicated below and in the history of the 77th Division in the second phase
of this operation.
In anticipation of the operation, Ambulance Company No. 305 established
a dressing station at La Croix Oentin, with a car j)ost west of Le Four de
Paris, detailed five runners to maintain contact with regimental and battalion
posts, and sent its litter-bearer section forward to bring the wounded from
the regimental aid station of the 307th Infantry, some I14 km. (0.7 mile)
distant. On the evening of September 26, this company established an ad-
vance dressing station 1 km. (0.6 mile) south of La Harazee, advanced the car
post to the same point, discontinued the former bearer route, and brought to
tliis place patients from the regimental aid stations of the 307th and 30Sth
Infantry. During the afternoon of this day the litter bearer route covered
PLATE XXVI.
MEUSE • ARGONNE
1ST PHASE 77 TH DIVISION
Battle lines, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J. Pershing. September 1, 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPERATION
561
562
FIELD OPERATIONS
21/2 km., (1.5 miles) through the trenches. Ambulance company dressing
stations were located in French dugouts. Evacuation, both by litter and by
ambulance, was retarded by muddy roads. The ambulance company used eight
Ford cars between the dressing station and the triage at La Florent, while its
heavier cars were assigned in rear of the triage. 10
Ambulance Company No. 300 operated a dressing station in a log cabin
on a road which entered the road from La Chalade to La Claon, about 1 km.
(0.6 mile) south of the former town. Here it cared for 60 gassed cases and
10 sick from the 28th Division. 16
Triage operated by the 77tli Division, La Chalade, September 2S, 1918
Ambulance Company No. 307 operated the triage at Florent, about 7 km.
(4.3 miles) behind the line, where Ambulance Company No. 308 was held in
reserve (supplying 25 men to the triage), and here the field hospitals were
grouped. 1 " Field Hospital No. 305 received medical cases. No. 306 the gassed,
Xo. 307 the slightly wounded, and No. 308 was held in reserve, but ready to
move. 16 Ford cars, including those of United States Army Ambulance Serv-
ice Sections No. 578 and No. 611. delivered patients at this point, and 12
C M. C.j ambulances evacuated to the rear those who would not be fit for duty
in four days. 16
On September 27, the ambulance companies continued to operate as be-
fore except that Ambulance Company No. 306 established a dressing station
at La Chalade with 2 officers and 15 men and sent 48 litter bearers to the 305th
MEUSE-AEGONNE OPERATION 5(53
and 306th Infantry. The station here admitted about 300 cases, which it
sent to the triage. It maintained 2 ambulances at its ambulance posts and
employed a total of 20, alternating shifts of 10 each.
Field hospitals remained as on September 20, except that No. 308 moved
to La Chalade at G p. m., occupying the church there as a triage. In the in-
terval September 27 to October 11 this hospital received from the 77th Divi-
sion, 3,284 patients, of whom 2,613 were wounded. 47 gassed, and G24 sick. 17
On September 28, the length of the bearer route of Ambulance Com-
pany No. 305. across very difficult terrain, had increased to 51/., km. (3.5
miles). The dressing station detachment of this company at La Harazee was
now increased by 16 additional men. The 306th Company sent 48 bearers
to Infantry regiments and with 1 officer and 8 enlisted men established a
dressing station in an old dwelling built into the side of a cliff near le Four
de Paris. About 250 cases were received there on this date. Twenty ambu-
lances from United States Army Ambulance Service sections, in shifts of 10
each, were used to serve with this ambulance comjuany which kept 2 ambu-
lances at its ambulance posts. On the afternoon of this date Ambulance
Company No. 307 sent 8 noncommissioned officers and 40 other enlisted men to
the Depot des Machines to assist Ambulance Company No. 305 in evacuating
cases from the 307th and 308th Infantry aid posts to the dressing station at
La Harazee. This evacuation was attended by almost insuperable difficulties,
being principally by hand carriage over very difficult ground, though at
times it was possible to evacuate by a narrow-gauge railway. From the regi-
mental aid stations to the Depot des Machines the distance was approximately
2 l /<2 km. (1.5 miles), and from that point to La Harazee 6.5 km. (4 miles),
necessitating, with the rough terrain, the establishment of relay posts at
short intervals. All this evacuation was effected under harassing artillery
(ire and sniping. The triage which the company had l>een operating closed
at 12.30 p. m. on the 28th. after caring for 372 patients. No change was
made in the location of Ambulance Company No. 308 nor of the field
hospitals. 1 *
Bearer routes of Ambulance Company No. 305 were changed on September
29 so that both converged to the car post at La Harazee. the length of these
routes being approximately 6 km. (3.5 miles). Ambulance Company No. 308,
now in reserve, moved to the neighborhood of La Chalade, where 50 men and
7 wagons were employed as a road-building detail at the triage. There was
no change in the disposition of other units. On September 30 the only change
in service was the establishment by Ambulance Company No. 306 of an ad-
vance dressing station in a dugout at Abri du Crochet, near the regimental
post control of the 305th Infantry. Personnel of this station was 2 officers
and 10 men, while 48 litter bearers carried patients 1 km. (0.6 mile) to the car
posts, which were 3 km. (1.8 miles) in advance of the main dressing
station. The following day. Ambulance Company No. 307 sent from Florent
3 additional noncommissioned officers and 20 other men to assist in evacuation
from the 307th and 308th Infantry to La Harazee. 19 Rearer routes were
564 FIELD OPERATIONS
gradually lengthened on account of the advance, of the troops, until on October
2 those of Ambulance Company No. 305 had increased to 7 km. (4.3 miles)
and others proportionately. The company dressing station at La Croix Gentin
was discontinued on October 3, its personnel reinforcing that at La Harazee.
On the same date Ambulance Company No. 307 established at the site of the
regimental aid station of the 307th Infantry a station near the Depot des
Machines, where it relieved Ambulance Company No. 305, which had been
operating in that area.
On this date, the last day of the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne opera-
tion, units of the sanitary train of the 77th Division were disposed as follows:
Ambulance Company No. 305 near La Harazee; No. 306, Abri du Crochet;
No. 307, Depot des Machines ; No. 308, La Chalade ; Field Hospitals, Nos. 305,
306, and 307 at Florent, 308 at La Chalade. 20
THE 28TH DIVISION
At the beginning of the Meuse-Argonne operation, the 28th Division held
a sector extending from Pierre Croissee on the west to the vicinity of Bour-
euilles on the right. The 35th Division was on its right and the 77th Division
on its left. 22
On September 26, at 5.30 a. m., all fire settled into a standing barrage on
the German front line for 25 minutes. The direction of the attack was ap-
proximately down the valley of the Aire, with the river on the right flank and
the Foret dArgonne on the left. The 55th Brigade was in the right front
of the line and the 56th Brigade was on the left. 21 - 22 The advance was to be
pushed rapidly along the Aire Valley, while the left of the line was to be
echeloned to the rear to follow up and complete the capture of that part of
the wooded heights of the Argonne in the division zone. 23 The attack was
launched successfully, although some units were late in arriving at their posi-
tion. In the advance the right of the line progressed rapidly forward after
once getting started, but the left, likewise behind schedule, made slow progress
in the Argonne forest. Some of the elements of this part of the line became
lost in attempting to move forward across No Man's Land and into the German
trench system. At the end of the day the line approximately reached the
corps objective on the right. It extended from the vicinity of La Forge,
southwestwardly to the vicinity of Les Escomportes Ferme, thence to a line
just south of Cote des Perrieres which extended westwardly to a point about
500 meters south of Carriere des Meurissons. 24
On September 27, at 5.30 a. m., the attack was renewed. The enemy in-
creased their resistance to our advance by machine-gun and artillery fire to
an extent almost to check further advance. In the morning, the 2d and 3d
Battalions, 111th Infantry, pushed north, overcoming resistance in the Foret
dArgonne, supporting the attack of the 112th Infantry. The objective was
given as combined army first objective. At midnight the line was approxi-
mately as follows: Vicinity of Baulny, thence south to Les Escompertes
Ferme. thence as of the preceding day. 21, -
PLATE XXVII.
MEUSE ARGONNE
1ST PHASE 28 TH DIVISION
^Char^l-Ch^hery legend
J + AMBULANCE COMPANY
ICLO HOSPITAL
RES5INC3TATION
Battle Hnes, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J. Pershing, Septembex 1, 1919. >re approximate-
METJSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 565
During the night of September 27-28, the 56th (left brigade) which was
held up in its advance through the Foret d'Argonne, was withdrawn and was
marched around through the open to the east of Cote des Perrieres, to a posi-
tion in the ravine south of Le Chene Tondu. One battalion was left in position
in Foret d'Argonne, maintaining liaison with the 77th Division.-' 1
On the morning of September 28 the attack was renewed. At noon the
line had advanced slightly so that it included Apremont, then ran southwest
parallel to the army objective, to the vicinity of Pont a l'Aiine. 21 ' 2
On September 29, the attack was continued during the day, the enemy
increasing his resistance with infantry reenforcement, with machine guns,
and artillery. The 112th Infantry made an unsuccessful attempt to pass around
Le Chene Tondu. After heavy artillery preparation the attack continued on
Le Chene Tondu, making a little progress. At nightfall the division line was
practically unchanged except for a slight improvement in some places. 21
On September 30, the division organized for defense a line which crossed
the sector of the division on a line Apremont — Le Chene Tondu. This order
was effected during the day. The line was pushed forward slightly in some
places to strengthen the position and close contact was maintained all along
the line. 21
On October 1, the division line was organized. However, as a part of
the line was very exposed it was determined to push forward in some parts,
thus obtaining more advantageous positions. With this end in view the artil-
lery preparation had been ordered for 6 a. m. and at 6.30 a. m. the infantry
was to advance along the entire division line and establish itself in the new
position, which would be improved during the day. At 5.45 a. m., however,
the enemy launched an attack, with about one division, over our entire divi-
sional front. This attack was of the most vicious and determined character.
Fortunately our trooj)s were on the alert, awaiting their own hour of attack,
so that in spite of the heavy barrage, especially heavy on Apremont, the line
was ready to receive the enemy. 21
On October 2 and 3, the division line remained unchanged. 21
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
For the jump-off of September 26, Ambulance Company No. 110 estab-
lished a dressing station at Les Sept Fontaines. Ambulance Company No. 1 12
already had placed a dressing station detail at Neuvilly, September 21, and
another at Le Vieux Foret. on the same date. Ambulance Company No. 100
was in reserve near Croix de Pierre, and Ambulance Company No. Ill was
at the triage at Locheres, to act as an evacuation ambulance company. Ambu-
lance Company No. 112 served the 55th Brigade, on the right, and Ambulance
Company No. 110 the 56th Brigade, on the left. Litter-bearer details from
these companies followed the troops closely, participating in their difficulties.
During the first 12 hours it was necessary for them to make long carries,
frequently under fire and often cut off from supplies- These details followed
the division's advance through Boureuilles, Varennes. Montblainville, Apre-
566 FIELD OPERATIONS
mont, and, in the second phase of the operation, to Chatel Chehery and almost
to Fleville. One litter squad, when searching for wounded, came upon a con-
cealed German machine-gun nest and captured its crew of 11 men.
On the 27th, a large dressing station was established at Varennes, with
personnel from all four ambulance companies. This station was near the
front and was unusually complete, maintaining, among other departments, a
separate shock room. It was estimated that 3,500 patients were treated at
this point, for from the date of its establishment it was the principal dressing
station of the division. 25
As the main highway southward from Varennes was blocked with traffic,
a road through the woods, across No Man's Land, was opened by the ambu-
lance sections. This was used to marked advantage for 36 hours ; then it was
cleared of all traffic save artillery and ammunition trucks, thus throwing
ambulances back on the crowded road to Varennes, where traffic was obstructed
by two huge mine craters as well as by great congestion. 25
When the division passed Apremont a collecting point was established at
Montblainville. As the ruins of that town offered no protection against
enemy artillery fire, cellars with 2 or 3 feet of earth and stone covering were
utilized to shelter both patients and personnel. Though the two available
roads to the rear were frequently shelled, the evacuation of patients proceeded
without interruption.
The triage was located at Locheres and was operated by Field Hospital
No. 109, which had reached that point at 11 p. m., on September 22. This
hospital took over a large barn, the best building available for the purpose,
and arranged dressing tables, record desks, and shock tables in the smaller
part of the structure, which had flooring of brick and tile. The larger section,
a shed for farm implements, was prepared for use as a storeroom and as a
ward for patients awaiting evacuation. By noon of the 23d, the entire build-
ing had been cleaned, disinfected, and made ready for patients. 26
Although the attack began on the morning of the 2Gth, patients did
not begin to arrive in any considerable numbers until the following evening.
The entire hospital personnel was divided into two shifts, but the irregular
arrival of the wounded made it necessary to arrange for special reliefs. At
5.45 p. in. on September 27 the ambulances and trucks, delayed for hours by
roads and trucks, began to come in from the dressing stations. By 7.45
some 350 patients had been recorded. The rush then abated, but by noon of
the 28th, 549 cases had been admitted. The number of arrivals continued
large, but irregular, until October 4, the largest number received in one day
being 688 and the total number 3,428. 27
Work of the triage was carried on quickly and without confusion, al-
though space was extremely limited. Two benches were constructed in the
receiving division, at each of which the required blank forms for each
patient — the register card and the field medical card and envelope — were
filled in. With the envelope attached to his clothing, each patient was trans-
ferred to the dressing table for examination and treatment. Here further
necessary notations were added to the records. The patient was then re-
MEUSE-AKGONNE OPERATION 567
moved to the ward, or immediately evacuated. As he was placed in an ambu-
lance his destination was added to the register card. The record of evacua-
tion, on the "Daily report of casualties and changes." was made only after
each register card had been checked against the corresponding record of
admission.
This hospital was closed on October 4, and on the 11th followed the divi-
sion to the rear, for rest at Bouvron. 27
Field Hospital No. 110 was established on September 23 near Croix de
Pierre and by morning of the 2Gth was read}' for duty. The total number
of patients here received was 732. of which 267 were returned to the front.
The greatest difficulty encountered was a shortage of water for bathing pur-
poses. 88
Field Hospital No. Ill reached Brizeaux on September 20 and on the
23d moved to Les Islettes, where a number of dwellings, two schoolhouses.
and a barn were utilized. There was a large increase in the number of influ-
enza cases admitted here. 20
Field Hospital No. 112 was located first at Froidos, and then, on Sep-
tember 23. near Croix de Pierre. Here a French underground dressing sta-
tion was occupied and shock tables set up. During that night and the next
day 4C patients were received. With the help of the engineers, a clearing was
made in the forest sufficient for the erection of four large tents, roadways were
built, and a complete field hospital was installed. Enemy shelling was inter-
mittent. On September 20, 86 patients were received, on the 27th. 200. and
on the 28th, 172. Then the underground hospital was destroyed by a fire of
unknown origin. Roads also became so choked with traffic that travel was
all but impossible, and Field Hospital No. 109 at Locheres took over most
of the work. Occasionally an ambulance worked its way through to the
front, but from Sejrtember 29 to October 4 only 58 cases were received. The
hospital then moved to Neuvilly and was installed there in a large barn. 30
THE 35TH DIVISION"
On September 17, 1918, the 35th Division was attached to the First Army
Corps, and passed under the tactical control of the French Second Army.
On September 18 it was placed under the command of the general, Groupi-
ment Mordaeq, pending the assumption of control of the sector by the
American First Army, September 22. On the night of September 20-21
the 35th Division relieved the French 73d Division in the Grange-le-Comte
sector. 31 ' 32
On September 26 the division attacked on a front, Vauquois (inclusive)
to Boureuilles (exclusive), at 5.30 a. m., after six and one-half hours' artillery
preparation. The division attacked in a column of brigades, the 69th Brigade
in the lead, the 138th Regiment on the right, and 137th Regiment on the left.
The 70th Brigade followed at a distance of about 2 km. (1.2 miles), with
the 140th Regiment on the right and the 139th Regiment (less one battalion)
on the left. 83
568 FIELD OPERATIONS
In accordance with the plan of attack, Vauquois Hill and Bois de Eos-
signol were passed through by the flanks and were cleared of the enemy by
the battalion detailed thereto. On the left flank the leading battalion of the
137th Infantry was held up by heavy fire from Varennes and was later passed
through by the 139th Infantry. The advance was held up for some time by very
heavy machine-gun and artillery fire from the front and by heavy artillery
fire from the 28th Division sector on the left, and also by flanking batteries
on the right. Heavy casualties, particularly among officers, were suffered
during this stage of the attack. Varennes was finally taken by the left com-
bat group ; in cooperation with the tanks, Cheppy also fell. 33
Many of the senior officers had been killed or w T ounded during these
actions and the units had become intermingled, due largely to the dense fog.
The battalions were reorganized and the advance was continued to the south
of Charpentry, with the right near Very and the left to the north of
Varennes. 33
On September 27, at 5.30 a. m., the division renewed its attack, but only
one battalion of 'Field Artillery supported the attack, though all the Light
Artillery had advanced beyond the old front position and could have sup-
ported the attack. A passage of the lines was made and the attack was carried
out by the 70th Brigade. The 69th Brigade supported the attack. 33 After
a short advance serious resistance was met from the enemy's artillery and
machine guns, and little progress was made. The town of Charpentry was
a particularly strong point, and the flanking artillery fire from the left
caused many losses. Tanks were brought up and the attack against Char-
pentry was renewed with but little success, owing to the heavy artillery and
machine-gun fire. At 5.30 p. m. a new advance was ordered. In this attack
Charpentry was taken, as was also the town of Baulny. In the night advance
some links of the division progressed beyond Montrebeau woods, but the
main body entrenched near Baulny. 33
During the day the artillery was advancing into positions north of
Varennes and Cheppy. By night all guns were in advanced position and were
set for firing in the region of Montrebeau woods, FEsperance, and Exermont.
The command post of the division was at Les Cotes des Forimont. 33
At daybreak on September 28 the enemy made a counterattack, which
was repulsed. The division advanced under heavy artillery fire, the fire from
the left flank across the river being particularly 7 deadly, since it was necessary
to cross open fields in full view of the enfilading batteries. On the left, the
advance reached the northern edge of the Montrebeau woods; on the right,
the attack being made a little later, reached a position about 500 yards north
of l'Esperance — Chaudron Ferme road. Enemy artillery 7 and machine-gun
resistance was strong, especially on the left flank. 33
The attack was resumed at 5.30 a. m., on September 29. The formation
was now in two columns. The left column succeeded in pushing a few men to
the ravine west of Exermont, with enemy machine guns menacing their flanks.
The right column was held up by heavy artillery fire at the start, and as the
PLATE XXVIII.
MEUSE -ARGONNE
1ST PHASE 35 TH DIVISION
R ..ft l.- line*, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J Pershing. September 1, 1919. are appnmmale
MEUSE-ARGONXE OPERATION 569
supporting; elements of the left column were unable to advance, the leading
battalion was forced back to the northern edge of the Montrebeau woods.
Later, elements of the right column succeeded in pushing; forward to Exer-
mont, but not in sufficient force to hold the position. At this time the division
commander made a personal reconnaissance and found that the losses, es-
pecially in officers, had been so great that it was necessary to reorganize, and
that it was impracticable to try to push, the attack further. He therefore di-
rected that the troops in Exermont fall back after dark, the withdrawal being
covered by the troops in the Montrebeau woods. The condition of the troops
in Exermont had become so precarious, owing to flanking machine-gun fire.
that they were forced to fall back before dark; but the withdrawal of these
troops and also of those in the Montrebeau woods was successfully accom-
plished, although heavy losses had been suffered during the day. 33
On September 30 a defensive position was organized with the line Cote
231 — Serieux Ferme — Chaudron Ferme — l'Esperance, as the line of resistance,
with a second line on the ridge north of Baulny. These lines were organized
and consolidated by the 110th Engineer Regiment. The outpost position was
held by the 69th Brigade and the 128th Machine Gun Battalion, with the 70th
Brigade in reserve at Charpentry. The position was held under heavy artil-
lery and machine-gun fire throughout the day. Two hostile counterattacks
were made, but they were easily repulsed. Early in the afternoon a battalion
of the 82d Division moved up just east of Baulny with orders to attack. A
heavy hostile barrage was brought down on this battalion and on the rear
defensive position of the 35th Division, causing many losses. The battalion of
the. 82d Division took over a part of the front trenches and, a detachment of
the 110th Engineers holding them, withdrew to the second line. 33
On the night of September 30-October 1, the 35th Division, with the ex-
ception of the 60th Field Artillery Brigade and the ambulance section of the
sanitary train, was relieved by the 1st Division, the relief being successfully
accomplished with no loss. The artillery was ordered relieved by the 1st Divi-
sion Artillery on the night of October 1-2, and the ambulance section of the
sanitary train was relieved on the 2d. The organizations of the divisions were
assembled and marched to the area south of Vavincourt, which was reached
by all elements of the division on October 7. 33
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIKS
When, on September 20-21, the 35th Division relieved the French 73d
Division, its sanitary train transportation consisted of 12 motor ambulances
(8 G. M. C and 4 Fords) and 12 animal-drawn ambulances. Twenty-two
trucks were all that could be spared from the divisional pool for the use of the
sanitary train, including its supply depot. 34 On September 21, Ambulance
Company No. 138 had established a dressing station, which also functioned as
a triage, at Auzeville; a portion of Field Hospital No. 140 had established,
near Camp du Wagon, a hospital for sick and wounded, and a section of
Field Hospital No. 139 had been set up at the same point to function as a gas
570 FIELD OPERATIONS
hospital. Ambulance Company No. 140 (animal-drawn) was serving the
Artillery. 3 " On the 24th, Ambulance Company No. 41. with 8 Gr. M. C.
ambulances and a litter bearer section, joined, and on the 25th United States
Army Ambulance Section No. 649 was reported en route to join. 34 The
medical carts joined their units in the woods, but some were not in time to
reach the most advanced battalions and were not permitted to accompany
their commands as they advanced, nor would they have been able to keep up
with them had they done so. For these reasons some of the battalions were
out of contact with their regular supplies from September 15 until after this
action. 34 Medical Department personnel with regiments therefore went for-
ward with such supplies as they could carry in empty gas-mask cases, grenade
sacks, and other containers. 36
At 6 p. m. on September 25. orders were issued directing the sanitary train
to proceed immediately to the ravine and woods south of Courcelles, on the
Auzeville — Aubreville road- Personnel of Ambulance Company No. 138, with
attached triage teams and triage equipment, were ordered to the same front,
but instructed to be ready to function at Neuvilly at 6.30 a. m., September 26.
Ambulance Company No. 139, using such transportation as Ambulance Com-
pany No. 41 could furnish, was to be prepared to move forward with litter
squads and dressing station at 5 a. m. Ambulance Company No. 137, with
the transport section of Ambulance Company No. 140, after proceeding to
Courcelles, was to be prepared at 6.30 a. m. to send forward its litter-bearer
and dressing-station section. The rest of the ambulance section was to move
to Courcelles as soon as transportation became available. By the same order
the field hospitals were disposed as follows : 34
Field Hospitals No. 138 and No. 139, at Depot du Wagon, cleared into
evacuation hospitals or into Field Hospital No. 140, and the latter was closed
and prepared to move to Courcelles by 6 a. m-, September 26. All field hospi-
tals were to move as soon as transportation became available, and the medical
supply unit was to open at Neuvilly on September 26. 37 Because of road
conditions there was grave doubt whether the movement could be made in
the time allowed. With his office personnel the division surgeon moved to the
dressing station at Auzeville. while his assistant represented him at division
headquarters. Division ambulance companies were placed in immediate con-
trol of the collecting and evacuating of patients in front of the triage, and the
commanding officer of the sanitary train was charged with all Medical Depart-
ment activities in rear of it. 38
The sanitary train experienced considerable delay in its forward move-
ment, but early in the morning of September 26 Ambulance Company No.
138 (the triage formation) had jmssed Courcelles and moved to a point just
west of Neuvilly, where it began operations. 30 The transport section of thi^
company entered the already congested stream of traffic on the Neuvilly —
Yarennes road, and a few ambulances were directed to make every effort to
get through the wood roads northeast of Neuvilly and remove the wounded
from the vicinity of Vauquois Hill. Ambulance Company No. 137, arriving
at Courcelles without transportation, sent part of its personnel to operate
MEUSE-AKGONNE OPERATION 571
a collecting station for slightly wounded at Neuvilly and a detachment of 2
officers and 50 men to establish a dressing station at Boureuilles and to collect
wounded between that point and Vauquois Hill. 39 Ambulance Company No.
139, also without transportation, covered the right of the sector, established
collecting stations at II ill 290. on the southern slope of Vauquois Hill, at
boureuilles, and later on that same day (September 2G) at Cheppy. 40 Ambu-
lance Company No. 140 (animal drawn) sent details to assist the shock, gas.
surgical, splint, and neurologic teams at the triage, and by the use of an
unindicated, circuitous route six of its ambulances reached Cheppy during
the evening of the 2Gth. 40 The remainder of its vehicles cleared the blockaded
sector between the trench lines and Cotes de Forimont. 40 United States Army
Ambulance Service Section No. 649 sent its 20 Ford ambulances to make con-
tact with the several collecting stations, while Ambulance Company No. 41 was
ordered to establish dressing stations at Boureuilles and, if possible, at
Varennes. 40 United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 520, as-
signed to the division by the corps surgeon, operated between the triage and
the evacuation hospitals. 41 The sanitary train, exclusive of the last-mentioned
unit, consisted of 19 G. M. C. ambulances, 12 animal-drawn ambulances, 20
serviceable and 3 unserviceable Ford ambulances, and 22 trucks. 41 Because
of the shortage of the last-mentioned vehicles it was necessary to move the
field hospitals in relays. All arrived at Courcelles by morning of the 27th.
where they were held in reserve, except that a section of Field Hospital No.
140 was sent to Neuvilly to operate as a medical and rest annex for the triage.
Fortunately the hospitals were not needed during the first day of the opera-
tion, for there was no road across the trench lines during the first 30 hours
after the attack, and animal-drawn ambulances were the only vehicles at this
time upon whose operation any reliance could be placed. 41 By evening of
the 2Cth surgeons with combat troops were informed that supplies were
being sent to Boureuilles and Cheppy, whence they were to be carried to the
front by ambulances, pack mules, and litter bearers. These officers were
enjoined to collect their wounded in groups, preferably on roads, and to
notify the division surgeon of their location. By nightfall there were 38
wounded remaining on the field near Vauquois and 400 near Cheppy. Nearly
all the disabled were collected in groups. 45
Ambulance Company No. 138, at Neuvilly, was relieved by Field Hos-
pital No. 138. at 2 p. m. on September 27, and was held in reserve, prepared
for an advance. 43 By afternoon the wounded had begun to reach the triage,
animal-drawn vehicles worked around Vauquois, and a few Ford cars had
reached Cheppy, and the G. M. C. vehicles the mine crater near Boureuilles. 43
Meanwhile the other companies were moving forward. Ambulance Company
Xo. 137. continuing its dressing station at Boureuilles, established relay sta-
tions between that town and Vauquois and thoroughly cleared this area. 44
Ambulance Company No. 139 moved its station to Cheppy, and Ambulance
Company No. 140 sent pack mules and ambulances to replenish supplies and
to assist the other companies, especially the 138th until that closed, holding
tlie main body of the company, however, in reserve. 44 United States Army
572 FIELD OPERATIONS
Ambulance Service Section No. 649 brought in wounded (sometimes from
the regimental aid stations) to the triage, while United States Army Ambu-
lance Service Section No. 520 worked both in front of the triage and in rear
of it."
The section of Field Hospital No. 140, established as a rest and medical
treatment station at Neuvilly, continued to operate there in this capacity after
Field Hospital No. 138 had relieved Ambulance Company No. 138, which con-
ducted the triage, until the afternoon of September 27. At this point a con-
siderable number of men claiming to have been shell shocked or gassed sought
treatment, and, though every effort was made to return suitable cases to the
front, many had to be sent to the rear to relieve congestion. In the rush
of cases it was not possible to sort them with definitive exactitude, and those
cases in which there was question were given the benefit of the doubt. Field
Hospitals No. 137 and No. 139 were held in reserve, but their personnel was
distributed as required among the other hospitals. 45
Eegimental detachments were still being supplied by ambulances return-
ing to the front. Every ambulance carried supplies — dressings, blankets, and
all the litters that could be spared. Infantry and machine-gun units were
supplied during the night. Artillery regiments were able to carry their own
medical supplies and had no difficulty. 40 Trucks were sent to the rear for
supplies to meet the constant drain. Road congestion continued well into the
afternoon of the 27th, by which time a new road around the mine crater near
Boureuilles had been completed. At 4 p. m. 4 mule-drawn ambulances ar-
rived at Neuvilly from Choppy in six hours, but the Vauquois — Cheppy road
was still impassable to motors. During the afternoon all ambulance company
sections pertaining to the division were working in advance of the field hospi-
tals, for the corps surgeon had sent two corps ambulance sections to clear
these hospitals. By 5 o'clock congestion on the main road (Varennes —
Neuvilly) began to lessen, collecting stations were being satisfactorily cleared,
and adequate supplies were going forward. Ambulance Company No. 41 had
established a dressing station at the crossroads east of Varennes, the 139th
Company had a station at Cheppy. while the 137th was still operating at
Boureuilles. 47
On the morning of September 28 Ambulance Company No. 137 moved
to Cheppy, established a dressing station in German dugouts on the south side
of the town, and by 3 o'clock had received more than 300 cases- At 3 p. m..
under heavy artillery fire, this company moved to Charpentry and established
a station in a building, four barns, and four dugouts. This soon was over-
flowing with patients. Evacuation was reasonably prompt, but the road was
so congested that 24 hours was the estimated time required in getting patients
to Neuvilly, distant 13 km. (about 8 miles). 48
All trucks going through to Neuvilly were loaded with such wounded as
could endure 24 hours of this kind of transportation, but the greater number,
including all seriously wounded, were relayed to Cheppy. 48
Ambulance Company No. 138, with triage equipment and accompanied by
the division surgeon, left Neuvilly at 8 a. m. September 28 for Cheppy, estab-
MEUSE-AKGONNE OPEKATIOX 573
lishing the triage there and relieving sections of Ambulance Companies No.
137 and No. 139, which were then sent forward to Charpentry. The triage was
located in dugouts formerly occupied by the dressing station, where 250
wounded men had been collected. Others continued to pour in. from the 91st
as well as from the 35th Division. Stations were assigned to the special
departments of the triage, in shacks and in the open, while dugouts and tents
were reserved for the wounded. The division surgeon's office, the admission
and the antitetanic service sections, and the supply, salvage, and evacuation
services were established in tents in front of the dugouts. So great was the
number of wounded that it was not possible to keep records, and the utmost
efforts were necessary to prevent complete overwhelming of the triage.
Ambulant cases were sent back on foot, and all returning vehicles were utilized
as well as all ambulances which could be spared from the front. This station
worked unremittingly day and night until the division was withdrawn."
Moving forward from Cheppy and withdrawing its station from Very,
Ambulance Company No. 139 concentrated at Charpentry, whence its dressing
station and litter-bearer section moved to Baulny, on the afternoon of the
28th, to establish a collecting station. 50
On the morning of the same day Ambulance Company No. 140 moved
up to Charpentry and established a dressing station at that place. Animal-
drawn ambulances were concentrated there, working forward to the battalion
and regimental aid stations. Ambulance Company No. 41 maintained its
dressing station east of Varennes, chiefly as a relay station and for the slightly
wounded coming down from Charpentry, but it also cared for other slightly
wounded and for ambulant patients. Its litter-bearer personnel was divided,
one section covering the territory between Cheppy and Charpentry,
while another section beyond Charpentry served the troops near Baulny and
Hois Montrebeau. The transport sections of Ambulance Companies No. 138
and No. 41 worked between the stations at Cheppy and Charpentry and the
field hospitals at Neuvilly. United States Army Ambulance Service Section
No. 520 worked on the same route, while No. 649 worked almost exclusively
between Charpentry and the triage at Cheppy. Trucks were also utilized for
wounded, both in front and in rear of Neuvilly. 51
Field Hospital No. 138 had continued to operate at Neuvilly, where, by
evening of September 28. 743 cases from the 35th Division and 417 from
other divisions had been received. 51 All four field hospitals were in service
here by evening of that date, operating in effect as a unit. 52 A section of
Field Hospital No. 140, consisting of 2 officers and 20 enlisted men, was sent
to Cheppy to operate a rest and medical station in connection with the triage.
As German dugouts faced in the wrong direction, tents were pitched in the
valley east of Field Hospital No. 138. Near-by batteries drew heavy German
artillery fire, but Medical Department units received no direct hits. By even-
ing conditions appeared serious, for losses had been heavy and all the froops
were becoming exhausted. Medical work continued throughout the night.
Roads were by this time fairly clear, though the average time necessary for
574
FIELD OPERATIONS
a round trip from Cheppy to Neuvilly, a distance of 8.5 km. (5.2 miles), was
24 hours. 62 Prom this time the demands for supplies were urgent.
On September 29 Ambulance Company No. 137, which continued to
operate its dressing station at Charpentry, at one time had 514 patients lying
in tlic open in addition to those being cared for in buildings and dugouts.
It was congested, under constant fire, and its personnel almost exhausted. In
the afternoon three regimental aid stations having moved back to Charpentry,
part of the company was sent back to Varennes for a rest. The division was
(lien withdrawing, and it was thought that the most advanced dressing stations
would be at Choppy and Varennes. 63
Fin. CO. — Dressing station operated at Cheppy, France, September 29, 1918
Ambulance Company No. 139 had followed the advancing troops in the
morning September 29. establishing an advance station at Chaudron Ferme
and another a little in the rear, toward Baulny. When troops returned, these
detachments came back to Charpentry and brought most of their wounded
with them. 54 At 3 p. m. the company was ordered back to Varennes for
rest, but at 5 o'clock a detachment of the least exhausted officers and men re-
turned to Charpentry. Ambulance Company No. 140 remained there during
the day. moving to Varennes in the evening. Animal-drawn ambulances con-
tinued to evacuate from the front, under artillery fire, while the troops were
retiring and reached many groups of wounded in places inaccessible to
motors. 55 Ambulance Company No. 41 continued to operate at Varennes. it?
litter-bearer section working out of Charpentry and Baulny, while its vehicles.
MEUSE-AEGONNE OPERATION 575
with those of Ambulance Companies No. 138 and No. 520. worked between
Charpentry, Cheppy, Varennes, and Neuvilly. 55 Thirty French trucks found
■it Varennes were used to evacuate the wounded. 55
Ambulance Company No. 138 continued to operate the always over-
flowing triage at Cheppy. Dugouts for 200 cases of psychoneurosis, exhaus-
tion, lightly gassed, and similar cases were prepared by the Engineer regi-
ment. These filled rapidly, and at noon the station had nearly 1.000 patients.
All buildings, tents, and dugouts were full, the surrounding ground was
covered with litter cases, and three lines of litter cases extended along the
road for 109 meters (a hundred yards). Extraordinary efforts were made to
get these casualties to the rear. All possible trucks were seized and all avail-
able ambulances used. A column of walking wounded, 250 in number, was
organized. At least 25 men totally unfit to walk volunteered for this column
and had to be taken out. Between 3 and 5 o'clock more than 750 patients
were evacuated to Neuvilly, and at the same time upward of 500 were sent
from Charpentry to Neuvilly. Congestion was relieved, and thereafter
evacuations more than kept pace with admissions. United States Army
Ambulance Service Section No. G49 continued the use of its light ambulances,
taking patients from Charpentry and Baulny to the station at Cheppy. 50
During the 24 hours ending at noon of September 29 the field hospital
group at Neuvilly received 1,142 casualties from the 35th Division and 353
from other divisions, a total of 1,495 patients. 57
On September 30 Ambulance Companies No. 137, No. 139, and No. 140
had detachments of their litter-bearer sections working in front of the dress-
ing station at Charpentry, the remainder of their personnel being at rest in.
Neuvilly and Boureuilles. Ambulances were kept going night and day, and
casualties continued to reach the dressing station in large numbers. It was
estimated that more than 3,000 men were fed here and sent back to the line,
in addition to some 2,500 casualties received. On the morning of the 30th
detachments from Ambulance Company No. 139, served by eight mule-drawn
ambulances, went over the open ground to collect the remaining wounded.
Those at Charpentry were evacuated to Cheppy and Neuvilly. By 11 p. m.
Cheppy was reported cleared, and the only wounded at the front were those
collected at Charpentry, about 200 litter cases. 58 At 11.30 trucks were avail-
able for their removal, while the field in front was reported clear. The field
hospitals remained at Neuvilly receiving, during the 24 hours ending at
noon of September 30, 1,035 patients from the 35th Division and 288 from
other divisions. The church was used for an overflow: at one time when
rear roads were blocked more than 1.500 patients accumulated at this town.
By midnight the field hospitals were fairly cleared, 1G litter cases remaining,
together with 400 cases of exhaustion, neurosis, and gassing, most of them
suitable for transfer to the corps rest camp which was to be opened the next
day. 59
On October 1 the sanitary train of the 1st Division took over the dress-
ing station at Charpentry and the triage at Cheppy. Medical Department units
of the 35th Division gradually being relieved and sent for rest to Varennes.
576
FIELD OPERATIONS
Field hospitals continued to operate and were reported to have received,
during the 24 hours ending October 1. 1.29G patients from the 35th Division
and 493 from other divisions. Of the total admitted from the 35th Division
during this action, about 480 were returned to duty and 250 sent to the rest
camp. 00
On October 2 the station at Charpentry was bombarded with high-
explosive and gas shells, causing 74 casualties and 3 deaths among the per-
sonnel of Ambulance Company No. 137. During the afternoon this com-
pany, with detachments from the other ambulance companies belonging to
the division, was returned to Neuvilly and Varennes, while Ambulance Com-
pany No. 41 returned to the First Corps sanitary train. 01
The triage report shows total admissions as follows:
35th Division 4,023
28th Division 443
37th Division 87
91st Division 798
Miscellaneous units 257
French 21
German 72
93
0,301
It was estimated that some 500 wounded from the 35th Division were
cared for by other divisions. 01
Of the 1,359 patients diagnosed as "gassed," more than 250 were so
diagnosed definitely enough to warrant evacuation. Some sent to the triage
were slightly gassed, but a number admitted with the diagnosis of gassed
were merely exhausted and not actual gas cases- 62
THE 1ST DIVISION
After participating in the St. Mihiel operation, the 1st Division was
withdrawn to Nonsard as reserve of the Fourth Army Corps. On September
23 it was assembled in the area of Benoite Vaux as a part of the Third Army
Corps. While in this area the division was assigned as reserve of the First
Army. On the night of September 27-28 the division moved to the region
of Blercourt-Nixeville ; thence to Neuvilly. On the night of September 30-
October 1 it relieved the 35th Division (less artillery and sanitary train)
and part of the 327th Infantry, 82d Division, on a front extending from a
point near l'Esperance to a point Bois Communal de Baulny. The 1st
Division was designated as the right division of the First Army Corps, with
the 28th Division on its left and the 91st Division, Fifth Army Corps, on its
right. - 04
The 1st Division did not make a general attack until October 4. However,
during the period October 1-^ it was subject to much harassing enemy artillery
fire. 04
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The sanitary train was encamped in the vicinity of Nubecourt until about
September 27, when it moved to woods near Julvecourt. It remained at the
latter place two days and then advanced to Charpentry. 65
MEUSE-ABGON XE OrERATION
577
The ambulance section of the sanitary train arrived in the divisional
sector early on the morning of October 1, and its units were disposed as
follows: Ambulance Company No. 3 established a dressing station at Char-
pentry, where Ambulance Company No. 12 was held in reserve, while Ambu-
lance Companies No. 2 and No. 13 were held in reserve at Varennes, except
that the latter company established at that point a dressing station for
the slightly wounded. United States Army Ambulance Service Section No.
649, which had been attached to the 35th Division, here rejoined the 1st
Company No. 13
Mens
ml Field
, France,
Hospital Ni
October 8, mis
1st Division, on the road at Very.
Division. Field Hospitals No. •'! and No. L2 were located in German dugouts
at ( lieppy, the former conducting the triage and treating gassed patients, while
the latter received the sick and nontransportable wounded. Field Hospital
No. 8 also treated, after operation, shock patients who were not able to endure
transportation.**
THE 92D DIVISION"
On September 22. 1918, the 02d Division (less the 368th Infantry and an
Artillery brigade) constituted the reserve of the First Army Corps in the
Mense-Argonne operation, and was assembled in the woods northwest of Cler-
mont. The 368th Infantry formed a part of the combat liaison between the
1357&— 25 37
578 FIELD OPERATIONS
French Fourth Army and the American First Army, September 20 to October
4, 1918. On September 29 the 92d Division (less one Infantry brigade, the
Artillery, and the Engineers) was placed at the disposal of the French 38th
Army Corps, operating in the Argonne Forest, where it formed the reserve
of the French 1st Light Infantry Division. On October 3 it was relieved
and placed at the disposal of the American First Army and was assigned to
the First Corps Reserve. On October 4 it was assigned to the Fourth Corps
and proceeded to the vicinity of Toul. 0li
MEDICAL, DEPABTMENT ACTIVITIES
After the 92d Division arrived at Triaucourt, September 22, the rear
echelon of its headquarters, including the division surgeon's office, remained
there, the sanitary train camping in the woods just north of the road from Les
Islettes to Clermont. There were but few casualties, as most of the division
was in reserve during this phase of the operation. No record is available of
the operations of the Medical Department at this time other than the state-
ment that an evacuation plan had been formulated and was utilized. Though
the sanitary train had neither ambulances nor trucks assigned to it. it appeared
necessary that materiel of the train should be made immediately available in
view of the anticipated activity of the division. It was therefore brought up
from the railhead to Ste. Menehould, and Field Hospital No. 3GG was estab-
lished there as a triage. 67
REFERENCES
(1) Operations report, First Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(2) Map showing daily positions of front lines, Meuse-Argonne operation, G-3, G. H. Q.,
A. E. F., May 24, 1919.
(3) Iteport of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, by Col. J. W. Grissinger.
M. C, corps surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Jbid., 5.
(5) Ibid., 6.
(6) Ibid., 14.
(7) Ibid., 15.
(S) Ibid., 7.
(9) Ibid., 8.
(10) Ibid., 9.
(11) Ibid., 10.
(12) Ibid., 11.
(13) Ibid., 12.
(14) Operations report, 77th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation. December 15. 1918.
(15) Report of Medical Department activities, 77th Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. 12. On file. Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(16) Ibid., 33.
(17) Ibid., 34.
(18) Ibid., 35.
(19) Ibid.. 3G.
(20) Ibid.. 37.
(21) Operations report, 2Sth Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, January 28. 1919.
METJSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 579
(22) F. O. No. 41, September 24. 1918, F. O. No. 42, September 20, 191S, 28th Division.
(23) F. O. No. 44 and No. 45, October 3. 191S, 28tb Division.
(24) Reports of messages, 28tb Division. On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College.
(25) Report of Medical Department activities, 28th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction Of the division surgeon, 28th Division (undated), Part I. On tile.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(26) Ibid., Part I, 30.
(27) Ibid., Part I. 32.
(28) Ibid., Part II, 4.
(29) Ibid.. Part II, 9.
(30) Ibid., Part V, 29.
(31) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War
College. 1700 (35th Division).
(32) History of 35th Division, April 2, 1919.
(33) Operations report, 35th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation. October 11, 1918.
(34) Report of Medical Department activities, 35th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon (undated). Part II, 3. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(35) Ibid., Part II, 2.
(36) Ibid., Part II, 4.
(37) F. O. No. 06, Headquarters 110th Sanitary Train, 35th Division, A. E. F.. Sep-
tember 25, 1918.
(38) Report of Medical Department activities, 35th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon (undated), Part II, 8. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(39) Ibid., Part II, 13.
(40) Ibid.. Part II, 14.
(41) Ibid., Part II. 15.
(42) Ibid., Part II. 16.
(43) Ibid.. Part II. 19.
(44) Ibid., Part II, 20.
(45) Ibid., Part II. 21.
(46) Ibid., Part II. 2l».
(47) Ibid.. Part II. 23.
(48) Ibid.. Part II. 25.
(49) Ibid.. Part II. 26.
(50) Ibid.. Part II. 27.
'51 ) Ibid.. Part II. 28.
(52) Ibid.. Part II. 29.
(53) Ibid.. Part II. 33.
(54) Ibid.. Part II. 34.
(55) Ibid.. Part II, 35.
156) Ibid.. Part II, 36.
i57i Had.. Part II, 39.
(58) Ibid.. Part II, 41.
f59> Ibid.. Part II, 50.
(60) Ibid.. Part II. 52.
(61) Ibid., Part II. 54.
(62) Ibid., Part II. 56.
'63) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army. 1917-1919. prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War College,
1700 (First Division).
'64) Operations report, First Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, October 17. 1918.
580 FIELD OPERATIONS
(65) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division. A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon (undated) , Fart I. 33. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(66) Outlines of Histories of Divisions. U. S. Army. 1917-1019. prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War Col-
lege, 1700 (92nd Division).
(67) Report of Medical Department activities, 92nd Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon (undated). On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
CHAPTEE XXII
FIRST PHASE— Continued
THE FIFTH CORPS (91 ST. 37TH, 79TH, AND 3D DIVISIONS, WITH THE 321)
DIVISION IN RESERVE)
The Fifth Corps, to the right of the First Corps and to the left of the
Third Corps, formed the center of the First Army and comprised the fol-
lowing divisions in line, from left to right: 91st. 37th, and 79th, with the 32d
Division in reserve. 1
The objectives of the corps were published in Field Order No. 31. Sep-
tember 21, 1918, parts of which read as follows:
(G-3 No. 2G-5)
Fifth Army Corps, American E. F..
21 September, 191S—8.00 o'clock.
Field Orders
No. "1
Part I
Maps: (Argonne special) 1:50,000.
1. (a) The enemy holds the front from the Mense to the Aisne with ahont five
divisions.
(6) The allied armies attack on the front from the Mense (exclusive) to the Suippe
(exclusive).
1. Direction, toward Mezieres.
2. Mission, to force the enemy from the line of the Aisne.
3. Objectives, (first) Dun-sur-Meuse — Grandpre — Challerange ; (second* Somme
Py — Stenay — Le Chesne — Attigny — Rethel.
^: * * :!= * *
(e) The 1st American Army attacks from the Meuse (exclusive) to La Harazec
(exclusive) in the direction of Buzancy-Stonne.
(/) The 3d Army Corps (U. S.), on the right, from the Meuse (exclusive) to Malan-
fourt (exclusive), protects the right of the American Army, and assists the advance of
the 5th Army Corps hy turning Montfaucon and later by turning the section of the
hostile 2d position within the zone of the 5th Army Corps. It advances in conjunction
with the 5rh Army Corps.
(g) The 1st Army Corps, on the left, assists the advance of the 5th Army Corps by
fading off hostile artillery fire and observation from the eastern edge of the Foret
d'Argonne. It clears up the forest of Argonne and advances to the American Army
objective in conjunction with the 5th Army Corps.
2. The 5th Army Corps attacks at " H " hour on " D " day on the front Malanrourr
(inclusive) — Vauquois (exclusive).
*******
(b) Direction: Cierges — Remonville.
*******
3. (a) The 70th Division.
* * * * * *
(2) The 70th Division * * * will advance rapidly to the corps objective (see
map). It will seize in succession Malancourt, Montfaucon. and Xantillois. It will assist
581
582 FIELD OPERATIONS
the 37th Division by turning the Bois de Montfaucon. The 37th Division and the 79th
Division will mutually assist each other in the capture of Montfaucon.
(b) The 37th Division.
*******
(2) The 37th Division * * * by proper echelonment in depth, will assist the 79th
Division in the turning of the Bois de Montfaucon and in the capture of Montfaucon. It
will aid the 91st Division in clearing up the group of woods, viz, Bois de Septsarges —
Betliincourt — Cheppy — Malancourt — Very and Chehemin. It will seize Hill 201, and the
village of Ivoiry, pressing forward without delay to the corps objective.
(c) The 91st Division.
***** * *
(2) The 91st Division will * * by its advance in conjunction with the 35th
Division, it will outflank the Bois de Cheppy and the Bois de Very. By its advance in con-
junction witli the 37th Division, it will assist ttie latter in mopping up the group of woods,
viz, Bois de Septsarges — Betliincourt — Cheppy — Malancourt — Very — Chehemin. * * '
(d) The divisions will push forward to the "corps objective line" (as shown on
map), rendering mutual support, but not delaying their own advance by waiting for each
other. After reaching line the corps advance will be continued to the American Army
objective without waiting for the advance of the corps on the right and left. The advance
will be pushed by all divisions witli the greatest vigor. The American Army objective
will be reached during the afternoon of " D " day. The penetration thus made in the
hostile third line will be exploited during the same night. Reconnaissances of at least
one regiment and one battalion of Field Artillery will be sent forward by each division.
Further advances will be regulated by Army Headquarters.
***** * *
9. Axis of liaison.
5th Army Corps: Ville-sur-Cousances — Brocourt — Recicourt — Avocourt Montfaucon —
Cierges — Komagne-sous-Montfaucon — Andevanne — Nouart.
79th Division: Cote 309 — northeast edge of Bois d'Esnes — crossroad 3998 — eastern exit
of Esnes — Malancourt — Montfaucon — Nantlllois — Cunel — Bant he vi lie — Andevanne — Tailly.
37th Division: Follows oth Corps axis of liaison to Banthcville : thence Remonville —
Barricourt — Nouart.
91st Division: P. C. 91st Division— Cole 290 (coordinates 30S.39 : 268.30)— Mt. des
Allieux — Boyau de Mossoul — La Neuve Grange — Bridge 198 — Very — Epinonville — Gesnes —
Landrea et St. Georges — liayonville — Fosse.
10 P. C.*s.
79th Division: Near road exit eastern Bois de Lambechamp.
37th Division : Verrieres Ferme.
91st Division: Near Bertrame Ferme.
32d Division : Waiy.
5th Corps: Ville-sur-Cousances.
***** * *
On September 2G, at 5.30 a. in., the infantry advance of the corps was
made under the protection of a rolling barrage. The 91st Division progressed
steadily, and by noon their left had occupied the left portion of their objective,
but their line sagged toward the east on the other flank. The center (37th
Division) and the right (79th Division) were checked in tbeir endeavor to
reach the corps objective, the advance of the 79th Division being hindered by
machine-gun fire during the entire afternoon. The 37th Division progressed
very slowly through the Bois de Montfaucon, and at midnight their line ran
apjjroxiniately along the northern edge of Bois de Montfaucon, thence to a
point approximately 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) south of Ivoiry. From here the line
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 583
of the 91st Division extended southwestwarcUy to about one-half kilometer
(0.3 mile) north of Very. 2 ' 3
A renewal of the attack was ordered for 5.30 a. m. on September 27.
The divisions were ordered to advance independently of each other, to the
combined army first-phase line, no change being made in the zones of action.*
At noon the 91st Division on the left was about 1 km. (0.6 mile) in advance
of the left half of their portion of the corps objective; running east, their
line skirted south of Epinonville and then bent down in the direction of
Ivoiry. The 37th Division held positions, generally speaking, about 1 km.
(0.6 mile) south of Ivoiry and running in an irregular line northeast of this
point. The 79th Division occupied a line about one-half kilometer (0.3 mile)
beyond Montfaucon, which it occupied shortly before noon. 2
During the afternoon the forward movement of the 37th and 79th Divi-
sions commenced. The 37th met resistance from the direction of Bois de
Beuge and artillery fire from the direction of Cierges. 2 At midnight the
corps line was practically as follows: From the southwest corner of the Bois
de Septsarges — southwest to the Epinonville — Montfaucon road, thence south
of Ivoiry and Epinonville, thence southwest across the Epinonville — Eclisfon-
taine road, thence to a point about 2 km. (1.2 miles) southwest of Epinon-
ville. 3 ' 6
On September 28 the corps attacked at 7 a. m. 6 Up to noon the town of
Eclisfontaine was reported taken by the 91st Division, and the leading ele-
ments of the 37th Division were in the Bois de Beuge and the Bois Emont.
At 2.55 p. m. the leading elements of the 79th Division were advancing on Bois
des Ogons and Bois du Fays, and leading elements of the 37th Division were
along the Cierges — Nantillois road. At 7 p. m. the corps line was approxi-
mately as follows: From a point about 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) northwest of
Eclisfontaine. northeastwardly, to a point about one-half kilometer (0.3 mile)
northeast of Nantillois. 2 ' 3
On the morning of September 29 the attack was continued at 7 a. m.
Because of strong enemy resistance our troops made slow progress: and ex-
cept for a slight advance of the 91st Division, the corps line remained prac-
tically that of the preceding day. 2
On September 30 the attack was not continued during the day. Present
lines were held and every effort was made to prepare for a resumption of
the attack on the following day. 7 During the day the relief of the 37th and
79th Divisions was begun by the 32d and 3d Divisions, respectively. The
relief was entirely completed during the night of September 30-October l. 8
During the period October 1-3 no attack was made by the corps. 2 The
following readjustment of the corps front was directed to be completed bj r
midnight October 3: The 3d Division to occupy the front from Nantillois —
Cunel road (exclusive) to Cierges (inclusive) : the 32d Division to occupy the
front from Cierges (exclusive) to the left boundary of the corps. The 91st
Division (less the 58th Field Artillery Brigade) was relieved in the front
line by the 32d Division and assembled in reserve in the Bois de Very and
Bois de Cheppy.
584 FIELD OPERATIONS
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The corps surgeon's office had been established at Ville-sur-Cousances. on
September 18, and, in addition to its authorized force, had attached to it one
consultant each in medicine, surgery, psychiatry, urology, and orthopedics.
Attached to the corps were United States Army Ambulance Service Sections.
Nos. 542, 602, 603, 604, and French sections No. 84 and No. 131. There was
no other corps sanitary train or transportation except one touring car from
the corps pool, which it was frequently impossible to obtain. About October
17 a touring car was assigned to the corps surgeon's office. 10
Army units serving the corps were as follows : 3 evacuation hospitals, 1
mobile hospital, 1 gas hospital. 1 neurological hospital, 1 contagious disease
hospital, 1 medical supply dump, and 1 advanced medical supply depot. 18
The following general plan for evacuation of sick and wounded was
published by the corps on September 24 : u
1. Divisional organizations.
(a) Battalion aid posts, relays of litter bearers, and regimental aid posts will be
established by the regimental surgeons under the supervision of the division surgeon.
(b) Station for slightly wounded will be established by the division surgeon of the
division in reserve at Jubecourt. Those able to return to duty will be returned at once
to the line. All others will be sent to Evacuation Hospital No. 9, at Vaubecourt.
(c) Division hospitals, to which all casualties and sick will be transported by the
division service, will be established by division surgeons as follows :
(1) One field hospital for sorting cases (triage) and one for gassed cases:
37th Division (to be designated later).
79th Division, Les Clairs Chenes.
91st Division (to be designated later).
All cases except gassed will pass through triage, where they will be carefully sorted
and sent to appropriate hospitals to prevent the necessity for subsequent evacuation by
surgical and special hospitals. Gassed cases will not pass through triage hospital. Will
receive only preliminary treatment in divisional gas hospital, and will be evacuated as
soon as possible to gas hospital at Julvecourt.
(2) One tield hospital for ordinary- sick (except contagious) will be established at
Ville-sur-Cousances by the division surgeon of the division in reserve.
2. Evacuation — all troops:
(a) Severely wounded, Mobile Hospital No. 1. at l.es Clairs Chenes; Evacuation
Hospital No 10, at Froidos; and No. 3, at Fleury-sur-Aire.
(6) Slightly wounded, Evacuation Hospital No. 9. at Vaubecourt.
(c) Gassed, Corps Gas Hospital at Julvecourt.
(d) Psychoneurotic cases, P. N. hospital at Nubecourt.
(e) Contagious, Evacuation Hospital No. 9, at Vaubecourt.
(f) Ordinary sick, skin, and venereal, Evacuation Hospital No. 9, at Vaubecourt.
(</) All evacuation for corps troops will he to the nearest medical unit.
(h) The evacuation service will evacuate from divisional field hospitals to the rear.
In anticipation of the operation the following preparations had been
made: The triage and gas hospitals of the 79th Division were located at Les
Clairs Chenes ; those of the 37th and 91st Divisions at Brabant. A station for
the slightly wounded was located at Jubecourt by the surgeon of the division
in reserve. Men who could return to duty were ordered to be returned at once:
others were to be sent to Evacuation Hospital No. 9, at Vaubecourt. One field
hospital of the division in reserve was established at Ville-sur-Cousances for
METJSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 585
the sick (except contagious cases) of the corps. (A serious epidemic of influ-
enza raged in the 79th Division.) Directions were given that all cases possible
he held and treated in division hospitals, but as a matter of fact the majority
of patients had to be evacuated to Ville-sur-Cousances or Souilly. 10
Casualties among corps troops were to be evacuated to the nearest hos-
pital. Gassed patients, it was ordered, were not to be sent through the triage,
but after preliminary treatment in the divisional gas hospital, were to be sent
to that of the corps at Julvecourt. 12
The following memorandum was issued by the corps on September 24: 13
1. G— 4 of the 1st Army requires from the corps surgeon a daily telegraphic report
from noon to noon of wounded, other injuries, gassed, and sick.
Beginning at " D " day and until further orders from this office, division surgeons will
prepare and have ready at 4 p. m. daily at headquarters, field hospitals, for collection by
corps surgeon's courier, the following numerical report in lieu of consolidated daily field
report of patients. [This latter report has called for an itemized numerical statement of
those wounded, otherwise injured, gassed, or sick, pertaining to the division, or (separately)
to other troops.]
Surgeons of nondivisional corps will suhmit the ahove report either direct to this
office or to nearest field hospital headquarters by 4 p. m. daily of cases in their organiza-
tion, only, which have been evacuated to an Army hospital without passing through a
divisional hospital of the 5th Corps.
2. Division surgeons will report at once present location of field hospitals by number,
and any change which may be made in the future.
3. Division surgeons of the 37th, 79th, and 91st Divisions will each designate a
medical officer of good judgment who will push forward in rear of advancing troops and
report to him as soon as practicable upon a suitable location for triage (to include non-
transportable) and gas hospitals, in about the horizontal coordinate of Montfaucon. This
report as soon received will be communicated to this office. No field hospital will be
moved without the approval of the corps surgeon.
4. The officer in charge of the evacuation of sick and wounded of the corps and
commanding officers of evacuation ambulance companies will take orders for movements
of ambulances from him or the corps surgeon or his representative. The corps surgeon's
office is at headquarters, 5th Army Corps.
5. The divisional triages of the 37th and 91st Divisions will be prepared to handle
nontransportable cases. At the triage of the 79th Division, nontransportable and severely
wounded cases will be transferred to Mobile Hospital No. 1.
This memorandum was later amended to read. " Report will be sent by
returning ambulance, by motor cycle, or by phone," and the following para-
graph was added : 13
For division surgeons:
In addition to the above, a second report will accompany it by courier and by phone
as follows :
(a) Number of evacuable patients in division field hospitals at time report is made
(the hour to be stated).
(b) Approximate number (if casualties expected to arrive within following 12 hours.
To be based on reports from the front.
After the advance began on September 26, and it was found that it pro-
ceeded rapidly, roads, especially in the region of Esnes, Malancourt. Mont-
faucon, and Avocourt, Avere almost impassable. In several instances 50 to GO
hours elapsed between the time when a man was wounded and when he arrived
at Mobile Hospital No. 1. at Les Clairs Chenes. French Ambulance Section
13570—25 38
586 FIELD OPERATIONS
No. 131 was on the road to Montfaucon for 26 hours without reaching its
destination. 10
On September 2S the triage of the 79th Division moved to Malancourt, that
of the 91st to La Neuve Grange Ferine on September 29, and on the 30th that
of the 37th to Avocourt.
The corps surgeon attempted to push ambulances up to them, but this was
an exceedingly difficult operation, because of impassable and blocked roads,
and was only partially successful. On September 28 a motor ambulance com-
pany of the 32d Division (the corps reserve) was temporarily attached to each
of the three divisions in the front line and proved of great assistance. It was
recognized that utilizing such reserve units was wrong in principle, generally
speaking, but this was considered a great emergency. The division surgeon
of the 91st Division was required by his division commander to take station
at advance headquarters, from which point it was almost impossible for him
to supervise his triage and the evacuation of wounded. The division surgeon
of the 79th later moved his triage to Montfaucon, where it was shelled and
several patients and some of the enlisted personnel killed or wounded. For-
tunately, casualties for this period were relatively light. 10
THE 91ST DIVISION
On the night of September 13rT4, 1918, the 91st Division moved to the
vicinity of Vavincourt (Meuse), and then, on the night of September 16-17,
it moved to the vicinity of Autrecourt (Meuse). On September 17, the
division was assigned to the Fifth Army Corps. It then moved to the Foret
de Hesse, northeast of Neuvilly. 14
On September 26, the division attacked on a front extending from
Yauquois to a point about 2 kin. (1.2 miles) southwest of Avocourt. 14 The
division occupied the left sector of the Fifth Corps; the 37th Division at-
tacked on its right, and the 35th Division (First Corps) on its left. 15
The zone of action of the division was divided approximately into two
equal sectors. The 181st Brigade was assigned to the sector on the right, and
the 182d to the sector on the left. The 181st Brigade was formed for attack
with its two regiments (each less one battalion) side by side, each regiment
having one battalion in the assaulting line. The 182d Brigade was formed
with its two regiments (each less one battalion) in column, the leading regi-
ment having one battalion in the assaulting line. 10
The front-line elements of the division left the line of departure at 5.30
a m.. September 26, following closely the rolling barrage when it moved
from the hostile front line. A heavy fog lay in the valley of La Baunthe
Kuisseau. A smoke screen had been thrown out to cover the advance of the
leading elements of the division and to blind the enemy. Both fog and smoke
hindered, to some extent, the rapid advance of our troops. In some instances,
gaps had not been completely cut by our artillery fire in the enemy wire;
this, together with enemy heavy machine-gun fire, checked to some extent
the progress of the advance elements of the division. In spite of the obstacles
encountered, however, the enemy's defensive system was penetrated to a
PLATE XXIX.
Baltic line*, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. Pcrshinfl. September 1 , 1919. arc approiinute.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 587
depth of about 4 km. (2.4 miles) by noon of September 2G. The attack was
pressed during- the entire day. and by 6 p. m. an advance of over 7 km.
(4.3 miles) had been made. Patrols from the 181st Brigade entered the
town of Epinonville during the afternoon of September 26. The high ground
northeast of Very, extending toward Montfaucon. was organized for defense
and was held during the night of September 2G-27. 15
On the morning of September 27, the attack was renewed. The dispo-
sition of troops remained the same as on the previous day, with the excep-
tion that the 182d Brigade advanced with both Infantry regiments in line.
The 181st Brigade encountered strong machine-gun fire in the vicinity of
Epinonville. The town itself was occupied several times during the day by
our troops, but each time their withdrawal was forced by the enemy's machine-
gun and artillery fire. The 182d Brigade succeeded in advancing several
hundred yards north of the road running northeast and southwest through
Eclisfontaine. and this line was organized for defense on the evening of
September 27. Because it was later learned that the road running through
Eclisfontaine w 7 as to be used as a barrage line by the corps artillery, the
elements of the 182d Brigade were withdrawn south of it and a defensive
line was established in the evening of September 27, running approximately
east and west through a point about 500 meters (545 yards) south of Epinon-
ville. Despite this slight withdrawal, the net gain for the day was approxi-
mately 1.5 km. (0.9 mile). 15
On September 28, the division renewed its attack at 8 a. m. Each brigade
was disposed with one regiment of infantry in the front line and one in
support. The advance progressed slowly throughout the entire day, and
everywhere met with increased artillery and machine-gun resistance. The
Bois Communal de Baulny, Les Epinettes Bois, and the southern part of
Bois Communal de Cierges were seized and held during the day, in the face
of considerable opposition. As during the previous day, hostile airplanes
constantly appeared over our lines. Hostile artillery was consequently be-
coming more and more accurate; our losses correspondingly increased. 15
At 7 o'clock on the morning of September 29 the attack was again re-
newed. The disposition of troops was as on the previous day, with the
exception that the supporting regiments passed through the front-line regi-
ments at the hour designated for the attack. The 181st Brigade gained pos-
session of Bois Communal de Cierges and La Grange-aux-Bois Ferme early
in the day, but was unable to make further progress on account of the heavy
opposition encountered through fire from the village of Cierges. The 182d
Brigade progressed as far as the woods immediately north of Tronsol Ferine,
where the front-line elements were held up by the enemy's machine-gun and
artillery fire from the north and northwest. In the afternoon the infantry
attack was launched at 3.40 p. m. On the right the town of Gesnes was taKen,
and the American First Army objective was reached at 5.30 p. in. On the
left the line was advanced to include the Bois de la Morine and Bois de
Chene Sec. This ground was gained by the leading regiment of each brigade.
Our losses were heavy, especially in the case of the leading elements of the
588 FIELD OPERATIONS
181st Brigade. At 4 p. m. definite information was received that the front-
line elements of the 35th Division had fallen back from the vicinity of Ex-
ermont toward Baulny, and that on the right of the 91st Division the Bois
Einont had been evacuated by the leading units of the 37th Division. This
left both flanks of the 91st Division exposed to attack and made retention
of the ground already pained very hazardous. To avoid the possibility of the
enemy cutting off our troops by an attack on the front of the salient they oc-
cupied, a withdrawal of the elements of the 91st Division already committed
to the attack was ordered to be carried out at nightfall. The line running
east and west along Bois Communal de Baulny and Bois Communal de
Cierges was organized for defense, with advance elements extending as far
north as Tronsol Ferme and the woods about 300 meters (327 yards) north
of Bois Communal de Cierges. 15
On September 30, in compliance with instructions from the Fifth Army
Corps, a line of resistance was established extending through the center of
Bois Communal de Cierges, Exermont Ferme. and Cote 231, with a line of
observation along the northern edge of Bois Communal de Cierges and Bois
Communal de Baulny. 15
From September 30 to October 3. inclusive, the line which this division
organized was held in the face of heavy shell fire and under almost constant
enemy aerial observation. Though the morale of the troops remained good
under the circumstances, these four days of holding the line of resistance with-
out being able to advance caused more casualties and more discomfort to the
troops than would have been the case had they been able to continue the at-
tack, accompanied by other troops on both flanks. 15
During the night of October 3-4 the division (less 58th Field Artillery
Brigade attached) was relieved from the line by the (36th Brigade of the 32d
Division, and it went into bivouac in the Bois de Cheppy and Bois de Very.
The last elements (parts of the 363d and 364th Infantry and 348th Machine
Gun Battalion) w-ere not relieved until noon, October 4. These last elements
held the Bois de Baulny until relieved. 15
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On September 26 the sanitary train established in Brabant field hospi-
tals for the sick, the gassed, and the wounded. Evacuations from that village
were conducted by corps ambulance companies. Reserve ambulance and field
hospital companies of the sanitary train Avere camouflaged and parked on the
Paris — Vraincourt road, just south of Parois. Trucks were available for the
transport of all the field hospital equipment and the medical supply unit. 1 "
First reports of the wounded on that day were received by the division sur-
geon at 10 a. m., and he at once recommended to G— 1 that ambulance trans-
port be sent forward to clear the wounded. Owing to orders governing trans-
portation — requiring that recommendation be submitted to a representative
of G-l, as traffic regulating officer, before an order could be issued allowing
any special transport on the road — it was not until after 2 o'clock that am-
bulances could pro forward to begin evacuation. 10 In accordance with the ad-
METJSE-ARGONNE OPERATION
589
590
FIELD OPKRATIONS
ministrative order concerning the action, an advance dressing station had been
established in the vicinity of Rendezvous de Chasse, 2 km. (1.2 miles) in the
rear of the front line of trenches. Another dressing station for slightly
wounded had been established on the left of the divisional sector some distance
from the front. Personnel and materiel for these stations Mere in position
on the night of September 24-25. At 12 o'clock, September 26, the division
surgeon ordered two additional dressing stations established, one at La Neuve
Grange Ferine and the other in the vicinity of Bois de Very. 10 At 4 p. in.
Ambulance Companies Nos. 3G1. 303, and 3G4 were ordered forward to act as
litter bearers, to clear the woods, and to assemble the wounded for evacuation
Fig. fl!>. — Wounded walking to dressing stations, Argonne Forest, because roads were impassable to
ambulances
at dressing stations or along the roads. The light Ford ambulances of United
States Army Ambulance Service Sections No. 593 and No. 640 were energetic
and persistent in clearing the wounded. 10
On September 29 the division commander gave orders that field hospitals
be established in Very, and Field Hospitals No. 361 and No. 363 were moved
from Brabant to the crossroads 1 km. (0.6 mile) southeast of Very, which at
that time was being shelled by 7 the enemy. 10 Shells were falling also in the
vicinity of sanitary 7 train trucks standing near these crossroads. On represen-
tation of the division surgeon that the proposed location was too near the
front line for the establishment of field hospitals, the chief of staff ordered
their establishment at another point. Field Hospital No. 361, as triage, with a
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 591
surgical operating unit attached, and Field Hospital No. 3C3, acting as medi-
cal and gas hospital, were established on the afternoon of September 29 in Bois
de Cheppy , near La Neuve Grange Ferme on the Avocourt — Very road. 3 km.
(1.8 miles) from Avocourt. During the night of September 29-30 about 200
patients were admitted to this hospital — about C km. (3.7 miles) from the
front line. 16
Evacuation of wounded was seriously hampered by road conditions.
During the nights of September 30 and October 1. because of slow evacuation,
the field hosjjitals in Bois de Cheppy were taxed to their utmost to care for
the wounded. Evacuation from field hospitals on those two dates was difficult.
Many patients were evacuated directly from dressing stations, on returning
ammunition trucks of the 91st Division, through Avocourt and the areas of
neighboring divisions, to evacuation hospitals in Froidos and Fleury. In
addition, many wounded of the division were sent to field hospitals of the
35th Division, on the left, in Cheppy. 17 The axial road of the 91st Division
from Very through the Bois de Cheppy to Avocourt was congested at all
times, for traffic of three divisions of the Fifth Corps went through Avocourt
on a one-way road, with resulting delay. Ambulances were held within this
congested section for 12 hours and longer before being permitted to pass with
their patients to the rear, despite the j^rotests of division surgeon and command-
ing officer of the sanitary train made to G-l and to the motor transport officer
of the 91st Division, who controlled traffic of the division over the axial road.
To make the trip from field hospitals in Bois de Cheppy to the evacuation
hospital in Froidos and return took in some instaiK es 21 hours for a round
trip of 50 km. (31 miles). 17
On October 1 the division surgeon moved to the advance division post of
command at Epinonville from the rear echelon at Cote 290 in Foret de Hesse.
Here the assistant division surgeon was wounded and the automobile assigned
to the division surgeon destroyed by enemy shell fire, with loss of some office
records and property. 17
The location of ambulance company dressing stations on October 1 was as
follows :
No. 3G1, held in reserve at Epinonville.
No. 362, li/o km. (0.9 mile) from Very on Very — Epinonville, 3 km.
(1.8 miles) from front line.
No. 363. at Epinonville, on road leading to Eclisfontaine, iy 2 km. (0.9
mile) from front line.
No. 364, in Very, 6 km. (3.7 miles) from front line. 17
On October 2, Field Hospital No. 361 was established in Very and re-
mained there until the 4th, when the division was relieved by the 32d Division. 17
On being relieved, while the troops were tired, their morale was excellent,
though practically all were suffering from diarrhea. During the offensive
about 700 cases were evacuated for this cause out of a total of 4.800 men tairged
by surgeons attached to line organizations of the division. To a small extent
the disease had been present from the time that the troops were in the training
area. During the movement toward the battle front, sanitary conditions were
592
FIELD OPERATIONS
never satisfactoiy, and with decrease in safeguards incident to the advance
there was a marked tendency to the spread of diarrhea. 17
Under road conditions existing during the first four days of the advance
the removal of the wounded had been as good as was possible. It is believed
that in an advance of this sort field hospitals should be established on the
enemy side of the natural line of resistance (in this case No Man's Land) as
soon as it is possible to place them. This natural line of resistance is the site
of subsequent traffic jams, and facilities should be available here for treatment
of the majority of the wounded. Many evacuations were accomplished by
returning trucks direct from ambulance dressing stations through Cheppy to
the evacuation hospitals in Froidos and Fleury. Neither time nor men were
available to put G inches of earth in these trucks, and statements of wounded
men were unanimous that truck transportation was extremely uncomfortable. 1S
Examination of the reports shows that divisional hospital units cared for three-
fourths of the divisional casualties and also for many coming to them from
adjoining divisions. Evacuation work fell mainly to United States Army
Ambulance Service Sections No. 593 and No. 040, which transported about
3,700 patients. 18
Summary of work of the field hospital section"
91st
Division
lirabant, Sept. 25-28:
Wounded
Gassed
Sick-.
Bois de Cheppy, Sept. 29-Oct. 2
Wounded..
Gassed-.
Sick
Near Very, Oct. 3:
Wounded
Gassed
Sick
342
85
86S
220
07
12
46
Others
French
254
2
34
127
8
224
3
43
49
1
14
1
3
1)
12
II
Germans
25
1
20
2
THE 37TH DIVISION
On September 16 the 37th Division was relieved from the Baccarat sector,
and moved to the new area around the town of Robert-Espagne. After a rest
of four days it proceeded to Rccicourt. Two days later the first elements of
the division moved north to participate in the Meuse-Argonne operation, which
was then about to be launched. Division headquarters were established at
Yerrieres-en-Hesse farm, 4 km. (2.4 miles) south of Avocourt. 20
On the night of September 24-25 the division took its position for the
initial attack on a front of a little over 3 km. (1.8 miles), extending east and
west, just north of Avocourt. 20
On September 26 the attack formation was right to left: 73d Brigade
(less headquarters and 2d and 3d Battalions, 146th Infantry) : 74th Brigade
(less 1st Battalion. 14Sth Infantry). 21
The 146th Infantry, less one battalion, and one battalion of the 148th
infantry and the 134th Machine Gun Battalion constituted the divisional re-
serve, following on the axis of liaison. 21
PLATE XXX.
Battle lines, taken from Filial Report, Gen. John J- Pcrshtnf. September 1. 1919. A* approximale.
MEUSE-AEGONXE OPERATION 593
The division moved forward from the parallel of departure at 5.30 p. m.,
September 2G, following a rolling barrage, and with comparatively little op-
position from the enemy infantry but much machine-gun opposition. The 73d
Brigade reached the ridge beyond the north edge of Bois de Montfaucon. and
the 74th Brigade penetrated a point of the enemy position about 1 km. (0.6
mile) south of Ivoiry that evening. 21
On September 27 the attack commenced at 5.30 a. m.. and the success of
the preceding day was continued to a general line about 500 meters (545 yards)
south of Ivoiry. At about 9 a. m. the advance was temporarily stopped by
an enemy counterattack against the 73d Brigade. With the aid of the brigade
reserve, this counterattack was driven back and the brigade again moved for-
ward at about 9.30 a. m. At 10.30 a. m. elements of the 74th Brigade entered
the town of Ivoiry, in the face of direct enemy artillery and machine-gun fire,
and by 11.28 a. m. the 74th Brigade had taken Hill 25G, southwest of Ivoiry.
The 148th Infantry, under artillery and machine-gun pressure, withdrew from
Hill 25(5 during the afternoon. At 10.30 a. m. patrols of the 73d Brigade
were entering Montfaucon. which Mas still occupied by hostile machine guns.
At 11.28 a. m. the enemy from in or near the Bois de Beuge and north of the
town of (Jierges commenced shelling troops of the division along the entire
front, the 145th Infantry receiving fire of direct range. At 12.07 p. m. the
intense, heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire drove the leading elements
of the 147th Infantry back on the Second element. At 1.15 p. m. the division
commander directed the 74th Brigade to move forward and occupy the enemy's
second-line 2^osition, to organize the position, and to prepare to resist a counter-
attack. At 1.33 p. m. the 73d Brigade had occupied Montfaucon and cleared
it of the enemy. At 5.43 p. m. the 73d Brigade had succeeded in occupying
the enemy's second-line position, and with the aid of captured enemy artillery
were able to hold but not advance. At dark, the line halted approximately
along the Ivoiry — Montfaucon road. 21
September 28, at 7 a. m. the attack was resumed, and 35 minutes later
troops of the division entered Bois de Beuge and Bois Emont. The infantry
of both brigades continued slowly, and at 10.45 a. m. was approaching Cierges.
At 2.55 p. m. the 73d Brigade was holding - a line paralleling the Cierges —
Xantillois road, and about 200 meters (219 yards) to the south thereof. The
74th Brigade had been counterattacked by infantry, supported by machine
guns and artillery, and at 5.25 p. m. it again attacked through and around
Bois Emont, which was practically cleared of the enemy, and the troops rested
for the night on a line approximately from a point 1.5 km. (0.8 mile) east of
Cierges to the eastern edge of Bois de Beuge. 3 The men were now much
exhausted from being continually wet and from the constant exposure of two
days to artillery fire, which at times was very intense for periods of from half
an hour to one and one-half hours. 21
On September 29, at 7.25 a. in., the 74th Infantry Brigade moved forward
and reached the open ground east of Bois Emont and then reached a line
joining the closest points of Bois Emont and Bois de Beuge. Tanks, which
594 FIELD OPERATIONS
accompanied the infantry, turned back from the southeast corner of Bois
Emont where they came under a direct, as well as indirect, laying of artillery
lire. When the tanks turned, the infantry took shelter in the hills southeast
of Bois Phnont and remained there. A battalion of the divisional reserve,
having got out of place in a move to join the divisional reserve during the
night of September 28-29, and having halted in the rear of the extreme left
of the 74th Brigade, was then directed by the division commander to proceed
forward through the opening of Bois Emont and Bois Communal de Cierges,
or through the edges of these woods, to reduce the machine guns west and
northwest of Cierges. Leading patrols of the 74th Brigade had succeeded in
entering Cierges. The increased artillery fire, only lightly replied to by our
artillery, due to lack of ammunition, and the intense machine-gun fire, coming
apparently from every elevation north, northeast, and northwest of Cierges.
completely stopped the advance of both brigades. The greater part of the 74th
Brigade was still on the ridge south of Bois Emont, where it had spent the
previous night. Near noon, a counterattack by the enemy, starting apparently
from the ridge 2 km. (1.2 miles) north of Cierges, advanced in the direction
of Cierges, but was halted by our machine-gun and rifle fire as it came down
the south slope of the ridge 1 km. (0.6 mile) north of that place, and turned
back. The Bois Emont, Bois de Beuge, and Bois Communal de Cierges were
now filled with phosgene and mustard gas, rendering them impassable. This
limited the forward passage to the spaces between these woods. Attempts to
advance farther at this time were deemed inadvisable, and at 2.12 p. m. the.
division commander directed that the lines be well dug in and held. This
was done on approximately the same line that was held in the morning, the
most advanced position. 21
Pursuant to Eield Orders No. 49, Fifth Corps, September 29, the attack
was not continued on September 30, and the day was given over to organiza-
tion and consolidation of the position then held. 21
In the afternoon of October 1 the relief of the 37th Division by the 32d
Division was started and was completed at 8.30 p. m., the same night, the
division starting its movement to the new area in the neighborhood of
Recicourt. 21
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
By September 1 the Medical Department of the 37th Division had been
furnished with all the required personnel, materiel, and other supplies. No
horse ambulances and no wheel litters were available till some time later,
after the Meuse-Argonne operation and when the division was serving in
Belgium. Shortage in transportation had an important bearing on its
activities. 22
On September 25 arrangements for the evacuation of wounded were
made as follows: The triage was located at Brabant, a small town about
2 km. (1.2 miles) south of Recicourt. Two field hospitals and the medical
supply depot were established in one half of this town, and the two other
field hospitals were held here in reserve. The other half of the town was
M EUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION
595
occupied by two field hospitals of the 91st Division. One ambulance com-
pany was detailed to the 73d Brigade and another to the 74th. The two
other ambulance companies were held in reserve. 25
In view of the necessity that artillery and ammunition have ri<rht of
way, the evacuation of wounded by vehicles was minimized as much as possible
for the first 24 hours of the conflict. Regimental surgeons were advised of
the conditions and instructed to use such litter bearers as they had, as little
ambulance service was to be expected for the first '24 hours. 24
Pig. TO. — Advanced dressing station near Avocourt, September *J<>, litis
On the 26th the two reserve ambulance companies were ordered to
Avocourt, where a dressing station was opened. Bearer sections accompanied
the advance and were deployed across the entire division sector, with instruc-
tions to collect all wounded and bring them to the dressing station at
Avocourt. 24
The road from Avocourt leading through enemy trenches was absolutely
blocked and impassable for motor transport. This necessitated a long and
difficult carry for the bearers and retarded evacuation considerably. During
the 2Cth and the succeeding night about 300 wounded were collected at
Avocourt, and were evacuated with difficulty, on account of congested road
conditions, to the triage at Brabant. During the night many of the wounded
596
FIELD OPERATIONS
were missed by bearer parties, and dugouts all over the field began to fill
with walking wounded from the various regimental and battalion dressing
stations. 24
By the morning of September 27. when the advance was resumed, it was
found that most of the battalion and regimental stations which had accom-
panied the advance through the forest had collected many casualties which
they had been unable to evacuate, as the road remained blocked and
ambulances had been unable to come forward. Many wounded had been
Fig. 71. — Entrance to dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 148. 37 tli Division, near
Clerges, September 26, 1918
carried great distances on litters. While the troops had advanced from the
Ravin de Chambronne past Montf'ancon and had reached the vicinity of
Ivoiry, many of the battalion dressing stations, delayed as they were by
many wounded, were unable to keep up with them. The situation grew worse
hourly, for there developed a great stiffening of the German defense, which
increased greatly the number of casualties. 25
A number of the ambulant wounded and bearer parties proceeding to
the rear came to a crossroads where the division command post was located,
and wounded began to congregate at this point, though there was no medical
formation established there to care for them. A forward dressing station
was hurriedly established at this point by the medical detachment on duty
MEUSE-AKGONNE OPERATION 597
with the 112th Field Signal Battalion and such other medical officers and
men as were in the vicinity, and orders were sent to an ambulance company
to proceed to this crossroads and locate a station there immediately. By this
time the horse transport of the division (nonmedical) had managed to get
through from Avocourt, and upon unloading their supplies of ammunition
they were sent to this dressing station and the wounded evacuated in their
wagons, then the only available means of transport from this point. The
patients were thus carried to Avocourt and from the dressing station there
were sent in to Brabant. 2 "'
Meanwhile the two reserve ambulance companies had been brought for-
ward. One of these operated two stations, one at crossroads in Bois de Mont-
faucon and the other on Montfaucon ridge, about 2 km. (1.2 miles) west of
the ruined village of that name. The other motor ambulance company occupied
some abandoned German dugouts in Bavin de Chambronne. The third ambu-
lance company also established a dressing station in Bois de Chehemin. A
number of stations were thus scattered on the field because of lack of trans-
port and the necessity for reducing to the minimum the work of carrying
patients by litter, lest bearers, for whom there were no replacements, be
exhausted. 20
By this time the regimental and battalion dressing stations of the 74th
Brigade had advanced, and most of them had taken station in the town of
Ivoiry and in a near-by orchard. Regimental and battalion dressing stations
of the 73d Brigade advanced and took position in a railroad quarry not far
from Bois de Beuge. They were in this position about the time of the with-
drawal of the division on October l. 27
On September 28 so many casualties were scattered over the field, not-
withstanding the fact that every wagon in the division was carrying wounded
to the rear, that the situation became A'ery serious, and strong efforts were
made to break through with ambulances from Avocourt on any road leading
to the front through other division or corps roads. Two ambulances managed
to <ret through from Avocourt, and six ambulances from the 32d Division
appeared and reported to the 37th for duty. These six ambulances had
managed to come through on the road leading from Varennes, which was in
much better condition than any road which the 37th Division was using.
They were loaded with wounded and were dispatched to the rear: it was
learned later that they were 72 hours in getting back to Brabant, a distance
of about 20 km. (12 miles), over difficult and congested roads and by a round-
about way. 20
The advisability that a division be equipped with a limited number of
animal-drawn ambulances and wheeled litters became apparent from this
experience. 26
Orders were now issued that no more motor ambulances be sent to the
rear, but be retained at the front. The two reserve field hospitals were ordered
from Avocourt, one reaching the ambulance company position in the Bavin
de Chambronne and establishing there. This hospital was very close to the
front, but no other suitable place presented which had as much protection as
598 FIELD OPERATIONS
had this. On September 29 the two motor ambulances that had succeeded in
getting through from Avocourt were used to evacuate the wounded from
battalion aid stations through the dressing station at the crossroads. To
add to the difficulties, a heavy rain had fallen the day before, and many neigh-
boring dugouts were filled with wounded. A number of these had to lie all
night in the rain with only such shelter as could be obtained from tarpaulins,
none of which stood up through the night in the storm. 27
Before daylight on September 30, the division commander ordered all
wagons of the division assembled and concentrated for the evacuation of the
wounded. By this means the problem was fully solved. The road through
Varennes was relieved of its congestion on the 30th, ambulances managed to
get through, and evacuation ran more smoothly, with the result that by
October 1 most of the wounded had been evacuated. The sanitary train re-
mained on the field through October 2, reaching all dugouts and shelters and
collecting the remaining wounded. It was relieved on that day by the sanitary
train of the 32d Division and proceeded to Brabant. 27
THE 79TH DIVISION
Beginning on the night of September 16-17, 1918, the 79th Division took
over the Montfaucon sector, extending from west of Avocourt to southeast of
Haucourt, relieving the French 157th Division. 28
On September 25 the original front occupied by the 79th Division was
contracted so that the western boundary was the western edge of Bois
d'Avocourt. 20
On September 2C the infantry attack commenced promptly at 5.30 a. in.
The 313th Infantry effected the necessary openings and went forward without
much difficulty, except for the fact that the nature of the terrain over which
the troops of this regiment had to pass made it impossible to keep up witli
the barrage, and the regiment soon lost its protection. The advance pro-
gressed satisfactorily until about 8 a. m., when it was temporarily retarded
by enemy machine-gun fire and high-explosive shelling. At 1 p, m. the ad-
vance was held up in front of the western edge of the Bois de Cuisy by heavy
machine-gun fire and high-explosive shell fire. Reorganization was soon
made, however, and the western edge of the Bois de Cuisy was taken at 4 p. m..
with the aid of tanks which had come up at that time. The advance was con-
tinued, and at 6 p. m. the northern edge of the woods was gained. Dark-
ness was coming on, but in compliance with instructions from the corps
headquarters the regiment took the enemy's strong position near Montfaucon,
with the assistance of two tanks. After suffering heavy casualties, the regi-
ment withdrew to the edge of the woods, at which point it bivouacked for
the night. 23
The 314th Infantry, on the right, had difficulty from the beginning of the
attack. In some places the troops were unable to get through the wire in the
time allotted; also the unusually rough condition of the ground in the immedi-
ate front of the regiment caused the men to fall behind the barrage at the
PLATE XXXI.
MEUSE -ARGONNE
1ST PHASE 79 TH DIVISION
Bajtlc lines, taken from Final Report. Cen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 599
outset, and as a result they obtained no protection therefrom at all. The
advance continued, during which clouds of thick fog and heavy smoke in
the ravines and drawheads caused many enemy machine-gun nests to be passed
unnoticed. When, at 10 a. m., the fog lifted, the regiment was subjected to
enemy machine-gun fire from all points of the compass. The remainder of
the day was occupied in clearing out these nests by the rear elements of the
regiment, though at the same time the advance was continued. At G to 7 p. m.
the regiment was organized for further advance, but because of impending
darkness a halt was ordered and the regiment bivouacked for the night. 20
The road conditions made traffic extremely difficult. Apparently no re-
connaissance had been made in advance to examine the road situation, and
the one road previously allotted to this division was entirely inadequate for
the program the division had to carry out. A very bad traffic block ensued
as a result, and the division roads were continually blocked throughout the
operation. 29
On September 27 the 313th and 314th Regiments of Infantry had begun
anew the advance of the previous day. From 5 a. m. on it was raining, and the
road situation was becoming worse. Roads had to be constructed over shell
holes which were practically contiguous, and it was not possible for the horse
artillery to get through. In addition, the road situation at Malancourt was
such, due to the use of the Malancourt — Montfaucon road by both the 79th
and the 4th Divisions, that when the accompanying artillery did arrive there
it could not get through, and the attack proceeded without any effective
artillery support until about noon, when the two battalions of the 147th
Field Artillery were able to pass and take up an advance position. Never-
theless, the 313th Infantry moved out of the woods and began its attack on
Montfaucon at 7 a. m. and at 11.50 a. m. Montfaucon was in its possession.
At 3.30 p. m. the attack was renewed. The advance continued under heavy
fire from Bois de Beuge to the north until 0> p. m., when the enemy fire
became so severe and the losses so heavy that, because of this and the ex-
hausted condition of the troops, the regiment was halted in position for
the night. 29
The 314th Infantry was directed to push ahead at an earlier hour than
that ordered for the attack of the 313th Infantry, and accordingly began
its advance at 4 a. m. on the 27th. Good progress was made before dawn,
but be-ause of the darkness, as had happened the day before, enemy machine-
gun nests were passed unnoticed necessitating their being silenced subse-
quently by rear elements of the regiment. On the regiment's right flank
near Cuisy severe machine-gun fire was encountered, but was overcome
without much artillery assistance. North of Montfaucon strong resistance
was encountered, so the regiment was reorganized to attack Nantillois
from the right flank and to come in by the north of the town. Attempts all
during the afternoon failed to take Nantillois, chiefly because of the very
heavy shell fire coming from all over the front and because of the exhaustion
of the troops, who had obtained no supplies of any kind since the advance
600 FIELD OPERATIONS
began. Bivouac for the night of September 27-28 was made about one-half
kilometer (0.3 mile) north of Montfaucon. 20
On the night of September 27-28 the troops of the 313th and 314th
Infantry were relieved to enable them to obtain food and rest, neither of which
had they had since the beginning of the advance. The 315th Infantry re-
lieved the 314th on the right and the 310th relieved the 313th on the left of
the division sector. 20
On September 28 the attack was begun at 7 a. m., after artillery prepara-
tion. The 31Gth Infantry, on the left, moved out against the Bois de Beuge,
and the 315th Infantry, on the right, against Nantillois. The advance of both
regiments was over open ground, raked by shrapnel and high-explosive shell
fire. The 310th Infantry was also under heavy machine-gun fire from the
Bois de Beuge, as well. The advance nevertheless continued, and at 2 p. m.
the 31Gth Infantry had progressed through the Bois de Beuge, over an open
valley beyond, and to the woods north of Hill 268. 20
The 315th Infantry, on the right, had entered Nantillois by 10.50 a. m.,
and after being re-formed and given a short rest on the high ground north
of the town, it advanced on Madeleine Ferme, to the north. Heavy enfilade
artillery fire was met throughout, especial]}- to the south edge of the woods to
the north of Xantillois. The regiment was unable to get through and retired
to the southern slope of Hill 274, bivouacking there for the night. 29
On September 29 the attack was again renewed, with the 316th Infantry
on the left and the 315th Infantry on the right. The artillery fire was very
intense over the entire front, especially on the right sector. The troops began
to attack at 7 a. m. The right battalion of the 310th Infantry succeeded in
reaching the western edge of the Bois des Ogons and in clearing it of machine
guns. The 315th Infantry, on the right, advancing also at 7 a. m., was able to
get into the Bois des Ogons but was unable to hold it, owing to the enemy fire,
and it withdrew again to Hill 274, entrenching on its reverse slope. 29
At 12.30 p. m. the 310th Infantry effectives had been so reduced that it
had not many more than 1,000 men, who had become somewhat disorganized
during the advance. In consequence, the 313th Infantry replaced it, and the
316th Infantry was reorganized into one battalion to follow the 313th at 800
meters (872 yards). This arrangement was completed, but because of the
physical condition of the troops the division commander ordered a withdrawal
to a line running along the northern edge of Bois de Beuge, there to take a
halting position. This was done at about 4 p. m. 20
On September 30 the 79th Division was assigned to the Third Corps.
It was relieved by the 3d Division and was assembled in the region south of
Montfaucon, thereafter being withdrawn to a concentration point south of
the Avocourt — Esnes road- 8 - 29
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The 304th Sanitary Train, less Field Plospitals No. 314 and No. 315, had
encamped at Gedeon about 12,30 a. m. on the night of September 16. On
September 25, 40 litter bearers from each of the 4 ambulance companies were
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION (jOl
assigned to report to the four Infantry regiments to facilitate liaison ami
evacuation. Ambulance Company No. 313 located an advance dressing
station at Morigny. Ambulance Company No. 315 established a dressing
station at Cesar, where United States Army Ambulance Service Section No.
506 was also stationed. Ambulance Company No. 31C operated at Gedeon a
station for the slightly wounded. A group consisting of 1 officer and 10
enlisted men was placed at Camp Seiville by Ambulance Company No. 310
to transfer any wounded from the 40-cm. railroad to the 60-cm. line. Animal
drawn ambulances of this company were stationed at Dombasle to receive
the slightly wounded who were expected to come down on the narrow-gauge
railroad. United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 502 was oper-
ating at Gedeon. where the dressing station of Ambulance Company No. 314
was held in reserve. 30 Field Hospitals No. 314 and No. 315 were stationed at
Les Clairs Chenes, the former operating as a gas hospital and the latter as a
triage. Field Hospital No. 313 was at Gedeon, its equipment loaded on trucks
and ready to move. The personnel and officers of Field Hospital No. 31C were
held in readiness at camp "A." at Gedeon. Although several sick were evac-
uated, there were no casualties or missing prior to the operation. 30
On September 26 Ambulance Company No. 313 and United States Army
Ambulance Service Section No. 502 moved to a point south of the Issues —
Avocourt road where, for 30 hours, they operated and evacuated a dressing
station. Ambulance Company No. 314 moved its dressing station to the post
of command at Zouave and operated there for 24 hours, assisted by United
•States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 506. The position of the 316th
Ambulance Company's advance dressing station was not changed. Field
hospitals made no change in station or capacity. 30
On September 27 the dressing station of Ambulance Company No. 315
and United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 506 were moved to
a point on the Malancourt — Montfaucon road close to the lines. Ambulances
of the 316th Company (animal-drawn) were also brought to this point. In
the afternoon Ambulance Company No. 314 opened a dressing station between
Montfaucon and Nantillois. where it operated until the following morning,
when shelling was so heavy that patients were endangered. The company
was then moved back to Montfaucon. where it operated a station on the
southern edge of the town, having left a detail to complete evacuation from
the former location. Ambulance Company No. 313 operated as before in con-
junction with United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 502. 31
On September 28. as an accumulation of wounded was reported at Fayel
Ferme, the dressing stations of Ambulance Companies No. 313 and No. 315
w'ere ordered there to assist in the care and removal of the wounded, and
later in the morning the whole of Ambulance Company No. 316 joined them
at this place. United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 506 moved
with them, its vehicle being used to evacuate wounded by Ambulance Com-
pany No. 314, and established a dressing station on the southern edge of Mont-
faucon. 31 Field Hospital No. 314 operated at Les Clairs Chenes as on pre-
vious days. Field Hospital No. 315 (triage) also operated at this place until
602
FIELD OPERATIONS
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 603
2.30 p. m., when verbal orders were given for its personnel to move to the
vicinity of Malancourt to establish and operate a triage with the equipment
of Field Hospital No. 313. Officers and enlisted personnel of the latter and
of Field Hospital No. 316 assisted in the operation of this triage, established
the same afternoon at Fayel Ferme. 31 As road congestion was such that great
difficulty was experienced in evacuating patients, field hospitals were over-
flowing, and there were no satisfactory moans of clearing them. Many
patients, however, were loaded on ambulances and trucks, after l>eing given
food and hot drinks, and were started rearward." 1
On September 29 the dressing station personnel of Ambulance Company
No. 314 operated as heretofore, while dressing station personnel of Ambulance
Companies Nos. 313, 315, and 316 worked in conjunction with the field
hospitals at Fayel Ferme. United States Army Ambulance Service Sec-
tions No. 502 and No. 506 were based at this point, to which they evacuated
patients. 31 Field Flospital No. 314 operated as formerly. Assisted by officers
and enlisted personnel of Field Hospitals No. 313 and No. 316, Field Hospital
No. 315 operated the triage at Fayel Ferme until about 3 p. m., at which
time the area was shelled. After 8 or 10 shells had fallen, orders were given
for the evacuation of patients to points of safety. Until this time the hospi-
tals had been greatly congested, for slightly wounded men had walked in
from all directions. This congestion was due chiefly to lack of transportation,
attributable, in turn, to the blocking of ambulances on crowded roads. So far
as possible, patients were loaded on vehicles, but Ambulance Companies
Nos. 313, 315, and 316, as well as hospital personnel, now carried patients
by litter practically day and night until this site was evacuated. Field Hospi-
tals No. 313 and No. 316 were then ordered to evacuate to Malancourt and there
to open a triage, while Field Hospital No. 315. with its personnel and officers,
was ordered to return to Les Clairs Chenes to reestablish the triage formerly
operated there. 32
On September 30 Ambulance Companies Nos. 313. 315. and 316
moved with the triage, from Malancourt toward Avocourt at a point on the
Malancourt — Avocourt road. Ambulance Company No. 314 operated as on
the preceding day. United States Army Ambulance Sendee Sections No. 502
and No. 506 were stalled on the road with all other transportation, the road
being blocked for more than 24 hours. Field Hospital No. 314 operated as
on the previous day. Field Hospital No. 315 was en route from Malancourt
to Les Clairs Chenes. Field Hospitals No. 313 and No. 316. which operated
the triage at Malancourt until about 2.30 p. m.. were then ordered to Avocourt.
A considerable number of patients had been cared for before that hour,
though it had been necessary to bring them in by litter the entire distance
from Montfaucon to Malancourt. At the latter station patients were loaded
on every available means of transportation of whatever character, and litter
bearers were sent in all directions to bring into this triage all patients found
between Montfaucon and Malancourt. 33
604 FIELD OPERATIONS
On October 1 Ambulance Companies Nos. 313, 314, 315, and 316 were
ordered to camp "A." at Gedeon. and United States Army Ambulance Service
Sections No. 502 and No. 506, after unloading patients at evacuation hospi-
tals, were ordered to join them there. Field Hospital No. 314 operated as
on the preceding day. while Field Hospital No. 315 conducted the triage at
Les Clairs Chenes. Field Hospitals No. 313 and No. 310 were ordered to
camp "A.'' at Gedeon. 34
The following notes are copied from the Medical Department report of
the 79th Division: 34
When action began in this sector on September 26 the divisional triage
was about 16 km. (10 miles) behind the lines at les Clairs Chenes, with
ambulance dressing stations as already indicated. Regimental medical units
were apportioned equally to battalions, or as necessity required, usually in the
proportion of two medical officers and as many enlisted men as were needed.
Regimental detachments followed up the infantry, often going over with it.
from one cover to another, so that as soon as a man was injured he was given
first aid, including the application of splints. 34
Road conditions were very bad, the only available evacuation route being
the axial road of the corps, so that with supply trains, ammunition trains,
artillery, etc., ambulances had great difficulty in getting to and from the
front. Dressing stations were located in dugouts or wherever other cover
could be found. Because of congestion on the only available evacuation route,
motor ambulances were held up for 36 and, on one occasion, for 48 hours.
When word was received that a road block was delaying ambulances, animal-
draw r n vehicles were rushed to the scene and, by driving out of the road
through mud, bushes, and shell holes, they expedited to a great extent the
removal of wounded. Because of their ability to go where motor vehicles
could not, these animal-drawn vehicles were instrumental in saving many
lives. 35
All vehicles going to the rear were loaded with the wounded to be taken
to the triage, which had a bed capacity of about 800. A 30-cm. railroad was
also used successfully in evacuating the wounded to this point, where they
were given prompt but sufficient attention and were supplied with hot drinks,
cakes, cigarettes, etc., by the Bed Cross representative stationed there. 35
When the division was withdrawn it left one field hospital at les Clairs
Chenes for two days to care for the wounded who might still be brought in.
Of the 40 original ambulances, only 12 were in condition to make the trip to
the divisional rest area without undergoing preliminary repairs. 30
THE 3D DIVISION
On the night of September 25-26, the 3d Division took position in the
northeast corner of the Foret de Hesse, constituting a portion of the corps
reserve of the Third Corps. 37
On September 29, the division was j:>laced at the disposal of the Fifth
Corps and on the 30th moved into the front line, relieving the 79th Division
MEITSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 605
and taking over its sector. This relief was completed at G p. m.. on the 30th,
with the 5th Brigade in the front line and the 6th Brigade still in reserve.
The 57th Artillery Brigade and the 304th Engineers were attached to I lie
3d Division. On completion of the relief of the 79th Division, the 3d Division
occupied the sector hounded on the cast hy Xantillois — Cunel (inclusive), and
on the west hy Bois de Beuge (inclusive) — Romagne (exclusive). 37
On Septemher 30, the division front extended approximately from Cierges
to Xantillois. 38 During the remainder ( f this phase of the Meuso-Argonne
operation, there was considerahle enemy artillery fire while the division held
this sector, and but little movement of the line, except on the right, where an
advance of 800 meters (S72 yards) was made. 37
MEDICAL DKPAKTMEXT ACTIVITIES
From September IS to 20 the sanitary train of the division remained in
Bois de la Cote, 2 km. (1.2 miles) southwest of Vadelaincourt. 38 Thence it
moved to Bois des Placys and on the 27th to Bethelainville. Train headquarters
remained at the latter place until October 5. hut the ambulance section head-
quarters moved on October 1 to a position 1.6 km. (1 mile) southeast of Mont-
faucon, where it remained until October 4 awaiting further orders."' 1 On
October 1 Ambulance Company No. 5 moved to a point the same distance south
of that town and camped about 500 meters (545 yards) from the road, evacuat-
ing until October 4 a few patients from regimental stations to the hospital
at Souilly. 40 Ambulance Company Xo. 7 bivouacked on the Malancourt —
Montfaucon road, about 1 km (0.G mile) east of the latter place. 40 Ambu-
lance Company No. 2G camped af a point 1 km. (0.G mile) north of Malan-
court. and Ambulance Company Xo. 27 took position in abandoned trenches
south of Montfaucon. All thesr units remained in these locations until October
I. when the second phase of the operation began. Field hospitals had moved
(o Malancourt and were parked there until the 4th. 41
THE 32D DIVISION
On September 2G. the 32d Division was in the Fifth Corps Reserve, and
on that date the plan was to have the division garrison the original front of
the Fifth Army Corps; that is. the old line passing through Xo Man's Land.
Divisional troops were distributed generally convenient for fulfilling their mis-
sions. The division command post was removed to Verrieres Farm. 42
During the night of September 29-30. the movement was begun for this
division to relieve, the 37th Division in the vicinity of Ivoiry. During the day
of the 30th and the night of September 30-October 1. all the elements of the
37th Division were relieved by the 32d Division, so that on the morning of
October 1. the 32d Division occupied the sector, the front line of which ex-
tended about 0.5 km. (0.3 mile) south of the village of Cierges. 42 This line ex-
posed our troops in the open, and in consequence, on October 1. the front line
606 FIELD OPERATIONS
was advanced to a point about 0.5 km. (0.3 mile) north of the village of
Cierges. 42
On October 3, the 32d Division relieved the 91st Division on the left, and it
was relieved, in part, by the 3d Division on the right. 42
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Pursuant to corps orders, Field Hospital No. 128 was established Sep-
tember 25 for corps sick in the vicinity of Ville-sur-Cousances, and a station
for the slightly wounded was opened at Jubecourt by personnel of Field Hospi-
tal No. 128 on the following day. On September 27, Ambulance Company
No. 125 was assigned to temporary duty with the 79th Division, Ambulance Com-
pany No. 126 to the 37th Division, and Ambulance Company No. 127 to the
91st Division, continuing with these divisions until the 32d entered the line,
when they rejoined it. 43 Horse-drawn ambulances were distributed to Infantry
regiments. On September 29, Field Hospital No. 125 was established near
Kecicourt, for slightly wounded and sick. On October 2, Field Hospitals No.
12G and No. 127, which had moved to the vicinity of Varennes, were established
at the southern edge of Bois de Chchomin, southwest of Montfaucon, the
former receiving gassed and sick and the latter functioning as triage and
advance surgical hospital for nontransportable wounded. These hospitals
were kept in juxtaposition throughout this action. Field Hospital No. 128,
for divisional sick, was advanced to Recicourt. On October 4, Field Hospital
No. 125 was ordered to establish in the vicinity of Very, where it acted both
as a hospital for the sick and wounded and as an auxiliary triage for that
part of the division sector. Meanwhile Ambulance Company No. 125 had
established a dressing station at Montfaucon, Ambulance Company No. 126
another at Very, and Ambulance Company No. 127 still another at Ivoiry.
A station for slightly wounded, operated by personnel of Ambulance Com-
pany No. 128, was located near the divisional post control, and later another
was opened near the intersection of the Cheppy — Montfaucon and Very —
Avocourt roads. Subsequently, dressing stations were advanced to La Grange-
aux-Rois Ferme.* 8 Though the wounded who were unable to walk were
usually removed by litter from regimental and battalion aid stations, in many
instances they were brought out by ambulances penetrating to these forma-
tions. 44 Evacuation from the front lines was usually prompt and satisfactory.
In some cases evacuation from divisional to corps and army hospitals was
delayed by traffic conditions and at times by the lack of sufficient ambulances,
but no unusual or extraordinary delay occurred.
Patients received refreshment and were given opportunity to rest at
battalion and regimental aid stations whenever possible. 44
REFERENCES
(1) F. O. No. 31. Fiftli Army Corps, September 21, 1918.
(2) Daily operations reports. Fifth Corps. Meuse-Argonne operation.
(3) Map Showing daily position of front line. Meuse-Argonne operation, G-3, G. H. Q.,
May 24, 1019.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 607
(4) F. O. No. 44 (a), Fifth Corps, September 27, 1918.
(5) Chronological statement of events, Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation.
(6) F. O. No. 45, Fifth Corps. September 28, 1918.
(7) F. O. No. 4!), Fifth Corps. September 29. 1918.
(8) F. O. No. 50, Fifth Corps, September 30. 191S.
(9) F. O. No. 55. Fifth Corps, October 3, 191S.
(10) Report of Medical Department activities, Fifth Army Corps, A. B. F., by Col. \V. It.
Eastman, M. C. corps surgeon, December 10, 1918. 5. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
Ill) Plan of Evacuation of sick and wounded, Fifth Army Corps, September 24. 1918.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(12) Report of Medical Department activities, Fifth Army Corps, A. E. F., by Col. W. II.
East man. M. C, corps surgeon. December 10. 1918, 8. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(13) Memorandum No. 18, Hdqrs., Fifth Army Corps, A. E. F., corps surgeon's office,
September 24, 191S. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(14) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War College
1700 (91st Division).
(15) Report of operations, 91st Division. Meuse-Argonne operation. October 10. 1918.
(16) Report of Medical Department activities, 91st Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. 4. On file. Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(17) Ibid., 5.
(18) Ibid., 0.
(19) Ibid., 20.
(20) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, II. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College
1700 (37th Division).
(21) Report of operations, 37th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation. October 24. 191.8.
(22) Report of Medical Department activities. 37th Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II, 1. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(23) Ibid., Part II. 2.
(24) Ibid., Part II. 3.
(25) Ibid.. Part II. 4.
(20) Ibid., Part II, 5.
(27) Ibid.. Part II, G.
(28) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, D. S. Army. 1917-1919, prepared by the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War College.
1700 (79th Division).
(29) Report of operations, 79th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, November 20, 1918.
(30) Report of Medical Department activities, 79th Division, A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 24. On file. Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(31) Ibid., 25.
(32) Ibid.. 20.
(33) Ibid.. 27.
(34) Ibid.. 1(1.
(35) Ibid.. 11.
(36) Ibid., 12.
(37) Special operations report. 3d Division. Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(38) Report of Medical Department activities, 3d Division, A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 11. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
008 FIELD (ll'KliATIOXS
(39) Ibid., 17.
(40) Ibid., 18.
i 11 1 Ibid., 20.
(42) Report on operations of the -'!-il Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(4. 1 ?) Report of Medical Departmenl activities, 32d Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of tlie division surgeon, undnted, 1'nrt II, 14. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
ill) Ibid., Pari II. 1-">.
CHAPTER XXIII
FIRST PHASE— Continued
THE THIRD CORPS (4TH, 80TH, AND 33D DIVISIONS)
The Third Corps formed the right of the attacking troops. First Army,
in the Meuse-Argonne operation. From left to right it at first consisted of
the 4th, 80th, and 33d Divisions, with the 3d Division in reserve. 1
The following extract from Field Order No. 18, published in advance
of the Meuse-Argonne operation, gives the information and directions most
pertinent to the present purposes :
Field Order P. C. 3d Army Corps, A. E. F.
No. 18. 21 September, 1918—9 hour.
Maps: Verdun-Mezieres, 1:80,000, 1:20,000, 1:80,000, attached.
Troops :
(a) Right Division:
Major Gen. Bell.
33d Div. (less Art.).
52d F. A. Brig.
212th F. A. (Fi\).
1 lin. 308th It. A. L. (Fr.).
1 Air sq. (less 1 flight).
1 Balloon Co.
Co. A, 1st Gas Regt.
('*) Center division:
Maj. Gen. Cronkhite.
80th Div.
228th F A. (Fr.).
1 on. 280th R. A. L. (Fr.).
1 Air flight.
Co. F, 1st Gas Regt.
(c) Left division :
Maj. Gen. Hines.
4th Div.
250th F. A. (Fr.).
1 l)n. 308th R. A. I,. (Fr.).
Troop " I," 2d Cav.
1 Air sqd.
1 Balloon Co.
1. (o) The enemy holds the front from
the Meuse to the Aisne with about five
divisions. He probably holds from the Meuse
to Malnncourt (exclusive) with one division.
Enemy's units are weak, discouraged, in
poor morale, and afraid of Americans (an-
nounce above down to privates). Details of
enemy positions shown on maps furnished.
(6) Allied armies (1st American Army on
the right; 4th French Army on the left)
attack on the front Meuse River (exclusive),
Stiippe River (exclusive), toward Mezieres.
Remainder of 1st American Army will con-
tinue to hold between the Meuse and the
Moselle.
(c) 1st American Army:
Right boundary of attack zone: The
Meuse (exclusive).
Deft boundary of attack zone : West edge
of Foret d'Argonno — Grandpre (lncl.) —
Chattllon Sur Bar (lncl.).
Direction : Buzancy — Stonne.
Objectives: See map herewith."
Troops :
3d Corps (4 divs.) on right.
5th Corps (4 divs.) in center.
1st Corps (4 divs.) on left.
Reserve, 3 divs.
■ The mnp mentioned shows the Third Corps objective to be roughly a line extending from
Xantillois to Gerconrt and north of Bois de Forges ; the army objective within the limits of th«
Third Corps, from Forges to Bois de Itappes.
13576—25 3ft 609
610
FIELD OPERATIONS
(d) The 17th Corps, French (part of 1st
American Army), holds the Verdun salient
east of the Meuse and assists in the neu-
tralization of the heights held by the enemy,
east of the Meuse.
id) Corps Artillery :
Brig. Gen. Gatchell.
289th (Fr.) (less 1 bn.).
407th "
413th "
81st
456th "
1 bn. 308th (Fr.).
2 Air sqds.
1 Balloon Co.
(e) Tanks:
(None.)
(f) Air Service:
1 Air Squadron.
1 Balloon Company.
(g) Reserve:
Maj. Gen. Buck.
3d Div.
(h) Special troops :
See Annexes.
2. (a) This corps (less 1st Div. held as army reserve) will break the hostile posi-
tions and resistance between the Ran de Forges and Bois de Foret, exploit its success by
advancing north from Bois de Foret, and meantime organize the left (west) bank of
the Meuse for defense as the attack progresses northwards. The attack begins D day,
H hour.
(b) Missions of this corps, in detail:
(1) To penetrate promptly the hostile second position, in order to turn Montfaucon
and the section of the hostile second position within the zone of action of the 5th Corps
(center corps) and thereby assisting in the capture of the hostile second position, west
of Montfaucon.
(2) To await arrival of 5th Corps at corps objective (dashed brown line) ; then to
advance in conjunction with 5th Corps to American Army objective (full brown line)
and organize this line for defense.
(3) To reach the American Army objective (full brown line) on the afternoon of
D day and exploit this penetration of hostile third line during the night D/D plus 1.
(4) To conserve its strength and be prepared to advance north of combined army
first objective (Bois de Foret) when ordered by army commander.
(5) To protect right flank of the general attack (organize west bank of Meuse for
defense) .
(6) Corps and divisional artillery to assist, when necessary, in neutralizing hostile
fire and observation from heights east of the Meuse.
Secret.
G-l.
Order No. 18.
1. Railheads:
3d Corps — Nixevilie.
1st Div.— Souilly.
3d Div. — Nixevilie.
4th Div. — Vadelaincourt.
Headquarters Third Army Corps,
American Expeditionary Forces.
France, 21st September, 1918.
Annex #5 & 7 F. O. #18
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 611
33d Div. — Vadelaincourt.
80tli Div.— Nixeville.
* * * * « * *
4. Roads :
(a) Circulation : See sketch. Axial roads : 33d Division — Thierville, Charney, Marre,
Cummieres, Forges; 80th Division — Fromereville, Germonville, Chattancourt, Bethincourt,
Cuisy, Gei-court; 4th Division — Story, Bethelainville, Sivry, Montzeville, Esnes, Malan-
court, Cuisy, Septsarges, Nantillois, Cunel, Bantheville, Amereville. The road from Nan-
tillois to Cunel will also he used by part of the elements of the right division of the 5th
Corps.
(6) Traffic: Control of traffic at H hour by divisions in their respective areas north
of the line Esnes, Chattancourt, Marre (all exclusive). South of this line by the Corps.
Stationary police posts at crossroads, bridges, and road forks. Bicyclists, motor-
cyclists, or mounted police patrols on main roads to control traffic, prevent jams, and pre-
serve road discipline.
* » * * * * *
5. Evacuation :
(a) Men:
Sorting stations (triages).
33d Div. — Glorieux Verdun.
SOth Div. — Fromereville.
4th Div. — Sivry la I'erche.
Evacuations to divisional hospital by divisional ambulance companies. Ambulances
will be augmented upon request to corps surgeon. Evacuation from divisional field hospi-
tals by army ambulance companies as follows:
Seriously wounded : To mobile surgical hospitals at Claire Chene — Bois de Placys —
La Morlette.
Severely wounded : To E. H. No. 4 at Fountain Routon and E. H. No. 8 at Petit
llaujouy.
Sick and slightly wounded (truck cases) : To E. H. Nos. 6 and 7 at Souilly.
Gassed: To gas hospital Souhesme le Grande.
Contagious : To hospital at Benoite Vaux.
Nerves and shock : Psych. Hospital No. 2 at Julvecourt.
As advance progresses corps surgeon will arrange for advance of division field hospi-
tals. He will also arrange for evacuation of corps troops.
(6) Animals: To corps veterinary hospital at Souhesme le Grande by divisions and
(•cups troops. From corps veterinary hospital to army veterinary hospitals at Heippes and
Autrecourt by corps veterinarian.
* * * * * * •
On September 2(5, 1918, the attack was launched along the corps front at
5.30 a. m., from a line which extended approximately from Kegneville, on the
east, to about 1 km. (0.6 mile) southeast of Malancourt, on the west. By night,
the corps line extended generally as follows: From a point about 1 km. (0.6
mile) northeast of Forges, along the Meuse, to the northeast of Dannevoux,
thence to a point about 1 km. (0.6 mile) east of Nantillois, approximately along
the line Dannevoux — Nantillois. 1, -
On September 27 strong enemy resistance developed at Montfaucon and
Nantillois, and on the left of Cuisy woods. For a time the advance was
checked by heavy machine-gun fire all along our front, by well-organized
enemy nests. The left pushed as far forward as Bois du Fays, but because of
heavy casualties withdrew for the night to a position on the reverse slope
612 FIELD OPERATIONS
of Hill 295, a point about 2 km. (1.2 miles) south of that which had been
reached the day before. For the night, the corps line extended approximately
as follows : Vicinity of Cote 295, northeastwardly to the vicinity of Cote 280,
thence through the Bois de la Cote Lemont, thence eastwardly to the Meuse
and southwardly along the west bank of the Meuse to the vicinity of
Forges. 1 ' 2 ' 3
On September 28 the 33d Division, on the right, started a consolidation
of their lines, facing the east along the Meuse south of Vilosnes, and sending
out patrols to reconnoiter for fords along the river front. Despite strongly
organized machine-gun fire, the left and center divisions advanced, and by
night occupied a line approximately as follows: About one-half kilometer
(0.3 mile) northeast of Xantillois, thence through the northern portion of
Bois de Brieulles, thence through Bois de la Cote Lemont, to a position about
one-half kilometer (0.3 mile) in advance of the line of the day before, thence
southeastwardly as of the day before. 1 - 2
On September 29 the 65th Brigade of the 33d Division, which had been
held as divisional reserve, completed its relief of the sector held by the 80th
Division, less its divisional artillery. On the corps left, the advance of our
troops in the direction of Brieulles was halted by the stubborn resistance of
the enemy, who had thrown fresh units in his lines opposite us. Severe flank-
ing machine-gun fire to the left, as well as heavy frontal fire, made further
advance by our troops impossible. The corps line remained practically un-
changed throughout the day except for slight advance in Bois de Brieulles and
Bois de la Cote Lemont. 1 ' 2
From September 30 to October 3 the front line remained unchanged. On
the night of October 3-4 the 79th Division was relieved from duty with the
Third Corps, and proceeded to the zone of the French Second Colonial Corps. 1
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
At this time the office of the corps surgeon was organized and operated us
follows: 4 The corps surgeon made all recommendations concerning medical
department tactics and maintained relations with all division surgeons. His
daily routine was to visit G-l of the corps, the chief surgeon of the army or
his representative, each divisional triage, and, if at all practicable, each divi-
sion surgeon. ° Almost daily he visited the several evacuation hospitals serving
the corps and frequently inspected the divisional sanitary units in addition to
his daily visit to their triages. One assistant to the corps surgeon was in
charge of all Medical Department matters relating to corps troops except
tactical movements of the sanitary train, and another was office executive.'
The latter was occupied chiefly in receiving code reports by telephone and in
giving verbal telephone directions with a view to coordinating the evacuation
service. 4 It was found essential that this officer have a good telephone voice,
excellent hearing, and alert mentality. He had to deal with the difficulties of
battle-field communication, grasp the meaning of faint and obscure messages,
change quickly from one language to another, and be prompt and accurate
in the formulation of orders given. Paper work was reduced to a minimum. 4
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 613
Consultants in medicine, surgery, and orthopedics supervised the pro-
fessional sen-ice in the corps. 4 Enlisted personnel of the office of the corps
surgeon consisted of 2 field clerks, both of whom wore stenographers, 3
sergeants, and about 8 privates or privates, first class. It was found con-
venient to have among the field clerks or office sergeants a draftsman for map
work. 5 Maps were of two kinds: (1) Secret, issued preparatory to battle,
piven to the corps surgeon to study and the details of which he could com-
municate to no one; (2) confidential, knowledge of whose purport was
restricted to those entitled to their official use. These latter, giving vague
battle lines and approximate corps sectors, were posted in the corps surgeon's
office and gave accurate details of the location of medical units of the division,
corps, and army. The routine office maps were: One of the general battle
field, with the lines marked in charcoal, amended daily; the map mentioned
above giving the details of the medical service and the corps circulation map
indicating available roads and the regulations concerning traffic. 5
The staff of the corps had now become a smoothly running machine. By
interviewing daily the chief of G— 1 of the corps, and the chief surgeon of the
army or his representative, the corps surgeon was able to inform each of these
officers what the other was doing or desired to do in matters affecting medical
service. In comparison with the great difficulties encountered in the attack
of July 18 and the lesser ones in the Vesle sector, work with the staff as it
existed in the Argonne was much easier. Friendly intimacy, fostered by the
corps commander, had grown up between the heads of sections and
departments. 6
The few sick from corps troops were sent to the hospitals established for
the St. Mihiel sector, consisting of Mobile Hospital No. 1, at La Morlette (later
at Les Clairs Chenes) ; Mobile Hospital No. 2, at Recourt; Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 8, at Petit Maujouy; Evacuation Hospitals No. 6 and No. 7. at
Souilly; Evacuation Hospital No. 9, at Vaul)ecourt; Army Psychopathic Hos-
pital No. 1, at Benoite Vaux; and to an improvised gas hospital at Rambluzin.
Preparations for the Mense-Argonne operation began immediately after
September 12. Field Hospital No. 332, the only field hospital in the sanitary
train of the Third Corps, was placed at La Morlette, where, augmented by
personnel expert in the treatment of gassed patients, assigned by the First Army,
it was utilized as the Third Corps gas hospital. Mobile Hospital No. 1. which
had been located at La Morlette, caring for nontransportable wounded from
the St. Mihiel sector, moved to Les Clairs Chenes, near Blercourt, where it
served the Third Corps during the early part of the Meuse-Argonne
operation. 7
Mobile Hospital No. 5 was placed at Bois de Placys near Rampont.
Evacuation Hospitals No. 6 and No. 7 remained at Souilly. 7 Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 8 remained at Petit Maujouy to care for the wounded who came
from the eastern part of the sector along the Meuse and from the heights to
the east of that river. Evacuation Hospital No. 4, coming from the Vesle
sector, established itself at Fontaine Ronton. 7
614 FIELD OPERATIONS
Army Neurological Hospital No. 2. at Benoite Vaux, together with the
French hospital for contagious cases at the same place, continued to serve
there throughout the Meuse-Argonne operation. 7
The triage of the 33d Division was placed at Glorieux, in the vicinity of
Verdun, because it was convenient to a well-equipped French hospital at that
place. 8
Great inconvenience was caused by the necessity for preserving absolute
secrecy in regard to the plan of campaign, which required that all troop move-
ments be made at night, and trucks ran only after dark. No tents were
pitched, and all of the thousands of men were required to bivouac in the
woods, sheltered by brush and trees, rather than in their tents. Field hospitals
were dependent largely upon tentage for shelter, and it proved difficult to
maneuver them into position behind troops without being observed by enemy
airplanes. At the time when the 33d Division was narrowing its front next the
Meuse to make more room for the 80th and 4th Divisions, which had taken
over part of the front held by the 79th Division, it was necessary for the field
hospitals to occupy buildings at Sivry-la-Perche and at Fromereville and then
to expand by erecting tents after the battle actually commenced. For the few
days that the 79th Division Avas a part of the Third Corps its triage was at
Les Clairs Chenes. at the site afterwards taken over by Mobile Hospital No. I. 8
Immediately before the advance commenced on September 26, additional
ambulance companies and sections and a number of French omnibuses reported
as additions to the Third Corps sanitary train. 8 These ambulance units were
of different character, two of them being ambulance sections which had been
loaned to the Italian Army and later reborrowed. There were also other
United States Army Ambulance Service sections and some sections which
were purely French. 4 Difficulties arose from time to time in the use of these
organizations, because of the different regulations under which they operated.
French ambulance formations, for instance, had to be dealt with exclusively
through their commanding officers, who were not always at hand, and as their
vehicles were large and heavy there was great difficulty in moving them over
the poor roads. 4 The United States Army Ambulance Service sections were
under rigid regulations from higher authorities to hold their vehicles together
and that certain cars be withheld from service in order that proper routine
repairs might be made and the drivers have needed rest. 4 Necessary as these
regulations were, in the stress of battle it was difficult to apply or even to
remember them, because they were not uniform. 4 The various ambulance
units and ambulances assigned the corps were distributed equitably to the
divisions for service back of their triages, but they remained under the general
control of an officer of the corps medical staff. They were administered as a
part of the corps sanitary train, with headquarters at Sivry-la-Perche, and
a reserve was maintained for use in emergencies. 9
On September 26 its hospitals pitched their tents and expanded to battle
proportions. As the triages at Glorieux. Fromereville, and Sivry-la-Perche
were connected by good roads with the fine highway running from Verdun,
through Blercourt, to Dombasle-en-Argonne, transportation to evacuation
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 615
hospitals was easy after this turnpike was reached, although the total distance
traversed was considerable. 9 Fromereville, where there were sufficient build-
ings for a triage, was particularly easy of access because of a number of good
roads. In the early stages of the offensive, evacuation to Glorieux was pre-
carious because of artillery fire sent across the lines from heights east of the
river, and for this reason the 33d Division for a time had a secondary triage
at Fromereville. The 4th Division also found this a convenient point for
triage at certain times during the early stages of the advance. 9
The situation on the first day was very satisfactory. The 33d Division
reached the Meuse except in one small section, had fewer casualties than had
been expected, and none of the complications in evacuation ' J developed which
had been feared. The 80th and 4th Divisions, on the other hand, had many
wounded in the neighborhood of Septsarges. 9 How to use the roads about
this village and Nantillois and Cuisy, leading to Esnes through either Malan-
court or Bethincourt, became the great problem not only of the medical serv-
ice but of all other departments. This area was in No Man's Land, and
both towns and roads had been destroyed. Esnes was a heap of ruins; the
surrounding hills full of dugouts. 10 Malancourt and Bethincourt were laid
flat, with not a building left standing, the sites of houses occasionally being
marked by pieces of doorsteps or by twisted fragments of iron projecting above
mounds of debris. Torrential rains washed away even the foundations of the
roads, which had been shoveled clear, and deep mud impeded traffic. 10 The
engineers did remarkable work with sandbags. Thousands of men carried
stone from the blackened, shell-pitted fields and ruined villages to the roads,
for food and ammunition had to go forward for the supply of advancing
troops. 10 Wounded from the 79th and 3d Divisions of the corps to the left
obliqued through the Third Corps area, and large numbers of them were
transported by the Third Corps and sorted in its triages. 10 For a short time
subsequent to September 26 it was almost impossible to move the wounded
from Cuisy and Septsarges, and the trip when made consumed much time.
Certain of the ambulances took 23 hours in carrying wounded from Cuisy
to Bethincourt, a 20-minute trip under normal conditions. 10
Many days of the hardest kind of work were required to organize traf-
fic, but considering the conditions under which the corps chief of staff labored
the service of evacuation of wounded received as sympathetic attention as
the situation permitted. 10 Immediately following the advance, the 4th Division
established a field hospital near Cuisy and the 80th Division one at Bethin-
court. Both of these hospitals were under fire. It was difficult to get wounded
out of Cuisy by way of Malancourt and Esnes, and this developed in the 4th
Division a desire to care for its casualties at Cuisy. 10 The demand for
operating teams was insistent. The 80th Division evacuated its wounded to
Bethincourt and thence to Fromereville, detaining at Bethincourt only such
cases as were not fit for removal beyond that point. When the road from
Malancourt to Bethincourt was made passable, the 80th Division removed
from Cuisy by that route the remaining wounded of the 4th Division. 10
During the delay an officer from the corps surgeon's office proceeded to Cuisy
616 FIELD OPERATIONS
and helped greatly with the evacuation service of the 4th Division and in
the organization of emergency operating teams. 10 Astonishing as it may seem,
the wounded who were held at Cuisy much beyond what was considered the
safety limit, including even those developing gas gangrene, showed but small
mortality. 11
THE 4TH DIVISION
On the night of September 25-26 the 4th Division took over the line of
Ruisseau de Forges, north of Esnes, as the left unit of the Third Corps. 12
The division attacked at 5.30 a. m. September 2C. The division was
arranged in a column of brigades, each brigade with its regiments side by
side. The 7th Brigade attacked and encountered little opposition before reach-
ing the corps objective at 12.40 p. m. Here the attacking brigade halted
and entrenched to await the arrival at the corps objective of the division on
the left, when it was to proceed to the army objective. 3
The advance of the 79th Division, on the left, was very much delayed
by enemy resistance at Montfaucon. Consequently the 7th Brigade, 4th
Division, remained at the corps objective until 5.30 p. m. Little advance was
made before dark, owing to increased enemy resistance, and the troops
remained for the night of September 26-27 on the corps objective. 3
The attack was resumed without artillery support at 7.30 a. m. Sep-
tember 27, and the division pushed as far forward as the edge of Bois de
Brieulles on the right and the southern portion of Bois du Fays on the left.
The left suffered heavy casualties, however, and withdrew to a position on
the reverse slope of Hill 295, from which it attacked again the following day
without appreciable gains. During the two days' fighting the line was along
the northern edge of Bois de Brieulles and along the Nantillois — Brieulles
road. 3
On the morning of the 29th the 7th Brigade was relieved in the front
line by the 8th Brigade, the 59th Infantry relieving the 47th on the right
and the 58th Infantry taking the position of the 39th Infantry on the left.
A slight advance was made by the 58th Infantry against machine-gun and
artillery positions. 3
During the four succeeding days no advance was made. The 59th
Infantry cleared the northern part of the Bois de Brieulles of hidden machine-
gun nests and held this terrain against continued and violent artillery and
machine-gun fire. 3
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The sanitary train, less Field Hospital No. 21, which remained at
Lemmes, advanced to Sivry-la-Perche, where Field Hospital No. 33 estab-
lished a triage, Field Hospital No. 19 opened for nontransportable wounded,
and Field Hospital No. 28 for sick.
The ambulance section established a park and dressing station at Esnes. 13
During the first two days' advance the 39th Infantry regimental aid sta-
tion was established in Esnes, battalion stations not being demanded because
of the extreme narrowness of the sector and the depth of the echeloned bat-
PLATE XXXI
MEUSE - ARGONNE OPERATION
FIRST PHASE
FOURTH DIVISION
SEPTEMBER 26 -OCTOBER 3,1918. ir
LEGEND
Tnafc
_.B Drw-IM ftt«ltm
x as Aid st2t»on
± FH KWd IWp'a:
Inf. InfajxJry
O MB'J U«dtcol BofjAv I)«po>
i>«*i fVft-n official m<*f>3 Br*n4**i-U*
Battle lines, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1. 1919. are approximate.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 617
talions. One medical officer with the advancing battalion, with two Medical
Department men to each company, followed the attack as far north as Cuisy,
where a semipermanent aid station was established and maintained. A col-
lecting j:>oint for wounded was also established near Haucourt, about mid-
way between Esnes and Cuisy, to which point the wounded were carried by
litter. The 47th Infantry regimental aid station was located just north of
Esnes and later moved to the barracks known as Bisinark Lager, in Bois de
Septsarges. Not more than 40 patients had been evacuated from the regi-
mental collecting point near Haucourt by ambulance when all movement was
stopped by hostile fire. The only axial road was choked with guns, ammu-
nition trucks, and traffic of all kinds moving in both directions, preventing
all possibility of rapid evacuation of the forward aid stations. 13
It was seen at once that traffic congestion would render prompt evacua-
tion of the wounded to field hospitals at Sivry-la-Perche almost impossible.
Accordingly, Field Hospitals No. 19 and No. 21, with tentage, were advanced
to Cuisy for station, 24 hours being consumed by the trip. Here they rapidly
filled to beyond their capacity because of the impossibility of evacuating to
the rear. Evacuation from the regimental aid station established in Bois de
Septsarges became very slow, on account of the muddy and congested condi-
tion of the roads and also because of intermittent hostile fire. Therefore, the
wounded were held at this station, where facilities for caring for patients were
as favorable as immediately to the rear. In some instances, regimental aid
stations were obliged to retain their wounded 72 hours. 13
The value of animal-drawn ambulances was appreciated at this time,
and it was reported that evacuations from the front to the field hospitals at
Cuisy would have been more rapidly effected and more efficiently performed
by animal-drawn ambulances than by motor vehicles. Although compara-
tively slow, the former could have moved forward with the marching com-
mand for use in collecting the wounded on a difficult terrain without any
established routes, since they were able to move where the motor vehicles
could not. Notwithstanding the difficulties, all ambulances available which
could be spared were filled and were started to the rear in order to clear the
field. They required from 24 to 48 hours for the round trip. Though return-
ing ammunition and supply trucks also were used to the utmost of their
capacity, little impression was made on the large number of wounded
collected. "
The site selected for the triage, at the foot of the southern slope of a hill
near the main cross and axial roads, slightly in advance of the division post
of command and at one time in front of the regimental aid station, was the
only location suitable at the date of selection. Some artillery shortly after-
wards moved to this same site and laid their guns in a semicircle, the hospital
being in the middle. It was inevitable and to a certain extent foreseen that
the hospital would be subjected to enemy fire intended for the Artillery.
This fire became so severe that the hospital was ordered to retire to Bethin-
court, 4 km. (2.4 miles) to the rear. The hospital was plainly marked with
a large red cross and no attempt at camouflage or concealment was made. It
33576—25 10
618
FIELD OPERATIONS
MEUSE-ARGONNB OPERATION G19
was not the opinion, however, of those on the ground at the time that the
hostile fire was directed at the hospital, but. rather, against the artillery,
ration dumps, and roads. 13 Eighteen casualties resulted from intermittent
tiring before the hospital was moved. In evacuating it preparatory to re-
moval, all wounded who were able to walk were started overland under guide
and guard. Some 20 patients were carried on litters, and the remainder not
able to walk were transported by means of ambulances and trucks brought
up during the night. The triage then proceeded to operate at Bethincourt.
but. owing to the proximity to artillery positions and to crossroads, it was
ordered to retire again, this time to Fromereville, 30 km. to the south (18.0
miles). Thereafter, road conditions having been improved by this time, evac-
uations proceeded smoothly, without serious difficulty except that incident
to the long distance which had to be traversed. 14
As a result of experience, the following general plan was adopted and
succesfully applied in the removal of casualties:
1. Company aid. — Two enlisted men, from the battalion medical detach-
ment, were assigned to each company as dressers. First aid with the com-
pany consisted of the application of dressings by one of these men or by the
wounded man himself, either at the place of receiving the wounded or at
the company aid post. Patients able to walk were required to walk to the
battalion station, others were assisted or carried by litter bearers, men de-
tailed for that purpose from each company, or by enemy prisoners. When
the number of wounded was too great to be evacuated promptly by battalion
litter bearers, the battalion surgeon so reported to the regimental surgeon. 14
2. Battalion aid station. — The personnel here was two battalion medical
officers, a dental officer if available, and the enlisted mpn of the battalion
medical department not already assigned with companies. One of these
officers was especially charged with removal of wounded from the front to
this station. The duties of the station were primary or supplementary treat-
ment, return to duty of men needing no further care, and preparation of
others for evacuation, including grouping of those able to walk to the dress-
ing station or to the field hospital. Men unable to walk were removed accord-
ing to practicability of means available, by motor ambulances, animal-drawn
ambulances, or litter bearers belonging to the ambulance company. 15
3. Regimental aid station. — While in a defensive action this station was
ordinarily opened, sometimes to serve as a secondary collecting point from the
battalion aid stations, sometimes solely as a dispensary, in open campaign it
was seldom used, as it was replaced by the dressing station, and the regimental
surgeon was tints released to supervise the care and removal of wounded along
the entire front of the regiment. It was the dutj' of the battalion surgeons to
keep the regimental surgeon informed concerning conditions at their stations,
and of the latter to notify accordingly the commanding officer of the
ambulance company who was evacuating them. 15
Ambulance company bearer detachment. — Litter bearers belonging to the
ambulance company were charged with the duty of maintaining contact witn
the regimental and battalion stations and were immediately available in case
620 FIELD OPERATIONS
evacuation from those stations by ambulance was impracticable or later be-
came so. A litter-bearer detachment consisting" of 1 medical officer, 4 ser-
geants, G dressers, and approximately GO litter bearers was a part of each
ambulance company, and ordinarily worked in the rear of each regiment in
action. 15
Ambulance head. — This was the station farthest forward to which
ambulances could advance; sometimes a battalion aid station. 15
Dressing station. — Here were posted the commanding officer of the am-
bulance company conducting it, and the ambulance company dressing station
detachment. It was the collecting, treatment, and evacuation point for all
casualties from the battalion and regimental stations which it served. The
services here performed were provision of shelter, in case of need administra-
tion of warm drinks, inspection and supplementary treatment of wounds,
treatment of shocked and gassed cases, classification and grouping of cases to
l>e evacuated, and return to the front of men not in need of further care. At
this point reserve litter bearers and ambulances were stationed and here the
ambulance service was regulated. On a narrow front, with a single route of
evacuation when many casualties were expected, three dressing station detach-
ments operated at one point, while the fourth was held in reserve. Wounded
were removed by motor, or less satisfactorily (except in very unusual con-
ditions) by animal-drawn ambulances or trucks, the less serious cases using
the last mentioned vehicles. 15
Ambulance posts. — These were placed where one or more ambulances were
held in readiness to answer calls from advance collecting points. These
vehicles were moved according to evacuation requirements and the condition
of roads. Ordinarily, one was at or on its way to each aid station, collecting
point, or dressing station, as directed by ambulance regulation at the dressing
station. It was a general principle that advance stations must be kept clear
and that transportation should not be permitted to go so far to the rear as not
to be available at the front in case of sudden need. 15
Rest or relay stations. — If the route of evacuation was long or the time
en route protracted, relay stations were provided, where patients rested and
received hot nourishment and any minor medical or surgical attention neces-
sary. The longer the route, the more stations were established. Each acted
as a regulating station, in several senses; i. e., it maintained a steady stream
of evacuations, utilized transport to the best advantage, and assured continuous
care of patients during evacuation. Signs reading "Wounded able to walk."
were posted by the ambulance companies along the routes which these patients
were directed to follow. The duties of stations for slightly wounded,
prescribed in our regulations, were taken over by the triage. 10
Field hospitals. — One hospital was located as far forward as 230ssible, to
receive, classify, and distribute all patients from the front. Xear it were
located a field hospital for nontransportable wounded, another for primary
treatment of the gassed, and still another which received the slightly gassed
and doubtful cases, and the divisional sick. The hospital for nontransport-
ables was supplemented by a mobile surgical unit, as required, and the gas
MEUSE -ARGONNE OPERATION 621
hospital by a mobile degassing unit. Seriously sick were sent to evacuation
or other army hospitals. From the divisional hospitals patients were sent
by corps ambulances, trucks, and busses to corj:>s and army hospitals. 15
Medical supplies. — Medical supplies for the battalion aid stations were
taken forward to the farthest point practicable by the medical carts; but as
these frequently failed of this purpose, it, was directed that each enlisted
member of the regimental sanitary detachment carry as many supplies as
possible, including an extra gas mask. Battalion aid stations were replenished
from the nearest source available — a regimental aid station or infirmary, or the
dressing station. The advance medical supply depot was located usually at
the triage. Medical officers were required to inspect medical combat equipment
daily and promptly to submit informal requests in order that as complete
equipment as possible might be maintained. 16
THE SOTH DIVISION
The 80th Division was assigned to the center of the Third Corps, with
the 33d Division on its right, and the 4th on its left. The division line on the
morning of September 2G, 1918, ran east and west, directly south of the town
of Bethincourt. 17
On the morning of September 26, the 80th Division moved to the attack,
and immediately captured Bethincourt; by noon, it had overcome resistance in
the Bois Jure. The enemy's resistance stiffened in the afternoon, and the
division was subjected to severe artillery fire from east of the Meuse River.
By midnight, the right of the army objective near Dannevoux (Meuse) was
reached, and the right of the division rested on the Meuse, and on the left a
position was organized along the northern edge of the Bois Den Dela and the
eastern edge of the Bois de Septsarges. 17
On September 27, the 318th Infantry and one battalion of the 315th Field
Artillery were placed at the disjoosal of the commanding general, 4th Division,
on the left of the 80th Division, for the purpose of supporting his advance.
On September 28. the 80th Division (less its artillery and the 318th Infantry),
was relieved by the reserve brigade of the 33d Division. On September 29,
all the artillery of the 80th Division was placed at the disposal of the com-
manding general. 4th Division. 17
On October 3, the fronts of the 3d Division, Fifth Corps, and of the 4th
Division. Third Corps, were reduced, and the 80th Division was assigned a
sector between these two divisions, with the Bois des Ogons in its front. On
the same date, the 318th Infantry (less one battalion) and the Artillery
organizations were returned to the 80th Division. 17
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Before arrival in this sector, Ambulance Company No. 317 had been de-
tached and did not rejoin the division until October 16, at Waly. Ambulance
Company No. 318 had been detached on August 24 and did not rejoin until
October 8, at Bethincourt. 18
622 FIELD OPERATIONS
The sanitary train moved from Souilly on September 19 and reached
Fromereville on the 21st. At this time, as stated, it had but two of its ambu-
lance companies, but those detached (No. 317 and No. 318) had been replaced
by United States Army Ambulance Service Sections No. 590 and No. 599, with
40 light ambulances. 19
Ambulance Company No. 319 opened a dressing station at Chattancourt
on September 24, where it received about 35 wounded on the 26th. It then
followed the infantry advance, establishing a station at Bethincourt and
another farther forward in a German dugout. Approximately 150 wounded
passed through these two stations. In the interval September 27-30 dressing
stations were established at Gercourt, between Gercourt and Dannevoux, be-
tween the last-mentioned town and Cuisy, and at Dannevoux, from all of
which, taken together, approximately 650 patients were evacuated by the ve-
hicles of this company and those of United States Army Ambulance Service
sections attached to the division. These were supplemented by a German am-
bulance captured at Gercourt. On the evening of September 30 the company
was relieved and returned to Bethincourt. 19
Unfortunately no history of the activities of Ambulance Company No.
320 in this engagement is available other than a statement that it participated.
In his general discussion of the ambulance company service of the 80th
Division the commanding officer of its sanitary train reports as follows:
Litter bearers from advanced dressing stations collected some wounded from
this vicinity, but most casualties were taken to the dressing stations from the
battalions by litter squads of four men, furnished by the battalion aid sta-
tions or by the ambulance companies. Little or no dressing was done by
litter bearers because of the incessant fire to which they were subjected.
Dressing stations were placed as far forward as 0.8 km. (0.5 mile) from the
line, and were never more than 1.6 km. (1 mile) behind it. During an advance
1 or 2 oificers and 8 enlisted men, with the necessary equipment, would pro-
ceed to the new station as soon as it was ascertained from litter bearers that
battalion aid stations were sufficiently advanced. The practice was to advance
stations by the " leapfrog " method, the rear one closing after the one in ad-
vance had opened. These stations were located in barns, dugouts, or cellars.
There were always tw T o or three officers on duty at each of these formations,
and relays of these and of other personnel were provided for except during
periods of stress, when everyone available was on duty. The condition of
patients received at dressing stations and field hospitals was uniformly good.
Splinting was performed at battalion aid or ambulance company dressing
stations and, if necessary, was rectified at the field hospitals. Ambulances
frequently penetrated to the battalion aid stations, and always reached a point
sufficiently near them to allow easy carriage by litter. At one time two com-
panies ran parallel stations and evacuation routes. Habitually, two com-
panies were held in reserve, but, with fresh personnel, their vehicles assisted
companies on duty. 20
Liaison was poor at first; but after two runners had been assigned from
the ambulance companies to each battalion aid station, it usually was fairly
PLATE XXXI
MEUSE - ARGONNE OPERATION
FIRST PHASE
EIGHTIETH DIVISION X
SEPTEMBER 26 - 28 , 1918.
Scaxe m, KUorrxeters
9E
(Oil
m.hdsWafh 3is SEPT.ae
BatUe lines, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J.Pershing, September 1, 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-AEGONNE OPERATION
623
satisfactory. These runners were charged with the duty of returning to the
ambulance station and notifying it of any move made by the formation to
which they were attached. In a rapid advance, contact by this means left
much to be desired. Then litter bearers were questioned, for information
from the regimental surgeon was often received too late or it was too indefinite
to be of value. The most common defects in liaison service were the
transmission of indefinite messages or their garbling in delivery, with the re-
sult that a battalion surgeon often did not know when a dressing station had
recently been advanced, or the latter was in ignorance of the point to which
a battalion aid post had moved. 20
Supplies to dressing stations and to aid stations were sent forward by
ambulance on requisition, or if an aid station was not accessible by ambulance
they were carried to it by bearers from the ambulance head. 20
Fig. 74. — Field Hospital No. 310, SOth Division, at Bethincourt, Meuse, September 27, 1918
During the period September 22-25 Field Hospital No. 317 was set up
as a gas hospital at Fromereville and Field Hospital No. 318 as a triage. The
other field hospitals were held in reserve until the night of September 27-28,
when they were moved forward and set up at Bethincourt to operate together
as a collecting hospital. These hospitals retained these sites until October 12;
statistics furnished by them in the divisional medical report were to that
date. The organizations at Fromereville were located in buildings on the
outskirts of the ruined town, while those at Bethincourt occupied tentage.
The latter place was shelled daily, but. though one tent was destroyed, no
casualties occurred, as its occupants had been removed when the bombardment
commenced. 21
624 FIELD OPERATIONS
Field hospitals of this division were operated throughout their service
in a manner that was quite unusual, their use being determined by evacuat-
ing facilities. If these were ample, the hospital or group of hospitals farthest
forward operated as a triage and distributed its patients direct to appropriate
evacuation hospitals; but if transportation facilities w T ere inadequate, the
hospital nearest the front acted as a collecting station in which regular hospi-
tal work was done in departments for wounded, gassed, and sick. This hospi-
tal, which was in the shelled area, had receiving and evacuating departments,
but performed only sufficient paper work to keep a record of the cases that
passed through it or died. Dressings were applied here and food administered,
but operations were reduced to a minimum. 22
It was the practice to utilize the triage and collecting hospitals in the fol-
lowing manner: The triage was the unit first established and, accommodating,
as it did, all kinds of cases, continued to act as a triage after hospitals were
needed nearer the front. One or, if need be, two of these were sent forward
when necessary to act as a collecting station. When a still farther advance was
necessary, the former collecting station became the triage and the former triage
moved in advance of them to become a collecting station. 23 Normally the
triage consisted of 2 hospitals, usually combined. While 2 of the 4 divisional
hospitals were furnished with British equipment and 2 with American, their
organization and administration were uniform. 24 Usually their tents for
patients were pitched in two rows of three tents each, with an open space be-
tween them. The middle tent of the front row was the receiving ward, and
all patients passed through it for antitetanic serum, examination, and classifica-
tion. At this point a medical officer examined and assigned the. patients, a
dental surgeon administered serum. 2 clerks made records, and litter squads
of 8 to 1G men were in readiness. This tent had a surplus of litters stacked in
front of it and a pile of blankets to replenish ambulance supplies. On one
side of the receiving tent was the evacuating ward for slightly wounded, re-
ceiving patients from its rear and discharging them to the front, while on the
other side of the receiving ward was a tent used as the evacuation ward for
litter cases. In the rear of this line was a gas ward with a small bath tent
attached, a ward for seriously wounded and shock cases, with operating facili-
ties, and a ward for the sick and for overflow from the other tents. Ample
supplies were kept on hand. Kitchens furnished not only diets but also some
2.000 or 3,000 meals a day to exhausted troops. 23
The dead were buried under the supervision of the chaplain.
The interior service of the hospital was so organized as to maintain
personnel in groups whose members were accustomed to one another's methods.
Day and night details were on duty at receiving and forwarding departments,
and an operating team of 2 officers and 24 men was always available. Ward
tents were so arranged that at one end patients were placed on litters, resting
on trestles, near a supply of easily accessible dressings. After being dressed,
they were then placed along the sides of the ward tent. Patients were not
usually held longer than from one to three hours, and none longer than nine
hours, the latter being the cases received during the night and evacuated at
.5 or 6 o'clock the next morning. About 200 cases could be cared for at one
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPEKATIOISr 625
time in two field hospitals combined, and in emergencies probably 2,000 daily.
though the number actually received never exceeded 900 in one day.-"'
Evacuation by intradivisional transport ended at the field hospitals, but,
as corps ambulances were not always sufficient for the removal thence of
even the more seriously wounded, returning trucks were used to transport to
the evacuation hospital all slightly wounded and slightly gassed cases. Large
trucks could remove 7 litter cases or 20 sitting; smaller ones, 3 litter cases.
All wounded sent to the field hospitals were evacuated. 2 "
THE 33D DIVISION
On September 5, the 33d Division began its movement, from the vicinity
of Tronville-en-Barrois, where it had been concentrated, to the Verdun sector,
where it relieved the French 120th Division and the right regiment of the
French 157th Division, on the nights of September 7, 8, and 9.- T
At the opening of the Meuse-Argonne operation, the 33d Division, sup-
ported by the 52d Field Artillery Brigade, formed the right of the Third
Corps. Here, its line ran from a point east of Bethincourt, east to the Meuse
River, to a point just north of Kcgneville, 10 km. (6.2 miles) north of
Verdun. 27
The division attacked on the morning of September 26, at 5.30. One
regiment (132d Infantry) gained the objective by 10 a. m. ; and some other
units reached their objectives before noon. In its advance, the division cap-
tured Forges and the formidable Bois de Forges. 27 ' 28
From September 27 to October 7, 1918, both inclusive, the operations of
the 33d Division on the west bank of the Meuse were characterized by no
engagements of major importance. During this period, however, the troops
were subjected to incessant artillery fire and gas from both banks of the
Meuse. 27
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
In the early part of September, the sanitary train was located at Fromere-
ville and at Sivry-la-Percbe, with the supply unit at the latter point. 29 On
September 10, the train moved to Thierville and Glorieux, in the vicinity of
Verdun, and the triage was established in French barracks at Glorieux. 3 "
.Medical Department formations were then located as follows, in preparation
for the operation :
Dressing station, Alexandre.
Belay and car post, Cumieres.
Dressing station and car post, Chattancourt station.
Collecting post for walking wounded, Marre.
Field Hospital No. 131, triage, Glorieux.
Field Hospital No. 132, nontransportable cases. Glorieux.
Field Hospital No. 130, gas hospital, Glorieux.
Field Hospital No. 129, in reserve, at Thierville.
Division surgeon's office, Thierville.
Headquarters, sanitary train, Thierville. 31
626 FIELD OPERATIONS
The following method of evacuation was used : Carry to battalion aid
post, by battalion litter bearers; thence by hand carry to nearest car post, by
ambulance company bearers; by motor ambulances to triages.
Battalion aid posts throughout were close to or in advance of battalion
headquarters; never farther to the rear. 32 Wounded usually were received at
these jDOsts in good condition, the most serious cases, generally speaking, be-
ing those that had been gassed. As a rule, seriously wounded were not held
hero longer than 30 minutes, but a few were so gravely wounded that death
supervened very shortly. Antitetanic serum was administered at these stations.
and all fractures were splinted except those with such extensive wounds of the
buttocks that splinting was impossible. Casualties from gas were caused more
frequently by vesicating than by asphyxiating gases. Psychiatric cases were
few. Liaison would have been better but for the fact that two of the ambu-
lance companies belonging to the division had not rejoined it and those which
remained had been depleted of their commissioned personnel in order to meet
needs in regiments. 32
During this attack it was clearly demonstrated that the medical detach-
ments of Infantry regiments could not function in the dressing of patients
and at the same time carry litters. In order to insure prompt evacuation, it
was found necessary to have the required number of bearers furnished by
battalion commanders. 81
Walking wounded sent to Marre went thence by trucks to the triage.
Evacuation from the triage to evacuation hospitals was carried on under corps
arrangements by evacuation ambulance companies.
In spite of the fact that the 33d Division did not have its full quota of
ambulances, evacuation was conducted successfully, through the untiring
efforts of all ranks of the sanitary train. In addition to the wounded of this
division, disabled from other divisions Mere received at its triage, together
with many German prisoners. 31
Medical detachments of Infantry regiments worked for several days and
nights without cessation. Following closely in the wake of advancing troops,
they established aid stations and dressed wounded under heavy shell fire from
three sides, sustaining numerous casualties. 31
Sanitary Train
On September 28, Field Hospital No. 128 was sent hurriedly, with one
ambulance to be used for emergency service, to a point northeast of Bethin-
court, where it was ordered to establish a collecting and dressing station. It
was to receive patients direct and also from the dressing station of Ambulance
Company No. 130, at Cote 281, and was to evacuate either to the triage direct,
or, if necessary, via the dressing station at Cumieres. Ambulance Company
No. 130 was notified to evacuate to this hospital (Field Hospital No. 129) if
unable to evacuate direct to the triage. Field Hospital No. 132 took over the
triage on September 30, and Field Hospital No. 131 went into reserve. The
director of field hospitals was ordered to supplement, if necessary, the per-
sonnel of Field Hospital No. 132 from that of No. 130 or from No. 131."
PLATE XXXIV.
MEUSE - ARGONNE
OPERATION
FIRST PHASE
THIRTY-THIRD DIVISION
SEPTEMBER 86 - OCTOBER 3,1818.
Scale in. Kilometers
A Trm*f
+ D» DnwCnf statu*
+ AC AjnJmlmvt Comnanv
* Fll K)«U Ilcxntm '
OUbD Mrdtc»l "Sapptv Dfpot
Ltramr\ '»<w, offtc.aL mafti Brantblrii
A>tt*(Ofl1 -,' •!'-/,-:«' Urttta from ryoO'
' CA* Jaffa* a* M* furtf-tltUrt ftru
Battle lines, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1 , 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 627
During the advance from September 26 to 30, Field Hospital No. 131 had
cared for several thousand patients and had promptly evacuated them. 31
After the advance, the following medical arrangements were made by the
division surgeon to supersede those of September 26, the latter no longer being
applicable :
Left
Right
176—827.
186—827.
195—820.
167—821.
168—822.
163—809.
183—813.
182—817.
205—758.
Car posts _
Do.
Do.
207—775.
207—775.
207—775.
216—745.
Chattancourt station.
(Relay).
Dressing stations Gercourt Drillancourt
Cote 281 Cumicres.
Holding parties were left at Esnes, La Claire, Alexandre, and
Montzeville. 31
REFERENCES
(1) Operations of the Third Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation, November 25, 1918.
(2) Map showing daily positions of front line, Meuse-Argonne operation, G-3, G. H. Q.,
May 24, 1919.
(3) Operation report, 4th Division, Mense-Argonne operation, December 10, 1918.
(4) Report of Medical Department activities, Third Army Corps, by Col. James L.
Bevans, M. C, corps surgeon (undated), 29. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(5) Ibid., 30.
(6) Ibid., 26.
(T) Ibid., 2T.
(8) Ibid., 28.
(9) Ibid., 31.
(10) Ibid., 32.
(11) Ibid., 33.
(12) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared by the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College
(1700, 4th Division).
(13) Report of Medical Department activities. 4th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon (undated), Part I, 7. On file. Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(14) Ibid., Part I, 8.
(15) Ibid., Part I, 9.
(16) Ibid., Part I, 10.
(17) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, IT. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared by the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War
College (1700, 80th Division).
(18) Report of Medical Department activities, 20th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon (undated), Part I, 10. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(19) Ibid., Part I, 14.
(20) Ibid., Part I, 20, 21.
' Figures represent coordinates on reference maps. Numbers on the left of the dash represent lines running north and
south; numbers on the right of the dash, lines running east and west. Intersection of lines gives position.
628 FIELD OPERATIONS
(21) Ibid., Part I. 11, 12.
(22) Ibid., Part I. 24.
(23) Ibid., Part I, 25.
( 24 ) Ibid., Part I, 20.
(2.")) Ibid., Part I, 25, 26.
(26) Ibid., Part I, 21.
(27) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared by tlie Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College 1700 (33d Division).
(25) Operations of the 33d Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, March 17. 1919,
(29) ReiHirt of Medical Department activities, 33d Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon (undated), Part I, 4. On file, Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(30) Ibid., Part I, 5.
(31) Ibid., Part I, 6.
(32) Ibid., Part II. 20.
(33) F. O. No. 10. Hdqrs., 108th Sanitary Train, September 28. 1918.
CHAPTER XXIV
SECOND PHASE"
ARMY OPERATIONS
The plans called for a concerted attack by the Third and Fifth Corps to
carry Cunel and Koniagne heights. Meanwhile the First Corps was to assist
the Fifth Corps with its right division, seize the eastern crest of the Argonne
with its center, so as to cut off the enfilade fire from that direction, and follow
up with its left.
The attack was made at 5.30 a. m., October 4, on a front of 41 km. (25.4
miles) and continued on the 5th. It was only a partial success. The Third
Corps j>enetrated the Bois du Fays and the Bois des Ogons, which is the
southern portion of the woods south of Cunel, but was unable to clear the
northern part of these woods, known as the Bois de Cunel, or to make farther
advance. The Fifth Corps carried its line through Gesnes to the foot of the
southern slopes of the heights of Koniagne. The 1st Division, on the right
of the First Corps, broke the hostile defenses at Exermont and drove the
enemy north of the ridge east of Fleville. The center division, the 28th, ex-
tended along the Aire River, keeping connection with the 1st Division. Little
progress was made in the Argonne.
In the meantime the French Fourth Army had been making good progress
and had reached Vaux-les-Mouron, whence its right bent back toward the
American left. While the enemy was still in possession of the larger part
of the Romagne and Cunel heights, the two armies, in conjunction, were in
a position to undertake the clearing of the Argonne.
On September 30 Marshal Foch had directed that the attack be extended
east of the Meuse and, at the same time, that the French Army take over the
attack on the east side of the Argonne.
On October 2 General Pershing suggested certain objections to this latter
feature of the plan. This correspondence resulted in an arrangement whereby
the American First Army was to continue its present attack and also undertake
the active operations east of the Meuse. The object here was to clear the heights
of Dun-sur-Meuse and Damvillers. relieving our troops from the flank fire
across the river.
On October 7 the First Corps began the final operation for clearing the
Argonne, attacking the crest of the ridge south of Cornay. The 1st Division,
'in the right, remained in position but continued exploitation. The 77th. on
the left, was held in readiness for an advance. In the center, the 82d. assigned
"Abstracted from Major Operations of the American Expenditionary Forces in France, 1917-1918.
Prepared in the Historical Section. Army War College.
630 FIELD OPERATIONS
to the corps for this attack, was inserted in the line, relieving one brigade of
the 28th and taking over that part of the front between Chehery and Fleville.
An attack by the 28th and 82d Divisions, directed almost due west, was
launched at 5 a. m. without artillery preparation, and Chatel Chehery and
the adjacent hills were taken. A firm footing was thus gained on the eastern
crest; through the forest the line ran east and west about 2 Ian. (1.2 miles)
north of Binarville. The attack was renewed the next morning, and some
farther progress was made. On the night of October 8-9 the relief of the 28th
Division by the 82d was completed. The advance continued, and by night the
line ran east and west through Cornay. The next day the forest was clear.
This attack was an exceedingly difficult and critical operation. The ad-
vance was from the river bed straight up against precipitous heights 300 feet
high, and, moreover, the sharp bend in the American lines at Fleville exposed
the whole attack to enfilade from the north.
The next problem was the Bois de Romagne, which had to be taken by
direct frontal attack. This was made on the 9th by the Fifth Corps, rein-
forced by the 1st Division and a brigade of the 91st. The country was rough
and difficult and the enemy's resistance, especially by machine guns, was very
strong; but steady progress was made, and on the 10th the line had been
carried forward to the Romagne — Sommerance road.
In the meantime the Third Corps had advanced through the Bois du
Fays and begun to penetrate the Bois de Foret. On the night of October 11
the front was almost straight from the northern tip of the Argonne directly
east to the Meuse. On the 12th and 13th the army held these positions and
prepared for further attack.
The attack east of the Meuse was opened on the 8th by the French
Seventeenth Corps. Its line ran about east from the river at Samogneux;
the American 33d Division, then of the Third Corps, was attached to the
French Seventeenth Corps for this purpose, connected across the river, and
held the left bank downstream to Dannevoux. The French Seventeenth Corps
was to start first, the 33d Division crossing the river and joining in when the
advance had progressed far enough to clear the crossing and make room for
more troops on the left. The right of the line Mas held by the French 26th
Division and the left by the French 18th Division, with one brigade of the
American 29th attached.
The attack began at 5 a. m. The right made little progress, but the left
gained some ground; and at 9 a. m. three battalions of the 33d Division, with
machine-gun companies, crossed the river at Brabant and Consenvoye on
bridges built by the engineers. This work was begun during the night and
finished in the morning, under fire. For several days the fighting continued
in the woods north of Consenvoye, but by the 16th these woods were cleared
and the line was nearly as far advanced as that west of the Meuse.
The operations were continued, and by the end of the month had been
carried to the high ground between Sivry and Wavrille. This attack broad-
ened the field for our operations, compelled the enemy to disseminate his
reserves, and made it more difficult for him to see where our heaviest blows
PLATE XXXV.
Battle lines, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J. Pershing, September I, 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 631
were to fall. The narrowness of the ridge limited the number of troops that
could be used there; this and the cross fire or hostile artillery from the north
of Romagne and Damvillers made it impossible to clear the ridge entirely at
this time.
To return now to the main operation of the American Army west of the
Meuse, it will be remembered that on October 11 the line had been pushed
entirely through the Argonne and reached nearly straight east across the
Meuse. Important changes now took place, a separate American group of
armies being organized.
The new Second Army, General Bullard, took over the front from
Fresnes-en-Woevre eastward on October 12. On October 16 General
Pershing turned over the command of the First Army to General Liggett,
established his own headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois, and took command of
the group.
Meanwhile a new general attack had been made. The French Seven-
teenth Corps was directed to continue its offensive east of the river. The
Third and Fifth Corps were to penetrate the enemy's third position east and
west of the Bois de Bantheville and the Bois de Romagne, connect their
attacks near the Grand Carre Farm, at the north end of the Bois de Banthe-
ville, and continue north. The First Corps w ? as to hold with its left and push
its right forward in conjunction with the Fifth Corps. The French Fourth
Army was to attack on the same day, to outflank the enemy opposing our left.
The attack was made on the 14th, 15th, and 16th of October, on a front
of 49 km. (30.4 miles). Not much progress was made, in general, by the
First Army. The French Fourth Army crossed the Aisne and reached the
Grand Pre-Olizy road, but was driven back to Les Terms.
On the 16th General Pershing issued instructions redefining the mission
of the First Army. According to these, the enemy w 7 as to be driven to the
east and across the Meuse. the advance being in concert with the French Fourth
Army. The first mission was to clear the woods east of the Aisne and north
of the Aire — the northern extension of the Argonne — and thus flank the
enemy's position on the Aisne. But the hard and continuous fighting was
telling on the troops, and there was need for rest and reorganization; so it
was decided that the next general attack would not be made for some
two weeks.
The First Corps, in conjunction with the French Army, undertook opera-
tions to clear the Bois des Loges and the southern part of the Bois de
Bourgogne. For 10 days the fighting here was severe, but by October 26,
the 78th Division had gained a footing on the high ground and in the
woods east of Talma Farm, and by the 27th had driven the enemy from the
whole Grandpre region.
AVhile the enemy's third position had been pierced on Cunel and Romagne
heights, there was no good line of departure here for a general attack. The
Fifth Corps was therefore called upon to secure the northern edge of the
Bois de Bantheville and the Third Corps to clear Cunel heights. These
6.32 FIELD OPERATIONS
operations were carried out successfully. East of the Meuse the advance
was continued, forcing the enemy to employ fresh troops there.
On October 21 Marshal Foch outlined the combined mission of the French
Fourth and American First Armies. On the same day General Pershing
issued instructions for the coming general attack. The elate was first set for
October 28, but was changed later to November 1.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The methods utilized in the first phase of this operation for the care and
evacuation of the wounded were continued, and with increased experience were
improved during its second phase.
During this phase of the operation army Medical Department units con-
tinued distributed as at the commencement of the first phase, with the following
exceptions: 1 Evacuation Hospitals No. 3 and No. 5, with their ambulance
companies, had been transferred on October 1 to the service of the 2d and 36th
Divisions in the French Fourth Army, operating in the Champagne sector
west of Foret d'Argonne and north of Chalons-sur-Marne. The first men-
tioned hospital was located in the vicinity of Mont Frenet, Marne, from
October 1 until it had cleared its patients, moving to Fontaine Routon on
November 10. Evacuation Hospital No. 5 was located at La Veuve, Marne,
until October 23, when it moved to Staaden, Belgium, to join Mobile Hospital
No. 9 in tlie service of the 37th and 91st Divisions then operating under French
command. Mobile Hospital No. 7, recently equij^ped in Paris, joined at La
Veuve on October 3, was moved to Forme Suippe on October 7, functioning
there until October 15 and moving then to Somme-Py. These places were
in the vicinity of Mont Frenet. On October 7 Evacuation Hospital No. 11
was moved from Villers-Daucourt to Les Islettes. Evacuation Hospital No.
15 moved from Revigny to Glorieux. Verdun, where, on October 13, it was
established to receive wounded from the Third Corps and to assist in caring
for wounded from the French Seventeenth Corps, which on October 8 had
begun an attack east of the Meuse.
Personnel of Evacuation Hospitals Nos. 20, 22, and 23, which arrived
in the interval October 1-7. were distributed among other hospitals which were
being taxed to the utmost. The personnel of Evacuation Hospital No. 21
on its arrival (October 17) was assigned to service with Army Eed Cross
Hospital No. 110 at Villers-Dauccurt. 2
Army medical units during the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne opera-
tion were located as follows, their arrival at the locations mentioned being on
the dates noted : 3
Evacuation Hospital No. 4, Fontaine Eouton, September 14, moved
to Fromeieville, Meuse, October 29.
Evacuation Hospital :
No. 6, Souilly, Meuse, August 28.
No. 7, Souilly, Meuse, August 28.
No. 8, Petit Maujouy, Meuse, August 28.
No. 9, Vaubecourt, Meuse, August 30
MEUSE-ARGOJSTNE OPERATION 633
No. 10, Froidos, Meuse, September 20.
No. 11, Brizeaux-Forestieres, Meuse, September 21.
No. 14, Villers-Daucourt, Marne, September 21, moved to Les
Islettes, Meuse, October 7.
No. 15, Bevigny, Meuse, September 21, moved to Glorieux,
October 13.
No. 16, Bevigny, Meuse, October 15.
No. 20 (personnel only), Souilly, October 1.
No. 21 (personnel only), Villers-Daucourt, Marne, October 17.
No. 22 (personnel only), Souilly, Meuse, October 7.
No. 23 (personnel only), Souilly, Meuse, October 7.
Army Bed Cross Hospital —
No. 110, Villers-Daucourt, September 24.
No. 114, Fleury-sur-Aire, September 18.
Mobile Hospital —
No. 1, Les Clairs Chenes, Meuse, September 24; moved to
Fromereville, October 9, and to Esnes, Meuse, October 27.
No. 2, Chateau de Salvange, Meuse, September 24.
No. 4, La Grange-aux-Bois, Marne, September 29, moved to
Cheppy, Meuse, October 27.
No. 5, Les Placys, Meuse, September 24.
No. 6, Deuxnouds, Meuse, September 29, moved to Varennes,
Meuse, October 17.
No. 8, Deuxnouds, Meuse, October 15.
Neurological Hospital —
No. 1, Benoite Vaux, Meuse, September 5.
No. 3, Nubecourt, Meuse, September 20.^
Evacuation Ambulance Company —
No. 1, Souilly, September 21.
No. 2, Fontaine Bouton, Meuse, September 14, moved to
Fromereville, Meuse, October 29.
No. 5, Souilly, Meuse, October 23.
No. 6, Les Islettes, Meuse, October 11.
No. 8, Fleury-sur-Aire, Meuse, September 20.
No. 10, Froidos, Meuse, September 23.
No. 12, Vaubecourt, Meuse, September 23.
Base Hospital No. 83, personnel only. Bevigny, September 20.
Gas Hospital —
No.2, Julvecourt Meuse| 0perated by Ambulance Company
No.4Earecourt. Meuse No _ 10g to Q ctober 12
-No. 1, Kambltizin, Meuse J
No. 3, Verrieres, Marne.
* After evacuation of war neuroses from the field hospitals to the neurological units at Nubecourt
and Benoite Vaux they were again transferred to Base Hospital No. 117, at La Fauche. Every effort
was made to prevent the association of these cases with patients who had been actually gassed or
with the wounded.
634 FIELD OPERATIONS
Contagious hospital, Verrieres, Marne.
Contagious hospital. Bcnoite Vaux (French).
Ambulance Company —
No. 42 (personnel only), Fleury-sur-Aire, October 29.
No. 108 (personnel only), Rambluzin.
No. 120, Villers-Daucourt, Marne, September 26.
Field Hospital —
No. 41, Villers-Daucourt, Marne, September 21.
No. 42, Cheppy, Meuse, October 31.
Medical supply depot, Varennes, Meuse, October 10: Souilly, Meuse.
September 14; Vaubecourt, Meuse, September 16; Les Islettes.
Meuse, October 4; Fleury-sur-Aire, Meuse, October 1.
The following units were detached and assigned to the Second Army on
October 12 : 2
Evacuation Hospital —
No. 1, at Sebastopol.
No. 2, at Baccarat.
No. 12, at Royaumeix.
No. 13, Justice group, Toul.
Mobile Hospital —
No. 3, at Rosieres.
No. 7, Somme-Py (on November 7).
No. 39, at Aulnois.
Provisional Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 1, Sebastopol.
Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 4, Royaumeix.
It had become evident that it would be impossible to evacuate casualties
by any road straight through the Fifth Corps sector and that oblique evacua-
tion to the First and Third Corps sectors was the only recourse. Though the
use of such routes of evacuation violated an established principle, there was
no alternative. 2
During October the number of evacuations was greatly increased on
account of a severe influenza epidemic. At this time influenza attacked the
First Army, whose evacuation service was already overburdened, and for a
while it appeared that its ravages would seriously affect military operations
both by depletion of the troops and by overwhelming the sanitary formations.*
The methods followed were sorting, as carefully as though they were
wounded, all men who showed signs of influenza, masking all who were
affected, transporting uncomplicated cases in ambulances carrying no other
class of patients to a special hospital at Revigny set apart for them, and
similarly removing all cases evidencing the slightest signs of pneumonia to a
special hospital hastily established at the village of Brizeaux, under the charge
of expert clinicians, and keeping the unaffected in the open air while influenza
was widespread. The morbidity and mortality rates from this epidemic at
the front were actually lower than those of troops in the training areas and
in the base sections. 2
MEUSE-ARG0NNE OPERATION 635
The influenza epidemic did not stop military operations, but it slowed
them perceptibly; then when its peak was passed the renewed vigor of the
operation increased the already heavy strain upon the Medical Department. 4
It was the established military practice to withdraw a division upon signs
of distress and to replace it with a fresh one, if necessary, from the Second
Army, not yet engaged in an operation. This reduced the number of men
who otherwise would have required hospitalization because of exhaustion, a
very fortunate thing for the Medical Department. A rest camp for the re-
ception of 5.000 patients from the First Army was proposed to care for men
who would be fit for duty within a few days, but its establishment was pre-
vented by lack of Medical Department personnel. Such a camp would have
greatly relieved the difficulties of evacuation from hospitals in the army area,
lessened congestion in base hospitals, and secured the retention at the. front
of many thousands of effectives who were lost to their organizations for several
weeks by reason of having left the zone of the armies. The need was met to
a certain extent by the corps hospitals, which received and retained patients
returnable to duty within a few days. 4
For this, as well as for other reasons, close liaison was necessary between
the chief surgeons of the corps, represented by the commanding officer of their
sanitary trains, w T ith the divisional hospitals on the one hand and the evacua-
tion hospitals on the other. The great number of evacuation and special
hospitals in the army area increased the difficulties of ambulance evacuation
and caused confusion, delays, and waste of transportation. At one time, in
October. 1918, there were 11 hospitals in different places draining the front
of one corps. Hospitalization resources and the military situation often deter-
mined the location of these units, but experience in this operation demon-
strated the desirability of grouping hospitals wdierever practicable, and con-
demned the establishment of separate institutions for special classes of cases.
The ideal evacuation arrangement was attained when the number of evacua-
tion points was minimized and evacuation hospitals generalized: that is, pre-
pared to receive all kinds of casualties. In them the wounded were sorted
under more favorable circumstances than farther forward and were more"
readily evacuated to base hospitals. 5
Reports from evacuation hospitals, formerly called for daily or twice
daily, later were required every four hours. These were on prescribed forms,
specifying whether patients were or were not coming in rapidly, whether the
hospital making the report could or could not take care of the cases being
received, and whether it would or would not have to evacuate in a few hours. 5
In the week of October 17-23, 29,426 evacuations were made on 74 hos-
pital trains. These figures equal the total number of French evacuations for one
month during the most intensive fighting of the Verdun defensive of 191G. In
one day — October 17 — 5.910 evacuations were made by train. For a part of
the Meuse-Argonne operation, evacuations were made at the rate of a division
a week. 5
636 FIELD OPERATIONS
EEFEEENCES
(1) Medical activities in the Zone of the Armies, by Colonel A. N. Stark, M. C. (undated),
14, On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(2) Ibid., 15.
(3) Report on Medical Department units, First Army, by the chief surgeon, First Army,
February 6, 1919. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Medical activities in the Zone of the Armies, by Colonel A. N. Stark. M. C. (undated),
10. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(5) Evacuation system of a field army, by Colonel C. R. Reynolds, M. C, undated. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
CHAPTER XXV
SECOND PHASE— Continued
FIRST CORPS
On October 4, an attack was launched by the First Corps with, from
left to right, the 77th, 28th, and 1st Divisions, all with four regiments in line.
The 82d Division (less Artillery), in the vicinity of Varennes, and the French
"ith Cavalry at Le Claon, were held in reserve. With no artillei - y preparation,
the Infantry, accompanied by tanks and preceded by a rolling barrage, left
the point of departure at 5.25 a. m. The 1st Division, overcoming strong
resistance, captured Montrefagne woods. The 28th Division advanced its
right brigade at Chehcry on the east bank of the Aire, but its left brigade
and the 77th Division, viciously opposed by machine guns, and under a
heavy connterbarrage which inflicted serious losses on them, were unable to
advance. 1
On October 5, the 1st Division, after an advance of 2 km. (1.2 miles)
succeeded in taking Ferme d'Arietal and in occupying Hill 240 in force. 1
During the night October 6-7, the Bois de Money was cleared of the enemy
by our troops who had worked around from the west. The 82d Division,
with Artillery (which had rejoined the division at Varennes on the afternoon
of October 5), had been brought up to the front line during the night. 1
On October 7, at 5 a. ni., the 82d Division attacked on the 28th Division
front, between Fleville, exclusive, and Chatel Chehery. Between Chatel
Chehery and Apremont one regiment of the 28th Division was in line and
aided in this flank attack on the forest. During the afternoon. Hills 180.
223. 244. and Chatel Chehery were captured, and the enemy was forced to
evacuate Le Chene Tondu, but clung with great tenacity to the high ground
above Chatel Chehery and Cornay, causing heavy losses among our assaulting
troops. At 5 p. m., the 1st Division passed under the temporary command
of the Fifth Corps. 1
On Octolxjr 8, the attack was resumed, and resulted in moderate irregular
advances. 1
Early in the morning of October 9. a brigade of the 82d Division, held in
reserve, was brought up. and relieved the 28th Division, which moved to the
vicinity of Varennes. 1
On October 10, one regiment of the 82d Division relieved elements of the
1st Division east of the Aire on the line Fleville — west edge of Bois de Boyon:
and the 78th Division, which had been in the First Corps area for several
days, was assigned to the corps and moved up to the front area. During the
nipht October 10-11, the enemy withdrew all but a few units to the north
bank of the Aire River, and thence their line ran east to the woods north of
Sommerance. During all these operations the advance was greatly hindered
by the destruction of roads in the northeastern part of the Argonne. 1
637
638 FIELD OPERATIONS
At this period it was considered probable that the enemy line might be
broken, in view of which eventuality the French 5th Cavalry Division and the
78th Division were brought up in close reserve, ready to exploit any such
success. However, while the 82d Division advanced their right to Soinmer-
ance and to the town of St. Juvin, the 77th met determined resistance from
the northern part of Grandpre, and the wooded ridges beyond, which effec-
tually prevented its progress. 1
On October 14, at 8.30 a. m. the 77th and 82d Divisions attacked and
advanced about 2 km. (1.2 miles) and took Hill 182, occupied Le Ravin-aux-
Pierres and the road to St. Georges, at the same time establishing a position
north of the Aire. Flanking artillery fire from enemy batteries in the Bois
de Bourgogne and wire in the vicinity of St, Juvin caused us losses and con-
siderable delay. 1
A continuation of the attack of the First Corps with objectives Imecourt—
Alliepont — north edge of Bois dee Loges — Haute Batis Ferme, was directed.
On October 15, but without success, because the enemy positions in the Bois
des Loges and Bois de Bourgogne were too strongly organized and their con-
centration of artillery too effective, the attack was made. During the night
of October 15-1G the 77th Division was relieved by the 78th Division. 1
On the morning of October 16 the 78th Division attacked and succeeded in
occupying the lower part of Grandpre, but could realize no further progress. 1
From now until the end of the month careful preparations were made, in-
cluding local operations, looking toward the acquisition of positions tactically
more advantageous. The 78th Division drove the enemy from the southern
ridge of Bois de Bourgogne and occupied Talma Ferme and Bellejoyeuse
Ferme. The 82d Division took possession of the northern slope of Ravin-aux-
Pieires. The 77th Division was held in reserve. The 80th Division, which
had arrived in the First Corps area on October 25, was assigned to the right
half of the sector of the 82d Division, the relief of which division by the 80th
Division and the 77th Division, except for an outpost screen, was effected dur-
ing the night October 30-31. 1
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Evacuation from the front was continued by the methods and to the
hospitals noted in the history of the First Corps in the first phase of this
operation (p. 525).
Evacuation Hospital No. 14 moved forward to Les Islettes on October 7.
AVhile this move did not materially alter the situation otherwise on the left
flank, it was of considerable value in shortening hauls. Army Red Cross
Hospital No. 110. at Villers-Daucourt, never received large numbers of patients
owing to its position on the inactive flank. Evacuation Hospital No. 10, at
Froidos, and Army Red Cross Hospital No. 114, at Fleury, on the more
active eastern flank, received most of the cases.
On October 17 Mobile Hospital No. 6 was established in a field just
outside of and north of Varennes, on the main road, where it was rather far
back for service to nontransportable wounded but much more accessible than
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 639
formerly. On the same date the corps rest camp moved to the same point and
continued to function as before until the armistice was signed. It was very
active, retaining as many cases as possible but sending those needing further
cure to Evacuation Hospital No. 9, at Vaubecourt, and to Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 16 and Base Hospital No. 83, at Kevigny. 2
On October 24 the following plan of evacuation of sick and wounded
was published in annex 8, Field Order 85, First Corps. This continued in
effect throughout this and the third phase of the operation.
* * * * * * *
7. Plan of evacuation of sick and wounded.
1. Sanitary organisation. — (a) Battalion aid stations, relays of litter bearers, and
rcRimental aid stations will be established by regimental surgeons under the supervision
nf their respective division surgeons. In no case will a battalion or regimental aid Station
lie located at the same place as the regimental P. C.
(6) Sorting and advance dressing stations (triages) will be established as follows:
78th Division, vicinity of Marcq.
77th Division, vicinity of St. Juvin.
80th Division, vicinity of St. Georges.
These stations will be provided with cut-out on the traffic route for the purpose of
avoiding traffic congestion. Officers will see that such provisions are carried out and that
the traffic is free at all times.
Regulations governing evacuation from triages will be as published in Memorandum
G-l-48, these headquarters, September 3, 1918.
(c) Evacuation points. —
All troops of First Corps and within its sector
Xontransportable Mobile Hospital No. 6, 1 km. NE. of Varennes.
Mobile Hospital No. 2, Chateau Salvange.
Mobile Hospital No. 4, La Grange-aux-Bois.
Seriously wounded (lying) Evacuation Hospital No. 14, Les Islettes.
A. R. C. Hospital No. 110, Villers-Daucourt.
Evacuation Hospital No. 11, Brizeaux.
Evacuation Hospital No. 10, Froidos.
A. R. C. Hospital No. 114, Floury.
Gassed Gas Hospital No. 4, Rarecourt.
A. R. C. Hospital No. 110, Villers-Daucourt.
Slightly wounded (sitting) Evacuation Hospital No. 9, Vaubecourt, by way of First
Corps relay station, 1 km. NE. of Varennes.
Sick To First Corps rest camp and relay station, 1 km. NE. of
Varennes.
Base Hospital No. 83, at Revignv.
Neurological cases Nubecourt.
Contagious diseases Verrieres.
French
Sick, wounded, and gassed A. R. C. No. 110, Villers-Daucourt.
(d) Evacuation routes. —
To hospital NE. of Varennes, St. Georges — St. Juvin — Fleville — Baulny — to
destination.
Marcq — Cornay — Chatel Chehery — La Forge — Pleinchamp Ferme— thence south
via Baulyn to destination.
To hospitals at Les Islettes, La Grange-aux-Bois, Verrieres, Villers-Daucourt, by
routes prescribed above to Baulny, thence via Varennes — Neuvilly — Clermont —
Les Islettes — La Grange-aux-Bois — Ste. Menehould — -Verrieres to destination.
640 FIELD OPERATIONS
To hospitals at Rarecourt, Chateau Salvange, Froidos, Fleury, and Nubecourt, via
Baulny — Varennes — Neuvilly — Clermont — Auzeville — Rarecourt — Froidos, and
Fleury to destination.
To hospitals at Brizeaux-Forestieres, and Vaubecourt, via Baulny — Varennes—
Clermont — Les Islettes — Futeau — Brizeaux-Forestieres to destination,
(e) Army and corps troops (both French and U. S.) will use the evacuation system and
facilities of the nearest division.
(J) The sanitary units of the Eighty-second Division will be held subject to the call of
the corps surgeon for use where needed. If this division reinforces the line, it will use the
sanitary organizations and system of evacuation of the division it reinforces or relieves.
(g) If additional transportation is needed, call will be made on the corps surgeon, who
has at his disposition the ambulance companies of the Eighty-second Division and those of
the corps.
(h) The corps surgeon is at present located at No. 89 Rue Basse, Rarecourt, telephone
number "Buster 15." Commanding officer, corps sanitary train, is located at No. 60, Rue
Basse, Rarecourt, telephone "Buster 36."
2. Army medical supply parks.
Park E at Les Islettes.
Park C at Souilly.
Park D at Vaubecourt.
* * * * * * *
8. Evacuation of animals.
(a) Division collecting stations will be established by each division to which sick
and wounded animals will be evacuated within the division. The location of these collect-
ing stations will be reported to the corps veterinarian (Buster 39) immediately.
(6) Corps advance collecting point, in bend of river, one-half km. north of Varennes.
(c) Army evacuation station, Aubreville.
(d) Evacuation routes.
1. From division collecting stations to corps advance collecting point overland, avoid-
ing prescribed traffic routes. By corps unless otherwise ordered.
2. From corps collecting point to army evacuation station — Varennes — Cote des Per-
rieres — Pte. Boureuilles — Rochamp Ferme — Abancourt Ferme — Cross the Neuvilly — Cler-
mont road south of Neuvilly bridge, thence south two and one-half km. to crossroads on
the Neuvilly — Clermont road (keeping to trail on east side of road), thence east to Aubre-
ville. By corps.
(c) Details of evacuation from the division collecting station will be arranged by
division veterinarians directly with the corps veterinarians.
(f) In case of necessity, the corps veterinarian may call upon the corps remount
officer for seventy-five (75) mounted men to assist in evacuations.
* * # * * * *
The procedure for burials was covered by paragraph 11 of the same
order, the only change from previous orders being provisions that two com-
panies of Pioneer Infantry be detailed to each division in line instead of one
as heretofore. They worked as before under the division sanitary inspector.
Burial of dead during the Meuse-Argonne operation was performed very
satisfactorily in the First Corps by this method. Dead horses gave much
more trouble, but these also were disposed of with gratifying promptness.
Sanitary conditions were very much improved. There were some cases of
intestinal diseases, but they were never as numerous or severe as in the
Chateau-Thierry region.
The chief surgeon of the corps reported that : Aside from road congestion
the other feature giving us most trouble was the scattering of evacuation
hospitals over a wide area. The difficulties resulting from this have been
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 641
previously discussed and need not be repeated. Grouping of evacuation hos-
pitals to the utmost practicable limit is much to be desired. This would
probably have been difficult to accomplish in the Argonne, but nevertheless the
principle remains the same. In future operations of a similar character every
effort should be made to secure this concentration. 3
The system for evacuation of wounded prescribed in memorandum dated
September 18 and quoted above in the history of the First Corps during the
first phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation woidd have proved very satis-
factory had the corps retained the same divisions permanently, or even for a
considerable time. Sometimes, however, divisions were not in the corps long
enough to familiarize themselves with the order in question.
THE 77TH DIVISION
On October 4, at 5.30 a. m. the Infantry of the division attacked the enemy
strong position. Enemy machine guns were still in position and fire from
them was encountered immediately. On this occasion the French attacked in
conjunction with our left, but their advance was again checked. Because of
the location of the enemy machine-gun nests they were difficult to take, and
owing to their number, our determined local attacks only resulted in heavy
casualties. The aim of the 54th Brigade was to advance to the line held by the
"Lost Battalion" at Charlevaux Mill. Recognizing the fact that passage
through the enemy wire and trenches, even after a careful artillery prepara-
tion, would probably be unsuccessful, one battalion of the 307th Infantry
was directed to move well to the right and endeavor to pass by a ravine around
the left flank of the enemy wire, flanking him out and cutting his rear in the
attempt to reach the ; ' Lost Battalion " by this means. Late in the afternoon
two companies of the 307th Infantry succeeded in passing through the wire by
the left flank of the enemy position, and by nightfall had found the battalion.
With the exception of the changed position of these two companies, the
division line was the same as it had been on the previous day. 4
On October 5, the attempt to advance was continued. The left of the
154th Brigade simply made a demonstration, as was the case along the front
of the 307th Infantry, while to the extreme right of the 307th Infantry the
attempt to pass around the flank was resumed. This movement progressed
very slightly owing to the resistance met with, and to the fact that from time
to time the troops encountered light wire around which they had to work, but
the advance progressed steadily, and by nightfall an entire battalion was on
the flank of the enemy's position, working toward the " Lost Battalion." On
the left of the position, in front of the 308th Infantry, no progress had been
made by 11.30 a. m. An attack with one battalion of the 307th Infantry and
a part of the 308th Infantry was then launched. On this occasion the French
were to have assisted us, under arrangements made by higher authority. This
assistance failed to come, however, and our attack, which lasted from 2.30 to
o p. m.. was unsuccessful. 4
13576—25 41
642 FIELD OPERATIONS
On October 6 the attempt to break the enemy lines and relieve the "Lost
Battalion" was continued. On the part of the 307th Infantry (154th
Brigade) there was a demonstration against the enemy front by one battalion
and the battalion which had passed by the flank continued its advance toward
the " Lost Battalion." This movement was extremely slow because of the
determined resistance of the enemy and the difficulties of the terrain over
which the advance aws being made. In front of the 308th Infantry an attack
was again launched by part of the divisional reserve and of the 308th In-
fantry. This attack again failed and our troops were retired to the position
from which they started. Late in the evening of the 6th word was received
that the flanking elements of the 307th Infantry were well to the front and
were approaching the "Lost Battalion." 4
On October 7, while the 307th Infantry was approaching the " Lost
Battalion," word was received that the 308th Infantry had penetrated the
enemy position and had reached and relieved this battalion. At the end of the
day the entire command of the 154th Brigade was on a line which extended
generally northeast from the direction of Charlevaux Mill. The 153d Brigade
had pursued the withdrawing enemy and had established their line north of
the road west of the crossroads at La Viergette, thus making an advance ol
about 2 km. (1.2 miles). 4 - 8
On October 8, the right brigade (153d) continued its advance north of
La Viergette and by night had established its line along a narrow-gauge
railroad in Bois de Chatel. The brigade on the left (154th) spent the day in
reorganizing its forces and in resting. 4
On October 9 the advance continued steadily, though slowly, through
Foret d'Argonne. 4
On October 10, the 153d Infantry Brigade lead the advance of the
division, being supported by the 154th Infantry Brigade. The objective for
the day's attack was a line of hills south of the Aire River. The 306th
Infantry on the left and the 305th Infantry on the right advanced through
La Besogne to the Aire River at Chevieres and Marcq, one battalion of the
306th Infantry going northwest of the woods just south of the river at
Grandpre. During the night following, the river was crossed by patrols, one
of which made its way into the town of Grandpre. 4
On the morning of the 11th there was a reorganization of the division
front so that again the 154th Brigade was in the front line, the 307th Infantry
on the right, and the 308th Infantry on the left. The general line occupied
by the command at this time was the edge of the Bois de Xegremont. south
of Grandpre, to the edge of the woods immediately south of Chevieres, with
detachments forward along the line of the railroad and the road immediately
south of the Aire River, and in Chevieres. 4
On October 12 attempts were made to cross the Aire, which was without
bridges or fords other than immediately in front of Grandpre and Chevieres.
These attempts were unsuccessful, being repulsed by heavy machine-gun fire
and by artillery and rifle fire from the heights north of the Aire River. 4
PLATE XXXVI.
MEUSE • ARGONNE
2THD PHASE 77 TH DIVISION
fZtferencet
M+ps Bozancy & Forit O'Artfonne
Positions of Metf/caJ Units from reports* of
Division Sjrtfeon Srvcnr* stwnfh Division
Battle lines, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 643
On October 13 the troops of the 15±th Brigade rested and were reorgan-
ized. The 153d Brigade, while holding the line along the south bank of
the Aire River, was prepared to launch an attack on St. Juvin from the south
and east. Accordingly, the 306th Infantry was moved to a position 1 Ian.
(0.0 mile) west of Cornay, preparatory to the attack. 4
On October 14, at 8.30 a. in., the 306th Infantry started the attack, its first
battalion advancing through Marcq for a frontal attack on St. Juvin. Heavy
consolidated barrages were put down on our troops by the enemy and severe
losses were sustained. Seven officers of one regiment were killed and as many
were wounded in this attack. An additional battalion was sent to execute a
flanking movement on the town to the right with the third battalion in close
support. The river was crossed by the attacking battalions, and St. Juvin
was taken, as well as Hill 182, north of St. Juvin.
On October 15 the 153d Brigade attacked at 7.30 a. m. Enemy resistance
was very strong, and all of our efforts met with terrific barrages and machine-
gun fire. The enemy defensive position was so strong that it was impossible
for us to advance. The brigade suffered severe casualties, and its effective
strength of both officers and men was greatly reduced. Troops of the 154th
Brigade succeeded in crossing the Aire and in entering Grandpre. 4
On the night of October 15-16 and on the morning of the 16th, the 77th
Division was relieved by the 78th Division. The 153d Brigade was then
marched to Campe dn Bouzon. The 154th Brigade was moved to the vicinity
of Chene Tondu and Abri du Crochet. 4
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Owing to terrific machine-gun fire and the shelling of all roads, it Mas
often impossible to remove the wounded before nightfall, but in spite of this
the average time required for the transport of wounded to the field hospitals
was only from three to eight hours. Difficulties of removal were augmented
by congestion of roads, for it had proved impossible to reserve certain of
these, which had been attempted, for removal of casualties."
The sanitary units of the division were disposed as follows at the com-
mencement of the second phase of the operation : Ambulance Company No.
305, at La Harazee: No. 30(5. at Abri du Crochet; No. 307. at Depot des
Machines: Xo. 308, at La Chalade. The field hospitals were at Florent, except
No. 308, which was at La Chalade." On the 4th of October, the dressing
station of Ambulance Company No. 305 was moved into French-constructed
dugouts near La Harazee, this organization working in conjunction with
Ambulance Company No. 307. The length of bearer routes at this time was
8 km. (5 miles). By the evening of October 5, Ambulance Company No. 305
was relieved by Ambulance Company No. 307, and went into rest at La
Harazee. The next day Ambulance Company No. 306 was in rest at Camp
Kopp, having been relieved by Ambulance Company No. 308, which also de-
tailed nine men to each of the Infantry battalions it served." On October 8
Ambulance Company No. 305 established a car-post and dressing station
at La Harazee, where after suitable treatment, especially of shocked cases,
(544 FIELD OPERATIONS
it loaded them on the tramway ears, which, operated by Ambulance Company
No. 307, ran to the Depot des Machines. At that place patients were trans-
ferred to ambulances and taken to the triage (Field Hospital No. 308 at La
Chalade). The same date, October 8, Ambulance Company No. 307 evacuated
in some six hours approximately 300 sick and wounded from the "Lost
Battalion." The majority were suffering from exhaustion and lack of food,
but about 30 per cent were wounded or gassed. The ambulance posts at this
time were at Binarville and at the Depot des Machines. Ambulance Company
No. 308 evacuated 131 men of the " Lost Battalion " on this date by mule-
drawn and Ford ambulances, and established an advanced dressing station
5 km. (3 miles) from the Abri du Crochet. 7 On the 10th the personnel of
Ambulance Company No. 305 operating the car post at La Harazee was
relieved, and the entire company went into reserve except 17 ambulance
drivers and orderlies and 2 officers and 20 men, who continued to operate the
dressing station there. The next day Ambulance Company No. 307 established
a dressing station at Malassise Ferme, and 4 car posts, 2 of them just outside
of Grandpre. 1 at La Besogne and 1 on the Grand Ham road. 8 During the
period October 11-16 it detailed 40 men to regimental aid stations and eared
for 365 cases at its dressing station. On the 12th an advanced section of the
triage (Field Hospital No. 308) opened at Lancon, where it received 682 cases
before it closed on the loth. The next day the remainder of the triage and
Field Hospital No. 305 moved to that point to care for the sick, and Ambulance
Company No. 308 established an advance dressing station at La Besogne, where
the distance of the litter carriage from battalion posts averaged about 1 km.
(0.6 mile) and to the ambulance post about 100 meters (109 yards). 9 On
the 14th. 1 officer and 16 men of Ambulance Company No. 306 established a
dressing station in the western edge of Chatel Chehery, while Ambulance
Company No. 308 established a subdressing station and a two-car post near
Grandpre. Ambulance Company No. 305 on the loth discontinued its dressing
station at La Harazee and advanced 9.6 km. (6 miles) on the Binarville-Lan-
con road to near Lancon, and Field Hospital No. 306, for gassed cases, with
Field Hospital No. 307, for surgical cases, arrived at Lancon. 10 The last-men-
tioned unit here took over the triage from Field Hospital No. 308, which
closed and went into reserve. From September 27 to October 11 it had ad-
mitted 3,284 patients, of whom 3.613 were wounded, 47 gassed, and 624 sick. 11
On the 16th the stations of the ambulance companies were closed and they
began moving for rest to Florent and Camp Kopp, near La Chalade. Field
hospitals closed on the 16th and 17th and moved to Florent, where, except
Field Hospital No. 308, which acted as the division hospital, they remained in
rest until the division reentered the lines. 12
The 302d Sanitary Train had organized its surgical service to the highest
degree possible. Complete operating rooms were established at La Chalade.
with facilities for performing any type of operation, and all appropriate cases
admitted to the triage from dressing stations were assumed to be operative
unless in a marked degree of shock on arrival. This subject is further discussed
in the history of the 77th Division during the third phase of this operation."
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 645
The advance medical supply depot was operated with the triage and ad-
vanced with that organization, thus securing prompt delivery of supplies to
the division medical department formations, but because of lack of trans-
portation the main supply depot remained stationary and did not advance
with the troops. This resulted in so lengthening the distance between the two
depots that three days were consumed in making a round trip between them ;
but notwithstanding this fact, full and complete equipment and supplies, ex-
cept a few drugs, was on hand at forward formations at all times. 14
THE 2STH DIVISION
The 28th Division attacked at 5.30 a. m. on October 4, with the 55th
Brigade on the right and the 56th on the left. The 55th Brigade was able to
drive the enemy approximately 2 km. (1.2 miles) down the Aire Valley until
it was held up by severe machine-gun fire from the Abbatiale Ferme — Plein-
champ Ferme — Chatel-Chehery. The 56th Brigade made very little advance,
due to the severity of machine-gun fire and heavy shell fire from the northern
slope of Le Chene Tondu ridge. At noon, the division line was approximately :
Ferme des Granges — La Forge (exclusive) — Le Menil Ferme — south to Le
Chene Tondu ridge. Our own Artillery increased its harassing fire on enemy
positions, while that of the enemy decreased in the rear areas and increased in
the forward areas and front-line positions. The town of Apremont was
shelled during the day with mustard gas, and our troops located there suffered
considerable losses and w r ere forced to move out of the town. By 7.05 p. m.,
the leading battalion of the right brigade had reached the Aire River at the foot
of Cote 180 and had taken Chehery and Pleinchamp Ferme. At La Forge
the situation was reported to be unchanged and as "full of machine guns; a
nasty proposition to go near." At 9.25 p. m., the clearing of Le Chene Tondu
ridge and the ridge west was reported as being about completed by the left
brigade, and all the lines had been extended on the entire crest. 15
On October 5, at 6.30 a. m.. the 55th Brigade succeeded in pushing forward
on the right, in spite of heavy artillery and machine-gun opposition, thus
improving their positions in Pleinchamp Ferme, Chehery, Abbatiale Ferme.
La Forge. At 2.15 p. m., troops of the 109th Infantry were entering Chatel
Chehen-; and the 56th Brigade was still advancing slowly along Le Chene
Tondu. By nightfall the right of the division line had straightened out west-
wardly to include La Forge, the rest remaining unchanged. On October 6,
there was no material change in the line during the day. 15
On October 7. the attack w r as renewed at 5 a. m. The 82d Division, which
had been in corps reserve, was now in the line on the right of the 28th and
took over part of the sector of the 28th Division. The objective of the attack
was the line occupied by the enemy, including Cornay, Hill 223, Hill 244, and
the ridges west of the River Aire. This confined the main attack to the 28th
and 82d Divisions. The 112th Infantry attacked Chatel Chehery and Cote
244. Only slight resistance was encountered in entering the village of Chatel
Chehery, but heavy machine-gun fire to the west of the village and from Cote
223 was opened on our troops after they had entered the town. Enemy fire
646 FIELD OPERATIONS
from Cote 223 enfiladed the village of Chatel Chehery; and though this hill
was in the sector of the 82d Division.it was impossible for troops of the 28th
Division to hold Chatel Chehery without our forces holding Cote 223. and as a
consequence one company of Infantry and a machine-gun company of the 28th
Division captured Cote 223 and occupied it. Cote 224 was occupied after over-
coming severe resistance by machine guns. Strong patrols from the 109th
Infantry, left brigade, by this time had been working up the ravines north
of Bois de Taille l'Abbe and north of Le Chene Tondu, partially overcoming
resistance from these points. Six companies of the 111th Infantry had worked
around to the west from Le Chene Tondu, and at noon were reported as ad-
vancing north from La Viergette, in liaison with the 77th Division, on the left.
At nightfall the line of the division was Hill 223 (exclusive), hill west of
Chatel Chehery, Hill 244, thence generally south to the western limits of the
division sector.
On October 8, the attack was again resumed at daybreak. During the
morning there was very little change in the line. At 1.10 p. m. an attack was
started, which developed strong infantry, artillery, and machine-gun resist-
ance. At 5.55 p. m.. one battalion of the right brigade was on Hill 244. One
battalion was between Hills 223 and 244. Two battalions were in the skirmish
line, 1,200 meters (1,308 yards) in advance of the crest of Hill 244. Two small
battalions were at a crossroads GOO meters (054 yards) south of Drachen. 15
On October 9, the 28th Division was relieved by the 82d Division. 1 '
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Unfortunately no official record is available of the operations of the ambu-
lance companies of this division during the second phase of this operation.
Field hospitals were in the locations which they held in the first phase; i. e..
Field Hospital No. 109 (triage), at Locheres; Field Hospital No. 110 (gas and
psychic cases), at Croix de Pierre; Field Hospital No. Ill (sick), at Les
Islettes; Field Hospital No. 112 (surgical), at Croix de Pierre, except that
the last-named was moved, October 4, to Neuvilly. Field Hospital No. 109, the
divisional triage, at Locheres, was closed October 4, and on October 11 followed
the rest of the division to the rear for a brief rest at Bouvron. The total num-
ber of patients it had admitted while at Locheres was 3,428. The divisional
supply unit was also located at this point. 10
Field Hospital No. Ill, at Les Islettes, receiving the divisional sick, noted
a large increase in the number of influenza cases. It moved on the 13th to
Ferme Boyer, thence to a French hospital near Minorville, and on October 30
to Buxerulles. One feature of the operation of this organization was provision
of a dispensary which was maintained for the use of any troops in the vicinity
which were without medical officers. During its existence this dispensary gave
assistance to at least 10,000 patients. 17
Field Hospital No. 112, located at Croix de Pierre, during the first phase
was relatively inaccessible to the seriously wounded, a fact which necessitated
that they be cared for at first by Field Hospital Xo. 109 and that Field Hos-
pital Xo. 112 be moved to Neuvilly on October 4. Here this hospital used
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION
(547
a barn to excellent advantage, and in the period October 5-10 (inclusive)
admitted 1,624 patients, with six deaths. After the division was withdrawn it
moved to Bouvron, about 8 km. (5 miles) north of Toul. whence it moved to
Essay, on the 18th."
THE 1ST DIVISION
On October 4. at 5.25 a. m., the division launched its attack, preceded by a
lolling barrage at 200 meters (218 yards). Considerable resistance was en-
countered from machine-gun nests in the Bois de Montrebean and along the
road running northeast of La Xeuville le Comte Ferine. The enemy was
strongly entrenched in wire positions in the woods north of Hill 212. The 1st
FIG.
>. — Location of Field Hospital No. Ill, nt Lis Islettes, October 5, 101K
Brigade reached its objective at approximately 7 a. m. : the left regiment of
the 2d Brigade. 30 minutes later. The right regiment was delayed by fire
from the road northeast of La Nenville le Comte Ferme and from its flank.
At approximately 1 p. in., the ICtli Infantry had reached the third objective."
The 18th Infantry was delayed on the southern slopes of Hill 240: the 2d
Brigade was delayed by strong machine-gun resistance and artillery fire both
from the front and flanks. 10 At the end of the day the line extended from
just south of Fleville. southeastwardly to just south of Exermont, then
slightly northeastwardly to a point about 2.5 km. (1.5 miles) beyond
Exermont. 15
On October 5 the 2d Brigade (right) and lsth Infantry, on the right of
the 1st brigade, were ordered to advance to the first objective." Following it
648 FIELD OPERATIONS
they were directed to proceed to the second objective (midway between first
and third objective). After taking the second objective the infantry was
next ordered to advance to the third objective (corps objective), there to
organize and await further orders. In its advance the 26th Infantry captured
Ferme d'Arietal, meeting with stubborn resistance from the enemy. 19
On October G in conformity with corps orders, troops remained on the
line reached the previous day. During the afternoon, the 26th Infantry (on
the right) advanced their line by pushing out patrols to the southern slope
of the hill northwest of Ferine d'Arietal. 19
On October 7 the entire line was slightly advanced by pushing out patrols
to the front and holding the ground gained. On this date, the 362d Infantry
Regiment (91st Division) was attached to the 1st Division. On the 8th. the
entire 181st Brigade (91st Division) was attached and the sector of the 1st
Division was extended to the line Cote 269 — La Tuilerie Ferme. The 1st
Division was temporarily attached to the Fifth Corps. 19
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The regimental aid stations were located in the vicinity of regimental
posts of command, and, like them, were at first in cellars or first-floor rooms
of partially destroyed buildings in the towns of Cheppy, Very, Charpentry,
Baulny, and of villages of the area. As the attack developed, however, and
the line moved forward, the regimental posts of command and regimental aid
stations were located in dugouts with the line of advance. Battalion stations
were located in less favorable positions, the majority in shallow ditches or
holes hastily dug into a hillside or in the shelter of woods. Because of in-
sistent enemy artillery fire and the fact that approaches to the aid stations
were frequently swept by machine guns, great difficulty was experienced in
evacuating the wounded from these points. In many instances the only mode
of evacuation Avas by hand-carry for about 1 Ian. (0.6 mile) to the nearest
point where wounded could be picked up by ambulances. Searching parties
continued to go out constantly from battalion aid stations, despite exposure
to shell and machine gun fire, and in this work a number of Medical Depart-
ment enlisted men were wounded or killed. The character of the terrain
made rescue work both difficult and hazardous. When the wounded reached
the battalion stations they were given such emergency first aid as was pos-
sible and were then sent promptly to the rear. 20 It was almost impossible to
get supplies up to these stations in adequate quantities, for everything had to
be carried forward either on the person or in improvised sacks. First aid
administered, therefore, was of necessity both crude and limited, intensifying
the need that patients be evacuated with all possible speed to positions far-
ther back, where more adequate treatment could l>e given them. In some
places it was possible to evacuate the wounded from battalion to regimental
aid stations, but in the majority it was found more practical for each station
to convey its own wounded to the nearest collecting point accessible to ambu-
PLATE XXXVII.
MEUSE • AKGONNE
T, T 9r, r (l8i s - T Br 1 g.)&42 ND DIVISIONS
2JH1> PHASE
e Ferme
A«/i»r»licej:- DriAWn. from. Maps 3u.zajtcy,
Foret <t'Argoi^n-e t VerdUuL-A, ajict Jhuv-suj--
-44eu-.se . Positions of MedLicaJ C/nits from.
Reports of Surgeons 1-sp & 425^ Divisions
r ± f: H.3odi
ffH.I2octt
Cheppy
I660cti2
|680ctl2
nd Div.
Rattle hnrv taken from Pinal Report. Gen. John J. Penning, September 1. 1919, are approximate
».*T*D Bi'H« U.I
MEITSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 649
lances. From these points the wounded were taken to the nearest dressing sta-
tion, where they were furnished hot drinks, dressings were applied or changed,
stimulants were given, and antitetanic serum was administered. 21
Ambulance Companies
Ambulance companies were utilized to their utmost capacity, evacuating
from the front to field hospitals and to the rear from them. Unfortunately,
the evacuation ambulance companies belonging to the corps were unable to
evacuate the field hospitals, and it was necessary to divert part of the divisional
ambulances to that service. Whenever possible, returning ammunition and
supply trucks were used for transporting the slighter cases. The haul from
Cheppy to the hospitals at Clermont, Les Islettes, Ste. Menehould, etc., was
long and difficult, over badly congested and shell-torn roads. Most of the
evacuation from the farthest advanced positions to the advanced dressing
stations was done by the personnel and Ford ambulances of United States
Army Ambulance Service Section No. G49. After United States Army Ambu-
lance Section No. 593 joined, which was when the 181st Infantry Brigade was
temporarily assigned to the division (October 6), it lessened greatly the diffi-
culties of evacuation from the field hospitals. 22
On the night of October 3-4, Ambulance Company No. 12 established an
advance dressing station in some ruined buildings at Charpentry, but during
the following day moved to L'Fsperance Ferme, near Apremont, establishing
a dressing station which remained at that point until the division withdrew.
Wounded men to the number of 3,4SG passed through this station. Ten of its
enlisted personnel were wounded and one was killed. 22
Ambulance Company No. 3 had taken over the dressing station at Char-
pentry and remained there until October 12, caring for and evacuating some
5.000 cases. During part of this time the station was under shell fire. It
suffered 49 casualties, with 5 deaths. 22
Ambulance Company No. 13 had reached Varennes on October 1, and there
established a station for slightly wounded and walking patients. While its am-
bulances evacuated suitable cases, its litter bearers and officers reinforced regi-
mental stations. Eight hundred casualties passed through the stations of this
organization. 23
Ambulance Company No. 2 operated an advance dressing station at
Chaudron Ferme, in some partially destroyed buildings, from October 3 to 12,
giving first aid and evacuating 2,500 wounded. The animal-drawn ambu-
lances of this company proved very valuable during the drive, as they could
operate under road conditions impossible to motor vehicles. 23
The triage and surgical hospitals being located together, the dressing
stations were not concerned with the sorting of cases except to direct walking
wounded to the station at Varennes. The other wounded were transported by
ambulance to Cheppy and there delivered to the triage. Experience in this
sector demonstrated the impossibility of carrying antigas medical equipment
to battalion aid stations and also the impossibility of administering antigas
treatment to patients in these exposed positions. The nearest point at which
1357G— 25 42
650 FIELD OPERATIONS
such treatment could be given effectively was the dressing station, and there
relief of the most pressing conditions was all that could be attempted. Yet,
in many cases it was found that the clothing could be removed at a dressing
station and the gassed patient prepared so that he might be sent as quickly
as possible to the field hospital, where more elaborate equipment had been
installed. Surgical cases were given such emergency treatment as their con-
dition demanded before being started on their trip to field hospitals. 21
Field Hospitals
Flanked as it was by hills on all sides, the devastated village of Cheppy
offered the most protected and convenient site for a field hospital, and Field
Hospital No. 3 there exchanged tents and some equipment with medical units
of the 35th Division, already installed, took over their site, and was ready to
function immediately. It operated as a triage and also received slightly
wounded, shocked, and gassed patients. 24 During the operations it cared for
6,066 patients at this site. Of gassed cases admitted, about 100 were severe,
but the majority were minor burns or irritated eyes. 26
Field Hospital No. 12, designated to receive the severely wounded, set up
four ward tents in a depression on the side of the road running from Cheppy
to Very and also made use of the extensive, electric-lighted galleries and
rooms which the enemy had constructed in the sides of hills. The most
severely wounded patients and the operating unit were placed in these bomb-
proof shelters. While at this place Field Hospital No. 12 cared for 818
patients. With its mobile surgical unit it was prepared to handle all kinds of
emergency surgical cases, but corps orders forbade any operative procedures
in field units. Later, however, these orders were modified to permit operations
on nontransportable patients whose only hope lay in immediate surgical inter-
vention. The wisdom of this modification was demonstrated in a number of
desperate cases operated on by the surgical unit in the operating room
improvised by this hospital. 26
Field Hospital No. 13 was held in reserve in the vicinity of Charpentry,
the Field Hospital No. 2 at Varennes. The only time that the latter unit
functioned in this operation was on October 4, when the Cheppy hospital
sites and roads leading to them were so severely shelled that they had to be
abandoned temporarily. On the morning of that day nine enemy observation
planes flew, unopposed, low over this location, returning safely to the German
lines. At 9 o'clock a remarkably accurate bombardment began. Tents were
hastily evacuated, all patients being removed to the dugouts close by. Though
considerable damage was done to tents and equipment, no casualties occurred.
As soon as the first shell fell, the division surgeon sent a courier to Varennes —
about 1.5 km. 0.9 mile) to the west — with orders to Field Hospital No. 2 to
establish and operate there as a triage until further notice. 24 Other mes-
sengers were dispatched to notify ambulance companies of the change in
location, and military police along the routes of evacuation were instructed to
direct ambidances and walking wounded to Varennes. By 10 a. m. on October
i Field Hospital No. 2 was ready to function and had received, treated, and
METTSE-AKGONNE OPEKATION 651
evacuated its first wounded. Up to 5 p. m. of the same day. when it closed, it
had received and disposed of approximately 1,500 patients. Records were
made of 1,003. and in addition some 500 patients for whom no record was made
were received, examined, and given appropriate treatment. 22
Medical Supply Unit
The medical supply unit of the division was moved to Cheppy and. with
the large supply of American materiel found in the area., furnished ample
equipment for the entire operation. The great difficulty found in distributing
this to forward stations has already been discussed. 20
THE 82D DIVISION
On October G the 82d Division, less the 163d Infantry Brigade, relieved
the Infantry units of the 28th Division on the north of La Forge. The divi-
sion boundaries were as follows: Right, Fleville (exclusive) — elevation 151;
left. Ferme des Granges — La Forge — Chateau of Chatel Chehery — meridian
79.8. 27
On October 7 the division, less the 163d Infantry Brigade (still in corps
reserve), attacked at 5 a. m.. the position of the brigade being the west bank
of the Aire River between the Chateau of Chatel Chehery and the southwest
outskirts of Fleville. The first objective included Fleville (exclusive) — Cor-
nay (inclusive) — Hill 223 (inclusive). Hill 180 was promptly captured at 5
a. m. Hill 223 was captured at 1 p. m. At 5 p. m., while the hill was in
process of organization, a determined counterattack on Hill 223 was repulsed
with heavy losses to the enemy. 27
On October 8 the flank attack of the preceding day was continued. At
7 a. m. the front line had advanced 700 meters (763 yards), and at 9 a. m.
an advance between 900 and 1.000 meters (981-1,090 yards) had been made
apainst heavy machine-gun fire. At 4 p. m. the attack was made on the crest
of the hill running west of Cornay. the sector being gained at approximately
6 p. m. Enemy machine gunners on the heights east and west of Cornay
swept with deadly fire the valley over which our troops had to advance. Of
the two companies which started, but 40 members reached the objective. 27
On October 9 the 163d Infantry Brigade, which had been released from
corps reserve the day previously, relieved the 28th Division on the left, which
had been holding the line, Hill 223 (exclusive) — La Viergette (inclusive).
The relief was effected at 4 a. m. The division boundaries now were : East-
ern, Fleville — Baulny road; western, La Viergette — La Besogne — Chevieres
(inclusive). The 163d Infantry Brigade executed a turning movement on a
large scale. "With little enemy resistance they had reached at the end of the
day a position along parallel 81, the right of the brigade refusing slightly to
connect with the left of the 164th Brigade on the Decauville railroad. A
battalion of the 328th Infantn-, advancing, crossed the Decauville railroad
and the Pylone — Cornay road. A battalion of the 327th Infantry captured
Cornay at 11 a. m., after fighting of the severest nature. At dusk the counter-
652 FIELD OPERATIONS
attack was launched from Fleville to Cornay, inclusive, and the battalion was
obliged to withdraw to the edge of the woods south of Cornay. 27
On October 10 the elements of the 1st Division east of the Aire River.
within the boundaries of the 82d Division, were relieved by the lG4tli In-
fantry Brigade by an extension across the river of the line of the 327th In-
fantry. The attack was resumed at 7 a. m.. the advance being made through
Hill 180 and from the ridge west of Hill 223. Cornay and the ridge north
of it were captured. 27 At the end of the day the line extended approximately
from a point 750 meters (817 yards) south of Sommerance southwestwardly
to the Aire 0.5 km. (0.3 mile) above Fleville, thence generally northwest-
wardly to Marcq (inclusive). 27 ' 5
On October 11, at 7 a. m., the attack was resumed, the first objective of
the division being the line Imecourt — Champigneulle. The direction of the
attack was due north. On the left an effort was made to cross the Aire and
attack the town of St. Juvin. Troops advanced east of Marcq to the Aire
River, but as passage of the river proved impossible the companies engaged
were withdrawn to the hills east of Marcq for the night. On the right the
troops crossed the river at Fleville. A battalion of the 327th Infantry
reached, for the first time, the Kriemhikle Stellung at 8 a. m., but finding the
position untenable withdrew to a line running east and west through the
center of St. Juvin. At the conclusion of the day the brigade line ran south
of this line. 27 ' D
On October 14 the attack was resumed at 8.30 a. m. Neither division
flank was able to advance because of the fact that the flank on the right and
left of the division remained practically stationary. The center of the divi-
sion, however, advanced through the Kriemhilde Stellung line at 11.15 a. m..
but was obliged to withdraw to the St. Juvin — St. Georges road, this position
being held for the night. 27
On October 15 the division continued the attack at 8.30 a. m. Its par-
ticular mission in this instance was to protect the left flank of the 42d Divi-
sion. No advance was made. 27
On October 16 the attack continued at G a. m. St. Juvin was entered at
9 a. m., and the whole of Hill 182 was secured at 9.30 a. m. Troops advanced
up the valley to the Agron River to about 0.5 km. (0.3 mile) south of Cham-
pigneulles, where they were compelled to seek shelter, without possibility of
advancing or retiring for the day. During the night these troops were
withdrawn. 27
No change was made in the line on October 17."
On October 18 the western boundary of the division battle line was
altered to the following line : Chatel Chehery — Marcq — Champigneulles —
Resille Ferme. The remainder of the line remained unchanged. 27
On October 21 the 163d Infantry Brigade advanced its line along the
slope north of Ravin aux Pierres. The 164th Infantry Brigade pushed for-
ward in liaison with the 163d. The division line ran as follows: Hill 182 —
Ravin aux Pierres, thence to and along St. Georges — St. Juvin road. 27
PLATE XXXVI
MEUSE -ARGONNE
2ND PHASE 82 ND DIVISION
Battle lines, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. I'crshinK. September I. 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 653
During the period October 22 to October 30 no advance was either ordered
or attempted. On October 31 the division, less the 157th Field Artillery
Brigade, attached to the 80th Division, was relieved by the 77th and 80th
Divisions at G a. m. The division was then assembled in the Argonne Forest
south of Marcq. 27
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Ambulance Company No. 327 established a dressing station, on the night
of October 3, at a convenient crossroads near Neuvilly, the remaining com-
panies moving, October 6, to Clermont-en-Argonne. The same night Ambu-
lance Companies No. 325 and No. 32G and a large detail from Ambulance
Company No. 328 moved to Varennes, where they arrived at 7 a. m. on the
7th. Ambulance Company No. 325 then established a station at Montblain-
ville and Ambulance Company No. 326 one at l'Esperance. Two officers and
120 men were sent as litter bearers to serve the four Infantry regiments, and
other officers and noncommissioned officers were sent as liaison personnel to
brigade and regimental headquarters. The litter-bearer detail continued to
function as such until the 18th. The dressing station of Ambulance Company
No. 325 was moved to Apremont on the night of the 8th, for most of the
wounded coming to Montblainville were being cared for by a station of the
28th Division there. Moreover, most of the wounded were being sent down the
right bank of the Aire. At this time the station of Ambulance Company
.No. 326 at l'Esperance was the most active, cooperating with similar stations
of the 1st and 28th Divisions, also established there; but immediately after
the dressing station of Ambulance Company No. 325 was established at
Apremont it began to receive a large number of wounded from the aid station
of the 328th Infantry at Chatel Cbehery. Throughout the service of this
station at this point its work continued heavy, though the site was frequently
shelled and some casualties occurred. As ambulances were inadequate for
the large numbers of wounded, it evacuated a number of patients by truck. 28
On October 18 the station of Ambulance Company No. 327 was also
moved, going to La Viergette, where it remained three days, though it evac-
uated practically no patients from this point. It moved to Pylone on the 12th.
On the same date the divisional triage moved to an old German hospital about
1 km. (0.6 mile) southwest of Apremont, and Ambulance Company No. 325
moved its dressing station from Apremont to Chatel Chehery, relieving the
regimental aid station of the 328th Infantry. Most of the divisional wounded
on the west bank of the Aire were collected at Pylone, as the road between that
place and Cornay was impassable. From this point they were sent to the
dressing station of Ambulance Company No. 326, at l'Esperance. 28
On the night of the 14th, as all combat troops of the division had moved
to the right of the Aire, this dressing station moved to Fleville, where it took
over the regimental aid station of the 327th Infantry. Most of its patients
were sent out by truck, for ambulances were too few to carry them ; but on
the station becoming overcrowded, it sent its evacuables to the dressing station
which Ambulance Company No. 326 was now operating at Pleinchamp Ferme.
654 FIELD OPERATIONS
On the 17th Ambulance Company No. 325 was relieved at Fleville by Ambu-
lance Company No. 327 and returned to Apremont. The almost continuous
shell fire caused Ambulance Company No. 327 to abandon its station at
Fleville on the 22d, the station which Ambulance Company No. 326 conducted
from October 10 to November 1 at Pleinchamp Ferme now being capable of
caring for all the wounded. 29
During this period all the ambulance company personnel available had
been concentrated at Apremont to assist the triage. On October 30 Ambu-
lance Company No. 325 again established a dressing station at Pylone to care
for casualties in the division as it moved from the front lines. For a period
of 36 hours and before medical department units of the 78th Division were in
position to function, the ambulance companies of the 77th Division evacu-
ated casualties developing in the relieving division. 29
During this engagement the ambulance transportation of the 77th Divi-
sion was limited to 2 salvaged cars. 8 G. M. C. and 20 Ford ambulances, the
latter belonging to United States Army Ambulance Service Station No. 647,
which had joined the division. The lighter ambulances operated near the
front, the heavier to the rear. These vehicles were supplemented by the trucks
and ambulances of the corps sanitary train as required. 29
The total number of patients cared for by the three motorized ambu-
lance companies (Nos. 325, 326. 327) from June 25. 1918, to February 15, 1919,
was 13,500, but this figure does not include those carried by United States
Army Ambulance Service Section No. 047 (number not known). The total
distance traveled was 206.663 km. (128.337 miles), and the total casualties
in the companies were 4 killed and 20 -wounded. 20
On October 5 Field Hospital No. 325 was moved from Waly, where it
had been functioning as a divisional triage and evacuating direct to army
hospitals, to a point south of Clermont, where it was joined by Field Hospital
No. 328 and the next day by Field Hospital No. 327. On the 6th Field Hos-
pital No. 328 moved on to Varennes, with ordei-s to establish the divisional
triage there before daylight of the 7th. Here it was joined by Field Hospital
No. 326, which cared for the gassed, and many gassed and wounded men were
cared for under shell fire. On the 12th the last-mentioned hospitals moved to
a point. 1 km. (0.6 mile) southeast of Apremont, while Field Hospitals No.
325 and No. 327 moved to Varennes. On the 13th Field Hospital No. 327
moved to the location of the other hospitals near Apremont. and on the 23d
Field Hospital No. 325, heretofore in reserve, advanced to the same point.
Thereafter, until the division was relieved, the four hospitals retained this
site, functioning in conjunction. All field hospitals were relieved on Novem-
ber 2 and moved to Les Islettes. 30
Field hospitals had reached the Argonne sector with very few supplies.
They had left behind in the Toul area as complete an equipment as it was
possible to secure for such units. Because of lack of transportation before
going into action in this sector, they were able to secure only some blanket*,
litters, dressings, and some other most essential items, including tentage. By
Octol>er 12. however, the medical supply officer had replenished the stock of
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 655
supplies to a considerable extent, for a truck train was sent back to Millery
to bring up what had been left behind, and these, with the new supplies, fur-
nished a full equipment, with the exception of sterilizing and X-ray appa-
ratus. When the division was relieved, all this equipment was turned over
to another division in exchange for that which it had brought into the field. 30
Except during the last 10 days at Apremont, field hospitals did only tri-
age, gas, and medical work. After the worst of the fighting was over (about
October 20) the hospitals were immobilized, tents were floored, and a rest
camp of 30 wards was organized, where all cases of diarrhea and exhaustion
were cared for. The largest number of these cases at any one time was about
TOO, all being well cared for and well fed. 31
The commanding officer of Field Hospital No. 328 gave the. following de-
scription of his establishment at Apremont: 32
The hospital in the forest 1 km. southwest of Apremont was situated back about 200
yards from the main highway and connected with it by an excellent road. It occupied
nine wooden buildings, a large dugout, and an abandoned ward tent. All, in excellent
condition, were wired for electricity and provided with many modern conveniences. A
complete laboratory and dispensary were found intact. The immediate vicinity of the
hospital was strewn with equipment, dead horses, and a few dead men. During the first
24 hours 4S0 patients were admitted and evacuated.
On October 13 Field Hospital 326 joined to act as a gas hospital, operating
under canvas. With the exception of a lull of three days, the two following weeks saw an
endless procession of wounded. The great majority of these were only slightly wounded
anil able to walk, with the result that the two wards set apart for these cases were
exceptionally busy. The heaviest days were October 15-18, when the admissions and
evacuations averaged one patient every one and a half minutes.
During this operation a large number of men in the front line suffered
from diarrhea, colds, and exhaustion. At the direction of the division com-
mander, the hospitals at Apremont were made ready to care for the sick and
exhausted and, if possible, return them to duty. The men came back from
the front, received food, baths, and medical attention, and in from two to
seven days were again ready for service. By this means the hospitals re-
turned to duty a large number of men who, had the usual procedure of
evacuating the sick been followed, would have been lost to the division. The
total number of cases of all kinds cared for by the divisional triage in this
sector was 9,964. Some of these cases were from other divisions, and it is
to be presumed that other triages handled cases belonging to this division. 3 '
THE 78TH DIVISION
On the night of October 15-16 the 78th Division relieved the 77th Division
in line. The regiments went into line from east to west in numerical order.
309, 310, 311, and 312. The attack of October 16 was scheduled to be launched
at 6 a. m., simultaneously with the scheduled plan of the relief of the 77th
Division. The lack of time to make any reconnaissance of the line to be taken
over, the ignorance and mistakes of guides, and the complete darkness of a
rainy night delayed the relief of the sector of the 310th Infantry until about
11.30 a. m. on the 16th. A coordinated, simultaneous attack with the 309th
656 FIELD OPERATIONS
Infantry was therefore impossible, and this fact greatly hampered the success
of the subsequent operations. Operations in the division sector involved the
reduction of two natural strongholds : Bois des Loges and Grandpre. The
former lay in the sector of the 155th Brigade and the latter in that of the
156th."
The 309th Infantry opened the attack on Bois des Loges by advancing
its 2d and 3d battalions from the ridge northwest of Sommerance. The ad-
vance was made through mud, at times knee deep, across Cote 182 and the
Agron River, entirely without artillery support. A halt was then made until
11.45 a. m., when, in conjunction with the 310th Infantry, which had come up
on the left, a further advance was made to a line roughly on the parallel
passing about 500 meters (545 yards) south of Champigneulle. 34 ' s
The 311th Infantry (15Gth Brigade) got into position in time to attack
through the mist at 6.35 a. m., without any definite information as to the
enemy line, his position, or the topography in front. After capturing
Chevieres, the advance reached the Aire. Only two platoons succeeded in
crossing the river before the mist lifted, permitting the enemy to sweep the
river with artillery and with machine guns located in the woods north of St.
Juvin road. This checked all further advances for the day. 34
On the morning of the 17th the 310th Infantry had pushed forward to
a line on the parallel passing through the center of Champigneulle, on the
eastern edge of the Bois des Loges, before an order reached its front line
directing that it withdraw and move so as to attack Bois des Loges from the
west side. The 309th Infantry advanced and took over this sector and pushed
patrols forward to the third east and west road of Bois des Loges. Before
night, counterattacks forced the line back in this part of the woods to the
crossroads in its southern part. The 310th Infantry, meanwhile, had executed
the dangerous maneuver of withdrawing from a position on the eastern side
of the Bois des Loges and attacking again toward the west, across the open
ground of Hill 180. By night, the 310th Infantry was entrenched on the
western side of the woods, its left flank running north and south from the
southwestern tip of the woods toward the woods about 2.5 km. (1.5 miles)
east of Grandpre. The line held temporarily in this position until a gap
which had developed between the 309th and 310th Regiments was closed.
Information from corps headquarters indicated that the success of the whole
military situation depended upon reaching the north edge of Bois des Loges
before the morning of the 18th, and immediate resumption of the attack was
ordered. 34
During the night of October 16-17 more troops of the 156th Brigade had
been pushed across the Aire, and at 6.30 a. m., October 17, this brigade, aided
by artillery fire, advanced to the line extending from about 2 km. (1.2 miles)
west of Grandpre, skirting the south tip of Grandpre. northeast to the
rirandpre — St. Juvin road. There the line was held up temporarily by ma-
chine guns to the north, but before the following morning its left had ad-
vanced about 0.75 of a km. (0.46 mile). On the right, liaison was also secured
with the Infantry of the troops of the 155th Brigade in Bois des Loges. 3 '- 5
PLATE XXXIX.
Battle lines, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1 , 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-AHGONNE OPEBATION 657
At daybreak on October 18 two companies of the 310th Infantry Regi-
ment were in position between Ferine des Loges and the westernmost tip of
Bois des Loges. Here they were held up by a line of enemy machine guns
on their front, were under heavy fire, and suffered severe casualties. Inside
the woods two companies of the 310th had advanced to within 30 yards (27
meters) of the northern edge, and the 309th on their right had also advanced
considerably. Desperate, confused fighting followed all day. The enemy coun-
terattacks were too strong, however, and at nightfall the line in the woods was
once more along the crossroads at its southern part. The companies between
Ferine des Loges and the westernmost tip of Bois des Loges were still in their
position, and all attempts to make a strong connection with these units were
broken up by enemy fire. The left flank was more than 1 km. (0.6 mile) north
•if the 311th Infantry. In between, the enemy was in the Ferine des Loges.
Operations planned to take place farther to the west were necessarily ham-
pered so long as the enemy occupied his position at Ferine des Loges. Our
troops between Ferine des Loges and the westernmost tip of Bois des Loges
were therefore withdrawn to the southern edge of Bois des Loges. 34
At midnight on October IS a heavy bombardment was opened on the
citadel of Grandpre, to prepare for attack by the 156th Brigade at 2 a. m.,
on the 19th. This attack was ordered to advance along the tongue of land
toward the edge of the woods to the west of Bellejoyeuse Ferine. There it was
to be joined by the 311th Infantry attacking at 3 a. m., and to press on into
the Bois de Bourgogne. The 311th Avas also to secure liaison with the 310th
on the ridge north of Ferine des Loges. The 312th was unable to carry out
its part of the program, and the 311th Regiment, after taking Ferine des
Loges, was held up 300 meters (327 yards) east of Bellejoyeusc Ferine, under
the shelter of a ridge. It also secured a foothold in the orchard on the rid<re
north of Ferine des Loges, but was unable to make connections with the 310th.
The line w^as maintained under heavy machine-gun and artillery fire until
late in the afternoon, when a hostile barrage forced that part of the line in
the orchard to drop back about 200 meters (218 yards) to the shelter of the
ridge. 34
At 3 a. m., on the 19th. an effort was made to take Bellejoyeuse Ferine.
This attack was partially successful in the west, but was stopped when in
the Bois des Loges. The 311th Infantry took Ferine des Loges and gained
a footing in the orchard on the ridjre north of it. It was also able to reach
the foot of the slope on which Bellejoyeuse Ferine was located, but the troops
were not able to take that place. The 319th Infantry found that the artillery
concentration had not silenced the machine guns in Bois des Loges, and all
attempts during the night and day of the 19th to establish liaison with the
311th Infantry failed. An enemy artillery barrage in the afternoon drove
the 310th back about 200 yards (182 meters) from the orchard, lietween Bois
des Loges and Bellejoyeuse Ferme. 34
Our troops in Bois des Loges were becoming exhausted, and neither the
brijrade nor the division had reserves available to relieve them. A request
658 FIELD OPERATIONS
was made to the corps for replacements to continue the attack, but this could
not be granted. In consequence the line was withdrawn from Bois des Loges
and was established along the Grandpre — St. Juvin road. The withdrawal
was successfully accomplished by all troops before 9.30 a. m., October 20.
The line now established ran along the Grandpre — St. Juvin road from Ferine
des Graves to Moulin d'en Bas. 34
Conforming to the withdrawal of the 155th Brigade from Bois des Loges
on the morning of the 20th, the line of the 311th Infantry was established
from Ferme des Graves, where liaison was gained with the 310th Infantry,
to the railroad cut about 1 Ian. (0.6 mile) a little south of east of Grandpre.
Operations in the sector from Chevieres to Ferme des Greves, after this with-
drawal, consisted mainly of reciprocal bombardments and patrols. 3 *
When the 2d Battalion of the 312th Infantry advanced to relieve the 77th
Division units in the town of Grandpre, the enemy was found to be occupying
the whole town in force, except for a half dozen houses at the western exit on
the south side of Grandpre — Echaude Ferme road. It required almost two
days of house-to-house fighting to complete the latter part of the capture of
the town. Farther west the 1st Battalion of the 312th Regiment and a
machine-gun company had forded the river in the morning under heavy
machine-gun and artillery fire, seeking liaison with the French entrenched
along the Grandpre — Termes road. 3 *
A pause in the operations around Grandpre followed from the 20th to
the 23d, during which careful reconnaissance and study of the situation were
made for the attack planned for the 23d. After a heavy destructive bombard-
ment and a concentration of nonpersistent gas on some of the points to be
attacked, a smoke screen was to be laid down and two converging attacks from
Grandpre and Talma Hill were to be delivered. One assault was to follow
a rolling barrage of artillery and a machine-gun barrage, and was to take
the citadel of Grandpre, advance up the tongue of land to a point just west
of Bellejoyeuse Ferme, along the eastern edge of the Bois de Bourgogne to a
point about one-half kilometer (0.3 mile) north, thence west about one-third
kilometer (0.2 mile) to a road fork. A second assault by a similar force was
to follow the first at 1 km. (0.6 mile) and extend the line from the road fork
southwest to the edge of the woods about seven-eighths of a kilometer (0.5
mile) distant. When this objective had been reached, a battalion of the 311th
Infantry, supported by machine guns, was to advance to the north edge of
Bois de Negremont and pass through the line established by the 312th. The
1st Battalion, 312th Infantry, was to attack Talma Hill and after capturing
it throw out patrols through the woods toward the east. 34
A small group of troops scaled the wall of the citadel and reached
Bellejoyeuse Ferme, but because of their insignificant numbers they could not
take the place and were obliged to fall back to our lines in the northern edge
of Grandpre. The attack on Talma was successful. While the full objective
set for this attack was not reached, two of the three points which made up the
stronghold of Grandpre were taken and the way was open for the success
which followed. 34
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 659
An attempted surprise attack on October 24 by the troops on Talma Hill
did not get started because of the enemy fire, and the day was quiet on the
whole front. On the next morning, however, a battalion of the 311th Infantry
attacked from the top of Talma Hill. This battalion easily gained the edge
of Bois de Bourgogne and then fought its way along to a line running roughly
along the objective set for the attack of October 23. The connection with
the troops in Grandpre was made just before the relief of the 312th Infantry
by the 311th had been completed, and by the establishment of this liaison the
reduction of the stronghold of Grandpre was ended. The 155th Brigade
extended its line to Ferme des Gieves, and the gap from there to Grandpre
was covered by strong machine-gun posts. The 312th Infantry went into the
division reserve, and the 311th Infantry, supported by machine-gun units,
organized the 156th Brigade front in Bois de Bourgogne, in preparation for
the major operation of November 1. Further serious exploitation of the
success in reducing Grandpre was not attempted, upon corps orders. Local
rectification of the front, including the occupation of Talma Village, on
October 28 and Bellejoyeuse Ferme on the 29th, was easily accomplished
while making ready for the great attack. 34
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
After the division had moved to the Argonne and before it entered the
lines, 11,000 men were put through the corps baths at Karecourt and the
division baths and given clean clothing. 35
During the march to this area and while the division was in the corps
reserve, the Medical Department maintained liaison by assigning 4 am-
bulances and 1 officer with 4 enlisted men from an ambulance company to
each brigade.
On October 15 the sanitary units of the division were disposed of as
follows: Ambulance Company No. 311 oj>erated a dressing station at La
Besogne. and Ambulance Company No. 312 another at Malassise Ferme.
Ambulance Company No. 310 and United States Army Ambulance Service
Section No. 569, at Lancon. established the divisional triage (Ambulance
Company Xo. 309 had not yet arrived from base ports). Field Hospitals No.
310 and No. 311, at Lancon, were prepared to receive gassed and sick, re-
spectively. Field Hospital No. 309 was at Apremont and Field Hospital No.
312 at Clermont. Seriously wounded were to be evacuated through the
triage to Evacuation Hospital No. 11, at Brizeau Forestieres, and nontrans-
portable wounded to Mobile Hospital No. 4, at La Grange-aux-Bois: Mobile
Hospital No. 2, at Chateau Salvange; and Army Bed Cross Hospital No. 114,
at Fleury. The medical supply unit was located at Clermont throughout the
division's activities, supplying forward units through subdepots at the triages
and assisting a number of organizations which did not belong to its division. 86
Medical organizations of the 78th Division, after a conference between
the division surgeons concerned, took over sites which had been held by
the similar organizations of the 77th, but difficulty in evacuation was ex-
perienced for the following reasons: The entire corps attacked before the
660 FIELD OPERATIONS
Medical Department could complete a reconnaissance, and it was then found
that the sector of the 78th did not exactly coincide with that of the TTtli.
The road conditions were extremely bad. For example, mud was over 2 feet
deep in some places between La Besogne and Lancon ; liaison between regi-
ments and ambulance companies was not satisfactory, telephone communica-
tion was not fully established, and it was not until the 17th of October that
the ambulance companies could locate some of the troops they served. 37
The direction of roads was such that the wounded on the 78th Division in
the eastern half of the sector, north of the Aire River, naturally drained into
St. Juvin, where several hundred of its casualties were cared for by the 82d
Division during the first 36 hours. It is true this half of the sector was
heavily drenched with gas by the enemy, but from the considerable number
of walking gas cases it was concluded that there was a large mental element
in the condition of many such patients. 38
On October 17 the evacuation system was radically changed; the sanitary
train was split in half and two evacuation routes established, each with its
dressing station or stations, triage, and two hospitals. The train was then
disposed as follows: Ambulance Company No. 311 established dressing sta-
tions at La Besogne and Marcq. Ambulance Company No. 312 operated a
station at Malassise Ferme. Headquarters of the train was located at Lancon.
with Field Hospital No. 310 for gassed cases and Field Hospital No. 311
for sick, and there headquarters of the ambulance section and Ambulance
Company No. 310, w 7 ith United States Army Ambulance Service Section No.
509, operated Triage No. 1. A section of Ambulance Company No. 310
established Triage No. 2 at Apremont, where Field Hospitals No. 309 and
No. 312 received gassed and sick, respectively. 39 The triages, augmented by
whatever personnel was available, cared for surgical patients. These were
not treated at any other divisional formation (though admitted to hospital
wards if necessary to await transportation), but were sent direct from the
triages to mobile or evacuation hospitals. After the division medical forma-
tions were located as above described, one section of the sanitary train
evacuated up the valley of the Aisne through the medical establishments at
Malassise Ferine and Lancon, while the other evacuated up the valley of
the Aire through those located at Marcq and Apremont. The station at
La Besogne was discontinued, except that 1 officer and 8 men were left there
to care for casualties in the divisional reserve. 38
Certain changes in assignment were made during this period. On October
17 a detachment which reported with an ambulance convoy reinforced the
sanitary train, and on October 19 and 20 detachments of Ambulance Com
pany No. 309 arrived and were assigned to the triage at Apremont. On the
23d that triage was further strengthened by assignment to it of the head-
quarters of the ambulance section. On October 29 United States Army
Ambulance Service Section No. 5C9 was relieved from duty witli the division. 4 ' 1
Liaison was maintained at first by a runner attached to each battalion aid
station, but later this system was modified by assigning to each regiment in the
line 1 officer and -4 men from the ambulance companies. This officer not only
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION
661
(562
FIELD OPERATIONS
maintained contact between the battalion and ambulance stations, but he also
inspected daily each of the former which he served, to assure himself that the
wounded were being evacuated promptly and that supplies were properly
maintained. He submitted a daily report concerning his activities. Each
medical department organization, whatever its character, made a daily report
of its location to the division surgeon. The chief difficulties which the Medi-
cal Department experienced were in maintaining contact. 11
The evacuation system in its relation to individual infantry regiments
during the most stable periods was as follows : All battalion aid stations were
Fib. 77. — First-aid station, 312th Infantry, Oramlpro, Ardennes, October IS, lyis
provided with runners from the ambulance companies, and contact was main-
tained by them. Under the liaison officer mentioned above, ambulances were
habitually parked in the vicinity of the dressing station: but when a bat-
talion station enjoyed ample protection because of steep hills or sunken roads,
an ambulance was parked near it. There was very little transportation by
bearers back of these stations, except in the vicinity of Grandpre, where the
character of the roads made access to their station by motor ambulance
utterly impossible. 42 Belays of litter bearers carried patients from the sta-
tion at Grandpre to a point on the road west of La Folie Ferine, accessible
by horse-drawn vehicles, viz, general service wagons and British limbers.
MEUSE-AKGONNE OPERATION 663
These vehicles then carried wounded to the motor ambulance head, at the
point where the road began to descend into the Aisne Valley, near Malassise
Ferine. At all other places, ambulances were sent up on call, by runner,
to the battalion aid station. 43 Later, ambulances were sent up experimentally,
via Senile, through territory occupied by the French 35th Division, to the
battalion aid station at Grandpre. As they were not fired upon, a regular
service was established from that point, over this route, and another was
operated via Termes to Talma Ferme. At a point about 200 meters (218
yards) east of Chevieres the 312th Infantry maintained a battalion aid station,
and ambulance service was established between this point and Marcq. At a
point about 1 km. (0.6 mile) west of St. Juvin, on the high road between
St. Juvin and Grandpre, battalion aid stations were established by the 309th
and 310th Infantry Regiments, and evacuations were carried on from this
point to Marcq, crossing the Aire River at St. Juvin, over bridges built by
the Engineers of the 78th Division. 4 *
The regimental aid station of the 309th Infantry was located at Marcq
and its battalion stations in St. Juvin, and about 1 Ian. (0.6 mile) west of that
point in the shelter of a hill. In this regiment all the medical officers but
one and most of the Medical Department enlisted men were gassed and
evacuated. The regiment itself was so reduced in strength that line stretcher
bearers could not be furnished, and the regimental band was sent to perform
this duty. 44
As a routine procedure, patients were given antitetanic serum at the aid
stations, but in about 10 per cent of the wounds, incurred in rear of them,
it was given at the dressing station. At the triages, where all patients were
examined, it was given to such as did not show evidence of its prior adminis-
tration, unless they were in profound shock, when its need was noted on the
diagnosis tag. Casualties which had not passed through a battalion aid sta-
tion were reported daily by the dressing station to the surgeon of the bat-
talion concerned, with appropriate data for his reports of sick and wounded.
About 80 per cent of fractures were splinted at battalion stations. At the
dressing stations, splints were rectified if necessary and applied to all needing
that attention. At the dressing station also, splints were applied to very
severe wounds of the soft parts in order to allay pain in transit over rough
roads. 43 During this action the average time which elapsed after a patient
was wounded before he was admitted to a field hospital was approximately
two hours. 45
It was necessary at times to use not only ambulances but all the trucks
of the sanitary train as well, and many trucks of the motor supply train, for
evacuation. Regular use was made of returning ration trucks, which had
to pass either the triage at Lancon or that at Apremont on their way to the
rear. To obviate delay, they were marked by broad white streamers across
the radiators, and thus being recognized were flagged on their return from the
front. At Lancon a waiting station, subsidiary to the triage, was established
on the main street down which the trucks had to pass. No figures are available
of the number of wounded men evacuated by truck, but it was considerably
664 FIELD OPERATIONS
larger than the number evacuated by ambulance. Ambulances in the division
proved entirely inadequate in number to carry out evacuation in addition to
the necessary transport in front of the triage, for the distance to evacuation
hospitals at this time varied from 25 to 45 km. (15 to 27 miles). Owing to
road congestion and the necessity for slow travel because of the condition of
the wounded, the round trip for ambulances averaged from 12 to 14 hours and
for trucks 24 hours. This alone deprived the division of the normal use of
its transportation, both ambulances and trucks. 46
REFERENCES
(1) Report of operations, First Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(2) Report of Medical Department Units, First Army, from chief surgeon, First Army.
to the assistant chief of staff, G-3, First Army, February C, 1919. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(3) Plan of evacuation of sick and wounded, by Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, surgeon,
First Army Corps, October 21, 1918. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(4) Special operations report, 153d and 154th Infantry Brigades. 77tli Division, Meuse-
Argonne operation, undated.
(5) Map showing daily positions of front line, Meuse-Argonne operation, G-3, G. H. Q.,
May 24, 1919.
(6) Report of Medical Department activities, 77th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 77th Division, undated, 37. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(7) Ibid., 38.
(8) Ibid., 39.
(9) Ibid.. 40.
(10) Ibid., 41.
(11) Ibid., 33.
(12) Ibid.. 42.
(13) Ibid., 19.
(14) Ibid., 7.
(15) Report on operations, Meuse-Argonne offensive. 28th Division. January 28. 1919.
(16) Report of Medical Department activities, 28th Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 28th Division, undated, Part I. 33. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(17) Ibid., Part II, 11.
(18) Ibid., Part II, 20.
(19) Report on operations of the First Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, October 17.
1918.
(20) Report of Medical Department activities. 1st Division, prepared under the direc-
tion of the division surgeon, 1st Division (undated), Part II. 44. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G O.
(21) Ibid., 45.
(22) Ibid., 42.
(23) Ibid., 43.
(24) Ibid., 41.
(25) Ibid., 46.
(26) Ibid., 47.
(27) Report of the operations of the 82d Division. Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(28) Report of Medical Department activities, 82d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 82d Division, undated, 10. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
MEXJSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 665
(29) Ibid., 11.
(30) Ibid., 17.
(31) Ibid., 18.
(32) Ibid., 34.
(33) Ibid., 4.
(34) Report on operations of tlie 78th Division. Meuse-Argonne operation. December
10, 191S.
(35) Report of Medical Department activities, 78tb Division, prepared under the direc-
tion of the division surgeon, 78th Division (undated), Part I. 7. On file. His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(36) Ibid., Part I, 30.
(37) Ibid., Part I, 0.
(3S) Ibid., Part I, 10.
(39) Ibid., Part I. 40.
(40) Ibid., Part I, 41.
(41) Ibid., Part I, 17.
(42) Ibid., Part I, 66.
(43) Ibid., Part I, 67.
(44) Ibid., Part I, 11.
(45) Ibid., Part I, 64.
(46) Ibid., Part I. 14.
CHAPTEE XXVI
SECOND PHASE— Continued
FIFTH CORPS
At the beginning of the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation,
the Fifth Corps, which held the center of the attacking lines, consisted, from
right to left, of the 3d and 32d Divisions. During the previous night and
the forenoon of October 4, the 91st Division (less the 58th Field Artillery Bri-
gade), had been relieved from the front line and had passed to the corps
reserve in the vicinity of Bois de Very and Bois de Cheppy. 1 The 32d Divi-
sion had moved over to the left, relieving the 91st, and divided the corps front
with the 3d Division. 2 The 42d Division, in the vicinity of Recieourt, had
now passed from the army reserve and was attached to the Fifth Corps as re-
serve. 3 The corps was ordered to attack the heights on both sides of Romagne.
The 3d Division was ordered to assist the left division, Third Corps, to capture
the Bois de Ogons, Bois de Cunel. and the heights east of Romagne. The 32d
Division was ordered to capture Gesnes and the heights west of Romagne, and
to assist the 1st Division on its left in the capture of Bois de Money. 4
On October 4, at 5.25 a. m., the attack began, the troops being preceded
by a barrage at 300 meters (327 yards). During the afternoon both divisions
encountered strongly organized machine-gun resistance and artillery fire.
Advance elements of the 3d Division reached as far north as the Bomagne —
Cunel road. At 5 p. m. the 32d Division reported that their troops had
passed through Gesnes. The 3d Division reported that they were attacking
Romagne and that their troops were along the Romagne — Cunel road. At 7.45
p. m. the 3d Division reported its inability to get the Cierges — Romagne road
because of machine-gun fire from the Bois de Gesnes. During the night the
32d Division occupied a position south of Bois do la Morine and had elements
of this division entrenched along the. Gesnes — Cierges road. 2 ' 5
On October 5 the attack continued at 6.30 a. in. At noon the line of the
32d Division was near the edge of Bois du Chene Sec. At the same hour the
corps line ran approximately through the Bois du Chene Sec to the northern
exit of Gesnes to the Bois de Cunel. At midnight the line taken was prac-
tically as follows : Hill 268, Hill 253, Gesnes, Bois du Chene Sec. 2 - »
No attack was ordered for the morning of October 6. Field Orders. No.
62, Fifth Corps, directed the Fifth Corps to organize for further attack and
to establish the general line of resistance for defense, as follows : Nantillois —
Bois de Beuge — Bois Emont — Bois Communal de Cierges — Bois Communal
de Baulny.
On October 7 Field Orders, No. 64, Fifth Corps, provided for the contin-
uance of the advance on " D " day at " II '* hour. The Fifth Corps was again
667
668 I'IKI.n OPERATIONS
ordered to attack the heights east and west of Romagne. The troops of the
corps now comprised the 3d Division, 32d Division, 1st Division, 42d Division,
181st Brigade (91st Division). The elements to be in line from right to left
were as follows: 3d Division, 32d Division (with 361st Infantry Regiment
and 347th Machine Gun "Battalion of the 91st Division attached), the 1st
Division with 362d Infantry Regiment attached. The 42d Division was the
corps reserve. No operations were attempted on October 7 or 9. 5 - 6
On October 9, at 8 :30 a. m., the attack was launched, the advance of the
corps being made under a rolling barrage. The 3d Division encountered
a short, violent counterbarrage and considerable machine-gun fire on entering
Bois de Cunel; but by noon this division had passed through these woods,
and its advance elements had occupied Tranchee de la Mamelle. Units were
then pushing on toward the Romagne — Cunel road. At noon the 32d Division
had advance units in the southern portion of Romagne, had advanced to the
army objective, and was progressing through the Bois de Money. The 1st
Division encountered considerable machine-gun resistance during the morning
as far as Cote 263 in Le Petit Bois. On the left this division was in position
1 km. (0.6 mile) south of Sommerance. During the afternoon there was a
general advance along the entire corps front excepting in the vicinity of Cote
255, where little progress was made. By nightfall the line from left to right
was approximately as follows : From point about 0.75 km. north of Fleville
the line ran northeasterly through center of Cote de Maldah, then through
center of Cote 263 in Le Petit Bois, then to center of woods at Cote 255. From
there the line ran due north to the army objective and along it about 1 km.,
turning sharply due east, skirting southern edge of Romagne, and then to a
point just 400 meters (436 yards) below Cunel. 2 - 7
On the morning of October 10 the 1st Division advanced, and by noon
had established its left just north of Sommerance, its center in the vicinity
of Ravin du Gras Faux, and its right just south of La Cote Dame Marie.
During the afternoon little progress was made, the time being spent, however,
in preparation for a vigorous offensive in the morning. 2 ' 7
On the morning of the 11th much opposition was encountered. During
the night of October 11-12 the 42d Division moved into the line and took
over the front occupied by the 1st Division. The 181st Infantry Brigade
(91st Division) withdrew from the line and the 32d Division extended into
the gap caused by its withdrawal.
On October 12 Field Orders, No. 71. Fifth Corps, changed the sector
limits of the corps. It also transferred the tactical control of the 3d Division
to the Third Corps, to be effective at 3 p. m. Field Orders, Xo. 72, Fifth
Corps, moved the 89th Division (which was transferred from the Third
Corps to the Fifth Corps) from the vicinity of Recicourt to the area Bois de
Montfaucon — Bois de Very and Bois de Chehemin. After completion of the
reliefs, the morning was used in making adjustments in the line and in im-
proving its positions, as well as in keeping contact with the enemy. At the
end of the day the situation was practically unchanged. The corps front was
shortened by the 3d Division's transfer to the Third Corps. The 32d Division
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 669
held the i-i <rlit of the corps front and the 42d Division the left, with the 80th
Division in reserve. 2
On October 12 Field Orders, No. 73, Fifth Army Corps, setting forth the
plans for further attack, were issued. The Fifth Corps was to seize La Ber-
yferie Ferine and Cote 253, flanking the Bois des Hazois. It was ordered to
advance to the line — ridge running southwest from Hill 300 in Bois d'Ande-
vanne — La Bergerie Ferine — Bois l'Epasse — Cote 253 — ridge 1 km. (0.G mile)
northwest of St. Georges. The 82d Division was to attack on the right and the
42d Division on the left, with the 89th in reserve.
On Octol>er 14 the attack was launched at 5.30 a. m. The advance was
made under a rolling barrage. Much opposition from artillery fire and ma-
chine guns was encountered at the start. By noon the line of the 42d Division
was just below St. Georges and over 1 km. (0.6 mile) below Landres et St.
Georges, then clown in the vicinity of La Musarde Ferine. The 32d Division
bad passed Komagne by noon.- At night the line extended approximately
along a line 1 km. (0.6 mile) south of St. Georges — Landres et St. Georges,
thence southeast to Bois de Gesnes. thence northeast to Bois de Chauvignon,
southeast just northwest of Komagne, thence to a point about 400 meters
(436 yards) northeast of Komagne. 7
On the morning of October 15 no pronounced advances were made. Prog-
ress was very difficult, especially in wooded areas. The 42d Division cap-
tured Hill 242 and at noon was attacking La Tuilerie Ferine. During the
afternoon the attack resulted principally in minor advances. Penetrations were
made into the Bois de Bantheville. 2
No attack was ordered for October 16, and the divisions of the line made
readjustments of their positions, in compliance with Field Orders, No. 76.
Fifth Corps. In the morning troops were in La Tuilerie Ferme, and at noon
the 42d Division reported the capture of La Musarde Ferine. In the after-
noon Cote de Chatillon and La Tuilerie Ferme were captured. No attack
was ordered for the 17th. The corps commander directed that the region
in the vicinity of Cote de Chatillon, La Tuilerie Ferme, as well as the road
leading to Bantheville, be cleared of the enemy and that patrols be pushed
forward into the Bois de Bantheville. 2
On October 17 patrols and outposts were pushed well forward. Patrols
from the 32d Division found the northern and western parts of the Bois de
Bantheville practically free of the enemy, and one element of this division
during the morning of October 18 established itself on the La Dhuy Ferine —
Bantheville road. 2
During the night October 19-20 the 32d Division (less the 57th Field
Artillery Brigade) was relieved by the 89th Division, after which it was as-
sembled in the vicinity of Bois de Cheppy, Bois de Very, and the western part
of the Bois de Montfaucon. where it was held as corps reserve. The 57th
Field Artillery Brigade was attached to the 89th Division. 8
From October 21 until the end of the month no change was made in the
ireneral situation of the corps. However, the period was used in a general
preparation for the next advance. This included the clearing of the Bois de
670 FIELD OPERATIONS
Bantheville by the 89th Division. 9 On October 24 a new plan of attack was
laid down in Field Orders. Xo. 90, Fifth Corps. The ridge of the Bois do
Barricourt and the heights northeast of Bayonville at Chennery were to
be carried. The troops for the attack comprised the 89th and 2d Divisions in
line, 1st Division as corps reserve. Provisions were made for the 42d in re-
serve to pass to the First Corps. As the 42d Division was to remain in line
until the attack, the 2d Division was ordered to pass through the 42d Division
to the point of departure, whereupon the 42d Division was to be assembled
in the vicinity of Exermont, passing to the control of the First Corps, after
the new plan of attack (for November 1).
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On September 30, when the 32d Division relieved the 37th Division, the
triage was located 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) southwest of Montfaucon. The 3d
Division replaced the 79th on that same date, and its triage was located next
day about 1 km. (0.6 mile) southeast of Very on the road to Avocourt; but as
it proved impracticable to evacuate by roads in the eastern part of the corps
sector, this route was shifted to the Very- — Cheppy — Varennes road. As this
change stopped evacuations from the corps to Mobile Hospital No. 1 at Les
Clairs Chenes, the latter unit was transferred to the Third Corps, and Mobile
Hospital No. 2, at Chateau Salvange, was assigned to the service of the Fifth
Corps and the First Corps conjointly.
Having entered the Fifth Corps on the night of October 6-7 in relief of
the 91st Division, the 1st Division established its triage at Cheppy. When,
on October 12. the 42d Division replaced the 1st it took over the triage site of
the latter at Cheppy. but later moved its triage to Baulny. 10
The 89th Division established its field hospitals near the site occupied by
those of its predecessor 2 km. (1.2 miles) southwest of Montfaucon, but soon
moved them to a point 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) north of Cbarpentry. AVhen they
were shelled out of this position, on October 20, the hospitals for sick and
gassed patients were moved to the south of that village and the triage was
established at La Grange-aux-Bois Ferme. United States Army Ambulance
Service Section No. 602 was now withdrawn from the corps. 10
On October 27, the surgeon's office, Fifth Corps, moved to Cheppy. Two
days later Mobile Hospital No. 4 was established 0.5 km. (0.3 mile) north of
that town, and Mobile Hospital No. 6, 1 km. (0.6 mile) west of it, was made
available to the Fifth and First Corps. 11
The following memoranda were issued by the corps surgeon during the
second phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation :
Memorandum Xo. 19 6 Octoder, 1918.
To division surgeons:
1. Establishment of field hospitals (so far as practicable following plan will l>e
followed) :
(a) One field hospital for triage, shocked cases, and nontransportables. Surgical and
shock teams will be organized by drawing upon the personnel of other field hospitals.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 671
All cases, except gassed, will be passed through this hospital and a careful sorting made
so that there will be no confusion of cases in the evacuation ; severely and slightly wounded
and sick to be kept separate.
(6) One field hospital for gassed. At this hospital the division medical gas officer
and an assistant will be stationed and examine and classify every case brought in. All
doubtful and slightly gassed cases will be retained for a reasonable length or time with
a view to the possibility of returning them to duty.
(c) One field hospital for ordinary sick. All serious cases will be evacuated, but
those requiring only a few days in hospital will be retained until cured, if possible, and
teturned to duty. Cases of influenza will be retained and treated in a separate tent.
(d) One field hospital in reserve.
2. Field hospitals should be located in a sheltered spot where water is available, and
near a good road; not at a crossroad or near an ammunition or supply dump, and not in
or in the outskirts of a town which is within range of enemy guns.
3. Instructions will be given to insure the administration of nntitetanic serum at the
earliest possible moment. In addition to the notation on the diagnosis tag. the patient
will be marked on the forehead with a " T " or a cross. In case a wounded man is re-
ceived at triage without this notation or marking, a dose will be administered immediately.
The man's statement that he has received a dose will not be considered. Great care will
be taken to have diagnosis tag made legible and to have it securely fastened to the
patient.
4. The greatest care will be exercised in the use of the tourniquet. The exact time
of application will be noted on diagnosis tag and the ambulance orderly be directed to
look after it during the trip.
Memorandum No. 20. 1G Oct. 18.
1. Beginning to-morrow at 8 a. m. a noncommissioned officer. Medical Department,
will be stationed on the main road at Clermont at northern end of loop to direct the
evacuation of wounded. He will have the necessary information as to available beds
in the different mobile and evacuation hospitals.
Each driver of an ambulance or truck used for evacuation, upon departure from a
field hospital, will be given a slip by the officer in charge, upon which will be stated
the number and class of patients in his vehicle : e. g., " 4 severely wounded." " 10 slightly
wounded," " 4 postoperatives," " sick," " 6 gassed," etc. Upon reaching the sergeant
in Clermont, the driver will hand him this slip; the sergeant will give the necessary
directions, note the destination on the slip, and file it to be turned in at this office at end of
his tour of duty.
2. The greatest care will be exercised in sorting patients for evacuation; severely and
slightly wounded, wounded and gassed, postoperative, and preoperative cases will not be
mired. All serious cases will be evacuated by ambulance whenever possible, and field
hospital trucks or trucks returning empty to the rear used for slight cases when
necessary.
An officer will be held strictly accountable for triage and evacuation at each field
hospital functioning.
The following changes were issued by the corps surgeon, Fifth Corps, on
October 25, 1918 :
EVACUATION OF SICK AND WOUNDED
1. Organization :
Field hospitals for triage, gassed, and sick: 89th Division now established about
1 km. northeast of Charpentry. This site will be occupied by the field hospitals of
1st Division when the division goes in. If conditions permit, the establishment will be
placed at La Grunge-nux-Iiois Ferme. Second Division will establish triage about 1 km.
672 FIELD OPERATIONS
southwest of Exermont. Field hospitals for gassed and sick and for nontransportable
oases of 2d and S9tli Divisions will be established on road running south from Char-
pentry, about % tan. from junction of that road with main road (Baulny — Varennes).
2. Evacuation :
Same as in previous orders except that Mobile Hospital No. C, about % km. west of
Cheppy, will be used in conjunction with 1st Corps for operable, severely wounded.
Memorandum No. 22- A was published by the corps surgeon on October 27.
1918.
1. There will be available very shortly three hospitals near front line for nontrans-
portable operative cases:
(a) Groupe eomplimentaire of the 2d Division, 1 km. south of Charpentry;
(b) Mobile Hospital No. 4, y_> km. north of Cheppy (to be established October
29), and
(c) Mobile Hospital No. i>. 1 km. west of Cheppy (to be used in conjunction
with the First Corps in case of need).
Therefore, no surgery will be performed in advanced field hospitals except the,
absolutely necessary emergencies, but special attention will be given to the treatment
of shock, especially at the triage, in order to prepare these cases for transportation and
subsequent operations.
All transportable cases which will evidently stand the two or three hour trip to the
rear will be sent to Mobile Hospital No. 2, Evacuation Hospital No. 10, or A. It. C. Hos-
pital No. 114, in order to avoid clogging the forward surgical centers.
Great care will be exercised in sorting cases at the triage, only one class of cases
being loaded into a vehicle, in order to expedite evacuation and return of the vehicles
and prevent the necessity of further sorting.
2. The divisional gas officer and an assistant will be stationed at the division gaa
hospital, and every case entering will be carefully examined. All cases of a suspicious
nature, very slightly gassed or exhausted, will be held for at least twenty-four hours and
returned to duty if possible.
A supply of clothing will be kept at gas hospitals for those returned to duty.
3. All cases of slight illness and of influenza will be held at divisional sick hospitals
for a reasonable length of time with a view of returning them direct to duty whenever
possible..
THE 3D DIVISION
On October 4, at 5.25 a. m., the 3d Division launched its attack, with the
5th Infantry Brigade in advance. Its point of departure was approximately
the Mantillois — Cierges road. 12
Its prescribed zone of action was, on the east, Nantillois — Cunel road
(exclusive) — Cunel (exclusive) — Rantheville (inclusive) — Andevanne (exclu-
sive) — Tailly (inclusive) ; and on the west, Cierges (inclusive) — Bois de
Gesnes (east edge) — Bois de Bantheville (southwest edge). Its action was to
assist the left division of the Third Corps to capture Bois des Ogons. Bois de
Cunel. and the heights to the east of llomagne. 13
The 5th Brigade comprised the 4th Regiment of Infantry on the right
and the 7th Infantry on the left. Because of the strongly organized machine-
gun and artillery resistance, the division line was advanced less than a
kilometer.
On the morning of October 5, at 6.30 a. m., the attack was continued.
By infiltration, the line was advanced slowly against stubborn resistance from
many enemy machine guns in the Bois de Baloup, to the north edge of Woods
PLATE XL
MEUSE « ARGONNE OPERATION
SECOND PHASE
3R.B- 5™~ 32™ & 89™ DIVISIONS
Scale in. Kiloin ctpi'8
M* DIVISION 89^ DIVISION
NV 12S N 4 -' 353
126 354
127 355
128 356
References
lUieMOHT-B, «/*-*.«-*(««(. FOBC
tfAMOVHt. V£QDU»-A, am VtQDUH B
».•* *^.. »f Kidu' iW« f>v> -w'i if &,.;>.«
Battle tines, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1 , 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION G73
250 and the western edge of Bois des Ogons. During the night of October 5-6
the 4th and 7th Infantries advanced their lines to Hill 253 and organized
outpost positions on Hill 253. 12
On October 9, at 8.30 a. m., the 3d Division attacked, with the 6th Brigade
in the front line. Its mission now was to capture the heights east and west
of Romagne by noon. Tranchee de la Mamelle was gained, and the advance
rontinued. The front line of the division advanced slowly throughout the
afternoon, the front line at nightfall being approximately as follows: From
just north of Tranchee de la Mamelle. at a point about 1 km. (O.G mile) south-
east of Romagne, northeastwardly to the Cunel— Nantillois road. 12, 7
On the morning of October 10, at 7 a. m., the division continued its
attack, its mission being to capture Bantheville and the heights east and west
of that town. The advance developed slowly, being retarded by enemy con-
centrated machine-gun fire. On October 11 the attack continued, under the
same general conditions as on the previous day. No material advance was
made but the division line was improved. 12
The 12th of October was spent in reorganizing units and positions,
preparatory to continuing the advance up>on receipt of orders. The 3d Divi-
sion was transferred from the Fifth Corps to the Third Corps, and on the
night of October 12-13, during a heavy rain and a thick fog, while the enemy
was actively shelling the front line, relief of the 5th Division, on the right,
was effected. 12
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Sanitaky Train
The sanitary train had been parked at Bethelainville, September 27,
whence the ambulance section moved, on October 1, to Montfaucon. Train
headquarters with the Held hospital section moved October 5 to a point 1 km.
(0.6 mile) southeast of Very. While there it was subjected to shell fire, but
no casualties occurred. 14 i
Headquarters of the ambulance company section remained at Montfaucon
until the division was withdrawn, and here Ambulance Company No. 7 was
stationed from October 4 to 31. It operated a dressing station at this point
until October 15, which it turned over to Ambulance Company No. 27 after
treating 4,426 sick and wounded and suffering 18 casualties, with 2 deaths. 1 ''
Ambulance Company No. 5, after evacuating a few j)atients to Souilly, in
the interval October 1 to 4, was also located at Montfaucon, evacuating
patients immediately in rear of the lines to the dressing station, and thence
to the field hospitals.
Ambulance Company No. 27 moved to Montfaucon on October 4 and
was engaged until the 14th in evacuating patients from the front to the
several division hospitals. During this period it also maintained relief shifts
in the dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 7.
Ambulance Company No. 26, after moving to Malancourt, on October 1.
and thence, on October 4, to the northern edge of Montfaucon, withdrew
1357G— 2". 43
674
FIELD OPERATIONS
on the 7th to a point immediately south of that ruined village and there
camped until October 31. During this action its duties were somewhat
varied. From the 4th to the 7th it operated a dressing station at its first
position, near Montfaucon. 10
Headquarters of the field hospital section remained at Very from October
4 to 14, when, on the transfer of the 3d Division to the Third Corps, it moved
to Bethincourt. 17 At Very, Field Hospital No. 5 functioned as a gas hospital
and received 913 patients before moving to Bethincourt, on the 14th. 17
Fig. 7S. — Collecting point for wounded, 3d Division, near Nantillois, Meuse, October 12, 191?
Field Hospital Xo. 7 was in reserve at Very until October 14. when it
took over the triage from Field Hospital No. 27 and, after evacuating all
its patients, moved the same day to Bethincourt. 17
Field Hospital No. 26 received the sick, neurological, and shock cases (582
in number) at Very from October 4 to 14, establishing an operating room
in connection with the shock ward and performing all necessary surgical
work. Though frequently under shell fire, it suffered no casualties here. 18
Field Hospital No. 27 conducted the triage, except for gassed cases, at
Very from October 4 to 14, receiving 3,601 patients, with 10 deaths. The
location was very satisfactory, but evacuation to the rear sometimes proved
difficult. 19
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION
675
676 FIELD OPERATIONS
The hospital site at Very was exceptionally satisfactory, for not only was
it a desirable location in itself but it was also on good roads to front and
rear and it was only about 8 km. (4.9 miles) behind the lines. The concen-
tration here of field hos2oitals and the medical supply unit facilitated prompt
distribution of patients and supplies and proved as advantageous as did the
concentration of ambulance companies at Montfaueon. This arrangement
was the most satisfactory one effected by the sanitary train in the entire
course of its activities. 20
During the period October 5 to 12. divisional casualties received at the
field hospitals were as follows: 20 Wounded. 1,957: psychoneurotic, 121;
gassed, 495; injured, 45; sick, 310; total. 2.911. These figures do not in-
clude patients admitted from other divisions. 21
THE 32D DIVISION a
In compliance with Field Orders, No. 55, Fifth Corps, the corps front,
during the night of October 3-4, was readjusted, the 3d and 32d Divisions
taking over the sectors formerly occupied by the 3d, 32d, and 91st. Under
this order the readjustment placed the 3d Division on the right of the 32d,
and the 1st Division on its left. The 64th Brigade of the 32d Division moved
forward and took over the sector held by the 91st Division. The 32d Division
was then disposed with brigades abreast. The division line was thus ex-
tended considerably to the left, giving it a wider sector, about 5 km. (3
miles). 22
On October 4, at 5.30 a. m., the division launched its advance. Its mission
was to capture Gesnes and the heights west of Romagne, as well as to assist
the 1st Division in the capture of Bois cle Money, and, in turn, it was to be
assisted by the 1st Division in the capture of the heights west of Romagne.
At 9.55 a. m. the filth Brigade reported that its right battalion had crossed
the Ruisseau de Oesnes and was attempting to outflank the Bois de la Morine.
At this time the right of the line was between Hill 239 and Hill 210. At
5 p. m. the 63d Brigade reported that it held the northern edge of Gesnes.
During the day the division realized approximately 1 km. (0.6 mile) advance.
The line at the end of the day extended in a generally northeast-southwest
direction from tho Romagne — Charpentry wood about 1.5 km. (0.9 mile)
southeast of Gesnes; thence south of Gesnes; thence along the ravine ex-
tending southwest through Gesnes to the small road just north of Tronsol
Ferme. 22 ' 7
On October 5, at 6.30 a. m., the attack was continued. The 64th Brigade,
in liaison with the 2d Brigade of the 1st Division, was given as objectives Bois
de la Morine and Bois clu Chene Sec. The 63d Brigade was to attack Hill "255.
1 km. (0.6 mile) northwest of Gesnes, and to work forward in liaison with
troops on its right, with a view to the capture of Hill 240 and the trench
system to the north of that hill. At 1.30 p. m. the division line was at or on
the north edge of the Bois du Chene Sec. At that time Hill 255 was still in
the enemy's lines. At the end of the day the line ran from east to west, just
" For mnp of activities of this division for this porlod, see Plate XI..
METTSE-ABGONNE OPERATION G77
north of Gesnes, from a point on the Romagne — Charpentry road to the
northern outskirts of Bois du Chene Sec, thence southwest to the south edge
of Bois de Money. 22 - 7
No advance was made on October 6, 7. or 8. During the night October
7-8 the 63d Infantry Brigade was so disposed as to occupy the front and
western edge of Bois de Beuge to Hill 255, exclusive, one of its regiments
relieving the regiment of the 3d Division on the right. The 361st Infantry
of the 91st Division was attached temporarily to the 32d Division and relieved
the 64th Infantry Brigade on the front from Hill 255, inclusive, to the western
boundary of the divisional sector. The 64th Brigade, thus relieved, took
position as divisional reserve in rear of the 63d Brigade. 22 ' 6
On October 9, at 8.30 a. m., the attack was launched with the 63d Brigade
in advance, followed by the 64th Brigade in support. The mission of the
division was to capture the Bois de Veloup, Tranchee de Dantrise, and a
portion of Tranchee de la Mamelle Avithin its sector, seize and hold the heights
north of Romagne, and capture the heights west of Romagne by envelopment
from east and southeast. At the end of the day the line followed the Kriem-
hilde Stellung, running just to the south of Tranchee de la Mamelle, through
the Bois de Veloup, northwest to about 300 meters (275 yards) southwest of
La Cote Dame Marie. 22 ' 7
No attack was made on October 10, but on the morning of October 11. at
7 a. m., the division attacked, the troops closely following the artillery barrage.
By 11.30 a. m. the left had advanced about 0.5 km. (0.3 mile), but the right
had been unable to make any advance. 22
During the night of October 11-12 the 127th Infantry Regiment relieved
the 181st Infantry Brigade (91st Division), taking over the sector occupied
by it. 22
On October 14 the attack was launched at 5.30 a. m. During the morning
there were hard fighting and severe losses, but there was continual progress.
The left of the division was held up for some time. At 10.25 a. m. the leading
battalion of the left regiment was held up on the south slope of Hill 286. At
10.45 a. m. the commanding general. 64th Brigade, reported trouble at
La Cote Dame Marie and that his right flank was held up just south of
Romagne by very heavy machine-gun fire. At 11.45 a. m. a battalion of the
128th Infantry was reported north of Romagne. At 2.45 p. m. the 127th
Infantry was passing on both sides of La Cote Dame Marie. At 5 p. m.
the 128th Infantry was in the Bois de Chauvignon. At 8.24 p. m. the
division commander reported to the corps commander that the line in the left
half of the division's right subsector extended across the sector about 1 km.
(0.6 mile) north of the center of Romagne. At dark the regiment in the left
half of the left subsector was pressing two battalions forward to get in touch
with leading elements in the left half of the right subsector and to connect
with the front line of the division on the left. 22
On the night of October 14, orders were issued for the continuance of the
attack on the 15th, with instructions to advance to objectives not gained on the
14th, and upon the arrival at the fourth objective to exploit vigorously to the
678 FIELD OPERATIONS
line Arbre de Remonville — Malmay — Cote 258. During- the day of October 15,
the division advanced and passed the third objective and held all of the Bois
de Chauvignon except a little corner of the woods on the east. 22
On the lGth the regiment on the left (127th) moved up on the western
edge of the Bois de Bantheville and established its lines about 0.75 km. (0.4
mile) in advance of that held previously. On the right the division took the
small remaining stretch of the Bois de Chauvignon. The 128th Infantry oc-
cupied this. For the remainder of that day and on the 17th, a line of resistance
was organized along the general line Tranchee de la Mamelle — Tranchee de la
Dantrise — La Cote Dame Marie. 22
On the night of October 19-20, the 32d Division was relieved from the
front line by the 89th Division. The relief was completed at 7.55 a. m., October
20. The division then moved into the area of Bois de Cheppy, Bois de Very,
and western part of Bois de Montfaucon. where it was held as corps reserve. 22
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Whenever it Avas possible to do so, provision was made at regimental and
battalion aid stations for giving hot drinks, food, and rest, and many sick and
exhausted men were returned from these stations directly to the line. 23
Ambulance Companies
Ambulance Company No. 125 established a dressing station at Montfaucon:
Ambulance Company No. 126 established one at Very, and Ambulance Com-
pany No. 127 one at Ivoiry, while Ambulance Company Xo. 128 established a
station for the slightly wounded at a crossroads near the command post. Later
another station was established by the same personnel of Ambulance Company
No. 128, near the crossing of the Cheppy — Autrecourt roads. A dressing sta-
tion was established subsequently at La Grange-aux-Bois Ferme, with ambu-
lance posts at Cierges, Uesnes, and at other points as the action developed. 24
Field Hospitals
Field Hospital No. 12G, for the reception of gassed and sick patients, and
Field Hospital No. 127, to act as triage and to receive the nontransportable
wounded, had been established at the southern edge of Bois de Chehemin on
October 1. On October 4, Field Hospital No. 125 was ordered to establish
in the vicinity of Very, where it received the sick and some of the walking
wounded, as the lateral shift of the divisional front diverted some of the
wounded through Very. 25 Field Hospital No. 128 cared for the sick at first
at IJecicourt and later at Sivry-la-Perche. Except for the change in the site
of Field Hospital No. 128, these hospitals retained these locations as long as
the 32d Division remained in the sector. 2 ' 1 Field Hospitals No. 126 and No. 127
were thus in close proximity throughout the action, and equipment and per-
sonnel of all four hospitals were used interchangeably as conditions required.
On account of the badly damaged state of the roads and in order that patients
might be given hospital care as promptly as possible, field hospitals were lo-
MEUSE-AEGONNE OPERATION
679
cated farther forward than usual — for several days in advance of the Light
Artillery — with the result that a number of casualties occurred in the hospital
personnel. The triage plan previously developed was continued, proving satis-
factory in its results and smooth in its operations, for at the end of each period
it gave prompt data concerning' numbers and names of casualties. 25 The
commanding officer of Field Hospital N"o. 127, which conducted this triage,
reported in part as follows : 20
Throughout our stay at Montfaucon we were shelled day and night, for we were
situated very close to our own 15os and were exposed to such fire as was intended for
American batteries. The triage was in an even more exposed position, and here, too, we
found ourselves the target for shells. * * *
Ky V'
PlO. 80. — Medical Supply Depot, 32d Division, near Montfaucon, October 22, 1018. Field Hospital
No. 12G in background
Cases remained In hospital an average of three days. In the triage patients were
kept only long enough to be given a thorough examination, to have splints and dressings
adjusted or changed, and were then either evacuated to Field Hospital No. 127 or to the
rear. Whenever the condition of patients warranted, hot drinks and food were given.
Three medical officers were stationed at the triage for the sole purpose of adjusting
dressings and splints. The hospital had a capacity of about 300 and the triage about 400.
(The hospital and the triage were situated about 1 km. (0.(5 mile) part.)
Ample medical materiel was available at all times.
In addition to 4,193 casualties in the 32d Division from September 22 to
October 19, 2.589 casualties of other American units, 107 French, and 50 Ger-
680 FIELD OPERATIONS
mans were cared for by the Medical Department of the division, making a
total of 6,939. Of 32d Division casualties, 235 were cared for by other organi-
zations. Casualties in the 32d Division as reported at the triage were as
follows : 23
Officers
Men
15
48
4
17
628
2,110
26
516
61
Sick
40
964
124
4,304
The division surgeon interpreted these and other figures as indicating
that medical officers were showing a keener discrimination than formerly
when called upon to determine whether a case should be evacuated. As a
matter of fact, very few were sent to the field hospitals who should have been
returned to duty at the front. A considerable number, however, were sent
to the rear from the field hospitals who could have been retained with the
troops if there had been adequate provision for giving them rest, food, and
reequipment.
Of 301 nontvansportable cases admitted to the advanced surgical hos-
pital, 176 were evacuated to the rear after operation or treatment, 125 died.
79 of these being in profound shock when admitted, and dying without sur-
gical intervention. Forty-six patients died during or following operation. In
addition, 13 were dead on arrival at hospital. 27
Because of the insistence of surgical consultants, the amount of surgical
work performed in field hospitals was greatly diminished. Some patients
who had been evacuated from them without operation were either dead or
moribund on their arrival at army hospitals. 25
The percentage of wounds due to shell fire was very high in this opera-
tion. 25
A peculiar feature of this action was the narrow division front and the
lateral shifting of divisions, resulting in many wounded getting out of their
proper evacuation lines. This resulted in the admission to the field hospitals
of each division of a number of patients belonging to some other division
or divisions. Complaint was made that men from the 32d Division were
going to other hospitals, but triage reports showed that the division had cared
for twice as many men from other divisions as its wounded numbered who
sought aid elsewhere. Most of the wounded from other divisions seeking
treatment in field hospitals of the 32d Division came from the 3d, 5th, and
89th Divisions. This interchange of patients was unavoidable, especially
after a sector was shifted. The whole terrain was exposed to long-range
artillery fire, and the walking wounded naturally crept back by the safest
route. These were tortuous, diagonal valleys, and in a strange country, with
no map for his guidance, a wounded man was apt to lose his way. Then,
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 681
where, as was the case to a certain extent, the country was open, men left the
roads patrolled by military police and thus missed the advantage of their
directions. A number of men reaching hospitals were stragglers from the
front. These were soon collected by the military police and taken back to
their companies. 25
Front-line evacuation was performed by litter bearers of the regimental
medical detachments, by bearers detailed from ambulance companies as re-
quired, and by litter bearers assigned to such duty by the commanding officers
of line organizations. Wounded men were carried on litters to battalion,
regimental, and ambulance dressing stations, but in many instances and
wherever it was possible ambulances went forward to aid stations near the
lines. The wounded were transported to the field hospitals in divisional ambu-
lances and were evacuated from field hospitals to rear hospitals designated in
corps orders by an evacuation ambulance company furnished by the corps,
supplemented as necessity required by ambulances of the division, by trucks
of the sanitary train, and by trucks furnished by the Quartermaster Depart-
ment. 23
Evacuation from the front was usually prompt and satisfactory. In
some instances evacuation from field hospitals to the evacuation hospitals
designated in corps orders was delayed by traffic conditions at the rear and
at times by the lack of sufficient ambulances ; but no unusual or extraordinary
delay occurred, and evacuation was generally satisfactory all along the line.
The sanitary train met the demands made upon it, and only one ambulance
belonging to it was out of commission for more than a brief period. 211
THE 91ST DIVISION (1S1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE) &
On October 7 the 181st Infantry Brigade (91st Division) was assigned
to the Fifth Corps, and was engaged in the attack until October 12. 6 The
two regiments of the brigade were assigned to the 1st and 32d Divisions.
On the 8th the entire brigade was assigned to the 1st Division. On October
10 the brigade passed from the control of the 1st Division to that of the 32d
Division, and on the following day its place in the front line was taken by
elements of the 32d Division. Its activities during the period, October 7 to
12, are considered in connection with those of the 1st Division. When the
brigade was withdrawn it rejoined the 91st Division, now in the Belgian
group of armies in Flanders.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Casualties from the 181st Brigade were cared for in the Medical Depart-
ment formations of the 1st Division. Their evacuation thence was facilitated
by United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 593, which joined
the 1st Division at this time and served with it until the 181st Brigade was
withdrawn. 28
' For map of activities of this brigade for this period, see Plate XXXVII.
13576—25 44
682 FIELD OPERATIONS
THE 1ST DIVISION c
On October 7 the 1st Division, with the 362d Infantry Regiment (91st
Division), was temporarily attached to the Fifth Corps. 31
On October 8 the entire 181st Brigade, 91st Division, was attached. On
October 9 the 1st Division, with the 181st Infantry Brigade, was directed to
strongly cover its front north of Hill 240 and to attack in the direction of
Hill 263 and Le Petit. Bois, and to assist the 32d Division (which had pre-
viously relieved the 91st Division) in clearing Le Petit Bois and Bois de la
Romagne, north of Hill 263. This necessitated an extension of the front and
a reinforcement of the front-line units from the divisional reserves. Because
of the extension of the front, the attack was made in three operations, thus
permitting a barrage of sufficient intensity for each operation. Despite stub-
born resistance on the part of the enemy, at the end of the day (October 9)
the line readied was generally as follows : From just southwest of Fleville,
northeasterly through the center of Cote de Maldah to Sommerance — Ro-
magne-sous-Montfaucon road, thence to just east of Cote 263, in Le Petit Bois,
thence southeastwardly to Cote 269 in the Bois de Money. 8 ' 29 ' 7
On October 10 the division proceeded to exploit its successes to the line
Sommerance — Tuilerie Ferme. 29
On October 11 very little advance was made, and no concerted attack was
ordered because of the exhaustion and depletion in the number of the troops.
On this date the 1st Division (less its artillery) was ordered relieved by the
42d Division, to be effected on the night of October 11-12. After remaining
for two days under First Corps orders in the Argonne. east of Rarocourt, the
division moved to the Vavincourt area, near Bar-le-Duc. 29
MEDICAL. DEPART MENT ACTIVITIES
The sanitary train and Medical Department personnel with troops, func-
tioned as described in the First Corps, with the following exceptions : Ambu-
lance Company No. 13 established and operated an advance collecting and
dressing station at Exermont. Field Hospitals No. 2 and No. 13 moved to
Very on October 7 and remained in reserve, ready to push forward as the line
advanced, relieving Field Hospitals No. 3 and No. 12, at Cheppy. Until the
division was relieved, however, the advance was not sufficient to justify moving
the triage or surgical hospital farther forward, and during the remainder of
the operation Field Hospitals No. 2 and No. 13 remained inactive. Some of
their personnel were distributed to other units to reinforce them as needed,
but remained subject to recall to establish, if required, the hospitals to which
they properly belonged. 30
The area was in a highly insanitary condition, and though very deter-
mined efforts were made to remedy this with the few T men available for the
work and under the exigencies of war, it was impossible to do more than to
try to enforce such sanitary regulations as were deemed essential and at the
• For mnp of activities of this division for this period, see I'lnto XXXVII.
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 683
same time possible. In nearly all parts of the area many dead bodies of men
and animals were found, especially nearest to points of departure. 31
A battalion of Pioneer Infantry was turned over to the division to help
bury the dead, under direction of the division sanitary inspector, but as
it had insufficient equipment was very much handicapped. Regular burial
details of the division, in charge of chaplains, worked incessantly and as close
to the front line as possible, often under heavy shell fire ; but when the division
left the area there was still an immense amount of work to be done to put it
into proper sanitary condition. 31
In the effort to provide sufficient drinking water for troops the army
engineers established several chlorinating plants in the area. One of these was
installed at a spring between Charpentry and Baulny, the reservoir consisting
of a trench lined with tarpaulins. Water carts and water-carrying squads
with canteens carried drinking water from these sources and distributed it
to the men. On the third day of action a shell exploded close to the plant in
front of Charpentry, cutting the supply pipe and doing so much damage that
the plant was put out of commission for several days. Whenever a reasonably
protected spot could be found accessible to water carts, Lyster bags were kept
filled with chlorinated water, and at night canteen-carrying squads from the
attacking line came back to these points to replenish the supply of drinking
water for the troops. Locations of these chlorinated water supplies were
indicated by signs at the places themselves and by other signs along roads
leading to them. Because of the impossibility, notwithstanding these ex-
pedients, to supply an adequate amount of chlorinated water, many of the
men filled their canteens or drank from any water source they could find,
even from the shallow streams flowing in ravines and often containing dead
bodies. The result of drinking bad water was manifest in the prevalence of
diarrhea and other digestive disturbances after the division was relieved. 32
THE 42D DIVISION d
On October 4, 1918 the 42d Division, assembled in the vicinity of Reci-
court, was assigned to the Fifth Corps. On October 5, orders were issued
by the Fifth Corps for the division (less the 67th Field Artillery Brigade
and the 117th Ammunition 'Train) to proceed to Bois de Montfaucon. This was
executed on October 5. The following day, October 6, the 67th Field Artillery
Brigade moved to an area between Avocourt and Montfaucon. Upon arrival
in this area, this brigade was immediately attached to the 32d Division, then
in line. On October 9. the division moved to Bois Communal de Cierges and
Bois Emont. On October 11. under instructions of the Fifth Corps, the
42d Division relieved the 1st Division, which was holding a position in the
line generally as follows: From just north of Sommerance eastward to the
Bois de Romagne, thence along the northern edge of the Bois de Romagne to
a point just south of the Sommerance — Romagne road. The 67th Field Artil-
lery was relieved from duty with the 32d Division, taking up positions in
support of the 42d Division on the night of October ll. 33 ' "•
* For map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XXXVII.
684 FIELD OPERATIONS
At the time when the 42d Division went into line, the enemy was holding
strongly on the front of the Fifth Corps. Facing the 42d Division here was
maintained a most stubborn resistance in the northern part of the Bois de
Bomagne, on Hill 288, Hill 242, on Cote de Chatillon, and along the line
Landres-et-St. Georges — St. Georges, this being in general part of the Kriem-
hilde Stellung. 33
On October 14 the 42d Division moved forward to the attack. The
84th Brigade on the right met stubborn resistance, almost immediately. The
progress of the 83d Brigade on the right was met by light machine-gun fire
until the troops of this brigade arrived within about 500 meters (545 yards)
of the wire south of St. Georges — Landres-et-St. Georges. Here the brigade
encountered very severe machine-gun fire from the front and from botli flanks.
Patrols penetrated the wire south of Landres-et-St. Georges and St. Georges,
but were driven back by machine-gun fire. 33
On October 15 at 7.30 a. pa., the division again attacked; the 83d Brigade
advancing to the corps objective, the 84th Brigade being engaged in exploit-
ing Cote de Chatillon and the woods near La Tuilerie Ferme. In this opera-
tion the 83d Brigade, after advancing about 200 meters (218 yards), was
again held up by severe frontal and enfilading fire. The 84th Brigade was
progressing in its mission and by nightfall had taken Hill 288, Hill 242, and
had one patrol in La Tuilerie Ferme. At the end of the day the front was,
in general, along a line about 100 meters (109 yards) south of the wire in
front of St. Georges and Landres-et-St. Georges, thence southeast to a point
100 meters (109 yards) south and east of La Musarde Ferme, thence east to
La Tuilerie Ferme. 33
On October 16, the exploitation of Cote de Chatillon continued. The
division was held in readiness to move its left forward, in conformity with
the movement of the First Corps, then attacking, but as the right of the First
Corps did not progress the movement was not made. The clearing of Cote
de Chatillon of the enemy was continued, and on the night of October 16 the
division fronted along the line about 100 meters (109 yards) south of the
wire in front of St. Georges and Langres-et-St. Georges, and thence along
the north edge of Cote de Chatillon. 33
From October 16 until October 30, the division was employed in organiz-
ing the front for defense and with continual pushing forward of strong
patrols to develop the enemy organization. 33
On October 30, support and reserve battalions were relieved by ele-
ments of the 2d Division. The two infantry battalions holding the line and
both the brigade and divisional machine-gun battalions were held in the line.
The 67th Field Artillery Brigade was attached to the 2d Division for the com-
ing attack. 33
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
In its march to its sector in the Meuse-Argonne area, mule-drawn ambu-
lances were distributed in the column in the proportion of two to each regi-
ment of Infantry and one to each regiment of Artillery and of Engineers.
METJSE-AKGONNE OPERATION 685
These ambulances evacuated patients to points whence they could be moved by
motor ambulance. This arrangement proved very satisfactory, both during
the inarch of the division to this area and during its advance to the front line.
Another innovation at this time was the assignment of each ambulance com-
pany to the evacuation service of the Infantry regiment having the correspond-
ing number and the detail from each ambulance company of an officer and
sergeant, to maintain contact between the regimental and ambulance company
services. This personnel remained constantly with the regimental surgeon
concerned when the organization to which he belonged was in action. Simi-
larly, an officer from the sanitary train performed liaison service for the
evacuation of the three regiments of Artillery, to whom the animal-drawn
ambulances were assigned as needed. This arrangement proved satisfactory,
especially in so far as the Infantry was concerned. 34
Individual aid stations during the operation had very different facilities
and shelter. A few fortunate enough to occupy partially ruined houses with
splinter-proof cellars were able to function normally, others were in wooden
shacks in woods or against hillsides, and a number had not even this shelter,
but were forced to carry on in the open or in shell holes. 35 In some regiments
the aid stations of the advance, support, and reserve battalions were either
with or in close proximity to the battalion post controls, thus in perfect con-
tact with the line troops served. The regimental aid station was near that
of the reserve battalion and had telephone connection with the three battalion
stations, as well as with the regimental post command, with its ambulance
company in the rear. With the regimental surgeon were the liaison officer
and sergeant from the ambulance company designated to evacuate casualties
of the particular regiment. If there was reasonable protection two motor
ambulances were held at the regimental aid station. This arrangement had
the advantage of not unduly exposing these vehicles and at the same time of
keeping the regimental surgeon in close touch with Medical Department for-
mations in both front and rear. As on former occasions, an enlisted man was
detailed to render first aid with each company in the front line, but as the
physical hardships were very severe there, he was replaced whenever possible
after 24 or 48 hours' service. 36
Four bearers (or sometimes eight, when relay or relief was necessary)
struggled back over shell-torn, muddy paths to the animal-drawn ambulances,
which were taxed to their utmost. 37 The absence of roads that motor vehicles
could use in the right half of the divisional sector made evacuation here
especially difficult, for carries by bearers or by animal-drawn ambulances, or
by both, over rough, hilly roads, knee deep in mud were necessary before
motor A T ehicles could be reached. The roads north and east out of Exermont
were impassable to motor vehicles, and until the road running east from Som-
merance had been cleared and rendered reasonably safe, the front of the
84th Brigade was from 6 to 10 km. (3.7-6 miles) from motor ambulance heads.
It was under these circumstances that the animal-drawn vehicles proved in-
dispensable, for they bridged much of the gap between the battalion aid
stations and Exermont. where patients could be transferred to motor vehicles. 3 *
686 FIELD OPERATIONS
As the division moved into the line a dressing station was opened at Apre-
mont on the main road to Cheppy, while the three other dressing stations
were located at Baulny. Coincidentally with the infantry advance, motor
ambulance heads were located at Fleville and at the crossroads east of that
town. At the latter point, aid stations of the 165th and lCGth Infantry Regi-
ments were established, and within a short time there was a considerable
accumulation of wounded here who were subjected to intermittent shell
fire. So, an emergency-collecting station was opened at Fleville, and three
ambulances Avere assigned to the task of evacuating sitting cases from the
crossroads to this station, whence they were sent by trucks to the rear. At
no time was there any delay in the evacuation of litter cases. Late in the
afternoon of October 14, ambulances were able to gain entrance to Som-
merance, whither an aid station of the 166th Infantry had moved in the mean-
time. 38
On the right the use of animal-drawn ambulances as previously planned
was adequate to meet the demands of the situation, though even these vehicles
were unable to advance more than 3 km. (1.8 miles) beyond Exermont.
thus necessitating a litter earn 7 of from 4 to 6 km. (2.4^3.7 miles) from the
front line to any kind of wheeled transportation. In addition to the long
portage, litter carriers were hindered by the hilly character of the country
and by deep mud, but by 9 o'clock on the night of October 15th the field had
been cleared and 1,211 cases had been evacuated to the rear. 39
After the division ceased its attacks, casualties were few and were cared
for readily.
Field Hospitals
Two field hospitals were established at Cheppy and two at Baulny. where,
in conjunction with them, a triage was manned and operated by ambulance
company personnel. One of these hospitals received gas cases only, while
the second, in connection with the triage, established a shock ward for non-
transportable cases, and fed < sheltered, and treated the slightly wounded.
All severely wounded who could endure the trip were evacuated to the rear. 4 "
Although Baulny was subject to shelling and bombing, the hospitals con-
tinued to operate there, because of their convenient proximity to the front.
As casualties decreased in number, the hospitals at Cheppy were closed and
moved to Baulny, where they were held in reserve. Evacuation in rear of
the field hospitals was effected by an evacuation ambulance company and by
a number of French ambulances, which transported large numbers so readily
that the proper service of the divisional ambulances which was, of course,
in front of these hospitals, was not interrupted. A total of 2,394 cases passed
through the field hospitals during this period. 41
From October 8 to the signing of the armistice the 42d division was in
the Argonne front, and casualties from gas were high, due in part to the
wooded nature of the. country. Of 1.129 patients received at the advance dress-
ing station, 481 were returned to duty from the divisional gas hospital after
from one to five davs' observation and treatment. 42
MEUSE-AEGONNE OPERATION 687
THE 89TH DIVISION '
Upon its relief in the Lucey sector by the 37th Division, on October 8,
the 89th Division proceeded to the Recicourt area, -where it became a part of
the reserve of the First Army for the Meuse-Argonne operation. On the
night of October 19-20 it relieved the 32d Division in the front line as a part
of the Fifth Corps. 43
The division then held the line extending from the vicinity of Ferme de
la Cavaniere, 3 km. (1.8 miles) northwest from Romagne, where liaison was
had with the 42d Division; thence the line extended through Bois de
Monteville to include Romagne. 44
On October 20 the division made preparations for an advance to develop
the enemy's main line of resistance and to complete the capture of Bois de
Bantheville. This capture of the Bois de Bantheville proved to be quite an
operation in itself, as the enemy defended his position with artillery and
machine-gun fire and made a stubborn resistance until the afternoon of
October 21. During October 21, 22. 23, and 24 the division remained in
possession of Bois de Bantheville, maintaining contact with the enemy.
On October 25 orders were issued to adjust the right boundary of the
division, thus turning over the western edge of the Bois de Bantheville to
the 90th Division of the Third Corps. The remainder of the month was spent
in making preparation for the advance of November l. 44
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The field hospitals on October 15 were located 2 km. (1.2 miles) south-
west of Montfaucon, 12 km. (7.4 miles) from the line, but on the 22d they
advanced to a point 2 km. (1.2 miles) south of Eclisfontaine, where they
were located on the road from that town to Charpentry, 7 km. (4.3 miles)
from the front. Ambulance Company No. 354 established a dressing station at
La Grange Ferme, 7 km. (4.3 miles) from the front, with all facilities for
treating shock and for serving of hot drinks. To this point and from it
to the rear two other ambulance companies carried wounded. 45 Evacuation
from Bois de Bantheville for the week preceding the advance of November 1
was extremely difficult, for all wounded unable to walk had to be carried by
litter to two collecting points west of Romagne, on the road to Sommerance,
3.5 km. (2.1 miles) from the line, where motor ambulances could reach them.
This cany averaged 3 km. (1.8 miles) in length, through mud knee-deep,
over rugged terrain. The roads through Bois de Bantheville were impassable
to horse-drawn ambulances, and the narrow-gauge railway through the woods
was so badly damaged that it could not be utilized. Difficulties were aggra-
vated by scarcity of litter bearers. 46
During the interval October 15 to November 1, 2,228 patients passed
through the triage, of whom 988 had wounds or injuries. Of this total, 1,441
belonged to the 89th Division, comprising 786 wounds and injuries and 055
• For map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XL.
(588 FIELD OPERATIONS
sick. On the afternoon of October 29 the field hospitals were shelled, some
15 or 20 high-explosive projectiles falling in and around them, wounding
three men, of whom one died. 45
REFERENCES
(1) F. O. No. 55, Fifth Corps, October 3, 1918.
(2) Daily operation reports, Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation.
(.">) Reports mi operations in the Argonne, 42d Division, November 22, 1018.
(4) F. O. No. 56, Fifth Corps, October 8, 1918.
(5) Chronological statement of events, Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operations.
(0) Operations report of 181st Brigade, 91st Division, October 17, 1918.
(7) Map allowing dally position of front line, Meuse-Argonne operation, G-3, (1. II. Q.,
A. E. F., May 2-1, 1919.
(8) F. O. No. 82, Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation.
(9) Operations report, Fifth Army Corps, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operation.
undated.
(10) Report of Medical Department activities, Fifth Corps, A. E. F., by Col. VV. It.
Eastman, M. »'.. corps Burgeon, Fifth Corps (undated), 6. on file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(11) Ibid., 13.
(12) Special operations report, 3d Division. Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
I 13) F. O. No. 15, 3d Division, October 3, 1918.
ill) Report of .Medical Department activities, 3d Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division sairgeon, 3d Division i undated). Fart IV. -hi. On
lile, Historical Division, S. G. O.
t l.M lliiil.. fart IV, 17.
t 16) Ibid., Part IV, 19.
(17) Ibid., Part IV. 50.
i is) [bid., farl IV, 5t.
(19) ibid., Part IV. 52.
(20) ibid.. Part IV. 5:;.
(21) Ibid., Part V. 127.
(22) Special report on operations of the 32d Division. Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(23) Report of Medical Department activities, 32d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 32d Division, undated, Part II, 15. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(24) Ibid.. I'art II. 14.
125) Ibid.. Fart II, 43.
(26) Ibid.. I'art II, GO.
(27) Ibid., I'art II, 16.
(25) Report of Medical Department activities, 91st Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(29) Report of operations of the 1st Division. Meuse-Argonne operation, October 17. 1918.
(30) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, prepared under the directi.ui
of the division surgeon. 1st Division, undated. Part II. 44. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(31) Ibid.. I'art II, 47.
(32) Ibid., Part II, 4S.
(33) Operations report. 42d Division. Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(34) Report of Medical Department activities. 42d Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon. 42d Division, ur?ated, Part I 22. On file.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(35) Ibid.. Part I, 24.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 689
(36) Ibid.. Part I, 23.
(37) Ibid., Peart I, 25.
(38) Ibid., Part I, 58.
(39) Ibid., Part I. 59.
(40) Ibid., Part I, SO.
(41) Ibid., Part I, 81.
(42) Ibid., Part I, 103.
(43) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, 1*. S. Army, 1917-1919. prepared in the Historical
Section, tiie Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.
1700 (89th Division).
(44) Operations report, 89th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation.
(45) Report of Medical Department activities, S9tb Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon. SOth Division, undated, 24. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(40) Ibid., 20.
CHAPTER XXVII
SECOND PHASE— Continued
THIRD CORPS
On October 4 the general attack of the American First Army was re-
sumed. The Third Corps comprised the 80th Division on the left, the 4th in
the center, and the 33d on the right. The corps front extended from Foi'ges
along the Meuse, skirting the northern edge of the Bois de la Cote Lemont,
thence southwestwardly to just north of Nantillois. 1 ' 2
The mission of the 33d Division was to hold its present sector and protect
the east flank of the 4th Division. The mission of the 4th Division was to take
the Bois du Fays, Bois de Malaumont, and to advance to the north edge of
Bois de Foret. It was not to attack across the open space east of the Bois du
Fays and Bois de Malaumont. The mission of the 80th Division was to pene-
trate southwest of Bois du Fays and to continue to the northern edge of the
Bois des Eappes and Les Clairs Chenes. 1
The attack was launched at 5.25 a. m., behind a heavy rolling barrage.
Heavy machine-gun and artillery fire were put down by the enemy on the
advancing units, particularly in the Bois des Ogons and Bois du Fays.
Despite this, the corps line advanced, the center division pushing forward to
a line just south of Cunel — Brioulles road. The left division met particularly
stubborn resistance, and its advance was retarded. At the close of the day the
corps line was as follows: Just south of the Bois des Ogons — north to include
Bois du Fays, thence southeast to the north edge of Bois de Brieulles, and
along this edge to the western limits of Bois de la Cote Lemont, thence
continuing along the old line generally southeasterly. 1 ' -
On October 5 the attack was continued against strong enemy resistance,
centering chiefly in Bois des Ogons, and Wood 250, which were powerfully
held by numerous and well-organized machine-gun nests. During the day the
corps did not succeed in gaining any ground, 1 except on the left, where the
southern portion of Bois des Ogons was taken.
On October 6 the troops advanced farther into Bois des Ogons. despite
very powerful enemy resistance. Otherwise the corps line remained the same.
Flanking hostile shelling from across the Meuse continued, as well as some
harassing fire on the corps rear areas, in addition to heavy shelling of forward
areas and front lines. Casualties for the day's operations were quite heavy. 1
On October 7 there was a slight advance in the line of the 80th, but none
in that of the 4th Divisions. Positions were consolidated and improved. At
5 p. m., the 33d Division was detached from the Third Corps and attached to
the French Seventeenth Corps. Field Order 24, Third Corps, issued on this
date, contemplated the action to be taken by the front-line divisions in case
691
692 FIELD OPERATIONS
the attack of the French Seventeenth Corps on the right of the Third Corps,
across the river, proved successful. This order directed that the divisions
of the Third Corps make preparations for an advance and that the corps and
divisional artillery assist the attack of the French Seventeenth Coi'ps and of
the American Fifth Corps. 1
( )n October 8 there was no change in the front line. The front was now
held hy the 80th and 4th Divisions, with the 5th Division in reserve. On
October 9 at 3.30 p. m., the 80th Division attacked along the front, taking
Ville-aux-Bois Ferine. The 4th Division attacked at 5.50 p. m., but was
unable to advance because of heavy gas concentration laid down by the enemy
artillery on Bois de Malaumont. 1
On October 10 the 4th and 80th Divisions attacked along the corps front
early in the morning, behind a heavy harrage. The attack was only partially
successful because of a severe, heavy artillery flanking fire from across the
Meuse and stubborn machine-gun resistance encountered at all points. The
line for the night was advanced approximately as follows: From a point
about 0.5 km. (0.3 mile) southeast of Cunel, to and along the northern edge
of Bois de Malaumont. thence to Cunel — Brieulles road to the west edge
of Bois de Peut des Faux, thence along the north edge of this wood to and
along the eastern edge of Bois du Fays, along the north edge of Bois de
Brieulles to Cote 280, thence northeasterly following along the edge of Bois
de la Cote Lemont. 1
On October 11 the attack was renewed early in the morning. Only
local advances, mainly in the center, were realized, and progress was bitterly
contested by heavy machine-gun fire and by flanking artillery support, as on
previous days. During the night of October 11-12. the relief of the 80th
Division and certain elements of the 4th Division, by the 5th Division, was
successfully carried out. The corps front was now held by the 5th Division on
the left and the 4th Division on the right. 1
On October 12 and 13 no change was made in the front. During the
night of October 13-14, the 3d Division passed from command of the Fifth
Corps to that of the Third Corps, relieved the 5th Division, by an extension
to the right of the front line and elements of the 4th Division as far as the
southeast edge of the Bois de Peut de Faux. For the night, the line was
held by the 3d Division on the left of the corps from Cierges — Romagne, thence
along the north edge of Bois de Foret to the northernmost portion of Bois du
Fays. From this point the 4th Division held southeast to the Bois de Brieulles
to Cote 280, thence northeast along the edge of the Bois de la Cote Lemont to
the Meuse. The 90th Division was relieved from the Fourth Corps and as-
signed to the Third Corps. The 5th Division was held in the rear of the
3d Division as an attacking division in preparation for the operations of
October 14. 1 - 2
On October 14 at 8.30 a. m. the attack was renewed. The 5th Division,
designated as the attacking division, passed through the line held by the 3d
Division, which had been designated as support. On the right, the 4th Divi-
sion executed a holding attack for assistance and was prepared to move upon
METTSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 693
receipt of any orders from the corps. Following a heavy barrage and smoke
screen, the troops advanced satisfactorily, despite heavy machine-gun and
artillery fire direct from the enemy. Cnnel was taken by the 5th Division,
but their progress was held up in the vicinity of Bantheville and the Bois des
Rappes by enfilade machine-gun fire from Bois de Bantheville. The 3d Divi-
sion advanced 1 km. (0.6 mile) between the Bois de Foret and Bois de la Pul-
tiere, where liaison with the 5th Division on the left was established. These
changes represent the advance of the corps during the day. the 4th Division
not advancing. The line now ran north of the western part of Bois de Foret,
Bois de la Pultiere, and the ridge running southeast from the westernmost
corner of Bois de la Pnltiere. 1
On October 15 the attack was resumed, the 5th Division on the left and
the 3d Division in the center being the attacking divisions, the 4th Division
on the right holding as previously ordered. Progress, however, was slight
because of unusually stubborn enemy resistance. Several counterattacks
launched by the enemy were repulsed. The corps line for the night remained
unchanged. 1
From October 1G to 19 no changes in the line were made. The period
was marked by infantry inactivity. Organization and improvement of the
positions for future advance were made. 1
On October 20 an attack with strong patrols was made at 7 a. m. with a
view to developing the enemy Freya Stellung, which he had been organizing
along the line Hill 261— Aincreville — Hill 270 — Le Grand Carre Ferme. thence
west. The attack progressed favorably, the main resistance encountered be-
ing the usual heavy machine-gun fire supported by artillery fire, especially from
the northern part of the Bois des Kappes. By the close of the day, Bois des
Clairs Chenes had been taken and cleaned out, and outposts were established
0.5 km. (0.3 mile) southeast of Bantheville and in the Bois des Kappes. 1 ' 2
On October 21 the action of the corps, to develop the enemy line of re-
sistance, continued. At 11.30 a. m. both divisions made fresh attacks on Bois
des Rappes and Hill 299, both of which were taken despite determined hostile
opposition. An enemy counterattack projected against our troops was broken
up, our advances all being held. All ground gained by the corps was imme-
diately organized and the positions were consolidated. During the night
October 21-22, relief of the 5th Division (less its artillery) by the 90th Divi-
sion (less its artillery) was accomplished. 1
On October 22 patrols of the 3d Division were pushed to the outskirts
of Brieulles. Troops advanced and succeeded in talcing all of Bois de Foret. 1
On October 23 the positions of the troops were further improved. The
90th Division on the left attacked Bantheville at 3 p. m. It took this town
and the village of Bourrut. The line of the division was pushed along the
ridge of Le Grand Carre Ferme. The 3d Division pushed strong patrols
through Bois de Foret and seized a small woods 0.5 km. (0.3 mile) north of
Hill 299. Other detachments occupied the high ground north of Brieulles. 1
On October 24 Grand Carre Ferme was taken, after a heavy artillery con-
centration had been put upon it, but because of the heavy return fire of the
694 FIELD OPERATIONS
hostile artillery, our troops withdrew to a point 200 meters (218 yards) to the
south. Otherwise our lines remained unchanged, except for minor improve-
ments. 1
On October 25, 26, and 27 the days were characterized as being quiet. Our
front lines were consolidated and organized during this period, and prepara-
tions were made for a new attack on November 1. During the night of October
26-27, the 3d Division was relieved by the 5th Division, the corps front then
being held by the 90th Division on the left and the 5th Division on the right. 1
On October 28 our patrols maintained contact with the enemy all along
our front, and entered Clery-le-Grand and Clery-le-Petit. Along the front
of the 5th Division, an outpost line of machine guns was organized along the
ridge of the high ground south of Andon Creek, thus dominating Aincreville,
Clery-le-Grand and Clery-le-Petit. 1
On October 29 the day was quiet, patrolling being the only activity. No
change was made in the front line. 1
On October 30 troops of the 5th Division entered and captured Aincre-
ville, which was at once organized and consolidated with our outpost line.
Other than this there was little activity. 1
On October 31 the corps front line was advanced 400 meters (436 yards)
north of Aincreville. Otherwise the line remained unchanged. Final prepara-
tions were made on this date for the attack ordered for November l. 1
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
By October 3 the Montzeville — Esnes road was given over to two-way
traffic, the Esnes — Malancourt — Cuisy road was limited to northbound traffic,
the Esnes — Bethincourt — Cuisy road to southbound traffic, the Cuisy — Sept-
sarges — Nantillois road to northbound traffic, the Cuisy — Montfaucon — Nan-
tillois road to southbound traffic, and the Nantillois — Cunel — Bantheville road
was made a two-way road for ambulances only. Examination of the map will
show that these traffic rules made Bethincourt the proper place for a triage
for all the divisions of the Third Corps in line. After October 3, evacuation
was effected in this corps in pursuance of annex 4, Field Orders, No. 22. Head-
quarters Third Army Corps. October 3, 1918. 3
Sorting stations, triages, all divisions, Bethincourt. From front to triage by divi-
sions. From field hospitals to evacuation hospitals by corps. Nontmnsportable and
gas hospitals, Bethincourt. After H hour, the corps surgeon will arrange for changes
as the advance progresses. Routes : Divisions — down, Cuisy, to Bethincourt ; return.
Bethincourt — Malancourt — Cuisy. Corps — up. Esnes — Malancourt — Bethincourt — Esnes. 4
The plan outlined in this order, made possible and convenient by the
narrowness of the sector and the arrangement of the roads, created in effect
a corps triage. This was truly such a formation tactically, although for con-
venience the divisions maintained administrative control over their respective
sections therein. Each division established a field hospital to receive its own
casualties for purposes of record, classification, and distribution. One divi-
sion then established a field hospital for all the nontransportable wounded
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 695
of the corps, another division established a hospital for all gas cases in the
corps, and the third established a hospital to serve as a corps reserve for
overflow. Two of the four field hospitals of each division thus went to com-
pose the corps triage. A third hospital of each division was retained out-
side the immediate battle zone for the reception of the sick, day by clay, and
to he used, if necessary, as a relay station for wounded on their long journey to
the evacuation hospitals. The fourth field hospital of each division was held
as a divisional reserve, to be moved, if necessary, beyond the triage first
established, and to be used as a magnified dressing station. Later, when the
line had progressed far enough, it was to become the divisional triage. The
corps triage at Bethincourt worked very satisfactorily, and several divisions
cooperated therein during the Meuse-Argonne operation; the 3d, 4th, 5th, 33d,
80th, and 90th all taking part as they came into battle. It retained this
location until November 3. 3
The establishment of the corps triage simplified evacuation. Among
other advantages it was a medical center whose size and importance made
possible procurement of exceptional conveniences. For example, solely be-
cause of its importance the engineers were willing to assist in constructing
entrances, exits, and parking areas. This proved very valuable, for a motor
vehicle which left the road in the Argonne was immediately mired.*
The group of field hospitals near Bethincourt was located on low ground
made exceptionally soft by two weeks' continuous rain. It was necessary to
construct a parking space for the use of vehicles. For this purpose 200
truckloads of stone were brought to the site, broken and used to form a park-
way and sidings. This road building not only facilitated ambulance service,
but it promoted the availability to the wounded of trucks returning to the
rear, as with a good road they were not delayed. Personnel of the Medical
Department did most of the work involved in this construction.
There never were enough ambulances for evacuation. Divisional ambu-
lances were used for transport of patients to and between the field hospitals.
Those of the corps for transport between field and army hospitals, while be-
tween and back of the latter evacuations were effected by the army. Until
the corps had received a sanitary train it operated with transport loaned it
by the army; in turn (in time of stress), the corps was frequently called
upon to lend ambulances to its constituent divisions. The Third Corps sani-
tary train had its headquarters at Sivry-la-Perche during the time the corps
triage was at Bethincourt; it was found a great help to have a central point
where the transport needs of each and all divisions promptly became manifest.
Trucks had to be used extensively for evacuation purposes during the most
active periods. As the road to the rear ran past the Bethincourt triage the
corps surgeon obtained a corps order for trucks of any unit to stop there on
signal and take on wounded. These trucks could not, it is true, be diverted
from their established route to permit conveyance of patients to the hospitals
at Souilhy, where the slightly wounded were to go, but it was possible to re-
quire them to stop long enough to unload these wounded at Fromereville or
Sivry-la-Perche. For this reason, relay stations grew up at these points.*
696 FIELD OPERATIONS
When the triage at Bethincourt became thoroughly well organized, the
corps surgeon placed a representative there who settled differences between
division medical officers concerning the distribution of transportation. This
officer maintained at all times a reserve of corps ambulances by communicating
with the corps surgeon by telephone, or, when this was not possible, by mes-
senger, lie controlled the system of stopping trucks by signal, and through his
efforts traffic was impeded as little as possible under the circumstances. The
evacuation of large numbers was systematized by coordinating the divisional
and corps transport services at the Bethincourt triage, by providing at Sivry-
la-Perche a station where the corps sanitary train could rest and do repair
work, and by maintaining contact at all times between the corps triage, the
corps surgeon, and the chief surgeon of the First Army. 4
The last-mentioned officer fully appreciated the difficulties incident to the
great length of the haul for wounded, and at the first possible moment he
moved the army hospitals forward. However, as our lines were advanced over
the nearly impassable terrain, there was an interval when wounded could not
be evacuated to such hospitals rapidly enough, and relief had to be given them
farther forward. To meet this need, the field hospital in reserve, or least
active, in each division was moved past the other field hospitals to the most
advanced point tenable. This was not intended as a triage, but as a rest place
where hot food, warm blankets, emergency surgical aid, and re-dressings were
available. Some classification of patients was possible here, but it was not the
formal sorting performed at the triage. The facilities so provided for rest
and comfort were especially welcome to wounded coming in during bad nights
or when traffic was blocked. When the lines advanced these field hospitals,
which had been gradually organized and properly located with this change in
view, were transformed into triages by the simple procedure of sending up
the trained groups of triage personnel, while the former triage hospitals in
the rear went into reserve. This "leapfrogging" in divisions and corps came
to be a well-understood maneuver and was accomplished repeatedly without
interruption of service."'
At the triage of the corps, specialization grew up; not the result of any
preconceived plan but of a natural tendency, for it was found to present
great advantages. In preparation for battle, professional teams, especially
skilled in the treatment of shock and surgical cases, had been organized and
assigned here. These prepared many nontransportable cases for evacuation.
Similarly a special service developed in the gas hospitals. The corps and
army consultants, moreover, found the corps triage a convenient center for
observation of how professional work was being done. 5
The difficulty due to the long journey which the wounded had to undergo
after they passed the advance stations and the corps triage was mitigated by
relay stations established by the various divisions at Sivry-la-Perche and
Fromereville. Trucks filled with slightly wounded poured their patients into
these stations, where they were given hot food, opportunities for rest, and, if
need be, were re-dressed before being transferred to French omnibuses for
proper distribution to hospitals in the rear. Fach relay station had a depart-
MEUSE-AKGONNE OPERATION ()97
ment for the reception of the sick day by day and for the definitive treat-
ment and return to the lines of slight cases of illness. Errors, though few, in
classification at the triage, or subsequent changes in the condition of wounded,
sometimes made reclassification at the relay stations advisable. A very great
advantage which these stations enjoyed was the fact that they were out of
the battle zone and therefore within easy communication by messengers or
telephone, so that in them needed changes could be speedily made in the rout-
ing of patients. In spite of close cooperation between the army and the corps,
the operating facilities of certain evacuation hospitals sometimes became over-
taxed, while at the same time in others the surgical teams were not working
to capacity. On notification from the army, a message to the proper relay
station Would correct such a condition, by altering the distribution of
patients. 6
Though the advance during the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne was
relatively slight, the combat was, in general terms, continuous, and though
the number of battle casualties on certain days was much greater than on
others the stream of wounded never ceased. Many changes in the arrange-
ments for disposition of wounded had to be made to meet the developments
of the military situation. Thus, when the 33d Division crossed the Meuse
it was lost to the corps, but it continued to use Glorieux as a triage until the
site was occupied by Evacuation Hospital No. 15. which arrived on October 13
and began operating the next clay. When the 5th Division relieved the 80th
as part of the corps its medical department units were located at the corps
triage in the places vacated by their predecessors. 6
As the corps advanced, the distance between the line and the triage pro-
gressively increased. As the right flank continued to rest on the Meuse and
there was a constant turning movement which changed the face of the corps
from north to east, the corps surgeon anticipated that the direction of evacua-
tion would be to the west toward Varennes, instead of to the south. Mobile
Hospital No. 1 was moved to Fromereville on October 9 and to Esnes on
October 27, serving the Third Corps as a hospital for the nontransportable
wounded. When this unit moved to Esnes, Evacuation Hospital No. 4 moved
to Fromereville, receiving severely wounded after Octol>er 31. Evacuation
Hospitals No. 6 and No. 7, at Souilly, continued to care for the sick and
slightly wounded sent by truck, while Evacuation Hospital No. 8 remained at
Petit Maujouy for the overflow of wounded who could not be attended by
Evacuation Hospital No. 4 and for the moderately and severely w r ounded who
came in from the right flank along the Meuse. Gas cases were retained at
the triage at Bethincourt until ready for evacuation to La Morlette, where the
corps gas hospital was located. Contagious and mental cases still had to
undergo the long haul to Benoite Vanx. Supply parks which bad been at
Vaubecourt, Fleury, and Souilly were augmented by parks at Les Islettes
and Verdun. 8
After Mobile Hospital No. 1 was established at Esnes, and Evacuation
Hospital No. 4 at Fromereville, the wounded transport problem of the Third
Corps was for a time much simplified. While Mobile Hospital No. 1 was at
698 FIELD OPERATIONS
Fromereville, in order that it might be close to the terminus of a 60-cm. rail-
way leading to Souilly, it established a camp near by instead of using build-
ings in the village. The little freight cars on this road were ingeniously con-
verted into cars for carrying patients, and many cases were evacuated by this
route ; but as the roadbed was in bad condition, and derailments were frequent,
the use of the railway for this purpose was discontinued. 7
The following memorandum was published by the corps surgeon to the
division surgeons:
October 18, 1918.
1. A study of the map will indicate to division surgeons that the sector occupied by
each division of this corps is characterized by its narrow front and great depth.
2. The circulation order made necessary by the road problem indicates that for the
present at least the site now occupied by the divisional triages is the logical one.
3. A recommendation has been made to bring forward to Esnes a mobile surgical
hospital, and an effort will be made to establish an evacuation hospital nearer the triages
than is now the case.
4. The chief surgeon of the First Army has written as follows :
" The solution brings us face to face with a concrete fact which admits of no digression
into the realm of theory, viz, we must accept the conditions imposed, difficult as they are,
and make the best use of the facilities at hand with a view to care for the sick and
wounded paramount to all else, and the shortening of transport distance for the gravely
injured.
" After close study the sole way we may accomplish this is by establishing the
divisional field hospitals in a line, one behind the other, to serve as places of reception
where a man may l>e warmed, fed, dressed, treated for shock and hemorrhage, and grad-
ually passed through one to the other until he arrives at the evacuation hospital.
" A slightly wounded man can travel the whole distance without injury, but winter,
which is rigorous in this sector, is upon us, and it behooves us to establish points where
the exhausted, chilled, and badly injured may lie removed from an ambulance and received
till sucli time as they may proceed."
5. In studying the best means of carrying out the desires of the chief surgeon. 1st
Army, it will be noted that each division has now established:
1st. A divisional triage.
2d. One hospital devoted to corps purposes as a gas hospital, a nontransportable hos-
pital and a corps reserve hospital.
3d. It is required that each division maintain a hospital for the care of the sick of
the division.
6. Therefore, each division has left a field hospital to be used as a rest station for
the sick and wounded in a far advanced position.
7. Eacli division will at once establish such a rest station after obtaining the proper
authority from the G-l of his division.
8. The 5th Division lias already established its hospital at Nantillois. It is suggested
that the 3d Division select a site near the same place and that the 4th Division take
advantage of the shelter said to exist in the southern boundaries of the Bois de Septsarges.
northeast of the town of Septsarges.
9. A review of the situation after the establishment of these rest stations will show
the first element of the echelon on a level with Nantillois, the second at Bethincourt, and
the third on a level with Fromereville and Sivry-la-Perche. If a mobile surgical hospital
is established at Esnes. an intervening one will be established between the zone of Bethin-
court and that of Fromereville and Sivry-la-Perche.
10. The sick and wounded of any division may be admitted to any of the hospitals
established by units of this Corps, but a serious effort should be made to have the
casualties of any one division pass through it own triage.
11. The provisions of paragraph 8 are general and apply to divisions relieving those
now in line.
MEUSE- ARGON SE OPERATION 099
The following memorandum concerning triage operations was published
by the surgeon, Third Corps, during the Meuse-Argonne operation :
OCTOBEB IS, 1918.
Memorandum for division surgeons:
1. Observation shows that correct triage is not being carried out in some of the
divisions of this corps.
2. Attention is especially invited to the following requirements of Memorandum
No. 4, this office, dated September 19, 191S :
(o) That all casualties, both sick and wounded, will pass through the triage.
(b) That the hospital used as a triage has three chief functions:
1st. Triage or sorting.
2d. Care of nontransportable cases.
3d. Care of gassed cases.
(c) That the triage officer must be one of sound judgment and must be possessed
of the power to decide quickly and accurately and that he must be properly advised
by representatives of the special divisions or officers carefully selected by the division
surgeon as advisers.
3. It has been reported to this office that cases are being sent directly to the gas
hospital and nontransportable hospital, ordered established by the corps, without pre-
liminary triage. This practice must be stopped. In each divisional triage there must
be maintained the gas department and a nontransportable department.
4. The faults in the organization and functioning of the triage usually reported
to this office are :
(n) Lack of training in the triage personnel during times of quiescence.
(6) The lack of distinct departments in the triage for the three chief purposes —
triaging, treatment of gassed patients, and the treatment of nontransportables.
(c) Lack of system in the feeding of patients, methods used being incoordinated
and inadequate.
(d) Dispersion of the triage function, cases being taken to the various departments
of the hospital and elements of the triage group going to the various classes of cases at
intervals instead of having all classes of cases going to a well-established centralized
triage where records are made and from which patients are distributed to the various
departments.
(e) The lack of control of the triage officer himself over the various functions of
the triage hospital, it being a common practice for him to delegate his functions to inex-
perienced junior officers and noncommissioned officers.
The following memorandum, under date of October 27, was addressed by
the corps surgeon to all division surgeons :
Subject: Owing to the confusion concerning the definition of " nontransportable," the
following is transmitted for the information and guidance of triage officers:
1. Under present conditions all cases, except the following, after inspection of dress-
ing and splints, are transportables :
{a) Cases showing active hemorrhage.
(b) Cases in shock.
(c) Sucking chests (as modified below).
{d) Partial traumatic amputations in which all blood supply below the site
of injury has been severed.
2. Modifications, according to situations liable to arise, are as follows:
(a) Under ordinary conditions, evacuation from the time of injury to arrival at the
mobile or evacuation hospital should be carried out within from six to ten hours in
this sector. Shorter time is desired, and delay in dressing stations and triage will be
reduced to the minimum.
(b) Cases arriving at the triage in shock will be evacuated within 15 hours t<> the
hospital designated for severely wounded if the condition warrants it.
700 FIKLD OPERATIONS
(c) Shock cases not showing evidence of sufficient improvement within two hours
to indicate that they will become transportable will be operated upon at the triage
if condition of patient warrants operation.
(d) The nontransportable department will be cleared as far as possible during the
early stages of battle in order to be prepared later to attend to the more severely
wounded.
(c) When wounded arrive at the triage after more than 24 hours, cases liable to
develop gas infection become nontransportable. They are chiefly wounds of the buttock
and the call'.
(/') In addition, all cases which show that they are bearing transportation poorly
should be operated upon at the triage, provided they do not arrive in such numbers
that they would receive attention as quickly if sent on to the evacuation or mobile
hospital.
(g) In cases of delayed transportation between the triage and the rear so that 24
hours or more are required, seemingly slight injuries should be classified as nontrans-
portable and be given first attention. These are the cases that are practically sure
to recover if gas infection does not arise.
(ft) All wounds arriving late at the triage should be carefully examined and smell
for evidence of gas infection. If gas is evident debridement should be done and the
case evacuated so that suitable after-treatment may be given as soon as possible.
Notations of such conditions should be made upon the field card.
3. The following remarks concern injuries to special regions:
Head. — These cases usually bear transportation better before operation than after.
and should generally be classified as transportable. If operated upon, after proper
debridement, removal of foreign body, and control of hemorrhage, they should be closed
tight.
Cltcst. — Sucking wounds can usually be made transportable by placing gauze over
the wound and strapping tightly. The gauze should not be packed deeply into the
wound. If this does not work, the case is nontransportable and should be operated
upon. Chests showing evidence of progressive hemorrhage should be operated upon.
All others are transportable. Through-and-througb machine gun bullet wounds of the
chest showing no evidence of hemorrhage will not be operated under any conditions,
except for a possible cleaning up, or superficial debridement of wounds of exit and
entrance, in case they are dirty.
Abdomen. — These wounds should be operated upon within 1."i hours. Otherwise leave
them alone. It therefore follows that if it appears that such cases can not reach a
mobile or evacuation hospital within that time limit, the triage is the place for the
operation.
4. Notations will be made on diagnosis tags- of the time the wounded man was
found, the time of reaching aid station, and the time of arrival at triage.
5. Make the total time as short as possible. Rapid transportation is the best pre-
vention against gas infection.
0. JYo sutures will be placed in any wounds except for cleansing abdomens, chests,
and heads.
The following corps surgeon orders were issued October 27 to the regu-
lating officer:
1. You will proceed during the afternoon of October 27, 1918, to Bethincourt, and act
as the representative of this office as regulating officer.
2. It will be your duty to keep this office constantly informed of — -
(a) The state of transportation.
(6) Any defect in the triage system which you can not correct on the spot.
(c) Any unusual event.
3. You will supervise the triage system of the divisions and will give such orders as
may be necessary to the triage officers or regulating officers direct. [Amended by memo,
dated October 31.]
METJSE- ARGON NE OPERATION 701
4. It is suggested tlint you require the triage officers to classify their patients and
the regulating officers of the triage to load them according to the following classifications:
(a) Very seriously wounded.
(6) Moderately wounded (ambulance cases).
(c) Lightly wounded (truck cases).
(d) Evacuable gas cases.
(c) Evacuable normal sick.
(f) Contagious.
(.'/) Psychopathic,
If you establish a station near the triages, but beyond both of them, along the out-
going road, and detail from the divisions having triages at Bethincourt personnel to direct
ambulances, loaded as stated above, to the proper hospital, it is believed that you will he
able to maintain a sufficient hold on the situation.
0. Under the terms of the evacuation order of the 1st Army, you will evacuate
patients as follows:
(a) Seriously wounded to Mobile Surgical Hospital No. 1, Esnes.
(6) Moderately wounded to Evacuation Hospital No. 4, at Fontaine Ronton.
(c) Slightly wounded to Evacuation Hospitals Nos. 6 and 7, Souilly.
(d) Normal sick to Evacuation Hospitals Nos. 6 and 7, Souilly.
(e) Contagious sick to the French contagious hospital, at ISenoite-Vaux.
(f) Psychopathic cases to the Army Psychopathic Hospital No. 1. at Benoite-Vaux.
(g) Gas cases to the gas hospital, at La Morlette.
0. All truck cases are to be evacuated to the relay station established by the divisions
at Sivry-la-Perche, and trucks diverting for tin; purpose should be directed to proceed on
their normal course, after unloading patients at that place.
7. Every ambulance leaving with patients for Mobile Hospital No. 1 should be in-
formed that if, on reporting at the hospital, it is found to be full they will be directed
to continue to Evacuation Hospital No. 15 at Glorieux ; also ambulances proceeding to
Evacuation Hospital No. 4 should he prepared, if that hospital is jammed, to receive orders
to proceed to Evacuation Hospital No. 8, at Petit Maujouy. Also, ambulances loaded with
gas patients proceeding to La Morlette may receive directions to proceed to Rambluzln.
8. Divisional ambulances will evacuate normal and contagious sick from the triage
to the sick hospitals, the corps evacuating system being responsible for tlie evacuation
of them farther to the rear.
0. It is the desire that existing orders be carried out rigidly with reference to the
sorting and evacuation of gas cases and of psychopathic cases and that every effort be
made to carry out the triage orders of the corps as written.
10. You are authorized to act for the corps surgeon in any situation which may
arise.
The following corps surgeon memorandum was issued October 30 to
division surgeons :
Memoranda from this office dated September 19, 191S, and October 10, 1918, on the
subject of triage, are hereby revoked and the following substituted therefor:
The following instructions for the operation of the field hospital used as a sorting
station (triage) are sent you for your information and guidance:
1. All casualties, both sick and wounded, will pass through the triage.
11. The functions of a triage are in general :
1. The grouping of casualties into —
(a) Transportable.
((*) Nontransportable.
2. The classification of casualties into —
(a) G. S. W.— severe.
(6) G. S. W.— slight,
(c) Psychoneurosis.
702 FIELD OPERATIONS
(d) Gassed.
(e) Injured.
it) Sick.
3. The operative treatment of surgical cases to make those transportable if possible.
4. The revision of splints and dressings.
5. The administration of antitetanic serum when the diagnosis tag, or the charac-
teristic sign on the patient's forehead, does not show that it has already been admin-
istered.
0. The bathing and changing of clothing of slight mustard-gas cases to prepare them
for prompt return to duty.
7. The hospitalization of absolutely nontransportable cases (wounded, gassed, and
sick I . together with the surgical or medical treatment of the same.
8. Contributing to the comfort of all who remain permanently or temporarily in the
sorting station by the administration of hot drinks, food, and by other means.
III. The sorting station is not a place for hospitalization, except for the nontrans-
portable, and only then when proper hospitals for nontransportable wounded and gassed
are not provided near by.
IV. The commanding officer of the field hospital acting as triage shall himself func-
tion as triage officer, or name a medical officer to act as such. The division surgeon
will assign, as advisers to the triage officer during periods of activity, either representa-
tives of the special divisions, or medical officers especially qualified in (a) orthopedics;
(6) psychiatry; (e) general medicine, includng the treatment of shock and gassed cases:
and (d) an officer especially skilled in surgery.
V. Since many cases will be evacuated directly from the triage to army hospitals
in the rear the triage is the only point where any accurate report of the divisional
losses can be obtained. To this end it lias proven of great advantage to the statistical
department of the division to place clerks at the triage to augment the medical depart-
ment clerical force in making a nominal check list of all cases passing through. The
following procedure is suggested as having been found practicable. A competent clerk will
collect the necessary data from each case as admitted. The triage officer, or his repre-
sentative, will examine the cases, marking the disposition of same on the back of the
diagnosis tag with a colored pencil. A clerk will then follow, note the disposition of the
case, and indicate on the diagnosis tag that record is complete by marking same witli
a fixed symbol. Cross in a circle is suggested. The noncommissioned officer in charge of
litter detail will assure himself that each tag bears the symbol before evacuating such a
case from the triage.
VI. Records will be collected in such a manner that cases from —
(«) Division making report.
(6) All other U. S. divisions. (Each division separately.)
(ct Allied troops.
I (1 1 Enemy.
Will show for each case —
( a ) Number.
(6) Name.
(c) Rank.
(d) Organization.
(e) Nature of casualty.
if) Disposition.
VII. In order that complete record of divisional losses may be maintained, division
surgeons will send to each neighboring division surgeon the dally report of those case*
belonging to the latter's division which have passed through the former's triage. This
work is a proper function for the division surgeon's office, and will not be added to the
paper work of the triage group.
The triage group is not a field hospital and does not within itself admit patients.
Forms 547 and 648 A. G. O., G. H. Q., need not. therefore, be prepared nor the field
medical card started. The same rule applies to sanitary formations which function ns
METJSE-ARUONNE OPERATION 703
advance dressing stations, rest, or relay stations, so long as the organizations hold patients
who are awaiting further evacuation to the rear. If, however, a ease is hospitalized —
that is, if it is admitted to the gas department or nontransportable department for defini-
tive treatment — or if a case is completed as by return to duty proper, record must lie made.
Cases dying in triage or enroute to triage will be forwarded and admitted to a hospital
where the necessary records will be prepared and proper provision made for burial.
Twenty-four hours will be considered the time limit within which sanitary formations
can hold patients awaiting evacuation without considering that such cases have been
hospitalized.
VIII. A numerical summary, classified as outlined in paragraph 1. corrected Memo-
randum No. 1. this office, dated October 12, covering the twenty-four hour period from
ti a. m. to 6 p. m. will be in the corps surgeon's office before 7.30 a. m. daily. Report will
lie telephoned or sent by special courier from the triage or from the division surgeon's
office, whichever system is considered the quickest.
IX. Nontransportable wounded will be admitted immediately to the nontransportable
section of the triage, or transferred at once to the field hospital or other hospital de-
voted to nontransportable cases. Nontransportable gas cases will also be admitted to the
gas section of the triage, or transferred at once to the field hospital or other hospital
ilevoted to the treatment of gassed cases.
X. Every effort will be made to prevent evacuation to the rear and to cause prompt
return to duty at the front of men found not to be proper subjects for evacuation.
XI. The personnel of the field hospital acting as a triage should be divided into ap-
propriate groups for the various departments, viz :
A triage group.
A surgical group.
A gas group.
XII. The following personnel is suggested as making a triage group to work under
the supervision of the triage officer. There should be two such groups working 12
hours each.
Two medical officers.
Two noncommissioned officers.
Two clerks.
One stenographer.
Twelve litter bearers.
Two men for kitchen detail.
One ward attendant for each tent in which patients are held and two men for
dispensary and dressing room.
XIII. The training of triage personnel is important to bring out the proper grouping
"f cases, correct record, and speedy evacuation. The triage officer must be an officer
of sound judgment and must be possessed of power to decide quickly and accurately.
XIV. No radical departure from these instructions will be made, except by order
from the corps surgeon.
THE SOTH DIVISION
Prior to the attack of October 4, the division was assembled in tlie vicinity
of Cuisy. On the afternoon of the 3d, preparations were made for an attack
in the Xantillois — Cunel sector, then held by the troops of the 79th and 4th
Divisions. The eastern limit of the zone of action extended from Septsarges,
400 meters (436 yards) from the western edge of Bois du Fays, thence north
through the Bois de Malaumont — Cote 299 — Aincreville. The western limit
of the zone of action was Montfaueon — Cote 259 — Nantillois — Cunel road —
Bantheville — Andevanne. 8
At 5.25 a. m.. October 4. the 159th Brigade (less one battalion, 318th
Infantry) attacked under cover of an artillery barrage. Its parallel of tie-
704 FIELD OPERATIONS
parfcure was Cierges — Nantillois — Brieulles road, north of Nantillois. The
160th Brigade remained in reserve, ready to move one or more of its units for-
ward on 15 minutes' notice. s
In the initial attack the infantry advanced at a considerable distance be-
hind the barrage because the troops had to reach their unreconnoitered assembly
positions in the dark. Upon reaching the line of Hill 274, the first wave was
met by very heavy' machine-gun fire from the north, northeast, and west and
by intense artillery fire from the north, northeast, and east, part of this fire
enfilading the attacking line. A few troops reached the edge of Bois des
Ogons. No advance could be made beyond this position, however, during the
day. A new attack was ordered for the afternoon of October 4. At 5.30 p. m.
this attack took place on the whole front, after an artillery preparation. It
failed, but troops filtered in through the Bois des Ogons under cover of dark-
ness. However, they were unable to organize and hold this forward ground
in the face*of enemy machine-gun and artillery fire, 8 and the line formed south
of Bois des Ogons.
On October 5 the attack was resumed at 6 p. m., and the line was advanced
to the southern portion of Bois des Ogons, without heavy casualties. 8
On October the position obtained was held during the day, and defensive
organization was begun. 8
During the night of October 6-7 the entire 159th Brigade withdrew to a
position south of Cuisy. 8
On October 9, in the general advance, the 80th Division reached and held
the Cunel — Brieulles road. 8
On October 11, at 7 a. m., the hour set for the resumption of the advance,
our troops formed in the rear of a barrage. Just prior to "H" hour, however,
the enemy laid annihilating artillery fire on the left of the lines and decimated
two companies of the attacking troops and made many ineffectives in two
others. Despite this, however, the right of the line and the reorganized left
went forward to the attack and made slight gains. 8 At the end of the day.
though, they had not been able to maintain a position north of the Cunel —
Brieulles road. 3
On October 11, at nightfall, the front line was held by one battalion of the
319th Infantry on the left and one battalion of the 320th Infantry on the
right, echeloned in depth; one battalion of the 320th Infantry in the southern
portion of the Bois de Malaumont; one battalion of the 320th Infantry west
of La Ville aux Bois Ferme, echeloned in depth. The reserve battalion of the
319th Infantry was in the northern part of the Bois des Ogons. During the
night of October 11-12 the division (less the Artillery brigade) was relieved by
the 5th Division. It then moved to the vicinity of Thiaucourt in the army
reserve. 8
MEDICAL, DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Ambulance Company No. 317 was functioning at St. Nazaire and did not
rejoin the 80th Division until after the division was withdrawn. Ambulance
Company Xo. 318 assisted in the operation of a dressing station at Nantillois
and litter-bearer evacuations in front of it, and performed various services
PLATE XLI.
MEUSE - ARGONNE OPERATION
SECOND PHASE
4™ and 80 T . H DIVISIONS
Scale in. Kilometers
A Triage
+ r>K DrraLnJ Moiion
+ AC Ajr&olATire Ctsmmrv
_ F.H HA) HomUl
B CiH <i/>» I Install
S.'!M) MmUtoI Supply Depot
AMHCIAKCE COMPANIES
.A.NTJ
FIKLD HOSPITALS
\TK DIVISION 60TB DIVISION
N°J
10
N« 3i?
2\
316
u
310
M
3tO
Qrtnw *^
£>n**rn from "■■*'•
, <■»
AMM j?/*ffl
■ ■
ifel-W
A*V«J# . r'ertiun
->J . Mrtltm-M.
2>>jte t o/-u of the
M*r1tt-*l Untts
from
r*pr>r~t3 - J " ffy* J>,*"
SLOfiAt '.isrfen'
3 . Fou -r
mr.d liQh
firth 2>t "i
s.on
a
SwiffiBass*"
Battle lines, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J.Pershing, September 1, 1919. arc approximate.
MEUSE-AEGONNE OPERATION 705
for Ambulance Companies No. 319 and No. 320. Ambulance Company No.
319 established a dressing station at Nantillois on October 4 which was taken
over by Ambulance Company No. 320 on the 5th and 6th. Ambulance Com-
pany No. 319 then resumed operations until the 8th, when Ambulance Com-
pany No. 320 took the dressing station over and maintained it until the division
withdrew. This station cleared about 400 patients a day, though both ambu-
lance companies suffered casualties from shell fire while on duty here. As
stated above, they were assisted here and in advance of it by Ambulance Com-
pany No. 318.°
Field Hospital No. 317 continued to operate a hospital for gassed and sick
at Fromereville, where from September 26 to October 12 it cared for 1,762
patients. At the same point Field Hospital No. 318 operated the triage, receiv-
ing 5,915 patients during the same time, this number including 1.226 patients
belonging to the 4th Division. The triage reports showed that it had received
1,610 gassed patients, of whom 679 came from the 80th Division. Two per
cent of these cases were serious, while 20 per cent of the patients admitted
as gas casualties showed no symptoms of that condition. Of the total number
received, diagnosed as gassed, 525 were returned to duty. 10
Field Hospital No. 319 at Bethincourt, in conjunction with Field Hospital
No. 320, cared for 3.176 surgical cases. Approximately 20 per cent of the
wounded were classed as seriously wounded, 10 per cent as having wounds
of moderate severity, and 70 per cent as slightly wounded. About 10 per
cent of wounds were caused by high-explosive shells. 10 per cent by shrapnel,
and 80 per cent by machine-gun or rifle bullets. About 10 per cent of the
sick were seriously ill, suffering chiefly from pulmonary or intestinal diseases. 11
THE 4TH DIVISION "
On October 4 the 4th Division, which had been holding a rather long
sector from near the Meuse to a point north of Nantillois. attacked at 5.30 a. m.
The attack was made northwestwardly from the Nantillois — Brieulles road,
the objective being Cote 299. and the north edge of Bois de Foret. The
attack progressed favorably, meeting little resistance except from machine-
gun nests, which, however, were very active in opposition. The Bois du
Fays was taken and our troops crossed the Cunel — Brieulles road, advanced
through the woods on the north, and approached the Bois de Foret. 12
Again the advance was delayed by exposure of the left flank, for the
Bois des Ogons had not been taken at this time. Consequently our troops were
compelled to fall back and to organize a temporary line of defense along the
Fond de Ville-aux-Bois, fully 1 km. (0.6 mile) south of the points taken in the
attack. The 59th Infantry protected both flanks of the salient thus formed,
and the 47th Infantry held the line on the right along the north edge of the
Bois de Brieulles. The line thus formed (western edge of Bois du Fays —
Fond de Ville-aux-Bois — eastern edge of Bois du Fays — northern edge of
"For mnp of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XLI.
13570—25 45
706 FIELD OPERATIONS
Bois de Brieulles) remained the same until October 9. The 4th Division had
occupied the western edge of Bois du Fays on the oth, in order to maintain
contact with the 80th Division and to assist in its progression. The Bois des
Ogons, on the left of the 4th Division, was taken by the 80th Division on the
night of October 5, but the line of the 80th Division remained nearly 1 km.
(0.6 mile) less advanced than the line of the 8th Brigade, 4th Division, mak-
ing it necessary to protect the left of the Bois du Fays. Several counter-
attacks and attempts at infiltration on both sides of the Bois du Fays were
made by the enemy and were repulsed. After the early morning counter-
attack on October 0, activity in the 4th Division sector was limited
to patrolling, occasional machine-gun fire, and to continued harassing shell
fire. 12
On October 9 in the evening, an attack on Bois de Malaumont was made,
It was planned that the attack should be made in line with the 80th Division,
on the left. It was learned through liaison with the 80th Division that this
attack would begin at 4 p. m. The advance of the 4th Division was accord-
ingly scheduled at 5.40 p. m. The 39th Infantry, having taken up a position
in the Bois du Fays, attacked northward from Bois Fond de Ville-aux-Bois.
The 47th Infantry continued to hold the line along the northern portion of
the Bois de Brieulles. The first attack was not successful, and the troops
suffered considerably from artillery fire from the right rear. Furthermore,
a heavy gas concentration necessitated the wearing of masks, which made
progress very slow in the thick underbrush and in the approaching darkness.
Units, in consequence, became separated, so the advance was halted and the
troops were withdrawn for reorganization, to the starting point. The right
of the 80th Division likewise had failed to progress. 12
On October 10, at 7 a. m., the attack was i-esumed. Owing to the heavy
resistance from shell and machine-gun fire, and to the dense undergrowth, the
troops were unable to keep up with the barrage in the morning, and the
advance got no farther than the northern edge of Bois de Pent de Faux. 12
In the afternoon the southern portion of the Bois de Foret was penetrated,
but machine-gun resistance rendered a consolidation of the positions im-
possible before nightfall, and all troops were withdrawn to the northern edge
of Bois de Pent de Faux for the night. 12
Again on October 11, at 7 a. m., the attack was renewed. At 8.30 a. m.
the troops had reached the railroad in the Bois de Foret and were pressing on,
though meeting considerable resistance on the right. During the day the
advance was pushed to the northern edge of the Bois de Foret, and at 6 p. m.
division patrols were on Cote 299. 12
No attack was made on October 12 because it was anticipated that units
of the 5th Division would relieve the 4th Division. This relief did not take
place as planned, but during the night of October 12-13 and the morning of
the 13th the 39th Infantry and part of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion were
relieved by the 4th Infantry of the 3d Division. 12
From October 13 to 19 the period was characterized as a holding action,
for the division was not called upon to make any attack. On the contrary, it
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPEKATIOX 707
concentrated its efforts upon the defense of the division sector. The divisional
front now extended from the northernmost point of Bois dn Fays down the
northeast edge, of Bois du Fays, thence to Trench de Teton, thence to the
northern corner of Bois de la Cote Lemont, on the Meuse. This was the
situation when the division was relieved from the line on October 20th and
became a part of the American Second Army. 12
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The evacuation service of the 4th Division in this (the second) phase of
the operation was a continuation of that already described for the first phase.
As there was not much movement of the line, Medical Department formations
were not moved frequently. On October 15 the field hospitals were advanced
to Bethincourt, where they remained until the division was relieved. There
Field Hospital No. 19 performed triage duty, and, in connection with the 3d
and 5th Divisions, a hospital for nontransportable wounded was operated.
Field Hospital No. 33, at Sivry-la-Perche, received the divisional sick. 13
THE 3SD DIVISION
As has been stated at the beginning of this chapter, the mission of the
33d Division, when the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation began,
was to hold its present sector and to protect the east flank of the 4th Division.
Also it has been seen that the 33d ceased to be a part of the Third Corps on
October 7 and was attached to the French Seventeenth Corps, then a part of
the American First Army. During the period October 4—7, the 33d had no
engagement of major importance. 1
In view of the fact that from October 7 forward the greater activities of
the 33d Division during the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation
occurred east of the Meuse, further discussion of the operations is given at
the end of this section with that of other troops so serving.
THE 5TH DIVISION 1
By 6 a. m., on October 12. the relief of the 80th Division by the 5th
Division had been completed. There had been a modification in the orders.
The original order required the holding of a line in advance of that actually
held. At 1.30 a. m. on October 12. arrangement was made with the com-
manding general, 160th Infantry Brigade of the 80th Division, that no
forward movement would be attempted until the relief had been completed.
Finally it was ordered that four battalions of the 9th Infantry Brigade should
remain south of the east and west line from La Ville aux Bois and that the
4th Division would occupy position on their left flank, previously outlined
as part of the 5th Division sector. At 6.30 a. m., having completed the
relief, troops of the 9th Infantry Brigade went forward on strong recon-
naissance patrols along the 60-cm. railroad cut east of Cunel and into the
Bois de la Pultiere. 14
•For map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XL.
708 FIELD OPERATIONS
On October 13 an attack by tins division in the direction of Le Grand
Carre Ferine, in conjunction with one of the 42d Division through Somiuerance.
to form a junction at the farm, had been set unofficially for the day, to be
made by the 10th Infantry Brigade for this division. Owing to their distance
from the line and to the distribution of the troops, a postponement of 24
hours was made. By the order the line of attack was west of north instead
of north, as the frontage of the division had previously been. Due to the
fact that, as planned, the line of attack placed the right flank of the troops
of this division within 400 meters (436 yards) of the Bois de la Pultiere
and the Bois des Rappes, which the enemy still held, and to the fact that
the smoke barrage which our artillery could place could last for only one
hour, orders of the division provided that the 9th Infantry Brigade should
attack from the south the Bois de la Pultiere and the Bois des Rappes. At
10.30 p. m. the commanding general of the 10th Infantry Brigade, which
was to make the attack, received a copy of the attack order of the 64th
Brigade, 32d Division, Fifth Corps, which was to attack on the west and
to protect his left flank. This order contemplated an attack on Romagne-
sous-Montfaucon at " H " plus 6 hours, instead of " H " hour. Romagne
was occupied by the enemy. A change of the hour of attack of the 64th
Brigade was requested and the hour was changed from " H" plus 6 hours to
"H " plus 3 hours, " H " hour being fixed at 5.30 a. m. on the 14th. Despite
this effort at cooperation, Romagne was not taken until after 2 p. m. on the
14th. On October 14 the 10th Infantry Brigade attacked at 8.30 a. in.
The enemy put down a strong counteroffensive barrage from 6 to 8 a. in.
This produced losses and some confusion. Machine-gun fire was encountered
almost immediately, indicating that our destructive fire and barrage had not
been sufficient to hold down the enemy. Our attack passed through an
effective barrage put down by the enemy at 8.33 a. m. with heavy losses.
None the less, the advance steadily progressed. Upon mounting the slopes to
the north of the Romagne — Cunel road, our troops met a concentration of
machine-gun fire from the Bois des Rappes, Bois de la Pultiere, Romagne.
and the direction of Bantheville, and the attack was brought to a halt in
attempting to pass into the valley of the Andon. The 9th Infantry Brigade
was stopped in the Bois de la Pultiere, after having passed Cunel. At 4
p. m. the attack was made on Bois de la Pultiere and the Bois des Rappes.
This attack was successful in taking the Bois de la Pultiere. and the troops
held their positions and entrenched themselves for the night. 14
On the 15th the attack was resumed at 8 a. m. Stubborn resistance was
encountered on the northeast edge of the Bois de la Pultiere and the southern
edge of the Bois des Rappes. The 61st Infantry was placed in and about
Cunel, and the 60th Infantry in the Bois de Cunel. 14
On the 16th, at 7.30 a. m., strong combat patrols set forth to reconnoiterthe
Bois des Rappes. At 10.30 a. m. the first word was received that on the 15th
our troops had gained the north edge and were still holding it. At 11 a. m.
the commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade asked whether, in view of orders
given on the previous day to hold the northern edge of the Bois de la Pultiere
MKUSE-AEGONNE OPERATION 709
as the line of observation, troops of that brigade at the north edge of the Hois
des Kappes should be withdrawn. Instructions were given to hold the northern
edge of the Bois des Rappes by all means. In the meantime, however, the
troops had reached the north edge of the Bois des Eappes, had returned to
the north edge of the. Bois : de la Pultiere, pursuant to an order given the
previous evening which they had received instead of a countermanded order
later issued and which they had not received. During the afternoon orders
were issued for the relief of the 9th Infantry Brigade in the Bois de la Pultiere
by the 10th Infantry Brigade. The lateness of the hour and the impossibility
of making the relief when there would be no definite line resulted in the
decision not to attempt a reconquest of the Bois des Rappes at that time.
Remnants of the 01st Infantry were directed to hold what, they had until
relieved by the 10th Infantiy Brigade. 14
On the night of October 16-17 the 9th Infantry Brigade was relieved by
the 10th Infantry Brigade, which extended its line to the right, covering the
entire divisional sector front, the 11th Infantry taking the sector previously
occupied by the 9th Infantry Brigade. The 9th Infantry Brigade returned
to the Xantillois — Montfaucon area to reorganize its units and the area
for defense. 14
On October 17 the Bois de la Pultiere was cleared of the enemy, and the
division advanced to its northern edge; contact was established with the 3d
Division on the right, and the defensive position was entrenched and wired. 1 "'
On October 20 the attack was made on the Bois des Rappes. Despite the
fact that the troops were exhausted and arrangements for the attack were
made in haste, about 200 meters (218 yards) were gained. Again, on October
21, an attack was made on the Bois des Rappes. This attack succeeded in
completely capturing the woods. That night the position was consolidated,
and the combat troops were partially wired in. 14
On October 22 the 10th Infantry Brigade, having been relieved the
previous night by the 90th Division, withdrew to the zone east of .Mont-
faucon. The 9th Infantry Brigade was then in the Bois Malaneourt. 14
During the period October 23-26 the division continued in the areas
mentioned. The troops were in bivouac, still under shell fire, mostly from east
of the Meuse. and were subject to airplane bombing and shelling at night. 1 "'
On the night of Octol>er 26-27 the division relieved the 3d Division in
line. The front line at that time extended from the northeast corner of the
Bois des Rappes, along the northeast edge of Clairs Les Chenes, Hill 299, and
the northern and eastern edges of the Bois de Foret. The 9th Infantry Brigade
held the north front of the 61st Infantry on the left and the 60th Infantry
on the right. The 10th Infantry Brigade was to the right rear, holding as its
front the northern edges of the Fond de la Cote Lemont, Cote 280, and Bois
de Brieulles. 1 *
On October 28 a system of small but persistent advances, at slight cost,
was instituted, which steadily encroached upon the enemy and ultimately
gained a starting point for the next major operation. On October 29, by
means of strong combat patrols, the division advanced its outpost line to
710
FIELD OPERATIONS
MEUSE-ARGOXNE OPERATION 711
within 400 meters (436 yards) south of Anclon Creek and extended outposts
and listening posts well down toward the western bank of the Mouse. On
October 30, Brienlles was cleared of any enemy, and on the 31st Andon Creek
was forded and Aincreville was taken. 14
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
It was only with considerable difficulty that ambulance companies main-
tained contact with regimental and battalion medical formations so they
might effect removal of the wounded by litter bearers or, in some cases, by
ambulances. Dressing stations were operated at Septsarges and Nantillois,
the capacity of that at Nantillois being greatly increased on October 15, when
Field Hospital No. 17 opened at that point. 15 Other such stations were estab-
lished at such times as the military situation in this phase of the operation
warranted, at Cunel, Madeleine Ferme, and Aincreville. The stations at
Xantillois and Madeleine Ferme were in use during the entire period of the
division's operations during this phase. 10 An important service of the dressing
station was the provision of hot food, for many men who had become exhausted
were able, after eating and enjoying a short rest, to return to the front. One
station reported having served over 3,000 hot meals in 48 hours. From these
stations ambulances were sent forward as required to regimental aid stations
and to other localities. Casualties from the front lines were removed by
division ambulances, while from the field hospitals at Bethincourt they were
removed both by ambulances and trucks. 17
For the shelter and care of patients awaiting transfer to the triage, Field
Hospital No. 17 was used as a collecting hospital in advance areas in connection
with dressing stations. It served in this manner from October 15 to 21 at
Xantillois, and at Septsarges from October 27 to November 4. At times it was
operated in two or more sections, furnishing personnel and tentage to several
dressing stations. 18
Field Hospital No. 25 operated the divisional triage at Bethincourt from
October 12 to 22, when it closed for three days while the division was not in
action. It reopened at this site on October 25 and continued to perform this
service until November 5. Similarly, Field Hospital No. 29 operated as a
gas hospital at Bethincourt from October 12 to 22 and from October 25 to
November 5. 18
Field Hospital No. 30 opened on October 11 at Sivry-la-l J erche. where it
operated a relay hospital until November 1. Such a formation was necessitated
by the length of the route to evacuation hospitals and the time required to
travel it. This unit also received sick and exhausted which were sent to it
directly from the triage. 18
For a short time the different divisions of the corps alternated in main-
taining a corps gas hospital, but this arrangement did not prove very satis-
factory. There were enough gas casualties in each division to keep one of
its hospitals fully occupied, and the attempt to treat at one field hospital
of one division all the gassed cases of the corps resulted in confusion both
U2
KIKI.D OPERATION'S
in respect to patients and to their records. After this became apparent the
5th Division operated its own gas hospital. 19
This division, like all others in the Third Corps, was provided with op-
erating teams, but as there were comparatively few wounded requiring opera-
tion in the field hospitals at Bethincourt, one team at a time was sufficient for
the needs of the corps at this point. Rotation was therefore practiced by the
teams belonging to the three divisions in the corps, and constant attention to
patients was thus made feasible. The surgical work of the field hospitals
was limited by the fact that a mobile hospital was readily accessible to the
wounded of the corps, first at Fromereville and later at Esnes. Some of
the shock teams organized in the divisions gave preoperative and post-
operative treatment in the field hospital where surgery was performed, while
others at other field hospitals restored such patients as had been chilled
while en route. 20
Under supervision of the corps regulating officer the evacuation service
from the field hospitals at Bethincourt was effected by French and American
ambulance sections (especially by Sections Nc. 566 and No. 571) and by
trucks which passed this point on their way to the rear.'- 1 Trucks were used
for the slightly wounded and the sick; they carried approximately 50 per
cent of the patients evacuated. The routes of evacuation from divisional
hospitals remained as at the beginning of the attack until November 8,
casualties going to the triage at Bethincourt and thence as follows: Seriously
wounded to Mobile Hospital No. 1, at Fromereville, and to Mobile Hospital
No. 5, at Les Placys, respectively 20 and 26 km. (12.4 and 16 miles) from
the front; transportable wounded and sick to Evacuation Hospitals No. 6
and No. 7, at Souilly, 34 km. (21 miles) from the front; and gassed psycho-
neurotic patients to Evacuation Hospital No. 3 and the neurological unit at
Benoite Vaux, 30 km. (18.6 miles) from the front. The distance to these
hospitals gradually increased and the difficulties of evacuation became pro-
gressively greater, but at this time the army hospitals could not be advanced,
as there were no railway facilities for their evacuation farther forward. 22
Medical supply dumps were established at Bethincourt and at Septsarges.
Triage reports 5th Division 2Z
[Admissions from 5th Division only]
Wounded
Psychoses
Gassed
Injured
Sick
Oct. 13 _
196
144
366
1,064
321
198
184
255
131
237
40
12
14
38
34
32
2
78
18
2
1
3
38
59
120
80
46
18
12
1
5
2
9
2
1
3
2
8
19
12
3
1
2
2
2
2
1
30
55
53
40
40
5
14 -.
22
15
54
16
70
17. .
61
18
24
19
57
20 - ..
52
21 -.-
33
22. -
32
23
12
27.
5
28 -
5
29
4
30
1
31
2
MEUSE-ARC.ONNE OPERATION 713
THE 90TH DIVISION
On October 17 the 90th Division passed to the reserve of the Third Corps,
and on the night of October 21-22 it relieved the, 5th Division, remaining in
the attacking line until the armistice, November ll.- 3
On October 22, the division was ordered to insure its position in the Bois
des Eappes and to push out strong patrols to take possession of Bantheville
and the high ground north and northwest of that town, and to establish a
line from the northwest corner of the Bois des Rappes, over the high ground
north of Bourrut, to the northeast corner of the Bois de Bantheville. 23
On October 23, the 357th Infantry attacked at 3 p. m., and took all ob-
jectives, with only slight casualties. The 3d Battalion, 358th Infantry, in the
Bois des Rappes, extended its left to connect with the 357th Infantry, north
of Bourrut. 23
On the night of October 23, it was reported by the Third Corps that
indications pointed to a withdrawal of the enemy. The 179th Infantry was
ordered to gain and keep contact with him. Pursuant to these instructions,
a portion of the 358th Infantry crossed the Brook Andon. A position was
then held from a point about 500 meters (545 yards) southwest of Aincreville
along the Aincreville — Bantheville road, to the north of Bourrut, thence along
Mill 270 to the western boundary of the division. The establishment of this
line, gave an excellent position for the attack of November 1, and it was held
despite continuous, severe shelling and severe, small counterattacks. 28
The 179th Brigade was relieved in line by the 180th Brigade on the night
of October 30-31. 23
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The office of the division surgeon moved on October 19 to Cuisy, the
division post control, but his subordinate office personnel was soon sent to
Sivry-la-Perche, in the rear. On the same date the division surgeon issued
an order concerning evacuation routes, disposition of medical department
formations, and other cognate matters. In the attack of October 23 the units
of the sanitary train were disposed and operated as follows : 24 On October 22
Ambulance Companies No. 357 and No. 359 had established the main dressing
station of the division at Nantillois. Ambulance Company No. 358 established
a dressing station at Septsarges and furnished details to regimental detach-
ments. Ambulance Company No. 360, in conjunction with Field Hospital No.
357, had established a triage at Bethincourt on October 19. 25 Field Hospital
No. 358, at Bethincourt, Avas the corps gas hospital, while Field Hospital No.
359 received corps sick and slightly wounded, at Sivry-la-Perclie. 26 Field
Hospital No. 360, the divisional collecting hospital, was located 0.5 km. (0.3
mile) south of Nantillois. 27 All motor ambulances (38 in number) were
pooled and operated from Nantillois under the direction of Ambulance Com-
pany No. 359. At Bethincourt were located the triages of the three divisions
attacking on the corps front. Here also was one hospital from each division,
designated to receive a certain class of patients from all divisions in the corps.
13570—25 40
714
FIELD OPERATIONS
Under this arrangement the hospital of the 90th Division (Field Hospital No.
358), designated for communal service of the corps, was at first in reserve
at this point, but was soon called upon to supplement the gas hospital,
operated for the corps by the. 5th Division. At the same place a field hospital
of the 3d Division received all nontransportable wounded in the corps. The
supply dump of the 90th Division was located at Sivry-la-Perche. 24
Division consultants and chaplains were assigned to duty at the triage,
which was augmented further by personnel of Ambulance Company No. 360,
Fig. 82. — Aid station, 358th Infantry, at Cunel, Meuso, October 27, 1918
to operate it at night. The commanding officer of the sanitary train was
ordered to make any other assignments to this formation necessary for its
efficient service. 2 *
Though the medical supply dump was ordered to remain at Sivry-la-
Perche. an advance dump was established at the triage, whence supplies could
be sent by ambulance on request of medical officers farther forward. 28
A medical officer was designated to control evacuations from the front
to the field hospitals, while another, under the corps surgeon, was charged
with evacuations from the hospitals to the rear. It was directed that divi-
sional officers make arrangements concerning evacuations either with him di-
PLATE XLII.
MEUSE -ARGONNE
2^ PHASE
90™. DIM SI ON
SHOWING AID STATIONS
OCTOBER 21-31, 1918.
de Foret .
isScL e . P„eu.l_-gCB- Fa ux
LZBivX314AR^0cp> W^/'#
▲ -Triage
X — Aid Station.
+ - Dressing Station.
± -Field Hospital
AC - Am.bulan.ce Company
Bn - Battalion,
I R. - Infantry Regiment
AR - Artillery Regiment
FS -Field Signal
MG- Machine Gu,a
DPC-Division Post Command
JjVBrieuUes -
1^* xur-Meuse
^rpois .,V; .
_./;•'. de la. *°g
0AZ4 zi$% «ito3lS^
^'57 TT3 I / •ry-;qr&F£rjn.e:d'eJa.Ma.deleiitre
\uAd'r n iMw*^ ,i f < AZ7
// / 1Bii357IR\
\»AR/ f^\
/ 35 71R 314 ^Jg^fr^
Cole 265 ^y*S
W0N^UTON^W 1 J -344KJGJ(k
j.c V\ 7 y " Datmevoux
SfegS^
Gerccurt >•
DfUl-SScourt
References - Hr<3.wn from Maps Ditn. £ur Meu.se A 1'ftrlu.r s\ * P
Positions of Medical Units from Rep-irts oi Surgeon .\:nt:<t'\
Battle lines, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, arc approximate.
MEUSE-AEGONNE OPEBATION 715
rect or with the corps surgeon by telephone or by courier. Wounded were
distributed from the division units as follows: 24
Seriously wounded : Evacuation Hospital No. 8, Petit Maujouy, and
Mobile Hospital No. 5, Les Placys.
Slightly wounded:
Ambulance cases — Evacuation Hospital No. 4, Fontaine Ronton.
Truck cases — Evacuation Hospitals No. 6 and No. 7, at Souilly.
Gassed cases: Gas Hospital, La Morlette.
Nervous cases: Psychopathic Hospital No. 1, Benoite-Vaux.
Contagious cases: French hospital, Benoite-Vaux.
Normal sick (in trucks if practicable) : Evacuation Hospitals No. 6
and No. 7, Souilly.
On October 24, Ambulance Company No. 357 established an advance dress-
ing station which included facilities for the treatment of gassed patients. This
was at Bomagne, where it operated until November 4. 27
On the 27th an advance rest hospital was established at Septsarges where
walking patients and those with minor injuries were received and forwarded
to the triage by truck. 27
Cases received at the triage were reported to have been as follows : - 9
To 6 a. m.—
Wounded
Gassed
Sick and
injured
27
42
34
43
59
74
48
41
68
Total
Oct. 23
22
62
139
58
57
32
14
31
26
5
58
40
42 [
66
16
13
13
44
54
24
162
25
213
26
143
27
182
28
122
29
75
30
85
31
138
441
297
436
1,174
The greatest number received on any one day was 213. but the average was
130.4 per day. Of the 297 gassed cases, none proved fatal. 29
In addition to the above. 838 cases belonging to other divisions were
admitted during this period, making a true total of 2,012. 29
THE 3D DIVISION'
On October 14 the 3d Division attacked at 8.30 a. m. Its mission was
to hold that part of its line through which the 5th Division had passed, from
the Cierges — Bomagne road to within 1 km. (0.G mile) of the Meuse, and
to advance to the army hrst phase objective on the right. 30 The 30th Infantry
was assigned the special task of clearing the Bois de la Pultiere and the Bois
des Rappes, in cooperation with the 5th Division, which was attacking these
woods from the southwest. The attack developed slowly, meeting with stub-
born resistance : and night found the division in possession of the Bois de la
Pultiere, and with its line well advanced into the Bois de Foret. 30
• For map of activities of this division for this period, seo Plate XI.
716 FIELD OPERATION'S
On October 15 at 7.30 a. m. the attack was continued, but except for a
general local improvement of the lines no advance was made. 30
On October 17 the division occupied the front line, approximately as
follows: East edge of the Bois de la Pultiere, thence southeastwardly along
the border of the Bois de Peut-de-Faux, to a point on the Cunel — Brieulles
road west of Brieulles. 30
On October 20, at 7 a. m. the 3d Division attacked in close cooperation
with the 5th Division, the mission of the 3d Division being to clear and hold
the Bois des Clairs Chenes and Hill '299. At 2.30 p. in. the Bois des Clairs
Clienes had been completely cleared of the enemy. However, a counterattack
by the enemy drove the elements holding the front line back to the point of
departure at the northern boundary of the Bois de la Pultiere. At 6 p. m. the
7th Infantry counterattacked and gained Bois des Clairs Chenes. 30
Hills 297 and 299 were attacked at noon, October 21. At 2.30 p. m. these
hills were occupied. 30
At 1.45 p. m. October 22 the whole of the Bois de Foret was held by
our troops, and that night Hill 281 was gained. 30
On October 23 the 3d Division, in cooperation with the 90th Division,
which had relieved the 5th Division on October 21-22 on the left bank of the
3d Division, made a successful attempt and captured Bantheville. 30
During the days of October 24-25. the troops of the 3d Division remained
in position, reorganizing positions which were unobservable by the enemy.
On October 25. orders were received from the Third Corps for the relief of
the 3d Division by the 5th Division, to be effected on the night of October
26-27. The 3d Division then passed into the corps reserve. 30
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Battalion aid stations with troops were frequently under fire, though
located, if possible, at points giving some protection. By order of the regi-
mental commander, one such station of the 7th Infantry was located in
the trenches (October 21), but casualties were so great that it had to he
withdrawn to Cunel. Some protection was obtainable in a quarry 1 km.
(0.6 mile) east of that town, and the aid stations of two regiments were
located there. Such good shelter as this was not usually to be found. When-
ever possible, both regimental infirmaries and battalion aid stations were
placed near a road — for example, those at Madeleine Ferine, Xantillois, Cunel.
Cierges. etc. — in order that they might be accessible to ambulances and thus
reduce carriage by litter. Exhaustion of litter carriers rendered very diffi-
cult the bringing in of the wounded from the front, though German prisoners
were used and some voluntary details of line troops were made available. 31 The
aid station of one regiment sometimes worked in conjunction with that of
another. Thus, at Madeleine Ferme, where the 30th Infantry maintained a
consolidated station for the entire regiment, caring for some 800 cases, there
were at one time, working in conjunction with it, aid stations of the 4th and
7th Regiments, and at other times those of the 38th, 60th, and 61st Regiments
and of the 8th Machine Gun Battalion. Such combinations were occasioned
1IEUSE-AEG0NNE OPERATION 717
by the narrowness of the divisional sector and the scarcity of desirable loca-
tions for aid stations. 32 Psychoneurotic cases received at these stations were
small in numbers in comparison with those in the battle of the Maroe. Also
the percentage of seriously wounded was higher than in that engagement,
more casualties being the result of high explosive shells. Best and food pro-
vided at aid stations enabled many exhausted men to return to the front, but
the resources were not sufficient for the refreshment of all. In one regiment
(the 4th Infantry) 70 per cent of the men evacuated during the last five days
of this action had become incapacitated because of extreme exhaustion. To
clear the aid stations, ambulances came forward as lulls in the firing or dark-
ness permitted, and many patients were sent from them on returning trucks."
Sanitary Train
Ambulance Company No. 7. with station at Montfaucon, was engaged in
removing wounded from the front until withdrawn October 31, 1918. 3 * Ambu-
lance Company Xo. 5 established a station in the vicinity of Septsarges on
October 19, with its vehicles in operation between the front and the field hos-
pitals. While there it. cared for 851 patients, of whom approximately 250
came from other divisions. In the period October 1-31. the company evacuated
3,295 casualties, of which 2,488 were members of the 3d Division. 3 "'
Ambulance Company Xo. 27 operated the dressing station at Montfaucon
from October 15-31, and its ambulances removed patients from that point to
the rear. After taking over this station it evacuated its patients to Bethin-
court. for when the 3d Division was transferred to the Third Corps its field
hospitals were moved to that location (October 14—15) in order that they
might be placed on the axial road of the corps in which the division was then
operating. During the time the station at Montfaucon was open, October 31,
its personnel consisted of alternating day and night shifts of 2 medical officers,
2 noncommissioned officers, and 21 other enlisted men. 3 " Ambulance Company
Xo. 2G conducted a shock ward in conjunction with the dressing station at
Montfaucon. and throughout the entire period furnished bearer details to the
Infantry, Machine (Jim Battalions, and to the dressing station at Montfaucon,
at the time also evacuating 60 patients to the field hospitals in Bethincourt. 3n
Headquarters of the field hospital section arrived at Bethincourt on Octo-
ber 14-15, functioning there until the 31st. 37
Field Hospital Xo. 5 assisted Field Hospital Xo. 27 at Bethincourt in
caring for sick and gassed patients and also in triage service. Here it admitted
77 sick and gassed cases. On October 25 it moved to Bethelainville, and
there cared for sick until the 28th. moving then to Sivry-la-Perche. 37
Field Hospital No. 7 cooperated with Field Hospital Xo. 26 at Bethin-
court in road construction and in the care of shocked and nontransportable
cases. After October 19, on which date Field Hospital Xo. 26 was moved,
Field Hospital Xo. 7 cared for all nontransportable cases here (admitting a
total of 14s). until October 28, when it withdrew to Sivry-la-Perche. 37
Field Hospital Xo. 26 conducted a shock hospital at Bethincourt until
the 19th. when it moved to Septsarges. At this point Ambulance Companies
718 FIELD OPERATIONS
No. 5 and No. 7 were engaged in removing casualties from battalion aid station,
and here Field Hospital No. 26 gave them food and treatment, evacuating to
the triage at Bethincourt those needing further care. 38 After suffering six
casualties from shell fire at this place, it moved about 200 meters (218 yards)
north, where it remained until October 28, then moving to Sivry-la-Perche.
In the interval, October 19-27, the shock and rest station which it had oper-
ated at Septsarges evacuated 616 patients. During the month it had cared
for 1,259 patients and suffered 12 battle casualties. 38
Field Hospital No. 27, assisted by Field Hospital No. 5, opened on the
17th at Bethincourt as the divisional triage. There it received 2,344 patients,
including gassed, among whom there were three deaths. Of the cases
received here larger numbers were due to illness than to battle casualties. On
the 27th the hospital closed and went into reserve until the 30th. 39
During the period October 15-30, sickness caused considerable loss to
the division, more cases of disease than wounds being received at the triage.
This was due largely to the influenza epidemic, but diarrhea also caused a
large number of temporary disabilities. 39
The following pertinent report concerning orthopedic service is quoted
from the Medical Department report of the Third Division : 40
The aim of the orthopedic section was to have every casualty Involving injury to
the bones or joints properly splinted at the earliest possible moment after injury, thus
avoiding a great amount of unnecessary pain to the patient and unnecessary damage to
the soft parts at the site of the injury. Instruction of the Medical Department enlisted
personnel on the proper application of various types of splints, especially the Thomas
arm and leg splints, and first aid treatment of fractures was encouraged.
During activity, the orthopedist operated from either the main ambulance dressing
station or the triage hospital. During the last offensive, until the 16th of October, all
fractures were examined at the main ambulance dressing station at Montfaucon. It was
made certain that these cases were properly splinted, that there was no frank hem-
orrhage, that the patient was as comfortable as possible under the circumstances, and that
antitetanic serum had been administered. Injuries to bones and joints were found to
cause a surprisingly large percentage of all battle casualties. The main dressing station
was operated by Ambulance Company No. 7 ; later on by Ambulance Company No. 27.
Here patients could usually find a warm fire, hot coffee, food, and cigarettes before beinj:
evacuated to the field hospitals.
It was found that all cases of fracture did not go through this station. Fractures were
subsequently treated from October 16 to November 1 at the triage hospital at Bethincourt,
operated by Field Hospital No. 28, and promptly evacuated to the evacuation hospitals.
refp:eences
<1) Operations of the Third Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation, November 25, 1918.
(2) Map showing daily position. Meuse-Argonne operation, G-3, G. H. Q., May 24, 1919.
(3) Report of Medical Department activities, Third Army Corps, by Col. J. L. Bevans.
M. C, corps surgeon, undated, 33. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Ibid., 34.
(5) Ibid., 35.
(6) Ibid., 36.
<7) Ibid., 37.
<8) Special operations report. 80tb Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPEKATION 719
(9) Report of Medical Department activities, 80th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 80th Division, undated, Part I, 14. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(10) Ihid., 11.
(11) Ibid., 12.
(12) Operation report, 4th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, December 10, 191S.
(13) Report of Medical Department activities, 4th Division. A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 4th Division, undated, 8. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(14) Report of operations. 5th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, November 21, 191S.
(15) Report of Medical Department activities, 5th Division, A. E. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 5th Division, undated, Part I, 42. On file, His-
torical Divson. S. G. O.
(16) Ibid., Part I, 4G.
(17) Ibid., Part I, 51.
(18) Ibid., Part I, 45.
(19) Ibid., Part I, 50.
(20) Ibid., Part I, 49.
(21) Ibid., Part I, 47.
(22) Ibid., Part I, 41.
(23) Report of operations, 90th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(24) Report of Medical Department activities, 90th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 90th Division, undated. Part I, 20. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(25) Ibid., Part II, 22.
(26) Ibid., Part I, 33.
(27) Ibid., Part I, 3G.
(28) Ibid., Part I, 40.
(29) Daily report of the triage, 90th Division. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(30) Report of operations. 3d Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(31) Report of Medical Department activities, 3d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part IV, 95. On file, Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
(32) Ibid., Part IV, 107.
(33) Ibid., Part IV, S3.
(34) Ibid., Part IV, 47.
(35) Ibid., Part IV, 46.
(36) Ibid., Part IV, 49.
(37) Ibid., Part IV, 50.
(38) Ibid., Part IV, 51.
(39) Ibid., Part IV, 53.
(40) Ibid., Part V, 78.
CHAPTER XXVIII
SECOND PHASE— Continued
OPERATIONS EAST OF THE MEUSE «
Hitherto the discussion of the activities of the division of the First Army
in the Meuse-Argonne operations has been confined to the area west of the
Me use. This was because, there, active operations took jjlace earlier; whereas
on the east, until October 8, a stationary line was maintained.
In the discussion of the activities of the First Army, in Chapter XX,
during what has been considered herein as the first phase of the Meuse-
Argonne operation, mention was made of the fact that it was primarily
intended to limit the front of the American attack to the west of the Meuse,
and that the three corps of the First Army located there were to advance
to the north and east, keeping in liaison with the French on the left, and
using the Third Corps of the First Army as a pivot to establish a line of
defense on the Meuse. In carrying out this mission, the forces of the First
Army on the right of the Meuse then were concerned only with protecting the
right of the attack.
In advance, however, when our troops had pushed farther north than
Montfaucon. the enemy artillery fire from the heights east of the Meuse
became so effective as to force their being cleared. 1 Accordingly, on Sep-
tember 30. Marshal Foch directed that the attack be extended east of the
Meuse. 2
The attack east of the Meuse was opened on October 8. by the French Seven-
teenth Corps. 3 The American troops participating in this attack were the
following: From west to east, the 33d Division, which was west of the Meuse
but put elements across the river during the day; the 58th Infantry Brigade of
the 29th Division, attached to the French 18th Division. Later, the remainder
of the 29th Division and the 26th Division were added to the forces east of the
Meuse. 4 ' "
The military activities of the First Army during both the first and
second phases, east of the Meuse, have been given in connection with the
activities on the west thereof.
° General remarks concerning military operations as a whole have been abstracted from Major
Operations, American Expeditionary Forces in France, prepared in the Historical Section, the Army
War College.
'During the period October 16 to November 5 the 35th Division held the Sommedleue sector,
near Verdun, being the right flank division of the First Army. No orders were received for an
advance by this division, and its only activity consisted in sending out strong patrols in order to
MCnre information of any possible withdrawal by the enemy. While in this sector the division was
attached successively to the French Thirty-third, Seventeenth, and Second Colonial Corps, 6
721
722 FIELD OPERATIONS
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
As no orders were issued for the evacuation service of the American
troops as a whole engaged in the operation east of the Meuse, the work of the
Medical Department of the several divisions concerned will be discussed
individually in connection with the operations of these divisions.
THE 33D DIVISION"
On October 6, the 33d Division was placed at the tactical disposal of the
French Seventeenth Corps, and was ordered to participate in the attack of
that corps east of the Meuse. Two days later, when this attack began, the
Engineer regiments of this division constructed two bridges across the river,
one at Brabant-sur-Meuse, the other at Consenvoye, despite the fact that
these bridges were under direct enemy observation and shell fire. Three
battalions of Infantry and two machine-gun companies then crossed the river
on these bridges, formed the left of the French attack, and by nightfall had
reached their objective south of Bois de Chaume. The next day these units
continued their advance to the road running from Sivry-sur-Meuse to Ville-
neuve Farm, but in the evening of that day a powerful enemy attack against
the right flank forced them to return to Tranchee du Cable, just south of
Bois de Chaume. Reinforcements had been dispatched from the main body
of the division across the river, and by the attack of October 10 all lost
ground was regained. During the next four days, these troops, whose right
flank remained exposed, were subjected to heavy artillery and machine-gun
fire, and to gas and airplane attacks. The G5th Brigade operated in the
sector of the divisional front east of the Meuse, and the 66th in the sector
west of it, from October 15 until the night of October 20-31, when most of
the division was relieved by the French 15th Colonial Infantry Division.
Relief was not completed until October 22. The 33d Division had been in
the trenches before Verdun for 44 days, and during the period it was astride
the Meuse it held a front of approximately 10 km. (6.2 miles), which was
subjected to incessant fire from enemy positions on the heights cast of the
river. When relieved by the French 15th Colonial Infantry Division, the
33d Division proceeded to the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector, where it relieved the
79th Division.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The divisional operations east of the Meuse and the concurrent tenure of
the former position west of it necessitated radical changes in the disposition
of Medical Department formations. It was necessary to evacuate from each
flank separately, and for this reason dual arrangements had to be made.
On the east of the Meuse an ambulance post was located at Consenvoye, a
dressing station at Cote des Roches, the triage and a reserve hospital at
Glorieux. On the left, ambulance posts were located at Dannevoux and
at a point east of Bois de Dannevoux and Bois de Scptsarges, a dressing
• For map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XLIII.
PLATE XLIII
MEUSE - ARGONNE
2 nd - PHASE
26,29,33 & 79 DIVISIONS
+ AC-Am.bulan.ce Company
± FH -Field. Hospital
® EH-Evacuatlort Hospital
▲ — Triage
ST -Sanitary Train
Htf«ren.ces
Divisional line* drawn from. Map No 4.,fin«
Roport of G*n*r*I ,'oKn J. ftrsMng .
CaswnoscU B«*vcux
tUMIe line*, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1. 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 723
station at Gercourt-et-Drillancourt, tlie divisional triage and a hospital for
nontransportable wounded of the corps at Bethincourt. Prior to the attack
of October 4. Field Hospital No. 129, which had moved to Bethincourt to
receive the divisional sick, was relieved from this duty and was designated
as the triage for troops on the left bank of the river. Field Hospital No.
130 at the same point received the nontransportable wounded from the corps,
while a hospital belonging to another division then acted as corps gas hos-
pital. At Glorieux, Field Hospital No. 132 was the triage unit for the troops
on the right bank, and at the same point Field Hospital No. 131 was held
in reserve. On October 16, the 29th Division took over the triage at Glorieux.
relieving Field Hospital No. 132; but that unit continued for several days
to operate its gas department. 7 Field Hospital No. 129 continued to act as
the triage at Bethincourt until the division was relieved. Field Hospital
No. 130 went into reserve on the 17th, moving on the 20th to Charny and
then to Genicourt-sur-Meuse, where it opened on the 22d. Field Hospitals
No. 129 and No. 132 moved on the 22d to Faubourg Pave, where the re-
mainder of the sanitary train eventually congregated, Field Hospital No. 132
having turned over all gas equipment to the establishment at Glorieux. On
October 17, Ambulance Company No. 131 had arrived at Thierville. All
units of the ambulance train prepared to leave their stations as soon as the
division withdrew from the forward areas and to provide ambulance service
for the troops on the march. s
By October 21, the division surgeon's office was established at Dieue, on
the Meuse, and the 108th Sanitary Train was located at Faubourg Pave, ex-
cept certain units which were distributed to serve elements of the division. 8
The physical condition of the troops had become impaired by long ex-
posure and harassing fire and many men were becoming exhausted. A
number were suffering from gastroenteritis, but none of the cases were serious
and the general health of the division was fairly good. 8
During its participation in the Meuse-Argonne operation, divisional
Medical Department formations cared for 3,639 patients, of whom 1,006 were
wounded, 1,625 gassed, 113 injured, 47 psychoneurotics, and 848 sick. Of this
number 32 died. It was reported that 60 per cent of the men tagged as suf-
fering from gas were in fact suffering from conditions other than gassing.
Evacuations were carried out promptly, though at certain times application
of dressings in the forward area had to be effected under the adverse condi-
tions occasioned by heavy enemy fire. A number of casualties were sustained
by the personnel of the Medical Department. 8
THE 29TH DIVISION" 1
Beginning on the night of September 29-30, the 29th Division (less
Engineers and Engineer train, which were on duty with the Fifth Army Corps) .
proceeded to the vicinity of Verdun, where it came under command of the
French Seventeenth Corps. The 57th Infantry Brigade was assigned as corps
* For map of activities of this division for this period, spo Plate XLIII.
724 FIELD OPERATIONS
reserve, but later elements of the brigade were placed in the line to assist the
French 18th Division in their attack. The 58th Infantry Brigade was at-
tached to the French 18th Division, and on October 8, with the 18th Division,
attacked to the north, from positions on a line just north of Samogneux,
against the heights which determined the Meuse-Argonne battlefield. The
attack penetrated Bois de Consenvoye, and two days later, after the 113th
Infantry had reinforced the line, the advance was resumed and the wood
cleared. On October 11, command of the division sector as far east as the
Bavin de Molleville passed to the 29th Division, but certain of its elements
continued for some days to operate with the French troops on its right. By
October 16, the line had been pushed forward into Bois de la Grande Montagne
on the north, and on the east into Bois d'Ormont, by elements of the divisions
attached to the French ISth Division. It was necessary to approach this latter
position by way of Etrayes ridge and Belieu Bois. On October 23, the ridge
was taken, the line now running from Ruisseau de Moyemont to Hill 370,
thence along the northern and eastern slopes of Etrayes ridge to a point be-
tween Bois de Wavrille and le Houppy Bois. On October 30 the division was
relieved by the 79th, when it moved to the Vavincourt area. 010 - 11
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The general plan for caring for wounded was reduced to the simplest
terms possible. Battalion surgeons, with their detachments, accompanied
advancing troops and established their stations as near the front as shelter of
any kind permitted. Each regimental surgeon kept about five enlisted men
in reserve to be used for messenger service or to reinforce any overtaxed
station. Battalion medical equipment was carried as far forward as possible
by carts and then by the Medical Department personnel. 12
On October 7, the sanitary 7 train was disposed as follows : Headquarters
of the train and of its sections with the four ambulance companies and
Sanitary Squads No. 41 and No. 42 were at Glorieux. a suburb of Verdun;
Field Hospital No. 114 had opened the divisional triage in a French military
hospital in the same community, and the other field hospitals were at Kam-
pont. At G a. m. October 8. Ambulance Companies No. 113 and No. 115 moved
to Charny, where they established ambulance parks, kitchens, and motor
repair shops. Shortly after 8 a. m. Ambulance Company No. 113 established
a dressing station near Samogneux with a part of its ambulance section and
sent forward litter bearers, who soon gained contact with the line. As this
point was under intermittent shell fire, the ambulances serving it were kept on
the alert at Charny. one moving up whenever another passed to the rear. 12
On the same date (October 8) Ambulance Company No. 115 located a dressing
station in a quarry midway between Samogneux and Brabant. The following
morning Ambulance Company No. 113 moved from Samogneux to a quarry
beyond it, but the same day moved farther forward to a site in Bois de
Consenvoye. where it remained until the division withdrew from the line.
This company also maintained a small dressing station in Brabant to care for
MF.r.SE-ARGONNE OPERATION (25
any casualties occurring in that place or in its vicinity. October 10, Am-
bulance Company No. 11G established a station 3 km. (1.8 miles) north of
Samogneux, and here Ambulance Company No. 115 also located its station
the next day. Though frequently under heavy shell fire, these stations
retained this location until October 19. 13
During this period Ambulance Company No. 114 (animal drawn) had
been in reserve at Glorieux, furnishing details for various purposes. Thus
at the request of the surgeon of the French Seventeenth Corps it assigned 4
noncommissioned officers and 30 litter bearers to assist the evacuation of the
French 18th Division on the nights of October 10 and 12. Another detail
assisted at the triage. The vehicles of this company were used only for some
short hauls over rough roads near the front, and to clear the slightly wounded
from a station which the company had established for this class of casualties
at Charny. This station functioned from the 11th to the 29th. 13
As the number of casualties had decreased by October 19. Ambulance
Company No. 116 closed its station and returned to Glorieux, and Ambulance
Company No. 115 returned to the quarry on the Samogneux — Brabant road.
where it continued to operate a station until relieved by a formation of the
79th Division, on October 29. Evacuation from the front to the triage was
made by the vehicles of Ambulance Companies No. 113 and No. 115, which for
three weeks were kept moving over roads which at places were almost impass-
able. At times it was necessary to supplement them by trucks. The motor sec-
tion of Ambulance Company No. 116 was assigned to corps service and assisted
in moving patients from the triage to the evacuation hospitals. 14
The triage at Glorieux was operated by Field Hospital No. 114. in con-
junction with a detachment from the sanitary train of the 33d Division, but
the latter was relieved shortly after the 29th Division began its offensive.
At this triage patients were received, recorded, classified, and prepared for
disposition and distribution. It was divided into departments for reception,
record, care of severely and slightly wounded and gassed, and for evacuation.
The only patients it retained were the nontransportables. Reinforced by
details from other elements of the sanitary train, it admitted 5.660 patients
in the interval October 8-29, of whom 4,865 came from the 29th Division, the
remainder from the American 26th. 33d. and 80th and the French 18th."
At the triage, patients received hot food, their dressings were reapplied or
readjusted, and delicacies, obtained through the Red Cross, were distributed.
At Charny, Field Hospital No. 115 cared for the slightly gassed and slightly
sick (October 12-27), returning nearly 200 patients to duty. Field Hospital
Xo. 113, on the arrival of Evacuation Hospital No. 15 at Glorieux. moved to
Charny to care for gassed cases there if need be; but as the division was per-
mitted to continue the use of the gas hospital belonging to the French at
Glorieux, such a need did not develop, and the hospital returned on the 27th
without having functioned.
Supplies were replenished as required from the army depot at Souilly.
whence everything needed by the medical department w r as readily obtained."
726
FIELD OPERATIONS
THE 26TH DIVISION '
On the night of October 17-18, the 26th Division completed the relief of
the French 18th Division, in a sector north of Verdun. The line taken over
extended 5 km. (3.01 miles), from the Ravin de Molleville, past the Ravin de
la Reine, to the eastern edge of Bois de Haumont, with the 52d Brigade on
the right and the 51st on the left. The left was to protect the exposed flank
of the 51st Brigade. 15
KiG. S3. — Dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 102, 2Gth Division, near Samogneui.
Meuse, October 23, 1018
The attack began at 6.15 a. m. October 23, the 51st Brigade advancing
northeastwardly in the direction of Hill 261, capturing Belieu Bois, and
reaching the heights of Hill 301 and Hill 346 ; but on account of tremendous
fire from La Grande Montagne and heights on the right, the troops could not
hold the woods. At night the line occupied Avas along the eastern edge of
Bois d'Etrayes, thence to a point in the edge of Bois d'Ormont, and thence
along the former front. 15
On October 24 an attempt to recover Belieu Bois was made at 3 p. m..
but little ground was gained. On the next day. attempts were again made,
but without success, although losses were heavy. 15
•For map of activities of this division for tills period, see Plate XLIII.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 727
On October 27 further attack was made, for the purpose of recapturing
Belieu Bois, the Bois d'Ormont, the Carrefour de la Croix Antoine, and the
western angle of Bois do Moirey. Belieu Bois was cleared to its eastern
border, but Bois d'Ormont resisted all efforts. This attack was the last made
by the 26th Division in the second phase of the operation. On October 30, its
left brigade was relieved by the 79th Division and was shifted to the right
of the former right brigade, in what was known as the Neptune sector. There
the division operated in the final phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation,
beginning November l. 18 - 16
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On the left, near Samogneux, Ambulance Company No. 104 established
a dressing station for which it utilized tentage. In the absence of other
protection its personnel dug individual shelters to shield themselves against
intermittent shell fire. Ambulance heads were located, one at Haumont, 5
km. (3.1 miles) beyond the dressing station and another at a point farther
forward in a locality known as Death Valley. As the dressing station men-
tioned above proved inadequate, Ambulance Company No. 102 established
another, larger than the former, 0.5 Ion. (0.3 mile) to the rear of it at a point
where shelter w r as available. The smaller station was then closed and held in
reserve. At Vacherauville. a detachment of Field Hospital No. 104 established
a station for walking wounded. 17
All the field hospitals were located at Casernes de Bevaux, where Field
Hospital No. 102 conducted the triage, Field Hospital No. 101 cared for the
sick. Field Hospital No. 104 for the gassed, and Field Hospital No. 103 was
in reserve. 17
REFERENCES
(1) Final report, Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919.
(2) Foch, letters 4353^354, September 30, 191S, to C. G.. A. of N. and N. E., and C. G.,
A. E. F.
(3) F. O. No. 39, October 5, 1918. F. O. No. 47, October 7, 1918, First Army.
(4) Report of operations, 29th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated. Report
of operations, 2Gth Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(5) Operations report, 35th Division, during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operation,
undated.
(6) Operations of the 33d Division, March 17, 1919.
(7) Report of Medical Department activities, 33d Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 33d Division, undated, Part I, 7. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(8) Ibid., 8.
(9) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College, 1700 (29th Division).
(10) Operations report, 29th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(11) Front line maps, American Battle Monuments Commission.
(12) Report of Medical Department activities, 29th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 29th Division, undated, 34. On file, Historical
Division. S. G. O.
728 FIELD OPERATIONS
(13) Ibid., 35.
(14) Ibid., 30.
(15) Report of operations, 26th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(16) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army "War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War
College, 1700 (79th Division).
(17) Report of Medical Department activities, 2Gth Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 26th Division, undated. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
CHAPTER XXIX
THIRD PHASE
ARMY OPERATIONS"
On November 1, at 5.30 a. m., the advance began on a front of 51 km,
(31.6 miles), preceded by two hours' artillery preparation. The first objective
was to secure control of Buzancy and the heights east ; the next, to clear the
Bois de Bourgogne. The Third and Fifth Corps carried their attack to Bar-
ricoiut Ridge, breaking through the enemy's defensive system and artillery
lines; hy night they were on the general line from Aincreville to the northern
edge of Bois de Barricourt, and through the Bois de la Folic The right of
the First Corps advanced with them, but the left made little progress. The
French Fourth Army gained a firm footing on the high ground north and
east of the Aisne. The attacks were continued on the succeeding days. The
Third Corps drove the enemy across the Meuse and held the west bank down
to Villefranche. The Fifth Corps connected, its right division, the 89th across
the Bauclair — Xouart road facing northeast, while its left division, the 2d.
had pushed its 3d Brigade boldly through the woods nearly to Beaumont.
The Fh-st Corps drove the enemy north along the east bank of the Bar River,
its right connecting with the Fifth Corps, and reached Chatillon-sur-Bar with
its left. By November 4 the Germans were in retreat on the entire front, with-
drawing behind the Meuse.
Between the Meuse and the Chiers, north and northeast of Stenay, there
was a strong position covering the crossing in that vicinity. By crossing south
of Stenay and advancing toward Montmedy, this position could be flanked.
The heights of Villers-devant-Dun, captured November 2, formed a good
position for the artillery necessary to cover this crossing.
The commanding general of the First Army ordered a vigorous pursuit.
By active patrolling and deep raids the French 17th Corps was to obtain
prompt information of the hostile movements and follow up any withdrawal
from the heights. The Third Corps was to establish a bridgehead east of the
Meuse in the vicinity of Liny and Dun-sur-Meuse. The First and Fifth Corps
were to push the pursuit toward Raucourt and Beaumont, respectively.
To carry out its mission, the Third Corps ordered the 5th Division to cross
the Meuse and secure a bridgehead on the general line Lion-devant-Dun —
Murvaux — Fontaines, to cover the crossing of the 32d Division. The 90th
Division was to hold the bulk of its forces on the western heights below Dun,
assisting the 5th Division with its artillery. The 32d Division, which was
now in corps reserve, was assembled south of Aincreville, prepared to cross
the Meuse near Dun-sur-Meuse.
•Abstracted from Major Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, 1H17-101S,
prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College.
729
730 FIELD OPERATIONS
During the night of November 3-4 the 5th Division made an effort to
cross near Brieulles. Three companies got over, but the rest could not follow.
These companies entrenched and held on to their precarious position. In
the afternoon another crossing was attempted at Clery-le-Petit, but the first
bridge was destroyed by artillery fire and this attempt failed. But meanwhile
the troops already over at Brieulles, by a surprise attack, got across the canal
which here parallels the river; other troops crossed just below, on rafts and
by swimming, and established themselves in the woods on the east bank. On
the morning of the 5th these woods and the adjoining hills were cleared and
the left of the division was enabled to cross. By night the division held
the whole line of heights from Milly to Vilosnes. On the night of the 7th.
its line ran eastward and southward from Lion-devant-Dun to the Harau-
mont — Brandeville road, where it connected with the French Second Colonial
Corps, which in the meantime, had relieved the French Seventeenth Corps.
Meanwhile the rest of the army had progressed and had reached the west
bank of the Meuse all the way down to Remilly. From here the line turned
west through Thelonne to the Bar, and connected with the French Fourth
Army.
On November 5 General Pershing issued general instructions covering
future operations of the American armies, in which he expressed confidence
that "the energetic action of the First Army should completely expel the
enemy from the region between the Meuse and the Bar within the next few
days." Corps and division commanders were called upon for bold and ener-
getic action. Where resistance was broken the troops were to be pushed
forward without regard to objectives or fear for their flanks.
Both the First and Second Armies were ordered to prepare to undertake
operations with the ultimate purpose of driving the enemy beyond the fron-
tier in the region of Briey and Longwy. As preliminary to this offensive, the
First Army was directed (a) to complete the occupation of the region between
the Meuse and the Bar; (&) to drive the enemy from the heights of the Meuse
north of Verdun and south of the Foret de Woevre; (<?) to conduct an offensive
with the object of driving the enemy beyond La Thinte and La Chiers Kivers.
Between November 1 and 7 the left boundary of the First Army had been
changed several times. The last change, announced in orders on the 8th and
effective on the 9th, limited the left of the army to Mouzon, the original ob-
jective having included Sedan. On the 5th, however, a verbal message, later
confirmed in writing, had been received from General Pershing, directing the
occupation of Sedan, and suggesting that advantage be taken of the oppor-
tunity for pressing the advance throughout the night, boundaries not to be
regarded.
The 1st Division was in position along the Meuse from Villemontry to
Mouzon. The commanding general of the Fifth Corps went in person to
division headquarters and verbally ordered the division to march upon Sedan,
to cooperate with the First Corps in the capture of that place. The division
was assembled in rear of its position and after dark commenced its march,
PLATE XLIV.
Battle tine*, taken from Final Report. C. en John J. Pershing. September 1, 1919, are approximate
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 731
moving in five columns. During the night of November 6-7 elements of the
division marched through or around the entire First Corps, and in the morn-
ing it came out upon the heights dominating Sedan, clearing away some little
opposition. Preparations were made to continue the advance, but in the after-
noon the division was ordered to withdraw south of the line La Besace —
Autrecourt. The change in direction of the First Corps, from north to north-
east, opened a gap on the left of the First Army, which the French were not
in a position to fill at once. A reserve division was disposed so as to protect
the flank here, if necessary, and American divisions were kept in line tempo-
rarily. The First Corps was withdrawn from the line, and the Fifth Corps
took over command of its former front until the French should be ready to
extend their right.
From November 7 to 10 there was little activity in our lines north of
Stenay. East of the Meuse, however, the Third Corps and the French Second
Colonial Corps continued their advance. On November 8 the Third Corps,
facing north, had passed beyond Brandeville; the French, facing east, ex-
tended this line through Flabas and north of Verdun to a junction with the
Second Army. On the 9th the 32d Division took over the left section of the
French line as far as Pouvillers; the Colonial Corps then pushed forward
to the Thinte, through Damvillers to Moirey.
On the same day the 90th Division crossed the Meuse at Mouzay. just
south of Stenay, the crossing having been secured earlier in the day by the
5th Division. The lines were then extended through the Foret de Woevre.
and by night the 5th Division had reached Jametz. On the 10th the Colonial
Corps reached Abaucourt. on the Verdun — Etain highway. The Third Corps
made a further advance with its left and center, occupying the southern out-
skirts of Stenay.
The Fifth Corps extended its operations east of the Mouse, crossing the 2d
and 89th Divisions on the line Stenay— Mouzon. On the 11th. slight gains
were made at several points, and when hostilities were suspended the line of
the First Army ran from Abaucourt to La Thinte River at Chaumont. along
the river to Bemoiville, along the northern edge of the Foret de Woevre to
Stenay, thence to Mouzon and along the west bank of the Meuse to Wadelin-
court.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The general plan of evacuation to army units and their supply previously
put into operation continued to be utilized through this phase of the operation,
though certain of its details were modified to meet changing conditions. The
increased length of the line of communications to railhead was a source of
gravest anxiety, for the strain on the already overworked ambulance service
increased progressively and could be relieved to only a limited extent by the
advancement of a few of the army hospitals.
The following transportation was at the disposition of the Medical De-
partment, First Army, on the night of October 31, exclusive of United States
732 FIELD OPERATIONS
Army Ambulance Service Section No. 600, loaned to the 33d Division, and
United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 649, attached to the 35th
Division : 1
Left flank, First Corps :
United States Army Ambulance Service Section —
No. 520.
No. 570.
No. 569.
Ambulance Company No. 41.
Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 11.
French Sanitary Section No. 145 (11 ambulances carrying 5
prone patients).
6 French sight-seeing busses.
Total number of ambulances, 71; French sight-seeing busses. 6.
Center. Fifth Corps :
United States Army Ambulance Service Section —
No. 542.
No. 603.
No. 604.
No. 590.
French Sanitary Section —
No. 63 (15 ambulances carrying 5 prone).
No. 85 (20 ambulances carrying 5 prone).
2 French sight-seeing busses.
Total number of ambulances, 83, and 2 French sight-seeing
busses.
Eight flank, Third Corps:
United States Army Ambulance Service Section —
No. 560.
No. 571.
No. 599.
No. 602.
French Sanitary Section No. 84 (20 ambulances carrying 5
prone).
2 French sight-seeing busses.
Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 1, 12 ambulances.
Total number of ambulances, 80, and 2 French busses.
(Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 1 evacuated the 26th
Division, -which was with the French Second Colonial Corps.)
Army: 132 ambulances and 2 French busses.
Army Reserve :
French Sanitary Section —
No. 12 (20 ambulances carrying 5 prone).
No. 131 (13 ambulances carrying 5 prone).
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 733
United States Ambulance Service Section —
No. 506 (20 Fords).
No. 511 (20 Fords).
10 French trucks.
Total number of ambulances, 73. and 10 French trucks.
Summary: Corps, 23-1 ambulances and 10 French sight-seeing busses;
army, 132 ambulances and 2 French sight-seeing busses; army reserve, 73
ambulances and 10 French trucks ; total, 439 ambulances and 22 French trucks
and sight-seeing busses.
The carrying capacity of the army and corps ambulances was 1.813 prone
and 400 sitting patients. This total did not include corps trucks nor divisional
ambulances or trucks.
On November 2, 1918, United States Army Ambulance Service Section No.
506 (20 ambulances) was attached to the First Corps. Evacuation Ambulance
Company No. 7 was attached to Evacuation Hospital No. 15 at Glorieux, on
October 31, 1918, and on the same date Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 5
was attached to Mobile Hospital No. 6, on the Varennes — Cheppy road. On
November 10, 1918, this ambulance company was moved to Varennes, to be at-
tached to Evacuation Hospital No. 14, and Evacuation Ambulance Company
Xo. 6 was transferred from Les Tslettes to Varennes, where it was attached to
Evacuation Hospital No. 14.
Evacuation centers and areas remained as provided during the first phase
(if the operation.
At the beginning of the third phase. First Army Medical Department
formations were disposed of as follows (dates represent the time organizations
arrived at the places specified) : 2
Evacuation Hospital —
No. 4, Fromereville, Meuse, October 29.
No. 6, Souilly, Meuse, August 28.
No. 7, Souilly. Meuse, August 28.
No. 8, Petit Maujouy, Meuse. August 28.
No. 9, Vaubecourt, Meuse. August 30.
No. 10, Froidos, Meuse, September 20.
Xo. 11. Brizeaux Forestieres, Meuse. September 21.
No. 14, Les Islettes, Meuse. October 7.
No. 15, Glorieux, Meuse. October 13.
No. 16, Revigny, Meuse, October 15.
No. 20 (personnel only). Souilly, Meuse. October 1.
Xo. 21. (personnel only) Villers-Daucourt. Marne. October 17.
No. 22 (personnel only), Souilly. Meuse, October 7.
No. 23 (personnel only), Souilly. Meuse, Oetolx-r 7.
American Red Cross Hospital —
No. 110, Villers-Daucourt, Marne. September 24.
Xo. 114, Fleury-sur-Aire, Meuse, September 18.
734 FIELD OPERATIONS
Mobile Hospital —
No. 1, Esne, Meuse, October 27.
No. 2, Chateau de Salvange, Meuse, September 24.
No. 4, Cheppy, Meuse, October 27.
No. 5, Les Placys. Meuse, September 24.
No. 6. Varennes, Meuse, October 7.
No. 8. Deuxnoucls-aux-Bois, Meuse, October 15.
Neurological Hospital —
No. 1, Benoite Vaux. Meuse, September 5.
No. 3, Nubecourt, Meuse, September 20.
Evacuation Ambulance Company —
No. 1. Souilly, Meuse, September 21.
No. 2, Fromereville, Meuse, October 29.
No. 5, Cheppy. Meuse, November 1.
No. 6, Les Islettes, Meuse, October 11.
No. 7, Verdun, Meuse, November 1.
No. 8, Fleury-sur-Aire, Meuse, September 20.
No. 10, Froidos, Meuse, September 23.
No. 12, Vaubecourt, Meuse, September 23.
Base Hospital No. 83 (personnel only), Kevigny, September 20.
Gas hospital :
La Morlette, Meuse, operated by miscellaneous personnel.
Rambluzin, Meuse, operated by miscellaneous personnel.
Julvecourt, Meuse, operated by miscellaneous personnel.
Barecourt, Meuse, operated by miscellaneous personnel.
Verrieres, Marue, operated by miscellaneous personnel.
Contagious hospitals, Verrieres and Benoite Vaux (French).
Ambulance Comj^any —
No. 42 (personnel only), Fleury-sur-Aire, Meuse, October 29.
No. 120 (j>ersonnel only), Villers-Daucourt, September 26.
Field hospital —
No. 41, Varennes, Meuse, November 4.
No. 42, Cheppy, Meuse, October 31.
Medical Supply Depot:
A^arennes, Meuse, October 10.
Souilly, Meuse, September 14.
Vaubecourt, Meuse, September 16.
Les Islettes, Meuse, October 4.
Fleury-sur-Aire, Meuse, October 1.
Trucks not being available for the purpose, it was impossible to move
the large and heavy evacuation hospitals to points off the railway concur-
rently with the advance of the troops. Moreover, the number of ambulances
being limited, those available would not have been adequate to carry to
railhead patients from a large number of such units had they been so ad-
vanced. To mitigate the fatigue incident to the long journey from the front
to the army evacuation areas, divisional and corps field hospitals were placed
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 735
in echelon to act as rest stations. They were equipped to furnish food and
warmth and were provided with facilities for rest, treatment of shock, and
for operations. Also, as opportunity permitted and resources warranted.
certain army hospitals were advanced as follows: 3 Mobile Hospital No. 8,
from Deuxnouds-aux-Bois to Exermont, November 3; Evacuation Hospital
No. 7, from Souilly to St. Juvin, November 7; Evacuation Hospital No. 14,
from Les Islettes to Varennes, November 8; Field Hospital No. 41, from
Villers-Daucourt to Varennes, November 8; Evacuation Hospital No. 3, from
Mont Frenet to Fontaine Routon, November 10; Mobile Hospital No. 1, from
Esnes to Bantheville, November 10; Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 6,
from Les Islettes to Varennes, November 6.
Varennes was the only advanced point whence railway evacuation was
practicable from the First and Fifth Corps at this time. 3 " Four years of
artillery exchange had so destroyed the railroad from Verdun to Sedan, on
the west bank of the Meuse, that engineers could not repair it in time for it to
be of use, and no attempt was made to install evacuation hospitals in this area
north of Verdun, for a plunging fire from the heights made the terrain un-
tenable till Cote St. Germaine was captured. Evacuation Hospital No. 4, at
Fromereville, had suffered from indirect shelling, although conspicuously
marked and well protected from direct fire." *
As transportation was inadequate to move army hospitals forward, the
only recourse for surgical equipment in the absence of railway transportation
was the assignment to divisional hospitals of the surgical and X-ray camions
belonging to mobile hospitals. Operated cases, as soon as they became trans-
portable, were then slowly evacuated through the chain of division and corps
hospitals to evacuation hospitals. 4
A topographical map of the region indicates some of the physical obstacles
which had to be overcome in the supply and evacuation services of any army
operating on this terrain, which had been the scene of disaster to more than
one army in the past ; yet hospitalization for many thousand combatant troops
was provided in this most inhospitable and rugged area, where not a house
was left standing and where roads were scarce and deeply scarred by shells.
Furthermore, patients were transferred from these hospitals in comparative
comfort, in spite of shell-torn roads and deep mud following incessant
autumnal rains. Notwithstanding the lengthening of the line of communi-
cations to railhead, the evacuation service had been so developed that within
nine hours after the signing of the armistice all wounded had been received,
hospitalized, and operated. 4
REFERENCES
(1) Final report of the chief surgeon, First Army, November 20. 1918, 17. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(2) Report on the Medical Department units, First Army, by the chief surgeon, First
Army, February 6, 1919. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(3) Medical activities in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stnrk, M. C, undated, 16.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Ibid., 17.
CHAPTER XXX
THIRD PHASE— Continued
FIRST CORPS
On November 1 at 5.30 a. m. the First Corps attacked. 1 with three divi-
sions in line, arranged from left to right as follows: 78th. 77th. and 80th
Divisions. The 42d Division was in reserve. Also the 82d Division occupied
the corps position of security and was prepared to advance on two hours'
notice. The attack was to be an enveloping one from the right, to flank the
enemy out of the Bois de Bourgogne. On the day of the attack the high
ground south of Verpel was to be taken, with the object of driving on to
the Boult-aux-Bois, upon further orders. The objectives of the corps were :
First objective, Imecourt — Alliepont — north edge of Bois des Loges: second
objective, Malmy — Sivry les Buzancy — vicinity of the northern part of Bois
des Loges; corps objective, Fontaine des Parades — Cote 278 — northern edge
of Bois des Loges — Grandpre — Talma; subsequent objective, the ridge west
of Fosse — Buzancy — Harricourt — the ridge 2 km. (1.2 miles) north of Brique-
nay — to connect with the French Fourth Army at Boult-aux-Bois. 2
After an artillery concentration on important points, the attack was
opened by the 80th Division on the right, one regiment of the 77th Division
(with another in close reserve)' in the center, and the 78th Division, with
three regiments in line, on the left. The right of the 80th Division advanced
beyond Imecourt to Malmy. The left was held up by enemy resistance in
the woods about 1 km. (0.6 mile) south of Alliepont. 34 The 77th and 78th
Divisions made little advance, due to enemy machine-gun nests in Hois des
Loges and the line east and west of these woods. 3, *
On November 2 the advance of the corps was so rapid that prisoners
were captured from a unit not yet in line. By this time the enemy positions
had become untenable. A determined and vicious attack had forced the
German command to decide upon a general withdrawal, which was effected
hastily, in front of our advancing troops. The Bois de Bourgogne was
evacuated in conjunction with the retirement, and with the exception of a
weak rear guard action, in which machine guns and harassing artillery fire
played a prominent part, no halt was made until the enemy reached the right
bank of the Meuse River. On the night of November 2 the corps line extended
from the vicinity of Ferme des Loges northwardly just east of Grandpre —
Briquenay road to Briquenay, thence to a point 1 km. (O.fi mile) northeast
of Bois de Thenorgues. Then from a point in the vicinity of Le Puiset des
Nonnes generally eastwardly to the vicinity of the northwest corner of Bois
de la Folie. 3, *
On the night of November 3 the line ran from southwest of Brieulles-
-ur-Bar. where there was contact with the 40th Division of the French Ninth
13576—25 47 737
738 FIELD OPERATIONS
Corps, to Verrieres, thence to a point approximately 2 km. (1.2 miles) north-
east of St. Pierremont, thence southeastwardly to a point approximately 1
km. (0.6 mile) northwest of Cote Jean. 3 ' 4
On the night of November 4 the corps held Les Petites Armoises, Bois
de Sy, Oches and the Bois de Four. The 80th, 77th, and 79th Divisions each
held sectors until this time. 3 ' *
On the morning of November 5 the 42d Division, which had been in
corps reserve, passed through the 78th Division and occupied the left half
of the corps sector. The 80th Division advanced and occupied Beaumont.
The line now held by the corps ran through the north of the Bois de Mont
Dieu, through the southern portion of Bois de Eaucourt to just west of Yoncq,
thence to Beaumont. 3 ' 4
On the 6th of November the 1st Division of the Fifth Corps passed
through the 80th Division. The 80th Division then assembled in the north-
west of Sommauthe, thence to move forward upon receipt of orders. 5 The
42d and 77th Divisions advanced, the 77th reaching the Meuse River; and
the line of the 42d, extending approximately from Cheveuges to Aillicourt,
made the corps line approximately as follows : Cheveuges — Thelonne — vicinity
of Mouzon. The elements of the 77th Division effected a crossing of the river
at Villers-devant-Mouzon. 3 ' 4
On November 9 the 77th Division relieved the 42d Division and was now
holding the entire First Corps front. This corps was to be eventually taken
over by the French Ninth Corps, which was then holding the sector on the
left of the 77th Division. 4 - •• 7
On November 10 the left of the First Army, having been limited to
Mouzon, the Fifth Corps took over command of the First Corps front until
the French should be ready to extend their right. 7
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The plan of evacuation issued as Annex No. 8 to Field Order No. 85,
October 24, 1918, and quoted above in the history of the First Corps during
the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation, continued in operation.
All divisions had their hospitals grouped and work so organized that casual-
ties passed through them without confusion or delay. Triages were well
organized and worked smoothly. The consultants had now become well ac-
quainted with their duties so that they were able to promote considerably the
professional services throughout the corps. By circulating among the divi-
sions they not only discovered and corrected defects promptly, but were able
to keep the corps surgeon apprised of the efficiency and needs of their respec-
tive specialties. The Germans were now retreating rapidly, casualties were
few, and the problems of the Medical Department were comparatively simple,
though the evacuation route was becoming very long. Generally speaking,
road conditions were improved except near Brieulles-sur-Bar where the Ger-
mans had destroyed an important road by a succession of 15 mine craters.
For a time traffic over this route was interrupted here, for the road at this
PLATE XLV.
MEUSE - ARGONNE OPERATION
THIRD PHASE M
T
1 st - 42^ - 77 th - 78 m - 80 ih
NOVEMBER i-il
Scale In Kilometers
Vbuzler*
Positions of Medical Units from
^ports of the Chief Surgeon , Tint
-orps an d. J^irtstonal Surgeons of
Dms tons .
Triage
T D.R. Dirssing Station.
T A.C. Anihulance Company
£ £, H FUM Hospital
<-■« Gail Hospital «
r n it NeTU "°'° t 5«»l Hospital \\
_ Vt, Contagious Disease Hotrf
Z fjH. Evacuation Hospital I
2 MH Mobile Hospital
1\? H A Baw Hospital
S, M .™ Medical Bupplv Depot
■ABCH. American jSdCrosT Hospi
B »nie line., taken from Final Report. Gen. John J. Pershing. September 1. 1919. are approximate
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 739
point traversed a rather swampy area and passage around these craters was
very difficult, until a corduroy road was built, replacing that destroyed.
Transportation was sufficient to care for all casualties, though it was neces-
sary to continue utilizing trucks to transport the slighter cases.
Movement of the army supjdy park to Les Islettes facilitated greatly the
supply to all divisions in the corps. 8
THE 78TH DIVISION
In carrying out its part of the mission of the First Corps, in the attack
of November 1, to flank the enemy out of the Bois de Bourgogne by envelop-
ment from the right and then to connect with the French at Boult-aux-Boix.
the 78th Division, on a front of 8 km. (4.9 miles), was to cover the left flank
of the 77th Division by advancing so as always to face the Bois de Bourgogne
and make a holding attack west of Grandpre. The objective laid down for
the 78th Division in the first day's attack was the northern edge of the Bois
des Loges and a line running from there, west, midway through the Bois de
Bourgogne, thence along the existing front to the corps boundary. The subse-
quent objective was a ridge 2 km. (1.2 miles) north of Briquenay, and the
establishment of connection with the French Fourth Army at Boult-aux-Bois.
This advance was to be made in such a manner that any resistance coining
from Bois de Bourgogne could be met at once. The 155th Infantry Brigade
was ordered to take Bois des Loges and to clear it out thoroughly on the first
day. The 156th Brigade (less one battalion) was ordered to maintain liaison
with the French around Talma, to advance its right flank about 2.5 km. (1.5
miles), and to cover the left flank of the 155th Brigade in its advance. On
the second day the 155th Brigade was to take that part of the subsequent
objective lying north of Briquenay, and the 156th that to the south. 9
The infantry preparations to accomplish these objects were simple. The
155th Brigade made no changes in its positions. The 156th Brigade continued
to hold its front with the 311th Infantry. Two battalions of the 312th In-
fantry were moved up to the vicinity of Grandpre. so as to be able to pro-
tect the left of the 155th Brigade. The other battalion of the 312th, with
the 307th Machine Gun Battalion, constituted the division reserve. 9
For two hours immediately preceding the infantry attack on November
1, the Bois des Loges was swept by divisional artillery fire, together with
such heavy army artillery as w T as not being used for counterbattery work
elsewhere. When the infantry attack started, it was preceded by a rolling
barrage and by a raking fire on known or suspected enemy positions in the
woods and its approaches. A heavy machine-gun barrage was also laid down
upon the Bois des Loges and the spurs west of it from the south, southwest,
and west, with searching fire on the road to Briquenay from just northwest
of Champigneulles to Le Morthomme. Such was the natural strength of the
positions in the Bois des Loges, however, that even though only slight shelters
had been constructed, this great concentration of artillery and machine guns
1 For map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XI.V.
740 FIELD OPEBATIONS
was unable substantially to affect tbe machine-gun nests in it. On the right
the troops advanced and reached the road from Champigneulles to Ferme des
Loges, capturing machine-gun nests along it. The advance was then stopped
by more machine guns to the north. The 77th Division, having failed to take
Champigneulles, as planned, the 309th Infantry therefore could not attempt
a flanking movement from the east. Further attempts to advance through
the woods resulted only in losses, and at nightfall the 309th Regiment was still
in position on the Champigneulles — Ferme des Loges road. At G p. m. the
310th Infantry had advanced slightly from this road, but had not materially
weakened the resistance. The 311th Infantry, on the left, reinforced during
the day by two companies of the 312th Infantry, established a line in the
Bois de Bourgogne late in the afternoon, after fighting hard in the woods and
after beating off one serious counterattack. The way was thus cleared to
assist the advance of the brigade on the right through the Bois des Loges by
flanking the Bois des Loges from the northwest. 9
On November 2 it was planned to have the 312th Infantry attack from
the west, behind a rolling barrage, at 5.30 a. m. When the 312th advanced,
no real opposition was encountered, and its movement was continued to the
ridge beyond Briquenay. The 310th Infantry, moving north and northwest,
through the Bois des Loges, reached the edge about 8.30 a. m., and shortly
thereafter the 309th Infantry arrived. The only resistance to their progress
was long-range machine-gun fire. Both regiments now halted to reorganize
their units before starting the pursuit. This was taken up at about 10.30
a. m. Pursuing troops encountered a few enemy machine gunners out of
Beffu-et-le-Morthomme about noon, and advanced steadily northward with
only occasional slight machine-gun resistance until about 5.30 p. m. The
town of Briquenay was taken in the afternoon, and at dark the right of
the line ran across the Canal des Arches, and to the north of the Bois de
Thenorgues. The 311th Infantry extended its line along the subsequent
objective, but the yperiting of the Bois de Bourgogne, which had been done
by our artillery in preparation for the attack, had been so successful that
no resistance was met there at all. and the advance was continued up the
Briquenay road unmolested. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 312th Infantry
were assembled after the advance from the Bois des Loges began and were
moved to the vicinity of Briquenay before encamping for the night.
On November 3 the advance was continued all day by the leading units
of the division. Boult-aux-Bois was entered at 4 a. m., Belleville-sur-Bar was
taken at noon, and Chatillon-sur-Bar was reached before dark. Farther
east the 312th Regiment had brushed the enemy out of Germont at about
9.30 a. m., and then advanced its detachments north through Authe toward
Brieulles-sur-Bar and west toward Chatillon-sur-Bar. Brieulles-sur-Bar was
entered at 4 p. m. by the 312th. whose line for the night ran north of Chatil-
lon-sur-Bar and Brieulles-sur-Bar. The 309th and 310th Regiments of In-
fantry entered Authe before noon and speedily outflanked machine-gun
resistance on the ridge about 1 km. (0.0 mile) north of Authe. These regi-
ments assisted the 77th Division to turn the enemy out of Autruche and
MEUSE-ARUONNE OPERATION 741
went <in toward Verrieres. Tlie town of Verrieres was entered by 4.15 |>. m.,
and a position was taken up for the night on the ridge northeast of that
town.
On November 4. because of the exhaustion of the front-line battalions, the
reserve of the 155th Brigade passed through the front-line battalions to take
up the pursuit. By noon, the advancing troops reached the north edge of
Bois de Sy. where they came under machine-gun fire from Sy and the ridge
to the north of that town, and artillery fire from Bois du Fay and from the
north of those woods. This fire prevented any farther advance (hiring the
clay and the night of November 4-5. During the day the 311th Infantry took
Les Petites Armoises and advanced to the road between that town and Sy
before night.
On November 5 the 42d Division was ordered to relieve the "Nth by pass-
ing through its lines. The relief was made about noon, at which time the
155th Brigade had sent patrols to and through the town of Sy. and had
located the enemy on the ridge to the north. The 156th Brigade had taken
the town of Tannay at 0.15 in the morning and was 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) to
the north of that place along the road to C'hemery when it was passed
through. Fpon completion of the relief, the troops of the division were
assembled at Brieulles-sur-Bar and at Germont, where they camped for the
night. On November 6 the division marched to the vicinity of Marcq and
Chevieres. and on the 7th to the Argonne camps west of Varennes. After
two days* stay in this area, the division marched to the Florent — Les Islettes
area, and on November 11 marched to an area south of Ste. Menehould."
-•MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Flans had been made prior to the advance of November 1 to effect as
soon as possible union of the two sections in which the sanitary train had been
operating during the second phase of the operation; i. e.. with two ambulance
companies and two field hospitals behind each flank. It was also proposed
that these formations follow up the advancing troops by "leapfrogging" as
rapidly as t he inadequate transportation permitted. The following memo-
randum, approved by G-l of the division, was therefore published by the
division surgeon to all medical officers of the division : 10
It is planned that evacuations and communications in general shall follow two main
routes :
One is via Beffu et Le Morthomme. Champigneulle, St. Juvin. Marcq. Cornay. and
Apremont. At present. Ambulance Company 311 has a dressing station at Marcq and
Triage No. 2 (Field Hospitals Nos. 300 and 312) is at present at Apremont. When con-
ditions permit, the dressing station will move to Champigneulle and the triage to Marcq.
Later the gas and sick hospitals will move to Marcq.
The other route is via Bellejoyeuse Ferme. Grandpre, Senue, to Lancon. At present.
Ambulance Company 312 lias a dressing stntion at Malassise Ferme and Triage No. 1 (Field
Hospitals 310 and 311) is located at I.atu When conditions permit the dressing
Itation will move to Grandpre and Bellejoyeuse Ferine in turn, and the triage will move
to Grandpre. It is possible that at a later state both triages will be consolidated at
lirnmlpre or at Marcq and all hospitals stationed with the triage.
742 FIELD OPERATIONS
This plan worked out as follows : (a) The dressing station at Marcq
(Ambulance Company No. 311) was moved to Authe, and the triage at Apre-
mont was moved up to replace the dressing station at Marcq. (&) The dress-
ing station at Malassise Ferme (Ambulance Company No. 312) was moved to
Authe. (c) The triage at Lancon was moved to Grandpre. (d) Later the
triage at Marcq consolidated with that at Grandpre, where it remained until
the division was withdrawn. 11
By this time the troops were advancing so rapidly that the ambulance
companies were simply directed to go ahead as far as they could and to establish
wherever possible, the result being that both companies in the forward area
established in the church at Authe.
The last casualties of the division occurred in the towns of Brieulles-sur-
Bar and Verrieres. An attempt was made to establish an ambulance dressing
station at Brieulles-sur-Bar on the night of November 4, but owing to the
extremely heavy shell fire at this point it was impossible to enter the town:
but a few hours later ambulance service was established between Authe and
Brieulles-sur-Bar. In the meantime, owing to the impassable condition of
roads, which were mined and blown up for a distance of 500 meters (545
yards), ambulances were unable to get from Brieulles-sur-Bar to Verrieres
and Les Petites Armoises, and litter-bearer sections from the ambulance com-
panies were sent to these towns. For 20 hours the wounded were evacuated
by them to the ambulance head at Brieulles-sur-Bar. whence they were carried
to Authe and Grandpre. In preparation for the large number of wounded
expected as a result of the offensive of November 1, the First Corps had estab-
lished a rest camp near Varennes for the reception of all sitting cases. Estab-
lishment of this camp relieved the sanitary train of evacuation to a consid-
erable extent, but, on the other hand, the recumbent wounded were evacuated
to evacuation hospitals, in one instance a distance of between 90 and 100 km.
(55-62 miles) from the front. 10
The triage and hospitals at Apremont had been shelled by long-range
guns at intervals during the entire time that they were located at this point,
and on one occasion (October 30) as many as 24 large-caliber shells (9-inch
or more) fell in the hospital area. Seventeen tents were hit, with but three
casualties, patients having been promptly removed to trenches or shell holes.
This bombardment was not thought to have been directed at the hospitals but
at a road 50 meters (54 yards) north of them, being used at the time by an
artillery organization which was on the march. 10
The regulating point situated just north of Clermont had been moved
forward to the Baulny — -Varennes road, 91 meters (100 yards) north of the road
leading to Mobile Hospital No. 6 and the First Corps rest camp relay station.
Removal of the wounded to army hospitals was regulated at this point. As the
evacuation hospitals were filled, nontransportable wounded were sent to
Mobile Hospital No. 6. 11
On November 4 all units of the sanitary train at Grandpre experienced
a bombing raid by hostile planes, one bomb landing in a yard back of a triage
30 metei's (100 feet) from it. The train suffered 1 death and 7 casualties;
METJSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 743
those of other organizations in or near the triage numbered 11. Two trucks
and one touring car of the train were damaged, one truck being practically
destroyed. 11
On November 6 orders were received relieving the 78th Division and
directing movement back to Argonne camps west of Varennes. Next day
preparations for the movement of the sanitary train progressed rapidly. On
November 10 all units were reported at Les Islettes, where all property was
sorted, excess disposed of by shipment to proper depots, and necessary and
serviceable property and equipment retained. On the 12th all units having
beer, moved to Braux-Saint Kemy, reached that point where property and
equipment were inventoried and troops rested. 11
THE 77TH DIVISION »
On the night of October 31 the 153d Infantry Brigade (77th Division)
took position as the leading brigade of the division, preparatory to relieving
the 82d Division in line. The 305th Infantry took position east and south of
St. Juvin, leaving a screen of the 82d Division in the front line; the 306th
Infantry was placed in a support position in the woods southeast of Marcq. 12
On November 1 the 153d Brigade attacked at 5.30 a. m.. having relieved
the remaining front-line elements of the 82d Division during the previous
night. The front-line position was between Champigneulles and St. Juvin,
and was practically the same line turned over by the 153d Infantry Brigade
of the 77th Division, to the 78th Division, on October 15-16. The attack
was preceded by a two hours' artillery preparation in the division sector. Very
heavy resistance was met from enemy machine guns, artillery, and determined
local attacks, not only in the front of the division sector but also from the
sector of the division on the right flank. Despite this stiff resistance, the front
line advanced on the right a distance of 1 km. (0.6 mile) to the right, turning
east from Champigneulles to St. Georges. On the left, the line advanced to
about 400 meters (43G yards) south of Champigneulles. 12
On November 2, after a short artillery preparation, two companies of the
305th Infantry captured Champigneulles, at 7 a. m. At the same time, the 3d
Battalion, 305th Infantry, advanced on the right. During the early morning,
two battalions of the 306th Infantry had marched to the eastern boundary of
the brigade sector, and were attacking in a northwest direction, in liaison with
the 80th Division on the right. The 305th Infantry, on the left, and the 306th
Infantry, on the right, steadily advanced and before noon Verpel was taken.
At 2 p. m., Thenorgues was captured. During the afternoon our troops
advanced rapidly in the direction of Buzancy and Harricourt. During the
afternoon and evening the troops reached the western outskirts of Buzancy,
in liaison with the 80th Division, and Harricourt and Bar were taken, and
the division line was established for the night on the road north of
Harricourt. 12
On November 3, the 306th Infantry continued the advance, followed by
the 305th Infantry in support. Little resistance was encountered. Aut ruche
'For map of activities of this division for tliis period, see Plate XLV.
744 FIELD OPERATIONS
was captured at '.) a. m. and by noon our front-line battalions, in liaison with
the 78th Division on the left and the 80th Division on the right, passed
through this place. Before 2 p. ni. the advancing troops passed through Fon-
tenoy and at 3 p. m., had passed through St. Pierremont in the direction of
Oches, which seemed to be a point of resistance of the enemy. For the night
the division front line was established on the hills south of Oches. 12
On November 4. the 154th Infantry Brigade, which had been supporting
the 153d Infantry Brigade since the beginning of the attack on November 1.
was ordered to pass through the 153d Brigade and to continue the advance.
The 153d Brigade then took a support position and was ordered to follow the
attacking brigade at 2.5 km. (1.5 miles). On this daj' the 154th Infantry
Brigade took the town of Oches and entrenched on the north side of the town,
having advanced about 1 km. (0.6 mile) beyond where the troops of the 153d
Brigade were on the previous night. 12
On November 5, both brigades were in line and took up the advance, the
153d on the right of the sector and the 154th on the left. The hour for the
advance was 6.30 a. in. The infantry made a quick advance along the woods
roads, passing by La Polka Ferme, Le Cendrieres Ferme. toward La Besace.
At 10.30 a. m., La Besace was entered. In front of La Besace the enemy was
found in force and the town itself was continually subjected to machine-gun
fire during the afternoon and evening. For the night the outpost line was
established just north of the town. 12
On November 6. the advance continued to push forward, the direction of
the advance turning sharply to the northeast just north of La Besace. The
305th Infantry executed a passage of the lines of the 306th Infantry, in posi-
tion north of La Besace. The advance was pushed vigorously, and by 2 p. m..
patrols had reached Autrecourt on the west bank of the Meuse. At 4 p. in. the
division front-line battalions were established on the heights overlooking the
Meuse on the line beyond Chaniblage Ferme, with support battalions close in
the rear. Two platoons were sent to occupy Autrecourt and Villers-devant-
Mouzon, and patrols were sent out to reeonnoiter the Meuse in the brigade
sector. 12
On November 7. the leading elements of the brigade were pushed up to
the Meuse. preparatory to its crossing. The river had been found to be very
deep and absolutely unfordable. so it was necessary to await the erection of a
bridge. Finally, at 3.45 p. m., the bridge was completed and the 1st Battalion
of the 305th Infantry started across the river. Two platoons succeeded in
crossing, but machine-gun fire made it impossible for more to pass over with-
out incurring heavy losses. The lines were established for the night with two
platoons across the river just southeast of Villers-devant-Mouzon. and the
remainder of the front line battalion along the river on a general line Villers-
devant-Mouzon — Autrecourt. 12
On November 8, the positions were reorganized, one battalion being
disposed in front, following the river bank along the general line Villers-
devant-Mouzon — Autrecourt to Le Vaubourg. Support battalions were placed
MEXJSE-ARGOXNE OPERATION" 745
on the hills overlooking Autrecourt in the vicinity of Chamblage Ferine and
the 30Gth Infantry in reserve in the neighborhood of Raucourt."
From November 8 to November 11, the position of the division line
remained unchanged, excejit that on November 1). the 77th Division extended
its left to include the front of the 42d Division, which had been relieved
from the line. 13
On November 10, the First Army Corps was relieved by the Fifth Army
Corps and the 77th Division on that date passed under the command of the
commanding general. Fifth Army Corps. 14
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On October 28. Ambulance Companies No. 305 and No. 307 bivouacked in
a ravine 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) southwest of Chatel Chehery, on the road from
that town to La Viergette. Both retained this location until October 31.
when Ambulance Company No. 305 moved to Pleinchamp Ferme. where it
established an advance dressing station on the following day, receiving 50
cases. 15 It detailed a sanitary squad to duty at St. Juvin and continued to
perform these services until the division withdrew. On November 3. four
Ford ambulances of United States Army Ambulance Service Section No.
524 joined its advance dressing station and continued permanently assigned
to it until the station closed. Ambulance Company No. 306, on October 27.
had established a dressing station in cellars at St. Juvin. which began to
receive patients on November 1, 450 being admitted on that date. Evacuation
to the station was effected by 48 litter bearers belonging to this company.
thence to the triage at Chatel Chehery by 12 G. M. C. ambulances. On the
2d. this evacuation service was taken over by six cars of United States Army
Ambulance Service Section No. 524 and by six G. M. C. ambulances, and
car posts were established at Champigneulles and Verpel. At the latter
place an advance dressing station was established on this date by 10 a. m..
and later the entire ambulance company moved there, with the exception of
the 48 litter bearers who were evacuating front-line formations. On the
4th, this company opened an additional dressing station at Harricourt, where
it treated 100 cases, evacuating them to the triage now located at Thenorgues. 1 '
Company car posts were now established at Fontenay and St. Pierremont.
Next day the company established an advance dressing station in the village
church at St. Pierremont and there cared for 400 patients, many of whom
it was obliged to evacuate by truck. This station continued to operate until
Xovember 11, treating a large number of wounded civilians and casuals,
and giving them food and shelter as well. On November 7. this company
also established a small station, staffed by 1 officer and 3 enlisted men. at
La Besace, and on the 8th, one at Haraucourt, staffed by 1 officer, 10 men. and
an advance triage detachment. Because of poor roads the latter functioned
as a temporary hospital, wounded reaching it through car posts established
at Remilly, Anzecourt, Autrecourt, and at a point south of the last-mentioned
town. 17
r.',-<n>— 25 48
746 FIELD OPERATIONS
Ambulance Company No. 307 moved to St. Juvin on November 3, where
it took over the dressing station of Ambulance Company No. 30, and operated
it until November 9, treating not only casualties of the 77th Division but
also some patients from other divisions, and a few German prisoners. 10
Ambulance Company No. 308. having experienced several casualties and
considerable damage to transportation from shell fire at Martincourt Ferme,
on the night of October 28 moved to the vicinity of Chatel Chehery, where
part of it occupied billets on the following day. 18 This being the animal-
drawn company, 50 of its personnel and 5 general service wagons were
used to repair roads around the triage located there. On the 3d it moved to
St. Juvin, where it was held in reserve until the armistice. 15
Field Hospital No. 305 was established in tentage on October 28 as the
division medical hospital, at Chatel Chehery, where it remained until Novem-
ber 3. It then moved to Thenorgues, where it operated until the 8th.
Field Hospital No. 306, the division gas hospital, operated at Chatel
Chehery from October 28 to November 8, receiving 403 patients. 18
Field Hospital No. 307 operated the triage at Chatel Chehery until Novem-
ber 3, admitting 549 patients. At this time it cared for surgical patients only,
transferring others to the gas and medical hospitals which were adjacent. 18
Field Hospital No. 307 then operated as the divisional medical hospital until
November 6, taking over cases of this class from Field Hospital No. 305,
when that unit moved, on the 3d, to Thenorgues. On November 7 and 8
Field Hospital No. 307 was en route to Haraucourt to establish a triage. 10
Field Hospital No. 308 was established from October 17 to November 3
at Florent, acting as a general hospital for the division and receiving all
classes of patients to a total of 1,076. It then moved to Thenorgues, where
it operated as a triage. 20 While at this location it received 706 patients, of
whom 244 belonged to other divisions. Patients admitted here were classified
as follows: 19 Severely wounded. 144; slightly wounded. 280; gassed, 25;
sick, 307.
Throughout its service in the Meuse-Argonne operation the medical
supply depot accompanied the triage. On account of lack of transportation
the army supply depot from which that of the division drew its supplies
did not advance, and this lack resulted eventually in a round trip between
them requiring three days. Despite this fact, however, the materiel proved
fully adequate; happily the number of casualties in this operation was rela-
tively small. 21
THE 80TH DIVISION"
For the attack of November 1 the mission of the division was to cover
the left of the Fifth Corps, attacking on the right of the First Corps, and
to seize the high ground to the north of Sivr^y-les-Buzancy. On the first clay
it attacked, the zone of action of the 80th Division was: On the right,
Vauquois, Cheppy, Charpentry, Baulny, Exermont, Fleville, Sommauthe, St.
Georges, thence along the 300th meridian to a ridge northwest of Imeeourt:
• For map of activities of this division for this period, see Plato XF.V.
METJSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 747
on the left. Apremont, Chatel Chehery, Cornay, meridian 298, from the
Aire River to the western edge of Buzancy, thence north to St. Pierremont.
The parallel of departure was south and west of St. Georges. The ICOth
Brigade was the attacking brigade in line of regiments, the 319th Infantry
on the right and the 320th Infantry on the left, formed in columns of
battalions. 22
After a two hours' artillery preparation, on November 1 the first wave
of the attacking troops formed behind the barrage and began its advance in
liaison with the 2d Division on the right (Fifth Corps) and the 77th Division
on the left. Enemy machine guns had taken position in the front of the line
of departure of the division, and upon the advance of our troops opened a
heavy fire. The attack on the right progressed rapidly, but the 320th Infantry
on the left was checked by heavy enemy machine gun fire from the north
end of Ravin aux Pierres. Enemy artillery fire at this time was very heavy.
By nightfall troops had reached in general the following line : About 2
km. (1.2 miles) east of Champigneulles — Imecourt — Malmy. The woods north
and east of Hill 214 were strongly held with machine guns. However, the
troops of the 320th Infantry, after rifle fire delivered by a flanking company
from the direction of Ruisseau de St. Georges, filtered through these woods,
and during the night advanced through them and along an east and west line,
300 meters (327 yards) south of Alliepont. - 3
At 6 a. m. on November 2 the attack through the woods north of Ime-
court and east of Verpel was successfully executed by the 319th Infantry.
Practically no resistance was met, and there was but little artillery fire.
Patrols of the division reached Verpel and Thenorgues, in advance of the 77th
Division troops. The attack of the 317th Infantry, which had been placed at
the disposal of the commanding general, 160th Brigade, and two battalions
of the 320th Infantry in support, was delayed until 10.15 a, m., due to the fact
that these troops were unable to get into position before this time. Shortly
after noon the lines were reported north of Buzancy. The enemy was
apparently retreating along the whole front. The 159th Brigade was ordered
to move its remaining regiment (318th Infantry) to Sivry-les-Buzancy, where
it arrived on the night of November 2-3, preparatory to a continuance of the
advance by that brigade on the morning of November 3. The IGOth Brigade.
less two battalion of the 320th Inf antry. after making certain that the left of
the sector was secure, through the advance of the 77th Division, was assembled
in the vicinity of Imecourt. By night the line of the attacking troops was
approximately as follows: Midway between Buzancy and Bar on the Bu-
zancy — Bar road, generally eastwardly to the vicinity of Ferme de Masmes. 5, 3
On November 3, the advance was continued, the 317th Infantry on the
right of the sector. The 318th Infantry returned to Imecourt. The leading
battalions advanced rapidly, encountering machine-gun fire, which was
speedily overcome. At 2.30 p. m. the left battalion of the 317th Infantry was
held up temporarily by heavy machine-gun fire from the woods southeast of
Vaiix-en-Dieulet and Cote 314. At the end of the day the division held the
748 FIELD OPERATIONS
line approximately as follows: From a point about 1 km. (0.6 mile) southeast
of St. Pierremont to a point approximately 2 km. (1.2 miles) north of Fosse. 5, 3
On November 4 the advance continued at daybreak, with the left battalion
of the 317th Infantry pushing vigorously forward, and at 10 a. m. had
occupied Sommauthe, where it encountered some enemy resistance; this re-
sistance increased to the north of the village. The 160th Brigade and 314th
Machine Gun Battalions were moved to the vicinity of Buzancy. Throughout
the remainder of the afternoon, strong enemy resistance was encountered.
The right battalion of the 317th Infantry also advanced rapidly, and at 7 a. in.
occupied Vaux-en-Dieulet. After being held up temporarily on the high
ground just north of Vaux-en-Dieulet. the advance was continued to the
northern edge of Bois de Four, where the battalion halted and reformed. The
318th Infantry, on the left, continued its advance over the open ground be-
tween Sommauthe and Oches. By night the general line of the division
extended over a front of 6 km. (3.7 miles), approximately as follows: From
a point about 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of Oches, just north of east for 6 km.
(3.7 miles) into the southern portion of Bois du Port Gerache. 5 ' 3
On November 5 at 2.30 a. m. the right of the line was advanced rapidly,
occupying Beaumont at 4.30 a. m., and the left battalion advanced at dawn
after a short artillery preparation, and pushed rapidly forward to Thibaudine
Ferme — Beaumont road, which it reached at 9 a. m. At 5 p. m. both battalions
again advanced toward the Yoncq — Beaumont road, meeting heavy resistance.
The 318th Infantry throughout the night of November 4-5 fought its way
through Bois de St. Pierremont — Bois de la Berliere and Bois du Grand
Dieulet, and by 9 a. m. had reached the Stonne — Beaumont road, just north-
west of Warni Foret. By G p. m. the 318th Infantry had extended its line
east, in liaison with the left of the 317th Infantry. Instructions for the relief
of this division by the 1st Division were issued, and the objective to be reached
during the night of November 5-6 was given as the Yoncq — Beaumont road,
with patrols extending north into Bois d'Yoncq, on the left, and to the Meuse
River, on the right. During the night of November 5-6. the four battalions
continued to improve their lines north of the Stonne — Beaumont road, and
early in the mornin<r of the 6th. prior to the relief by the 1st Division, the
objective as given was reached. r '
On November 6 at 6.30 a. ni. the 1st Division "leapfrogged"' the
forward elements of the 80th Division along the Yoncq — Beaumont road.
After the relief of all units of the 80th Division, it was assembled in the
vicinity of Sommauthe. 5
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On November 1 the 317th Ambulance Company, at Baulny, assisted in
the evacuation of divisional patients, its ambulances serving in front of the
Held hospitals and its two trucks evacuating the sitting wounded from them.
On the 2d the company moved to Imecourt. on the 4th to Vaux. on the 8th
to Buzancy. and on the 10th to Alveville. where it was again employed in re-
moval of patients. 2 '
MEl'SE- ARGON N'.: OPERATION
749
Ambulance Company No. 318 assisted the triage (Field Hospital No. 318)
at Baulny from November 1 to 3. and thereafter until November 11 operated
a dressing station at Buzancy. 28
Ambulance Company No. 319 moved to Fleville on the night of October
30 and established a dressing station preparatory to the operation of Novem-
ber 1. Here approximately 350 casualties were cared for, and at Imecourt.
where a dressing station was established by this company on November 2, 160
casualties were cared for. As the advance was very rapid, the next station
opened on Novembr -4, was locate! at Vaux, and on the 6th, others were estab-
lished at Beaumont and Somniauthe. The company closed its stations on the
FIG. 84. — Ambulanee Companies Xo. 817 and Xo. 318, 80th Division, at Vaux, Ardennes, November
0. 1018
7th and followed the division to Aubreville. There is no record available of
the movements of Ambulance Company No. 320 other than that it participated
in this operation. 24
Field Hospital No. 317 established a gas hospital at Baulny on November
1. working in conjunction with the gas hospital of the 2d Division. On the
3d it established a branch hospital for gassed cases at Imecourt, which con-
tinued in operation until the 6th. On that date it moved to Buzancy, where,
until the 11th, it cared for gassed and sick, then moving to Aubreville. :: '
Field Hospital No. 318 operated the divisional triage at Baulny from
November 1 to 3 and from the 6th to the 10th at Buzancy. receiving 671 casual-
ties at its former site and 841 at the latter. 25
750 FIELD OPERATIONS
Field Hospital No. 319, at first in reserve at Baulny, was in operation at
Imecourt from November 3 to 6. While there it received 553 patients, then
moved with other units of the train to Aubreville. 26 Field Hospital No. 320,
at Baulny on November 1, received the sick, but moved next day to Imecourt.
where it operated until November 5. The unit then moved to Buzancy, but
did not establish its hospital, and on the 9th was withdrawn to Aubreville,
after treating 285 patients in this phase of the operation. 22
THE 42D DIVISION' 1
On November 1 the 2d Division of the Fifth Corps attacked through the
lines of the 42d Division. The 42d Division, less the 67th Field Artillery
Brigade, was then assembled in the vicinity of Sommerance, and passed to
command of the Fifth Corps. 27
On November 2 the division moved to the vicinity of St. Juvin. in the
First Corps reserve. 28
On November 3 the movement of the division was continued, and for
the night it halted in the vicinity of Buzancy. 27
On November 4 the march was continued to the vicinity of Authe-
Fontenoy. At midnight on the night of November 4-5, the division com-
menced to move forward to pass through the 78th Division and to take up the
pursuit. At this time the enemy was in retreat and was fighting a rear-guard
action. This action consisted mainly of machine-gun resistance which fell
back from ridge to ridge, and of long-range artillery fire. 25
On November 5. at noon, the assaulting troops of the 42d Division passed
through the 78th Division, on an east and west line, through the northern
edge of Oches, and took up pursuit. At 9 p. m. the division front was along
the northern edge of the Bois de Montdieu. 25
On November 6-7 the pursuit was continued. On the night of November
6, the line ran from east of Cheveuges to just north of Thelonne, thence to the
vicinity of Aillicourt. Patrols of the division had reached the river to the
northeast of Thelonne and the vicinity of Aillicourt and Remilly-sur-Meuse.
At this time telephone and radio instructions were received from the First
Army Corps to advance and capture Sedan, regardless of boundaries. The ad-
vance was attempted, but was held up by heavy machine-gun and artillery
fire from across the river. A patrol of the 156th Infantry penetrated the
southern edge of Wadelincourt, but was driven back by machine-gun fire. The
83d Brigade, on the left, was " pinched out " by the advance of the French, the
84th Brigade holding the division sector, in accordance with division orders.
The line held on November 7 was approximately Pont-Mangis — Aillicourt. 27, 3
On November 8 the defensive organization of the line, as given above,
was begun. Strong patrols were pushed well forward, and they determined
that the enemy had withdrawn across the river and was holding the eastern
bank of the Meuse in force. 27 - 3
' For map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XLV.
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPEBATION 751
On November 9 the 42d Division was relieved by the 77th Division, and
was assembled in the area : Artaise-le-Vivier — La Besace — St. Pierrcmont —
Tannay. 27
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The rapid advance to the lines had severely taxed men and animals.
while ruined roads and destroyed bridges obstructed traffic. The battalion
medical carts, still remaining, had to be abandoned, and the personnel had to
carry on their persons the equipment necessary to open stations. Fortu-
nately, casualties were few until November 7. 28
On November 4 the ambulance section entered Authe, and there Field
Hospital No. 168 established a triage, Field Hospital No. 167 a gas hospital,
and Field Hospital No. 165 was held in reserve. Field Hospital No. 168 opened
at Briquenay. 28 The ambulance companies sent 16 litter bearers to each regi-
ment and established contact with them through the liaison officers. The
ambulance companies were now confronted by the most difficult problem they
had been called upon to solve. The distance to army hospitals was A-ery long,
and between the battle line and Authe lay 0.25 km. (0.15 mile) of road so
thoroughly mined by the enemy that it was necessary to make a detour over
low, water-soaked ground which apparently was impassable to motor vehicles.
An alternate route by St. Pierremont required a wide detour blocked by
traffic. 29 Six animal-drawn ambulances dispatched at once to each Infantry
brigade proved most valuable. On the morning of November 5. five motor
ambulances were dragged across the swamp by horse-and-man power and
then moved forward under their own power, making contact with the troops
the same day. A station with a small personnel was established at each end
of the destroyed stretch of road, and 20 men were detailed to carry patients
across it to the rearward station where motor ambulances were parked. In
advance of this bad break in the road there were a number of other less
formidable obstructions encountered, chiefly those resulting from the destruc-
tion of numerous small bridges. On November 7 a relay station was estab-
lished at Tanney and a collecting station at Chemery, to which the ambulances
first gained access by running for some distance along a railroad track. 30
Casualties were now beginning to accumulate at Bulson and Chehery.
With the animal-drawn ambulances and the few motor ambulances available,
every effort was made to free the stations at these places. This work was
promoted by the arrival of additional motor ambulances shortly after dark.
which had finally been able to cross at Brieulles via the partially completed
corduroy road then being constructed by the Engineers. At Chemery, by
10 p. m., two buildings, previously used by the enemy as hospitals, were filled
to overflowing by approximately 400 wounded, with but a small detail of 1
officer and 6 men to care for them. Meanwhile, the slightly wounded were
being relayed back to Tannay with what ambulances could be spared from the
front. Later a few empty ration trucks were obtained and somewhat relieved
the congestion of wounded. Meanwhile Field Hospital No. 166 had moved
forward to Tannay and was taking under its care the patients assembled
752 FIELD OPERATIONS
there. 80 At midnight an urgent call for help brought part of the personnel
from this hospital to Chemery, and a few hours later, after Field Hospital
No. 165 had reached Tannay, the remainder of the personnel belonging to
Field Hospital No. 166 was released and went forward to Chemery. By
daylight (November 8), operations had been begun on the more urgent cases.
As soon as congestion at the front had been relieved, ambulances were im-
mediately set to work on rearward evacuation, and by noon, November 8, the
situation was well in hand. By the time the 42d Division was relieved, clear-
ing of the field had been accomplished, not only for the division in question
but also for those elements of the 1st Division which had been ordered up to
participate in the capture of Sedan. When the 42d was directed to leave the
area, there followed another 48 hours of continuous work for the ambulances
evacuating from the field hospitals to Cheppy. 31
In this action, the ambulance section accomplished the stupendous task
of transporting 1.422 casualties, an average of 60 km. (37 miles), to mobile
hospitals in the rear over many stretches of well-nigh impassable road and
through difficult traffic blocks. Yet the average time required to transport
wounded to a place where surgical intervention could be obtained far exceeded
the " eight-hour rule." 31
As the division moved forward into the lines, the field hospitals were
ordered to Authe, but Field Hospital No. 168, delayed by road congestion,
was later ordered to establish itself in an old German hospital at Briquenay.
At Authe. Field Hospital No. 166 opened a temporary triage, and Field Hos-
pital No. 167 prepared to receive gassed cases, but as the line advanced
rapidly and but few casualties were received, the Field Hospitals No. 166 and
No. 165 moved to Tannay. The unit which arrived there first (No. 166) then
moved, during the night of November 7-8, by sections up to the ambulance
collecting station at Chemery as has been described above. Here many
wounded were operated throughout the 9th. and relayed back through the
other field hospitals at Tannay. Authe. and Briquenay. to the mobile hospital
at Cheppy. The divisional units continued to operate at these points until all
patients had been evacuated, though not without great difficulty. Coincident
with the cessation of hostilities the field hospital section assembled at Authe.
While on a number of previous occasions they had served much more easily
a larger number of patients, it was only because of the rapidity with which
they had followed up the advance that they were able to meet the demands
imposed. 32
BEFERENCES
(1) Operations report, First Army, January 5, 1919.
<2i F. O. No. 85, First Corps, October 28. 1918.
(3) Map showing daily position. Meuse-Arjronne operation. G-3. G. H. Q., May 24, mm.
(41 Report of operations. First Corps. Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
<■">> Report on operations of ttie Sfltli Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(6) F. O. No. 94. First Corps, November 8, 1918.
(7) Operation reports, Fifth Corps. Meuse-ArRonne operation.
(S) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, by Col. J. W. Grlsstager,
M. ('., corps surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
MEtTSE-ABGONNB OPERATION 753
(9J Report on operations of the 78th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, December
10, 1918.
(10) Report of Medical Department activities, 7Sth Division. A. K. I'., prepared Under
the direction of the division surgeon, 78th Division, undated, Part II. 5. On tile.
Historical Division. S. G. O.
(11) Ibid., Part II, 28.
(12) Report of operations, 153d Infantry Brigade, Meuse-Argonne operation. November
19, 1918.
(13) F. O. No. 68, 77th Division, November S, 1918.
(14) F. 0. No. 69, 77th Division, November 9, 1918.
(15) Report of Medical Department activities. 77th Division. A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 77th Division, undated. 46. On tile. His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
(1G) Ibid., 47.
(17) Ibid., 49.
(18) Ibid., 45.
(19) Ibid., 48.
(20) Ibid., 43.
(21) Ibid., 7.
(22) Report of Medical Department activities. 80th Division, prepared under the direc-
tion of the division surgeon. SOth Division, undated. Part I, IS. On file, His
torical Division, S. G. O.
123) Ibid., Part I, 14.
(24) Ibid., Part I, 15.
(25) Ibid., Part I, 11.
I2til Ibid., Part I. 12.
(27) Reports on operations, 42d Division. Meuse-Argonne operation, November 22. litis.
(28) Report of Medical Department activities, 42d Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 42d Division, undated. Part 1. 81. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(29) Ibid., Part I, 60.
(30) Ibid., Part I, 61.
(31) Ibid., Part I, 62.
(32) Ibid., Part I, 82.
CHAPTER XXXI
THIRD PHASE— Continued
FIFTH CORPS
On November 1, after two hours' artillery preparation, the corps at-
tack started at 5.30 a. m., under an effective barrage, the 2d and 89th Divisions
in line and the 1st Division in reserve. The mission of the Fifth Corps was
to seize the ridge of the Bois cle Barricourt and the heights northeast of
Bayonville-et-Chennery. Meeting with but little resistance, both divisions
advanced during the day from the line running approximately along the
northern edge of Bois de Bantheville — north of the Cote de Chatillon — south
of Landres-et-St. Georges, to the third objective, which was the line La
Tuileries, north edge of Bois de Barricourt, north of Margenta Ferme, north
of Cote 313, southern part of Bois de la Folie, to Ferme des Parades. 1 - -
On the morning of November 2 strong detachments were pushed forward,
the 89th Division encountering stiff machine-sun resistance. Barricourt was
taken by the 89th Division, and the 2d Division made steady progress. Steady
progress was likewise made in the afternoon. The front line at the end of
the day was somewhat indefinite. It was, however, approximately as follows:
From left to right : Tailly, south to Nouart, thence north to the exploitation
line, thence along the exploitation line to the corps boundary (the exploita-
tion line being approximately Buzancy — Ferme de Masmes — Barricourt — just
west of Villers-devant-Dun). 1 ' -' 3
On November 3 the advance was continued, the mission of the Fiftli Corps
for this day being to secure the heights overlooking Vauclaire — Champy
Haut — Vaux-en-Dieulet. The 89th Division, after securing a portion of the
heights on its front, was to push strong reconnaissances toward Stenay. The
2d Division was ordered to assist the advance of the First Corps by securing
the ridge southeast of Vaux-en-Dieulet, and to push strong patrols toward
Beaumont. At the end of the day the line reached was approximately from
Vaux to Champy Haut, thence along the heights southwest of Vauclaire. 2 ' *
The mission of the Fifth Corps on November 4 was to advance on Beau-
mont and Laneuville. The 1st Division (less one regiment of Infantry and one
battalion of Field Artillery) was to move at daylight b} - way of Bayon-
rille — Bauclaire — Laneuville road. The 2d and 89th Divisions were ordered
assembled, after the passage of the 1st Division, in their present forward
areas, to be ready to march upon receipt of orders. Both columns of the
1st Division were ordered to seize all standing bridges over the Meuse and
make the necessary arrangements for suitable crossing of the river. The} 7
were to seize and hold the west bank of the Meuse from Laneuville to Beau-
mont, both inclusive. At the end of the day the line reached was approxi-
mately as follows: That of the 2d Division, from just south of Petit Foret
Ferme, extending about 1 km. (0.6 mile) east and west of that point, then
755
756 FIELD OPERATIONS
south of Ferine de Bille Tour to the northern edge of the woods. The 89th
Division had patrols in Laneuville, then south of the Laneuville — Beaumont
road. Because of the progress made by the 2d and 89th Divisions, the orders
pertaining to the 1st Division were held up, this division remaining in the
vicinity of Bois de Jaulnay and Fosse. 2
On November 5 the plans for the Fifth Corps were the seizure of the
bridgehead in the vicinity of Beaumont. The 2d Division was to seize this
bridgehead and to push strong patrols east and west. The 1st Division was
ordered to assemble in the rear of the 2d Division and to await further orders.
At the end of the day the line was practically as follows: Laneuville, due
north through Cesse — Luzy — to a point on the west bank of the river opposite
Inor, with patrols toward Inor and Pouilly: along the heights east of Beau-
mont and running north of Beaumont. 2
On November 6 the Fifth Corps was ordered to seize and hold the heights
east of the Meuse. extending its left to include Mouzon. The 1st Division was
directed to move through and on the left of the 2d Division and through the
80th Division in the direction of Yoncq — Mouzon: to establish and maintain
liaison with the First Corps and with the 2d Division on its right, and to seize
a crossing at Mouzon. The 2d Division was to hold the heights east of the
Meuse opposite Beaumont and to protect the right flank of the 1st Division.
The 89th Division was to hold the heights east of the Meuse on its present
front, at the same time to reorganize in preparation for an advance to the north,
At the end of the day the 89th Division had entirely cleared the western bank
of the Meuse, from Laneuville to Pouilly, and reported patrols in Pouilly
Flements of the 1st Division occupied Villemontry. The 2d Division occupied
the west bank of the Meuse within its zone of action. 2
On November 7 the Fifth Corps continued its present mission. The 1st
Division was to continue its advance north toward Mouzon, the 2d Division
was to push forward on the right of the 1st Division and the 89th Division
was to cover the front of the Meuse from Stenay northward, protecting the
right flank of the advance. Strong reconnaissances were to be pushed across
the Meuse. and the 89th Division was to be prepared to follow the advance.
During the day, patrols from the 2d and 89th Divisions were active along the
river. Crossings were reconnoitered. patrols entered Pouilly, there encounter-
ing rifle and machine-gun fire, and were reported to have reached Martincourt.
The 1st Division reported that they had taken Autrecourt. This division con-
tinued to push ahead in a northwesterly direction west of the Meuse during
the night of November 6-7, and, during the 7th. advanced and gained the
heights just south of Sedan. At the end of the day the 89th and 2d Divisions
held the west bank of the Meuse from Laneuville to Mouzon. with patrols
across the river at Pouilly. The 1st Division was continuing its advance
toward Sedan. 2
On November 8 the mission of the Fifth Corps was to hold the west
bank of the Meuse within the corps sector. The 89th Division was ordered
to hold the front from Laneuville (inclusive) to Letanne (exclusive). The
2d Division was to hold the front from Letanne (inclusive) to Mouzon
(inclusive). Both divisions were to push strong patrols across the Meuse to
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 757
maintain contact with the enemy. The 1st Division was ordered assembled
in the area Vanx-en-Dieulet — Chateau de Belval, there to await further orders.
.U the end of the day the corps front line remained along the west bank of
the Meuse from Stenay to Mouzon and was held by the 2d and 89th Divisions.
The 1st Division was assembling- in the vicinity of Vaux-en-Dieulet. 2
On November 9 there was no change in the mission of the Fifth Corps
for the day. The 2d and 89th Divisions continued to hold the west bank of
the Meuse and to make preparations for effecting a crossing. 2
On November 10, at 6 a. m.. the Fifth Corps took over the First Corps
front. The 77th Division, First Corps, had relieved the 42d Division and
was now holding the entire First Corps front. This front was to be eventually
taken over by the French Ninth Corps, which was then holding the sector on
the left of the 77th Division. The Fifth Corps was ordered to cross the Meuse
and seize the heights southeast of Vaux and east of Inor. The 2d Division
was ordered to cross the Meuse at places already selected by the division com-
mander, and to seize the heights east of Mouzon and southeast of Vaux.
The 89th Division was to cross the Meuse at places already selected and to
seize the heights east and northeast of Inor. At the end of the day. the Fifth
Corps had three divisions in line, the 89th on the right, the 2d in the center,
and the 77th on the left. The line extended along the west bank of the river
from Stenay to Pont-Maugis. The 2d and S9th Divisions were making prepa-
ration to effect crossings of the river during the night. The 1st and 42d Divi-
sions were awaiting orders for a movement to the Third Corps area. The
77th Division continued to hold its front on the west bank of the Meuse. 2
On the night of November 10-11 the 2d and 89th Divisions, under effec-
tive artillery and machine-gun fire, successfully completed the crossing of
the Meuse. On the morning of November 11, Pouilly was reported captured
at 4.30 a. m. Every effort was made to put across two bridges in the vicinity
nf Mouzon, but this was unsuccessful owing to heavy machine-gun and artil-
lery fire. Attempts made in the vicinity of Bois de l'Hospice were successful,
however, and crossings were made here by troops from both the 2d and 89th
Divisions. At 8.30 a. m. notification was received from the First Army that
the armistice had been signed, effective at 11 a. m. November 11. At 11 a. m.
the location of the, front-line elements of the divisions in the sector was ap-
proximately as follows: From the eastern side of Stenay westward to the
first bend of the Meuse north of Stenay, thence west of north to a point ap-
proximately 1 km. (0.G mile) northeast of Autreville. thence westwardly to
just southwest of Ferine de Vigneron, thence north and west to southwest of
Mouzon. thence along the Meuse to Pont-Maugis. 2, 3
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The following plan of evacuations was published by the corps surgeon on
October 25. 1918 : 5
EVACUATION OF SICK AND WOUNDED
1. Organization. — Field hospitals for triage, gassed and sick: 80th Division now
established about I k. NE. of Charpentry. This site will be occupied by the field hospitals
758 FIELD OPERATIONS
of First Division when the division goes in: If conditions permit, the establishment will
be placed at La Grange-aux-P.ois Ferine. Second Division will establish triage about 1 k.
SW. Exermont. Field hospitals for gassed and sick and for nontransportable cases of 2(1
and SOth Divisions will be established on road running south from Charpentry, about
] /o k. from junction of that road with main road (Baulny — Varennes).
2. Evacuations. — Same as in previous orders, except that Mobile Hospital No. 6,
about V-i k. W. of Cheppy, will be used in conjunction with 1st Corps for operable, severely
wounded.
At the urgent insistence of the corps surgeon, Field Hospital No. 42
joined the corps train on November 1, and on the next day Field Hospital
No. 339. Both of these units were located 1 km. (0.6 mile) south of Very.
United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 590 reported for duty
with the corps on November 2, and Field Hospital No. 338 on the 3d. The last
mentioned was located near Mobile Hospital 'No. 8, established November 3
1 km. (0.6 mile) southwest of Exermont. As the 2d Division advanced, its
triage was moved to Landreville, and later to Beaumont, and its surgical
hospital to the former place. The 89th Division advanced its triage to
within 1 km. (0.6 mile north of Nouart, where it was joined later by the
other hospitals of that division. The 1st Division did not locate at any point
for a long period, and nr» reports of locations were received from it until
after the armistice.
Collecting points were designated at Field Hospital No. 338 and at La
Grange-aux-Bois Ferme, to which point Field Hospital No. 339 was moved
on November 6. Divisions were directed to send their patients to these points,
whence evacuation ambulance companies would transfer them to the rear, but
as the haul which this plan required was too long, Evacuation Hospital No. 14
was moved up to Varennes on the Cth. Thereafter one ambulance company of
the corps train was sent forward daily to the triages of the 2d and 89th
Dh'isions. 7
The Medical Department labored under the great disadvantage, common
to all brandies of the service, of lack of transportation. No division entered
the corps with full quota of ambulances, with anything approaching the
allowance of trucks for field hospitals, or with motor cycles or motor cars.
The sanitary train (four field hospitals and four ambulance companies)
allowed by Tables of Organization to a corps was lacking, except that three
field hospitals reported the first part of November, entirely without trans-
portation at first and with no cots, stoves, extra blankets, or tents for officers.
The corps surgeon reported as follows : '
Had this sanitary train been available from the beginning it is believed that a number
of lives would have been saved. In each regular ambulance company there are from 60
to 80 men available as litter bearers in addition to the drivers and orderlies on tlie
ambulances, while in an evacuation ambulance company there are only 32 men. Further,
the four field hospitals could have been drawn upon for personnel and transportation
and could have relieved divisions of their sick.
The great defect in the Medical Department organization in the divisions
was the lack of litter bearers in the front line. 7
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 759
In a supplementary report, dated December 5, 1918, the corps surgeon
reported as follows concerning the evacuation service of the corps and its
component divisions : T - s
The battalion aid station was near its battalion command post in a dugout or other
sheltered spot, as near the front lines as possible. Here were located all available
medical officers with dressing parties and litter bearers. The regimental surgeon with a
small force was at the regimental aid station and had general supervision over regimental
aid and evacuation. Casualties from battalion aid stations did not necessarily pass
through regimental aid stations.
Dressing Stations
Main dressing stations were established at each ambulance company head-
quarters at convenient, central, sheltered spots. Wounded men passed through
these stations, were examined and given hot drinks, but were not unloaded
unless it was necessary to do so in order to check hemorrhage or to revive from
profound shock. These companies also assisted the regimental personnel to
establish advance dressing stations at, or as near as possible to, battalion aid
stations, re-dressed or readjusted dressings, administered antitetanic serum
when necessary, gave hot drinks and other nourishment. Ambulance company
litter bearers were concentrated at these advance stations to assist in bringing
in the disabled. Service at these stations was usually satisfactory, but a few
cases were reported where tourniquets were too tightly applied or were left
too long in place, where splints were not applied, or antitetanic serum was
not given. 8
The greatest difficulty in the evacuation of the wounded was that of
transporting them to an aid station within a reasonable time after their
wounds had been received. This condition was due to the lack of litter bearers
and the distance to be covered, especially when the advance was rapid and the
terrain hilly and wooded. The corps surgeon had foreseen this shortage, but
his request to have 200 litter bearers assigned to each division was not
approved. 8
Field Hospitals
In general it was found best to have the four field hospitals of a division
located together; one to act as a triage and to care for surgical and shock
cases, one for gassed patients, one for the sick, and one in reseiwe. In but
few instances was it found necessary to modify this plan. 9
The question whether the triage should be operated by an ambulance com-
pany or a field hospital came up early in the course of operations and was
settled in favor of the latter. This conclusion was deduced from the need
that every available man in an ambulance company perform litter-bearer
duty and the desirability of having, in conjunction with the triage, facilities
for the care of nontransportable and shocked patients. All casualties, with
the exception of gassed patients, were passed through the triage and carried
from it by litter to tents designated for nontransportables, slightly wounded,
severely wounded, or sick. The great majority of the divisions operating in
760 FIELD OPERATIONS
the corps were found to lx; poorly organized for this class of work, the
tendency being to devote an undue amount of energy to surgical interference
and to neglect triage service and the treatment of shocked cases. This was
controlled by insistence that a medical officer be designated at each triage to
have entire charge of sorting and loading patients for evacuation; that only
emergency surgery be performed at these locations (this had to be modified
in certain cases) ; and that a shock team be organized and instructed. 9
In order to prevent the possibility of other patients becoming gassed
from, contact with them, gassed patients were delivered by the ambulances
directly to the division gas hospital. Their records were made here and
were consolidated with those of the triage. All cases of this character were
examined and classified by a medical officer, their clothing removed, and baths
given. Suspected malingerers and those who were slightly gassed or ex-
hausted were held under observation for 24 hours with a view to their return
to duty. In order to make this procedure possible, a supply of clothing was
maintained at this hospital. In the early stages of its operations the corps
gas hospital was overwhelmed with patients, many of them but slightly gassed,
some not at all; but as soon as the foregoing plan could be put into effect
this condition was relieved, and a large number of cases were returned to duty
from the divisional gas hospitals. 9
AYhen the Fifth Corps entered the Argonne sector the 79th Division and.
to a less degree, the 37th and 91st were experiencing considerable losses from
the epidemic of influenza. Most of the sick were being evacuated to Souilly,
where it was reported that many men developed pneumonia, with a high
death rate. To care for these patients with as little exposure as possible, the
32d Division, in reserve, was directed to establish at Ville-sur-Cousances a
field hospital for the sick of the corps. 9 This hospital received several hundred
cases during one week, with a decided decrease in the pneumonia and fatality
rates. But as the 32d went into line on October 3. it was necessary to dis-
continue the service of this hospital ; and although every effort was made
to secure another for this purpose, none became available until Field Hospital
Xo. 42 arrived on November l. 9
Orders were then issued directing that each division establish a field
hospital to care for its own sick and retain influenza and pneumonia patients
and all slightly ill, evacuating only other cases and those which threatened
to become more or less chronic. Because of the frequent movement of divisions
this method was not given a thorough test ; but whenever it was possible to
apply it. especially in the 32d and 42d Divisions, the results were extremely
satisfactory, saving a large number of men for the front lines and reducing
the number of cases of serious illness. 10
At the beginning of the Meuse-Argonne operation there were attached
to the corps 4 United States Army Ambulance Service sections and 2 French
sections, giving a total of 85 ambulances. Of these there were generally avail-
able 90 per cent of the United States Army vehicles and 70 per cent of the
French. 10
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 761
There was great demand for ambulances for independent organizations
of the corps, such as Artillery, Engineer, and pioneer Regiments. Ten ambu-
lances, therefore, were distributed among these organizations; but, considering
the shortage of these vehicles, this was a mistake, as experience proved, and
later the ambulances were returned to their organizations. 10
As ambulances of the United States Ambulance Service were provided
with substitute drivers, these organizations were assigned to divisions to
evacuate their field hospitals. With the French ambulance units the arrange-
ments made were somewhat different, chiefly because their service allowed but
one driver to a vehicle. These ambulances were sent out early in the morn-
ing and made one trip daily, which often carried them into the night. 10
Had our line remained stationary along the line existing at the com-
mencement of the operation, the allowance of ambulances would have been
sufficient for all purposes, as the haul to the nearest evacuation hospital, at
Froidos, was not long and roads were excellent : but on the day that the triages
moved forward from Brabant to Les Clairs Chenes trouble began. Division
surgeons had been informed that they woidd be held responsible for trans-
porting casualties to their field hospitals and that the corps would evacuate
from these points; but during the first few days it was almost impossible to
get ambulances through to Malancourt, Vauquois. or beyond Avocourt. on
account of the bad condition of roads and the blocking of traffic. Maps which
had been furnished the ambulance companies were incorrect in some instances,
and there was great confusion in routing. About October 4 (second phase)
it was possible to shift the corps evacuation route to the Very — Clieppy —
Varennes road, which was in fairly good condition: but the haul was very
long— Very to Froidos. 20 km. (1G miles), to Fleury-sur-Aire. 32 km. (19.8
miles), and to Vaubecourt, 4G km. (28.5 miles), and roads were congested so
that frequently it required 12 to 24 hours to make the round trip. 10 There
was also great difficulty in obtaining spare parts for the vehicles, and an
ambulance might be laid up for days for the lack of a spark plug or some
small part of a motor. An ambulance repair shop was located at Triaucourt,
but only the simplest repairs could be made there, and it was necessary to
scour the country for spare parts — often unsuccessfully, though quest was
made in Souilly. Bar-le-Dnc. Sampigny, and even Langres. During opera-
tions there were some losses by theft, several tires and rims and two motor
cycles complete being taken from corps medical organizations. 11
During the early days of the operation considerable confusion existed
in the delivery of patients to evacuation hospitals. Officers in charge of
triages apparently failed to appreciate the importance of careful sorting and
would, for instance, direct a driver to proceed to Froidos with his load of
patients, though there might be among them sick who should have been sent
to Vaubecourt and gassed wdio should have gone to Julvecourt. Moreover.
drivers did not always report wdiere they were sent; apparently being treated
better at some hospitals than at others. Fleury-sur-Aire was the favorite
destination, and drivers frequently delivered every class of cases at this point.
762 FIELD OPERATIONS
Also, as the First Corps used the same road as the Fifth, and occasionally
evacuated large numbers of patients to Froidos and Fleury-sur-Aire, both of
these hospitals sometimes were filled, and orders were received at night that
patients be diverted to Villers-Daucourt or Brizeaux or Souilly. Lacking tele-
phone connection with triages, the only course open to the corps evacuation
officer was to notify the military police to route ambulances accordingly or to
send a representative to do so at the crossroads at Clermont. 11
Trucks were used by the divisions for the evacuation of wounded and
gassed from the front to triages, and even to the rear of them in many cases.
Though section G-l of the corps staff cooperated constantly with the corps
surgeon, he was unable to furnish corps trucks to assist in evacuation, because
of the shortage of such vehicles in the corps train, the enormous amounts of
ammunition to be hauled by such as were available, and the fact that the
corps supply and ammunition clumps invariably were forward of evacuation
hospitals.
As the corps was a tactical unit, routine reports from divisions did not
necessarily pass through the corps surgeon's office, but certain information
was necessary for that office, and so the reports listed below were required.
The requirements were made as simple and brief as possible in order not to
overburden the division surgeons, the corps surgeon having had considerable
experience in that capacity and appreciating the difficulties of getting out
complicated reports during the heat of action. There were many other points
of interest which might have been included, such as the number of killed,
slightly and severely wounded, number of gassed cases, and sick returned
directly to duty from divisional hospitals, etc. 11
The daily casualty report was, of course, the most important and was
in fact apparently the only reliable report of the corps so far as "Wounded,
other injuries, gassed, and sick" were concerned. When complete, as was
usually the case, it showed the total number of admissions to medical organi-
zations of the corps. 11
Keports required were as follows:
Immediately upon joining the corps — 1. Numerical list of medical per-
sonnel and transportation. 2. Roster of medical officers, including specialists,
dental, sanitary corps, and veterinary officers.
Daily — 1. Casualty report.
Weekly — 1. Personnel and transportation (copy of Form 9, A. G. O.
S. D.). 2. Contagious diseases for the allied commander. 3. Venereal, giving
name, rank, organization, and number of each new case.
Reports from nondivisional corps troops:
Daily — Casualties and changes, adding number of cases evacuated directly
to evacuation hospitals. 12
THE 2D DIVISION
On the night of October 31, the 2d Division, which had been in the Fifth
Corps reserve, relieved the 42d Division in line south of St. Georges, and
at 5.30 on the morning of November 1, launched its attack on a 4-km. (2.4-mile)
front."
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 763
The plan of action was to attack in a northerly direction within the sector.
The reduction of the enemy strong positions in and around Landres-et-St.
Georges, the Bois des Hazois. and the Bois de l'Epasse, was made the mission
of the 23d Infantry (3d Brigade), which regiment was to attack on a 2-km.
(1.2-mile) front on the right. Following the capture of the areas assigned
it, the 23d Infantry was to pass to the division reserve. The remainder of
the division front, on the left, was given to the 4th Brigade. This brigade,
upon arriving at the level of Imecourt, was to be extended so as to cover the
entire front of the division, thus replacing the 23d Infantry, on the right."
The attack advanced in accordance with scheduled arrangements. Upon
arrival at the third objective (La Folarde — La Magenta Ferme — dote
313 — Fontaine des Parades), the position was consolidated and patrols were
pushed forward to the exploitation line (Nbuart — Fosse). The 89th Divi-
sion, on the right of the 2d Division, reached the corps objective on Novem-
ber 1. The 80th Division (First Corps), on the left of the 2d Division, was
unable to advance to its objective. This caused the left flank of the 2d
Division to be exposed to attack from the direction of Sivry-les-Buzancy and
Buzancy. The 4th Brigade was therefore ordered to seize and hold with
its rear elements the woods north and west of Sivry-les-Buzancy, and the
3d Brigade to place itself in position to resist any counterattacks which the
enemy might make on the left flank of the division. 13
On November 2 the division began a movement which involved a change
of its front and an attack in the direction of Buzancy. In the afternoon, how-
ever, corps orders changing this plan were received, stopping the movement.
This change in plans was caused by the refusal of the First Corps and the
80th Division to change their plans and permit the Fifth Corps to attack
diagonally across their front, in the direction of Buzancy. The 4th Brigade
was relieved in the front line by the 3d Brigade. Due to the change of orders
and the time necessary for the relief of the first line of the division by the
3d Brigade, it was decided to make the advance to the exploitation line,
Nbuart — Fosse, during the night of November 2-3. This was successfully
accomplished, and the exploitation line was occupied during the night by
the 3d Brigade. 13
On November 3 the 3d Brigade leading, with its regiments abreast, at-
tacked from the line of departure, Nouart — Fosse. At 6 a. m. they advanced
to and occupied the ridge southeast of Vaux-en-Dieulet by 8.30 a. m. In this
advance the troops were subject to heavy artillery and machine-gun fire and
suffered many casualties. In the position gained it was discovered that the
line was confronted by strong enemy positions along the southern edge of Bois
de Belval. Division orders were then issued, directing the division to advance,
the 3d Brigade being ordered to attack and dislodge the enemy from his
position in its front, and to move up through the woods, during the night,
and occupy a commanding position in the vicinity of Beaumont. The advance
was made as directed. The division, after an artillery preparation of about
one hour, advanced and occupied, late in the afternoon, the enemy position
above referred to. This being a night operation, the 3d Brigade, supported
764 FIELD OPERATIONS
by accompanying artillery, pushed forward by a single road and passed
through the Bois de Belval, Bois de Four, and Bois du Port Gerache, and
debouched into the open. The heights north of La Tuilerie Ferme. south of
Beaumont, 6 km. (3.7 miles) behind the enemy's main line of resistance, in
front of the divisions on the flanks of the 2d Division, were reached by 11.30
p. in. on November 3. By the morning of November 4 a strong position had
been built up north and east of La Tuilerie Ferine. This advance through
the woods was made by a single road and with the troops in column of twos. 1
November 4 was spent in building up, wdth the 3d Brigade and 15th Field
Artillery, a strong position northeast of La Tuilerie Ferme, and preparations
were made to advance to the bank of the Meuse on the night of November 4-5. i::
After darkness on the night of November 4-5, the 3d Brigade again ad-
vanced and, passing by the outskirts of Beaumont, reached by daybreak.
November 5, the tow r n of Letanne, and the Bois de la Vache, which places were
occupied, together with the trenches between them. The bank of the Meuse.
within the elements of the division, was cleared of the enemy. After day-
break, a detachment from the 23d Infantry was sent into Beaumont to com-
plete the capture of that place and to occupy it. 13
On November 5 the 5th Regiment of Marines completed the capture o;
Foret de Jaulnay and reconnoitered the destroyed bridges at Pouilly and Inor.
One battalion of the 89th Division assisted in these operations. 13
During the night of Noveml>er 5-6, information was received that the
1st Division was to pass through the 80th Division, which, at that time,
occupied the line Beaumont — La Thibaudine Ferme, and was to inarch on
Monzon. The Fifth Corps directed the 2d Division to assist in these opera-
tions and to protect the right flank of the 1st Division during its march
toward Mouzon. In the 2d Division, the 3d Brigade was given this mission. 13
On November 6 corps orders were issued directing the assembly of the
2d Division, preparatory to marching on Sedan. However, early in the
morning of November 7. these orders to march northward were countermanded
and the 2d Division was directed to hold the line of the Meuse on the front
Letanne — Mouzon. The 3d Brigade organized and occupied the front line
and continued reconnoitering the river crossings. The 4th Brigade was moved
up and was bivouacked along Beaumont — Sommauthe road, about 3 km.
(1.8 miles) southwest of Beaumont.' 3
November 8 was spent in improving positions and in searching for bridge
material. 13
On November 9 the division was directed to cross the river at 6 p. m..
that da j', but owing to the difficulty experienced in securing bridge material
the orders were changed and the crossings postponed. 13
After dark, on November 10. the 2d Engineers threw two improvised foot-
bridges across the Meuse near Bois de l'Hospice. and the 4th Brigade, in the
face of very heavy machine-gun and artillery fire, succeeded in putting two
battalions of the 5th Marines, plus two machine-gun companies, across the
river. A battalion of the 89th Division, which had been placed under the
command of the commanding general. 4th Brigade, for combat liaison with
PLATE XLVI.
MEUSE - ARGONNE
OPERATION
THIRD PHASE
L 2'\ d 6, 89 u> DIVISIONS
NOV ill . 1918.
FIELD HOHPTTAI.H
and
AMJHlLuANTE COMDAKIEft
R"4 Div. «*»• Div
No i So n;i
IR 354
10 353
Buzmnty, CUrmtnX •* ,Cfr-me*t £>. ZX. •
Oauoeurt , Bbrtfrty, Smintim Mtnuhauia
tuition-, of Ktitiza. Un.fi ftvtn reao'-.*-:
V fAr CAi*f Surfoan , fl^tA Car^oi *ntt tf%.»
Dtrtsianat Sury*->s)3 of Cut Sacontf <*^tf
LEGEND
+ I ) n DnM(n| wniia,
+■ AC .VrnMl/uur*- fWtnany
± l\H 11*U Ibtfttal ^
■ (.11 Ci*« Uwrftal
■ Nil NmrclogW Hnwmtol
• EH Kv ft ni«?i nri I W.*t*l
* Mil Mobil* Ho«pit»l
SMM) tWIfl Nuprtvl)w«
(AMl'.ll A^nrnn BW Crow H<Mf»t*l
Rattle lines, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J. Pershing. September 1, 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 765
the 89th Division, crossed at the same time, following the 5th Marines. The
crossing north of Mouzon was abandoned because of the success which attended
the crossing at the other place. The 3d Brigade and all the division machine
!_ r uns assisted in this operation, and one battalion of the 9th [nfantry was,
about dawn, November 11. pushed over in support of the 5th Marines. 13
During the early morning hours of November 11, the enemy was driven
from Bois des Flaviers and a bridgehead was established which included
Warmonterne Ferine, Bellefontaine Ferme, and Senegal Ferine. Liaison
with the 80th Division was established near Vigneron Ferme. This operation
lasted until 11 a. m. November 11. at which time the armistice with the enemy
went into effect. 13
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
About October 27 all the units of the sanitary train were in place and
ready for the operation. The triage (Field Hospital No. 1) and the medical
supply unit was located behind camouflaged screens in a field 1.5 km. (0.9
mile) southwest of Exermont and 6.5 km. (4 miles) from the lines, as the
ground here was soft, stone roads had to be built to prevent miring of trans-
portation. 11 Tentage was not erected until the night of the attack, for the
location was within sight of enemy observation balloons. Field Hospital No.
16 for sick and gassed patients, and Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23 (com-
bined), for nontransportablc wounded, were located 0.5 km. (0.3 mile) south
of Charpentrv. Ambulance Companies No. 1, No. 16. and No. 23 occupied
shelter tents in a small valley near the triage. Casualties from the division
were to be removed to Evacuation Hospital No. 10. at Froidos: Red Cross
Hospital No. 114. at Fleury; Evacuation Hospital No. 14. at Les Islettes: and
Mobile Hospital No. G, near Varennes. The distance from front lines to these
units varied from 11.5 km. (7.1 miles) to 39.6 km. (24.5 miles). 14
By the night of October 31. officers and men of the litter-bearer sections
of the ambulance companies had joined the battalions they were to serve, and
a dressing station, well stocked with supplies, had been established by Am-
bulance Company No. 15, at Sommerance. with United States Army Ambu-
lance Service Section No. 556, standing by in readiness for service. 14
Because of the rapid advance, the dressing stations moved forward al-
most daily. Two were operating at Sommerance and one at Landres-et-St.
Georges on the night of November 1. one at Bavonville on the afternoon of
November 2, two at Nouart November 3. one at Fosse on November 4, two at
Sommauthe on November 7. and all four dressing stations were located at
Beaumont November 8 to 10, functioning as a triage and as a hospital for
minor eases of sickness. 14 The field hospitals moved in echelon formation, leav-
ing when they moved forward a group in the rear to care for sick and wounded
left behind until they were evacuated. Field Hospital No. 1 was at Exermont
Xoveml>er 1-2; at Landres-et-St. Georges. 8 km. (4.9 miles) from the front
line. November 2-3; Nouart 6 km. (3.7 miles) Noveml>cr 4 to 7: Sommauthe 9
km. (5.5 miles) November 8-9: Beaumont 2 km. (1.2 miles) November 10.
766 FIELD OPERATIONS
The surgical unit, composed of Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23 and Mobile
Surgical Unit No. 3. moved to Landreville. 15 km. (9.3 miles) from the line
on November 4. Field Hospital No. 16 moved to Soramauthe on November 8
and to Beaumont on the 12th. 15
The problem of evacuating casualties soon became a very serious one.
Roads, which at first were fairly good, were soon almost impassable. The G.
M. C. ambulances of the sanitary train were reduced to 25. and the train was
further hampered at rirst by the temporary loss of 12 drivers who had been
sent to Marseille on November 1 to bring up 12 new G. M. C. ambulances.
Twenty additional Ford ambulances belonging to a United States Army
Ambulance Service section reinforced the train, but these, machines, formerly
considered equal to almost any road condition, were unable to endure the
strain imposed by deep, sticky mud. In the first five days much travel at low
gears had so worn their transmissions that the section in question was prac-
tically out of service, except that a few vehicles were kept in condition for
evacuating patients to the rear. The Gr. M. C. ambulances, with chains, and
the "Commerce" machine-gun trucks which came to the assistance of the
Medical Department, were the only cars that could operate under the road
conditions in the forward area. Arrival of the convoy of 12 G. M. C. ambu-
lances from Marseille on November 7 aided greatly in the work of evacuation. 1 "'
In short hauls from the forward area mule-drawn ambulances were very
useful, but the two-mule teams were soon exhausted. It was considered doubt-
ful whether four-mule teams could have held out much longer. Sanitary and
supply train trucks assisted greatly in rear evacuation. Those of the sup-
ply train reported at the triage after leaving their rations and supplies: but,
because of extremely bad roads and the long hauls back to the hospitals at
Fleury and Froidos. could not make a round trip inside of 24 hours. Tt lie-
came necessary therefore to forbid by orders their going farther than to
evacuation hospitals. These, however, were unable to keep up with the ad-
vance, and often, after extremely long hauls, the trucks found them over-
flowing, and so were obliged to proceed still farther to the rear. 15
At Nouart. the 1st Division supplied several ambulances for rear evac-
uation, when not actually needed for use in the forward area. The establish-
ment of Mobile Hospital No. 8 at Exermont shortened the haul for nontrans-
portable patients for whom the surirical units of Field Hospitals No. 15 and
No. 23 could not care; but much of the time it was filled to its utmost capacity.
The extremely bad weather, fatigue, and lack of food in the lines conspired
to cause much sickness. At one time the 16th Field Hospital, at Sommauthe.
had 1,100 patients under canvas and in billets in that town, most of them
suffering from influenza or diarrhea. 1 "
With the establishment of one-way routes, patrolled by caterpillar tractors
day and night to pull mired trucks and ambulances onto the road, traffic was
kept moving: slowly, it is true, but under road conditions that ordinarily
would have been impossible. 10
In this engagement, as in a previous one, a supply officer was given the
special task of keeping dressing stations supplied and rationed with hot food
until kitchens could be brought up. The plan worked well. 18
MEUSE-AKGONNE OPEEATION 707
In addition to the transportation problems, already difficult enough,
when Sommauthe was reached about 1,600 refugees, some seriously wounded,
had to be evacuated to Hardcourt, near Buzancy. Trucks of the sanitary
train (some were temporarily out of commission) were unable to meet the
needs of the ever-increasing number of arrivals. In this emergency the re-
turning supply train trucks of the 1st Division were put at the disposal of
the division surgeon, 2d Division, and soon all these unfortunates were sent
safely to the rear. 10
When the armistice went into effect the sanitary train was disposed as
follows: Headquarters and headquarters of its hospital section with Field
Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23, to which Mobile Surgical Unit No. 3 was at-
tached, were at Landreville; Field Hospital No. 1, the triage, medical supply
unit, and all the ambulance companies, with their dressing stations in opera-
tion, were at Beaumont; while Field Hospital No. 16 was at Sommauthe
caring for some 800 sick patients. 10
Throughout this operation the triage had been advanced frequently, with
a view to reducing the time of admission after receipt of wounded — a pro-
cedure which the division surgeon reported had doubtless saved many lives.
On the morning of November 1, when 6.5 km. (4 miles) from the line, it
received 316 cases within an average of 1 hour and 33 minutes from the
moment a patient's diagnosis tag was affixed.
THE 89TH DIVISION «
On November 1, at 5.30 a. m., the 89th Division attacked, with the 177th
Infantry Brigade assaulting, the 178th Brigade being in reserve. The ad-
vance progressed on schedule time, the third objective, Les Tuileries — Cote la
Folarde, being reached at about 11.30 a. m. In the afternoon a heavy fog
arose, making it difficult for the advancing infantry to be certain of its loca-
tion. The position of the line was checked by field officers and it was reported
as on the third objective, Cote la Folarde— northern edge of Bois de Barri-
court to just east of Les Tuileries. 17, 1S
On November 2 the attack was slow and uncertain. 17 The attack of the
assaulting battalions was directed to move forward and follow the barrage.
This attack failed to get started, because the barrage was about one-third as
dense as the preceding day and was not recognized as a barrage by the attack-
ing troops. Successive attacks were ordered and started during the day, but
did not succeed because the infantry was instructed to follow the barrage
instead of having orders to move forward at definite hours, regardless of the
'larrage. The enemy's resistance was severe, both with artillery and machine
guns. Moreover, liaison was not satisfactory during the day. It was late in
the afternoon before the attack really progressed, bit by bit, on the left and
on the right under covering fire of all available artillery. At about 9 p. m..
the right regiment entered Tailly and placed itself on its objective for the
■ For map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XLVI.
768 FIELD OPERATIONS
day, and the left regiment, although not having taken Barricourt, which was
held by enemy machine guns, had practically encircled the town. The reserve
Infantry brigade moved after placing its leading element in Bois de Barri-
court, preparatory to the relief of the advance brigade. 17
On November 3 the 178th Brigade passed through the 177th Brigade and
attacked at about (3 a. m. The mission of the division was now to attack and
carry the heights overlooking Le Champy Haut and Beauclair, and to push
strong reconnaissances toward Stenay. The Infantry started satisfactorily,
and at 7.30 a. in. a report was received that Barricourt had been taken as well
as the heights east and west. At 9.30 a. m. the advance brigade commander re-
ported his troops were on the objective for the day and were entrenching
on the heights. He was then ordered to press forward at once with his recon-
naissances toward Stenay and to the north. Beports in the latter part of the
morning indicated enemy resistance developing on the right and left. At
12.05 p. m. the leading battalion of the right regiment was reported clear of
the woods beyond the heights. Through the officer in charge of the message
center, liaison was accomplished with the advance battalion of the right regi-
ment, which was held up before Beauclair. Artillery fire was then adjusted
on the southern edge of Beauclair. At dusk all the remaining artillery am-
munition was fired in support of the Infantry attack, which moved up to the
town. Full possession of the town of Beauclair was gained and patrols were
put in Halles, but the Infantry did not enter Beaufort until the following
morning. On the left the exploiting column had passed Le Champy Bas and
had entered Bois des Dames. 17
On November 4 the mission of the division was to advance and seize the
town of Laneuville, the north edge of Foret de Dieulet. and to push recon-
naissances forward to the Meuse and reconnoiter for river crossings. The
operations for the day were slow and on the whole unsatisfactory, although
the division gained its objective. Just before 8 a. m. word was received from
the advance brigade that the commander of the right assaulting battalion
reported a successful flanking move, but that unless an artillery fire could be
put down immediately, instructions planned for the barrage at 8.30 a. in.
should be countermanded. This was done. Further reports were meager and
unsatisfactory. The division commander accordingly went forward to the
heights north of Tailly. overlooking the operation. The inactivity of our
Infantry was apparent. Beyond the river, large convoys of Germans could
be seen leaving Stenay. South of the Foret de Dieulet small numbers of the
enemy, apparently machine gunners, could be seen moving about. Our troop
north of Beaufort were receiving fire and were not advancing; our artillery
was practically silent. The division commander therefore directed the advance
brigade commander to drive forward his attack and take Laneuville. More
favorable progress was then reported on the left, where the attacking Bat-
talion had entered the woods, although experiencing steady resistance, and
was followed by tire support battalion. The center battalion made little prog*
ress. The battalion on the right could not advance until the artillery support
MEXTSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 769
was obtained. The assaulting battalion on the left reported itself on its ob-
jective about an hour before dark. On the right the town of Laneuville was
entered by an officers' patrol and a reconnaissance was made of the destroyed
bridge and railroad in the vicinity before midnight. 17
On November 5 the mission of the division was to continue the advance
and drive the enemy across the Meuse. including in this operation the Foret
de Jaulnay, and seize and hold the bridges in the front of the division. The
leading brigade was given the mission of the division. About noon the corps
commander issued instructions that the S9th Division would hold the heights
east of the Meuse on its present front. This meant obtaining a river crossing.
The advance brigade commander was then given definite orders to drive in
behind Foret de Jaulnay and seize and hold the Pouilly bridge. However.
later reconnaissances proved the Pouilly bridge had been badly damaged and
men could cross to the town only singly. Inor bridge was found to be intact
by an engineer reconnoitering officer, but it was destroyed on the night of
November 5 by the enemy. 17
Inasmuch as Field Orders No. 118 of the Fifth Corps required that, in
addition to holding its front, the 89th Division would organize in preparation
for an advance to the north, special inspections and conferences were held to
obtain the exact status of the division. In part this was reported as follows:
Division holds position to guard bridges from Pouilly to Stenay. inclusive. * * *
I'ridges at Pouilly. Inor, Luzy. Cesse. and Stenay. with intermediate crossings, have been
demolished by the enemy. Demolition at Pouilly was incomplete, and small Infantry de-
i.ichments have crossed and are holding the far side, supported by strong infantry de-
tachments and machine guns on its side. It is believed that a similar operation is pos-
sible at Inor. At Pouilly it would take a week's time to put bridge and road in condition
for heavy vehicles. Infantry and light trains could probably be put over in four days.
[toads leading to bridges between Steuay and Pouilly are bad except road to Inor,
which is reported as in fair condition. Road along northwest corner of Foret de Jaulnay
is practicable for first movement of artillery and trains, but it has not yet been deter-
mined if it can bear sustained traffic. * * * This division has forces in Pouilly and
Foret de Jaulnay. which area is also covered by the 2d Division. * * *
In the afternoon orders were received from the corps that the 89th
Division would cover the front of the Meuse from Stenay northward, protect-
ing the right flank of the advance, and that strong reconnaissances would be
pushed across the Meuse and that this division should be prepared to follow
the advance. Accordingly orders were issued bringing the reserve brigade
into the line. 17
On the 7th. no change in the line was made. During the morning word
was received from corps headquarters revoking the order to extend to the
northwest. 17
On the morning of November 8 corps orders were received directing the
^!»th Division to push strong patrols across the Meuse and to maintain con-
tact with the enemy. Accordingly, the 178th Brigade was directed to carry
on aggressively the mission of the division and to force a crossing of the
river at Pouilly on the night of November 8-9. The advance brigade com-
13576—25 19
770 FIELD OPERATIONS
mander asked for further delay, and on the recommendation of the division
engineer this was granted. However, instructions were given to push patrols
across the river. Some six or seven attempts were made at night, by various
expeditions, including several patrols, which tried to swim, regardless of the
low temperature of the water. Two crossings were actually effected, but no
information was obtained other than that the enemy was holding the east
bank of the river all along the front."
On November 9 the division maintained its position, with the 178th Bri-
gade in the line patrolling the river, with a view to detecting enemy activity.
During the night our patrols met with success. Using bridge equipment, de-
tachments crossed west of Pouilly and gained important data in regard to the
character of the banks on the east side of the river. 17
On November 10 the 89th Division was directed to cross the Meuse at
places already selected by the division commander, and to seize the heights
east and northeast of Inor. The corps order directed that the best possible
use be made of machine guns and artillery and that the hour of beginning
the operation be 4 p. m. Dividing lines and boundaries were given : Letanne
to the 2d Division and Autreville to the 89th Division. On the south the
boundary was Stenay, exclusive. The plan was to force a crossing near
Pouilly, drive eastward to the heights back of Inor, then exploit to the
south and connect with the other brigade, which was to work north through
Stenay, in liaison with the 90th Division. The 178th Brigade was given
the mission of crossing at Pouilly, maintaining liaison with the 2d Division
and furnishing the combat liaison troops on that flank. The 177th was given
the task of maintaining combat liaison with the 90th Division, sending troops
by the footbridge at Villefranche, as well as by a reported footbridge at
Stenay, to push northward to the far side of the river, clearing the woods
and maintaining contact with the 178th Brigade north of Inor. 17
On the night of November 10-11 the operation developed on the left prac-
tically as planned. The hour of starting was coordinate with that of the 2d
Division; and although our troops began the operation of moving boats from
their camouflaged park near the main road about 4 p. m., the crossing of the
river was not under way until 9.30 p. in. Two battalions of Infantry crossed
the creek running from Ferine de la YVaimne down the river, proceeded north
circling Pouilly, and did not disturb the inhabitants or garrisons until our
position was well secured on the heights beyond. The capture of the town
was then completed and our Infantry pressed on and took Autreville after
daylight, and reached the heights to the east. The combat liaison battalion.
and the machine-gun company, which was under the orders of the 2d Division,
did not fare so well. Just as they were preparing to cross the river they
were subjected to a very heavy concentration of enemy artillery fire, anil
suffered heavy casualties. Their operation was delayed, but they accomplished
their mission with the 2d Division. To the south, the 177th Brigade sent
one regiment, less one battalion, by way of the footbridge at Villefranche.
following the elements of the 90th Division. One battalion was directed to
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 771
cross directly opposite Stenay as soon as opportunity afforded. The regi-
mental commander with the Yillefranche column moved up on the east side
of the river just in rear of the 90th Division and on the left flank. lie was
told that the town was strongly held by the Germans and that since opera-
tions were to cease later in the day the 90th Division would not take the town.
The engineers of the division, in Laneuville, again reconnoitered the crossing
there during the night and commenced work which resulted in placing a
platoon of our troops in Stenay at about 10 a. m.„ November 11."
At 8.30 a. m.. November 11, word was received from the corps that the
armistice would go into effect at 11 a. m., and that firing would cease at
that time. Since the division had been in the line a considerable time with-
out proper bathing facilities, and since it was realized that if the enemy were
permitted to remain in position our troops would be deprived of the billets
and probable bathing facilities there, instructions were sent to the Infantry
commander at Laneuville to push forward directly and take Stenay. not
waiting for any assistance or support of the 90th Division. It was intended
to complete the operation by capturing the heights east of the river between
Stenay and Moulins. The enemy, however, was found to be in I nor and,
Cervisy. Moreover, orders were later received not to advance, and the line
held at 11 a. m. The line of the division, when the armistice became effective,
was approximately as follows: From the north side of Stenay westward to
the first bend of the Mouse, north of Stenay, thence west of north to a point
approximately 1 km. (0.6 mile) northeast of Autreville. ir ' 19
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
As the division went into action with a shortage of 10 medical officers,
presently increased by casualties to 23, dental surgeons reinforced the battalion
medical service, performing the duties of medical officers. 20
The scarcity of stretcher bearers was keenly felt, for no provision had
heen made to replace bandsmen, who had ceased to be used, and the regimental
evacuation service was handicapped by lack of sufficient personnel to conduct
the heavy and exhausting work incident to litter bearing. Whenever possible,
prisoners were used for the purpose. 20
Before each attack packages containing sterile needles and silkworm
gut were distributed to regimental and battalion surgeons, and through this
provision many aspirating chest wounds were closed by suturing. Some of
this work was done in positions as far forward as battalion and regimental
aid stations; other cases were treated at the ambulance dressing stations, and
none was allowed to go beyond the triage without suturing. It was noticed
that patients when treated in this way suffered less, were transported more
easily, and reached the hospital in much better condition than in previous
engagements, when only gauze and adhesive plaster were used to control
aspiration. 21
772 FIELD OPERATIONS
On November 1 Ambulance Company No. .550, with seven horse-drawn
ambulances and a horse-drawn ambulance company from the 2d Division, at-
tached for temporary duty, left La Grange-aux-Bois Ferme at 5.30 a. in.
Ambulance Company No. 354 left this farm at G.30 a. m., all companies en
route for a point near the eastern edge of the woods on the road south of
Bantheville, where at 7.30 a. m. a dressing station was established. The
animal-drawn companies operated north to the Remonville — Bantheville road,
returning over a dirt road through the woods to the dressing station, where
patients received treatment and were evacuated thence to La Grange-aux-Bois
Ferme by motor ambulances. Ambulances of Ambulance Company No. 353
were called into service about 9 a. m. The dressing station was under shell
fire several times during the day, occasioning some casualties among the
personnel. 22
On November 2 the director of ambulance companies, with ambulances
from Ambulance Company No. 354 and Ambulance Company No. 356. moved
to Remonville. where Ambulance Company No. 353 later established a dressing
station. Because of heavy shell fire the vehicles of Ambulance Company No.
354 were parked behind a hill south of that town, while the horse-drawn ambu-
lances worked forward evacuating the wounded from Barricourt Wood. At
3 p. m. of the same day, after reconnaissance by the director of ambulance
companies, a dressing station was established on the Remonville — Barricourt
road, at the south edge of Barricourt Wood; but this location was found to
be too dangerous and was abandoned. Because of road conditions it was par-
ticularly difficult to evacuate the 353d Infantry. 23
At 9 a. m., on November 3, three motor ambulances were sent to Tailly.
where a few patients were found. After reconnaissance. Ambulance Company
Xo. 354 established a dressing station at that point and Ambulance Company
Xo. 353 another at Barricourt, the latter advancing to Nouart on the morning
of November 4. Evacuation was very slow on account of road conditions, a
round trip to the field hospitals at La Grange-aux-Bois Ferme requiring
10 hours. 21
Two days later the ambulance section was given 42 mules, using from
that time 4 mules per ambulance: but roads were so bad that even this numlxT
could not pull a loaded ambulance, and several times doubletrees were
broken. 24
On November 6 Ambulance Company No. 355 moved its station to Beau-
fort, establishing its headquarters at Barricourt. and Ambulance Company
No. 353 moved its station to Beauclair. employing its ambulances to evacuate
from the field hospitals now established near Nouart. The towns of Beauclair
and Beaufort were under heavy shell fire at various times. 24
On November 10 Ambulance Company No. 355 moved its dressing station
from Beaufort to Gaudron Ferme. and the next day Amoulance Company No.
354 established a station at Laneuville. These were the final movements of
these two formations. 2 "
MEUSE-ABGOXXE OPERATION 773
There were evacuated through the dressing stations the. following litter
and sitting patients — wounded, gassed, and sick — of the 89th and other
divisions. The activity of these stations from day to day is indicated by the
following statement of the number of patients they received : 25
Nov. 1-
2
.".
I
5_
,19*3
Nov. 8
652
9
18S
in
231
11
315
27C,
185
04
105
37
57
Total 3.332
Patients received at ambulance dressing stations were examined, their
wounds were re-dressed when necessary, splints were reapplied, morphine and
antitoxin serum were administered, hot. drinks and food were furnished, and
shock cases were treated. In a number of instances patients had to he held in
these stations for a rather long time: for instance, during the night of
Xovember 6. 230 patients were held at Tailly and Xouart because traffic con-
ditions made it impossible for ambulances to get through to the rear. A good
shock ward, therefore, was improvised in each station in a vacant building,
and in these patients were made comfortable. 26
The horse-drawn ambulances proved invaluable in this sector, for in Bois
de Bantheville. Bois de Barricourt. and Foret Dieulet they operated success-
fully on roads impassable for motors. Four animals were absolutely necessary
for eacli vehicle. 27
A station for slightly wounded which had opened at La Grange-aux-Bois
Ferine on October 23 moved to Remonville on Xovember 1 and to Beauclair
on Xovember 5. All walking wounded were directed to this station, which
relieved the ambulance section of much work and was a great factor in pre-
venting wastage. Wounds were dressed, antitoxin serum administered to such
as had not received it, and men able to carry on were returned to the front.
A large number of men who were slightly ill and others suffering from over-
fatigue were sent to this station. After being given a few hours' rest, hot
drinks, food, and cigarettes, the majority of them were ready to return to
their organizations, generally of their own free will. A small minority had
to be put in charge of the military police, stationed there for that purpose. 21
On October 30 Field Hospital Xo. 356 moved to La Grange-aux-Bois
Ferme to function as a triage, and Field Hospital Xo. 354 came up during
the night of October 31 to care for shock and nontransportable cases. Field
Hospital Xo. 353 was moved up in reserve and set up on the following day.
Field Hospital Xo. 355 remained in its old location, 2 km. (1.2 miles) south
of Eclisfontaine, on the road to Charpentry, where it continued to care for
•ras cases and the divisional sick. On Xovember 5 the field hospitals began
moving, one each day. to a new location northeast of Xouart. 28
The first casualties incurred in this phase of the operation reached hos-
pital on the morning of Xovember 1. Fracture cases were examined by the
774 FIELD OPERATIONS
division orthopedist, and splints readjusted when needed. Shock cases, sent to
designated wards for appropriate treatment, were held in hospital as long as
was necessary, the length of patients' stay varying from 20 minutes to 5 days.
Severely wounded patients — who, unless in shock, were evacuated as rapidly
as possible — were given preference in evacuation over all others. 29
Though pain and hemorrhage were usually the most evident essential
factors in shock, many cases were admitted in profound shock for which the
injury alone could not have been responsible. These had been exposed to cold
and wet for varied lengths of time. Medical officers were impressed by the
benefit which followed the use of morphine in large- doses, and battalion
surgeons were encouraged to use it liberally. In many a case of severe injury
very little shock was present if the patient was not in pain. It was appreci-
ated that heat was the most important factor in the treatment of these cases,
for which reason shock beds and hot-water bottles were provided. Hot drinks
were given whenever it was possible for the patients to take them, and gum-
salt solution was used intravenously when indicated. 20
All gassed patients were cared for at Field Hospital No. 355, which treated
415 cases between October 28 and November 11. Of these, 15 per cent were
returned to duty within a few days. Patients were stripped immediately
after admission, thoroughly bathed in soap and water and then with a solu-
tion of bicarbonate of soda. Surface burns were dressed witli a saturated
solution of the same drug, and the patient's eyes were washed in a 2 per cent
solution of bicarbonate of soda and covered with a dressing kept wet with the
same solution. Gassed patients were then dressed in pajamas and kept in a
ward tent under observation, except that severe cases were evacuated to the
rear as soon as possible. 26
During the period from November 1 to 11, 3,285 cases passed through the
triage, of whom 1.133 were from other divisions, 15 were French, and 101 were
prisoners of war.
Those admitted from the 89th Division were classified as follows:
Wounded. 43 officers, 1,311 men; sick, 25 officers, 565 men; totals, 68 officers,
1.876 men. 31
Evacuation to the rear — a long and tedious journey — was effected partly
by division ambulances and partly by trucks, with the help of 29 trucks from
the corps supply train, ambulances from United States Army Ambulance
Service Section No. 590, and by two ambulances from Ambulance Company
No. 355, wdiich made short hauls. The length of time required for making
these trips varied ; at best it was too long, and was dependent upon the dis-
tance to the rear, upon road conditions and police regulations concerning one-
way roads, and upon whether the journey was made during daylight or dark-
ness. Mobile Hospital No. 4, near Cheppy, which received nontransportahle
wounded, 7 km. (4.3 miles) from the triage, was the nearest army unit to
which the divisional hospitals evacuated. 29
The 89th Division had been in forward areas since August 6. but had
shown a very small pneumonia rate despite the fact that the troops had lived
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 775
under conditions which are considered ordinarily to predispose to that
disease — exposure to wet, cold, fatigue, and an almost universal epidemic of
influenza. There were but 20 suspected and 2 positive cases of pneumonia.
Freedom from this disease was attributed by the division surgeon to the fact
that up to November 20 the men lived out of billets in small groups in the open
air. 3 -
The following casualties occurred in the Medical Department personnel
with the division :
Wounded — Officers, 5, men, 24 ; gassed — officers. 2, men, 8 ; killed — officers.
1, men, 9. 32
THE 1ST DIVISION
During the period November 1-5 the 1st Division advanced forward
behind the Fifth Corps, in the reserve of that corps. On November 5 the
inarch was directed to be continued to the line then held by the 80th Division
(First Corps). Elements of the 1st Division were to pass through the front-
line elements of the 80th Division. 33
On November 6 the division attacked at 5.30 a. m., the line of departure
being approximately the Beaumont — Yoncq road. The mission of the division
was to advance in the direction of Yoncq — Mouzon and to seize a crossing of
the Meuse at Mouzon. During the operations but slight resistance was en-
countered. The enemy had apparently withdrawn across the Meuse, leaving
only isolated machine guns to delay the advance. 34 Yoncq was occupied at
7.30 a. m.. and the heights overlooking the Meuse were reached at 11.45 a. m.
Patrols were sent out. These exploited Villemontry, Givodeau Ferme, Mouzon,
Autrecourt, and the general line of the Meuze River. At noon, two companies
of the 18th Infantry were pushed forward to seize and hold the crossing of
the Meuse at Mouzon. Rush orders now were received for the division to
assemble and march with all haste to the heights south and southwest of
Sedan. 88 The movement was to be made in five columns, from east to west. 35
At daylight on November 7 the 16th Infantry was in position and began
the attack. The operation was carried out in three phases, the final objective
being Hill 202. At 4.30 p. m. the regiment had reached its final objective —
that is. a line running from east to west just north of Hill 202. Here it
consolidated its position and prepared for defense in depth. At 7.40 a. m.
the 28th Infantry reached the town of Chehery. The advance from here was
made against severe machine-gun and artillery fire coming from the heights
north of Cheveuges. The 26th Infantry marched by way of Malme — Omicourt.
After leaving, column 4 encountering resistance from the woods north of
Omicourt, these woods were attacked and captured. St. Aignan was captured,
and strong patrols were pushed out to the north of this village. At 2 p. m..
in accordance with instructions from the Fifth Corps, the division was with-
drawn to a position south of the line La Besace — Autrecourt. By 5.30 p. m.
all units of the division had severed contact with the enemy and were on the
inarch back to the designated area. 33
776
FIKU> OPERATIONS
JIEDICAI, DEPABTMENT ACTIVITIES
By November 5 the division surgeon, with the commanding officer of
the sanitary train and the director of ambulance companies, had reached
Nouart, around which town the division was encamped. The field hospitals,
somewhat to the rear, were packed on trucks ready to move forward at a
moment's notice. The advance began on the Gth was accomplished with but
relatively few casualties, the number killed or dyinu of wounds being 98,
including 3 officers. The number of wounded was 738. including 22 officers. 86
Fig. 85. — Field Hospital No. 13. 1st Division, at Vaux, Ardennes, November 0, 1918
Movement of troops was so rapid that it was impossible for the ration
trucks to supply them, officers and men appeared to ignore hunger as well as
discomfort and fatigue, and the number who failed to keep up with the ad-
vance was very small indeed. Though it was effective, service of battalion aid
stations was especially difficult; for while these formations cared for patients,
at the same time they had to keep up with their commands. From the Medical
Department standpoint then the advance partook more of the nature of a
rapid and difficult march than of an attack. It was practically impossible
from time to time to establish and operate satisfactorily either dressing
stations or field hospitals. As a matter of fact, conditions were such that they
MEUSE-ARGOXNE OPERATION' 777
were not required largely, for hospitals of the 89th and 42d Divisions received
some of the casualties of the 1st Division, and sufficient transportation was
available to remove others to the mobile hospitals at Bantlievillo and Fxer-
mont or to the evacuation hospital at St. Juvin." 7
On the morning of November 6 dressing stations were established near
the crossroads at La Bagnolle by Ambulance Company No. 1:2. and at La
Thibaudine Ferine by Ambulance Company No. 3. which a few hours later
moved to Yoncq. United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. G49
was also stationed at La Thibaudine Ferine, while Ambulance Company No.
13 evacuated Field Hospital No. 13, at Vaux, and Ambulance Companies No.
•2 and No. 3, and Field Hospital No. 3 remained at Nouart. On this date
Field Hospital No. 13 was joined by Field Hospital No. 12; but as the latter
unit received no patients it moved the same day to Sommauthe in reserve."' 8
At this time evacuation was from the advancing front to the dressing stations
at La Bagnolle and at La Thibaudine Ferine (replaced later by the station at
Yoncq) and then to Field Hospital No. 13 at Vaux, where nontransportable
eases were received and whence others were transferred to the hospitals of
the 89th Division." 9 This evacuation circuit was extremely difficult, for roads
were not only very muddy and congested but they had been destroyed to a
certain extent by mines and became progressively worse under heavy traffic.
In order to remedy matters it was decided, after reconnaissance, to establish
a field hospital near La Bagnolle. Then, on the evening of the Cth. the
division's sector and mission were suddenly changed and the division was
ordered to advance toward Sedan. 39 As the sanitary train received instruc-
tions concerning this movement about 9 p. m. there was no opportunity for it
to make reconnaissance of roads or area, but tentative plans were made (based
on information of the enemy position) to locate dressing stations at Chaumont
and Cheveuges by Ambulance Companies No. 12 and No. 13, respectively, to be
served also by United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 049. and
to advance Field Hospital No. 12 to Chemerv.' 10 The last-named unit, how-
ever, while en route was directed to camp at Le Grose Faux and to await
further orders. Ambulance Company No. 13 found that the enemy still
occupied Cheveuges and therefore located in the vicinity of Chemerv. The
medical supply unit, attempting to reach the same point, was held up by a
block in road traffic until withdrawal of the division was ordered. 40 A
skeletonized hospital. Field Hospital No. 2. sent from Nouart on the only truck
available, likewise was unable to reach its destination. There existed, there-
fore, in this area only a fragmentary evacuation system at the time that with-
drawal was ordered, though a few ambulances had been able to work their
way forward. Patients in the most advanced position were received by a
small field hospital established by an organization of the 42d Division at
Chemerv. 41 All roads through the forest south of the Beaumont-Stonne
road were almost impassable. United States Army Ambulance Service Sec-
tion No. G49 worked its way south after the division began to withdraw, but
Field Hospital No. 12, with the medical supply unit, was stalled for several
days near La Forge Ferme. even tractors failing to pull it through. Field
1867ft— 25 50
778 FIELD OPERATIONS
Hospital Xo. 13, at Vaux. continued to function until November 12, receiving
637 patients. 42
REFERENCES
(6
(7
is
(9
(10
(11
(12
(13
(14
(15
(16
(17
(18
(19
(20
(21
(22
(23
(24
(25
(26
(27
(28
(29
(30
(31
(32
(33
(34
(35
(36
(3T
(38
(39
(40
(41
(42
Daily operation reports, Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation.
Chronological statement, Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation.
Position map, Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation.
F. O. No. 112, Fifth Corps, November 2, 1918.
Report of Medical Department activities, Fifth Corps, by Col. W. R. Eastman.
M. C, corps surgeon, Fiftli Corps, December 10, 1918, 12. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
Ibid., 6.
Ibid., 7.
Ibid., 32.
Ibid., 33.
Ibid., 34.
Ibid., 35.
Ibid., 41.
Operations report of the 2d Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, December 31, 1918.
Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 2d Division, undated, Part I. 46. On file,
Historical Divison, S. G. O.
Ibid., Part I, 47.
Ibid., Part I, 48.
Keport on operations, 89th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, November II, 1918.
F. O. No. 45, 89th Division, October 28. 1918.
Map showing daily position of front line, Meuse-Argonne operation, G-3, G. H. Q..
May 24, 1919.
Report of Medical Department activities, 89th Division, A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, 89th Division, undated, 41. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
Ibid.. 37.
Ibid., 31.
Ibid., 32.
Ibid., 34.
Ibid., 35.
Ibid., 36.
Ibid., 40.
Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 27.
Ibid., 29.
Ibid., 28.
Ibid., 42.
Report on recent operations of the 1st Division, November 25, 1918.
Report of operations in Mouzon Area, 1st Division, November 26, 1918. F. O. No.
61, 1st Division, November 5, 1918.
F. O. No. 62, 1st Division, November 6, 1918.
Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 1st Division, undated. Part II, 52. On file, His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
Ibid., Part II, 53.
Ibid., Part I, 63.
Ibid., Part I, 64.
Ibid.. Part T. 65.
Ibid., Part I, 66.
Ibid., Part I, 67.
CHAPTER XXXII
THIRD PHASE —Continued
THIRD CORPS
On November 1, at 5.30 a. ni., the general attack for which our troops
had been preparing during the previous few days was launched. The line
of departure was approximately from east to west, a point on the Meuse
about 1 km. (0.G mile) southeast of Brieulles-sur-Meuse, thence along the
Meuse to a point opposite Liny-devant-Dun, thence northwestwardly, south
of Clery-le-Grand to a point approximately 500 meters (545 yards) north of
Aincreville, thence following the ridge just south of Ruissean de Cheline,
including Bourrut, j^assing just south of La Grande Carre Ferme. 1 ' 2
The 90th Division, on the left, was the attacking division; the 5th Divi-
sion, on the right, was to hold its front, meanwhile pushing out strong patrols
to develop the enemy's main line of resistance and seize any ground made pos-
sible by the advance of the 90th Division. The attack progressed in accordance
with the scheduled arrangements. At 7.05 a. m. Clery-le-Grand was captured
and troops of the 90th Division entered Bois d'Andevanne. The right regi-
ment of the 90th Division reached its objective, but the left regiment
encountered heavy machine-gun and artillery fire in Andevanne and was
forced to halt. By the end of the day the corps line was roughly the line of
the corps objective; that is, the ridge north and east of Andevanne. thence
generally southeast to the position of the right flank of the morning. 1
On November 2 the attack again started at 5.30 a. m. Clery-le-Petit was
taken at the outset and patrols of the 5th Division, sent out to capture Bois de
Babiemont, succeeded. The 90th Division encountered strong resistance at
Yillers-devant-Dun and in the Bois de Raux. The day's operations centered
around these two points, and it was not until late in the afternoon that they
were reported taken. The line for the night was approximately as follows:
North edge of Bois de Raux. Hill 321, head of Ravin du Fond de Theisse,
thence to the exploitation line to Les Dix Jours, thence to Les Grandes Raies,'
including Cote 216, Cote 201, thence to the Meuse, including Clery-le-Petit. 1
On November 3 the attack continued. The enemy started a rapid retreat
and offered resistance only in the form of rear-guard action. By night our
troops were occupying the general line of the heights from Halles to Sassey,
Ferine de Jupille, Ferme de la Briere, Doulcon, and Clery-le-Petit. 1
On November 4 the advance continued with but slight and scattered
resistance from the enemy. Our patrols continued active along the west bank
of the river, reporting all bridges destroyed along the front and the bridge-
head strongly held by detachments who were very alert. For the day. the line
779
780 FIELD OPERATIONS
held was approximately as follows: The west bank of the Meuse south of
Sassey, the heights Halles — Sassey, with detacliments in Wiseppe and strong
patrols, in conjunction with patrols of the 89th Division," pushing forward in
t lie direction of Stenay. 1
During the night November 4— 5 the 5th Division perfected a crossing
of the Meuse and a canal in the vicinity of Brieulles. and by daylight had
one brigade east of the Meuse. After a foothold had been gained and the
rear guard of the enemy beaten down, advance was ordered. By night of
November 5, the corps line included Laneuville. thence south along the west
bank of the Meuse. East of the river the corps held Milly-devant-Dun.
Dun-sur-Meuse, Cote 292, Limy, Cote 260, and the entire Bois de Chapillon. 1 - s
On November 6 the successes of the 5th Division east of the Meuse were
continued. Encountering nothing but the usual rear-guard action of machine
guns, our troops made rapid advance, and by the close of operations for the
day held the line: Lion-devant-Dun. Murvaux. Fontaines, Cote 284, Bois de
Sartelles and Vilosnes, with fighting still in progress on Cote St. Germain
and in the Bois de Fontaines. The 90th Division, on the left, continued its
preparations for a crossing of the Meuse at an early date. 1
On November 7 the completion of the capture of the heights east of the
Meuse, including Lion-devant-Dun, was continued, and preparations were
started to organize defensively those positions in depth. Attacks were mack
on the 5th Division subsector, resulting in the capture of Cote St. Germain.
Cote 350, Bois de Corrol, La Sentinelle, and Cote 378. On November 8 the
day was comparatively quiet and was spent by our troops in improving,
strengthening, and defensively organizing the positions already gained. In
the direction of Brandeville minor advances were made, but on the whole
the corps line remained the same as it was at the close of the preceding day's
operations. 1
On November 9 pursuit of the enemy, whose retirement still continued.
was made. The 32d Division was put in the line on the corps' right think.
The 5th Division was now 7 in the center, with the 90th Division on the left.
The corps sector was increased by the addition of the area of the French 15th
Colonial Division, north of Damvillers. where pursuit of the enemy was
made by a march of divisional columns preceded by powerful advance guards,
who in turn were preceded by strong patrols. The morning was spent in
forming the columns, in the starting of patrols and advance guards, and
in crossing the troops of the 90th and 32d Divisions to the east of the Meuse.
The pursuit continued rapidly throughout the day, and at night the corps
line included Mouzay, Louppy. Remoiville, and our patrols were engaged
in the hostile rear guard in the outskirts of Jametz; Breheville and Peuvillers
were taken over from the French by the 32d Division. 1
On November 10 the pursuit continued. At several points the enemy
resisted our advance with strong detachments. Baalon and the heights to
the north formed his chief center of resistance. Our troops were retarded
somewhat by poor roads, especially in the Foret de Woevre, as well as the
• For map of activities of this division for this period, *<•<■ Plate XI.VI.
MECSE-ARGONXE OPERATION 781
necessit}' to permit complete clearing of the enemy from the towns and
areas previously taken. For the night the corps line included part of Stenay
on the left and Jametz, Bois de Jametz, Bois de Lisson, and part of Bois du
Chenois. Practically the whole of the Foret de Woevre was in the hands
(if the corps. 1 ' 2
On November 11 preparations for a continuation of the pursuit early in
the morning were halted by word from the division headquarters. First Army,
that an armistice had been signed and would become eff'eetive at 11 a. m. 1
The line at the hour of the armistice included Stenay and Baalon and extended
along the eastern edge of Foret de Woevre; otherwise it was practically the
same as of the preceding day. 2
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
As the axis of the corps operation during this phase of the Meuse-Argonne
was toward the northeast, logical sites for the corps triage, it advancing
pari passu with the troops, would have been Bantheville, Aincreville and
eventually at Dun-sur-Meuse. On November 3 and 5, elements of the corps
triage were moved from Bethincourt to Septsarges, and just before tlm
armistice were advanced again to a point on the main road between Bantheville
and Aincreville. The road between Dun-sur-Meuse and Bantheville was in
excellent condition, while a standard-gauge railway ran through the former
town and a 60-cm. gauge railway through the latter, so that several alterna-
tive lines of evacuation were potentially available. Had the railway and roads
along the Meuse not been opened to traffic, the road from Dun-sur-Meuse via
bantheville would have provided a route for evacuation. 3
All divisions in the Third Corps were provided with operating teams,
but the few patients requiring operating in divisional units and the estab-
lishment of a corps hospital for surgical cases permitted these teams to meet
requirements there by serving in rotation. An adequate and uninterrupted
surgical service was thus provided. Similarly, for a short time, there had
been alternation by divisions in the corps gas-hospital service, but this did not
prove satisfactory and it was discontinued, the number of gas cases in each
division being sufficient to keep one of its hospitals fully occupied. Two
shock teams were organized in each division, one of which assisted an oper-
ating team by caring for preoperative and postoperative cases, while the other
was employed in restoring those who had become chilled en route to the
hospital, but which were not cases suitable for operation in the division. 4
THE OOTH DIVISION
On November 1, at 5.30 a. m.. the 90th Division, the left division of the
Third Corps, launched its attack from a line of departure approximately as
follows: North edge of Bois de Bantheville. Remonville — Bourrut road to
Bourrut and the Bourrut — Aincreville road to the western edge of Aincre-
ville. The mission of the 90th Division was to seize the heights, north and
east of Andevanne. and the ridge running southeast to the Croix St. Mouclen.
782 FIELD OPERATIONS
The ISOth Brigade, comprising the 360th Infantry on the left and the 359th
on the right, was the attacking brigade. The 179th Brigade was in reserve.
The first day's attack was divided into two phases. There was an inter-
mediate objective, Hill 300 — Hill 278 — La Grande Fontaine — southeast along
the Ruisseau Cheline, which all troops were scheduled to reach by 8 a. m. :
then there was the corps objective, the final objective for the day. which was
Les Tuileries (exclusive) — heights north and northeast of Andevanne — ridge
southeast from Andevanne to Croix St. Mouclen. 5 ' °
At 6.30 a. m. the leading battalion of the 360th Infantry was entering the
southern edge of the woods north of La Grande Carre Ferme. At 7.30 a. in.
the troops of the 359th Infantry were on the intermediate objective. At 10.35
la. m. the 1st Battalion, 359th Infantry, had reached the corps objective.
At 10.30 a. in. the right of the assault battalion of the 300th Infantry was on
Hill 278. Here, they were held up because of artillery and machine-gun fire
from Andevanne and Cote 243. At 4.30 p. m. the 2d Battalion of the 360th
Infantry was on the corps objective, and at 8.45 p. m. the 1st Battalion, 300th
Infantry, was occupying Cote 243/'
On November 2 the attack again started at 5.30 a. in. The 359th Infantry
advanced, without serious resistance, to just south of Villers-devant-Dun, at
which place it encountered severe resistance. Likewise, was the 360th Infantry
held up just south of Hill 321 and at Bois de Raux. At 12.15 p. m. the 359th
Infantry reported its 3d Battalion as occupying Cote 261 in the sector of the
5th Division, and its 2d Battalion was advancing through Villers-devant-Dun.
At 2 p. m. the 360th Infantry reported its 2d Battalion entering Bois de Raux,
its 1st Battalion occupying Hill 321 and advancing north. At the same hour,
the 369th Infantry reported Villers-devant-Dun as having been thoroughly
cleared of the enemy. At 7.30 p. m. the front line of the 360th Infantry ex-
tended along the northern edge of Bois de Raux, Hill 321, and Villers-devant-
Dun. The front line of the 359th Infantry extended from Les Dix Jours,
alonir the original exploitation line to the right boundary of the division, about
2 km. (1.2 miles) northwest of Cote 216."' °- 1
On November 3, at 8 a. in., the 179th Brigade passed through the lines of
the ISOth Brigade to carry on the exploitation. The 180th Brigade went into
division reserve. Following the seizure of the bluffs Ilalles — Sassey, at noon,
by the 179th Brigade the 180th Brigade was ordered to move forward to a
position on the heights. 5
On November 4 a reconnaissance forward was made, the mission of the
division for this day r being to seize Cote 205. and to secure possession of all
territory north of that point in the division sector west of the Meuse to Laneu-
ville. At the end of the day the line extended from the woods southwest of
Laneuville to the Bois de Doulcon, with patrols in Laneuville; and included
Wiseppe, Villefranche, Saulmory, and Sassey. 5 ' 2 ' 7
During the period November 5-8 the division line remained practically
unchanged. 5
On November 9 the 179th Brigade crossed the Meuse at Sassey, its mission
being to take the wooded heights west and south of Baalon. to take Stenay and
PLATE XLVII.
MEUSE - ARGONNE
OPERATION
TKBD PHASE
NINETIETH DIVISION
NOVEMBER i - i i , 1918
Scale in Kilometer ft
+ D». Drewfrig Station
+ AjC Ambulance Conipaiw
± r.H. Fi*U Howpital
ffl Gil Gait Jlowntal
BM.dI> Medical Supply Depot
TSsfer-enc a s
Ur&wn from afftcL&t matpa
Branrf.evt.ilG , Suz<s,ncy , JDun- sur-
Meuae , Tbret 2}'Ar#onne , Montmedy
Steruay , Verdun. -A , VtrcLun -J3 .
~Posi.tt.on3 of Mectccat Llntts from
reports of the JDtviaton&i Surgeon,
Battle lines, taken from Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 783
the heights northeast of that town. The 180th Brigade continued in reserve,
the 359th Infantry awaiting orders at Montigny, and the 3C0th assembled at
Sassey. 5
On November 10 the 359th Infantry crossed the Meuse at Sassey. the
360th at Dun-sur-Meuse. Both regiments moved in the direction of Mouzay.
At 9.50 a. m. one company of the 358th Infantry. l"9ht Brigade, entered
Stenay. Through the remainder of the day efforts were made to complete
the capture of Stenay. but these were unsuccessful. At 9.30 p. m. the 108th
Brigade was assembled in the area between Baalon and Chatel Charmois. in
readiness to attack in the direction of Montmedy. 5
On the morning of November 11 patrols from the 179th Brigade entered
Stenay and Baalon to complete the capture of these places prior to 11 a. m..
when the armistice was to become effective. Both the 357th and 358th Infantry
reported prior to 11 a. m. that Stenay and Baalon had been completely cleared
of the enemy/'
M EDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On the morning of October 30 all battalion officers of the 300th Infantry,
with a medical officer for each battalion, were sent forward to reconnoiter
for sites and to locate and prepare aid stations in positions which the units
were to occupy in the region of Bois de Bantheville that night. Each bat-
talion had 2 medical officers. 1 dental officer and his assistant, and 14 enlisted
men of the Medical Department. Battalion surgeons were charged with
keeping the medical carts with the troops at all times. The medical detach-
ment and sufficient company litter bearers were to march in the rear of each
cart.
The aid stations in question were located in the woods northwest of
Bantheville. All litter cases were to be carried to the dressing station at
Romagne. but this was found too remote, so ambulances went up the Banthe-
ville road and sent ambulance company bearers to the aid stations. 8
On October 31 aid stations of the 359th Infantry were located near Cunel.
As troops advanced it was the practice for the battalion aid station to send
forward one officer and three men to establish an advance aid station, which
the remainder of the personnel joined as soon as they had collected and cleared
their patients. Frequently, stations of two battalions were established at
the same point, because of narrow frontage, road distribution, and shelter.
The advance of troops on November 1 and 2 was so rapid it was found im-
possible to give the wounded the elementary first aid usually supplied at advance
aid stations, as a sufficient supply of dressings and splints could not always
be maintained at battalion aid stations. 10 The only battalion able to keep its
medical cart with its detachment at all times was the 2d, and this was accom-
plished by its personnel literally putting their shoulders to the wheels. So
far as possible the battalion aid stations maintained an even exchange of
litters, blankets, and dressings with the more advanced ambulance dressing
stations."
Units of the sanitary train were at first disposed as at the end of the second
phase. The triage. Field Hospital 357. was at Bethincourt. Field Hospital No.
784 FIELD OPERATIONS
358 operating a gas hospital at the same place, an advance collecting hospital
(Field Hospital Xo. 360) was at Septsarges, and the hospital for sick (Field
Hospital Xo. 359) at Sivry-la-Perche. Dressing stations were located at
Septsarges (Ambulance Company Xo. 358), Romagne (Ambulance Company
Xo. 357), and Xantillois (Ambulance Company Xo. 359). Ambulance Com-
pany Xo. 300 (animal drawn) was in the triage at Bethincourt and at Sivry-
la-Perche.
On Xovember 1, because of the long distance from the front to field hos-
pitals, the large number of casualties, and the congestion of traffic, only cases
requiring immediate attention were sent to the triage from the dressing stations.
Ambulance Company Xo. 359, at Xantillois, during the first 24 hours of this
drive, cared for more than 800 cases. All mustard gas patients were stripped
and bathed: other gassed patients were required to recline on litters. Xantil-
lois at that time served as the ambulance head, and necessary supplies were
kept there to meet not only the needs of dressing stations but those of the
more advanced formations as well. 10
On Xovember 2 an aid station of the 359th Infantry was advanced to
Aiiiereville and one of the 360th Infantry to within 1.6 km. (1.5 miles) of
Andevanne. Ambulances could not reach the latter point because of large
shell holes in the road, but light trucks received by the regimental surgeon
from regimental headquarters managed to work their way around these
obstacles and moved patients back to Aincreville throughout the night. In
the 24 hours preceding 8 a. m. of Xovember 2 three motor ambulance com-
panies transported 289 litter and 454 sitting cases. Ambulance Company Xo.
357 established an advance station at Romagne, while the remainder of the
company remained at Xantillois. 10 On Xovember 3 aid stations were advanced
to Villers-devant-Dun, Montigny. Andevanne, and a point 2 km. (1.2 miles)
from that town, on the Villers — Montigny road. Troops coming forward on
this road were subjected to heavy shell fire, and casualties were heavy. Motor
ambulances could not at first go nearer than within 1 km. (0.6 mile) of aid
stations, but eventually they were reached by animal-drawn ambulances.
Ambulant patients were assisted to collecting points and others were carried
to the ambulance head.
Ambulance Company Xo. 358 was located at this time at Septsarges.
The triage at Bethincourt was now closed, and Field Hospital Xo. 357, rein-
forced by 1 officer and 15 enlisted men from Field Hospital Xo. 358. was
moved to a site previously prepared near Septsarges. The nontransportable
department did not function at this station, its work being prepared by the
5th Division triage, reinforced by a shock team from the 90th Division. 11
The following order was issued on Xovember 3 covering movement of
the triage:
Memo. Office of the Division Surgeon, 90th Division.
3 November, 1918.
The triage of the 90th Division will move this date from Bethincourt to Septsarges.
('apt. Van D. Barnes and section of Ambulance Company #360. on duty at triage,
will proceed by truck with two ward tents and one-half the gas equipment of the gas
section of the OOth Division triage to Septsarges and report to Capt. Jesse W. Ingram for
duty.
MEUSE-AKGONNE OPERATION 785
Tlie officers on night duty at triage will also move by truck this afternoon. The above-
mentioned personnel will ;ill arrive at Septsarges in time to go on duly as triage force
Ell 11 p. in. this date.
The officers on clay duty at the triage will move the nignt of November 3 and I to
Septsarges and be prepared to go on duty at 6.30 a. m. November 4. This' latter move
will not take place until notice has been received from Captain Ingram that he has begun
the triage at Septsarges.
Captain Ingram will notify by telephone when he is prepared to function as com
uianding officer of triage, commanding officer sanitary train. Nantillois, office of the divi-
sion surgeon. Romagne (Taylor 15).
Office of division surgeon will notify all regimental and battalion surgeons, either by
telephone or courier, when triage is ready to function at Septsarges.
He will also notify the officers on duty at the dressing station at Bantheville and
Ounel and the division medical supply officer at Sivry-ln-Perche and Captain Zook. at
the same place.
The nontransportable section of the triage at Bethincourt will continue to function
until the 5th Division has established a triage at Septsarges. Upon receipt of this infor-
mation the nontransportable section will cease to function at Bethincourt, will be packed
and shipped to Septsarges.
The Emergency Medical Team No. 142 will report to the commanding officer of the
5th Division triage upon closure of the nontransportable section of the 90th Division
triage at Bethincourt.
All trucks of the sanitary train employed in moving the night force of the triage this
afternoon from Bethincourt to Septsarges will upon being unloaded return at once to the
triage at Bethincourt and will report at once to the commanding officer for orders.
One-half of the medical supplies at the medical dump at Bethincourt will he moved
this afternoon to Septsarges upon closure of the triage at Bethincourt.
Field Hospital Co. No. 35S. now in reserve at Bethincourt, will be moved to Septsarges
upon the closure of the nontransportable section of the triage at Bethincourt.
As the division wheeled to the right and approached the Mouse, from near
Lnneuvillo-sur-Meuse to Sassey. Medical Department formations moved ac-
cordingly. 1 ' Ambulance Company No. 357 established a dressing station in
the church at Villers-devant-Dun. Ambulance Company No. 358 was located at
Nantillois, and Ambulance Company No. 359 moved from Nantillois to Cunel.
sending the dressing and litter-bearer section to Villers-devant-Dun on Novem-
ber 5. where they took over the dressing station previously established there by
Ambulance Company No. 357, retaining this site until November 12. A part
of Ambulance Company No. 358 had advanced, on the 3d, to Cunel; on the 5th
the entire company was there, pitching a ward tent inside the walls of a
ruined church. This location was used for four days as an ambulance head.
Ambulance Company No. 357, retaining this site until November 12. A part
which it operated until November 10. Part of Ambulance Company No. 300
was at Sivry-la-Perche. but 3 of its officers and 90 enlisted men were on duty
with Field Hospital No. 357 — the triage — at Septsarges. 13 On November 5
Field Hospital No. 358 moved to Cunel and Field Hospital No. 360 advanced
to Nantillois. while Field Hospital No. 359 remained at Sivrvda-Pcrche.' 4
On November 6 Field Hospital No. 358 moved to Bantheville, where it
operated the triage until Field Hospital No. 357 arrived on November 8. and
resumed this duty. Here the nontransportable department began operating
786
FIELD OPERATIONS
again, assisted by a shook team. Ambulance Company No. 359 moved to
Yillors-devant-Dun. 15
On November 9 the 90th Division crossed the Meuse. on the right, and
made a long advance to a point beyond Mouzay, where aid stations were
established. No change was made in the locations of units of the sanitary
train. The next day, when the division again made a deep advance, passing
Meuse near Stenay on the left, while its right approached Baalon, Ambulance
Company No. 357 established a dressing station in Mouzay, Ambulance
Company No. 358 an advance station at Sassey, and the triage (Field Hos-
pital No. 357) moved to Dun-sur-Meuse, while Field Hospital No. 360 moved
to a site 0.25 km. (0.15 mile) west of the latter place, establishing there a
rest hospital. 16 The corps surgeon directed that Bras, northeast of Verdun
and east of Charny. be investigated and a site for a field hospital for the
sick be selected there. 17
On November 11 Ambulance Company No. 357 was located at Mouzay.
Ambulance Company No. 358 moved in its entirety to Sassey-sur-Meuse. and
Ambulance Company No. 359 was located at Villers-devant-Dun until the
triage was established at Dun-sur-Meuse. when the station at Villers was
closed, it being out of the direct line of evacuation. Ambulance Company
No. 360 established itself at Dun-sur-Meuse. Field Hospital No. 357 operated
the triage at the last-named place until November 14. From October 23 to
November 11 it received 3,794 patients from the 90th Division and 1,828
from other organizations, a total of 5,622. 1S
Field Hospital No. 358 (gas hospital) at Bantheville. evacuated its patients.
42 in number, and was closed. In the interval November 6-11 it had re-
ceived 130 patients at this point.
Field Hospital No. 359 was still functioning at Sivry-la-Perehe and Field
Hospital No. 360 had remained at Dun-sur-Meuse. in
Ninety-nine per cent of all wounded arriving at the triage during this
operation were found to have been properly splinted and satisfactorily
dressed. There were few cases of shock other than some patients who were
suffering from abdominal or chest wounds, incurred some hours previously,
and cases of fractured femur. Fven when well splinted these patients were
invariably in profound shock. The average time taken in transporting
wounded from the battle field to field hospitals was about 6 hours. Morale
of the wounded was always high. 20
The proportion of killed to gassed and wounded was 1 to 5.
Casualties of the 315th Sanitary Train were as follows: Killed and died
of wounds, 10: wounded and gassed. 40.
The triage reported the following admissions from the 90th Division:
Date
Wounded
Gassed
Sick and
injured
Nov. 1
81
409
304
no
44
S3
If.
162
120
15
20
53
117
86
61
91
2
3
4
5
6
I >:.!>■
Nov. 7
8
9
10
11
Wounded j Gassed S $ u %$
32
13
76
1H
7
78
16
H
54
36
119
21
68
a
MEUSE-AKGONNE OPERATION 787
The medical supply unit had established a dump in a dilapidated farm-
house at Sivry-la-Perche on October 25, remaining there during the operation.
An advance dump was established at the triage at Bethincourt and about
seven truckloads of supplies distributed from it. It advanced with the triage'
to Septsarges and thence to Bantheville, where it was stationed on the day
that the armistice was signed. 1 "
The surgeon of the 360th Infantry reported as follows concerning main-
tenance of contact with that regiment, and its medical supply: 21
Liaison was maintained between battalion aid stations and battalion P. C.'s by
runner; from battalion P. C. to regimental surgeon at It. P. 0., by phone; between regi-
mental surgeon and ambulance company by ambulance runner. Keeping battalion aid
stations near the battalion P. C. was very advantageous, as battalion surgeons were
always conversant with the battalion commander's plans, and access to the field telephone
expedited communications to the regimental surgeons. Regimental surgeon had with him
at the It. P. C. one clerk, an orderly, and two runners furnished by the ambulance com-
pany, who were used to order ambulances to the collecting points; also two men loaned
from the pioneer platoon from this regiment, who carried emergency supplies for the
treatment of casualties occurring about the R. P. C. It was impossible to tag. administer
A. T. S., or give more than first aid to many cases, on account of the darkness and adverse
weather conditions, the battalion aid stations operating in the open, no shelter available,
and lights tabooed. While dressings*, splints, supplies, and service by the ambulance
companies left much to be desired, only by almost superhuman effort on the part of the
commanding officer of the 357th Ambulance Company, his officers and men, was it possible
for them to function at all. The roads were literally torn to pieces by shell fire and
continually congested by trucks and artillery. We evacuated approximately !MX) cases
from October HI to November 11, and at least 00 per cent of them November 1 and 2.
THE 5TH DIVISION
When the general attack of the First American Army was made, on
Xovember 1. the mission of the 5th Division was to stand fast and be the pivot
on the west bank of the Meuse for the swing of the Third Army Corps and
the corps beyond to the north and northeast, and also to exploit the Bois de
Bahiemont and Hill 261 north of Clery-le-Grand, after the OOtli Division
had obtained its objective. In pursuance of the policy to make progress at
slight cost, one company of the 60th Infantry, attacking with artillery
assistance at the same hour as the general attack of the army, captured Clery-
le-Grand, four minutes after "H" hour (5.30 a. m.), and drove the enemy
north. At 9.30 a. m. a company of the 61st Infantry and a platoon of
machine guns started forward through Aincreville to exploit Bois de Babie-
mont. These troops, however, were able to advance only 500 yards because of
strong enemy machine-gun resistance. Date in the afternoon, patrols from
Clery-le-Grand reached Hill 261. despite heavy machine-gun and artillery fire
from the north. 22
The mission of the 5th Division on November 2 was, in case of withdrawal
by the enemy, to cross the Meuse and advance northeasterly. Therefore, to
gain a good foothold on the west bank of the jleusc, our troops approached
Clery-le-Petit under cover of darkness, two companies of the 60th Infantry
taking it at 6 a. m. and driving the enemy in the direction of Doulcon. Dur-
788 FIELD OPERATIONS
ing the day Bois de Babiemont was taken by troops of the Gist Infantry, and
Hill 261 by troops of the 60th Infantry, those troops advancing to Bois de
Babiemont encountering machine-gun fire on their left flank, since the 90th
Division was not maintaining its scheduled advance at this time. 22
On November 3 the 5th Division cleared the region west of Dun-sur-
Meuse and north of Hill 261 and also took Doulcon, in spite of machine-gun
fire from several directions and artillery fire from east of the Meuse. Mean-
while, orders had come from headquarters, Third Corps, that the 5th Division
was to turn due east and force across the Meuse and the canal beyond it and
seize the heights of the Meuse to the east and thus form a bridgehead for the
crossing of the rest of the army. The first attack was made by the 2d Bat-
talion of the 6th Infantry, east of Brieulles-sur-Meuse. Owing to the flooding
of the basin of the river north of Brieulles-sur-Meuse and its closing south-
ward to within 100 meters (109 yards) of the ground held by the enemy, the
front on which a crossing could be made was limited to a line 1.5 km. (0.9
mile) in extent. To the east of the river lay the canal, about 20 meters (21.8
yards) wide and approximately 10 feet deep. The entire basin of the river
and the canal were visible from the high ground to the east thereof, which
was manned by the enemy with infantry, direct-fire artillery, and machine
guns, all at close range. On the east bank of the Meuse the Bois de Chatillon
extended down the edge of the canal, concealing the enemy movements.- 2
On the night of November 3-4 efforts were made to place footbridges
across the Meuse. Between midnight and 1 a. m., November 4, one foot-
bridge was in place and a second nearly finished, when work had to be stopped
because the enenvy swept all approaches by machine-gun fire. Under the
protecting fire of all available men and machine guns, a small column of onr
troops attempted to rush the bridge at 2 a. m. on November 4, but were forced
back. Repeated efforts to cross resulted similarly, and at dawn no one was
over. It was impossible to move in the river basin during the day. and the
troops who had reached the canal bank lay there and entrenched themselves. 22
No less difficult than the crossing east of Brieulles was the crossing east
of Clery-le-Petit. Here the river was 110 feet wide and 10 feet deep. At 4
p. m., two battalions, one from the 61st Infantry and one from the 60th In-
fantry, echeloned in great depth, attempted a crossing, after artillery and
machine-gun preparation. Intense enemy artillery and machine-gun fire from
the slopes of Hills 292 and 260, east of the river, prevented the crossing. Our
forces suffered many casualties, and the light pontoons which our troops
constructed were destroyed as quickly as made. On the night of November
4-5, at 6.20 p. m.. troops of the 6th Infantry crossed east of Brieulles on the
two footbridges already prepared. Firing on both flanks, these troops rapidly
silenced the enemy machine gunners which had held the banks, and organized
a guard for the bridgehead. In the meantime, protected by these operations,
the 3d Battalion of the 6th Infantry, using telegraph poles lashed together,
as rafts, silently crossed the river and canal to the west of Bois de Chatillon.
During the night all of the 10th Infantry Brigade had crossed the river and
canal. 3
PLATE XLVIII
Battle lines, taken from Final Report. Gen. John J. Pershing. September 1. 1919. are approximate.
MEUSE-AKGONNE OPERATION 789
On the morning of November 5, the 1st Battalion, Gtli Infantry, secured
Hill 228, and the 3d Battalion completed the capture of Bois de Chatillon and
raptured Vilosnes-sur-Meuse, enabling the French on our right to cross the
river while the 2d Battalion guarded the bridges. The 11th Infantry captured
Liny-devant-Dun, thence, moving southward, captured Hill 2G0, with the
assistance of a battalion of the 00th Infantry. The 3d Battalion of the Cist
Infantry advanced over the south slopes of Hill 292, with the 11th Infantry
on its right. The 2d Battalion of the Gist Infantry, advancing north of Hill
292. captured Dun-sur-Meuse at 1.45 p. m. The three battalions (2d and 3d
of the 61st Infantry and the 3d of the 60th Infantry) reached the first objec-
tive, Milly being captured before nightfall by the 2d Battalion of the 61st
Infantry. 22
At 8 a. m. on November 6 the attack was resumed. The 1st Battalion
of the Gth Infantry captured Bois de Sartelle, completely breaking the resist-
ance in front, and consolidated its position. The 11th Infantry swept aside
all resistance and, advancing with wonderful speed and dash, captured Bois
de Chesnois, Bois du Fayel, Les Fonzy Bois, Murvaux (in cooperation with
the 60th Infantry), Fontaines. Hills 343 and 344, and gained a foothold in
Bois du Corrol, east of Murvaux. The enemy was driven by the 9th In-
fantry Brigade from Cote St. Germain and Cote 350, at the northeast end of
that hill. Lion-devant-Dun was taken by a company of the 61st Infantry.
However, because the enemy was heavily shelling the town, our troops, instead
of occupying it, entrenched near at hand. 22
On November 7 the attack was resumed. The 11th Infantry captured
Bois du Corrol and conquered one-half of Bois de Brandeville. The Gth
Infantry consolidated its position. The 128th Infantry attached to the Fifth
Corps, effective November 6. advanced its leading battalion to Hill 370, but
in progressing toward Brandeville was met by heavy machine-gun fire which
it was unable to overcome. The 9th Infantry Brigade completed the capture
of Lion-devant-Dun, Cote 350, and the valley southeast of it and the northwest
slope of Bois du Corrol. 22
On November 8 the 11th Infantry completed the capture of Bois de
Brandeville, and pushed jjatrols forward into Brandeville. which was entered
at 6.30 a. m. A battalion of the 128th Infantry entered the town later with
little or no opposition, the enemy having withdrawn to Cote 378, which was
promptly put under the fire of our artillery. The 1st Battalion of the 6th
Infantry, moving by way of Hill 388, captured Cote 378 with but little opposi-
tion. The 9th Infantry Brigade pushed outposts into the area to the north
of the divisional objective as far as 2 km. (1.2 miles) north of Sassey, to cover
the bridgehead of the 90th Division at Sassey. 22
On November 9 reconnaissance by the 10th Infantry Brigade demonstrated
the enemy had withdrawn. Pursuit was immediately ordered and the 11th
Infantry advanced with great vigor. The enemy rear guard, encountered
near Bois de Moncel, was attacked and scattered, and Louppy was captured
at 4.55 p. m.. Remoiville at 7 p. in., and Jametz at about 9 p. m. Companies
of the 61st Infantry, with machine guns, proceeded northward from Lion-
790 FIELD OPERATIONS
devant-Dun. despite strong enemy machine-gun resistance all along the route,
and captured Chateau Charmois and Mouzay. A bridgehead was then estab-
lished between Mouzay and Stenay for the 90th Division, and Mouzay was
turned over to the 90th Division upon its arrival on the east bank of the
Meuse. 22
During the night of November 9-10 troops of the 9th Brigade completed
the capture of the southwest half of Foret de Woevre, a jungle of trees and
heavy undergrowth, whose roads were knee-deep with mud. On the morning
of the 10th the 61st Infantry, on the left, was subjected to heavy, enfilading
fire from the high hills east of Baalon and north of Juvigny. in the area of
the 90th Division. Because the 90th Division was meeting such heavy resist-
ance in the Bois de Chesnois. the 9th Infantry Brigade was advancing with
its left flank exposed. 22
On November 11. when the armistice became effective, the division held
the northeast edge, of the Foret de Woevre. with one left flank facing north,
connecting with the 90th Division in the Bois de Chesnois, around the edge
of the Foret de Woevre, through the eastern edge of the Bois de Juvigny.
thence south to north of Louppy. Remoiville, and Jametz. 22
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Ambulance Companies No. 29 and No. 30 operated the dressing stations.
Ambulance Company No. 17 worked with Field Hospital No. 17. and Ambu-
lance Company No. 25 worked with the triage.
Ambulance collecting stations were established in rear of the advancing
troops at Septsarges, Nantillois, Ferme de la Madeleine. Cunel, Aincreville.
Doulcon, Dun-sur-Meuse, and at Milly-devant-Dun. Those at Nantillois and
Ferme de la Madeleine were in use throughout the first part of this phase
of the operation, but during the latter part, as the advance was more rapid,
collecting stations were changed from day to day as occasion demanded.
Ambulances from these stations were sent forward to regimental aid stations
or elsewhere as needed. 23
During active operations the ambulance campanies of the division oper-
ated well toward the front and rendered valuable assistance to the regimental
medical personnel in carriage, of patients by litter. The advance of troops east
of the Meuse was exceptionally rapid. There were also many casualties during
this time, and it was difficult to maintain liaison between the ambulance com-
panies and the regimental sanitary personnel. It is of interest, however, to
note that the second vehicle to cross the Meuse River was an ambulance
belonging to Ambulance Company No. 30, at that time attached for duty
with the 61st Infantry. The first two vehicles to enter Brandeville were
ambulances belonging to the sanitary train of the division. 23
On November 1 Field Hospital No. 25 operated the triage at Bethin-
court. Field Hospital No. 29 at the same point cared for gassed cases. Field
Hospital No. 17. operating as a collecting hospital near the front, was located
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION
791
at Septsarges, and Field Hospital Xo. 30, as a relay hospital on the long route
to the army evacuation area, was established at Sivry-la-Perche. 23
On November 5 the triage (Field Hospital Xo. 25) was moved to Sept-
sarges, on the 8th to Bantheville, and on November 10 to Dun-sur-Meuse.
Field Hospital No. 29. the gas hospital, left Bethincourt on November 5 and
operated at Bantheville November 8-10. Field Hospital No. 17 operated at
Septsarges until November 4. when it moved to Madeleine Ferme and oper-
ated there as a collecting hospital until November 10. Personnel and tentage
from this hospital also were used at dressing stations at Cunel, Aincreville,
Doulcon, Dun-sur-Meuse, and Milly-devant-Dun. Field Hospital Xo. 30
closed, on November 1, at Sivry-la-Perche. 24
Division medical supply dumps were located successively at Bethincourt,
Septsarges, and Dun-sur-Meuse. 23
Evacuation routes remained the same as at the beginning of the attack
until November 8, when a new route was opened, railway communication hav-
ing been established to Varennes. Evacuations were then made through the
triage hospital at Bantheville and later through the evacuation hospital estab-
lished at that place. Roads on the right bank of the Meuse were not com-
pletely cleared of the enemy until after cessation of hostilities, but thereafter
patients were evacuated from Dun-sur-Meuse direct to hospitals in the
vicinity of Verdun. 88
The triage reported the following admissions from the 5th Division dur-
ing this phase:
Date
Nov. 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Wounded
Neuro-
psychosis
49
19
80
302
3W
1
83
58
?9
3
1
23f>
104
1
9
«
Gassed
Sick
Injured
21
2
47
6
f,4
i
38
10
11
7
41
12
57
12
40
4
57
4
57
12
53
1
18
o
The following is abstracted from the Medical Department report of the
5th Division and from answers to a questionnaire addressed to the division
surgeon after the armistice :
Mere recital of the fact that certain hospitals operated at certain times
and at certain places and that they cared for a specified number of cases, gives
little account of the immense amount of work done and the difficulties en-
countered and overcome. Obstructions which appeared insurmountable were
everyday matters. Frequently, for example, it appeared impossible to clear a
field and to transport the sick and wounded to hospitals where they could be
given suitable treatment; but with each new emergency a solution was found or
was made. Throughout the entire period of operations in this offensive the
flow of wounded to evacuation and base hospitals was uninterrupted. 25
792 FIELD OPERATIONS
The efficiency of service rendered was the result of support given by army
and corps surgeons, cooperation given by associated divisions, cooperation of
other divisional staff departments, study of the military situation, with antici-
pation of probable emergencies, and hearty cooperation and untiring energy
shown by each individual officer and enlisted man belonging to the Medical
Department. An immense amount of hard labor was required, and men re-
mained on duty night and day T continuously throughout periods of greatest
activity. Wagoners, ambulance and truck drivers at times worked continuously
for 48 hours transporting the wounded under most trying circumstances. 25
At no time was there sufficient truck transportation to provide for rapid
movement of the sanitary train in case of emergency, and efficiency was some-
times hampered because of this. Under such circumstances, however, it was
possible to " carry on," though often extremely difficult. Often it was neces-
sary to nurse and coax along motors which under ordinary circumstances would
have been given up as hopelessly out of repair. Throughout the entire period
the sanitary train was operated with from one- fourth to one-half its author-
ized truck tonnage, and much of what was used was in bad condition. This
shortage of truck transportation was general. Other trains of the division
labored under the same handicap. 20
Of 9,435 patients transported to field hospitals of this division during this
operation, 200 were carried in animal-drawn ambulances. During the first
phase there was no opportunity whatever for the use of these vehicles, for
roads to the front were in full view of the enemy and were subject to shell
and machine-gun fire. Motor ambulances, which ran at high speed and thus
diminished the time of exposure to enemy fire, therefore were used exclusively
at this time, but after the division crossed the Meuse, animal-drawn vehicles
were used to more patients from several places in the woods at a distance
over routes impassable for motors. 27
During the comparatively short time in which mule-drawn ambulances
were used, 16 animals were killed. During the entire operations only two
motor ambulances were put out of operation by enemy fire, and one of these
was subsequently repaired. The high percentage of losses in animal-drawn
transportation was attributed to slow speed, long exposure to enemy fire, the
large target presented by an ambulance and its double team, and the vulner-
ability of animals. 27
Throughout the period of the engagement, hot meals were served from
ambulance dressing stations. From the kitchen of one such station 3,000 meals
were served in 48 hours. Many men exhausted in combat were able to return
to the front after having been given nourishment and a short rest. 28
Forty-nine cases of psychoneuroses were received in hospitals of the 5th
Division. That the number of these was so small was due chiefly to the fact
that a trained psychiatrist was on duty at the advance collecting hospital and
also to the fact that fear was differentiated from "shell shock." Individuals
simulating neuroses or psychoses were returned at once to duty.* 9
During this operation, October 12 to November 12, 2.330 cases of sickness
were passed through the triage. Almost all of these were cases of serious
MEUSK-ARGONNE OPERATION 793
illness resulting from exposure, exhaustion, malnutrition, and the us? of con-
taminated water. Everyone had bronchitis and nearly everyone has gastro-
enteritis with diarrhea; but only those who were absolutely unable to go
forward were sent to hospital. Many patients received at hospital were, com-
pletely exhausted, their resistance was lowered, and a number of patients ad-
mitted for influenza or bronchitis subsequently developed pneumonia.' 20
Wounds of the upper extremities were operated only when the injury was
so severe as to necessitate amputation or when hemorrhage demanded ligation
of vessel. 30
As the vast majority of patients with wounds of the lower extremities
presented a profound degree of shock, especially in all compound fractures
of the femur in severe injuries of the knee joint, it became necessary to hold
them for several hours, unoperated. Such patients were ordinarily given
normal saline solution intravenously, though several were given citrated
blood. Gas gangrene developed in four cases. The only patients operated at
the triage were those who could not possibly be transported within the time
limit required by orders (15 hours) or whose wounds were so severe that im-
mediate operation was imperative. 30
The length of time that wounded remained in field hospitals varied from
1 to 48 hours, depending usually upon the length of time before transportation
to the rear became available. At a rough estimate this averaged about 4 hours.
Field hospital bed capacity varied from 200 to 300. 31
During the first week of the Meuse-Argonne operation the division sur-
geon permitted the operating team at the triage to operate only two definite
types of cases, namely, the so-called " sucking chest " cases and all cases of
hemorrhage. Later, owing to the length of time elapsing between the receipt
of wound and arrival at triage, all cases were operated which for any reason
could not lie transported to the nearest evacuation hospital within 15 hours
after being wounded. The number operated on at the triage during this
period was 75, which were classified as follows: Abdominal. 20 per cent; chest,
21 per cent; head, face, and neck. 9 per cent; upper extremity. 18 per cent:
lower extremity, 20 per cent. 32 The abdominal cases comprising those present-
ing intestinal perforations, hemorrhage, or extensive lacerations of the liver.
Three cases with the intestines presenting through ventral wounds and one
case of laceration of left external iliac vein were received. 32 The chest cases
operated were the " sucking chest wounds," and two cases of hemorrhage.
Head, neck, and face cases included only those with severe hemorrhage,
necessitating ligation of the principal blood vessels. No brain cases were
operated at the triage. 32
THE 32D DIVISION &
On November 1. the 32d Division passed from the reserve of the Fifth
Corps to that of the Third Corps, serving in that capacity until November
10. On November G, however, the 128th Infantry reentered the line as a
unit of the 5th Division, operating east of the Meuse in the vicinity of Dun-
s For map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XI. VIII.
794 FIELD OPERATIONS
sur-Meuse. On the night of November 9-10 the remainder of the division
crossed the Meuse and entered the line, attacking on the morning of the 10th,
east of Breheville and northeast of Peuvillers; on the morning of the 11th
a continuation of the attack was halted by the signing of the armistice. 33
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On November 8, the sanitary train was disposed as follows: Ambulance
Company No. 125, Bois Chehemin, near Montfaucon ; Ambulance Company
No. 1*20, Septsarges, with ambulance head at Cunel; Ambulance Company
No. 127, on Avocourt — Very road, near Cheppy road ; Ambulance Company
No. 128, distributed to Infantry regiments, with three ambulances assigned
to the 158th Artillery Brigade; Field Hospital No. 125, Septsarges, in reserve;
Field Hospital No. 126, Bois Chehemin, in reserve; Field Hospital No. 127,
Ivoiry ; Field Hospital No. 128, Sivry-la-Perche, for the sick ; medical supply
unit, Bois Chehemin. 34
The surgeon of the Third Corps directed that the train should not func-
tion until its triage could be established on the east bank of the Meuse, and
that meanwhile its casualties should be cared for in triages of the 5th and 90th
Divisions, at Septsarges. 34
Next day, November 9, sanitary train units were disposed as follows:
Ambulance Companies No. 125 and No. 126 were ordered to Dun-sur-Meuse,
where the former was held in reserve, the latter moving from that point to
Yilosnes to establish an ambulance head. Field Hospitals No. 125 and No. 126
were also ordered to Dun-sur-Meuse, the former to establish, by 4.30 p. m.
of the 10th, a triage for nontransportable wounded; No. 126 to care for
gassed patients. Other units retained their former locations for a short time,
but were soon moved forward. A dressing station was established at Harau-
mont November 10, with ambulance heads at Ecurey and Breheville, whence
evacuations were rapid and satisfactory. At Dun-sur-Meuse the triage was
operated by Field Hospital No. 127. Field Hospital No. 125 cared for non-
transportable patients and No. 126 for the gassed. The units here used tents,
semipermanent barracks, and other buildings, facilities being superior to any
enjoyed by them heretofore during this offensive. 34
During this time the triage of the 5th Division admitted the following
casualties: 34 Wounded. 212; neurosis, 1; gassed, 26; injured, 1; sick 111:
total, 351.
REFERENCES
(1) Beport of operations, Third Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation. December 1. 191S.
(2) Map showing daily position front line, Meuse-Argonne operation, G-3, G. H. Q.,
May 24, 1919.
(3) Report of Medical Department activities, Third Army Corps, by Col. ,T. L. Bevans.
M. C, corps surgeon. Third Army Corps, undated, 3S. On file. Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(4) Keport of Medical Department activities, 5th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 5th Division, undated, Part I, 48. On file.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 795
(5) Report of operations, 90th Division. Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(6) F. O. Xo. 13, 90th Division, October 29, 1918.
(7) F. O. Xo. 18, 90th Division. November 4, 1918.
(S) Report of Medical Department activities, 90th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon. 90th Division, undated. Part I. 40. On file. Historical
Division. S. (!. O.
(9) Ibid., Part I. 60.
(10) Ibid., Fart I. 57.
mi Ibid., Part I. 61.
(12) Ibid., Fart I, 65.
(13) ibid.. Fart I. 68.
(14) Ibid., Part I, 09.
(15) Ibid.. Part I. 72.
(16) Ibid., Part I, SO.
1171 Ibid., Part I, 81.
(18) Ibid., Part I, 85.
(19) Ibid., Fart I, 80.
(20) Ibid.. Part II, 31.
(21) Ibid., Fart I, 82.
(22) Report of operations, 5th Division. Meuse-Argonne operation. November 21, 1923.
123) Report of Medical Department activities, 5th Division. A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 5th Division, undated, Fart I, 40. On file. His-
torical Division. S. 6. O.
(24) Ibid., Part I, 45.
(25) Ibid., Fart I, 47.
(26) Ibid., Fart I, 49.
(27) Ibid., Part I, 50.
(28) Ibid., Part I, 51.
(29) Ibid., Fart I, 52.
(30) Ibid., Part IV. 27.
(31) Ibid., Part IV. 31.
(32) Ibid., Part IV. 26.
(33) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, V. S. Army. 1917-1919. prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War College,
1700 (32d Division).
134) Report of Medical Department activities, 32 d Division. A. E. P., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon. 32d Division, undated. Fart I. 12. On file.
Historical Division, S. G. O.
CHAPTER XXXIII
THIRD PHASE— Continued
ACTIVITIES OF THE AMERICAN DIVISIONS ATTACHED TO FRENCH CORPS
EAST OF THE MEUSE
Only those of our divisions which were attached to the French Corps
east of the Meuse will be considered here.
THE 70TH DIVISION
After it was relieved, on September 30, by the 3d Division, the 79th
Division was then transferred to the Third Army Corps and acted as corps
reserve until the night of October 3-4. when it marched to the zone of the
French Second Colonial Army Corps and was attached to that corps." On
the night of October 7-8 it relieved the 26th Division in the Troyon sector.
holding an outpost position on the plane of the Woevre. No offensive action
was taken, although the troops were subjected to constant shelling by the
enemy. Beginning October 23, the division was relieved by the 33d Division
and proceeded by marching to the Grande-Montagne sector, where it relieved
the 29th Division on the nights of October 28-29. 29-30, and a part of the
26th Division on the nights of October 31-November 1, and November 1-2.
In this sector the 79th Division was placed under the command of the French
Seventeenth Army Corps, and later under the French Second Colonial Army
Corps. On November 3 the division opened the final offensive by an attack
to the north, with its left flank, and on November 6. after severe fighting.
troops had advanced as far as the crest of Hill 378 (La Borne de Cornouiller).
The attack changed on November 8 to an easterly direction, and the heights
from Ecurey to Crepion were captured: that night the division sector ele-
ments were changed to extend from Etraye to Moirey. This required ele-
ments of the division at Ecurey to execute a flank march of about 4.~> km.
(2.7 miles) at night, through thick underbrush and woods, in order to be in
position for the attack at 6 a. m. the following morning. On November 9
the towns of Crepion. Wavrille, and Gibercy were taken, and also Etraye
and Moirey. in conjunction with elements of the divisions on the right and
left: before night of November 10, Chaumont-devant-Damvillers and Hill 319.
northeast of the town, had been taken. 1
"During the period October 12-23 the 79tli Division, as a part of the Frencli Second Colonial
( 'orps, was a part of the Second Army. However, the description of its activities is given at this
time for convenience, especially because during the time it was in the Second Army it took n<>
"(Tensive action.
797
798
FIELD OPERATIONS
PLATE XLIX.
Battle lines, taken from Final Report. Cen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, are approximate.
MEUSE-ARGONXE OPERATION
799
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On the arrival in the Troyon sector the sanitary train relieved correspond-
ing units of the 20th Division on October 8, 1918. The disposition of the
units being as follows: Field Hospitals, Xos. 313, 314, 315, and transporta-
tion section of Ambulance Company No. 316 at Ferine Notre Dame de Palameix ;
Ambulance Companies No. 313 and No. 314. and United States Army Am-
bulance Service Section No. 506 at Dommartin-la-Montagne ; Ambulance
Companies No. 315, No. 310, and United States Army Ambulance Service
Kiu. s~. — Dressing stiition, operated by Ambulance Company No. 31G, 70th Division, Les EpargVB,
Meuse
Section No. 502 at Les Eparges, and Field Hospital No. 310 at Ambly-sur-
lleuse. Dressing stations were established at Dommartin and Les Eparges,
Field hospitals functioned as follows: Field Hospital No. 313 for skin and
venereal; No. 314 for gassed; No. 315 triage; No. 316 for sick. 2
As this sector was relatively inactive, the number of wounded was not
large. Roads were good, and the evacuation of casualties proceeded without,
any delay. On the night of October 14 Les Eparges was subjected t*> a
violent bombardment of gas. causing the withdrawal of the medical units
tliere. Ambulance Company No. 315 located in some barracks northwest of
Vaiix les-Palameix. Ambulance Company No. 310 moved to Notre Dame de
Palameis, and United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 502
800
FIELD OPERATIONS
to Dommartin-la-Montagne. Casualties in this bombardment were 1 killed
and 17 moderately gassed. On October 13 Field Hospital No. 313 established
a hospital for influenza cases at Troyon-sur-Meuse. On the 18th the United
States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 502 was relieved by Section
Xo. nil. 2
The units of the train remained in these locations until October 23, when'
they were relieved by similar units of the 33d Division, and proceeded to
Troyon-sur-Meuse, with the exception of Field Hospital No. 316, which re-
mained in operation at Ambly until 25th. Field Hospital No. 313 evacuated
its patients to No. 316 and proceeded to (Jenicourt-sur-Meuse.
w ^ ***** J-*. *"..
-
-
I'lo. 88. — Aid station. 315th Infantry. 70th Division. Bois <le Consenvoye, France, November 8, 1918.
On the 24th the train moved to Faubourg-du-Pave. where it was billeted
until October 29. Here Field Hospital No. 316, on October 25, opened a
hospital for the division sick. On October 27 the sanitary train proceeded
to the Grande-Montagne section. 2 Here the advance stations were well located
and fairly safe, with the result that wounded were promptly given first aid
and evacuated. An ambulance pool was organized at a point where cover
was available close to two regimental aid stations, whereby their evacuation
was greatly expedited. Wheeled litters, used by this division for the first
time, were employed with very satisfactory results. The units of the sani-
tarv train, on October 30 and November 1, relieved like units in the 2flM)
MEUSE-AKGONNE OPERATION 801
Division and were disposed as follows: Ambulance Company No. 313 took
over the dressing station near Samogneux. Its evacuation service assisted
by wheel litters via the Ormont-Ferme — Samogneux road, though this was
constantly subject to shell lire; Ambulance Company No. 315, with United
States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 511, operated a dressing station
at a rock quarry on the Samogneux — Brabant road, and Ambulance Company
No. 314 an advance dressing station north of Brabant on the Molleville Ferme
road, the remainder of this company serving as litter bearers. Ambulances
could not reach regimental and battalion stations because of shell fire, for
the enemy at this time gave unusual attention to shelling the roads, and this
actually caused a disproportionate number of casualties in the supply and
evacuation services. Two animal-drawn ambulances were assigned to each
Infantry battalion in support. On the outskirts of Charny a station for
slightly wounded was established by one officer and six men from Field
Hospital No. 316. 2
Although casualties were heavy, evacuations were prompt, the average
time elapsing between receipt of wounded and arrival at hospital being about
three hours. Roads were very rough but not crowded. On November 4. 41
Ford ambulances were assigned to the division, replacing United States Army
Ambulance, Service Sections No. 511 and No. 506, but throughout the action
returning trucks transported slightly wounded, and in emergencies the trucks
of the sanitary train were also used for that purpose. 3 On November 7
Ambulance Company No. 316, less animal-drawn vehicles, relieved Ambulance
Company No. 314 at its advance dressing station, and the latter relieved Am-
bulance Company No. 315, which moved to Glorieux for a rest. Meanwhile
evacuation was carried on by Ambulance Company No. 313. in reserve. 4
Field Hospital No. 313 had been established at Genicourt-sur-Meuse.
where, it received the sick, but the other field hospitals, with United States
Army Ambulance Service Section No. 506, were congregated at Glorieux.
There Field Hospital No. 315 operated the triage. Field Hospital No. 314
cared for the gassed, and Field Hospital No. 316 was in reserve. Both field
hospitals functioning were located with Evacuation Hospital No. 15 in an
old French hospital building — an arrangement which facilitated transfer of
the seriously wounded to an institution where they could receive immediate
and thorough care. 2
By November 9 the lines of evacuation had been lengthened by the rapid
advance of the troops, and the two roads Molleville Ferme — Brabant and Or-
mont Ferine — Samogneux had become so rough that night driving was lxrth
difficult and dangerous. Therefore, Field Hospital No. 316 was moved from
Glorieux to a point near Neuville, where it established a triage. Ambulance
Company No. 31 4 advanced its dressing station to west of Molleville Ferme,
accompanied by Ambulance Company No. 313. which furnished litter bearers
to clear the aid stations. The other units remained as before except that six
ambulances of Ambulance Company No. 315 were moved to the triage. Evac-
uations from the front were now less difficult, though the route to the rear
was longer. 4
13576—23 51
802 FIELD OPERATIONS
On November 10 the station for slightly wounded at Charny was closed.
The dressing station of Ambulance Company No. 314: was advanced to a
German barrack on the Brabant-sur-Meuse — Etraye road, and the dressing
station of Ambulance Company No. 316 to the vicinity of Etraye. 5
On November 11 it was decided to move Field Hospital No. 314 to the
German barracks occupied by the dressing; station of Ambulance Company No.
314, and the order directing this movement was issued the next day. Eoads
were now much better, traffic control was excellent, and evacuations were very
satisfactory. Because of the roughness and narrowness of the roads the Ford
ambulances were especially serviceable in this sector. 5
THE 26TH DIVISION "
From November 1 to 7, no advance by the 26th Division was made. Dur-
ing this period a number of reliefs from the front line were made, and troops
improved their positions and organized strong points. Reconnoitering patrols
were sent out, raids made, and gas concentrations and harassing artillery fire
delivered, but there was relatively small movement of the line until November
8. Such advance as was made on and after that date was in a generally
easterly direction, the southern end of the line being pivoted, at first, north of
Beaumont, and later, when the division front was extended, south of it, near
Les Fosses. Information was received, on November 8. that the enemy was
withdrawing. He was closely pursued, in the face of stubborn machine-gun
resistance and scattered artillery fire. The advance continued until the
armistice, with progressive general increase in speed, despite opposition from
certain strongly organized positions such as Ville-devant-Chaumont, Her-
bebois, Le Chaume, and Le Cap de Bonne Esperance. When hostilities were
suspended by the armistice, the division front, facinp- eastward, extended be-
tween 5 and C km. (3.1 to 3.7 miles) in a general north and south direction,
from just east of Ville-devant-Chaumont, to a point near Le Chaume. - "
MEDICAL DEI'ART.MKXT ACTIVITIES
As the 26th Division formed the pivot on which the entire army to the
westward of it moved, its advance was relatively slight, especially on its right,
and it was unnecessary to move the organizations of the sanitary train, except
that ambulance heads were gradually advanced. The location of the Medical
Department units remained as given in the history of the division during the
second phase of this operation.
THE 81ST DIVISION f>
On the night of November 6-7, the 81st Division relieved the 35th
Division in the Sommedieue sector, which at that time was under the command
of the French Seventeenth Corps. On November 7. however, the division
passed from the French Seventeenth to the French Second Colonial Corps.
'' For mnp of activities ol' tlifs division for this period, see Plate XI. IX.
MEUSE-ARGOXNE OPERATION 803
At 8 a. m., on the 9th, after a short artillery preparation, with two regiments
in line and two in sujjport. positions in the marshy plain of the Woevre which
the Germans had fortified during their prolonged occupancy by numerous
concrete machine-gun nests and elaborate wire systems were attacked. Ville-
cii-Woevre was a particularly strong, heavily fortified position, which had
resisted capture during the St. Mihiel operation. The Artillery brigade gave
the infantry all possible support during this action, but the enemy was able
to oppose the advance by guns which outranged those of our troops. During
these operations the division captured the fortified villages of Moranville,
Grimaucomt, and Abaucourt, and occupied the woods Les Clairs Chenes and La
Noire Haie and Le Grand and Le Petit Cognon. When hostilities ceased the
troops had advanced over the Hindenberg line and had reached the main
defense of Hautecourt, having pushed back the enemy from 2 to 5.5 km. (3.4
miles). 8
MEDICAIi DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
When the 81st Division relieved the 35th, dressing stations were estab-
lished by Motor Ambulance Company No. 321 at Escargot and Derame and by
Xo. 323 at La Chevretterie and Bernatant. Field Hospital No. 322, the triage
and jras hospital, occupied Adrain barracks at Fontaine Brillante. Field Hos-
pitals No. 323 and No. 324 were at Les Petits Monthairons in the chateau and in
Adrain barracks. Field Hospital No. 321, with Ambulance Companies No.
322 and No. 324, was held in reserve at Les Petits Monthairons.
On November 9, Field Hospital No. 321 was ordered to take over the triage,
and Field Hospital No. 322 functioned as a gas hospital, while Field Hospital
Xo. 323 was held in readiness to " leapfrog " the triage and establish a hospital
in case of advance. 10 The dressing station of Ambulance Company No. 321,
at Escargot, moved to Moulainville and Ambulance Company No. 322 marched
to Fontaine Brillante, where it assisted in evacuation from the front lines.
On November 10 Ambulance Company No. 324 established a dressing station
at Moranville. 10
One motor ambulance company and a section of the animal-drawn ambu-
lance company was attached to each Infantry regiment in the front line, with
orders to keep constantly in touch with the respective regimental surgeons.
The animal-drawn vehicles were used only over routes that could not be
traversed by motors. Because of the wet condition of the ground, there was
a constant mist, which i>ermitted ambulances to go to the battalion aid stations.
In some jiortions of the sector information concerning the proper roads to use
could be obtained only by driving over the road and mapping out the proper
course for vehicles. Regimental and ambulance company dressing stations
were combined and located in the most advantageous positions and ambulances
were stationed along the front. 10
Because ambulances could remove patients direct from battalion stations,
evacuation was prompt, and the forward shipment of supplies was facilitated.
Ambulances were also in direct touch with the divisional reserve and visited
artillerv areas at recrular intervals. 10
804 FIELD OPERATIONS
Immediately following the cessation of hostilities searching parties from
the ambulance companies were sent over the field to bring in -wounded. By
10 p. m. of November 11, all had been recovered and cleared from the triage. 11
The triage report, November 9 to 11, gave the following figures: Total
number admitted to triag(!, 1,010; wounded in action, 537; wounded acci-
dentally, 30 ; gassed, 242 ; war neurosis, 38 ; sick, 193. All gas casualties were
caused by arsine, but none w T as of such severity that the patient required more
than two days' hospitalization. 11
THE 33D DIVISION
Upon being relieved in the Verdun sector, by the French 15th Colonial
Division, on the nights of October 20, 21, and 22. the 33d Division proceeded
to the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector, where it relieved the 79th Division, the relief
being completed on the night of October 25-26. The line now held extended
approximately from Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeastwardly, to Doncourt-aux-
Templiers. On the night of October 27-28, this line was extended southeast-
wardly to the edge of Bois de Kebois, southeast of Woel. Operations of the
33d Division, in this sector, beginning with daily and nightly patrols, de-
veloped a number of important raids, among them the raid of November 7,
on Chateau et Ferine d'Aulnois, and the two raids against St. Hilaire. on
November 8 and November 9. On November 10, the German stronghold of
Marclieville was captured; however, a counterattack of the enemy drove our
troops back to the trenches southeast of the village. The enemy was driven
out of Bois des Hautes Epines, Bois de Warville. The southern portion of
the formidable Bois d'Harville was taken and the Kriemhilde Stelhuio-
crossed. 12
On November 11, Chateau et Ferme d'Aulnois had been taken, and Marclie-
ville recaptured, when an order to cease hostilities put an end to the advance.
The line now extended approximately from the crossroads northwest of
Chateau et Ferme d'Aulnois— Riaville — Marclieville — St. Hilaire — north edpe
of Bois de Warville and Bois des Hautes Epines to Forme des Hants Journaux.
The southern portion of Bois de Warville. which had been wrested from the
enemy on the preceding day, was given up. 12 ' 7
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
When the 33d Division took over the line in the Troyon sector, the dis-
position of its sanitary train was prescribed by Field Order No. 18, Head-
quarters 108 Sanitary Train, published October 24. as follows:
Pursuant to instructions from the division surgeon, tlie following movements of
units of the sanitary train will he accomplished in connection with the relief of the
70th Division. V. S.. in the Troyon sector :
1. Field Hospital Hq. will move from Fauhourg-Pauve to the vicinity of the tringe
near Forme do N, D. de Pnlnmeix.
2. A. C 129, company Hq., and remaining personnel will move from Fsiuhourg-Pnuve to
the location of the dressing station nt Dommartln la Montagne early October 2">. litis.
:t. A. A. S. OOO will move from Faubourg-Pnuve to Troyon and take over the evac-
uation of the triage.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 805
4. F. H. 130 will move from Genlcourt to Troyon early on October 25 and will con-
tinue in operation as the divisional sick collecting station. A holding party will be sent
out not later than 7 a. m. to secure the location. An advance section will proceed at
once to the new location and go into operation in order that there will be no cessation
of function as the divisional sick collecting station. A guide will be left at Genlcourt
t<> inform ambulances as to the new location.
5. The mobile laboratory will move with F. H. 130.
0. Train Hq. and ambulance section Hq. will move from Fnubourg-l'auve to Troyon
early on October 25th.
7. F. H. 132, A. C. 130. A. C. 132. and camp infirmaries will remain at Fnubourg-
Pauve until further orders.
On October 30. the sanitary train was disposed as follows: Headquarters
of the train and of its ambulance company section, Troyon ; Ambulance
Company No. 129. Dommartin : Ambulance Companies No. 130 and No. 132,
Troyon: Ambulance Company No. 131, dressing station near St. Maurice,
serving the. right sector.
Headquarters of the field hospital section, with three units of its com-
mand, was located at Ferme de Notre Dame de Palameix, where Field Hospi-
tal No. 131 operated the triage, Field Hospital No. 130 the gas hospital, and
Field Hospital No. 129 was in reserve. Field Hospital No. 132 at Ambly
conducted a division sick collecting station with triage function. On Novem-
ber 8, Field Hospital No. 130 moved to Creue, where it continued the care
of gassed patients, and the next day Field Hospital No. 129 moved to Creue
to prepare to assume triage duties. 13 On November 8, Field Order No. 23 of
Sanitary Train No. 108 was issued, reading as follows:
1. F. H. 129, at Creue, will go into operation as a triage at a. m. Nov. 9, 1918.
2. F. H. 131 will close as a triage and go into reserve in its present location as soon
as the redirection of the evacuation of the forward area has been accomplished.
3. F. H. 130 will open a gas hospital at Creue at G a. m. Nov. 9, 1918, with the equip-
ment and personnel now at that point. This personnel and equipment will be supple-
mented from the larger detachment at Ferme de Notre Dame de Palameix, as fast as
the conditions permit, leaving, if possible, a working gas section to go into reserve with
F. H. 131. No special evacuation of the gassed patients need be made.
4. Triage reports will be made for 12-hour periods, such reports to reach the division
surgeon's office not later than 7 a. m. and 7 p. m. daily.
5. The forward area will be evacuated to the triage (F. H. 129) at Creue after »i
a. m. November 9, 1918.
6. The division sick and back area casualties will be evacuated as before to F. H.
132 at Ambly.
7. Evacuation points for the division are as follows:
Seriously wounded (nontransportable) : To Mobile Hospital # 39, between Heudicourt
and Chaillon.
Slightly wounded: To Evacuation Hospital 13, at Commercy. (Note. — Evacuation
Hospital 18 at St. Mihiel will soon be available.)
Neurological : To Neurological Hospital # 1, at Varvinay.
Gassed cases : To Evacuation Hospital 13.
Sick: To Evacuation Hospital 13.
ALTERNATIVES
All classes of cases: To Evacuation Hospital 12, at Royaumeix, or Evacuation Hospital
# 1, at Sebastopol, 5 kilos north of Toul.
806 FIELD OPEEATIONS
8. A. C. 132 will gradually take over the dressing station and the evacuation of the
left sector, relieving A. C. 129. A. C. 130 will evacuate the triage at Creue in accordance
with par. 7. Hq., A. C. 131, will move to Creue as soon as the C. O. lias arranged for
billets.
9. The D. A. C. (director of ambulances) will arrange for the evacuation of F. H. 132.
at Ambly.
10. The D. F. H. (director of field hospitals) will arrange all details concerning the
field hospital section.
11. The division specialists will function with the triage at Creue unless otherwise
ordered.
The other orders issued controlling the sanitary train during the operation
of the Second Army were the following, promulgated by the commanding
officer, Sanitary Train, November 9 and 10:
Field Order No. 24 :
1. F. H. 132 will evacaute its sick on the afternoon of Nov. 9, in accordance with
par. 7, F. O. 23, and will continue to function on a smaller scale, but will not hold its
patients longer than necessary to properly conserve evacuation facilities.
2. F. H. 130 will evacuate its gas hospital at Ferme de N. D. de Palameix early Nov.
10 and will prepare this section to go forward with F. H. 131.
3. The D. A. C. will arrange transportation for the evacuation proposed in pars.
1 and 2.
4. F. H. 131 will be prepared for a contemplated move to Thillot at an early date.
5. The division tuberculosis specialist will function with the division sick collecting
station until otherwise ordered.
Field Order No. 20:
1. A. C. 129 will move with the northern pursuit column (65th Brigade). The com-
pany will be divided for action. One half, with light dressing station equipment and four
or five ambulances, to move behind the advance guard. The other half, with full dressing
station equipment, rations, etc., will follow the main body. These combat elements
will join the pursuit column along the St. Remy — Herbeuville road before the H hour.
The mission of A. C. 129 will be to serve the 05th Brigade, particularly after it has
passed the sphere of action of A. C. 132. It is contemplated that a dressing station
will eventually be established in the vicinity of St. Hilaire — Butgneville or Harville.
The axis of march of the north column will be St Remy — Herbeuville — Hannonville-
sous-les Cotes — Wadonville [-en-Woevre] — St. Hilaire — Maulotte — Allamont.
2. A. C. 130 will move with the southern pursuit column (00th Brigade). The
company will be divided for action. One half, with light dressing station equipment
and four or five ambulances, to move behind the advance guard. The other half, with
full dressing station equipment, rations, etc., will follow the main body. These two
elements will join the pursuit column near St. Maurice along the Deuxnouds — St.
Maurice road. The mission of A. C. 130 will be to serve the 60th Brigade, particularlj
after it has passed the sphere of action of A. C. 131. It is contemplated that a dressing
station will eventually be established at or between Woel and Jonville. The axis of
march of the south column will be St. Maurice — Woel — Jonville — Hannonville-au-Passage.
3. A. C. 132 will serve the left sector as long as practicable using its horse ambulances
in the region of impassable roads for relaying to the motor ambulances. It may become
advisable, as the pursuit lengthens, to evacuate in part or whole to the dressing station
of A. C. 131 in the rear of St. Maurice.
4. A. C. 131 will serve the right sector as before and as far forward as is practicable.
5. The establishment of a triage and gas hospital at Thillot is contemplated for
F. H. 131 and a gas section of F. H. 130. These units will hold themselves in readiness
for immediate action and will send forward a holding, cleaning, and billeting party.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 807
Plans outlined in these orders were carried out as intended except those
which were to be applied later, including the establishment of dressing
stations after objectives were secured. Battle activities ceased, of course,
with the armistice.
REFERENCES
(1) Outlines of Histories of Divisions. U. S. Army. 1917-191!), prepared by tlie Historical
Section. The Army War College. On file. Historical Section. The Army War Col-
lege, 1700 (79th Division).
(2) Report of Medical Department activities, 79th Division, A. E. P., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 79th Division, undated, 20. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(3) Ibid.. 14.
(4) Ibid.. 22.
(5) Ibid., 23.
(6) Report of operations. 20th Division. Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.
(7) Front-line maps, American battle monuments- commission.
(8) Operations report, 81st Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, January 17. 1919.
(9) Report of Medical Department activities, Slst Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon. Slst Division, undated. 5. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(10) Ibid.. 21.
(11) Ibid., 11.
(12) Report of operations, 33d Division, Meuse-Argonne operation. March 17. 1919.
(13) Report of Medical Department activities, 3.3d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, 33d Division, undated, Part III. On file. His-
torical Division, S. G. O.
CHAPTER XXXIV
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
BATTLE CASUALTIES
The army chief surgeon reported as follows on battle casualties in the
Meuse-Argonne operation : 1
Mounded, including 2,035 enemy prisoners 72,407
Gassed 18,064
Neurological cases (shell shock) 2,029
Neurological cases returned to duty in 3 days, 1,204.
Total 03,100
During this period the hospitals received medical cases 08, 700
Died in hospital 3,528
Evacuations 143.051
Total , 215, 339
It is interesting in this connection to note that the neurological units
returned to duty 59 per cent of the patients ■which they admitted. 1
PATIENTS CARRIED P.Y ARMY AMBULANCES
The following, which shows the number of patients carried by Army
ambulance companies, etc., during the Meuse-Argonne operation, does not
include those carried by the ambulance companies in corps sanitary trains,
luit it comprises those transported by United States Army Ambulance Serv-
ice sections, evacuation ambulance companies. French sections, and French
busses and trucks loaned to the army and operating in the service of its
Medical Department. 1
American sections:
Sept. 26 to Oct. 14.
Oct. 15 to Nov. 11,
French sections
French busses
Total.
Trips
^T £g£ Perns' KHometers
9.800 19,000 21,000 2,200 290.000
10,130 22,210 25,722 2,107 343,784
3,946 12.000 14,512 238.738
645 | 12,439 35,378
24.521 53,210 I 73.673 4,307 907,910
Average number of patients per trip: Corps, 4.6; army, 4.8.
Average one-way haul: Corps, 22.4 km. (13.9 miles); army, 12.2 km. (7.5 miles).
Percentage of prone patients to total: Corps, 47.6; army, 46.
Average number of kilometers traveled by patients: Corps, 10.3 km. (6.3 miles); army. 5.4 km. (3.3 miles).
Average number of kilometers traveled per diem by Army ambulances, 19,737 km. (12,256.6 miles).
As stated in the description of the first phase of the operation. Army
ambulances also transported 4,307 passengers during this operation (chiefly
medical officers and nurses changing station, with their baggage). 1 ' 2
1357(>— 25 52 809
810 FIELD OPERATIONS
TRAIN EVACUATIONS
The following evacuations were made by train during the Meuse- Argon ne
operation : -
Total number of trains 408
Total evacuations 151, 045
Total casualties 93, 437
Total medical 55, 698
Total prisoners (included in casualties) 2,635
Total rations placed on trains 23,237
The large number of evacuations from the army area was necessitated by
lack of an institution equivalent to the Frencb depot des ecloppcs provided
to care for the slightly wounded, gassed, and sick who would be incapacitated
for a period of 10 days or 2 weeks. The establishment of such a formation,
with a capacity of 5,000 beds, was contemplated before the armistice was
signed, but its organization had been delayed because there was no Medical
Department personnel available for its operation. The army surgeon advo-
cated establishment of such an institution for 10,000 patients. One section of
it was to have been reserved for venereal cases — a perennial source of trouble
at the front. 3
As the towns in the rear of the army afforded no buildings such as those
in Toul in the Second Army area, and tent age was unobtainable, it was
necessary to evacuate these slightly wounded, disabled patients to the advance
and intermediate sections, with consequent loss to the front of many thousands
of men for a long period. This need, in turn, required an injudicious use of
hospital trains and congestion of base hospitals, which would have proven
calamitous had the offensive continued. 3
ARMY HOSPITALS a
MOBILE HOSPITAL NO. I *
On September 24 Mobile Hospital No. 1 proceeded by truck from La
Morlette to Les Claires Chenes. where it operated in huts, being one of the
most advanced hospitals of that section. " The condition of the wounded re-
ceived at this point was deplorable. Some wounds had not been dressed;
many patients came in without having received antitoxin ; some were exposed
on the field for two or three days before arrival. Ambulances were sometimes
24 to 36 hours on the road bringing wounded from the dressing stations a
few kilometers away. This was due largely to the frightful congestion of the
roads."
This hospital was designated for nontransportable wounded, of whom 494
were received and upon whom 411 operations were performed. The problem
of burying the dead proved a stupendous one, for from 12 to 20 patients
• The reports from the different hospitals vary widely ; some are complete and in detail, others
fragmentary. The procedure here has been to set down what is considered vnluablc from each
report. It has been quite impossible with the material at hand to balance the account.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 811
died daily; and the soil being extremely rocky, the digging of graves was very
arduous labor.
On October 7 the unit was ordered to Froinereville, Mease, where on the
!>th it was established in tents. The condition of the wounded received at this
point was much improved ; all had received antitetanic serum, and wounds
were well dressed and splinted. Evacuation facilities from this point, how-
ever, were bad. and to relieve this situation use was made of a narrow-gauge
railroad line which ran past the hospital to Souilly. Five cars were fitted up
and equipped to carry eight wounded each, and a private of the Medical De-
partment was assigned to each car under command of a medical officer who
was in charge of the train. By this means 163 patients were moved, the time
for the trip being about two hours. As the cars were light and tended to leave
the rails, they were weighted with concrete blocks. At this station (Froinere-
ville) 658 nontransportable wounded were admitted, and 627 operations were
performed.
The unit moved on October 27 to Esnes. where it again occupied tents.
As the troops at this time were moving forward rapidly, and the hospitals
were in consequence left far behind, wounded were now received in a serious
condition of shock, largely due to exposure and to the strain occasioned by
the long rough ambulance rides, over almost impassable roads. At this loca-
tion 419 nontransportable wounded were admitted, and 367 operations were
performed.
On Xovember 14 the organization moved to Bantheville. Meuse. and 10
days later to Varennes. Meuse.
MOBILE HOSPITAL NO. 2 4
This unit had entrained August 25 for Souilly. Meuse. whence it moved
to Rarecourt, Meuse, where it was stationed on the 28th. On Septemlier 24
it moved to Chateau de Salvange. near Rarecourt, Meuse. where it operated
until Xovember 5. It was then closed and all patients evacuated in preparation
for a forward movement.
MOBILE HOSPITAL NO. 4 4
This unit had formed part of the provisional evacuation hospital establish-
ment at Trondes during the St. Mihiel operation but had received only slightly
wounded while at that station.
When the Meuse-Argonne operation began, September 26, it was located at
Villers-Daucourt, but later moved to La Grange- Aux-Bois, where it occupied
a small French "ambulance," consisting of a few permanent buildings ex-
panded by Bessonneau tents. Here it served the First Army Corps, receiving
nontransportable cases. These numbered 464, upon whom 351 operations were
performed. Because of shock and exposure, the wounded received here were
in very serious condition. On October 27. the unit moved to Cheppy, Meuse,
where it served the Fifth Corps.
812 FIELD OPERATIONS
Total admissions by this unit during the Meuse-Argonne operation were as
follows: Wounded, 635; sick, 12; gassed, none: operations performed. 498:
deaths, 265. At La Grange-aux-Bois and at Cheppy, 71 cranial injuries were
operated, with 26 deaths. The unit also cared for 30 unoperated cranial cases,
with 21 deaths. The unoperated cases that did not die were largely those with
multiple wounds including minor scalp injuries who were admitted in shock.
Eleven spinal cases were operated, with six deaths. In all its service (total)
there were 841 surgical admissions to this hospital, of which GOG were non-
transportable.
Nitrous oxide and oxygen proved of particular value in the anesthetization
of shock patients and those in whom gas gangrene had developed. In these
cases, as well as in others, these agents were found to be of great value. The
conclusion was reached that there was a definite field for nitrous oxide and
oxygen anesthesia for the treatment of serious cases, and for those who require
but brief operations.
MOBILE HOSPITAL XO. o 4
From September 26 to 30 this unit, at Les Placys, admitted 108 cases, with
14 deaths; from October 1 to 31, inclusive, it had 839 admissions, with 119
deaths ; from November 1 to 11. inclusive, 6 admissions, 3 deaths : total ad-
missions, 953; total deaths, 136. Percentage of deaths, 14.27.
The following gives a summary of its work:
Operations
Head, penetrating 13
chest, penetrating .'{.'!
Abdomen, penetrating __ 22
Amputations:
Upper extremity 11
Lower extremity 24
Multiple wounds 239
Fracture, comminuted compound :
Femur 30
Knee joint 2S
Gunshot wounds :
Head and neck, nonpenetrating 17
Chest, nonpenetrating in
Abdomen, nonpenetrating 4
Extremities 260
Fracture, comminuted compound:
Upper extremities 28
Lower extremities 20
Blood transfusion 7
Appendectomy 1
Dressings' under nitrous oxide and
secondary operations 152
While at Les Placys this unit occupied six frame huts, in good condition,
which were used as wards, and two Bessonneau tents, with a bed capacity of 38.
Total bed capacity was 207, providing 48 feet of floor space per capita.
Grounds were well drained, bathing facilities were excellent, and facilities for
laundering clothes were adequate. The water supply was sufficient, but all
water for drinking purposes was chlorinated.
The average strength of the command was 53 during the month of Sep-
tember. During October the average strength was 147. and during Xovemlier.
162. On November 5 an acute shortage of medical officers was reported, with
request that six more be assigned. At this time 10 officers were on duty with
the unit, a number of whom were performing several dissimilar duties.
MEUSE-ABGONNE OPERATION 813
MOBILE HOSPITAL NO. 6*
In the latter part of August and the early part of September, 1918, Mobile
Hospital No. 6 was organized by personnel from Base Hospital No. 5 and
other sources. When ready for duty, on September 25, its strength was 8
officers, 20 nurses, and 83 enlisted men. From September 28 to October 16
it was stationed at Deuxnouds-devant-Beauzee, and from the latter date to
January 4, 1919, at Varennes, being at both points in the service of the First
Army.
At Deuxnouds the unit occupied wooden barracks recently vacated by the
French, who had left them partially equipped. As these had a capacity of
200 beds and two operating rooms were provided, only a small amount of
tentage was pitched. The unit was designated to care for injuries of the
head, and its staff was increased by 6 surgical teams headed by neurosurgeons,
a neurologist, a roentgenologist, 2 opthalmologists, 4 ward surgeons, a mess
sergeant, 3 cooks, and 9 privates. The hospital gradually expanded to a
capacity of 390 beds, necessitating a temporary increase in its strength by
details of French troops, Pioneer Infantry, and prisoners of war.
After it moved to Varennes, 7 km. (4.3 miles) behind the lines, Mobile
Hospital No. 6 was attached to the First Corps. Here it cooperated with
Field Hospital No. 162 in caring for the nontransportable wounded until the
latter unit moved, after which Mobile Hospital No. 6 cared for this class of
patients exclusively. Here tents and a portable building — too small for an
operating room and therefore used as office — were erected. The operating
teams and special officers formerly attached had been transferred, but the
command was reinforced by additional enlisted personnel and at times by
surgical, splint, and shock teams. Usually there were four and sometimes
six teams operating.
The greatest problem encountered here was that of evacuation, for
wounded had to be removed by ambulance over crowded roads to railhead;
but by keeping well ahead of the situation the hospital never became crowded.
During the first 48 hours of the third phase of the Meuse-Argonne
operation many preoperative cases were sent to evacuation hospitals, but
none were forwarded unless it was believed they could well endure the
trip. When it became evident that nontransportable cases could not be
sent from the front because of the great and rapidly increasing distance they
would have to cover, all casualties received were operated. From October 17
to November 3 the time from receipt of wound to admission was seven hours.
Preparations were made to advance the unit to Brieullers-sur-Bar, but this
was prevented by the armistice.
Forty-five per cent of the wounded admitted to this hospital were not
operated, for this was not indicated in many of the cases admitted while the
unit was at Deuxnouds, and a number of those admitted while it was at Varennes
were either admitted dead or dying (32 cases) or were sent on for operation
at the evacuation hospitals (135 cases). The following statistics were
furnished.
814 FIELD OPERATIONS
1. Both stations, September 29 to November 11 ; 43 days :
Admissions :
Sick 63
Gassed 4
Wounded —
Operated 678
Not operated 567
1,245
1,312
Deaths :
Preoperative (including sick) 32
Postoperative 124
156
Total mortality, 11.9 per cent.
2. Deuxnouds station (battle casualties received were gunshot wounds of
head only) :
Operated 403
Nonoperated (including sick) 416
819
Deaths 44
Mortality, 5.4 per cent.
3. Varennes station (nontransportable wounded) :
Operated 275
Not operated (including sick) 218
493
Deaths 112
Mortality, 22.7 per cent.
Throughout its service this unit was complete in itself. It received, with
few exceptions, only the cases it was designed to treat, for whose service its
equipment proved entirely satisfactory. Injuries cared for were chiefly those
of the brain, lungs, abdominal viscera, and multiple wounds or fractures which
were in bad condition because of hemorrhage or shock. The most seriously
wounded were transfused and anesthetized with nitrous oxide and oxygen.
Blood donors were obtained in sufficient numbers.
MOBILE HOSPITAL NO. S'
In September, 1918, Mobile Hospital No. 8 was organized from personnel
of Base Hospital No. 10 and casuals, the initial nucleus consisting of 4 medical
officers, 20 nurses, and 30 enlisted men. On October 15, it relieved Mobile
Hospital No. 6 (q. v.) at Deuxnouds-devant-Beauzee. This unit, like the unit
it relieved, received head cases only. Among these the mortality was high, and
the period of recoA'ery among those cases which eventuated favorably was
disproportionately long.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 815
Toward the end of October, orders were received to admit no more
patients, to evacuate all possible, and to prepare to move to a point near
Varennes. All attached officers, except one surgical team and one facio-
maxillary specialist, were relieved, and on November 3 the command moved to
Exermont, leaving a small detail to care for patients not yet evacuated. This
detail rejoined on the 5th, by which time the unit, now reinforced by three
additional teams, was receiving patients. Evacuation to railhead was effected
by Ambulance Companies No. 542 and No. 604, and occasionally by French
ambulances. Surgical work slackened after the armistice, and on November 16
orders were received to admit no more patients, and canvas was gradually
struck in anticipation of a move.
This unit, while at Deuxnouds, from October 16 to November 5, admitted
214 patients, with 23 deaths, and while at Exermont, from November 6 to
December 2, admitted 368 patients, with 18 deaths.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 3 4
Evacuation Hospital No. 3, after serving at Toul, was attached, from
September 26 to October 1, to American Red Cross Military Hospital No. 114,
at Fleury-sur-Aire, where it occupied a large French evacuation hospital. The
plant was already equipped with the exception of the operating room,
laboratory, and pharmacy. A large ward was turned into a 12-table operating
room.
When the first phase of the operation began, wounded began to arrive
in great numbers, over 1,400 being received in one day. Many preoperative
trains were dispatched, only cases requiring immediate surgical attention being
operated, (ienerally speaking, the wounded were in a poor condition when
received, and a large percentage of wounds were from 36 to 72 hours old.
On October 1, the unit left for Mont Frenet, where it served the 2d
and 36th Divisions attached to the French Fourth and Fifth Armies in the
Champagne sector, west of the Meuse-Argonne battle field. On November 9
it left this station and moved to Fontaine de Eouton. where it arrived the
next day for service of the First Army.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL XO. 4 4
On arrival at Fontaine de Routon, Evacuation Hospital No. 4 occupied
some temporary structures, but erected no tentage before the night of September
25. It then pitched all its tentage, and in four hours had a large pail of the
ward equipment in readiness for patients, who began to arrive within a few
hours after the offensive began. Most of those received during the first few
days had been wounded from 24 to 72 hours previously. Transportation was
very limited, and considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining rations,
fuel, medical, and other supplies. A portable French laundry was here added
to the equipment, but it proved inadequate. The hospital moved to Fromere-
ville on October 29, where it was shelled Noveml)er 2 by 8-inch guns. 12 missiles
falling in its area and causing 12 casualties among the hospital personnel.
81 G FIELD OPERATIONS
Patients were removed to a distance from the establishment and then evac-
uated, and all nurses were also transferred to the rear.
During this operation the hospital received 4,543 patients from 11
divisions, performed 2,448 operations, and had 176 deaths- From the 11th
to the 25th of November it received 838 other patients, with 2 deaths. While at
Fromereville the strength of the command was 48 officers, 34 nurses, and 254
enlisted men — an increase of 70 of all grades over that wliieh it had when
stationed at Fontaine de Routon.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 5*
After completion of its duty with the 32d Division at Villers-Cotterets,
Evacuation Hospital No. 5 proceeded to Souilly and thence to Ville-sur-
Cousances. Meuse, wdrere it arrived September 16. Here the unit was held
in reserve, some of its personnel assisting other hospitals in the vicinity during;
emergencies. It left, on October 3, for La Veuve, Marne. for service of the
American divisions (2 and 36) assigned to the French Fourth Army in the
Champagne sector to the west of the Argonne Forest. During its total
period of activity it handled 15,195 patients, classified a% follows: Surgical.
8.050; medical, 5,470; gas, 1.706.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. G 4
At Souilly, Evacuation Hospitals No. 6 and No. 7 ha d been established
prior to the St. Mihiel operation in a French hospital building, which was
transferred with practically all its equipment except instruments. In addition
to its official equipment there was a large quantity of material supplied by a
French patroness, who had assisted in this manner a number of other hospitals
in the Marne area. She remained at the hospital during the. greater part of
American service there and was of great assistance in many ways. The part
of this large plant utilized by Evacuation Hospital No. (i had a capacity of
1,000 beds, but later, after the Meuse-Argonne operation was well under way.
this was expanded by the use of tentage, the capacity of the unit then increasing
to 1,200 beds, while that of Evacuation Hospital No. 7 was even greater. In
addition these units operated an evacuation area where accommodations were
provided for 600 patients from Evacuation Hospitals No*. 4. 5, and 8, Mobile
Hospitals No. 1 and No. 5, the Gas Hospital at Rambluzin. and the neurologiml
and contagious hospitals. Patients accommodated in thlfi area were those
awaiting the arrival of hospital trains, for none of the units mentioned was
located on a railway. Such an area was further necessitated by the fact that
there was no replacement camp among the armies to which these patients could
have been sent.
Most of the cases sent to Evacuation Hospital No. 6 came from the Third
Corps, but many were also received from other sources, JSfUch as the Freneh
Seventeenth Corps, to which American troops had been att ached. It had been
planned that this hospital should receive the slightly wounded only, but in
point of fact, it received wounded of all degrees of severity, and medical cases
as well.
MEUSE-AEGOKNE OPEKATION 817
One of the greatest difficulties encountered was provision of facilities for
caring for the slightly wounded and sick. Cases which would have been ready
for duty within a few days had to be evacuated in order to make room for
others, thus necessitating a greatly increased use of hospital trains. Though
from three to six trains daily were dispatched from Souilly, Evacuation
Hospitals No. 6 and No. 7 and their evacuation area were constantly crowded,
the number of patients at one time being over 3,800.
About November 3 Evacuation Hospital No. 6 took over the entire forma-
tion, and three days later Evacuation Hospital No. 7 moved to St. Juvin, in
the vicinity of Grandre. The capacity of the entire establishment was then
reduced to 1,800 beds, nearly all of which were constantly occupied, 1,400
cases being admitted on November 11. Thereafter, the work was almost en-
tirely medical until the unit closed on December 8 and packed to move into
Germany. (For a discussion of the organization of this unit see Chapter
XVIII.)
During the period September 12 to December 8, while Evacuation Hospital
Xo. 6 was stationed at Souilly 68 per cent of its cases were medical. As
the capacity of the unit was expanded, wards were set aside for contagious
cases and those with bronchopneumonia, for a general order had been received
directing that no patients with fever be evacuated. Causes of admission in-
cluded diarrhea (in diminishing 7iumbers), typhoid fever (occasional and
mild), diphtheria, meningitis (sporadic) , and influenza, frequently complicated
by bronchopneumonia, which gave a mortality of 42 per cent.
Patients were classified in three categories — sick, seriously wounded, and
slightly wounded. All patients who, on admission, had fever or quickened
respiration were sent at once to the pneumonia ward without the usual bath,
for the early physical signs of pneumonia in many cases were very obscure, and
it was found preferable that each patient be given the benefit of any doubt.
If the complication mentioned did not develop, the patient was then transferred
to another ward. The clinical course of bronchopneumonia varied widely,
and treatment was almost entirely symptomatic.
Seriously wounded were undressed, bathed, prepared for operation, and
X rayed, but the slightly wounded were merely undressed and the wounded area
X rayed and prepared for operation. Cases requiring only a dressing were
cared for in the dressing room, through which slightly wounded passed, ex-
cepting cases of shock, which were sent immediately to the shock ward, where
a shock team was on dut}' at all times. No surgical cases were sent to a ward
until after operation or dressing. For the seriously w'ounded two operating
rooms were provided, and one for the slightly wounded. Each of the former
had three tables at which two teams worked. The slightly wounded were
treated by two of the most skillful teams available, who utilized four tables.
Rapid anesthesia was practiced by employing ether according to the Rausch
method or in combination with chloroform, or ethyl chloride was utilized.
The orthopedic service was considerably developed while this hospital was
at Souilly, for under the general supervision of the surgical service this service
818 FIELD OPERATIONS
was made responsible for the splinting of all fractures and other cases that
required mechanical support and the preparation of such patients for trans-
portation. A ward was set aside for these cases, and to this two splint teams
were assigned, each consisting of 1 officer and 2 enlisted men. From September
1 to December 10 the splints utilized were as follows : Thomas leg splint with
traction, 222; Cabot posterior splint, 246; Jones traction splint, 15; hinged
modification of Thomas arm splint, 180 ; Jones " cock-up " or " crab " splint, 16;
Hodge, 5 ; long Liston, 4 ; wire ladder, 618 ; wood, 150 ; plaster of Paris
jackets, 2. Wire ladder material was used for posterior angular splints of the
arm, forearm, wrist, hand, ankle, and foot, when traction was not required.
The average number of patients operated daily was about 175. Schedules
for all teams were such that they allowed each team a full night's sleep every
other night.
From September 1 to December 8 this hospital performed 7,124 operations,
of which 6,951 were performed between September 12 and November 12.
This was exclusive of dressings, which were not counted. Surgical deaths
from September 1 to December 8 numbered 211.
In the eye, ear, nose, and throat clinic 480 important cases were treated
while the unit was stationed at Sonilly. The total number of cases treated in
this clinic was 5,303. The X-ray department at Souilly examined 8,535 cases,
during rush periods averaging 600 cases in 24 hours.
Admissions during the Meuse-Argonne operation were as follows : Total.
22,174, including 14,095 sick, 324 gassed, 7,755 wounded. Operations num-
bered 6,591, deaths 204. In addition, before and after this operation this unit
here admitted 11,038 cases. It also served as a collecting point for Evacuation
Hospitals. Nos. 4. 8, 15, and Mobile Hospital No. 1.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 7 «
In conjunction with Evacuation Hospital No. 6, Evacuation Hospital No.
7 operated at Souilly during the St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne operations,
but its history furnished no detailed information concerning its organization
or methods during those actions separately. The unit moved to St. Juvin on
November 6 where it remained until after the armistice.
During the Meuse-Argonne operation, total admissions numbered 18,791.
of whom 6,375 were wounded, 12,374 were sick, and 42 gassed. Operations
totaled 1,991 and deaths 302. During its operations in France, this unit re-
ceived a grand total of 50,252 patients, including 18,380 admitted because of
gunshot wounds.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 8 *
Arriving at Petit Maujouy on August 26, Evacuation Hospital No. 8 estab-
lished 1,000 beds in Adrian barracks and tents on the hillside sloping toward
the north. Here it received seriously wounded and some other cases during
the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations.
In order to make available for professional work as many officers as
possible, the administrative functions of the hospital were centered in the
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 819
commanding oflicer, adjutant and registrar, and the quartermaster. The last
mentioned also performed the duties of supply officer, disbursing officer, sum-
mary court, and was in charge of the effects of deceased patients, of salvage,
and of the Graves Registration Service. Medical supplies were obtained from
medical dumps and from the Red Cross, and commissary supplies from the
railhead and from the American Red Cross warehouses. Owing to inability
to purchase an adequate supply of subsistence stores through a sales commis-
sary, the greater portion of the subsistence supplies were procured on ration
returns. Two kitchens were operated. The officers on day and night duty
in charge of the admission of patients collected and receipted for all valuables.
As this unit received very few medical cases, the chief of the medical service
was placed in charge of evacuations and also acted as official censor of the
organization. The adjutant and registrar had charge of all hospital records
and correspondence, and supervised the preparation of the reports of sick
and wounded.
The receiving department was one of the most vital parts of the entire
organization, as it was at this point that all the patients were admitted,
examined, and appropriately distributed, records made, clothing removed and
salvaged, and valuables collected. It occupied the largest structure con-
veniently available. Teams organized from the enlisted men of the hospital
prepared patients at this point for operation before they entered the X-ray
department. These teams served in rotation throughout the 24 hours in
order to prevent delay in the surgical service. The work here was all carried
on under the direction of day and night triage officers, whose duty it was to
examine all wounds, select the cases that required attention first, and see that
every patient requiring X-ray examination was provided with a distinctive
slip which insured his being taken to the radiologic department before he
entered the operating room. The triage also had charge of the enlisted
personnel and was responsible that each team did the work required of it.
A noncommissioned officer and eight litter bearers were stationed at the
entrance ready to unload the ambulances as they arrived. Conveniently
accessible and ready for distribution were piles of litters, blankets, hot-water
bottles, and splints, which could be put in the ambulances and sent back to the
front in exchange for such articles as they had brought in with patients.
After removal from the ambulances, patients were carried to one of the re-
ceiving tents to await their turn to be sent to the record and preparation room.
If their condition was such as to require it, they were allowed to remain on
the litters. Two other litter-bearer squads, working under the control of the
triage officer, then carried the patients into that portion of the receiving
department where the necessary records were made on the two or more type-
writers utilized for this purpose. The required entries were made on the
patient's field card; but in case a patient had none, one of these cards was
started at this point. For the convenience of the hospital, and in order to
provide a directory which could be used as an alphabetical index to all
patients admitted. Medical Department Form No. 52 was made out in dupli-
cate down to and including the diagnosis, the duplicate placed in the patient's
820 FIELD OPEKATIONS
field envelope with his other papers, and sent with him to the ward. The
original of this form was put into the file and became part of an index to
patients in the hospital. This arrangement was found to be of great value,
as numerous telegraphic requests were constantly being received from the
central records office relative to the character of the injuries received by
specified officers and men and the points to which they had been evacuated
after treatment. This latter information was entered on each patient's card
as soon as he was evacuated from the hospital.
All slightly wounded patients were directed by the triage officer to be
carried to the section provided for care of patients of this character; if
seriously wounded they were sent to the undressing and preparation room,
which occupied a section of the receiving department. At this point the
patient was cared for by a team composed of two orderlies; one of the order-
lies removing or cutting away his clothing, while the other collected his
valuables and made out duplicate receipts for them. These receipts were
signed and the original went with the patient in his field envelope. A suit of
pajamas was given him, and he was then moved on his litter to a rack which
raised him about 3 feet above the ground, and which permitted another
attendant to give him treatment preparatory to operation. The parts ad-
jacent to the wounds were shaved and a small sterile binder was applied. It
was found impracticable to bathe the severely wounded men, many of whom
were suffering from multiple wounds and could not stand the amount of
manipulation involved. Four of the teams mentioned worked side by side
simultaneously on day and night shifts in charge of a noncommissioned officer,
removing clothing, collecting valuables, and preparing wounds for operation.
The patient was then carried to the X-ray room. The triage officer gave
each patient requiring X-ray investigation a special green slip, with entries
thereon of the wounds requiring examination. This proved to be of great
advantage and facilitated the work. Two specially designated litter-bearer
squads moved each patient having one of these slips in his envelope to the
X-ray room as soon as he could be admitted for examination. An attendant
wrote on the slip the findings dictated by the officer making the examination,
and returned it to the field envelope, which went with the patient to the
operating room. Indelible markings were made on the skin of the patients
by using silver nitrate, wherever foreign bodies were seen under the X ray,
and an accurate description of the size and shape was noted on the green
slip above mentioned.
The chief of the surgical service selected the personnel of the operating
teams which were organized from the hospital staff, and designated the type
of cases each team was to treat. He also assigned the nurses and orderlies
in the operating room, determined the tours of duty there, formulated regula-
tions governing treatment of certain wounds, and was the hospital consultant
in his specialty. An assistant alternated with him. Operators continued
care of their cases after these had been sent to the wards, thus reducing the
number of ward surgeons. The most satisfactory arrangement for tours of
duty was from 8 to 8, being in fact, however, slightly less than a 12-hour
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 821
shift, as half an hour at the end of each period was devoted to cleaning and
replenishing the operating room. At one time the hospital had over 700
severely wounded patients, who required such an amount of care that the
operating-room force had to he reorganized in order that nurses might he
released for duty in the wards. When possible each team used three tables,
one patient being anesthetized or splinted while two were being operated.
With 12 operating teams this hospital ordinarily was able to perform the
work required, by continuous day and night shifts.
The operating was performed in an Adrian barrack in which 18 operating
tables were set up. half of the building, running lengthwise, being the " sterile''
portion for dressings, instruments, etc.. and the other half being " nonsterile."
Patients were brought in on litters from one end of the structure through the
"nonsterile'' portion. After litter bearers had received the necessary instruc-
tions from the chief of the surgical service they carried the patient to the
table indicated. At the middle of the building, on the sterile side, an open-
ing was cut through, and a large storage tent was put up at right angles to
the opening and adjoining the building. In this tent all instruments were
cleaned and sterilized by men especially trained for this work. The " non-
sterile" nurse from each group of teams carried the instruments to and from
this tent. All surgical dressings and gloves were sterilized and stored in a
structure immediately adjoining the operating room, where they were under
the charge of a day or a night nurse, whose duty it was to see that each team
was furnished with an adequate supply at all times. Eight litter bearers, with
a sergeant, first class, in charge, were detailed to move the patients from the
tables as soon as the operations were finished and transfer them to the wards,
leaving the operating room by the door at the lower end. Litters thus moved
through the operating room in one direction only and thereby saved much
confusion. The noncommissioned officer kept a list of the vacant beds in
all surgical wards and also a list of the wards designated for the reception
of evacuable and nonevacuable cases, respectively. Certain wards were re-
served for special cases, such as injuries of the head and spine, chest, abdomen,
fractures, and joints. The operator indicated on the field card the type of case
to lie sent out, and the noncommissioned officer directed the litter bearers where
the patient should be carried. The portion of the hospital area devoted to
tiie evacuable cases was made easily accessible to the ambulances by construct-
ing roads in such a manner that patients could easily be evacuated without
interfering with the ambulances which were carrying patients to the receiving
ilepartment. Many patients were admitted who were unable to undergo
operative treatment immediately, and these the triage officer sent to the shock
wards. These consisted of two large Dickson tents where patients came under
the care of the shock team, made up of 1 medical officer, 2 nurses, and 2
orderlies. These cases were held under treatment until their condition im-
proved sufficiently to enable them to withstand the shock of operative pro-
cedures.
A space apart from the general operating room was provided for the
treatment and dressing of the slightly wounded patients and those able to
walk. It was not always easy to determine whether such cases should lie
822 FIELD OPERATIONS
sent to this department or to the general operating room, for it frequently
happened that wounds which on the surface appeared to be trivial proved in
reality to be extensive and oftentimes serious. Proper classification of such
cases required considerable experience on the part of the triage officer. All
walking cases, however, were without exception cared for in the room for
slighlly wounded, for otherwise the operating room became badly- crowded,
resulting in confusion and lack of discipline.
The hospital was provided with its own electric lighting system. The
calcium carbide apparatus furnished light for a few hours at a time, but
habitually soon developed some defect so that it could not be used. The Delco
system gave good results in a small way, but was entirely unfitted to bear
the burden which was finally' required of it. A lighting arrangement which
proved to be satisfactory was the installation of four incandescent bulbs for
each table, one attached to an extra long cord which permitted it to be
used in any situation. Two dynamos which were set up by the engineers, and
were maintained by them, gave satisfactory service both day and night. A
regulation in force throughout the zone of advance required that all lights
must be shut off from observation after dark, owing to the danger from
hostile airplanes. As this required the entire hospital area to be kept in
total darkness, tarred paper screens were used to prevent rays of light from
emerging from the operating room, wards, or other tents or structures. This
requirement caused considerable difficulty for at times patients were received
continuously through the night and often had to be evacuated by night.
One of the important fields of activity was the evacuation service, for
upon the success with which bed space was freed by patients who were able to
be transferred depended in large measure the ability of the hospital prop-
erly to function. Every medical officer was impressed with his responsibilities
in this matter, and urged to mark every case for evacuation as soon as his
condition would permit. Cases leaving the operating room who would be
fit for evacuation within a period of 12 hours were sent to the group of wards
for evacuable cases; these wards were emptied each day. In the nonevacuable
group of wards a careful check was made daily- by the ward surgeon with a
view to determining which cases were fit for evacuation : they were reported
to the registrar's office. Necessary arrangements were then made at frequent
intervals with the. ambulance service to carry out the evacuation of these
serious cases. The wards were notified at what hour the evacuation ambu-
lances were expected to begin removals, a distinctive marker was placed on
the bed of each evacuable to indicate to the litter bearers that he had been
selected for transfer. Numerous blankets were provided, one or two being
placed folded double on the litter, and one or two over the patient. The
successful administration of the hospital was dependent, largely upon the
promptness with which patients ready for evacuation were removed.
Admissions to this hospital during the Meuse-Argonne operation were
■4,340 wounded. 135 sick. 261 gassed; total, 4,736. Operations numbered 6.134;
deaths, 338. The total number of wounds among those admitted during that
period was 6.204. and the. total cases of gas gangrene were 288. The total
number of surgical admissions to the hospital during its service was 6,922.
M ETJSE-ARGONNE OPERATION
EVACUATION HOSPITAL XO. 9 4
823
Evacuation Hospital No. 9 was stationed at Vaubecourt. Meuse, from
August 29 to December 12. Its receiving ward during tbe Meuse-Argonne
operation was staffed by 2 commissioned officers, 1 sergeant, 8 clerks, 2 guards,
and 10 litter bearers. Though patients were received at all hours, the most
active period of this department was from 1 p. m. to 7 p. m.
With the arrival of troops in the Meuse-Argonne area, this hospital
became progressively more and more active, receiving a number of medical
cases before the offensive began. Attempts were made properly to segregate
infectious cases into different tents, but after the influenza epidemic began
this was not wholly practicable. The medical section of the hospital provided
1.300 beds, but these sometimes proved inadequate in number and patients
were then placed on litters. A section with 360 beds was provided for those
ill with influenza or mild respiratory disease. The activity of this section
was evidenced by the fact that during one period of 24 hours it received
and evacuated 824 cases. Another section of 162 beds received the serious
medical cases, half its beds being reserved for influenza and pneumonia
patients and half for other infectious cases. In general, medical cases were
distributed according to the following classification : Pneumonia, other re-
spiratory diseases including influenza, noncontagious cases and diarrheal dis-
eases, miscellaneous contagious cases, and gassed patients.
The following table shows the number of admissions for the various
jrroups of diseases, by months:
Septem-
ber
October
Novem-
ber
Decem-
t>er
Total
Respirator*" diseases, including influenza, but not pneumonia . ..
2,517
348
63
83
40
500
7,018
3, 9.53
373
246
186
1,500
2,733
2, 309
91
110
19
600
23
11
12, 291
6,621
527
439
245
2,600
Total _ . -
3,551
13, 276
5,862
34
22, 723
Many gassed cases (not included in the above figures) passed through
without being admitted to the gas ward, for some required operation for
wounds and others were lightly gassed. Practically all gassed patients had
been incapacitated by mustard gas, causing burns, conjunctivitis, laryngitis,
irastroenteritis, and bronchitis.
Surgical cases were distributed as follows : In the receiving ward where
surgical and medical cases were sorted, the former were classified as for 1.
immediate operation; 2, operation after X-ray examination; 3. dressing, or 4.
doubtful cases for X-ray examination. These last were sent to the operating
room if the X ray showed a foreign body, but were returned to the dressing
room if it did not.
Routine methods were quickly evolved to promote this classification and
consequent distribution. Six litters supported by trestles received recumbent
cases, ambulant patients occupying benches in the receiving ward proper, while
824 FIELD OPERATIONS
sin annex with 38 beds received an overflow. Clothes were removed, wounds
inspected, and if the patient was to go direct to the operating room, he was
jiitirely undressed, the wound area was shaved and drained, and a light dress-
ing was applied. Similar preparations were made if he was routed to the
operating room via the X-ray laboratory. Simple wounds not requiring
debridement were taken to the adjoining dressing room and thence to their
wards. As in other hospitals of this class, a shock ward received patients in
need of such treatment. In the operating room 2 tables were provided for each
team, and the total 12 tables utilized was served by a splint team. Two of
these teams w T ere provided alternating in 12-hour shifts. Instruments were
sterilized in quantity, laid on a large sterile table, whence they were issued
to all teams. On most active days, the average number of patients operated
in 24 hours was slightly over 200. Patients were evacuated in from 24 to 36
hours, except a few suffering from shock, wounds of the head, thorax, or
abdomen, or in danger of hemorrhage or gas infection. These were some-
times held as long as 10 days.
During the Meuse-Argonne operation this unit admitted 33,910 patients,
of whom 23,582 were sick, 9,809 wounded, and 519 gassed. Operations num-
bered 3,437 and deaths 259. The number of patients received by this unit
in France totaled 36,322. Total admissions to the surgical service were
13,765, of whom 10,200 were dressed without operation and the remainder
operated. Gas bacillus infections numbered 57, of whom 2 died without
operation and 5 after it. Most of the wounded had received injuries of
the extremities, there being 2,094 admissions for wounds of the upper ex-
tremities and 1,449 for those of the lower. In 1,931 cases, fragments of
high-explosive foreign bodies were discovered, of which number 1,496 were
removed. In 287 cases, machine-gun or rifle bullets were lodged and in but
5 cases shrapnel bullets. In 1,131 wounds examined no foreign body was
found, more of these w T ounds having been caused by machine-gun or rifle
bullets. In one patient 13 machine-gun bullets were located.
The time elapsing between injury and operation was less than 6 hours
in 2.5 per cent of the cases, from 6 to 12 in 18.5 per cent, from 12 to 18 in
27.5 per cent, from 18 to 24 in 26.5 per cent, from 24 to 30 in 10 per cent,
from 30 to 36 in 6 per cent, and over 36 hours in 9 per cent.
The conditions of most patients on arrival was good, only 11 being shocked
and 33 being gassed. The number of cases debrided was 3,265. Of these,
2.903 received a general anesthesia, while for the others local anesthesia was
employed.
Orthopedic activities were closely associated with general surgery and con-
sisted chiefly in the temporary splinting of fractured or severely wounded
extremities for immobilization during evacuation. Three hundred and ninety-
seven splints were applied.
The laboratory performed indispensable service in the performance of
its technical examinations.
The eye, ear, nose, and throat service cared for a large number of patients
both in its clinic and throughout the wards.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 825
The X-ray department performed 4.804 examinations while this unit was
at Yaubeeourt. The dental department treated 630 patients, including 32
cases of gunshot wound of the jaws.
The evacuation area consisted of a large Bessonneau hangar and IS smaller
tents where litter cases were collected shortly before a train was due and
ambulant cases immediately after it arrived. As a rule from 6 to 8 hours'
notice was given before the arrival of a train. The largest number evacuated
in 24 hours was 2,128 and the largest number on any train 787, all of the
latter members being sitting patients. The average number evacuated on
American trains was 480 and on French trains 270. about 90 per cent of
all patients being placed on board at night.
Throughout its service in France, this unit received assistance from the
Red Cross, which supplied it with large quantities of bandages, cotton,
sponges, medicines, surgical instruments, blankets, pajamas, and other neces-
sities and maintained a canteen department which served hot cocoa, sand-
wiches, cigarettes, and chewing gum to all arrivals. Its personnel also pre-
pared the special diets, some of the material for which was furnished also
by the Red Cross.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 10*
Evacuation Hospital Xo. 10, on September 21, took over from the French
barracks at Froidos equipped with a quantity of supplies. After September
26, when the first patients were admitted, the operating rooms were con-
stantly in service. The total number of surgical cases received from Sep-
tember 27 to November 15. inclusive, was 5,419. Total cases operated were
3,343; total cases evacuated without operation, 2.05G: total patients dead on
arrival, 10; total died after operation, 112: total died without operation, 109.
A very large proportion of the patients admitted to this hospital were
seriously wounded, and because of delay in getting them to hospital many
cases were complicated with gas infection. For the same reason there was
a large mortality from abdominal wounds. Of the patients operated, 2,47G
had single wounds and 8C5 multiple wounds. The X-ray department
examined 3.037 cases before the end of December, 1918, fluoroscopic examina-
tions for battle injuries numbering 2.934. The contagious disease section of
the hospital occupied buildings previously used by the French for the same
purpose. These were 24 in number, most of which were of barrack construc-
tion and of which, 13 were used as wards, the others being used for miscel-
laneous staff purposes and as quarters. Over 3,000 medical cases were ad-
mitted during the operation, the most common ailments being, in the order-
mentioned, mumps, influenza, diarrhea, toxic gassing, acute bronchitis, and
rheumatic fever. Laboratory examinations from September 12 to .January 1,
1919, numbered 1.853.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. II 4
After reinforcing Mobile Hospital Xo. 39, at Aulnois, and Field Hospital
41. for 10 days during and after the St. Mihiel operation Evacuation Hos-
pital Xo. 11 located, September 21, about 1 mile north of Brizeau. This
826 FIELD OPERATIONS
location was well toward the front, but suffered from the great disadvantage
of not being on a railway. This situation required that supplies be brought
in by truck and that patients be evacuated by ambulance from 11 to 15 km.
(G.G to 9 miles) to Evacuation Hospital No. 10, at Froidos; to American Red
Cross Hospital No. 114, at Fleury sur Aire ; to American Red Cross Hospital No.
110, at Viller Daucourt; or to Evacuation Hospital No. 9, at Vaubecourt. The
capacity of the unit was 4G0 beds, but two annexes of 200 beds each were
established, one on October 5, at Camjo Raton, 1.2 km. (0.75 mile) distant.
for influenza, pneumonia, and other cases of infectious diseases; the other,
opened October 27, at Brizeaux Village, 1.6 km. (1 mile) distant, received
only mumps cases. The hospital proper was ordered to receive only seriously
wounded cases, but toward the end of the Meuse-Argonne operation some
slightly wounded were admitted and after the armistice became effective,
medical cases. While at this site the hospital with its annexes received 2,273
medical cases and 3,292 surgical cases. Of the latter, 2,792 were serious and
among them 21G deaths occurred. The largest number of seriously wounded
operated in one day was 195. In order to expedite care of patients still carry-
ing tourniquets or suffering from shock, abdominal wounds, aspirating chest
wounds, or hemorrhage, an ''emergency tag" was used carrying the following
notations: Name; urgency, 1, 2, 3; preoperative ward; X ray; evacuation
ward : shock ward. In filling out this card the triage officer circled the number,
1, 2, or 3, according to circumstances, a circle around the figure "1" signifying
"rush." and made appropriate check opposite the other entries.
The personnel on duty in the receiving and sorting section of the hospital
consisted of 6 officers and 58 enlisted men, divided into two shifts. The
greatest number of admissions in one day was 221, all of whom were seriously
wounded. After operation, abdominal cases were held 10 days, head cases, in
the event the dura had not been opened, were evacuated at the discretion
of the operator, but those in which the brain was involved were held at least
7 days. Hemothorax complicating chest cases with a through and through
injury were operated in 48 hours and evacuated as soon as it was shown that
the hemothorax was not likely to recur. If a foreign body remained in the
thoracic cavity no attempt was made to remove it. No localized abscess de-
veloped up to the time of evacuation, and thei-e were but two cases of infected
hemothorax in 35 cases. Compound fractures, including those of joints, were
held from 3 to 7 days, but simple fractures were evacuated at once. All
amputations were held from 7 to 10 days and then evacuated as ordered by
the chief of service. Spinal cases were at first held 7 days, but when it was
learned that they were prone to develop bed sores and fatal spinal meningitis,
they were evacuated as quickly as possible on well-padded litters. Cases
infected with gas-forming bacilli were segregated, but it was never possible
to give them a ward by themselves. The shock ward treated 240 patients, of
whom 54 died. Stimulants used in this ward in order of their frequency were
camphorated oil, caffeine, adi-enalin. digitaline, strychnine, and whisky-
Normal salt solution proved more satisfactory than gum acacia solution for
intravenous injections. The hours of operating teams were at first 8 hours,
but were later changed to 12. which proved more satisfactory. Teams were
METISE-AEGONNE OPERATION 82 7
then required to dress their own eases. The two splint teams, which alter-
nated in service, found the Thomas leg splint and the Murray modification of
the Thomas arm splint to be the most suitable for outgoing patients, employ-
ing 12G of the former and 122 of the latter. Other splints applied were Cabot.
166; Liston, 10: Jones, 8; wire ladder, 85; and wood support splints, 00.
Splinting was required in 6 of the 13 cases of maxillofacial injuries. The
number of fluoroscopic examinations made was 3, 143.
During the Meuse-Argonne operation. Evacuation Hospital Xo. 11 ad-
mitted 3.654 patients, of whom 265 were sick, 4 gassed, 3,365 wounded. Oper-
ations numbered 3,364 and deaths 208. The annex at Brizeaux received dur-
ing this operation 469 patients and that at Camp Raton 366; of the latter.
25 died.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 14 4
On September 21 Evacuation Hospital Xo. 14 arrived at Villers-Daucourt
from Toul. transporting its equipment on 90 trucks and the officers and men
in the vehicles of Evacuation Ambulance Company Xo. 12. At this point the
unit prepared to take over part of a French evacuation hospital, but orders
to that effect Avere countermanded, and until October 11 a detachment of 102
of its enlisted men assisted Army Red Cross Xo. 110, at that station. On
October 6 it moved to Les Islettes, reaching its destination the next day.
Here from October 11 to Xovember 6 it received seriously wounded only,
operating entirely under canvas, except that the office, laboratory, the field
officers, and nurses were quartered in a neighboring chateau. This location
was very satisfactory, except that there was only a one-way road into the
premises and that it was at some distance from railhead.
The operating room consisted of a Dickson tent containing 10 improvised
wooden tables whereon the litters carrying patients were placed — an expedient
found more satisfactory than the use of metal tables, to which patients were
lifted from their litters. Electric light for the unit was furnished by its
own dynamo. Evacuations were made by Evacuation Ambulance Company
Xo. 6, usually to Villers-Daucourt, some 24 km. (15 miles) distant. As prac-
tically all cases thus transferred were postoperative litter cases, and as 75 per
cent of them were evacuated at night, this removal was an arduous and diffi-
cult task.
On Xovember 6 the hospital moved to Varennes. where its site was a low
muddy flat, pitted by shell craters which had to be filled in : the approach was
over a very difficult road quite unsuitable for ambulance transport.
These disadvantages were partially offset by proximity to a railway sid-
ing, though patients had to be carried to this by litter through very deep
mud. At this location the hospital received all classes of patients, until
several days after the armistice, after which its admissions were chiefly
medical.
Admissions numbered 1.757 at Les Islettes and 1.045 at Varennes (before
the armistice became effective). Total operations were 1.425. There were 71
preoperative and 58 postoperative deaths among surgical patients. Seventy-
five cases of gas gangrene developed, necessitating 23 amputations.
828 FIELD OPERATIONS
At no time did the hospital have enough transportation to haul supplies,
usually only one truck being available for all service of this character, after
the hospital had reached its location.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL XO. 15 *
Evacuation Hospital No. 15, organized at Fort Riley. Ivans.. March 21,
1918, arrived in France September 3, 1918. On September 21 it reached
Revigny, where it took over a French hospital, which it operated in conjunc-
tion with Base Hospital No. 83 until October 12, when it left for Glorieux.
Service, at Revigny was not very active, and many officers belonging to this
unit were sent out on temporary duty to various other evacuation hospitals.
During its entire period of active service, this hospital admitted 4.761
medical and 4,214 surgical cases.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 10 4
After arriving in France September 7. 1918. Evacuation Hospital No. l(i
remained at Pontanezen, near Brest, until September 18, when it moved to
Le Mans, then to Bazoilles-sur-Meuse and. on October 12. to Revigny, where
it took over the management of a hospital and 495 patients from Base Hos-
pital No. 83. It operated this hospital until November 13, when it returned
its management to Base Hospital No. 83, and reinforced same until January,
when it closed.
In the interval October 15 to November 13 the unit admitted 2.840
patients, of whom 508 were returned to duty and 2.197 evacuated, while 80
died and 8 went absent without leave. The surgical admissions, operative and
nonoperative, totaled 132. Medical admissions included 1.140 cases of in-
fluenza. 99 cases of lobar pneumonia, and 69 cases of bronchopneumonia. The
dental work consisted of 548 sittings and treatment of 11 cases of fracture of
the jaw. Examinations made by the X-ray laboratory totaled 365 (of which
70 per cent were fluoroscopic chest examinations), and those by the pathologi-
cal laboratory 686.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL XO. 20 *
After landing at Brest. September 8. Evacuation Hospital No. 20 moved
successively to Le Mans. Bazoilles-sur-Meuse, and Souilly. where the. hospital
in effect was broken up, its personnel being distributed among other units
until November 18.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 21*
After the arrival of Evacuation Hospital No. 21 at Rimaucourt, on
September 20, 1918, many members of its personnel were assigned to duty
with other units, until the hospital moved to Yillers-Daucourt, October 14.
when it was attached to American Red Cross Military Hospital No. 110.
This was a small unit consisting of but 3 officers and 2 nurses and 2 enlisted
men, while the personnel of Evacuation Hospital No. 21 then consisted of 80
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 829
officers and 226 enlisted men. On October 14, however, half of its commis-
sioned personnel was assigned, by orders of headquarters, First Army, to
duty with American lied Cross Military Hospital No. 114, at Fleurv. with
which they remained until November 30. Forty-two enlisted men were assigned
to Evacuation Hospital Xo. 9. at Vaubecourt. and 1 officer and 15 men to the
pis-treatment annex of Evacuation Hospital Xo. 10. at Julvecourt. Three
officers and 18 enlisted men, between November 4 and 15, relieved Field Hos-
pital Xo. 41. operating the gas-treatment annex of American Red Cross
Military Hospital Xo. 110, at Villers-Daucourt. From November 4 to 15 one
officer and three enlisted men operated the gas-treatment annex of Evacua-
tion Hospital Xo. 6, at Eambluzin. and one officer was assigned to the train
regulating office. Two surgical teams operated continuously at American Eed
Cross Military Hospital No. 110.
Ambulance Company No. 120 was assigned to duty with Evacuation
Hospital No. 21.
Four operating rooms Avere provided at Villers-Daucourt, the three
largest having three tables each. One of these rooms was used for minor
cases and as a preoperative ward, whence patients were taken to the shock
ward or to the X-ray examination room. During all his successive moves
through the hospital, except when jilaced in bed. a patient remained on the
litter which had brought him in, apparently a minor detail, but in emer-
gencies of considerable importance. On November 1. 985 patients were ad-
mitted in 12 hours, and 2 hospital trains were loaded in 8 hours. When teams
operated in 12-hour shifts, the best results were secured if 2 teams utilized
3 tables, but when the shift was 8 hours. 1 team using 3 tables proved as
effective as did 2 teams using the tables in conjunction, for the former arrange-
ment prevented confusion. Patients were evacuated as soon as they coidd
endure transportation, usually in from 12 hours to 3 days. The last patient
was evacuated on November 15, when the gas-treatment hospital, which had
a capacity of 275 beds, was closed. In addition to caring for its own cases,
Evacuation Hospital No. 21 received for train transfer all patients from
Evacuation Hospital No. 14, at Les Islettes.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 22'
After reaching Brest, September 12, 1918, Evacuation Hospital No. 22
was sent to the hospital center at Allerey on September 20, but on October
•3. entrained for Souillv. arriving there October 6. where the unit was broken
up and its personnel assigned to 11 other hospitals in the zone of the army.
On November 19 the unit was reassembled at Vaubecourt, and moved the
next day to the Medical Department concentration area around Joinville.
EVACUATION HOSPITAL NO. 23 *
Arriving in France September 16. 1918, Evacuation Hospital No. 23
moved first to Beaune and thence to Souillv. where it arrived October 10.
830 FIELD OPERATIONS
Here the unit was broken up and its personnel distributed among 12 other
armv hospitals, where they served until the unit was reassembled at Souilly
on November 20 for movement to the Joinville area.
NEUROLOGICAL HOSPITAL NO. I 4
On September 2, 5 officers and 15 men were sent from Base Hospital No.
117, at La Fauche — the neurological center — to Benoite Vaux for temporary
duty in the neurological hospital there, whose staff was to number 15 medical
officers. Plans at this time contemplated that Base Hospital No. 117 be ex-
panded to 1.000 beds, and the neurological hospital at Benoite Vaux to 500
beds, that 10 field hospitals provide 300 beds for neurological cases, and that
Base Hospital No. 45, at Toul, provide 500 beds for cases of this character.
Temporary overflow accommodations at Rimaucourt were to provide 500 beds,
thus giving a total of 2,800 for neurological cases. Shortly thereafter authority
was also given to expand the hospital at La Fauche to 2,000 beds; 2 officers
were sent to Base hospital No. 45 for temporary duty in its neurological wards
and 7 were sent for distribution to tactical divisions.
AMERICAN RED CROSS MILITARY HOSPITAL NO. 110 «
From September 25 to November 20 this unit operated as an evacuation
hospital at Villers-Daucourt, though it was not so designated. It was directed
to receive seriously wounded and gassed cases only, and its personnel was
drawn both from the Army and, to a small degree, from the Red Cross. This
unit admitted a total of 10,679 patients, not including 2,978 from other hospi-
tals in the evacuation area. Shock cases to the number of 470 were sent to
the shock wards before operation, except when intervention was necessary to
check hemorrhage. "When the patient's condition permitted, as indicated by
the. blood pressure, he was sent to the X-ray department and thence to the
operating room. The total number of operations performed was 4,575. Of
the 3.088 cases admitted to the operating room, 138 were suffering from gas
gangrene and 242 were received in shock. The average number of hours be-
tween injury and admission to the. operating room was 24 hours, the shortest
period being 1 hour and the longest period 4i/> days. Total deaths in the
hospital numbered 194. Total foreign bodies removed were 1,277. The per-
centage operated was 37.4, the percentage of deaths from all causes being 1.8.
Of these. 14.6 per cent were preoperative in the shock ward. The percentage
of surgical to other cases was 78.5. Shock-ward statistics were as follows:
Total admissions, 470; preoperative admissions. 242; preoperative deaths, 28:
postoperative admissions, 228; postoperative deaths. 53; total deaths. 81.
Normal saline transfusions. 80: gum-acacia-saline transfusions. 42; glucose (3
per cent) transfusions. G; citrate of blood transfusions, 80. Deaths after
blood transfusions numbered 20. Total admissions by this hospital during
its service in this and other areas numbered 18,867.
This unit was assisted by personnel from Ambulance Company No. 120.
Field Hospital Xo. 41. Evacuation Hospital Xo. 14. Mobile Hospital No. 4
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 831
Ambulance Company No. 310, United States Army Ambulance Service Sec-
tion No. 610, Evacuation Hospitals Nos. 21, 22, and 23, and by numerous
surgical teams. It was also supplied with individual officers and nurses
from Army and Bed Cross personnel.
The summarized report of this unit from the four months ending Novem-
ber 10 was as follows:
Hospital days 23. 170
Patients admitted 17, 440
Patients evacuated 13.074
Patients died 255
Patients returned to duty 9
Total beds 525
Maximum expansion 781
AMERICAN RED CROSS MILITARY HOSPITAL NO. 114'
After arriving at Fleury, this Red Cross unit was known as American
Red Cross Military Hospital No. 114, and eventually was taken over entirely
by the Medical Department, United States Army. Certain Red Cross nurs-
ing personnel continued with the formation until it closed. On November 1
this unit became Evacuation Hospital No. 114.
Until reinforced October 15, by 15 officers from Evacuation Hospital No.
21, the commissioned personnel of this unit consisted of 5 officers, supple-
mented by teams temporarily assigned. The officers from Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 21 were now assigned to administrative and ward services and to
other duties not performed by attached teams. Service was handicapped
by the limited number of nurses.
Eoutine service was as follows : Patients in shock were taken at once
to the adjoining shock ward, the slightly injured and walking cases to the
receiving ward for patients of that class, whence they Mere sent to the
evacuation ward, where they remained from 12 to 24 hours. The number of
patients in this category, who were evacuated without operation, depended
directly upon the number of serious cases requiring such attention that could
be cared for in 24 hours. As a rule, the most serious cases were selected for
operation. These and all litter cases (many of whom had arrived in bad con-
dition as ambulant patients) passed through the receiving ward for patients
of this class, which was on the opposite side of the general receiving ward
from that to which the slighter cases were sent. All litter and serious cases
were completely undressed and bathed, all dressings renewed except the
larger splints, wounds inspected, re-dressed, and re-splinted, or splints were
readjusted. Clothed in pajamas, patients were taken to the X-ray depart-
ment, whence, after fluoroscopic examination, they were taken to the operat-
ing room. This was equipped with from 15 to 20 tables arranged in 2 rows.
1 or 2 being assigned to each team. These teams consisted usually of an
operator and his assistant, an anesthetist (a commissioned officer), a nurse,
and an enlisted man. In general no specialized work was assigned to indi-
vidual teams except for some cases of head injuries. Teams worked in 12-
832 FIELD OPERATIONS
hour shifts. Beside each operating table was a small table holding only a
scalpel, pair of scissors, hemostatic forceps, anatomical forceps, a needle, and
catgut. Other instruments and dressings were kept on a large table in the
middle of the room in charge of a nurse, who distributed tbem on call. From
the operating room, cases were carried to the postoperative ward, unless in
need of treatment, in the shock department. All cases reaching the wards bore
tags marked " hold " or " evacuate," the former tag being affixed to tbe severe
cases, which were held 24 hours or more. Head, thorax, and abdominal cases
were held from 3 to 10 days, according to the pressure for beds, but all others
except these usually were evacuated in 36 hours. Tbe ward surgeons re-
dressed patients every 24 hours, or oftener if dressings became soiled, and
verified the application of splints.
As was to be expected, after tbe armistice the proportion of medical cases
increased greatly, due chiefly to influenza, pneumonia, and dysentery. From
September 26 to December 11 the total number of evacuations was 28,139, of
whom 21.078 were surgical, not including 575 wounded prisoners and 6,477
medical cases. These patients were removed by 93 trains.
GAS HOSPITALS 4
Four gas-treatment hospitals were provided in the area of the First Army.
On September 24, the officer charged with degassing service reported that
the total number of officers assigned to these units, including teams, but not
including 3 officers assigned for instruction, was 13. and the total of enlisted
men was 231. None of the units were fully equipped and none had trans-
portation. Gas Hospital No. 1. witli 3 officers and 288 beds, was at Rambluzin:
Xo. 2, with 6 officers and 300 beds, was at Julvecourt: Xo. 3, with 1 officer and
325 beds, was at La Morlette, and No. 4, with 3 officers and 350 beds, was
at Karecourt.
Gas Hospital Xo. 1 had reached Rambluzin August 29 and opened the
next day. On October 5 its personnel consisted of 2 officers and 37 men.
During October the number of gassed patients it admitted averaged 8 daily.
but at the end of that month it was ordered to discontinue service as a gas
hospital and to receive contagious cases.
Gas Hospital No. 2, at Julvecourt, with a bed capacity of 300, was caring
for 475 patients on October 2. Thereafter its patients usually numbered less
than 300. though occasionally they exceeded that figure. This unit was pro-
vided with excellent bathing facilities and a portable laundry. From Novem-
ber 5 to 25, when it closed, it was designated as Annex B of Evacuation Hos-
pital Xo. 10. and operated under its general jurisdiction. During the Meuse-
Argonne operation this unit admitted 4,267 patients, among whom were 37
deaths.
(ias Hospital No. 3. at La Morlette, was staffed by 1 officer and 19 en-
listed men. but this number was augmented, for part of its service, by 2
officers and 40 men from Field Hospital 338.
MEUSE-AROONNE OPERATION 833
Gas Hospital No. 4, at Rarecourt, was staffed by 3 officers and 47 enlisted
men. From November 5 to November 17, when it closed, this unit was known
sis Annex A to Evacuation Hospital No. 10.
BASK HOSPITALS AT TOUL
On October 9 the hospitals at Toid were transferred from the First to the
American Second Army, but they are discussed at this point as they were
more active during the period of their service in the First Army, and during
that time they cared for more battle casualties than they did later.
Like the other hospitals located at Toul, Base Hospitals No. 45 and No. 51
received casualties from the Meuse-Argonne operation, but because of their
distance from the front, relatively few were admitted. Most of the surgical
work which they performed consisted of secondary closures and care of
postoperative cases.
BASE HOSPITAL NO. 51 4
Base Hospital No. 51 had arrived at Toul and taken over French bar-
racks. The unit received patients from the First Army and later in much
smaller numbers from the Second Army.
Admissions during the last week of September totaled 812, and weekly
admissions thereafter were as follows: October 8, 496; October 15. 851;
October 22. 105; October 29. 534; November 5, 66; November 12, 252. Of
this number, about 1.200 were surgical, 271 gassed, and the remainder medical.
After the installation of its X-ray plant, which had begun operations
September 11. surgical work was limited for a time by lack of instruments.
Nevertheless, the unit was able to care for from 50 to 150 cases daily and in
emergencies for even larger numbers.
BASE HOSPITAL NO. 55 *
This unit arrived at Tend September 28. On October 8 it had a normal
capacity of 924 beds, with emergency expansion of 1.163. By the addition of
tentage its bed capacity could be increased to approximately 2.000.
BASE HOSPITAL NO. 78 4
On September 23 this unit arrived at Toul. where it became a part of
the Justice hospital group, occupying 3 three-story and 3 two-story structures
and about 10 smaller buildings.
The first patients were admitted September 29. During the months of
September and October its activities were practically those of an exacuation
hospital. It received some cases from evacuation hospitals and mobile hos-
pitals, hut most of its patients from divisional units. During the height of
its activities this hospital functioned with less than 50 nurses on duty and
only 150 enlisted men. exclusive of patients assigned to miscellaneous duties.
The original equipment was not received until December. 1918. Patients were
1M.-.7fi— 2r 53
834 FIELD OPERATIONS
carefully classified in the receiving ward and distributed to the appropriate
departments of the hospital. Operating teams were made up of three medical
officers, an operator, an assistant, and an anesthetist. The schedules of service
were so arranged that not more than 12 hours continuous service was required
of a team, night and day service alternating. Much of the operating was
performed at night, for the convoys usually arrived after dark. A large
number of preoperative cases were received a few hours after the injury had
been sustained. Except the shock cases, which were cared for in their special
ward, surgical cases were X rayed and promptly operated. Patients were
handled as little as possible : most of the cases did not leave the stretcher upon
which they arrived from the ambulance until they were put to bed after
operation.
Extensive debridement was practiced, followed by the Carrel-Dakin
method of wound treatment. Because of early evacuation of patients there
was but little opportunity for secondary closures of wounds.
During the early part of its activities this hospital was the surgical unit
of the group, but after the armistice it took over the treatment of infections
and suppurating cases and still later the treatment of genitourinary diseases.
From September 29, 1918, to April 29, 1919. it admitted 3,205 cases to
the surgical service, performing 343 operations. Among these patients 25
deaths occurred, 12 of them being preoperative.
Although designated as a surgical unit, this hospital always had a fairly
large proportion of its cases in medical wards, receiving a total of 2.38S
medical cases, with respiratory diseases predominating, in October and
Xovember. Preventive measures for these were the use of masks and the
" cubiculizing" of wards by means of sheets strung across the room on wires.
Total deaths from disease numbered 65, of which 45 occurred in October.
There were few unusual features in connection with the laboratory work.
Pneumonia, especially that following influenza, was very severe, with an over-
whelming toxemia and a high mortality. Hemorrhagic conditions in the
intestines were found by post-mortem in a number of cases which primarily
had presented pulmonary symptoms. There were many cases of enteritis,
which seemed largely due to dietetic errors. Many influenza cases presented
abdominal symptoms resembling those of appendicitis in the severity of pains
in the right lower abdomen.
The X-ray department utilized a total of 489 plates and 754 films. The
number of X-ray examinations was 966.
The dental service cared for 800 patients, giving 1,074 sittings.
BASE HOSPITAL NO. 82 4
This unit, with 34 officers and 192 men, moved to Toul on September 27.
1918, where it occupied the Luxembourg Barracks. By the 28th it had n
normal capacity of 1.120 l>eds, 250 emergency beds, and space in a receiving
tent and an annex. At that time there were enough surgical supplies for
three or four tables. The laboratory had supplies for clinical work, but the
X-ray laboratory was not equipped. There were no orthopedic appliances, but
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 835
there was a sufficiency of beds, quarters, bedding, mess equipment, ward equip-
ment, food, and medicines. Material to meet all deficiencies had been requi-
sitioned and was expected within a few days. The American Red Cross
equipped this unit almost completely. It occupied 30 buildings which had been
turned over by that organization through an arrangement made with the
French Government, 10 being one-story structures which accommodated 150
patients each, and 10 bein<r other structures of six rooms; the latter were set
aside for nurses and officers. The other buildings were used as offices, store-
rooms, etc. This formation operated as an Army hospital and was not con-
sidered a Red Cross unit, though it occupied buildings and utilized equipment
which had belonged to that society. Its official numerical designation, how-
ever, was followed by the words " Red Cross Foundation," in parentheses, thus
indicating its obligation. This unique addition to the official title of Base
Hospital No. 82 was due to the following facts: A Red Cross unit, commonly
known as " McCoy's unit," from the name of the officer of the Medical Corps
who was placed on duty with it when the Red Cross placed it in control of
a hospital at Chateau-Thierry, had been sent from the Maine area to operate
a hospital at Toul during the St. Mihiel operation. The hospital was one
which the American Red Cross had been operating for French civilians, but in
this emergency the society agreed to evacuate its patients and to turn it over,
with its equipment, to the Army. The hospital, which was then designated
Army Red Cross FCvacuation Hospital Xo. 114. was reinforced by the personnel
of a field hospital. After the St. Mihiel operation. "McCoy's unit," which
now consisted almost entirely of army officers and enlisted men and Red Cross
nurses, was moved to Villers-Daucourt, where it operated during the Meuse-
Aigonne operation. Base Hospital Xo. 82 took over the premises and equip-
ment which had been supplied by American Red Cross Military Hospital
Xo. 114.
BASK HOSPITAL NO. 83*
On arrival in France Base Hospital Xo. 83 moved to Revigny. where it
arrived September 22 and was united with Evacuation Hospital Xo. 15. Here
C officers and 20 enlisted men were detached to organize a 200-bed hospital
for influenza and pneumonia cases, as an annex to Evacuation Hospital Xo.
11, at Camp du Raton, Brizeaux Forrestiere. Other officers and men were
distributed anion"; Evacuation Hospitals Xos. 6, 7, 10 and American Red Cross
Military Hospital Xo. 114. On or before Xovember 10 all the detached per-
sonnel was reunited at Revijrnv where, until Xovember 13. Base Hospital
Xo. 83 was under the command of the commanding officer of Evacuation Hos-
pital Xo. 1G. On Xovember 14 the former unit assumed command of the
hospital there.
The service rendered at Revigny was chiefly that of an evacuation
hospital.
BASE HOSPITAL NO. 87 *
This unit arrived at the Justice hospital <rroup on October 8, where it
took over control of the pis and neurological services of the <rroup, with a bed
capacity of 1.700. Only about 1.100 beds were available at first and these
were filled by October 11. The unit occupied large stone and cement buildings
836
FIELD OPERATIONS
divided into rooms that had from 14 to 18 beds each and averaged about 100
beds to each floor. The personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, was about
equally divided between the gas and neurological services.
The personnel attached to the organization by local orders consisted of 12
officers, 33 nurses, and 153 enlisted men, but it was anticipated that later their
numbers would be considerably reduced, as orders would be issued returning
them to their original units. On October 10 total strength of the organiza-
tion was 48 officers, 33 nurses, and 327 enlisted men. Four surgical teams
were organized on the 11th, each consisting of 3 medical officers. 1 nurse, and
2 enlisted men. The laboratory began operations on the 25th. The X-ray
plant had already been established in connection with the neurological service.
By the date the armistice was signed bed capacity had increased to 1,825,
the number of patients varying from 1,200 to 1,500.
Admissions, by weeks, prior to the armistice were as follows:
Date
Medical
Gassed
Neuro-
logical
Oct. 12 — — -.
213
49
91
31
65
456 ! 14
19 ... .
80
26
48
205
Nov. 2 . --
9 -. . -.
173
The gassed and neurological sections were situated about 0.8 km. (0.5
mile) apart. The latter was known also as Neurological Unit Xo. 2. This
was located at the western end of the Justice hospital group, where it had
a normal capacity of 650 beds and facilities for 300 additional beds under
canvas. The greatest difficulties which this unit experienced were those inci-
dent to crude sanitary facilities, including inadequate bathing equipment.
The gas hospital section occupied structures which formerly had been
used as a hospital by the French for the La Marche Barracks. These build-
ings, of stone and cement, were all in good condition and were equipped
October 3 to care for 1.000 patients. There was sufficient space to provide for
considerable expansion.
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE HOSPITAL AT TOUL 4
On October 4 the contagious disease hospital at Toul was located in
buildings formerly known as the Perrin-Brichambault Annexe. These build-
ings, previously a French military hospital, were two and one-half stories high.
of brick and cement construction, with a spacious central court. On October
9 the unit had GOO beds erected ready to receive patients. On December 22.
it was recommended that the official capacity of the contagious hospital bo
564, with an emergency expansion to 700.
Admissions from October 2 to January 10 varied from 4 to 71 per day.
the highest average being for November, when an average of 44 patients was
admitted daily. The number of patients during November was about 500.
also slightly more than during the preceding and succeeding months. The
jiersonnel on duty averaged 6 medical officers and 84 enlisted men.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 837
The unit treated a great variety of infectious diseases, comprising in fact
practically every type which appeared in the army overseas.
In a report on meningitis cases for the month of December, note was
made that only a few occurred in the same company. The meningococcus of
Weichselbaum was isolated in the cerebrospinal fluid of all cases. Twenty-six
per cent of the patients were of the fulminating type, 48.1 per cent of the
ordinary type, 12 per cent of systemic type, 7.8 per cent chronic, 4.6 per cent
intermittent. The total number of cases in this series (that of December)
was G4. with a mortality of 35.93 per cent.
SANITATION
Throughout this action, pioneer and labor troops were too strenuously
engaged in repairing roads and railways and in assisting to forward ammu-
nition and rations to perform, as formerly, police duties on the battle field,
while combatant troops were too fully occupied in defeating the enemy to
cive attention to the simplest rules of sanitation. It had been made clear
to the command that every other consideration must be subordinated to the
defeat of the enemy and in responding to this supreme requirement troops
often resorted to primitive sanitary practices. Frequently, latrines were not
provided, and thousands of animals were, for a time, unburied; but, because
of the cold weather, such lack of sanitatary precautions was faulty more from
an esthetic than from an hygienic standpoint. 5
With the knowledge that American forces were at death grips with a
powerful and ruthless enemy, medical officers at the front refrained from
making recommendations that common sense declared impracticable, confining
their efforts in sanitation chiefly to the provision of good water and food to
the troops in line and to the prevention of the spread of epidemic disease.
They insisted, however, and with success, that labor troops police the battle
field when discharge of this duty did not interfere with their assistance to the
supply service. In the terrain back of the battle lines customary standards
of sanitation were maintained despite the handicaps imposed by torrential
rains and deep mud. As Avas the case at the front, provision of good water
and suitable food and control of epidemics were considered the primary sani-
tary requirements. Notwithstanding the adverse circumstances under which
all labored and the hardships to which troops were exposed, the rate for ad-
mission for influenza was lower in the First Army than among troops in the
base sections and training areas. 5
REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ON MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
ACTIVITIES IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION
The following extracts are from the report of the inspector general,
A. E. F., made on December 11, 1918, to the commander in chief, concerning
activities of the Medical Department in the Meuse-Argonne operation. 6 In
common with such reports generally, it especially stresses defects noted.
Xntes made by the Inspector General, A. E. F. During active operations from 12th
of September, 1918, to 11th of November. 1018.
♦ ****»•
838 FIELD OPERATIONS
IV. Hospitalization :
A. Evacuation of icounded. —
1. Evacuation of wounded from the battle field : Tlie succor of wounded in the battle
field was. on the whole, prompt, and patients began to pass- through the battalion and
regimental aid stations in a short time after the offensive began. When the line became
stationary and resistance of the enemy increased, it was often very difficult to get the
wounded in, even the walking wounded, for the enemy machine-gun fire was very heavy
and many lay for hours in shell holes and other protected places before litter bearers
could reach them, or ambulatory patients could walk back to the aid stations with any
safety.
2. Personnel : The supply of personnel for succor of wounded varied as the divisional
sanitary personnel was in some divisions augmented by a certain number of line troops
from each company. These were trained in first-aid work and were available as litter
hearers when needed. This personnel was provided for by corps orders in the First Corps,
while in the Fifth Corps the detail of line troops as litter bearers was not permitted.
This made a shortage of bearers in divisions of this corps, and it was necessary to aug-
ment the regimental sanitary personnel by a certain number of soldiers from ambulance
companies when they were available.
Under the new tables of organization, the regimental sanitary personnel will be very
materially increased, but the present allowance of personnel is not adequate to care for
the wounded when casualties are heavy, and it would seem wise to make uniform pro-
visions in all corps to provide for additional personnel to assist the regimental Utter
bearers in case of emergency.
3. Evacuations of battalion and regimental aid stations were made, as a rule, by
divisional ambulances, but frequently heavy shell fire prevented ambulances from reaching
these stations, and the patients were littered back to ambulance heads or to advance
dressing stations by personnel of ambulance companies. Evacuations from dressing
stations to triage and field hospitals was always by field ambulances.
Many divisions arriving in the area reported heavy shortages of ambulances, mounting
often to entire ambulance companies. These shortages were made good, as far as possible,
by evacuation ambulance companies and S. S. U. units, etc.
Evacuation of triage and field hospitals were under the control of the corps sur-
geons and made by evacuation ambulance companies. A large number of trucks were
also used for transportation of the wounded. Most of the less seriously wounded were
transported by trucks, ainf a relatively small number of litter patients were similarly
transported.
4. Evacuation time was, on the whole, satisfactory. The time between the receipt
of wound and arrival at the triage averaged about 5 or (i hours, and to evacuation hos-
pitals, 10 to Hi hours. Many patients arrived in much shorter time, and again, in some
cases, considerable delay occurred. The delay mentioned above in evacuating battle
fields was due to very heavy machine-gun fire directed at sanitary personnel and wounded,
as well as at combatant troops ; sholl-riddled terrain making litter bearing extremely
difficult ; and a local shortage of litter bearers. Instances have occurred where four litter
bearers consumed as many hours in the transportation of one patient from the battle field
to the advance dressing station. Delays in reaching dressing stations were mainly due
to extremely bad condition of roads, road congestion, and block, which frequently held
ambulances for many hours. This was especially the case after the preliminary advance
of October 26. There were isolated instances where the triage and field hospitals wen 1
taxed to their limit through the delays in evacuating, sometimes due to the shortages
of evacuation ambulance companies or delay in their reaching these stations. This caused
temporary congestion at the hospitals, but no hardships to the patients, as they were
sheltered, fed. and given the required treatment.
With the improvements in road conditions and road policing, as well as increased
experience and efficiency on the part of the hospital personnel, these delays !>ecame less
frequent and during the advance, beginning November 1, the evacuation time was excel-
lent in spite of the great distance between the line and the various evacuation hospitals.
MEFSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 839
5. Distribution of wounded to evacuation and mobile hospitals : Under the system
in vogue at the beginning of the offensive of October 26, for distribution of patients to
the various evacuation and mobile hospitals, some hospitals received fewer wounded than
their bed and operating capacity justified, while others were running to the limit of their
capacity, and at times were temporarily overcrowded. This was later corrected by plac-
ing guards on the feeding roads leading south, and these guards, under the direction of
the office of the chief surgeon, directed the flow of ambulances so that all hospitals re-
ceived a proportion of the wounded corresponding to their bed and operating capacity.
This plan tended to make most effectual use of all facilities, prevented overcrowding, and
tended to reduce to a minimum the number of wounded evacuated preoperative.
6. Hospital trains : Evacuations to the base hospitals in the rear were made by
trains, many French trains being used for this purpose. The supply of trains was at all
times sufficient to prevent undue congestion at advanced hospitals, though they were at
times taxed to the limit of their capacity. The French trains, especially those of box-car
type, are not by any means ideal for the transportation of the wounded, especially seri-
ously wounded, and it is believed that only the less serious cases should be transported
cm these trains.
The handling of patients on these trains showed certain defects, the most serious of
which arose from the fact that the French orderlies could not understand any English, and
the American patients, its a rule, could speak no French, and were in consequence unable
at times to communicate their needs and secure appropriate attention.
Arrangements were being made to supply American orderlies to interpret and to
assist the French attendants
B. Care of wounded. —
1. The iirst-aid dressing and splints were applied on the battle field or at the battalion
aid station. Where these stations were established in dugouts and shattered buildings,
some hot food was also given wounded, though frequently with an advancing line this was
inqiossible.
2. Antitetanic serum: In a large proportion of cases. A. T. S. was not administered
until the wounded reached the advance dressing station, and in a small percentage of
cases had not been given upon their arrival at the field hospitals. Conditions in this re-
spect improved with experience, though even toward the close of the period many in-
jections of the serum were still given at the dressing stations, having been omitted by
the regimental personnel.
:{. Dressings and splints : The dressing of wounds and the splinting of fractures
were, on the whole, well done. A small number of undressed wounds and uuspliuted
fractures which occurred were investigated, traced to their sources, and by taking early
corrective measures their number was kept down to a minimum.
4. Triages and field hospitals : Triages varied as regards their organizations, being
in some divisions under charge of the personnel of ambulance companies, while in
others a field hospital served as a triage and the other field hospitals were grouped near
by, serving as divisional gas, nontransportable, and hospitals for divisional sick.
5. Gassed cases : At the beginning of the offensive, especially in less experienced
divisions, there was a large number of patients evacuated from their divisions and
diagnosed as " gas suspect," who on their arrival at the various evacuation gas hospitals
showed no symptoms of gas intoxication. Some of these were returned to their organiza-
tions, but others, because of the difficulty in returning patients to organizations, or
liecause of the congestion of the hospitals incident to the large number of admissions,
were evacuated by train to the rear, their services being temporarily and unnecessarily
lost. This condition was promptly corrected by retaining all mild and indefinite cases
in divisions and evacuating only the more serious clear-cut cases.
A very large proportion of these patients held in divisions were returned to their
organizations within a few days.
Many so-called " gas patients" were in reality suffering from exhaustion, diarrhea,
etc., as demonstrated by further observation. Accuracy of diagnosis in gas cases is
especially important, as symptoms are frequently delayed, in mild cases they are vague.
840 FIELD OPERATIONS
and the fact that wound stripes are allowed "gas patients," has a tendency to make
some men complain of the symptoms of gas poisoning. By retaining these men in divi-
sions, accuracy of diagnosis was assured and malingering discouraged.
li. Xontransportable hospitals: At the beginning of the offensive, October 27,
the (ield hospital groups were located mainly in shattered buildings only slightly in ad-
vance of some of the evacuation hospitals. Facilities for operating and postoperative
care were very inferior to those available at the latter hospitals, and performing of opera-
tions on nontransportable cases under these conditions were not justified.
After the advance of the line, and with it the divisional sanitary organizations, a
large number of life-saving operations were done. In some divisions the equipment of
these hospitals was elaborate, operating teams were on hand as a correspondingly large
amount of work was done, while in others, facilities were very limited and frequently
no operative interference was attempted, nontransportable cases being sent to corps
hospitals for operation.
7. The work of the Second Division, whose triage and field hospitals were located
near Charpentry during the offensive beginning November 1, was of the highest order.
The group was well located and planned, and a stone road constructed by the sanitary
personnel made ingress and egress of ambulances very easy. All the wards were well
heated, the beds clean and comfortable, and the attention given patients compared
favorably to that given at evacuation hospitals. Litter racks and bedrests for all beds
were improvised from the metal supports of barbed-wire entanglements collected in the
neighborhood. The discipline of the personnel was of a high order. The work done
was a great credit to the division surgeon, Lieut. Col. Richard Derby, and to the per-
sonnel of the various hospitals of the group.
The triages and field hospital groups of other divisions, though less elaborate than
those of the Second Division, showed nevertheless a high degree of efficiency and indi-
cated that much had been learned through experience in each of these offensives.
C. Records. —
1. In some divisions field cards and envelopes were prepared at the triage, while
in others diagnosis tags alone accompanied patients to the rear. This was due to the
fact that the supply of cards and envelopes was Insufficient to furnish all divisions and
that there was also a shortage in some of the evacuation hospitals. This shortage was
later corrected to some extent, a considerable number of the forms having been received
at the supply dump and distributed to the organizations.
In some inexperienced divisions patients, especially gas suspects, arrived at various
hospitals without diagnosis tags, but this was promptly corrected.
In a large percentage of cases diagnosis tags were not signed by the officer who
treated the patient, hut by the attendant who made out the tag. This is a bad pro-
cedure, as it prevents fixing of responsibility for the diagnosis and treatment of any
particular case. All cards should be signed, or at least initialed, by the medical officer.
Some improvement in this respect was brought about toward the close of the period.
D. Evacuation hospitals. —
The work done by the various evacuation hospitals was very creditable, both as
regards operations performed and the preoperative and postoperative treatment The
hospitals at the bases to which patients were evacuated were visited to determine after
results ; the report was favorable both as to the condition of patients on arrival and
results of operations performed.
1. Personnel : There was in general a shortage of personnel, especially personnel for
labor work, fatigue, litter bearing, and digging of graves. This was especially the
case at the beginning of the offensive, but was later much improved on the arrival of
additional personnel and labor elements assigned to hospitals.
2. Care of property of patients: During the St. Mihiel offensive provision was not
made in most hospitals for the care of property of patients, and a considerable numl>er
of officers and soldiers were robbed of money, watches, and other valuables. These
cases were investigated, and one thief who had stolen 250 francs from a dying patient
MEUSE-ARGOXXK OPERATION 841
apprehended and the money recovered. Adequate provisions for the safeguarding of
the effects of patients were Immediately instituted in all hospitals, and only a very
few isolated cases of loss of property were later reported.
A large number of officers and some soldiers arriving at hospitals wounded have
mi their persons considerable sums of money and other valuables, and in several cases
company funds of organizations which they command. Several officers stated that they
had not been able to deposit this money, though they had frequently attempted to do so.
as there were no depositories for company funds. Provision was later made for deposi-
tories for company funds in divisions.
3. Salvage of property: This was on the whole very badly handled at first, the
quantity of property salvaged from patients, including uniforms, overcoats, puttees,
slickers, gas masks, shoes, infantry packs, etc.. heing tremendous. Labor for earing for
and sorting the same and space for storing it were Inadequate. This was later cor-
rected by the Salvage Department arranging to collect the same and transport it to the
dumps.
4. Laundry facilities: Some hospitals have no laundry facilities, and in others facil-
ities were far below hospital needs. This made it necessary in some cases to salvage soiled
linen instead of washing it. and requisition was made on supply depots to replace that
salvaged, taxing the linen supply of the dumps. The supply of laundries was always
limited, hut the shortage was made good to some extent before the closing of the offensive.
5. Signs for hospitals: Cardboard signs were conspicuously placed indicating the
location of various hospitals. Due to inclement weather, some of these became effaced,
blown down, or destroyed. It is recommended that sheet-iron signs be included in the
equipment of these hospitals. These would be posted when hospitals are established
and would be taken down and reposted as the hospitals moved forward. If these signs
could he marked with luminous paint, it would do very much toward preventing am-
bulances from losing their way when traveling at night and especially when running
without lights.
6. Return of patients to organizations: Many patients admitted to the evacuation
hospital, especially early in the offensives, soon recovered, and would have been able to
return to duty had suitable machinery been in force to effect their return to their organi-
zations. Under the conditions existing, many of them were evacuated to the rear. Ar-
rangements were later made to send patients marked " duty " to replacement battalions,
from which they were forwarded to their proper organizations, thus preventing wholesale
evacuations to the rear.
V. Burial of dead :
A. During the offensives in the Chateau-Thierry area very little attention was paid
to the burial of the dead : many of the dead lay for days without being buried : a large
number of isolated burials occurred : and many of the dead were improperly or par-
tially buried in shell holes. In many cases no attempt was made to identify the dead,
and approximately 10 per cent were buried unidentified. Strict orders covering the
entire subject of the burial of the dead was issued at that time.
B. There has been considerable Improvement, but that the technique as yet is by no
means perfect is indicated by the fact that an investigation at present being made had
revealed neglect on the part of the lid Division. A large number of isolated burials have
been made, and in some cases several of the dead have been buried in a single grave and
improperly identified. This condition is an exception, and as a whole chaplains and other
burial officers are now carrying out their work in an efficient manner.
C. Sanitation : Sanitation was. on the whole, poor in the entire areas. Buildings,
towns, and the terrain in general was left in a filthy condition by the retreating armies.
and the American forces had little opportunity to correct the sanitary defects during
active operations. This was especially manifested in primitive methods used to dispose
of excreta and waste. Latrines were rarely, if ever, constructed along line of inarch.
and men were constantly seen defecating in fields beside roads and soiling the terrain
of the villages. This was also characteristic of organizations at the front. Organizn-
13570—25 54
842 FIELD OPERATIONS
tions at rest behind the lines generally built straddle trenches and insisted upon the use
of them in general, though numerous exceptions were noted.
As regards kitchen waste and refuse in general, they were at times carted away,
though frequently simply left in piles or scattered when organization? left the terri-
tory.
D. Water supply : Men during advances frequently had no access to pure water ami
drank from shell holes or any other source that they could find. In some organizations.
even at rest, there were no Lister bags or other facilities for chlorinating water. These
conditions were very markedly improved during the latter part of the period, and in
some cases marked decrease in gastrointestinal disturbances were brought about through
improvements in the supply of pure water to the troops.
E. Clothing: In many divisions there was a shortage of clothing to permit of a
change as the men were bathed, and a large proportion of the men were infested with
lice. The clothing situation was cleared up through the establishment of a very large
dump at Fleury, from which all necessary winter underwear, overcoats, blankets, and other
clothing were supplied in sufficient amounts to equip the entire personnel of all divisions.
REFERENCES
(1) Final report of the chief surgeon, First Army, A. B. F., upon the St. Mihiel and
Meuse-Argonne operation, November 18, 1918, 18. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(2) Evacuation of the wounded in the Meuse-Argonne operation, by Col. H. H. M. Ljie,
M. C, December 10, 1919, 26. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(3) Medical activities in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C, undated, 19.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) From reports of Medical Department activities of individual hospitals, prepared
under the direction of commanding officers, undated. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(5) Medical activities in the Zone of the Armies, by Col. A. N. Stark, M. C, undated, 21.
On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(6) Notes made by the inspector general, A. E. F., during active operations from Septem-
ber 12 to November 11, 1918. Copy on file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
SECTION V
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH THE MEUSE-
ARGONNE OPERATION
CHAPTER XXXV
THE SECOND ARMY" •»
During the activities which were taking place west of the Meuse, other
operations had been in progress farther east which were acquiring greater
importance. The front had become so extended and the objective so diverse
that a single army could no longer handle the situation, and the Second
Army had been organized. This army, under General Billiard, established
headquarters on October 12, and took over the front from Fresne-en-Woevre
to the Seille River, east of Pont-a-Mousson. This line ran from Port-sur-
Seille near Clemery to Pont-a-Mousson, down the river to Vandieres, thence
by Lachaussee Lake and Doncourt to Fresne-en-Woevre. The line in question
was about the same as that held by the American Army at the end of the
St. MiMel operation; when taken over by the Second Army it was occupied
by the American Fourth and the French Second Colonial Corps. The Sixth
Corps was also assigned to that army, but as yet it consisted of headquarters
only, no troops having been assigned to it. On the right, the Second Army
connected with the French Eighth Army; on the left, with the American
First Army.
The new army had first to perfect its own organization, meanwhile oc-
cupying and defending the assigned zone : later, to prepare for offensive action.
The right of the army was astride the Moselle, which here runs generally
north through Metz and Tbionville. Its valley is about 2 km. (1.2 miles)
wide. The bank of each side rises into a series of ridges, well suited to
defensive positions. Along these heights, west and southwest of Metz, are
the permanent forts forming part of the chain of defenses of the city. In
front of our sector of the lines were woods, favorable to defense. On the
left, the country was more open and more favorable for offensive operations.
The enemy's withdrawal position, known as the Michel position, along
this front had been laid out some two years before, but very little was ac-
tually done upon it until now. It was well wired, and recently the enemy
had improved the trenches. Behind it were the works of the Metz defenses.
■For convenience of description it has been decided to cover bore the period from the organiza-
tion of the Second Army, October 12, 1918, until the armistice, November 11, 1918 : it should be
noted, however, that this advance, which was in the direction of Briey Iron Basin, took place only
during the last three days of hostilities. The. 79th Division, attached to the French Second Colonial
Corps, was a part of the Second Army from October 12 to 23. Its activities have been described
In Chapter XXXIII.
'Abstracted from: Major Operations of the American Exneditionary Forces in FYance, 1917-18,
prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College.
843
844 FIELD OPERATIONS
Metz was strongly fortified, being entirely surrounded by a chain of
permanent forts mounting heavy long-range guns. About the forts some
work had been done in the nature of temporary fortifications. It was com-
monly assumed that, in the withdrawal of the German Army, Metz would
serve as a pivot, the line running generally north from there.
The enemy line being now in motion, and hotly engaged throughout, ;i
blow at the pivot itself should he decisive. To direct a frontal attack at
Metz. however, would have meant unnecessary losses, for the advance of
the First Army made it possible to direct an attack eastward, north of the
city. At the same time, the French could launch one northward, east of the
Seille. This was the plan of operations contemplated.
On October 23 the American Sixth Corps entered the line, taking over
the right section on the Moselle.
On November 1 orders were issued, giving instructions as to the course
to be followed in ease of a withdrawal by the enemy. These orders were
based upon the assumption that the withdrawal would be to the northeast
and east, holding as a pivot the outer defenses of Metz, along the line be-
tween Amanviller. Aney-sur-Moselle, and Yerny. They provided for an
advance by the left corps in the direction of Conflans, conforming to the
movements of the First Army; by the center corps in the direction of Yion-
ville. keeping touch both ways; the right corps was to remain in position
and to send forward strong reconnaissances to maintain contact.
On November 6. preparations for a withdrawal having been observed,
the army commander decided to '" develop the situation by a reconnaissance
in force," which was to seize and hold a portion of the enemy main line of
defense. It was believed that this action would definitely determine the enemy's
intentions, and clear up the question as to the point on which lie proposed
to pivot.
This mission was assigned to the Fourth Corps, in the center. The attack
was to be made down the Iiupt de Mad; a line through Charey and the north
edge of the Bois de Grand Fontaine was to be taken and held, and recon-
naissance pushed to the Chambley railway. The flank corps were to make
raids and artillery demonstrations during the operation. While preparations
for this were under way. it was discovered that the enemy, disorganized, was
withdrawing along the entire front: and the Second Army ordered an attack
at 7 a. m. November 10. The Sixth Corps was to push forward west of the
Seille River, along the heights on both banks of the Moselle, its left boundary
l>eing the line from Preny to Gorze. The direction for the center corps was
Yionville; its left boundary, the line Jonville — Jarny. The French Seven-
teenth Corps, on the left, was to attack toward Conflans. its left following the
line Fresnes — Parfondrupt — Lantefontaine. On account of the wide fronl
occupied, the army did not possess sufficient strength to make a general attack
along the, whole line: therefore, the action was begun by vigorous attacks at
selected points, which did not, in fact, develop lieyond local operations lie-
cause of the cessation of hostilities. The total advance was from 1.5 to 3.5
km. (0.9-2.1 miles) along the whole line.
PLATE L.
Battle lines, taken from existing orders and maps, are approximate.
tttBRAVCDAMO 6
i- I I ■
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 845
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The medical staff authorized by our Tables of Organization for an army
consisted of -1 officers, 3 noncommissioned officers, and 8 other enlisted men. 1
This proved quite inadequate, and the commissioned Medical Department
personnel at army headquarters consisted in point of fact of man}' more
officers organized by the army surgeon into several administrative sections,
which were under his immediate jurisdiction. 2
When the Second Army was organized, certain units which have been
mentioned in the discussion of the Medical Department activities in the second
phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation were transferred to it from the First
Army ; these were the following: 2
Sebastopol. Evacuation Hospital No. 1: Provisional Evacuation
Ambulance Company No. 1.
Baccarat, Evacuation Hospital No. 2.
Royaumeix, Evacuation Hospital No. 12: Evacuation Ambulance
Company No. 4: Field Hospital No. 117.
Rosieres-en-Haye, Mobile Hospital No. 3.
Aulnois-sous-Yertuzev, Mobile Hospital No. :i!).
The following units, though technically under command of the chief
surgeon, Services of Supply, were in effect and de facto virtually under tile
control of an army surgeon. Such jurisdiction over them as he possessed was
transferred by the army surgeon. First Army, to the surgeon of the Second
Army, when the latter was authorized.
Toul, Evacuation Hospital No. L3; Base Hospitals. Nos. 45. 51, 55,
78, 82. and 87; Neurologic Unit No. 2: gas hospital: contagious
disease hospital: medical supply park.
Additional units as follows were assigned to the Second Army: 3
Verdun, Evacuation Hospital No. 15.
St. Mihiel, Evacuation Hospital No. 18.
Bernecourt, Mobile Hospital No. 7.
Motorized section. 115th Sanitary Train.
Evacuation Ambulance Companies Nos. 7. 32, 33, 68, 69. 70, and 71.
United States Army Ambulance Sections No. 570 and No. 600.
Field Hospital No. 39, 6th Division.
Ambulance Company No. 39, 6th Division.
The following is extracted from an order issued concerning the plan of
communications, evacuation, supply and salvage:
Annex No. <i to F. O. No. 13. Headquarters Second Akmy,
November 7, WIS.
I. Evacuation of sick and wounded.
A. Sixth CQrps sector and all troops therein:
Seriously wounded: Mobile Hospital No. .'!. near Ilosieres.
Slightly wounded: Evacuation Hospital No. 1: Sebastopol, 5 km. north of Toul.
Gassed: Base Hospital No. 87. Justice group, at Toul.
Psychiatric cases: I'.nse Hospital No. 87. Justice group, at Toul.
Contagious cases: Contagious hospital, Justice group, at Toul.
Normal sick : Any base hospital of Justice group.
846 FIELD OPERATIONS
B. Fourth Corps sector and all troops therein :
Seriously wounded : Mobile Hospital No. 39, between Heudicourt and Chaillon.
Slightly wounded : Evacuation Hospital No. 12, near Royaumeix ; Evacuation
Hospital No. 1, Sebastopol, 5 km. north of Toul.
Gassed: Evacuation Hospital No. 12, near Royaumeix; Base Hospital No. 87,
Justice group.
Psychiatric cases : Base Hospital No. 87, Justice group, Toul.
Contagious diseases : Contagious Hospital, Justice Group at Toul.
Normal sick : Evacuation Hospital No. 12, near Koyaumeix.
C. French Seventeenth Colonial Corps :
Seriously wounded : Mobile Hospital No. 39, betweeh Heudicourt and Chaillon.
Slightly wounded, gassed, psychiatric cases, contagious diseases, normal sick :
Evacuation Hospital No. 13, at Caserne Oudinot. Commercy.
II. Evacuation of animal*.
6th Corps, Belleville.
4th Corps, Bernecourt.
33d Division, Woinville.
The hospitalization problem of the Second Army differed from that of
the First Army in that in the former the base hospitals at Toul were within
ambulance distance of the lines. At the time of the armistice the hospitals
forming the Justice Groupe at Toul had a capacity of 17,000 beds. In addition
to the Justice Groupe, a base hospital was established at Commercy, with a
capacity of about 5,000 beds. Another was established at Lerouville, while
arrangements had been made for taking over French hospitals at Nancy which
would have afforded about 15,000 beds. Therefore, in future operations, had
the}' occurred, the area of the Second Army could have been supplied with
about 35,000 base hospital beds to which ambulance evacuations could have
been made without the use of hospital trains. 4
Neurological Hospital No. 3 was established at Varvinay, an advanced
position within 4 km. (2.4 miles) of Mobile Hospital No. 39, which modified
the evacuation order previously issued. 5
The plan of hospitalization, evacuation, and supply in operation at the
time of the armistice provided for an advanced office of the army chief sur-
geon at Bernecourt, where the officer in charge of hospitalization was posted,
as also were the evacuation officer in control of a pool of all motor ambulances
available and an advance medical supply depot. Liaison was established with
the corps and divisions, Avith evacuation and mobile hospitals, with the base
hospital group at Toul, and with the hospitals at Commercy and Nancy. The
situation required constant supervision of hospitalization in order so to direct
the flow of patients as to prevent congestion and to hasten evacuation, and
the provision of advanced sites for the mobile and evacuation hospitals to
keep pace with any advance of the troops. Casualties during the last few days
of the operations were comparatively few and were not enough to severely
tax the sanitary units engaged in hospitalization and transportation. 5
Within the Second Army area were many miles of a 60-cm. light railway.
A plan was made for the. utilization of this sy T stem which it was thought might
be of service, especially during periods of relative inactivity, but the result
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH MEUSE-ARUONNE OPERATION 847
was unsatisfactory, as the closed cars available were top-heavy and often
jumped the tracks. Open cars were then employed, equipped with upright
posts and chains or straps for the support of litters, the extra equipment being
carried on each car. At the time of the Second Army operation 2 trains of
7 cars each were placed at the disposal of the chief surgeon. The agreement
for the use of light railways was as follows: 6
1. Light railways will be employed in evacuation of sick and wounded from points
on railway lines in forward areas directly to evacuation hospitals.
2. During active operations all empty rolling equipment returning from forward areas
will be available for this purpose except that required for movement of troops, materiel,
or ammunition service. During quiet periods a special hospital train will be at the dis-
posal of Medical Department at all times. An operator from light railway service will be
stationed at each clearing station and will be connected by telephone with the office of
the light railway train dispatcher. Requests for transportation of sick and wounded will
not be transmitted to G-A. of the army, but the requirements of Medical Department will
lie met without delay. Trains of wounded will have precedence over all traffic except
ammunition, troops, and material destined for the front.
3. When practicable, light railway- sidings will be installed at evacuation hospitals
upon request of the chief surgeon of the army.
4. Corps and division surgeons will take into consideration the location of both
light railways and roads in selecting triage or sorting stations.
5. The Medical Department will provide all necessary personnel for loading and
unloading the sick and wounded and for their care en route.
6. Medical equipment necessary for hospital trains will be provided by the Medical
Department.
All Medical Department transportation was supervised, distributed, and
administered by a medical officer in the office of the army chief surgeon.
Ambulance companies and evacuation ambulance companies were assigned to
evacuation hospitals and to the Fourth and Sixth Corps.
The general plan of evacuation within the army area was the normal
one of evacuation to divisional hospitals by divisional sanitary trains. Corps
ambulances supplemented by army reserve ambulances transported patients
from divisional hospitals to evacuation and mobile hospitals, or to base hos-
pitals acting as evacuation hospitals. A central pool of ambulances under
direction of officers detailed from the army surgeon's office was in readiness
to supplement the activities of other ambulances and to provide evacuation
as needed by evacuation and mobile hospitals. 7
Our Tables of Organization for a field army did not provide for a medical
officer to supervise the service of the army troops, exclusive of the army
Artillery. The multitude of army troops scattered throughout an army area
and frequently changing station were without the control of corps or divisions,
and so required a medical officer specifically detailed to supervise their medical
and sanitary service. Provision of medical and ambulance service for these
miscellaneous troops, who were widely distributed over the army area and in
the interstices between divisions, was one of the most difficult problems en-
countered by the chief surgeon of the Second Army. The following plan was
adopted and an officer was assigned to its execution : 8
1. The region occupied by army troops, 2d Army, will bo divided into definite areas,
in each of which an ambulance station will be established.
848 KIKI.I) OPERATIONS
2. From these ambulance stations daily rounds will be made covering the camps of
all troops within the area.
H. These stations will he designated by the chief surgeon. 2d Army, and changes will
he made by him in their locations and t lie area covered as variations in the concentration
and positions of the troops may require.
4. The senior medical officer at the ambulance station will provide a medical officer
to accompany the ambulance on its rounds and will furnish him with such medical sup-
plies as may he necessary. He will likewise arrange and regulate the proper handling
of emergency calls. Lack of ambulances and the need for economy in their use require
that the emergency in each case be a real one.
5. Ambulances on their rounds will be accompanied by a medical officer. In addition
to the evacuation of the sick from organizations provided with a medical Officer, the ambu-
lance surgeon will take sick calls for any organizations not so provided.
6. Ambulances for this service will be detailed under direction of the chief surgeon,
2d Army. The commanding officer of the ambulance company from which the ambulances
are drawn will retain technical control of this transportation, see that proper supplies are
provided and repairs made. He will replace and change ambulances on duty at various
stations as may be necessary to keep them in proper running order.
7. The commanding officer or surgeon of any unit of army troops to which this service
is not extended shall communicate directly with the chief surgeon's office. 2d Army, in
order that proper arrangements can be made.
Special directions 'were invert to medical officers furnishing this attendance,
and reports of their activities were required. To supplement this method of
meeting the situation, instructions were issued to corps and division surgeons
to furnish medical attendance and ambulance service to all army organiza-
tions stationed within their areas.
The plan mentioned of ambulance rounds covering certain areas, with
daily visits by the medical officers in charge, gave satisfactory results. It
should be understood in this connection that most of the army troops were
divided into small units which rendered it impossible to attach Medical Depart-
ment personnel to each of them. Frequent changes of station, and. in many
cases their isolated location, still further complicated the situation/
The successful operation of the system adopted was found to depend in
large part upon simplicity and elasticity. Constantly chan«rino; conditions
required constant readjustment: and a plan complicated by establishment of
many collecting points and dependent on the cooperation of various agents
would not have brought about satisfactory results. Patients were evacuated
c The gradual Introduction of Services of Supply organizations into the area of the Second Army
and the transfer of Second Army units to the Services of Supply, commencing shortly after the
armistice and continuing through the period January 1 to April 1. 1010. transferred the service of
the Second Army more and more into that belonging to the advance section. Services of Supply. No
distinction was ever made between Second Army and Services of Supply troops and the management
of Medical Department affairs in the respect mentioned continued under the supervision of the chief
surgeon. Second Army, until March 28, 1010. when the Medical Department personnel and units
engaged in the work were definitely turned over to the advance section and with them the manage
meat of the service. Certain modifications made in the original plans from time to time as condi-
tions required should also be noted. The following were the most important: (1) For units of the
Air Service it was necessary to station ambulances at flying fields to bo available for duty at all
times. t-\ For Engineer and Pioneer Infantry on demolition or other hazardous service, in addition
to the ambulance on the ambulance run, other reserve ambulances were stationed at specified points
on call in cases of emergency, as accidents not permitting delay might require their use at any time.
(8) For outlying organizations too remote to be included on a regular ambulance route separate
ambulances had to be assigned. 14) For organizations in and about the larger centers, such :i*
Toul. stationing groups of ambulances on call was found to be the lust assignment for meet Ins
evacuation requirements.
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH METTSE-ARGONNE OPERATION S4 ( J
in each case to the nearest hospital without delay. Retention of technical
control of ambulances by ambulance companies as was the case insured
economy in the operation and proper care of transportation.''
The main source of supply for the Second Army was the advance medical
supply depot at Is-sur-Tille, whenever supplies were forwarded through the
regulating station at the same place. To provide for replacements and im-
mediate issues to troops in line, a medical supply park at Toul which had been
established by the First Army was transferred to the Second Army. This
was stocked on the basis of 10 divisions: later, when the Second Army became
actually organized, on a basis of 15 divisions. This depot was restocked by
''replacement requisitions" as provided by General Orders. No. 14, General
Headquarters. A. F. F.. 1918. Immediate issues were made to troops upon
requisition for 10-day periods, approved by the chief surgeon. Second Army.
To facilitate further the prompt issue of supplies in emergencies, an advance
depot was established at Bernecourt and another at St. Mihiel in the Second
Army area. These depots were stocked with articles most needed by troops
in action, viz, blankets, litters, cots, splints, dressings, and antitetanic serum.
The supplies here were issued direct, requisitions being approved later. After
the armistice, when the troops moved forward, other supply depots were
established at Mars-la-Tour and at \Y alferdange. Luxembourg. 1 "
The operation of the system of requisition and supply described in General
Orders. No. 44, was suspended during activities, and replacements (exclusive
of initial equipment) were at all times made on approval of the army chief
surgeon. During quiet periods and for all initial equipment the provisions
of General Orders. No. 44, General Headquarters, A. E. F., 101S, were com-
plied with. That is, the requisition prepared by the divisional medical supply
officer was approved by the division surgeon, and by 0-1 of the division,
and then forwarded, as was the case with other supplies, to G-4 of the army,
who sent the requisition to the depot, whence supplies were forwarded through
the regulating officer. 10
THE SIXTH CORPS
For the few days prior to the operations of November 10, the Sixth Corps
was occupied in patrolling its entire front, in making numerous raids, in daily
exchange of Artillery bombardments, and in fluctuating activity of Infantry
machine guns, and airplanes. At 7 a. m.. on November 10 the Infantry at-
tacked, supported by a rolling barrage, and by 11 a. m., had taken Bois de la
Voivrotte. Bois de Cheminot, and Bois de Frehaut. AVest of the Moselle, it
did not attack, due to the inability of the right elements of the 7th Division
(Fourth Corps), on the left of the Sixth Corps, to capture the heights of
Preny. 11
At ;"> a. m.. November 11. the attack was renewed on the front east of the
Moselle, but was stopped at 11 a. m., in accordance with the terms of the
armistice. 11
The 02d Division was the only division on the front of the Sixth Corps
during this action. 11
850 FIELD OPERATIONS
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Unfortunately no report of the activities of the Medical Department of
the Sixth Corps during this action is available.
THE 92D DIVISION
On October 1> our 92d Division relieved the French 69th Division in the
Marbacbe sector. It passed from the Fourth Corps to the Sixth Corps on
October 23. The division participated in the attack of the American Second
Army, November 10-11, between the Moselle and the Seille Rivers. 12
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Upon entering the Marbache sector, Field Hospital Xo. 366 was estab-
lished as the divisional triage at Millery, in Adrian barracks, providing 200
beds. Its personnel was increased by six female nurses charged with the care
of pneumonia cases, which were treated here with a very low mortality. In
connection with the triage a gas hospital was established by Field Hospital
No. 367, and near it, in tents, a camp for the treatment of skin and venereal
diseases. Forty-three motor ambulances had been received shortly before
the arrival of the division in this sector. 13
Administrative Order No. 5, accompanying Field Order No. 22, 92d Divi-
sion, read in part as follows: 14
Part V. — Eradiation of sick and wounded
(a) Battalion and regimental aid stations will be established by the respective regi-
mental surgeons, in consultation with the regimental commander and under supervision
of the division surgeon. In no case will battalion or regimental aid stations be located
at the same place as the regimental P. C.
(b) The divisional triage is located at the evacuation hospital at Millery. All cases
evacuated from the front line will pass through this triage, where they will be classified
and evacuated.
(c) Ambulance Company #305 will establish a dressing station at Atton and will
furnish ambulance service from the front line via Pont-a-Mousson — Atton — Loisy — Millery.
(d) Field Hospitals Nos. 305 and 307 will be held in readiness at Millery. Ambulance
Companies Nos. 300, 307, and 308 will be stationed at Millery.
(e) Commanders of battalion and regimental aid stations, ambulance companies, and
field hospitals will be held responsible that the roads leading to these stations and
hospitals are plainly marked.
(f) Cases will be evacuated as follows:
I. Severely wounded : To Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at Sebastopol. 5 km. north of
Toul. on the Toul — Menil-la-Tour road.
II. Slightly wounded: To Evacuation Hospital No. 14, af Toul-.Tustice.
III. Nontransportable wounded: To the field hospital at Millery.
IV. Gassed: To Gas Hospital at La Marche section of the Justice Groupe of barracks
just west of the city of Toul.
V. Contagious, venereal, and skin diseases: To contagious hospital of the Justice
Groupe of barracks Just outside the city of Toul.
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH 3IEUSE-ARG0NNE OPERATION 851
VI. Sick, nervous and shell concussion: To Base Hospital No. 51, La Marclie section
of the Justice Groupe, Tout.
{g) The division surgeon will indicate loading points for ambulances.
(h) The 60-cm. tram lines will be utilized in moving wounded to the rear, and cargo
trucks will be used to move back the slightly wounded whenever such trucks return
empty to the rear.
(i) The evacuation from dressing stations and stations for slightly wounded will be
under direction of the Division Surgeon.
* * >:■• * * * *
About October 25 Field Hospital No. 368 established a triage at Gris-
court, and the same system of evacuation was now employed for the troops
west of the Moselle. So much of the sanitary train as was not functioning
with the hospitals at Millery was moved to Blenod, whence after a few days it
proceeded to Jezainville. Distribution of the train was as follows: Field
Hospitals No. 306 and No. 367 with an ambulance company at Millery; Field
Hospital No. 365. in reserve at Millery ; Field Hospital No. 368, at Griscourt ;
train headquarters and the remaining ambulance companies at Jezainville.
When the armistice was signed, arrangements were being made to establish
a field hospital as a triage at Pont-a-Mousson.
The divisional consultants were assigned to duty with the triage, where
the orthopedic consultant supervised the usel of splints and checked the
administration of antitetanic serum. Orders required that all wounded and
cases of trench foot be given this serum at the battalion aid stations. The
amount given at first. 500 units, was later increased to 1000 units.
Hospital facilities at Millery were increased by a mobile surgical unit and
a shock team.
When the advance began on November 10 the 365th and 366th Regiments
reported a large number of casualties from mustard gas, but half the patients
reporting were returned to duty from the regimental aid stations, and from
the triage a large percentage more were sent back to their organizations. 15
THE FOURTH CORPS
On November 9 the Fourth Corps occupied the Thiaucourt zone, com-
prising the Pannes and Puvenelle sectors. The Puvenelle sector was hilly and
crossed by the Eupt de Mad. The Pannes sector was rolling, the western half
of it being divided by the Etang de Lachaussee. The Puvenelle sector was
held by the 7th Division and the Pannes sector by the 28th Division. 16
The enemy was reported to be withdrawing, disorganized, along the entire
front; but from 5.30 to 6.30 a. m., November 10, he placed a heavy bombard-
ment along our whole front. Seven a. m., November 10. was designated as
" H " hour for the attack required by field orders of the Fourth Corps. At
5.30 p. m. a battalion of the 112th Infantry, 28th Division, attempted to raid
Dommartin. but intense enemy artillery fire prevented its advance. This raid
had been planned before it was known that there was to be an attack by the
corps, and, as it was thought the raid would help the attack, it was allowed to
occur. Patrols from the 28th Division were active throughout the morning,
but developed no weakness in the enemy lines opposite the division. At 2.30
852 FIELD OPERATIONS
p. in.. November LO, an artillery preparation was laid down south of Dom-
inartin and south of the line Lachaussee — Bois Boused. At the same time,
the lOyth Infantry attacked through Haiimont, gaining the railroad track
northeast of that place. A battalion of the 111th Infantry made an attack on
Dommartin at 3.30 p. in., hut was held up on the edge of Dommartin woods
by a counterattack. In the 7th Division, repeated attempts to take Mod
I'laisir Ferine failed. The day's operations resulted only in a slight advance
of the lines held by the 7th Division in the morning. The enemy was still in
his position on the Hindenberg line, and showed no intention of with-
drawing. 15
Early in the morning of November 11 the l()!)th Infantry, 28th Division,
attacked northeast from Haumont. and reached the wire defenses of the enemy
at 8.20 a. m.. when word was received that the armistice had been signed,
together with orders requiring a suspension of hostilities at 11 a. m. The
division commander. 28th "Division, issued orders directing a discontinuance
of infantry attacks, and that positions be consolidated and held. The enemy
opened heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, which was silenced by intense
and accurate counter battery and destructive fire from our divisional and corps
artillery, continuing until 11 a. in. In the 7th Division no infantry attack was
made on November 11. in
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The triage for the 7th Division was located at Thiaucourt and that of the
28th Division at Nonsard. Both formations were well forward, thus making
possible early care of the wounded after a short haul. Surgical, orthopedic,
medical, and gas consultants were stationed at the triages to insure proper
treatment, splinting, and sorting' before patients were removed to hospitals in
the rear. Patients in shock were given appropriate treatment and were held
until their recovery was such as to warrant further transportation.
By reason of the short haul and the well-advanced position of Mobile
Hospital No. :?9 — which, in anticipation of the action, had been moved up to
a point just west of Ileudicourt — hospitals for nontransportable wounded
were not established within the divisions, hut all severely wounded, including
the nontransportable cases, were evacuated direct to that hospital. 17
Field hospitals for the slightly gassed were established in each division,
to which slightly gassed patients were sent, while the more serious cases were
sent to the Justice Hospital Group at Toul.
Slightly wounded were sent from triages to Evacuation Hospitals No. 12
and No. 1, at Royaumeix and at Sebastopol, respectively. Seriously sick and
psychiatric patients were evacuated to the Justice Hospital Group at Toul.
At no time were the triages congested. Evacuation was prompt and pro-
ceeded smoothly, and the wounded were given prompt definitive surgical
treatment, only a few hours intervening between receipt of wound and
surgical treatment, except in a few instances when the wounded were not
at once found on the field. 17
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH MEU6E-ARGONNE OPERATION 853
THE 7TII DIVISION
During the night of October 10-11 the 7th Division (less Artillery)'
completed the relief of the 90th Division (less Artillery), in the Puvenelle
sector, from the Moselle River, near Champey, to a point northeast of Jaulny.
On October 12 the 7th Division passed to the command of the Second Army."
On November 9 the 7th Division, as a part of the Fourth Corps, held a
line approximately as follows: Charey — Xammes road, just west of Bois de la
Montague, thence, generally southeastwardly to Bois de Rappes. 18
On November 10, in the general advance of the Second Army, the division
launched an attack in the direction of Vionville. its objectives being Bois des
Rappes — Bois de Biche en Cote — Chambley. On the right. Breny ridge was
occupied, but the enemy could not be dislodged and our troops were forced to
retire, after a 40 per cent loss. On the left. Hill 323 was captured, after a
determined attack, but Mon Blaisir Ferine, the enemy strong point, resisted
-repeated attacks. The day's operations resulted in a slight advance of the line
held by the division, but it failed to gain its objectives, as the region in front
was one of the last strongholds of the old Michel line, and the advancing line
of the division was but a line of patrols. The operations planned for
November 11 were canceled by reason of the armistice. 19
MEDTCAI, DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On October 10. when the 7th Division relieved the 90th, its Medical De-
partment personnel took over from the latter the sites of all corresponding
formations. The units of the sanitary train were then disposed as follows:
Ambulance Company No. 22. Mamev : Ambulance Company No. 34. Vieville-
en-Haye: Ambulance Company No. 35, Vilcey-sur-Trey and Fey-en-IIaye:
Ambulance Company No. 36, Montauville; Field Hospital No. 34 (the triage).
Griscourt: Field Hospital No. 36 (for nontransportable wounded). St.
Jacques; and Field Hospitals No. 35 and No. 22 (for gassed and sick, respec-
tively), near Bogeville. On October 19 Field Hospital No. 34. because of the
enemy shelling of Griscourt. was moved to Martincourt. On November 1
Ambulance Company No. 22 moved to St. Jacques, and on November 10
organized a triage at Thiaucourt. 13 km. (8 miles) from the front line, where
it functioned on November 10 and 41. Field Hospitals No. 22 and No. 35
moved, on October 29, to a point near Minorville. and Field Hospital No. 35.
on November 11. to Bouillonville. Batients were sent from the divisional
hospitals to Evacuation Hospital No. 1, at Sebastopol. about 15 km. (9.3 miles)
in the rear of Field Hospital No. 36. 20
The regimental medical detachments were divided into three battalion
units, each of the latter consisting of 2 officers, a sergeant, and 13 privates or
privates, first class. Two enlisted men from each battalion. Medical Depart-
ment, unit were assigned to each line company of the battalion while the
remainder were at the battalion aid station. At the company aid posts
wounded were dressed and splints applied. Those unable to walk were carried
on litters to the battalion aid stations, dressings there were readjusted if
854 FIELD OPERATIONS
necessary, morphine and antitetanic serum were administered, proper mark-
ings being made with tincture of iodine on each patient's temple or forehead
to indicate that these medicaments had been given, appropriate notations on
diagnosis tags being entered at the same time. If a patient was in a state
of shock or this appeared imminent, he was treated on the shock table and
heat, morphine, stimulants, and sometimes an intravenous injection of gum-
salt solution were administered. Patients unable to walk were evacuated by
ambulance to the dressing station. Here further examinations were made,
splints Avere readjusted, and bandages changed if necessary, and hot coffee or
chocolate were given. All patients were segregated here, and when necessary
were undressed and, if facilities permitted, bathed. At the triage records were
made, treatment was continued as indicated, and patients were classified for
distribution. 21
The majority of patients received at battalion aid stations were free from
shock. The time necessary to transport them to hospital in this relatively
quiet sector before the offensive averaged only about 45 minutes. Ambulances
evacuated directly from battalion aid stations, for the division had its full
quota of these vehicles and battalion stations were relatively well protected. 22
The motor ambulances were pooled at the triage and definite quotas
assigned to the service of each dressing station, to the evacuation of the field
hospitals, and to service between them. As the several battalion aid stations
were the ambulance heads, use of the ambulance company litter bearers in rear
of the battalion aid stations was obviated except on a few occasions. The
animal-drawn ambulances collected wounded from rear positions, while a
large part of the personnel of the company to which they belonged reinforced
other formations. 22
Liaison was maintained by two runners posted at each regimental post
control and at each battalion aid station. 23 The dressing stations of this divi-
sion cleared 2,647 patients during the 32 days it was at the front, evacuating
nontransportable wounded direct to the surgical hospital (Field Hospital No.
36) and not to the triage. These included patients with aspirating wounds
of the chest, wounds of the abdomen, extensive injuries of the head, compound
fractures of the lower extremities, and all with hemorrhage who required a
tourniquet during transport. Gassed patients were sent in separate ambu-
lances (unless they had been degassed) and were kept recumbent. 24
Ambulance Company No. 34 staffed its dressing station at Vieville-en-
Haye with 1 officer and 32 men, and, as the sites occupied were well protected,
parked three ambulances with the two battalion aid stations and the regi-
mental station of the 34th Infantry. Some of its other ambulances were kept
on the alert near the dressing station, while others served the triage. While
the division was engaged in trench warfare this dressing station evacuated
an average of 20 patients a day and gave dispensary treatment to the personnel
of neighboring organizations. This service was typical of that performed at
this time by other dressing stations in the 7th Division. 2 "'
In the 32 days that Field Hospital No. 34 (the triage) operated here it
received 3.121 patients, including 935 gassed, 1.506 surgical, and 680 medical
cases. Specialists classified all patients for further distribution, and those
OPERATIONS CONTESIPOHANEOT78 WITH MKI'SE-AROOXXK OPERATION 855
requiring special treatment here, e. g., for shock, received it before they were
sent to other hospitals, a few also undergoing emergency operations.-
Field Hospital No. 35, the divisional gas hospital, practiced routine gas
treatment for all such patients who had not been treated at the dressing sta-
tions. These patients were undressed by a detail which wore gas masks, oiled
suits, and rubber gloves. This detail examined, recorded patients, and treated
their eyes with a saturated solution of boric acid or a 1 per cent solution of
sodium bicarbonate, followed by liquid petrolatum. Then the patient was
passed into a room where he was bathed first with soap and water and then
with a 2 per cent solution of sodium bicarbonate. He was then dried, wanned,
•riven a hot drink and taken to a ward. After receiving this treatment patients
usually slept for 24 hours. 27
Field Hospital No. 36 — the surgical hospital — reinforced by a mobile
surgical unit, passed about 75 per cent of the cases it received through its
shock ward, where they were cared for by a special team consisting of 1
medical officer, 2 nurses, and 1 noncommissioned officer. Moderately shocked
and postoperative patients were sent to a surgical ward, where appropriate
treatment was given for from 24 to 48 hours, after which they usually were
fit for evacuation; but patients who had undergone operations for chest and
abdominal wounds were held for a longer time. Two operating teams were
organized, each consisting of 2 medical officers, an anesthetist, and 1 enlisted
man, who was charged with the sterilization of dressings. At this hospital
it was found that the following cases almost invariably developed shock:
Compound fractures of the extremities, aspirating chest wounds, perforating
wounds of the trunk, wounds of the head (except when superficial), those
who had experienced severe hemorrhage, especially when they had required
prolonged use of a tourniquet in addition, and those who had suffered any
major injury several hours before treatment. The average time elapsing
between receipt of wound and admission to this hospital was 8 hours, but it
was sometimes as long as 20 hours. Patients received more than six hours
after being injured were often in poor condition. 28
Field Hospital No. 22 enjoyed many of the conveniences of a camp
hospital and was therefore able to secure to its patients a greater degree of
comfort than would have been possible otherwise. For example, each patient
on admission received a bath; laundry facilities were also excellent. Though
this hospital primarily cared for the divisional sick, it also received slightly
wounded and slightly gassed patients. Of the 482 patients admitted while
the unit functioned at Minorville, 152 were returned to duty. 2
29
THE 28TH DIVISION
Beginning on the night of October 15-16, the 28th Division, as a unit of
the Fourth Army Corps, relieved the 37th Division in the Pannes sector.
With the 7th Division, this division constituted the front lino of the American
Fourth Corps. Until November 10 the division sent out patrols and conducted
raids. On November 10 it participated in the general operations of the Second
856 FIELD OPERATIONS
Army, from a line that extended approximately as follows: Bois de la Haute
Voye. southeastward]}' to about 1 km. (0.(5 mile) south of Haumont, thence
to the Clarey — Xammes road, west of Bois de la Montague. 80
On November 10 the plans of the division were to attack Donimartin.
the area between Bois Bonseil and Lachaussee, and toward the enemy trenches
northeast of Etang de Lachaussee. gaining the line Lachaussee — Hageville
before nightfall. At 3.30 p. m. the town of Dommartin was attacked, but our
troops Mere held up on the edge of Bois Dommartin by a counterattack.
In the center the attack was made through Haumont; and at G.10 p. in. the
troops here had taken up a position on a railroad track northeast of Haumont.
From this point the line extended generally northwestwardly to Ferine des
Hants Journaux. 30
On November 11 the 55th Brigade was designated as the attacking unit,
while the 56th Brigade was held as reserve. The attack of the 55th Brigade
was made by pushing the 100th Infantry forward northeast from Haumont.
This attack again only succeeded in reaching the enemy wire, where it was
held up by machine-pun fire from both flanks, and was forced to withdraw.
Troops were being reorganized, ready to make another attack at 8.30 a. m..
when word was received, at 8.10 a. m.. that the armistice had been signed,
effective at 11a. m. At about this time the enemy artillery opened all along
the line in great force, and our artillery was directed to fire every gun in
retaliation. This fire was kept up until just before approximately 11 a. m. 30
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
In the Thiaucourt sector. Field Hospital No. 109 was first located at
Bouillonville. whence, on October 30. it moved to Nonsard. There a large
barn and surrounding buildings furnished fair facilities for a hospital and
for quarters of the personnel. The site was constantly exposed to shell fire and
several of the buildings were injured by fragments of shell and shrapnel, but
the number of patients admitted daily was not large, as the sector was com-
paratively quiet. When the armistice was signed Field Hospital No. 104 was
in active operation as the divisional triage — a capacity in which it had served
since it entered upon active operations. Its grand total of admissions was
8.556 patients. 31
Field Hospital No. 110. charged with the care of gassed and sick patients.
after operating two days at Bernecourt moved, on October 19, to Essey-et-
Maizerais, where it erected eight ward tents and two bathhouses. Here it
admitted (532 patients before the armistice was signed. 32
Field Hospital No. 111. after the "28th Division left the jurisdiction of the
First Army, moved successively to Ferine Boyer. Minorville. Bernecourt. and
on October 30 to Buxerulles. occupying there some barns and German-built
shacks. This hospital, which received most of the sick, cared for more patients
at this location than at any other, as its stay there lasted from October 30,
miS. to January 8. 1919. 33
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 857
Field Hospital No. 112, which cared for the wounded, took station in
Essey-et-Maizerais, on October 18, occupying a barn where it began operation
on the 20th. At first it discharged triage duties, but was soon relieved of
these. Field Hospital No. 109 taking over all such service. 34
GENERAL MEDICAL DEPARTMENT CONSIDERATIONS
ARMY HOSPITALS
What has been said in Chapter XXXIV concerning the histories of army
hospitals in the Meuse-Argonne area equally applies in connection with those
which served the Second Army. (Some further description of certain of
these units which operated at Toul under the control of the First Army during
the St. Mihiel operation, and prior to October 12, during the Meuse-Argonne
operation, is given in Chapters XVIII- XXXIV.) All in all, however, in-
formation concerning Second Army hospitals is generally of very little value,
and for this reason the following account of their activities is incomplete
and imperfect.
Mobile Hospital Xo. 39 35
This unit has been described in part in the preliminary chapter on mobile
hospitals, and its activities during the St. Mihiel operation are noted in
Chapter XVIII. For several Aveeks after that attack it admitted patients
from neighboring units, though it had been transferred to the Second Army
on October 9. October 30, Mobile Hospital Xo. 39 was ordered to move to a
station on the road between Chaillon and Heudicourt, some 32 km. (20 miles)
distant. Here admissions began promptly, the first case being operated 11
hours after arrival of the first truck load of equipment. The hospital received
some 250 seriously wounded or nontransportable patients during the last two
days of its activity during operations.
A convenient narrow-gauge railroad was utilized to bring up some sup-
plies, but no casualties were evacuated over it.
At the Chaillon-Heudicourt station the hospital admitted, between
November 1 and December 20, 427 patients, which it classified as follows:
Battle casualties 312
Operated upon 239
Not operated upon 73
Died without operation 9
Died following operation 21
Acute appendicitis 6
Surgical conditions unoperated 03
Sick from command and other units 25
Surgical conditions operated, exclusive of appendicitis 12
Total admissions 427
Total deaths 30
Total percentage deaths 7
858 FIELD OPERATIONS
OPERATIONS
Patients operated on for battle casualties : 235
Operations on above patients 388
Total deaths, including admitted dead 30
Total death percentage, battle casualties 9.0
Percentage of operative deaths 8.9
Number of cases debrided 220
Number of nonbattle casualties operated upon 12
Number of appendectomies 4
Total number of patients operated upon 241
Total operative death percentage 8.7
Average time elapsed between receipt of wounded and operation,
7 hours 10 minutes.
Average time elapsed between receipt of wounded and admission
(evacuation time), hours 10 minutes.
CLASSIFICATION OF WOUNDS
1. Head:
Penetrating 8
Nonpenetrating 35
2. Chest:
Penetrating
Nonpenetrating 7
3. Abdomen :
Penetrating 10
Nonpenetrating 1
4. Extremities :
With fracture 54
Without fracture 231
With nerve or large blood vessel injury 9
5. Locality not stated 39
0. Trunk 34
7. Cord 3
JIobilk Hospital No. 3 36
On September 24 this hospital relieved Field Hospital 359 at Kosieres-en-
Haye, when it established a hospital for nontransportable wounded. Here it
employed four operating tables with six teams. On October 9 a fire broke out
in the X-ray room, destroying the entire hospital, including its records, and
nothing but the tentage was saved. The hospital remained at this station
until December 20, when it returned to Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at Sebastopol
Barracks, near Tool, where it formerly had served.
Mobile Hospital No. 7 z "
After serving at Ferme de Suippes and Somme Py, on November 7 Mobile
Hospital Xo. 7 received orders to proceed to Berricourt, where it arrived on
the 9th. Erection of all tentage had not been completed when the armistice
became effective and the unit ceased to function.
Evacuation Hospital No. 1 3S
This unit was permanently stationed at Sebastopol Barracks, north of
Tonl. where it had been located since February, 1918. Its organization and
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 859
earlier activities have been discussed in Chapter XVIII. Too far to the east
to receive casualties from the Meuse-Argonne battle fields, it was transferred
to the Second Army October 9, 1918.
Evacuation Hospital No. 2 39
This hospital was permanently established at Baccarat. Meurth-et-
Moselle, where it occupied a large set of French barracks on the outskirts of
the town. As there was no violent fighting in this sector it did not receive
many wounded, but in October. 1918, cared for large numbers of influenza
patients from the 81st Division. The hospital was transferred to the Second
Army on October 9, 1918, and it was planned that it should serve as a base
hospital. It was exposed to six air raids during its service.
Evacuation Hospital No. 12 40
Arriving at Eoyaumeix on October 9, Evacuation Hospital No. 12 was
quartered in an old French hospital consisting of four groups of Adrian bar-
racks. On October 9 it was transferred to the Second Army. During its
stay at Eoyaumeix it received 2,700 patients, including over 1,000 seriously
wounded.
Evacuation Hospital No. 13 41
Arriving in France August 26, 1918, Evacuation Hospital Xo. 13 took
station, September 2, at Chaligny, where until September 23 organization was
developed and perfected. The unit then moved to Toul. where it occupied a
part of the Justice Groupe of barracks, and was in reserve from September
23 to October 12. It then moved to Champigneulles, where it admitted 237
patients, and then, October 31, to Commercy, where its admissions prior to
January 1, 1919, numbered 2,145. of whom 1,117 were received from November
9 to 12. Of the total cases admitted, 1,071 were surgical, including 525 battle
casualties and 163 injuries caused bj accident. Three hundred and forty-nine
operations were performed. Among the 1.416 medical cases admitted, the
most numerous were influenza, 345; gassing, 161; mumps, 150; and bronchitis.
110. All respiratory cases were placed in cubicled wards, while cases of
measles and meningitis were isolated in separate rooms. Two hundred and
twenty cases were treated in the eye, ear, nose, and throat departments; in
the dental department 30 cases were cared for who required oral surgery,
in addition to over 1,000 others.
The X-ray laboratory 7 made over 2,000 examinations, almost all of which
were fluoroscopic, but few plates being utilized, while the pathalogical labora-
tory made 247 examinations in the same period.
Evacuation Hospital No. Ifi 42
On September 21 Evacuation Hospital Xo. 15 arrived at Revigny. where
it replaced a French hospital and shortly thereafter was joined by Base
Hospital No. 83. As service here was not active, a number of officers were sent
for temporary duty to other evacuation hospitals, namely, Nos. 6, 7. 9, 10, 11,
American Red Cross Evacuation Hospital No. 114. and American Red Cross
860 FIELD OPERATIONS
Hospital No. 110. After the hospital moved to Glorieux, October 13, most of
its detached personnel rejoined and was reinforced by operating, splint, and
emergency medical teams and 20 nurses. At this place the unit at first re-
ceived the nontransportable patients from the 33d and Tilth Divisions, but
after the field hospitals of those commands left the vicinity it admitted all
classes of patients. From September 21 to November 17 it received 2,03?
surgical patients and performed 1,235 operations. Admissions between the
latter date and January 1, 1919, included 1,575 surgical patients, upon whom
151 operations were performed, with 5 deaths.
At both Revigny and Glorieux medical patients were cared for in wooden
barracks accommodating from 15 to 40 beds. They were classified and dis-
tributed as " general medical contagious." influenza, pneumonia, and psy-
chiatric, but at Glorieux prior to the armistice only a few medical patients
were admitted. Immediately after the signing of the armistice the number
of medical patients received increased greatly, and by the time the unit closed.
in April, 1919, they had totaled 4,761.
During the Meuse-Argonne operation the dental service was occupied
chiefly with surgery of gunshot wounds of the jaws. In none of these was
infection by gas-forming bacilli noted. While the unit was at Glorieux, the
eye, ear, nose, and throat service was occupied chiefly in the extraction of
foreign bodies and in enucleations. The total number of patients cared for by
this department of the hospital was 4,500, of whom 2,000 received treatment of
the nose and throat, 2,000 of the car, and 500 of the eye. The X-ray depart-
ment examined every patient before he was sent to the operating room; i.e..
from 75 to 200 patients a day in active periods. Roentgenograms were made
only in joint cases where fracture was suspected and in those cases where a
strongly suspected fracture could not be detected by visual fluoroscopy. The
pathological laboratory was occupied by routine examinations, including
wound bacteriology cultural tests and sanitary bacteriology, thus promoting
diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis in both the medical and surgical services.
Evacuation Hospital No. 18 **
This unit arrived at St. Mihiel November 3, 1918, and its first casualties
were received November 10; on the 12th all casualties were evacuated, and on
the 24th the unit was attached to the Third Army and operated at Briey.
REFERENCES
(1) Tables of Organization and Equipment, U. S. Army, Series C. Table 202. July 30.1918.
(2) Report of Medical Department activities, Second Army, A. E. F., by Col. C. R.
Reynolds, M. C, chief surgeon, Second Army, undated, 1. On file, Historical Divi-
sion, S. O. O.
(S) Ibid., 2.
(4) Ibid., 3.
(5) Ibid., 4.
(6) Ibid., 5.
(7) Ibid.. 6.
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH MEOKE-ARGONNE OPERATION 861
(8) Ibid., 7.
(9) Ibid., 8.
(10) Ibid., 10.
Ill) Report of operations, Sixth Army Corps, November 10-11, 1918, to December 28, 1918.
(12) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army. 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War Col-
lege. 1700 (92d Division).
(13) Report of Medical Department activities, 92d Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 8. On file. Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(14) Ibid., 10, 11.
(15) Ibid., 12.
(16) Special report, Fourth Army Corps, November 10-11 to November 26. 1918. On file,
Historical Division. S. G. O.
(17) Operations report November 10-11, Medical Department, Fourth Corps, by Col. J. AY.
Hanner, M. G, corps surgeon, undated. On file, with G-3 records, General
Headquarters. A. B. F., Washington. D. C.
(IS) Outlines of Histories of Divisions. U. S. Army, 1917-1919. prepared in tbe Historical
Section, the Army War College. On rile, Historical Section, the Army War Col-
lege, 1700 (7th Division).
(19) Report of operations, 7th Division for November 9 to 11, 1918, undated.
(20) Report of Medical Department activities, 7th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(21) Ibid., S.
(22) Ibid., 9.
(23) Ibid., 48.
(24) Ibid., 49.
(25) Ibid.. 40.
(26) Ibid., 65.
(27) Ibid., 47.
(28) Ibid., 72.
(29) Ibid., 56.
(30) Journal of operations, 28th Division.
< 31 > Report of Medical Department activities. 28th Division. A. K. F.. prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part I. 35. On file. Historical Divi-
sion, S. G. O.
(82) Ibid., Part II, 4.
(33) Ibid., Part II, 10.
(34) Ibid., Part II. 31.
(35) Report of the activities of Mobile Hospital No. 39. from the St. Mihiel operation
to demobilization, by I,t. Col. J. M. Flint, M. ('.. commanding officer, undated.
On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(36) Report of Medical Department activities. Mobile Hospital No. 3. A. E. F.. prepared
under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
i37) Report of Medical Department activities, Mobile Hospital No. 7, A. E. F.. prepared
under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical Divi-
sion. S. G. O.
(38) Iteport of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 1, A. K. F.. pre-
pared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(39) Iteport of Medical Department activities. Evacuation Hospital No. 2, A. E. F., pre-
pared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file. Historical
Division, S. G. O.
862 FIELD OPERATIONS
(40) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 12, A. E. F., pre-
pared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(41) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 13, A. E. F„ pre-
pared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On hie, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(42) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 15. A. E. F.. pre-
pared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(43) Report of Medical Department activities. Evacuation Hospital No. IS. A. E. F.,
prepared under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file. His-
torical Division. S. O. O.
CHAPTER XXXVI
MEUSE-ARGONNE (CHAMPAGNE) OPERATION (2D AND 36TH
DIVISIONS)
YPRES-LYS (FLANDERS) OPERATION (37TH AND 91ST DIVISIONS)
MEUSE-ARGONNE (CHAMPAGNE) OPERATION"
It should be kept in mind that our attack in the Meuse-Argonne was a
part of the general offensive which extended along almost the entire front of
the allied armies, from the English Channel to the Vosges Mountains; the
field orders of the First Army habitually gave information of the progress
made in Flanders, as a part of the general situation, just as they mentioned
the advances on their own front. The British and the Belgians were on the
move eastward; the French, between them and the Americans, were advanc-
ing along the line of the Aisne. The French Fourth Army was working in
intimate cooperation with the American First Army; to indicate this relation-
ship, American troops which served in that French Army are given credit for
participation in the operation, under the title " Meuse-Argonne (Cham-
pagne)."
When the Germans were thrown back at the first battle of the Marne,
the line stabilized in Champagne between Souain and Soinme-Py. It was here
that the French Twenty-first Corps, of the French Fourth Army, was to
attack. The French asked for American assistance in this region, and on
September 23 orders were issued at American General Headquarters, placing
our 2d and 36th Divisions at their disposal. The 2d Division was near Ton],
having just reached there after participating in the St. Mihiel operation. It
was fully equipped and prepared for any duty. The 36th Division was in the
Bar-sur-Aube training area, never having been in line: it was about 20 per
'•ent short in strength and lacked much of its equipment, notably transporta-
tion. Its artillery was not with it. These divisions were used in a local opera-
tion known to us by the name of the principal feature of the ground, an
elevation called Blanc Mont.
The country hereabouts, after four years of trench warfare on stationary
lines, was a desolate waste. The German front-line trenches had run along
the Xavarin Farm ridge, which crossed the Souain — Somine-Py road, at right
angles, halfway between the two places. The Xavarin ridge lay 4 km. (2.4
miles) north, and rose some 60 meters (65 yards) above the valley to the south.
It was wooded, but not densely. At its eastern end was Orfeuil. at its center
AfpoVah Ferme. and at its west end Blanc Mont. North of it the ground fell
•Abstracted from Major Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, 1017-1918,
prepared in the Historical Section, (lie Army War Pollepe.
863
864 FIELD OPERATIONS
away to a whole country, north and south; its natural advantages had been
enhanced by observation towers, constructed by the Germans.
Between September 26 and October 1, the French Fourth Army had
advanced 4 or 5 km. (2.4 or 3.1 miles) west of the Argonne. and at the point
now in question were attacking the German trendies north of Somme-Py, the
rearmost of the main line. The Germans were holding strongly, for a sur-
render of this line meant a retirement of 3 km. (1.8 miles) to the next pre-
pared position on Blanc Mont Ridge. The French were nearing the end of
their resources, and called upon the American divisions assigned to them.
THE I'D DIVISION
On October 1. 1918, the 2d Division was assigned to the French Twenty-
first Corps in the Fourth Army, and on the night of October 1-2, the 4th
Brigade took over the line from Boyau de Custrien on the right to Boyau de
Bromberg on the left, theretofore occupied by the French Gist Division and the
right battalion of the French 21st Division in the French Eleventh Corps,
which was to the left of the 2d Division. On October 2. the 2d Division
cleared so much of the Tranchee d'Fssen in its sector as was still occupied by
the Germans west of the Boyau de la Pirna.
At 5.50 a. m.. October 3, as the left flank of the French Twenty-first
Corps, the 2d Division attacked behind a creeping barrage, in conjunction with
the two other divisions in the line of that corps, and with the French 21st
Division of the French Eleventh Corps on its left. The divisional operation
was a converging attack by the 3d and 4th Brigades upon the massif of Blanc
Mont Ridge, the final objective being Medeah Ferme (exclusive) — Schwaben— -
Konig — Blanc Mont (inclusive). The enemy T had strongly fortified the posi-
tion by coordinated machine-gun emplacements, barbed wire, and trench
systems. The attack was successful despite heavy artillery fire and stubborn
resistance by the enemy, and the objective was reached according to schedule.
On the right the French 67th Division brought its lines up to Medeah Ferine,
where contact was established, but on the left the attack of the French Eleventh
Corps failed, and our 4th Brigade suffered severely because of machine-gun
fire on its left. 1
During the afternoon of October 3. the 2d Division pushed its advance
about 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) down the ridge in the direction of the St. Etienne^
Orfeuil road — despite fire on both flanks and on its right and left rear, the divi-
sions on its flanks failing to keep contact. The next day, after repulsing
powerful counterattacks, the division advanced about 0.5 km. (0.3 mile) but
was held up by machine-gun fire on the front and flanks, particularly from
a strong point on the western end of Blanc Mont. This point it reduced on
the 5th. The next day. the left of the division again advanced. 1
The relief of the 2d Division was begun by the 36th Division on the night
of October 6-7. but this was not completed until the 10th. the 2d Division
troops that were not relieved continuing to operate with the 36th until with-
drawn. The Artillery and Engineers remained with the 36th Division, and
until withdrawn the 2d Division remained in close support. 1
PLATE LI.
MEUSE-ARGONNE (CHAMPAGNE)
2D AND 36TH DIVISIONS
5ca.le in. Kilometers
LCMNP
A Tt,»r.(
+ 01 Mt»>xa ITATlOW
+■ A' *M»g.*»-f COMMWio
± FM tiUS NOJPiTAL
MOViLt HMII*»L
Battle lin*»s. taken from existing orders and maps, are approximate.
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 865
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
All units of the sanitary train had reached Suippes by the 1st of October
and were located at the Ferine de Suippes, 2 km. (1.2 miles) south of the town,
in the following capacities: Field Hospital No. 1, triage; Field Hospitals No.
15 and No. 23, consolidated hospital for nontransportable wounded; Field
Hospital No. 1G, for gassed and sick. With the field hospitals was Ambulance
Company No. 1, while the other ambulance companies were at Camp Mont-
pellier, 4 km. (2.4 miles) north of Somme-Suippes, on the Perthes-les-Hurlus
road. 2
On October 2 all the ambulance companies established a forward triage
in an excellent shell-proof dugout at Souain, which was also used by the French
to serve the sectors to the right and left of the 2d Division. Here were gathered
the 27 G. M. C. ambulances belonging to the sanitary train and United States
Army Ambulance Service Sections No. 556 and No. G06, which were assigned
to the division. Transportation was further augmented by two French char
a bancs (six-seat trucks, of the sight-seeing type) with a seating capacity of
24, which, with 22 ambulances of Evacuation Ambulance Companies No. 5
and No. 7 and the trucks of the sanitary train, were held in readiness near the
field hospitals. Arrangements were made that, when requested, trucks of the
supply train and of other divisional units also would assist in removing
wounded. 2
Before the attack, the divisional litter-bearer officer made a reconnaissance,
located the battalion stations at the jump-off, and at them posted the ambu-
lance company litter-bearer officers, with their detachments. The system of
evacuation was as follows: Enlisted men of the Medical Department followed
the attack and dressed the wounded, who were then carried back to battalion
aid stations by litter bearers detailed from the line, in the proportion of 12
from each company. The battalion surgeons, relieved of all responsibility
((.l evacuation from their stations, devoted all their attention to the work
forward of these. As the battalion stations advanced, the old ones were taken
over and cleared by the bearers from the ambulance companies, under their
litter-hearer officers, who maintained contact with stations as they advanced. 3
The terrain offered little protection, but at times dugouts were found and
used. Many aspirating wounds of the chest were closed by sutures or safety
pins, with good results so far as transportability of such cases was concerned,
fractures were immobilized in Thomas splints, and antitetanic serum was given
very early in nearly all cases. Wounded were rapidly removed and congestion
rarely occurred. 3 The two United States Army Ambulance Service Sections
with Ford ambulances, assisted by G. M. C. ambulances, evacuated to the
triage, and the other motor vehicles available evacuated from that point to the
rear." Two-wheeled French litter carts (broii^.tfcs) were used to some extent
in this sector. 4
Profiting by their experience in the St. Mihiel operation, the ambulance
companies kept their kitchens with them. Ambulance Company No. 16 had
13576—25 55
866 FIELD OPERATIONS
its kitchen in concealment near its dressing station, but the other kitchens
were consolidated at Somme-Py, and hot food was sent up, so that at least
one hot meal and two cooked meals, often both hot, reached the litter bearers
daily. This proved a great aid in maintaining their strength and morale
under the trying conditions then experienced. Litter bearers from the En-
gineers materially aided the ambulance company litter bearers. 4
On the afternoon of October 3 Ambulance Company No. 1 established a
dressing station at Somme-Py, Ambulance Company No. 16 taking over its
former station at Souain. 3 On the 4th the ambulance head was advanced
to Somme-Py and Ambulance Company No. 15 reinforced the station
there, as the wounded were coming in very rapidly. 3 In the meantime, Am-
bulance Company No. 16 advanced its station to a point 2 km. (1.2 miles)
north of Somme-Py, and the triage, Field Hospital No. 1, moved up to
Souain. On the 5th the station of Ambulance Company No. 23 "leapfrogged"
to a position near Medeah Ferine and Field Hospital No. 1 moved to Somme-
Py, where it was joined by the surgical unit (Field Hospitals No. 15 and
No. 23 ). 3
The field hospitals were set upon the roadbed of the railroad, on the right
of the railroad station, in a position exposed to shell fire should the enemy
choose to bombard the location. Many shells passed overhead and fell near
the crossroads nightly. Early on the morning of the 8th the town (Somme-
Py) was continuously shelled ; one ' : dud " passed through one of the tents
of the surgical unit, which was filled with wounded at the time. Operating
was resumed at 10 a. m. and continued until 3 p. m., when continued shelling
caused the hospital to be evacuated. The surgical personnel resumed operat-
ing in conjunction with Mobile Hosjutal Xo. 7, at Ferme de Suippes. 3
On the 10th Field Hospital No. 1 returned to Ferme de Suippes and
the ambulance dressing stations returned on the 11th, but the ambulances
remained until the next day, assisting in evacuation of the wounded of the
36th Division, which, at that time, had no ambulances. By the 12th all the
medical units of the 2d Division were back in rest billets in the rear areas. 5
Abundant medical supplies were maintained at the front by returning
ambulances and by a German ambulance, which had been captured at St.
Mihiel, into which American and French litters did not fit, so that it could
not be used conveniently for wounded. The medical supply unit located at
Ferme de Suippes kept the ambulance head well supplied with everything
needed. 5 On October 6 it advanced to Somme-Py, where it located beside
the field hospitals, which facilitated issues. 4
The roads were very good, except in No Man's Land, where there were
mine craters, around which the Engineers soon built roads of plank, stone,
and earth. The distances from Somme-Py to the evacuation hospitals were
as follows: To Evacuation Hospital No. 3 at Mont Frenet, 24 km. (14.0
miles) ; to Evacuation Hospital No. 5 at La Veuve, 45 km. (27.9 miles) ; and
to Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23 and Mobile Hospital No. 7, which
operated here only a few days, at Ferme de Suippes, 15 km. (9.3 miles). 4
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 867
For a short attack, the medical personnel suffered rather severely. Two
battalion aid stations received direct hits, causing several fatalities and many
casualties. 4
THE 3GTH DIVISION "
On the night of October G-7 the 71st Infantry Brigade of the American
3Gth Division relieved the front-line troops of the 2d Division, which left
some of its own elements in the line and furnished the support. The division
line ran more or less along the Orfeuil — St. Etienne road. There was no
righting of importance on the 7th, and on the 8th the advance was only slight.
The other Infantry brigade of the 36th Division now came up and relieved
the Infantry of the 2d Division in support. The 36th Division took over the
command, the Artillery and certain other elements of the 2d remaining
attached to the 36th.
On the 10th the enemy was found to be withdrawing. The French divi-
sions on the flanks made progress and the 36th Division was ordered to advance
in connection with them. The 72d Brigade relieved the 71st in the front line,
and during the next few days advanced steadily to the line Attigny — Givry.
The other brigade came up abreast of it, and the line became stationary until
the end of the month, when the division was relieved.
Eelief began on the night of October 26-27, but the 71st Brigade was left
in line to complete a minor operation planned for the 27th. This, called the
Forest Farm operation, was intended to expel the Germans from a position
across a loop in the Aisne River, west of Senuy, which they still held on the
south bank.
Orders were issued on the 24th for the capture of this position by the
36th Division. This was accomplished, the losses being very slight on account
of the powerful artillery support. This operation ended the service of the
American troops in this region.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Casualties at first were evacuated to the triage of the 2d Division, at
Somme-Py, which continued to function until the evening of October 9, receiv-
ing 626 casualties belonging to the 36th Division. Ambulance companies com-
menced operating on October 7 and were reinforced by United States Army
Ambulance Service Section No. 586." The 24 G. M. C. ambulances belonging
to the division went forward on the morning of October 8. and evacuated
approximately 1,000 wounded during the ensuing 24 hours, but by noon of
the following day all evacuations from the battalion aid stations were being
made by United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 586. so that the
ambulances of the 2d Division which had been operating in front of the triage
were relieved. That evening military activities had quieted somewhat, but
there was a steady stream of wounded passing through the triage. 7 Through -
• For map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate LI.
868 FIELD OPERATIONS
out the day (October 9) the ambulance company directors of the 2d and
36th Divisions worked in conjunction through the regulating station of the
2d Division, which was located at the triage of that division at Somme-Py.
This formation was subjected to heavy fire, and it was believed that it was
too near the front. Meanwhile, by 7 p. m. of October 9, Field Hospital Xo.
143 had established the divisional triage (36th Division) behind a small lull
about 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) to the south of Somme-Py on the Suippes — Somme-
Py road, and Field Hospital No. 141 was receiving the normal sick at Aulnay-
sur-Marne. The ambulance section of the sanitary train was moved to the
vicinity of the triage during the night, but United States Army Ambulance
Service Section Xo. 586 remained at Somme-Py to evacuate the battalion aid
stations. As the personnel of the bearer sections was at this time inactive,
it was moved the following morning (October 10) to a still safer location at
Souain. where the regulating station for the ambulance service of the 36th
Division was now established. 8
On the morning of the 10th Field Hospital No. 144 was established near
the triage to receive nontransportable wounded, and Field Hospital No. 142,
at Ferine de Suippes, 1 km. (0.6 mile) south of Suippes. began to receive the
gassed. The triage retained no patients, but evacuated them to either the
appropriate field hospital or to Evacuation Hospitals No. 3 or No. 5. 9 Field
Hospital No. 16 of the 2d Division, about 6 km. (3.7 miles) from Suippes.
also cooperated for a short time in the service of the 36th Division. As each
loaded ambulance passed the regulating station, about 5 Ion. (3.1 miles) in
rear of the triage, an empty ambulance moved up to the triage, where six
ambulances were constantly kept posted. 9
On the night of the 12th the triage, still being operated by Field Hospital
No. 143, moved to a point 1 km. (0.6 mile) north of Machault, where it was
located in the shelter of a railway embankment on the Machault — Leffinconrt
road. Here it was joined the next day by Field Hospital No. 144 and by Field
Hospital No. 142, which was held in reserve. 9 Meanwhile, on the 13th a new
regulating station with a detachment of ambulances had been established in
the suburbs of Machault. on the road to St. Etienne ; a few ambulances had
been established in the suburbs of Machault. on the road to St. Etienne; a
few ambulances had been left at Souain to carry on the regulating station
there until the new one was established; and the remainder, except United
States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 586, which moved to Dricourt. were
parked near the triage. s The ambulance section was again advanced on the
14th, moving to a point on the Leffincourt — Mont St. Remy road near the fork
leading to Dricourt and about 1 km. (0.6 mile) south of this town. Casualties
now became so few that the regulating station was discontinued. Until the
United States Army Ambulance Service section was withdrawn, October 29.
five G. M. C. ambulances were posted at Dricourt, and a few others near the
triage, while the. others were held in reserve. 9
Field Hospital No. 142, now designated to operate the triage, moved to n
point 1 km. (0.6 mile) south of Dricourt. on October 13, where it was joined
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 8G9
by Field Hospital No. 144, still caring for nontransportables, while Field Hos-
pital No. 143 went into reserve north of Maehnult. Field Hospital No. 141.
having evacuated its patients, moved the next day from Aulnay to a point 2
km. (1.2 miles) north of Machault, where it again received the sick from
the division. This disposition continued until the division withdrew on
October 29. 9
Evacuations ix Rear of the 30th Division
Evacuation Hospital No. 5. at midnight of October 2, received orders to
load equipment at daylight and move from Ville-sur-Cousances to La Veuve,
where it arrived October 3. It remained here until October 22, when it moved
to Staden, in Belgium. During this period it received 236 gassed cases. 299
medical. 1.602 surgical — a total of 2,137, of whom 56 died. While here the
enlisted strength was brought up to 340 men. 10 This hospital had developed
and here utilized the system of " set up "' described in Chapter XXXIV. p. 818.
Evacuation Hospital No. 3 arrived at Mont Frenet on October 2, and its
most important parts were erected under tentage on the same date. The
kitchen, which utilized a paulin stretched over framework made of boughs,
was soon serving 1,500 people a day. It was supplemented by a diet kitchen.
Officers and nurses occupied British marquee tents and the enlisted personnel
shelter tents. The site was level, crossed by a narrow-gauge railway and by
B ditch which promoted drainage, though later constant rains made, the
camp very muddy. An abundant supply of good water was available and a
rectangular roadway had already been constructed to afford passage to ambu-
lances. The first 10 days, wounded arrived in large numbers, but were easily
cared for, evacuations by hospital trains being provided almost daily. During
the third week only a small number of patients were admitted, most of these
because of illness, and during the last two weeks of the hospital's operation
here even professional work was practically nil. Total admissions were 5.802.
of which 1.402 were received on October 5 and 4,037 in the first 10 days.
Total operations were 718, and total deaths 133. 11
On October 11, Evacuation Hospital No. 18 arrived at Mont Frenet. when
its personnel was split into three groups and assigned for duty with Evacua-
tion Hospital No. 3. Mobile Hospital No. 7. at Ferme de Suippes. and Evac-
uation Hospital No. 5. at La Veuve. Evacuation Flospital No. 18 did not func-
tion as a unit at this station, as its equipment did not begin to arrive until
October 23. On November 2 the organization left for St. Mihiel. where it
served the 33d Division. 12
Mobile Hospital No. 7, in the service of the 2d and 36th Divisions, was
located at La Veuve from October 3 to 7, at Ferme de Suippes from the 7th
until the 14th, and at Somme-Py from October 15 to November 7. 13 A liaison
officer for our Medical Department was attacherl to the French regulating
Nation at Connantre to facilitate the operation of hospital trains and liaison
with the medical subsection of the 4th section of the American general staff
at Chaumont. 14
870 FIELD OPERATIONS
YPRES-LYS (FLANDERS) OPERATION
Iii October while we were so heavily engaged in the Meuse-Argonne, the
commander in chief received a call from Marshal Foch for two American
divisions to help the French Sixtli Army and the Belgians who were attack-
ing to the extreme north. In answer to this call the, 37th and 91st Divisions
(the 91st being accompanied by the Artillery of the 28th Division) were sent.
On October 30 these divisions entered the line and methodically overcame the
enemy's resistance until they were relieved on November 4. On November
10 they again entered the line and were there when the armistice was signed. 1 ''
THE 37TH DIVISION
On October 17 entrainment of the 37th Division was commenced for
participation in the Ypres-Lys operation. 16 On October 22 division head-
quarters were established at Hooglede, Belgium, and the division was at-
tached to the French Sixth Army, forming a part of the army group of the
King of the Belgians. From Hooglede, successive moves were made to Lich-
tervelde, Meulebeke, and to Denterwhem. On the night of October 29-30, about
3 km. (1.8 miles) of the front were taken over along the Coutrai — Ghent
railroad, just across the Lys River, with Olsene in front. 17
On October 31 an attack was launched. The enemy was forced back, and
that night the line rested on the crest of Cruyshautem heights. On November
1 the division advanced and established its line on the west bank of the Scheldt
River, and on November 2 and 3 the river was crossed and a line established
on the east bank, in the face of stubborn opposition. 17
The division was relieved on the night of November 4-5, and it retired
to the Thielt area. On November 9 it moved up again. Another crossing of
the river, this time between the villages of Asper and Heuvel, about 15 km.
(9.3 miles) from Ghent, was the task assigned the 37th; the crossing was
effected on the 10th, and on the 11th the eastern bank was securely held. The
advance continued until 11 a. m.. at which time troops had reached Dickele,
Zwartenbroek, Bouchaute Farm, and the crossroads about 800 meters (872
yards) southwest of Keerkem. 17
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
During the attack of October 31, Ambulance Companies No. 145 and No.
147 were combined and opened a dressing station 1 km. (0.6 mile) east of the
Lys, covering the southern half of the divisional sector, while Ambulance Com-
pany No. 148 rendered a similar service for the northern half. The next day
a station was opened in Olsene by Ambulance Company No. 140 and the station
of the Ambulance Companies No. 145 and No. 147 was advanced 10 km.
(6.2 miles) to Warande. During the night, contact with the advance element
was lost, and the day was spent in clearing the large area covered by the ad-
vance. This was no small task, for each farmhouse sheltered some wounded,
including allies, civilians, and Germans. The next day this station again
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH METJSE-ARGONNE OPERATION 871
advanced to Ruybrook, 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) from the Escaut, but as this position
was found to be too exposed it was replaced by a small advanced station, while
the main station returned to the Marollebeek, a small creek paralleling the
Escaut, 3 km. (1.8 miles) from the firing line. 18 From this time then two sta-
tions served the southern half of the sector, sending their litter bearers forward
in advance of the regimental detachments, and bringing in wounded from
beyond the river. The main station in this sector remained open until after
the division was relieved. Meanwhile Ambulance Company No. 148 had
opened a sorting and distributing station on the line of the axis of liaison
at Wannegem-Lede. All these stations were frequently under fire, for the
terrain was very flat and no shelter was obtainable. 19
Field Hospital No. 145, operating the triage, was located at Denterghem,
3 km. (1.8 miles) from the line, Field Hospital No. 47 receiving surgical cases
at Meulebeke and Field Hospital No. 140 at Thielt. Each of these latter was
about 10 km. (6.2 miles) to the rear, and served in effect as way stations
on the line of evacuation to Evacuation Hospital No. 5, at Staden, 40 km.
(24.8 miles) from the front. Field Hospital No. 148, at first held in reserve
at Denterghem, Avas advanced, October 31, to Cruyshautem, near the second
objective of the attack. The coordination and rapidity of evacuation was
such that within 24 hours after receipt of wounded, casualties other than non-
transportables were either on a hospital train or awaiting its arrival. 19
In the second phase of the division's activities, the triage was established
at Thielt and the relatively few casualties which occurred during this operation
were removed to that formation by the morning of November ll. 18
THE 91ST DIVISION c
On October 10 the 91st Division entrained for Belgium, and upon its
arrival, on the 18th, was placed at the disposal of the army group of the
King of the Belgians; it was assigned to the French Seventh Army Corps,
French Sixth Army, on October 28. The division relieved the French 164th
Division in line, on October 30, and participated in the Ypres-Lys operation
October 30-November 11. During this operation, it took and held Spitaals —
Bosschen, a strongly fortified wood, captured the town of Audenarde, and
drove the enemy east of the Scheldt River. Commencing on the night of
November 3-4, it was relieved by elements of the French 41st Division, and
withdrew to the vicinity of Oostroosebeke, with headquarters at that place.
On November 8 it passed from the French Seventh Army Corps to the
French Thirtieth Army Corps, and entered the front line again on November
10, preparatory to the resumption of the attack and the crossing of the
Scheldt. 20
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Until the division had crossed No Man's Land, Field Hospital No. 362,
which had gone forward on October 15, was established at Boesinghe, near
Ypres. evacuating to British Casualty Clearing Station No. 36. 3 km. (1.8
• For map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate LII.
872 FIELD OPERATIONS
miles) northwest of Ypres, on the Ypres — Elverdinghe road. As the divi-
sion moved eastward the other hospitals passed on to Roulers, one being estab-
lished in Oostniewkerke for a few days. 21
During the night of October 30-31. 41 G. M. C. ambulances arrived, hav-
ing been brought by a detail of the 316th Sanitary Train from Marseille,
and the next day. United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. C40.
with its 20 Ford ambulances, was relieved from duty with the division.
Evacuation from the field hospitals to Evacuation Hospital No. 5, at Staden.
was effected by 15 ambulances belonging to the division, supplemented during
the last 24 hours in this sector by 5 ambulances from an evacuation ambu-
lance company. During the entire advance evacuation was performed expedi-
tiously, for roads were numerous, not so much congested, nor in such bad con-
dition as in the Meuse-Argonne area, and ambulances habitually brought
wounded from the battalion aid stations. All these vehicles were operated
from an ambulance head located in the vicinity of the division post control.
Bearers from the ambulance companies worked in advance of the regimental
stations, bringing wounded to these points. 22 On October 31 a detachment
of Ambulance Company No. 361 crossed the Lys and established a dressing
station on the Sprite — Waereghem road, near a railway crossing. The same
date Ambulance Company No. 364 was held in reserve at Oyghem, and the
ambulance park was established at Desselghem. Evacuations were made to
Field Hospital No. 363, located north of Oyghem, which was supplied with
triage and degassing equipment. 23 Field Hospital No. 362, for surgical
cases, was also located here, while Field Hospital No. 361 was operating in
a convent at Eoulers. Because of the distance to the evacuation hospitals,
it was necessary to perform much more surgical work in divisional units
than had been the practice heretofore. 24
On November 1, Ambulance Company No. 361 established a station at
AVaereghem, which moved a few hours later to Leeuwken. Ambulance Com-
panies No. 362 and No. 364 advanced their stations to Wortegem, the ambu-
lance park was established at the crossroads near Chateau Stuivenberghe and
Ambulance Company No. 363 Avas held in reserve at Oyghem. The following
day the dressing station of Ambulance Company No. 364 moved to a point
near Vondelken and that of Ambulance Company No. 361 to Oycke, the latter
sending forward that night to Audenarde personnel for an advance station
which was withdrawn November 4. Ambulance Company No. 363. as yet in
reserve, moved to Waereghem, where the field hospitals were established, then
6 km. (3.7 miles) from the front line, early on the afternoon of the 2d.
On the 3d, Ambulance Company No. 364 established a temporary advanced
station staffed by 1 noncommissioned officer and 4 privates, in the neighbor-
hood of Chateau de Mooregem, but in the afternoon the three companies (Nos.
361, 362, and 364) operating stations withdrew all their personnel, except 1 non-
commissioned officer and 15 other enlisted men from each company, to Waere-
ghem. These detachments continued to operate the dressing stations until the
next day, when the ambulance company section was withdrawn to Oostroose-
beke. 2 "'
OPERATIONS CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH MEUSE-AKG0NNE OPERATION 873
Before the division reentered the lines a bathing and disinfesting plant
in Oostroosebeke constructed by the Germans was put in repair and as
many men as possible were passed through it. November 9 the ambulance
section and Field Hospital No. 363 moved to Waereghem. On the 10th,
Ambulance Company No. 362 established its station at Chateau Mooregem,
Ambulance Company No. 363 at Ruybroek, and advanced during the day across
the Scheldt River, Ambulance Company No. 364 at Hemelryk. All of those
stations, accompanied by ambulances, were advanced during the day across the
Scheldt River, Ambulance Company No. 362 to Audenarde, Ambulance Com-
pany No. 363 to Eename, and Ambulance Company No. 364 to a location
midway between the former two. Patients from east of the Scheldt were
avacuated to the station of Ambulance Company No. 362, and thence carried
by litter across a footbridge to a station operated by Ambulance Company
No. 361. Here they were again placed in ambulances and sent to Field
Hospital No. 363, at Waereghem. The next day these sanitary formations
occupied the same sites as formerly, but evacuations from dressing stations
were made directly by motor ambulance over the bridge at Audenarde to Field
Hospital No. 364 which had been located at that point. 62
Medical Department Service in Rear of the 37th and 91st Divisions
On the morning of October 24 Evacuation Hospital No. 5 reached Staden.
Belgium, where it set up its plant in the vicinity of a French hospital close
to the railroad on the outskirts of what remained of the town. Establish-
ment was completed before casualties began to arrive, and assistance was
rendered neighboring field units of the Medical Department in erecting their
formations. Most of the evacuations, too, were made by divisional am-
bulances, at times over a distance of 45 km. (27.9 miles). The unit here
admitted from the 37th and 91st Divisions and Artillery of the 28th Division.
62 gassed patients, 2,161 medical. 1,695 surgical; total of 3,918, among whom
occurred 103 deaths. At one time, because of interruption in hospital train
service, the hospital was accommodating 1.420 patients, but was able to
evacuate 1,020 the following day. The unit remained at this station until
December 9, when it moved to Dunkirk, in the service of the 37th Division. 1 "
REFERENCES
(1) Operations report, September 15, October 9, 2d Division, undated,
(2) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 41. On file. Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(3) Ibid., Part I, 42.
(4) Ibid., Part I, 44.
(5) Ibid., Part I, 43.
(6) Report of Medical Department activities, 36th Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated. Part II, 3. On file. Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(7) Ibid., Part I, 3.
18) Ibid., Part I, 4.
(9) Ibid., Port I. 5.
13570—25 56
874 FIELD OPERATIONS
(10) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 5, A. E. F., by
Maj. T. J. Leary, M. C, commanding officer, undated. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(11) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 3, A. E. F..
prepared under the direction of Lieut. Col. C. M. De Forest, M. C, commanding
officer, undated. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(12) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 18, A. E. 1\.
prepared under the direction of Maj. Junius McHenry. M. C, commanding officer,
undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(13) Report of Medical Department activities, Mobile Hospital No. 7, A. E. F., prepared
under the direction of Maj. C. G. Heyd, M. G, commanding officer, undated. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(14) Report on activities of G-4-B medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q..
A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C, chief of section, December 31, 1918. On
file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(15) Report of the assistant chief of staff, third section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F..
undated, 91. Copy on file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(16) F. O. No. 32, 37th Division, October 17, 1918.
(17) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, the Army War College (1700, 37th
Division)-
(18) Report of Medical Department activities. 37th Division. A. E. F., prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 10. On file, Historical
Division, S. G. O.
(19) Ibid., Part I. 17.
(20) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919. prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, the Army War College (1700. 91st
Division) .
(21) Report of Medical Department activities, 91st Division, A. E. F.. prepared under
the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 7. On file, Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(22) Ibid., 8.
(23) Ibid., 17.
(24) Ibid., 21.
(25) Ibid., 18.
(26) Ibid., 22.
SECTION VI
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WITH THE
BRITISH
CHAPTER XXXVII
SECOND CORPS
On January 10. 1918, the British requested that American battalions be
brought over to France for service in British divisions. England agreed not
only to furnish supplies for these troops, but also to undertake to provide
sufficient commercial shipping to assure the transport of the American bat-
talions to France, without interference with our own program. The condition
was that these American battalions serve in British divisions for a minimum
period of four or five months. It was agreed, however, that the period of
training with the British cover a ]>eriod of about 10 weeks. For purposes of
supervising the demonstration and training of the divisions involved, the
Second Corps staff was created on March 19, 1918. without, at first, a com-
manding general. 1 ' 2
Several months passed before the arrival of the divisions, during winch
time the corps headquarters staff made all necessary preliminary arrange-
ments for their reception, assignment to training areas, their training, billet-
ing, etc. In the late spring of 1918. the designated divisions, less Artillery,
began to arrive and continued to do so throughout the summer, the Infantry
of the following divisions constituting, at one time or another, the Second
Corps: TTth, 35th, 28th, 4th. S2d, 33d, 30th, 78th, 27th, and 80th. 3 ' »
On arrival in France, the Artillery and part of the personnel of the sani-
tary trains of these divisions were diverted to various points with the Ameri-
can Expeditionary Forces other than in the British area. Each of the
divisions in the Second Corps was assigned to a section back of the British
front, and immediately began a course of training, preparatory to taking its
place in line. 4
About the middle of August, the 33d, 78th, and 80th Divisions, which had
Wlonged to the Second Corps, and were in training in various localities on the
British front, were withdrawn, leaving with the corps the 27th and 30th
Divisions, which were attached to the British Second Army in Flanders.
These two divisions, having completed their phase " B " training, as set forth
in the program of training for American divisions serving with the British,
were put in the line as divisions; the 30th on August 19, with the British
Second Corps, and the 27th, on August 23, with the British Nineteenth Corps.
The 30th Division was on the right of the Second Corps and the 27th on the
left of the Nineteenth Corps, and the two divisions were side by side in what
were known as the ("anal and Dickebush sectors. 4
875
876 FIELD OPERATIONS
Arrangements were made between our Second Corps headquarters and
the headquarters of the British Second Army, whereby a neAv corps sector was
to be formed out of the two above-named sectors, to be taken over by the
Second Corps. The necessary divisional Artillery and corps troops were turned
over by the British, and all the orders were issued for the passing of the
command at G p. m. on August 30. 1918. However, at 5 p. m. on that date
orders were received from British general headquarters withdrawing the
Second Corps from the British Second Army, and placing it in British
general headquarters reserve, in the vicinity of Doullens. Consequently,
although the two divisions functioned as such in the line for about two
weeks and took part in the operation in which the enemy lost Mount Keinmel
and the, high ground in its vicinity, the corps did not actually function in ac-
tive operations in the British Second Army. 4
From September 3 to September 22 the Second Corps formed part of the
British general headquarters reserve. It occupied training areas in the vicin-
ity of Doullens, with corps headquarters at Beauval. While here information
was received from British general headquarters that the corps would be used
later in operations then in contemplation, and the prescribed program of
training was entered upon with this end in view. 4
On September 20 the Second Corps was released from general head-
quarters reserve and was transferred to the British Fourth Army, with a view
to its employment in contemplated operations against the Ilindenburg line east
of Peronne. The movement took place during the period of September 22-24.*
On the night of September 23-24 the 30th Division relieved the Austra-
lian 1st Division, in the line west of Bellicourt, taking over what was known
as the Nauroy sector, a front of approximately 3.3 km. (2.1 miles). In the
sector taken over by the 30th Division, the British had. during recent opera-
tions, captured most of the advanced trench system which ran about 010 meters
(1,000 yards) west of the main Ilindenburg line. The front line of the divi-
sion, accordingly, occupied approximately what bad been known as the Bin
denburg outpost line. The division was disposed with the 59th Brigade hold-
ing the sector and the GOth Brigade in divisional reserve. 4
On the night of September 24—25 the 27th Division relieved the British
18th and 74th Divisions in the line, taking over what was known as the Gouy
sector, a front of approximately 4 km. (2.5 miles), connecting with the 30th
Division on its right. On this front the British divisions had never succeeded
in gaining the advanced defenses of the Hindenburg system. These defenses
were particularly strong and comprised three very troublesome strong points,
known as the Knoll, Quennemont farm, and Guillemont farm. The front line
of the 27th Division occupied approximately the old British front-line trenches,
which was very close to the Hindenburg outpost line. The line was taken
over by the 53d Brigade; the 54th Brigade was held in divisional reserve. 4
Opposite the sector occupied by the corps, the country was gently rolling
and open, with a fairly well-defined ridge running from near Vendhuile at the
northern limit of the sector, to Bellicourt. near the southern limit. This ridge
roughly paralleled our front line at a distance of 1.76 km. (1.1 miles).
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WITH THE BRITISH 877
Through it, longitudinally, the Cambrai — St. Quentin canal passed, by means
of a deep tunnel, generally known as the Bellicourt tunnel. The main Jlin-
denburg line, consisting of a complicated system of trenches, heavily wired,
run along this ridge. 182 to 36-f meters (200 to 400 yards) west of the tunnel.
which passed under the eastern slope of the ridge. The tunnel added tre-
mendously to the natural strength of the position. 4
To break this strong portion of the German line, it was necessary to
utilize every available means of inflicting loss on the enemy and of breaking
up his defensive arrangements. In order that the attack might be carried on
by fresh troops, after the line had once been penetrated, the Australian corps
was affiliated with the Second Corps, for the attack. The Second Corps, hav-
ing no American artillery assigned to it, the entire operation was supported
by British and Australian artillery.' 4
The plan of the corps attack was, briefly, to carry the bridges of the
canal, if possible, and to gain objectives on the east thereof. As soon as the
.'50th and 27th Divisions had reached their objectives, the Australian 5th
Division, on the right, and the Australian 3d Division on the left, were to
pass through the 30th and 27th Divisions, respectively, and to continue the
advance to a line which included the towns of Beaurevoir and Wiancourt. 4
The main attack was to be preceded by a preliminary operation for the
purpose of advancing the line of departure to the outpost line of the Hinden-
burg defenses. The 30th Division, upon its entry into line, had partially
occupied the outpost position, but the 27th Division was still to the west of it. 5
The objective was the rearmost trench of the Hindenburg outpost line,
to gain which would require an advance of about 1.100 yards from the line
already occupied by the 27th Division. 5
The advance started at 5.30 a. m. September 27. There was hard fighting,
which lasted all day. The Infantry seemed to have advanced in places to the
objective, but the strong points at the Knoll and (iuillemont and Quennemont
farms were not taken, and German counterattacks forced the withdrawal of
those fragments that had reached the objective, except on the extreme right,
where groups held on and were connected with the left flank of the 30th Divi-
sion. The fighting died down during the afternoon and evening, and during
the night the 27th Division front line was established at approximately the
position it occupied prior to September 27. 5
In preparation for the main operation, each division, on the night of
September 27-28, relieved the brigade in line by the brigade which had been
in reserve. 4 The main attack started at 5.50 a. m. September 29. The morning
was very foggy. This fog. mixed with the smoke of the barrage, made it
extremely difficult to see more than a few feet in any direction. Almost from the
start, the Infantry and tanks experienced great difficulty in maintaining direc-
tion and contact. In the right division sector of the Second Corps, the advance
was made against heavy resistance, without serious mishap. On the afternoon
of September 29. the 30th Division. l>eing approximately on its objective, the
Australian 5th Division passed through it. as had been planned. At this
878 FIELD OPERATIONS
time, the 117th Infantry, on the right, was approximately on its objective,
facing southeast, and in touch with the British 46th Division, to the right.
The 120th Infantry was in Nauroy. In the left division sector, grave difficul-
ties were encountered from the start. Apparently expecting the attack in this
sector, the enemy pushed out strong parties through the underground passages.
communication trenches, and ravines, and succeeded in getting considerable
forces on our side of the barrage line. The advance was opposed by heavy
machine-gun fire along the whole front. The right of the line in this sector
succeeded in getting forward to the edge of Bony, in the main Hindenburg
line. Along other parts of the line elements pressed forward, in spite of the
heavy opposition, and detached groups reached their objectives at various
points throughout its extent. Quenncniont farm and various other strong
points held out. Elements which had passed through the main point of
resistance thus found themselves between two fires. The Australian 3d Divi-
sion, which had been designated to pass through the 27th Division, assisted
and supported that division through the latter part of the advance. 4
From October 1 to 5 the Australian corps improved the position obtained
as the result of the attack on the Hindenburg line, and advanced to a line
running from Montbrehain northwest to Beaurevoir. On the night of October
5-6 the Second Corps relieved the Australian corps, which was then with-
drawn to a back area, and the command of the corps sector passed to the com-
manding general, American Second Corps, at 9 a. m., October G. 4
On October 8, at 5.15 a. m., an attack was launched along the entire army
front, with the object, as far as concerned the Second Corps, of capturing
Brancourt and Premont and advancing the line a distance of about 5.5 km.
(3.44 miles). 4 The 30th Division attacked; the 27th Division was corps
reserve.
The fighting was severe, but the normal objective was gained by 10 a. m.
and the contingent objective by evening. The progress of the British divisions
on the flanks was slower than that of the 30th, whose task thus was rendered
more difficult by flank fire. 5
The success of the day's work may be ascribed in part to the fact that the
Germans had already decided upon a general retreat on this front and were
fighting merely a rear-guard action. 5
On October 9. at 5.20 a. in., the attack was resumed, and in the afternoon
the towns of Busigny and Becquigny were captured. 4
On October 10, at 5.30 a. m., the attack began again, to secure the Selle
River and the high ground be3'ond. The country at this point was thickly
scattered with villages, farms, and woods, and the enemy took full advantage
by its very effective use of machine guns. The 119th Infantry, however, cap-
tured Escaufort and St. Souplet, and with the British, St. Benin, in the face
of heavy fire. 4 The 120th Infantry took Vaux-Andigny, but the British
Ninth Corps on its right got only as far as the west edge of the Bois de
Kiquerval. The 120th, being then exposed to fire from the south and south-
east, was compelled to refuse its right along the railway south of Vaux. and
was unable to reach its objective, the village of Molain and the Selle River. 4
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WITH THE BRITISH 879
On the following day the attack proceeded. Stubborn resistance was still
encountered, as during the day before, but on the right, the town of La Hade
Menneresse was taken by assault, and the line advanced there about 910 meters
(1,000 yards). The left sector remained stationary. On the night of October
11-12 the 30th Division, which had been continuously attacking since October
7, and had advanced over 13.6 km. (8.5 miles) on a 6.3-km. (3.9-mile) front,
was relieved by the 27th Division. The 30th Division was withdrawn to the
vicinity of Fremont and Butry Wood, where it remained in support for five
days. 4
On the night of October 15-16 the 30th Division took over the right half
of the sector from the 27th Division, 4 on a line that was practically the same
as that turned over by it five days earlier. These five days had been utilized
by the corps in consolidating the strength of captured territory, over which
it had advanced, and in preparing for the next attack, which was scheduled
by the British Fourth Army to open on October 17*
On October 17 the British Fourth Army attacked along its whole front.
The Second Corps attacked with the 27th and 30th Divisions in line, the
attack beginning at 5.20 a. m. Vigorous resistance, assisted by the natural
defenses of the terrain, was met from the start. Fart of the line of departure
of the 27th Division ran through the partly destroyed village of St. Souplet,
where even unimpeded progress would have been slow. The attacking troops,
therefore, fell behind their barrage and suffered for lack of its assistance in
clearing the machine-gun nest on the ridge just beyond. A thick fog made
observation very poor during the morning. When the advance regiments of
the 27th Division reached the line just west of Le Cateau — Arbre Guernon
road, they r were too far in front of both flank divisions to permit continuing on
until these came up. Consequently the division halted on this line. After
capturing the villages of St. Martin Riviere and Molain, the progress of the
30th Division was \evy slow. The task of the 30th Division was made
particularly difficult due to the necessity of forming a defensive flank to main-
tain touch with the British division on its right, which was experiencing the
same difficulty still farther to its right. ,As a result of the day's fighting, the
line was advanced 3.6 km. (2.2 miles). 4
On the 18th a late start was made because of the necessity of maintaining
contact with the divisions on the right. The terrain was especially difficult,
containing the strong positions of Ribeauville, Ecaillon, and Mazinghien.
The first tAvo of these towns were captured before nightfall : and after an
advance of about 1.3 km. (1,500 yards), halted in a position encircling the
town of Mazinghien. On the morning of October 19 the 30th Division made
a determined attack at 5.30 a. m., and took the town of Mazinghien by assault.
pressing vigorously on to La Haie Tonnoile farm, a distance of nearly 2.7 km.
(2.1 miles). The objective for this day's attack was the high ground over-
looking Sambre a l'Oise canal, and by night the west slope of this ridge had
been reached all along the divisional front. 4
Meanwhile the 27th Division had pushed out strong patrols, behind which
the line advanced slowly to the next ridge. Here the strong point of
880 FIELD OPERATIONS
Jonquieres was captured at 10 a. ra., giving the 27th Division complete com-
mand of the high ground, while patrols advanced across the St. Maurice River.
The ridge beyond, behind which lay Le Catillon, was strongly fortified by
machine guns. This was the situation by nightfall, October 19. The com-
manding ground overlooking Catillon and the Sambre canal had been reached
and a pause on this part of the front was ordered, pending movements on
other parts. Both the 27th and 30th Divisions had been strongly attacking,
with but little rest, since September 29. Their losses had been heavy, and no
replacements had been received. The army commander therefore gave in-
structions for the withdrawal of the corps for a period of rest, refitting, and
assimilating of replacements which were then en route. This period was to
last from two to three weeks. The 30th Division was relieved on the night of
October 19-20, and the 27th Division on the night of October 20-21, the corps
sector being taken over by the British Ninth and Thirteenth Corps. 4
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Upon the arrival of each division surgeon in the corps area, the corps
surgeon immediately met him and gave him the training schedule which
previously had been prepared. Arrangements had already been made with
the director general, medical services, British Expeditionary Forces in France,
for the assignment of an officer of the Royal Army Medical Corps to the staff
of each American division, as liaison officer, and when the divisions arrived,
these officers reported and subsequently assisted in many ways. 5
The corps surgeon had the following officers on his staff: One consultant
in surgery, one consultant in medicine, and an assistant in charge of clerical
work and the office force."
Complete records were kept of the medical, dental, and veterinary officers,
with a station list. Frequent reports of venereal diseases and sick and
wounded reports were required, and copies of correspondence originating in
and passing through the corps surgeon's office were filed. In addition, reports
and returns were required by the chief surgeon, American Expeditionary
Forces, as well as certain reports and returns to the director general, medical
services, British Expeditionary Forces in England. The latter were simple
in nature and few in number. 5
After the arrival in France of the divisions constituting the Second Corps,
the first and most important duty of the corps surgeon was completion of
the training of divisional medical officers and of the enlisted men of the sani-
tary units and detachments. The program of training for American divisions
serving with the British, issued by General Headquarters, American Expedi-
tionary Forces, was strictly adhered to. Prior to the arrival of the 77th
Division, the first division to report to the Second corps, preliminary arrange-
ments had been made, after a conference, with the director general, medical
services, British Expeditionary' Forces. These included the detail of British
officers to the divisions which have been mentioned, and provision was made
that two British field ambulances be assigned to each division, especially for
training purposes, but also to be used in caring for and transporting sick and
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WITH THE BRITISH 881
wounded during the training period. These replaced the division stationary
trains which were diverted elsewhere. 5
During the summer of 1918 the Medical Department of the Second Corps
entered energetically into work intended to render its personnel thoroughly
familiar with conditions on the British section of the Western Front. This,
the final stage of their training, consisted of daily drills; demonstrations of
sanitary arrangements in the field and in the trenches; frequent conferences
of division medical officers; "talks" by experienced American and British
medical officers concerning the various problems confronting sanitary troops
on the Western Front. The lectures and practical demonstrations covered
especially prevailing diseases and their prevention, including trench fever and
trench foot, the application of splints, treatment of gassed cases, methods em-
ployed for transporting the wounded, and selection and operation of lines of
evacuation, treatment of water for drinking purposes, and kindred subjects.
This course was followed by visits to the front, both by medical officers and
enlisted men. British and American officers and men worked in perfect
harmony to secure the best possible results from the training and to complete
it at as early a date as possible. At this time, the duties of the corps surgeon
consisted mainly of frequent visits to divisional areas, general supervision of
sanitary conditions, conferences witli the division medical officers, and over-
sight of the records and reports required. 5
Upon arrival of an American division in the British area, all our Medical
Department material and equipment, except the personal equipment of officers
and men, was turned in for storage, and British equipment and medical sup-
plies were issued in its stead. These supplies were obtained from the nearest
British field medical supply depot, on requisition approved by the division
surgeon. 5
All Medical Department transportation was also furnished by the British.
In some instances, this transportation, especially the motor ambulances, was
found to be old, worn, and unserviceable, as most of it had been in constant
use for a long time. During the training period, however, it answered the
purpose. 5
Some complaint was made by the personnel of American divisions, soon
after their arrival, concerning rations furnished by the British. In point of
fact, complaints were due probably to the change from living in well-con-
structed cantonments in the United States, where there were excellent cooking
arrangements and a generous ration, to field conditions and a ration figured
down to the lowest point to meet actual requirements. After becoming ad-
justed to the new conditions and having coffee substituted for tea (which was
at first furnished by the British) no further complaints were received, and
the men showed by their appearance that the ration supply was ample and
suitable. 5
THE 27TH DIVISION
During June, 1918, the 27th Division (less Artillery and most of its train).
was attached for training to British troops in Belgium. On July 9, after
882 FIELD OPERATIONS
having been attached to the British Nineteenth Corps, the division was
assigned to the defense of the east Poperinghe line, the second line of defense
in the Dickebush and Scherpenberg sectors, on a front of approximately 3.6
km. (2.2 miles). At that time, enemy forces operating in Flanders com-
prised a group of armies which it was known were to attack to the north
part of the Lys salient, in the vicinity of Mount Kemmel, for the purpose
of driving through to the sea, gaining the channel ports, and cutting the
allied army in two. 6
The position of the division was under direct observation from Mount
Kemmel, and casualties were caused almost daily by enemy shell fire. While
holding the line, troops of the division continued the training required by
General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces. The division was
assigned to the American Second Corps, but at this time the only control
exercised by the Second Corps was in training and instruction. 6
On August 23 the division relieved the British 6th Division in the front
line of the Dickebush sector, on a front of 3.1 km. (1.9 miles) at Dickebush
Lake. From here, on August 31, the division attacked in the Ypres-Lys
operation, and on that date and the following two days advanced its line
about 1.8 km. (1.1 miles). 6
On the night of September 2-3 the division turned over its new line to
the British 41st Division, and on the 3d it moved to the Winnezeele area. It
was transferred from the British Second Army to the British Third Army;
and on September 4-5 entrained for an area near Doullens. On September 4
division headquarters was established at Beauquesne, and the division was
billeted for training in the surrounding area, being transferred from the
British Third Army to British General Headquarters reserve. Here the
division remained until September 22. 7
On Septemlxn' 23-24 the division moved by rail and by road from the
Beauquesne training area to the vicinity of Tincourt, having been transferred
from the British General Headquarters reserve to the British Fourth Army.
On the night of September 24—25 it relieved the British 18th and 74th
Divisions in the front line. The line taken over ran generally north and
south on the east of Ronssoy, and extended from the vicinity r of Le Tombois
farm to Malakoff farm. The support line was approximately a north and
south line through the eastern outskirts of Bonssoy. 7
The line taken over faced, at about 910 meters (1,000 yards), the outer
defenses of the main Hindenburg system, to the west of Bellicourt tunnel,
the division holding a 4-km. (2.5-mile) front. 7
The enemy held several strong points and outposts close to our line and
had repulsed previous attempts to take them. The main features of thi^
outer line were its strong positions situated on the high ground opposite the
division's right sector and left, called, respective^, Quennemont farm, Guille-
mont farm, and the Knoll. From this outer line the terrain sloped down
toward the main Hindenburg line, about 1.3 km. (1,500 yards) to the east-
rising again at Bony, which was included in the enemy defensive system. 7
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WITH THE BRITISH 883
An attack on the main Hindenburg line being contemplated, it was decided
by the commander of the British Fourth Army that a preliminary operation
was necessary in order to occupy the outer line of defenses, including the
Knoll, and Guillemont and Quennemont farms, from which to launch the
main attack. The line taken over by the 30th Division on the right was
farther advanced than was that of the 27th, and included much of the outer
lines of defenses. The line held by the British 12th Division on the left
dropped back in a northwesterly direction, giving the 27th little support,
and leaving Vendhuile (strongly occupied) free to threaten the left of any
advance made by the 27th. 7
On September 27 the division, 53d Brigade in line, attacked in the pre-
liminary operation, its objective being the rearmost trenches of the outer
line of the Hindenburg system, at a distance of about 1 km. (1.100 yards)
from the line occupied by our troops. Throughout the day there were attacks
and counterattacks, and on the night of September 27-28, when the 54th
Brigade relieved the 53d Brigade, in the front line, the position taken over
was practically the old front line held previous to September 27. T
On September 28 preparations were made for the main attack to take
place on the following day. On the 29th, the 54th Brigade advanced. On
the extreme, left, opposition was met with from the start, the enemy holding
outposts quite close to our line. The right regiment advanced during the
day, an average depth of about 2 km. (1.2 miles). On the left, the troops
advanced to a position on a line just east of the Knoll. The division line, on
the evening of September 29. was approximately as follows: From the Knoll
south to the west of Guillemont farm, thence southeastwardly to the Hinden-
burg line, and along this line to the division limits. 7
On September 30 the troops of the division in the rear line remained in
support during the day in the same position as that occupied on the evening
of September 29. Under an arrangement with the Australian 3d Division,
which had taken over the front line on the night of September 29-30, those
portions of the 27th Division which were on the front lines moved forward
with the Australian division and continued the attack during the 30th. com-
pleting the capture of the Hindenburg line in the right regimental sector,
capturing the Hindenburg line in the left regimental sector, and capturing
Bony, the possession of which place was not completely gained until the fol-
lowing day. 7
Upon its relief from the lines, the 27th Division moved to the Peronne
area. On the right of October 11-12 the 54th Infantry Brigade relieved
units of the 30th Division in the front line. The 53d Infantry Brigade moved
up. in support, to camps west and northwest of Busigny. The line taken over
from the 30th Division was about 7.800 meters (8,500 yards) long, on the west
hank of the Selle, extending from the village of St. Benin on the north to the
south of St. Souplet, thence extending westward somewhat to and around the
eastern outskirts of Vaux-Andigny. On the night of October 14-15 the
division front was reduced to about 7.7 km. (4.7 miles), the British 8th
Division taking over a portion of the line on the south, and the British 50th
884 FIELD OPERATIONS
Division a portion of the line on the north. Preparatory to an offensive opera-
tion to commence on October 17 this line was still further reduced on the
night of October 15-16, the 30th Division taking over that portion which
extended southwardly from just north of St. Martin — Riviere. The 53d In-
fantry Brigade relieved the 54th Infantry Brigade on the southern part of
the division sector. This placed the Infantry brigades of the division on the
front side by side, each holding a frontage of about 1,820 meters (2,000 yards).
The enemy was holding a line on the east bank of the Selle River as far south
as St. Souplet. ' "'' 8
On October IT the division, as a part of the American Second Corps,
and in connection with the general British advance, attacked in the direction
of Catillon. There was a very heavy fog in the morning of the attack, and
this, combined with the smoke from the barrage, rendered it impossible to
see except for very short distances. The advance was difficult from the start,
both on account of the difficulty of observation and the terrain, which had
to be covered immediately troops moved forward. The village of Arbre de
Guise (Guernon). Advantage farm, the line of the main highway, Joncq de
Mer ridge. Baudival farm, and many points along the ridges and railway
embankments were found to be strongly held by the enemy with machine-
gun nests and infantry. At nightfall, the left of the line was approximately
along the ridge 227 meters (250 yards) west of Le Cateau — Wassigny road.
In the right brigade sector the line was continued forward which readied
the road north of Advantage farm, and passed along to and around the eastern
outskirts of Arbre de Guise to the boundary of the divisional sector, where
it connected up with the 30th Division. 7, 8
On October 18 the troops advanced at 5.30 a. m. In the right brigade
sector the troops met with enemy machine-gun lire from many hedges along
the. ridge about 455 meters (500 yards) east of the departure, line, and enfilade
fire from the sector of the division on the right. This delayed the attack on
the right, but in the afternoon the line was. advanced to the ridge east of Arbre
de Guise. In the left brigade sector no serious resistance was encountered
until the line Joncq de Mer farm — La Roue farm was reached. 7
During the night October 18-19 the line moved forward across the Joncq
de Mer valley and seized the river west of the St. Maurice valley with very
little resistance except from La Jonquiere farm, and because of it, the troops
entrenched on the eastern crest of the Jonquiere farm ridge, where it remained
in position during October 20. On the latter date arrangements were made
for the relief of the division, and on the night of October 20-21 the British
6th Division marched in and relieved the 27th. after which the 27th Division
moved to the vicinity of St. Souplet and Busigny. Dining October 21. 22, 23
the division marched back to the Roisel and Tincourt areas, where, on October
23-24, the troops entrained for the Corbie area. 7
MEDICAL DEPAIiTMEXT ACTIVITIES
While the division was encamped in the Sonune area, it turned in all
medical property not carried by the personnel individually, and gradually re-
UJ
h
<
-J
Q.
UJ
>
z
<n
o
z
<o
m >
u_
Q
O
LU
CO
2
<*
2
i
i-
CVJ
CO
■» 5 « i i ;
OSJ!!'. "
- 3 I S ; 5 a ■
+ + ■«■♦( -H + ©ffl
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WITH THE BRITISH 885
ceived corresponding British equipment in its stead. This included water
carts, with, sterilizing apparatus, in whose use attendants were instructed by
the 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulance of the British 66th Division. In
the British service the field ambulance comprised a field hospital and an
ambulance company combined. The divisional medical service was soon re-
inforced by another British unit, viz, 2/1 East Lancashire Field Ambulance,
and for instruction American medical officers were assigned to both these or-
ganizations. For the same purpose, British officers crave lectures daily to all
medical officers of the 27th Division, and a few of the latter were assigned to
field ambulances serving the battle line. 9 During the time from July 9 to July
31 the 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulance established a main dressing sta-
tion (equivalent to our field hospital) at Trappistes Ferine and a smaller col-
lection station at Oudezeele. and collected all the sick and wounded from this
area, transporting the mild cases to the division rest station operated by the
2/1 East Lancashire Field Ambulance at Arneke and more serious ones to
casualty clearing station, Canadian No. 2. and ambulance clearing station. Aus-
tralian No. 1. at Esquelbeck. These organizations were British analogues
of our evacuation hospitals. 10 The division was under shell fire here, and a
number of battle casualties occurred. On Jul}* 31 Field Hospitals No. 105 and
No. 106 and Ambulance Company No. 106 of the 102d Sanitary Train joined
the division, the first of the divisional medical units to rejoin in France.
Field Hospital No. 105 was stationed at Oudezeele. Field Hospital No. 106 at
Arneke. and Ambulance Company No. 106 at Trappistes Ferme. 10
On August 20, in anticipation of occupation of a sector of the battle line
by the 27th Division, the 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulance and Field
Hospital No. 105 were ordered to take over the main dressing station at Remy
siding, then operated by the 17th Field Ambulance, of the 6th British Divi-
sion, while the 2/1 Field Ambulance, in the forward area, took over advance
dressing stations at Long Barn (right flank) and at St. Dunstan (left flank).
This relief Avas to be completed August 23-24. w The personnel of the latter
unit was supplemented by Ambulance Companies No. 10C and No. 107, which
had reported to the division August 22. and by the bearer section of 2/2 East
Lancashire Field Ambulance. A collecting station for slightly wounded was
organized at Burre barn, whence casualties were evacuated on a 1-meter rail-
way to the main dressing station at Eemy siding. At Trappistes Ferme, Field
Hospital No. 106 operated a sick collecting post during the interval August
21 to September 3, receiving sick from all units not in the front line. It held
the minor cases, but sent others to the casualty clearing stations at
Esquelbeck. 11
The advance dressing station at Long Barn occupied shell-proof elephant
shelters, reinforced with sandbags. This station received patients by hand
or wheel stretcher carry from nine regimental and battalion aid posts and
evacuated by motor ambulance to the main dressing station at Remy siding —
a distance of 7 km. (4.3 miles). The total number treated at this post was
335 Americans and SO British. 1 '
The advance dressing station at St. Dunstan occupied two reinforced
elephant shelters and one dugout, all constructed in old buildings. The 221
886 FIELD OPERATIONS
l^atients received at this station from two battalion aid posts were evacuated
over a 12-km. (7.1-mile) route to the main dressing station at Remy siding. 12
On August 27 the entire medical, surgical, and ordnance equipment of
the 2/1 and the 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulances were ordered by the
Second British Army transferred to the 102d Sanitary Train, and the British
organizations were relieved from the 27th Division. 12
The transport so taken over by 102d Sanitary Train consisted of 4 Ford,
9 Daimler, and 6 horse-drawn ambulances; their condition was such that under
constant use they were unable to stand the strain. By September 2 the ambu-
lances frequently had to be sent to the shop for repairs, and at times only 7
or 8 of them were in commission. From August 24 to September 30 the
sanitary train was reinforced by three ambulances from a neighboring British
unit. During this period two ambulances were damaged by shell fire. 12
After the relief of the 2/1 and 2/2 East Lancashire Field Ambulances
the ambulance company personnel of the forward area consisted of 9 officers
and 168 men of Ambulance Companies No. 106 and No. 107. 12
The British 133d Field Ambulance, which reported for duty with the
division on August 20, 1918, operated the divisional rest station at Arneke
until, on September 1. it was relieved from this duty, then taking over the
divisional rest station at Hilhoek from the British 16th Field Ambulance of
the 6th Division. 13
On August 31, on the advance of the 27th Division to York road, and on
subsequent advances of September 1 and 2, the advanced dressing stations were
held in their original positions at Long Barn and St. Dunstan, while advanced
car posts were pushed up the Ouderdom-Vierstraat and Hallebast-Vijverhoek
road. A car post was established behind a brick house in the outskirts of
St. Hubert-Ushoek, some 364 meters (400 yards) from Hallebast Corners and
about 1.8 km. (1.1 miles) from the advance dressing station. Ambulances
were stationed here until a sufficient number of cases to warrant their removal
were assembled at a collecting post established 1.2 km. (0.74 mile) forward,
when a motor ambulance Avas speeded over the dangerous area to the collect-
ing post. The American Red Cross was constantly in touch with the forward
area, its division representative establishing a depot of supplies at the main
dressing station at Remy siding and issuing to each battalion aid post a
primus stove, cocoa, sugar, milk, cigarettes, tobacco, and extra blankets. 13
On September 2 and 3 the sanitary train was relieved, and with the
British Field Ambulance No. 133 marched to Proven, where all the organi-
zations entrained for the Doullens area, arriving September 4. The 102d
Sanitary Train, which now comprised Field Hospitals No. 105 and Xo. 106.
and Ambulance Companies No. 106 and No. 107, was now billeted at Beauval.
where the field hospitals established a division rest station for the sick re-
turnable to duty within 14 days, sending the more serious cases to Casualty
Clearing Station No. 21, several kilometers distant. 14
While the division remained in this area, from Sejitember 4 to 22, its
sanitary personnel participated further in intensive training. A problem
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WITH THE BRITISH 887
covering and simulating the proposed attack on the Hindenburg line was
carried out, in which the entire division participated. 14
On September 25 Field Hospital No. 105 relieved the field ambulance
company of the British 74th Division, which had been conducting a main
dressing station at Driencourt, and Field Hospital No. 106 established itself
at Longavesnes, where it converted two wooden buildings into dressing rooms
and erected marquee tents as wards. 14 The next day. Field Hospital No. 105
closed and moved to Villers-Faucon, where it began to receive patients at
noon on the 27th. The advance dressing station was established by Ambulance
Company No. 106, on the night of September 24, in some old buildings and
dugouts at St. Emilie, the forward area being covered by Ambulance Com-
panies No. 106 and No. 107. reinforced by the litter-bearer section of the 133d
British Field Ambulance and 100 men of the 108th Infantry. The motor
transport consisted of 3 Ford and 11 Daimler ambulances. 14 The personnel
of the advance dressing station was taxed to the limit of its endurance, and
on the morning of the 28th was reinforced by the Australian 11th Field Ambu-
lance. 15 From this location walking wounded were carried by trucks to the
corps walking wounded rail post just east of Villers-Faucon. During the main
attack commenced on the 29th the motor transportation was reinforced by 10
Red Cross ambulances and an advanced car post was established at Ronsoy,
whence cars were sent up to the front on the Ronsoy — Lempire — Bellicourt
roads. Motor ambulances evacuated the main dressing station to the casualty
clearing station at Tincourt and Doigt. 15 On October 2. when the division
was relieved, the sanitary train and P'ield Ambulance No. 133 marched to
Coureelles, where they rested until October 8. 1 "
October 10. an advance party of Field Hospital No. 106 proceeded to
Montbrehain to take over the main dressing station at this point from the
American 30th Division. The next day when orders were received for the
27th Division to take over the line from the American 30th Division. Field
Hospital No. 105 prepared the schoolhouse at Fremont for use as a main
dressing station, and Field Hospital No. 106 opened an advance dressing
station at Busigny. These arrangements continued until the morning of the
18th of October, when the advance through St. Souplet occurred. 18 Use of
a field hospital to operate the advance dressing station was due to the experi-
ence, on September 27, at St. Emilie. where it had lieen learned that two
ambulance companies were unable to spare sufficient personnel to operate such
a formation during a period when a great many casualties were arriving.
Employment of a field hospital as an advance dressing station was also ad-
vantageous because this could be used later as a main dressing station if the
main dressing station from the rear was "leapfrogged" beyond it. 17
Ambulance Companies No. 106 and No. 107, the litter-bearer section of
the British 133d Field Ambulance, with the motor and horse ambulances,
evacuated the forward area. Transportation was again augmented by a loan
of 10 American Bed Cross ambulances. 17
At the beginning of the battle of La Selle Biver, on October 17. the main
dressing station at Fremont was closed, the advanced dressing station was
888
FIELD OPERATIONS
converted into a main dressing station, and the British 133d Field Amhulance
opened an advance dressing station at Escaufourt, with the main car post
at St. Souplet. This was later pushed across the river and railroad tracks to
L'Arbre de Guise, and up to North Chimney and La Roue Ferine. On October
19 Field Hospital No. 105 opened an advance dressing station at St. Souplet.
the British 133d Field Ambulance closing at Escaufourt. 17
Evacuation of the forward area was effected promptly and completely
each day by nightfall, as the nature of the terrain made it possible to push
Fig. 89. — Wounded from the 27tli Division helng carried to the rear,
17. 1918
Buslgny, Nord, October
Ford ambulances up close to the rear of the advancing troops. Evacuation
from the main dressing station to the casualty clearing station was very diffi-
cult, because of the long distance and the condition of the roads. The round
trip, owing to the rapid advance of troops and the delay in advancing rail-
head and casualty clearing station, took from eight to nine hours. At first
the convoy consisted of 40 ambulances from the British 37th Motor Ambulance
Convoy, but upon the return of the American 30th Division, which took over
half of the front line of the 27th Division on October 15-16. 20 ambulances
were transferred to that organization. The ambulances remaining with the
27th Division proving inadequate, 22 were turned over to it by the corps and
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WITH THE BRITISH 889
army. This reinforcement was adequate promptly to evacuate all the divi-
sion's casualties. 17
The walking wounded were transported to the entraining point at Mont-
brehain, where a detail from Field Hospital No. 105 operated an entraining
post. The division dental surgeon, with a detail from Field Hospital No. 105,
operated a detraining point at Roisel whence the wounded were conducted
across a badly torn-up field to waiting char a bancs for evacuation to the
casualty clearing station at Roisel, 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) distant. 18
After the 27th Division was; relieved by the British 6th Division and
ordered to Corbie, Field Hospitals No. 106 and No. 107, which had reported
for duty October 25, opened a division rest station at Fouilloy on October 26,
and Field Hospital No. 105 opened a disinfesting and treatment station for
scabies at Corbie. Field Hospital No. 108 had reported for duty with the
division on October 15, but was held at Roisel until ordered to Corbie, October
21. Ambulance Companies No. 105 and No. 108 reported October 20. but were
likewise held at Roisel until ordered to Corbie. 18
THE 30TH DIVISION"
On July 2, 3, and 4, 1918, the 30th Division moved to Belgium, under
the British Second Army. For further training, units were brigaded with
British divisions in the canal sector southwest of Ypres, from July 16 to
August 17. Oil August 17-18 the division took over the canal sector from
the British, holding its position until August 30. During the period August
31 to September 2 the division participated in the Ypres-Lys operation in
the battle before Mount Kemmel. In this operation the division captured all
its objectives, including Lock No. 8, Lankhof farm, and the city of Voor-
nezeele, advancing 1,500 yards. 19 ' 20
On September 4r-5 the division was withdrawn from the canal sector and
was placed in British General Headquarters reserve, with division head-
quarters at Roellecourt, France. While in this area, the entire division was
trained in attacking in conjunction with British tanks. 19
On September 17 the division was again moved farther south, with
division headquarters at Herissant; and on September 22 was moved to the
British Fourth Army, with division headquarters at Bois de Buire, near
Tincourt, taking over a front line sector from the Australian 1st Division on
the night of September 23-24. 19
On September 29 the division, with the American 27th Division on the left
and the British 46th Division on the right, assaulted the Hindenlmrg line,
which at this time curved in front of the subterranean canal south of Bellicourt.
The Infantry started off well from the line of departure, but had not
progressed more than a few hundred yards before they began to experience
difficulty in maintaining direction and contact. During the remainder of the
morning the attack was carried on by more or less mixed groups which had
been picked up along the whole front. Small groups of men. acting on their
own initiative, would clear out troublesome machine-gun nests, or complete
" For map of activities of tliis division for this period, seo Plate LIT,
890 FIELD OPERATIONS
the capture of any trench encountered. The troops on the right, having the
enemy only in their direct front to contend with, were able to make steady
progress toward their objective. Troops on the left early encountered
machine-gun fire from the sector on their left and were soon forced to form
a defensive flank in that direction. On the afternoon of the 29th, at the time
the Australian 5th Division passed through the 30th Division, the 117th
Infantry, on the right, was approximately on their objective, facing south-
east and in touch with the 46th Division, on their right; the 120th Infantry
was in Nauroy, elements having gone beyond there and reached their objective,
but having been forced to return on account of being out of touch with units
on their flanks; the regiment in general occupied Le Catelet — Nauroy line.
The 119th Infantry had its right on the Le Catelet — Nauroy line, but had been
forced to bend its line back to the tunnel because of fire from the sector on
its left. When the Australian 5th Division passed through the line held by
the 30th Division, they were joined and assisted by various groups from the
different regiments of the 30th Division. These groups remained with the
Australian division and were withdrawn during the night September 29-30.-°
On October 2, the division was moved back to the Herbecourt and Le
Mesnil areas, presumably for rest and refitting. However, on October 5 it
moved to the vicinity of Hargicourt and Templeux le Guerard, and on the
night of October 5-6 its 59th Infantry Brigade relieved the Australian 5th
Division in the line extending from Montbrehain northwest to near Beau-
revoir. 20
A formal attack having been ordered by the American Second Corps for
October 8, the division advanced on a front of approximately 3.6 km. (2.2
miles), with two objectives, the first about 3.6 km. (2.27 miles) distant,
including the town of Brancourt; and the second, about 2.2 km. (1.3 miles)
beyond the first objective, including the town of Fremont. By the end of the
day both these towns had been captured and the line lay east of Premont. 20
On October 9 the 59th Brigade attacked, its objective being about 4.5
km. (2.7 miles) distant. Having attained this, it was passed through during
the afternoon by the 60th Brigade, whose objective was 1.8 km. (1.1 miles)
beyond. This was attained on the afternoon of the same day. 20
On October 10 the attack was renewed, the objective now being the high
ground to the east of the Selle River, from St. Benin to Molain, both villages
inclusive. This necessitated an advance of from 5 to 6 km. (3.1 to 3.7 miles)
over very difficult terrain, including villages, farms, and woods. 20 The 119th
Infantry, by 12.50 p. m., had captured St. Souplet and St. Benin, the latter
in conjunction with the British.
The 120th Infantry took Vaux Andigny, but the British Ninth Corps, on
its right, got only as far as the west edge of the Bois de Riquerval. The 120th.
being then exposed to fire from the south and southeast, was compelled to
refuse its right along the railway south of Vaux, and was unable to reach its
objective, the village of Molain and the Seille Rner. 5
On October 11 the left of the line remained stationary, but on the right
the town of la Haie Menneresse was taken, and the line in general was
advanced about 910 meters (1.000 yards). 20
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WITH THE BRITISH 891
On the night of October 11-12 the 30th Division was relieved by the
27th Division, and remained in support of that division until October 16.-°
On the night of October 15-16, the 59th Brigade took over a portion of
(lie line held by the 27th Division, 5 the front being practically the same as that
which had been turned over on the night of October 11-12. The front assigned
to the 30th Division was only about 1.8 km. (1.1 miles) in extent, but included
the towns of St. Martin-Riviere and Molain, both of which were strongly held ;
while the high ground on the east bank of the river was fortified by trenches
and wire. 20
On October 17 the 59th Brigade attacked, its objective being a line at
about 5.4 km. (3.3 miles) in front. The Infantry and tanks moved off
promptly at the prescribed time. Strong resistance was encountered, par-
ticularly from the towns above mentioned; this, together with some difficulty
experienced in crossing the Selle River, made it impossible to keep up with
the barrage. After losing the barrage, heavy enemy machine-gun and artillery
fire rendered progress impossible without ruinous losses. The brigade there-
fore entrenched on a line at about 3.6 km. (2.2 miles) from the parallel of
departure, and was here relieved by the 60th Brigade on the night of
October 17-18. 20
On October IS the 60th Brigade attacked, its objective being the high
ground commanding the Sambre canal. The terrain included in the attack
presented many difficulties to an advance. The towns of Ribeauville. Ecaillon,
Ribeaucourt, and Mazinghien furnished a series of natural centers of re-
sistance, with mutual covering fire, while many hedges and woods were filled
with machine-gun nests. Very stubborn resistance was encountered, especially
from the above-mentioned towns; though the line was advanced some 1.8
Ian. (1.1 miles) on the right, it was bent back on the left above the town of
Mazinghien, which offered exceptionally good opportunities for defense. This
line held during the night October 18-19. 20
On October 19 the attack was again made, the objective being again the
high ground overlooking the Sambre canal. Again the attack met with
severe resistance, especially from la Haie Tonnoile Ferme. All resistance,
however, was finally overcome and the troops were practically on their
objective when a halt was ordered to straighten out the division line prepara-
tory to being relieved by the British 1st Division.
On the night of October 19-20 the relief was made, and the division moved
back by easy stages to the Tincourt and Roisel areas.
On October 24 it entrained for the Guerrien training area, northeast of
Amiens, where it remained until November 21."' zo
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On July 5 three field ambulances, Xos. 132, 133, 134, of the British 39th
Division were attached to the 30th Division to care for its sick and wounded.
Field Ambulance No. 133 was detached on August 16, 1918. The sanitary
train of the division did not join until August 1, 1918, when Field Hospitals
No. 118 and No. 119 and Ambulance Companies No. 118 and No. 119 reported.
892 FIELD OPERATIONS
In order to comply with the British Tables of Organization, the field hos-
pitals and ambulance companies were combined on August 14 and designated
Field Ambulances No. 118 and No. 119. 21 ' h
On September 28 the following medical arrangements were made: Two
aid posts were established in both the right and left sectors of the division,
and back of these, in each sector, one ambulance loading post (collecting
station). Advance dressing stations were established by the American Field
Ambulance No. 119 at Jeancourt in the right sector and at Templeux le
(Juerard in the left. A station for walking wounded was also located at
the latter point. The main dressing station was established by American
Field Ambulance No. 118 and the divisional gas center by British Field
Ambulance No. 1.32 at Marquaix. The ambulance dispatch post was located
at Roisel. British Field Ambulance No. 134, in reserve, was to operate a
temporary advance dressing station in the right sector. The bearer sub-
divisions of the American Field Ambulance No. 118 and the British Field
Ambulance No. 132 were ordered to be relieved on call by the commanding
officer of the American Field Ambulance No. 119, as were all ambulances and
wheeled litters. 21
Within one and a half hours after the barrage was let down at 5.30 a. in.
the wounded began to come in rapidly, and soon the advance stations were
working to full capacity. Large numbers of German prisoners were em-
ployed to bring in litter cases from the front lines. The walking wounded,
after being dressed and receiving antitetanic serum, were sent by auto bus or
truck to an entraining point on a light railway which carried them to within
1.6 km. (1 mile) of Tincourt. where a casualty clearing station was located.
Congestion developed at the dressing stations, particularly at Jeancourt. but
was overcome by obtaining additional ambulances. The casualty clearing
stations nearest the field ambulances were soon filled to capacity, necessitating
evacuation to others farther to the rear. Cases of abdominal and chest wounds
were selected for immediate evacuation to the casualty clearing station. The
average time necessary for the removal of these and other seriously wounded
patients from the time their wounds were received until they reached the
casualty clearing station, was approximately four and a half hours. In the
24 hours from 6 a. m. September 29 to 6 a. m. September 30. a total of 2.075
cases were evacuated, and the following day 1,265. Each medical formation
replenished its supplies by informal requisition on the organization in its
rear. 21
On October 8 the advance dressing station was moved forward to Mont-
hrehain and the American Field Ambulance No. 119 opened a main dressing
station and degassing center at Joncourt. where American Field Ambulance
No. 118 went into reserve. 22 On October 9 the ambulance section of this com-
pany opened an advance dressing station at Busigny. The station for walk-
ing wounded was advanced to Bellicourt. where patients were entrained. Late:
the walking wounded were entrained at Joncourt. The American Field
Ambulance No. 119 moved up to Montbrehain: the 132d (British) went into
'Unfortunately the history of the division floes not show the activities of the 105th Sanitary
Train during tho Ypres-Lya operation.
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WITH THE BRITISH 893
reserve. The walking-wounded station, conducted by the British Field Ambu-
lance Xo. 134 was now advanced to Busigny. 21 On October 10 a hospital for
divisional sick was established at the main dressing station at Montbrehain
and continued to receive patients after the division withdrew from the line
on the night of October 11-12. 21
When the division again reentered the line on the night of October 15-16.
in the right of the Second Corps, the American Field Ambulance No. IIS
established the advance dressing station at Busigny. where the British Field
Ambulance No. 134 opened the post for walking wounded, evacuating by light
railroad to the casualty clearing station at Templeux le Guerard. The main
dressing station and gas center were established by the American Field Ambu-
lance No. 110 at Montbrehain. and the British Field Ambulance No. 132 was
in reserve. 21 On October IT the last-mentioned unit soon opened the main
dressing station and gas center at Bohain, while that operated by the American
Field Ambulance No. 119 cleared at Montbrehain and Avent into reserve at that
place. 21 On the 18th the American Field Ambulance No. 118 opened an
advance dressing station at Molaine. and at the same time the station for
walking wounded was brought forward from Busigny. The distance from
the main dressing station at Bohain to the casualty clearing station at Tem-
pleux le Guerard was now so long that some difficulty occurred in clear-
ing the former on the night of October 17-18. 21 The following night the divi-
sion was relieved and the sanitary train accompanied it to the Querrieu area,
near Amiens. British Field Ambulances No. 132 and No. 134 were relieved
from duty with the division on November 17. 21
EEFERENCES
(1) Report of assistant chief of staff, G-3, G. H. Q., July 2, 1919.
(2) G. O. No. 1, Second Corps, 191S.
(3) Journal of operations. Second Corps. Report of Medical Department activities,
Second Corps, by Col. C. C. Collins, M. C, corps surgeon, undated. On file,
Historical Division, S. G. O.
(4) Report of operations, Second Corps, December IS, 191S.
(5) Report of Medical Department activities, Second Corps, A. E. F., bj Col. C. C.
Collins. M. C, corps surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(6) Operations report, 27th Division, undated.
(7) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army. 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War Col-
lege. 1700, (27th Division).
(8) Front line map, American battle monuments commission.
(9) Report of Medical Department activities, 27th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the
direction of the division surgeon, undated, 2, 3. On file. Historical Division,
S. G. O.
(10) Ibid., 5.
(11) Ibid.. 7.
(12) Ibid., 8.
(13) Ibid., 9.
(14) Ibid., 10.
(15) Ibid.. 11.
894
FIELD OPERATIONS
(16) Ibid., 12.
(17) Ibid., 13.
(18) Ibid., 14.
(19) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.
1700 (30th Division).
(20) Operations reports, 30th Division, undated.
(21) War diaries, division surgeon's office, 30th Division. On file, Historical Division,
S. G. O.
SECTION VII
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY,
ITALY, NORTH RUSSIA, AND SIBERIA
CHAPTER XXXVIII
THE ADVANCE INTO GERMANY
THE THIRD ARMY
The following is quoted from the Final Report of Gen. John J.
Pershing : *
In accordance with the terms of the armistice, the Allies were to occupy all German
territory west of the Rhine, with bridgeheads of 30 km. radius at Cologne, Coblenz, and
Mayence. The zone assigned the American command was the bridgehead of Coblenz and
the district of Treves. This territory was to be occupied by an American Army, with
its reserves held between the Moselle — Meuse Rivers and the Luxemburg frontier.
The instructions of Marshal Foch, issued on November 10, contemplated that 2 French
infantry divisions and 1 French cavalry division would be added to the American forces
that occupied the Coblenz bridgehead and that 1 American division would be added to
the French force occupying the Mayence bridgehead. As this arrangement presented
possibilities of misunderstanding due to difference of views regarding the government of
occupied territory, it was represented to the marshal that each nation should be given
a well-delined territory of occupation, employing within such territory only the troops
of the commander responsible for the particular zone. On December !) Marshal Foch
accepted the principle of preserving the entity of command and troops, but reduced the
American bridgehead by adding a portion of the eastern half to the French command at
Mayence.
Various reasons made it undesirable to employ either the First or Second Army as
the Army of Occupation. Plnns had been made before the armistice to organize a Third
Army and, on November 14. this army, with Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman as commander.
wag designated as the army of occupation. The Third and Fourth Army Corps staffs and
troops, less artillery, the First, Second, Third. Fourth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second
Divisions, and the Sixty-sixth Field Artillery Brigade were assigned to the Third Army.
This force was later increased by the addition of the Seventh Corps, Maj. Gen. William
M. Wright commanding, with the Fifth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth Divisions.
Headquarters of the Third Army was first located at Ligny-en-Barrois,
that of the Third Corps at Dun-sitr-Meuse, and that of the Fourth Corps at
Woinville. 2
When the armistice became effective (November 11, 1918) the Third Corps
held the general line from left to right, as follows: From the Meuse River at
Stenay along the northern and eastern edge of the Bois du Chenois to the
southwest corner of Bois Robert: thence to a point 100 meters south of Ilugne
Ferme. thence 400 meters north of Louppy to 400 meters north of Remoiville,
thence 400 meters east of Jametz, Ihence south along the Jametz — Peuvillers
road to a point, thence south along the eastern edge of Bois . Jametz and Bois de
895
896 FIELD OPERATIONS
Lissey to a point on the Vittarville — Ecnrey road, thence south to bridge over
the Theiute River, where it joined the French. The 32d Division was on the
right from Jametz (exclusive) to Penvillers (inclusive). One regiment of
the 2d Division was at Stenay. The 5th and 42d Divisions were in reserve. 2
St. Pierremont Ferine, south of Sedan; 3d Division in vicinity of Bar-le-Duc,
On the same date the Fourth Corps was disposed as follows: 1st Division.
4th Division at Boucq. The 2d, 32d. and 42d Divisions were retained in
the Third Corps for the army of occupation, and on November 17 held the
same positions as those mentioned above. The 4th Division remained in the
Fourth Corps and at 5 a. m. on November 17 the 1st and 3d Divisions moved
into position through the 28th and 7th Divisions, which on that date were
transferred to the Sixth Corps. 3
General Pershing's report continues : 4
Tlie advance toward German territory began on November 17 at 5 a. m., six days
after signing the armistice. All of the allied forces from the North Sea to the Swiss
border moved forward simultaneously in the wake of the retreating German armies.
"When the march began all units of the various organizations of the Third
Army were in place, and the forward movement began in perfect order. The
zone of the advance of this army was as follows : s Northern (left) : Mouzon—
Carignan — Florenville — Jamoignes — Etalle — Habay-la-Neuve — Redange —
Grosbons — Diekirch — Wallendorf (all inclusive). Southern (right): Thiau-
court — Chambley — Conflans-en- Jarnisy — Moyenvre — Gandringen — Thion-
ville— Mallingen — Schengen (all inclusive)."
Advance elements of the army on the first day reached the general line:
Ecouviez — Sorbey — Gouraincourt — Mars-la-Tour. Next day they reached the
line : Etalle — St. Leger — Ruette — Aubange — Longwy — Audun-le-Roman—
Briey. and headquarters moved to Longuvon."
On November 20 the general line of the army was: Grendel — Autelbas —
Mondercange — Dudelange — Wollmeringen — Gentringen. Next day the line
reached Yichten — Mcrsch — Schutt range — Rentgen — Kattenhofen. Boundaries
of the army zone of advance remained unchanged. Each corps kept two divi-
sions in the front line and one in the second.
The advance units passed through Luxemburg on November 21 in review
before General Pershing, and the following day the line was advanced to
Ingeldorf — Betzdorf — Wormeldange, thence to the Moselle River, to
Schengen."
Third Army headquarters moved to Hollerich, a suburb of the city of Lux-
emburg, on November 22. The boundary line between the Third and Fourth
Corps was now extended as a line Roodt-sur-Syre — Berg-sur-Syre — Wasser-
billig. On the 23d the army began its advance to the Luxemburg-German
frontier, and there it remained until 5.30 a. m. of December 1, when it entered
Germany as part of the entire allied force.
General Pershing's report continues: 7
Upon entering the Duchy of Luxemburg in the advance, a policy of noninterference
in the affairs of the grand duchy was announced. Therefore, when the French com-
mander in the city of Luxemburg was given charge of all troops in the duchy, in so far
as concerned the "administration of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg," my instructions
PLATE LV.
MARCH OF THE
THIRD ARMY
ZUL&1CH
EUSXIRCHENj
Soland»«cW
OOerwioterfl
OottesfeMo / " >tv .
rtMundersbacK
HilberathQ
If*
SCH&ElDEN
*:fctiii3-Dttio «
:t>M 1 65D.<i3 °«\ rH» 1 EZ1
»rt. lfcFHlft6l67-ie* CVtlfc ^^. lVCH fl\A \^^
) fJb.r.qsrn
,-,s* al • ,■ .-.
SCALE IN KILOMETERS
20 25 30
35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
N
) -v. y
I * \ BC "A lL
^CHARLEVILLE
Jmezieres
(S3T HUBERT
../a Meu-se R.\
Muno \
* * FLORENVILL
Hab&y-fo-AfcuveV
^5
aMl^fiOTTs)
p
Jernbacr.!-.
wo/zraaAt/o
qesh* is«r
Kcmpknicho
UMBvf*6-^
/OGHqcnback
Dr / D«' 1° -l/OTT^ ^r A DEN A
Dec 3
usdort
:-r- !?H;f.?t|
0»t 16 FH 21 :
OEttrii
MAYtN^jftf^'^
M HpfB^UtifEHfiENafiEiTSTEIN
:oble
p«<.6 -FM166 IM±
Obark.jtt.nqen r
sObr.Eh*
£Ug
|//,fZA«iM
Lo m m ntwt . I • p © >
oAlfarstaqi
S3
"P
s.imO ttJBUnkarn
Weldenbacho
Mullanbacho
u •,<■■■■ \ \
)0«(. 1<4 / Dr.eachO
J-^c
/^ G»pp»n«ch
Nlunhtimo J? 1
Miinatermaifeld
ia«j*7p! '
ii>-:o Jt>. u
\Wald«schO
BOPPA ffd^%
nfeld ^"^SST 5 GOARSHAUSEN
S r GOAfr*
§HOUf* L 'ZE * A
Himenchtidi
Munchausen
b,«..i,o;i/fs-«oji'"o(i
v >*'.
oBour*ch«<d
DIEKIRCW&
Sefi.
icKleido
!'*■-.■..'
^i&g-C. pBpBV
M.ttenSorf C • Sicllmqen
■5 r
id^r.k-;,»o
^ 1
\WaJI«ndorf \ . ' \
^*lnU« !6{.lfthIJ«(i
'rumlurlay T p
Hylcnenburg^ j-J=
fr
Gillanfeld.
S«U«nfeld
aC^*
iiaanaclWill
OBm
pDf
oHesw#il«r
d /
?E±'i-
TechtinqsKausen
1
/if H128-0«t 3
Sp«ich
PlatUno
(23 pi
RNCAf.
Todenrotb
°oM«ticnhau6eri^,
OberkoiteniQ
^Rav*rab«ijr«n
beuren\
r.beureno^Ii'^''" Menqerschledp
7±D«t6\
0'iauser.
Ihduntn
JlMMEPHs'
VKREUZNACH
\
/n3*n 6D «^
[ ' / (Fels) Con«lorfF0.3S4*lV t J » 0,c2tM 3
«»SCH± t 1123-No. 26-1)^7 oBarbcurg
^O//?
RIER
^TREVES)
Worbacb
He.d«nbur<3 HunoUt^n OKempfeld
s^-~*~^ \jenaweilerQ
. / AllenLd
Rmqel Kpf
08E8ST£fN
r
GfteyENMACHER
o
°Zo»c^
•^aERAXOSCHE L
MEISENHEIM
pn*
Schuttr«nqe
■yn..
Jtev£l-F)ii6Cn'W
LUXE
jH*aparang9 :
i).aau;
Sandv/eikr
CURG 0*Wfort
Canacho
Waldweikr SitztfratbV^ ""*!?' 1 ^
Q O % — -
°toandern GnmburqarKof
3ta3tbr.dim.iii
Hlrsckf^ldarhof
OTOURTERON
Pouillyoy
Ru«tle/
i£ CHESNE
lOS^ PI«rra
STENAX
, _.^+\ ™ \ ' "±K r '„ \ V Mo***!* Elvanae
-'»W\^ or *>CS, "^ » *»««J.„o^S? 5 \\
/P
m/^^" 3 "'" Meo ** iowandtville
vrAAur£ ilFH167-NovI7
f Ktffixgenov.
c OOudelange y 4C«cl-.
,.A t , f * Suflqan
*MUB*Wfc«/ * t O Breladorf O
Ottmq«r> OW6llm«r.ngen
IB
tlCH
i*r*c>(«i
SorbcyO
■J«f .O Gr rtettinqen
EiCh«r«g«n \ Ga
Otrinqen \ /
jpn
Briuullc^C
ttflZ-Nov.e-DecfiJ *"-Afc««r
Peuvillara
T
JWNCOURT
pn&ttirtl + >Arsw«lero ■*
f {AijgavTikfsJ G^ntrlnqanO rTO
AUDUNQ £ \
^a \ Ftyrchlnqen
."
ONcrro-^/e --V?c
z(5? Francoia)
EDtNHOFEN
thionvilleJ
l««No*.»C Det^
D«clO-fMl303
[3 L*
[3
Moincvillep
Wi.i.£-5 U r-Tpurbc \ ft
>er)(vill«l!
C/-£flAfOA/7-«n-Arqonni»
m^'
Ponci>urt-/»*-Co/« c /an
^flf JWf 5^en -\AW«v r«
3™ MENEHOULD
AuQZ6-Dec 17-E H 6 QJO
Maujouy fV»
'fi*uviu*o
. t' if -erhWo*,''*
CHAM8LEY O
TfilAUCOUfiT
VAUBE$OURT
msdQ
rj) qst M Aur . c ,\
• 22 3E't,!„*
WOW£UiifS-0
las-Hattonchatyl'
p&zvz thiauc5U5T&\:
-HlZ9±[)cc7-B aouillonJill.
5iJul!«n-/aj-Go'-ze H J
O
:tz
OVerny
OChar«2y
'U % «?|
PIERREFITTl ST wWEL
£a»€v\> oCuv««in\ P0NT-A-MQUS5ON
J \ J^ oMousaon '
|wBSc*tuRm
OWo'mviHe
BOttfHEN
(BOdfAY)
yKALKEHBERa
(FAb-LQUEMONT)
mun\rt\
5 T W£NDEL
ST^WGBERT
VOLKUNGEN
SRBRUCKEN
MOPCHINGEN
\(frORHANGE)
pa
Apremooiti
tii'Atri' '■ ieirrico^t
UtULOUAKD
e O * CHATiEAU-SALINS
SAAROEMUHD
&ARRIGOEMINES))
SAAIIALBEN.
SAARUNION
{FS. NIS~ RANGER
ZWEIBRUCKEN
^(D^E^X-PONTS)
E^X-PO
K AI5ERLAUTERN
LAHDSTUHL
FIELD HOSPITALS
Br corps
2T* DIV.
•i2--« DIV.
N9 1
IS
23
N? I25
I26
I27
P 2*
166
I6S
EZ ORPS
I'J DIV.
3"^ DIV.
-a^" DIV.
N1 2
3
13
N° 5
7
2<
2 7
N» 1 9
2 I
1)
sn corps
'- mv.
a ^
"J* DIV. 69'
90** r 1 v
m 17
■
29
-.
l/>9
I 30
9 1
I 42
353
3 b*
3SS
356
H" 367
3&e
3 39
360
LEGEND
H ARIvfi HEADpuARTECS
IQ- -COPPS HEADOUARTER5
fT) DIVISION HEADQUARTERS
▲ TRIAGE
fflc-i-CORPb HOSPITAL
± IH-FIUD HOSPITAL
©MH-MOBUE HOSPITAL
©EH -EVACUATION HOSPITAL
BB N H -NEUROLOGICAL HOSPITAL
□ MSO-MEDICAL SUPPLY DEPOT
HEILTZA,-Ms.ur„pt
TiWK
VAVINCOURT
S&AX-LE-DUC
*fH19-NOYi-2l ,
Boncourt \/
DOMEVITE-en-Ha
•0*
Oct3IJan6-FH13t
COMMEft
DRqyaumaix
J&SAARBURG
UlTGVK^-Barr
rtStfff TOULy
wi*I-
NvS 7 O/Z/ffl
TXA/CERV/LLE
^\P05IEPES-
\aux-Salin«s
C/PE y-iur-Veioua«*
. ft H OPPENHEIM
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 897
were that our troops would not be subject to his control. Later, at my request, and
in order to avoid possible friction, Marshal Focli placed the entire duchy in the American
zone.
After the passage of the Third Army through Luxemburg, the occupation
of that principality for the purpose of guarding our line of communications
was intrusted to the 5th and 33d Divisions of the Second Army. The city
of Luxemburg, garrisoned by French troops and designated as headquarters
of the allied commander in chief, was excluded from our control. 4
Upon arrival at the frontier, a halt was made until December 1, when
the leading elements of all allied armies crossed the line into Germany. 4
Orders were issued on November 29 for the Third Army to resume the
march, and on December 1 it had reached the general line Alfersteg — Win-
terscheid — Masthorn — Mulbach — Kill — Cordel — Trier — Konz ; thence the Saar
River within army limits. 8 Headquarters of the Third Army, at Hollerich,
was ordered to Bitburg on December 3; that of the Third Corps, at Jung-
linster, to Echternach on December 1 and to Kylburg on December 3 ; that of
the Fourth Corps, at Hesperange, to Grevenmacher on December 1 and to
Schweich on December 3 : that of the Seventh Corps, at Virion, to Greven-
macher on December 4; that of the 5th Division, at Longuyon. to Hollerich
on December 4. 9
The general line reached through the advance of December 2 was :
Krewinkel — • Roth — Neuendorf — Dausfeld — Neidenbach — Metterich — Eieven-
ich — Morscheid — Mandern — Hirschfelderhof. 10
On the second day of the o2ierations in Germany the roads were found
to be poorer and progress was more difficult. Roads were below the standard
of French and Luxemburg highways, and the several hilly sections which had
to be traversed delayed the march. 10 On the 3d of December the Third Army
had reached the line: Budesheim — Sahn — Dahlem — Ormont — Pronsfield —
Arzfeld — Manderfeld — Olzheim — Salm — P^isenschmidt — Wittlich — Berneas-
tel — Noviand — Heidenburg — Beuren — Wadril. 11
On the same day, December 3, when Third Army headquarters moved to
Bitburg. across the German frontier — a movement of over 50 km. (31 miles) —
the army staff and the various sections were functioning the same date and
liaison between the Third and Fourth Corps was complete. Supplies were
being moved up in sufficient quantities, and the Signal Corps soon had com-
pleted telephone and telegraph connections with the rear. 11
The army having established itself in German territory, at once took
measures for canying out orders regarding the treatment of German civilians
and the protection of property. While the troops were not to fraternize nor
to have anything resembling friendly intercourse with the Germans, forbear-
ance was to be shown and property carefully protected. The army entered
Germany as a conquering army, but there was to be no wanton destruction nor
any act of violence, 11
The general line at this time (December 4) was: Dahlem — Glaadt — Ober-
bettingen — Kalenborn — Wallenborn — P^isenschmidt — Wittlich — Zeltingen —
13576—25 57
898 FIELD OPERATIONS
Berncastel — Gornhausen — Hnnolstein — Basch — Malborn — Nonweiler — Otzen-
hausen. 11
German civilians evinced great, curiosity and interest concerning the
movement of American troops, but exhibited no unfriendliness, and as time
passed they showed relief from early apprehension. 10
The advance continued on December 5 and 6. and on the latter date
the army front was the general line : Udelhoven — Dockweiler — Boos — Lau-
bach — Driesch — Mesenich — Metzenhausen — Sulzbach. 11 Next day the line
took in Rupperath — Gilgenbach — Drees — Boos — Kempenich — Mayen — Greim-
ersburg — Buch — Simmern — Kellenbach. On December 7 the boundary be-
tween the Third and Fourth Corps was extended to Naunheim — Ruber — Ko-
bern (all to Fourth Corps), and thence to the mouth of the Moselle River. 12
Third Army headquarters opened at Mayen on December 10; Third
Corps headquarters, at Daun, to open at Polch on the same date, and Fourth
Corps headquarters, at Zell, to open at Cochem on December 9. The Seventh
Corps moved up to Grevenmacher and the 5th Division to Hollerich. 12
The first unit of the Third Army to reach Coblenz was the 2d Battalion,
39th Infantry.
The general line reached on the 9th was the Rhine River from Rolandseck
to Brohl, thence Wassenach — Kerben — Munstermaifeld — Liesenfeld — Khein-
bollen. Exactly 22 days from the time the march to Germany had begun, and
25 days after issuance of orders for this march, the American Army had
marched from the Verdun-Argonne battle front through Lorraine, Luxem-
burg, and over more than 150 km. (93 miles) of German territory to the
banks of the Rhine. The long march had been made in perfect order. Every
division and every corps had moved forward with jn'ecision. There had been
no delays and no hitches in opening army headquarters. In the march from
Luxemburg through German territory, more than 200,000 men marched
through fields, towns, and villages and over roads and highways of a nation
with whom until a short time before they had been at bitter war; yet not a
complaint was registered by the conquered enemy of a single case of ill treat-
ment, unfairness, or trouble of any kind. 12 General Pershing, in this connec-
tion, made the following comment: 4
The advance to the Rhine required Ions, arduous marches, through cold and inclement
weather, with no opportunity for troops to rest, refit, and refresh themselves after their
participation in the final battle. The army of occupation bore itself splendidly and ex-
hibited a fine state of discipline both daring the advance and throughout the period of
occupation. 4
From a military point of view the most important difficulties met during
the advance were: (1) The formation of an army staff (167 officers) by draw-
ing its members from all parts of France without disturbing existing staffs:
(2) maintenance of communication and supplies for a command moving
rapidly through evacuated, partially devastated territory where transportation
facilities in many places had been completely destroyed and where food was
extremely scarce; (3) the rebuilding of roads and reestablisbment of telephone
and telegraph lines; and (4) close check on all enemy movement, following
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 899
his plan of withdrawal and verifying his compliance with the terms of the
armistice. 9
The Seventh Corps, assigned to Third Army November 22, was charged.
with the duty of covering the advance of the other corps and with maintenance
of army communications. On December 12, the 33d Division was assigned
to the Seventh Corps, then in Luxemburg, to be in turn relieved five days
later and transferred to the Second Army. 3
Boundaries of the zone of advance of the Third Army in Germany were :
Northern (left) : Between Garignan and Merzig (exclusive) Oberfeulen —
Xeiderfeulen — Bourscheid — Hoscheid — Consthum — Bockholz-les-Hosingen
(all inclusive) — Munshausen (exclusive) — Marbourg — Roder (both inclu-
sive) — Heinerscheid — Kalborn (both exclusive) ; thence the eastern frontier of
Luxemburg; thence the administrative boundary separating the districts of
Coblenz and Trier from those of Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle — approximately
the line Lommersweiler — Manderfeld — Kronenburg — AValdorf — Bohr — Ilil-
berath — Oberwinter. 8 Southern (right) : From Schengen to the southern
limits of the circle of Saarburg; thence the northern and eastern limits of the
circle of Merzig; thence the northwestern limits of the principality Birken-
fekl; thence the northwestern limit of the circle of Kreuznach; approximately
the line Schengen — Saarburg — Sitzerath — Muhlfeld — Zusch — Kemfeld — Kel-
lenbach — Dichtelbach — Trechtingshausen. 8
The Third Army headquarters were established at Coblenz and an ad-
vance general headquarters located at Treves. Steps were immediately taken
to organize the bridgehead for defense, and dispositions were made to meet a
possible renewal of hostilities. 4
During this advance into German territory, staff officers had been sent
ahead to study conditions, to prepare plans for crossing the Rhine, and for
occupation of the bridgehead. In expectation that American troops would
occupy the entire bridgehead at Coblenz, the original plans contemplated four
divisions on the right (eastern) bank of the Rhine, two in support on the
west side, and two in reserve farther toward the rear, with one on the lines of
communication across Luxemburg. The four divisions were to cross the river
simultaneously; one over the bridge at Remagen, one at Engers, one on the
pontoon bridge at Coblenz, and the fourth on the Pfeffendorf bridge at
Coblenz, with the added help of ferries at St. Goarshausen and Boppard. A
preliminary survey w r as made also of the country composing the bridgehead,
and a plan of action prepared in case hostilities should be resumed. Return-
ing to army headquarters at Mayen, the staff officers detailed for this work
found that plans must be modified somewhat, as only three divisions were to
be sent across the Rhine. The southern boundary of the Third Army was
changed. Near Schneppenbach it remained as before, thence became the admin-
istrative limits separating the Kreise of Berncastel, Wittlich, Cochem. Mayen.
Coblenz, Montabaur, and Westerburg from those of Simmern. Zell, St. Goar.
St. Goarhausen, Diez, and Limbing. This made it necessary to move the
right division (3d) to the north, holding it on the left bank of the Rhine. 13
Field Order No. 11, Third Army, issued on De;eml>er 12. directed the
Third Army to occupy the northern sector of the Coblenz bridgehead, advance
900 FIELD OPERATIONS
elements to cross the Rhine at 7 o'clock on December 13. Before this advance
the 1st Division passed to the command of the Third Corps, which with the
three divisions, 1st, 2d, and 32d, occupied the prescribed sector. On the same
day the 42d Division passed to the command of the Fourth Corps, and the
latter, in support of the Third Corps, continued its march to occupy the Kreise
of Mayen, Ahrweiler, Adenau, and Cochem. 13
After the Rhine was crossed, Field Order No. 12, Third Army, under
date of December 13, prescribed the following forward limit of the American
sector at Coblenz bridgehead, to be determined by straight lines joining the
following villages: 14 Malmeneieh — Hundsangen — Molsberg — Salz — Mallren
— Elbingen — Obersayn — Wolferlingen — Seeburg — Mundersbach — Hilgert —
Steimel — Lahfbach — Dottesfeld — Heckerfeld — Pulenburg — Borscheid — Fern-
thal — Neschen — Weibenfels — Arnsau — Hakenen — Hothenrsuz — Ariendorf."
The commanding general of the Third Corps was instructed to take im-
mediate steps to have this line plainly marked by signs on every road cross-
ing the boundary and to prevent all allied troops from crossing it. The civil
authorities in each village on the prescribed boundary were also notified of the
limits arranged. By nightfall of December 14, troops were occupying their
positions at Coblenz bridgehead. 14
These advanced positions were occupied without disorder. Though
civilians in the Rhine area were less friendly than those seen farther west, n"
hostility to our troops was openly exhibited.
Third Army headquarters moved, on December 15, from Mayen to Co-
blenz; Third Corps headquarters from Polch to Neuweid, Fourth Corps head-
quarters remaining at Cochem, with that of the Seventh Corps at Greven-
macher. During the Third Army's crossing of the Rhine no hostilities were
encountered. Food and fuel supplies in the occupied area were adequate. 13
MEDICAL DEPABTMESTT ACTIVITIES
The order designating the chief surgeon, Third Army, was received by
him November 14, and the next day, after reporting to the headquarters of
this army, he proceeded to Chaumont for conference with members of the
general staff concerning Medical Department arrangements for the march into
Germany. Originally it had been planned to send forward a number of base
hospitals to be grouped at Coblenz and Trier, but this plan was abandoned
at request of the chief surgeon. Third Army, who apprehended a divided re-
sponsibility if these units operated in the army area. It was then decided to
send sufficient evacuation hospitals with additional personnel, equipment, etc
these to operate under the army surgeon. 15
The following personnel was on duty in the office of the chief surgeon.
Third Army: Executive officer, hospitalization officer, personnel officer, j
medical supply officer, evacuation officer, and representative of chief surgeon.
A. E. F., consultants in medicine, surgery, orthopedic surgery, neuropsy-
chiatry, urology, opthahnology, otology and laryngology, finance and account-
ing, sanitary inspector, epidemiologist, chief dental surgeon, director of
laboratories, director of nurses, water supply officer. 1 "
I
i
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 901
The assistant chief of staff, G-4, exercised supervision over the Medical
Department and coordinated its activities with those of the various other sec-
tions and services. The army surgeon's office dealt directly with G-4, and
through this section of the general staff. 17
The hospitalization officer was sent forward immediately to arrange for
our advance, and from this time until the troops reached Coblenz was as far
forward as orders permitted, investigating sites and facilities for hos-
pitalization. 17
It was planned that the sick be evacuated from corps and field hospitals
to the hospital center at Toul on the east and to Evacuation Hospital No. 15
near Verdun on the west while the army was within reasonable evacuating
distance of these places. It was intended to move an evacuation hospital com-
plete into the city of Luxemburg before the arrival of our troops in that area,
and to that end the hospitalization officer preceded the army into Luxemburg
and selected a large modern school building as the location for an army evacua-
tion hospital. This building would have provided a complete 1,000-bed
hospital. G-4, at General Headquarters, had ready an evacuation hospital com-
plete in personnel and equipment and a sufficient number of motor trucks avail-
able to transport it into the city of Luxemburg. All arrangements had been
perfected with the Luxemburg authorities, and everything was ready to locate
these 1.000 beds for the use of the Third Army. When the necessary authority
from army headquarters was requested, the chief surgeon. Third Army, was
informed that the French high command objected to any American organiza-
tion entering the city of Luxemburg, for which reason the request was dis-
approved. 17 The army evacuation service had also met with another serious
difficulty. Railroad communication over the devastated area had been com-
pletely destroyed, and for two weeks it was impossible to get a hospital train
forward to relieve the field hospitals of corps or divisions, the first train
arriving at Briey on December 1." Likewise, it was impossible at this time to
move evacuation hospitals forward by train. Except for the movement of
Evacuation Hospital No. 18 to Briey, which arrived there November 24. the
first of these hospitals to move to a more forward position by train were
Evacuation Hospitals No. 3 and No. 12, which reached Trier on December 2.
In the meantime, the division and corps field hospitals, though not equippeil
with personnel, proper supplies, or nursing facilities for the protracted hos-
pitalization of numerous patients, were forced to retain not only the slightly
sick but also to care for all patients whatever their condition until the rail-
road situation could be relieved and an evacuation hospital could be sent
forward. On November 24, 1918. Evacuation Hospital No. 18, from the
Second Army, arrived at Briey and there took over a small German hospital,
where they accommodated about 200 patients. This proved a great relief,
though this hospital was not large enough to receive all the patients evacuable
from divisions. 18
The nearest hospital with proper equipment, supplies, and personnel for
tlie care of pneumonia and other serious diseases was that at Briey, 80 km.
(50 miles) from the divisions farthest forward, and seriously sick patients
902 FIELD OPERATIONS
had to be evacuated the distance mentioned from those formations. The
weather was bad and the roads had been torn by shell fire. Also, because of
lack of hospital trains, evacuations from Briey and from Longwy, where the
Third Corps maintained a field hospital, were by ambulance to Toul and
Verdun, respectively. These were very long hauls, but there was no alter-
native. It should be noted here that a number of men who ordinarily would
have been returned to their commands in a week or so had to be sent to the
rear in order to clear beds for other patients from the front. 18
From the foregoing it becomes evident that the carefully formulated plans
originally developed by the Medical Department for field hospitalization and
evacuation did not materialize.
The hospital at Briey was greatly overcrowded, for it had at least 1.000
patients, with hospital facilities for only 200, but fortunately the additional
patients were of a class which required little save food and rest and fair
shelter. The long evacuation and overcrowding in hospitals could have been
obviated to a great extent if the American Army had been allowed to hos-
pitalize in the city of Luxemburg, this being the only suitable location in the
duchy for a 1,000-bed evacuation hospital. Though divisional, corps, and army
sanitary trains were 100 per cent motorized, it was desired to reduce the trans-
portation of the disabled, especially of the serious cases, to a minimum. 18
About November 24 permission was obtained from army headquarters for
the officer in charge of hospitalization to proceed, ahead of the army, into
Trier. His mission was to find sites for hospitals in that city, but he was
at once confronted by about 160 American and allied prisoners of war — in-
cluding about 50 Americans — in German hospitals in a pitiful condition. The
food supply was practically exhausted and there were no suitable diets avail-
able for the sick. German medical authorities had apparently given them
the best of medical and surgical care, but they did not have food enough for
themselves to constitute a balanced ration and some of these patients were
suffering from lack of projier food. 18 These facts were reported to the chief
of staff, Third Army, who made every effort to permit the medical depart-
ment to enter Trier at once with food, doctors, nurses, and supplies to care
for our wounded prisoners of war; but the request of the commanding general.
Third Army, was disapproved by General Headquarters. Instructions were
given that no medical organization cross the Moselle River until December 1."
A request was made to G-l, Third Army, for authority to take over, in
Trier, barracks and German hospitals sufficient to afford 5,000 hospital beds
for our use. After many requests and conferences with G-^ and G-l and.
finally, with the chief of staff, Third Army, two barracks which had been
used as German auxiliary hospitals were turned over to the chief surgeon,
Third Army, for hospital purposes. In these were to be installed two evacua-
tion hospitals with a total bed capacity of about 2,000 patients. Competition
I>etween different services and army units to secure buildings in Trier was
extremely keen, and it was very difficult to obtain a final decision in this
matter. Finally, on December 1, Field Hospital No. 303, of the Fourth Corps
Sanitary Train, was allowed to enter Trier. It then took over the German
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 903
auxiliary military hospital in the Horn Kaserne, and began the care of the
allied sick and wounded in this hospital. On December 2 a part of Evacua-
tion Hospital No. 3, consisting of 16 officers, 25 nurses, and 28 enlisted men
proceeded ICO km. (100 miles) by ambulance through Verdun, Longwy, and
Luxemburg to Trier, where it found 1,000 sick — mostly mild cases — and re-
lieved the corps field hospital above mentioned. The German female nursing
staff continued on duty here for about a week. No supplies were brought by
this detachment of Evacuation Hospital No. 3 except 3 days' rations. At this
time, too, there was great difficulty in getting rations from the army, and
for several days the hospital food supply was rather limited. 20
Evacuation Hospital No. 12, at Eoyaumeix, France, in the Second Army
area, on December 1 received orders to proceed to Echtemach, Luxemburg,
and next day the advance party of this hospital organization started in am-
bulances furnished by the Second Army to join the army of occupation. En
route its orders were changed and it was directed to proceed to Trier. On
December 2 this hospital occupied the Stadt Kaserne, Trier, formerly used
by the Germans as an auxiliary military hospital, with 1,500 beds. Patients
began to arrive at about the same time as the personnel of Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 12; 230 were admitted on the first day. 20
On December 4, a hospital train was secured and practically all of the
allied prisoners of war were evacuated from Trier and Echternach to France. 20
By December 8, the advancing American arm} 7 had close to 1,000 patients in
the hospitals at Trier, which rapidly expanded by taking over all available
buildings in the barracks. 20
The establishment of Evacuation Hospitals No. 3 and No. 12, at Trier,
with about 2,500 beds available and facilities for twice that number, sufficient
personnel and supplies, had as a matter of fact considerably relieved the situa-
tion. This situation had existed from November 17 to December 3. Hos-
pital trains were soon making frequent evacuations from Trier. 20
Yet because of the bad condition of railroads and roads, amounting in
places to total destruction, it was not possible to bring forward sufficient army
hospitals and to have them function properly until the early part of December.
Thereafter army hospitalization met all requirements. Meanwhile, though it
had been necessary to require the medical departments of corps and divisions
to perforin services which their resources and equipment did not contemplate,
their resourcefulness had met a difficult situation satisfactorily.
About December 10, the army surgeon received a statement of the perma-
nent locations which would be held by! the eight divisions of the army of
occupation, and he instituted measures to establish 5,000 beds in Coblenz for
the troops of the 42d, 32d, 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisions. The plans now con-
templated that all sick who would probably be fit for duty in two months be
retained in the army hospitals and that only other patients would be evacuated
into the hospitals of the Services of Supply. Hospitalization of 5 per cent
was planned for this army of 300,000 men. but this was never fully realized. 21
Authority was obtained by the officer in charge of hospitalization to pro-
ceed ahead of army headquarters to inspect suitable locations for hospitals
904
FIELD OPERATIONS
in the occupied area. Evacuation Hospitals No. 3 and No. 12 were assigned
station in two casernes in West Trier, the advance general headquarters refus-
ing to allow the Medical Department to take over the complete and well-
equipped German military hospitals in the city of Trier proper, as that com-
munity was reserved for its exclusive occupancy. These hospitals had a
capacity of 4.000 beds. The hospitals at West Trier were to receive the sick
from the 90th Division.
The next location selected for an army hospital was Traben-Trarbaeh.
on the Moselle River, midway between Trier and Coblenz. Three hotels and
a school building were to be requisitioned there for Evacuation Hospital No. 4,
Fig. 90. — American hospital and infirmary, Neuenahr, Germany, December 20, 1918
which had been ordered into Traben-Trarbaeh and had actually arrived when
word was received that no American troops would be allowed there as it was
to be occupied by the French. A few days later Evacuation Hospital No. 4
was moved into Coblenz. 21
A large school building at Prum, about 60 km. (37.2 miles) from Trier
in the area occupied by the 89th Division, was secured with comparatively
little difficulty for Evacuation Hospital No. T. 19 The 4th Division Avas to be
provided for by Evacuation Hospital No. 8, which was ordered to Mayen. 21
It was the intention to establish 2,000 beds at Ems, where two large sum-
mer hotels were selected and arrangements made for moving two evacuation
hospitals to that point, but in the readjustment of army areas Ems was re-
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY
905
moved from the American sector. 10 Four German military hospitals in Co-
blenz were then taken over by the American Third Army. As these could
accommodate only about 1,500 patients, it was necessary to secure German bar-
racks for additional beds. 19 A site at Neuenahr to serve the 42d Division in
the extreme left of the American sector was also selected, but could not be
utilized before February. 1919, when Evacuation Hospital No. 2G took over
a large hotel there which would accommodate 1,000 beds. 10
When, in the week of December 15, our divisions reached their final
areas, additional evacuation hospitals arrived. As it was intended that these
hospitals should function as base hospitals in order that as many men as
possible might be retained in the army and returned to duty, their staffs were
Fig. 91. — Surgical and medical wards of the American hospital group, Coblenz, Germany
reinforced by expert, trained personnel, and they were supplied with ample
materiel. They were well and suitably housed, a few in buildings constructed
for hospital use; others were in large schools and military barracks, pre-
viously used by the Germans as hospitals. It was planned that these hospi-
tals be grouped in centers, so far as possible, in order that their special serv-
ices might be the more highly developed ; but owing to the large area which
the Third Army occupied, it was necessary to place a few isolated hospitals
at outlying points. The largest hospital center was located at Coblenz.
though competition for buildings there was very severe. 10
Evacuation hospitals of the Third Army were finally located as follows:
No. 3 and No. 12, 1,500 beds each, at West Trier; No. 7, 500 beds, at Prum:
Xo. 4, 450 beds. No. 6, 600 beds, No. 2, 1,500 beds, No. 9, 1,000 beds, No. 14, 550
beds, at Coblenz ; No. 8, 500 beds, at Mayen ; No. 26, 1,000 beds, at Neuenahr. 11 '
i:?r>76— 25 58
906 FIFXD OPERATIONS
As nearly as conditions would permit, the various hospitals at Coblenz
functioned as a hospital center, under control of the hospitalization section of
the chief surgeon's office, Third Army, each hospital being designated to
receive certain classes of cases. Evacuation Hospital No. 6, established in a
finely equipped German military hospital in Coblenz, admitted all surgical
and orthopedic cases and sick officers and nurses. Evacuation Hospitals No.
2 and No. 9, at Coblenz, were the chief centers for medical cases, the former
having in addition a contagious and a urological service. Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 4, located in a schoolhouse on Oberwerth Island (Coblenz), had an
eye, ear, nose, and throat service and a small medical service as well. Evacua-
tion Hospital No. 14 took over the Bruderhaus Hospital, Coblenz, and later
a military hospital in Ehrenbreitstein. This hospital provided neuropsychiat-
ric and medical services and was also used as the triage to which all patients,
except acute surgical and contagious cases received in Coblenz, were sent for
distribution to other hospitals. 22
The second hospital center, at Trier, consisted of Evacuation Hospitals
No. 3 and No. 12, the former devoted to surgical, orthopedic, eye, ear, nose,
and throat, and medical cases: the latter to urological, neuropsychiatric, con-
tagious, and medical. 23
Evacuation Hospital No. 8, in Mayen, Evacuation Hospital No. 7. in
Prum, and No. 26, at Neuenahr, which served the more remote area, received
all classes of cases but sent fracture and mental cases to Hospitals No. 6 and
No. 14, respectively, at Coblenz. 23
The following list of evacuation hospitals with the Third Army, showing
the class of cases assigned to each hospital, was published for the information
and guidance of all troops, Third Army, December 23, at headquarters: 24
Hospital Location Class ot cases
Evacuation Hospital:
No. 2_ Coblenz... General medical; contagions; venereal; skin.
No. 4 do General medical; eye, ear, nose, and throat; optical unit.
No. 6 do Officers and nurses; all surgical cases draining into Coblenz; fractures; orthopedic
No. 9 do General medical.
No. 14 ...do General medical; mental; neurologic.
No. 3 Trier . Officers and nurses; all surgical cases draining into Trier; optical unit; eye, ear,
nose, and throat; fractures; orthopedic; genera] medical; out-patient.
No. 12. __do General medical; contagious; venereal; skin; mental; neurologic.
No. 7 Prum All classes. Mental cases will be transferred as soon as possible to Evacuation
Hospital No. 12, at Trier; also such neurological cases as are severe or which
resist treatment.
No. 8... . Mayen | All classes. Mental cases will be transferred as soon as possible to Evacuation
Hospital No. 14, at Coblenz; also such neurological cases as are severe or which
resist treatment.
For service to the Sixth Corps, attached to the Third Army during the
first two weeks of April 1919, Evacuation Hospital No. 13 was located at
Walferdange, near the city of Luxemburg, and remained attached to the army
after the Sixth Corps had been disbanded. This hospital was established in
a chateau which accommodated 150 beds, additional accommodations to a total
of 500 beds being provided in tents. On account of its limited capacity this
hospital ojjerated as an evacuation hospital only, to a certain extent, sending
most of its cases to the center at Trier. 23
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 907
A thoroughly equipped medical supply depot was established at Trier
and a smaller one at Coblenz under the Third Army. Supplies Mere plentiful
and of excellent quality. 23
During the march into Germany a general order was prepared, after
consultation with the corps surgeons, concerning the evacuation of casualties.
This was issued as General Orders No. 13, Third Army, on December 20,
1918. 25
I — The following is published covering care of sick and injured In Third Army.
1. Division field hospitals. — Buildings will be used for division field hospitals
wherever possible. The location of the field hospitals will be determined by the division
surgeon under the direction of the division commander.
2. Regulations governing treatment of cases in division field hospitals :
(a) Ordinary medical cases who will recover in four days will be retained and treated
in division field hospitals. All seriously sick will be sent at once to the nearest evacuation
hospital. In each division an experienced and competent internist will be held responsible
for the proper selection of cases for retention or evacuation.
(6) No surgery will be done in division field hospitals except minor surgery, ordinary
surgical dressings, and such other cases as are ordinarily treated in a dispensary. No
other surgery will be attempted except in absolute emergency when the patient could not
stand transportation to the nearest evacuation hospital. Cases of hernia (unless irre-
ducible or strangulated), hemorrhoids (unless Irreducible or severe), and varicocele shall
not be referred for operation at this time. All fractures will be sent to an evacuation
hospital for treatment.
(c) Contagious diseases: Only mumps will be retained in division field hospitals.
Patients witli mumps will be retained for 15 days from time of onset, or until all symp-
toms and signs of the disease have disappeared. All other contagious disease will be sent
at once to the evacuation hospital designated for this service. The hospitals selected for
this purpose will be announced later.
(d) Venereal diseases: Uncomplicated gonorrhea will tie retained and treated in
divisional field hospitals. Complicated cases (epidymitis, prostatic abscess, stricture,
cystitis, arthritis, ophthalmia) will be sent to the nearest evacuation hospital designated for
venereal diseases. Chancroids and all cases of primary syphilis or suspected primary
syphilis will be sent to the nearest evacuation hospital designated for venereal disease.
Other cases of syphilis, except those showing visceral or cerebrospinal lesions, will be
treated in the field hospitals. The evacuation hospitals selected for venereal disease will
be announced later.
(e) Skin diseases: Ordinary cases will be treated in division field hospitals. Severe
or complicated cases will be sent to the nearest evacuation hospital designated for that
purpose.
(f) Mental cases will be sent to the evacuation hospital designated for such cases.
If such a case requires special attention en route, the hospital will be notified and will
send an ambulance, with an attendant trained in the care of such cases to bring him to
the hospital. Neurological cases will be sent to the hospital designated for mental cases.
3. Corps field hospitals. — Corps field hospitals will be used to supplement division
field hospitals wherever and whenever needed. The regulations governing them will
be the same as for division field hospitals. The use of corps field hospitals to establish corps
collecting stations and the specific location for the same is left to the judgment of the
corps surgeon under the direction of the corps commander.
4. Evacuation. — Ordinarily all cases should be sent to the division field hospitals!.
Such cases as require evacuation to an evacuation hospital will here be selected and trans-
ferred accordingly — the remainder, as noted under paragraph 2, will be retained and
treated in the division field hospitals.
908 FIELD OPERATIONS
The following exceptions will be noted :
(a) Contagious cases except mumps will be sent direct to the appropriate evacuation
hospital without passing through a division field hospital.
(b) Cases which are obviously seriously sick, and which are located in such position
that evacuation by way of a field hospital will lengthen their haul, will be sent direct
to the nearest evacuation hospital. This includes all fractures and acute surgical con-
ditions.
5. Evacuation to the division field hospitals will be accomplished by the ambulance
section, divisional sanitary train.
Evacuation from the divisional field hospitals to the evacuation hospital will be ac-
complished by the corps sanitary train. For this purpose the corps surgeon will call on
the division surgeon for such assistance from the ambulance section, divisional sanitary
train, as may be necessary.
Evacuation from evacuation hospitals to the replacement depot or by hospital train
to the S. O. S. will be under the supervision of the commanding officer, army sanitary
train, who is authorized to call on corps surgeons for such assistance in ambulances as
may from time to time be required.
Some division and corps hospitals operated in the Third Army area after
the troops were in position along - and beyond the Rhine, but they retained only
cases that could be returned to duty within a few days, with the exception
of the field hospitals of the 90th Division. As this division occupied a large
area, a field hospital at Cues was equipped to care for its pneumonia cases. 23
During the month of March, 1919, certain evacuation hospitals which had
been longest in the American Expeditionary Forces were relieved by others
which had had a shorter overseas service, as follows : Evacuation Hospital No.
2 was relieved by No. 49. No. G by No. 27, No. 4 by No. 22, No. 8 by No. 30.
No. 7 by No. 29. No. 3 by No. 19, and No. 14 by No. 1G, April 3. The reten-
tion of the former commanding officers — with one exception — and of some
of the directors of the medical service promoted continuity of policy. De-
crease in the size of the Third Army led to the. closure, during May, 1919. of the
following hospitals: Evacuation Hospitals No. 9 and No. 22, Coblenz; Evac-
uation Hospital No. 12, Trier; Evacuation Hospital No. 26. Neuenahr; Evac-
uation Hospital No. 29, Prum. The special services which these hospitals had
conducted were transferred to the hospitals which were retained. 23
An epidemic of respiratory diseases which occurred durin<r January and
February, 1919, made necessary frequent evacuations to base hospitals, while
the resulting congestion in hospitals of the Coblenz center was relieved In-
sending convalescent patients to Trier. After stabilization of the Third Army
in the occupied area, patients to be evacuated to the Services of Supply were
collected at hospital centers. 23
A decline in the hospital rate of admissions after the early part of March.
1919, made it possible to retain in the army area a much larger percentage of
patients until they could be returned to duty or sent back to the United States,
but in order to carry out this policy it proved necessary to establish convales-
cent sections in hospitals. One such section was organized at Evacuation Hos-
pital No. 19, at Trier, one at Evacuation Hospital No. 9. at Coblenz, and a
third at Evacuation Hospital No. 20, at Neuenahr. 23
The evacuation hospitals of the Third Arm}* were in point of fact ad-
vanced base hospitals and at till times did advanced base hospital work.
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 909
There were 1,500 beds — operated by three evacuation hospitals — in what had
previously been German military bospitals. There were 5,500 beds — belong-
ing to four evacuation hospitals — in German kasernes (barracks). One Evac-
uation Hospital — No. 26, at Neuenahr — of 1.000 beds, occupied a former hotel,
and former school buildings provided shelter for 1,000 other beds. Our hos-
pitals in former German military hospitals were splendidly equipped and suit-
able in every way, the only drawback being that their bed capacity was small.
Cooking facilities, baths, sanitary arrangements, and lighting in these institu-
tions were excellent, and the hospitals we maintained in them were equal in
every way to the best civilian hospitals in the United States. The kasernes
recommended themselves for hospital use only because of their large bed
capacity. They were dirty when Taken over, poorly arranged for hospital
purposes, cooking facilities were limited, baths were inadequate, no central
heating plants were provided, and lighting arrangements were unsatisfac-
tory; but after much work they made very acceptable institutions. 10
Each evacuation hospital was directly under control of the Third Army
commander, local commanders having no jurisdiction over those in their
divisional areas. These hospitals were controlled by the hospitalization sec-
tion of the army surgeon's office. The army surgeon had authority from his
commanding general to transfer medical department personnel as he saw fit:
he could promote and demote enlisted men up to and including the grade of
sergeants, first class, and he was authorized to employ civilian labor. All
monthly sanitary reports from evacuation hospitals were acted upon in the
chief surgeon's office, Third Army, and then forwarded through the command-
ing general of the army to Headquarters A. E. F., for the chief surgeon,
A. E. F. Disposition of all medical supplies was directed by the army sur-
geon. Each hospital had its own summary court and special court-martial
and was authorized to issue travel orders for patients returning to duty, hav-
ing practically the status of a military station. All sick and wounded records
from evacuation hospitals, Third Army, were sent direct to the chief surgeon.
A. E. F., at Tours, but hospital fund statements from evacuation hospitals in
the army of occupation were definitely acted upon in the army surgeon's
office. 25
The hospitalization section of that office controlled all evacuations from
army hospitals and kept a daily record of all beds and of vacant beds in each
hospital. It also kept a record of the hospitals receiving certain classes of
cases and took proper measures to have patients classified and placed in the
designated hospital. It regulated the distribution of incoming patients in
such a way as to equalize the work of different hospitals, preventing over-
crowding in any one hospital, and in general regulated the distribution of
patients to meet any special condition. It secured orders necessary for the
evacuation of patients, and in evacuations by train notified each receiving
hospital of the departure of the train, the number of patients in each cla.-s —
surgical, medical, mental, lying, sitting — to be evacuated to it. Every hospital
kept a record of all patients evacuated, with date, destination, names, and
numbers of patients evacuated, and such other data as might \ie necessary to
910 FIELD OPERATIONS
facilitate tracing outgoing patients. The hospital section familiarized itself
with any conditions which would influence hospital capacity, such as ability
to meet emergencies, quality of water, modification in buildings or equipment.
It also kept a consolidated daily record of evacuable cases and made the
necessary arrangements and reports to the regulating officer who ordered
hospital trains. 20
To promote coordination, the army surgeon held daily informal con-
ferences with the chiefs of the sections of his office, weekly formal conferences
with all members of his staff, and weekly conferences with the corps surgeons.
The object of these conferences was to learn the status of the army medical
service, its needs, accomplishments, problems of mutual interest affecting dif-
ferent elements, and to give instructions. Corps surgeons similarly held weekly
conferences with division surgeons and these, in turn, with as many of their
subordinates as could be assembled. These conferences promptly secured
the transmission of information in respect to the army surgeon's policies to
the junior officers of the Medical Department and promoted coordination
throughout. The head of the hospitalization section had weekly conferences
with the commanding officers of the evacuation hospitals and made formal
inspections of these as well as of division hospitals. The army surgeon's
office published a weekly bulletin of communicable diseases, including venereal,
and of preventable accidents, showing by graphic charts the relative standing
of army, corps, and division troops. 26
During the first few weeks of the occupation obtaining proper food for
diets for seriously sick patients proved a difficult problem. Only one evacua-
tion hospital had a sales commissary where subsistence stores other than the
ration could be secured, and advance general headquarters issued orders that
no food supplies be bought from the Germans. Hospitals of the Third Army
at this time contained hundreds of patients sick with pneumonia, typhoid fever,
and other serious diseases, but the only food available was the straight ration.
This condition had been anticipated on the march to Germany, and many
earnest requests were made to the quartermaster department. Third Army,
through the assistant chief of staff, G-4, to secure from the Services of Supply
a sufficient stock of food suitable for diets for the use of the hospitals, but for
some weeks no favorable action was taken. Many letters were written and
every few days the subject was taken up with G-4, Third Army, but with no
result. The response was that Tables of Organization did not call for a sales
commissary for army hospitals. Finally, the American Red Cross made
arrangements to purchase eggs, chickens, cereals, milk, and fruit in France to
be shipped to Trier and Coblenz for the use of the sick of the Third Army,
the purchase prices to be repaid to the American Red Cross by the hospitals.
This plan was followed for several months with only fair success, as the
American Red Cross did not have the proper organization to handle the matter
consistently. The situation was of such importance that a personal appeal
was made to General Headquarters for the establishment of two large hospital
sales commissaries, one in Coblenz and one at Trier. After three months,
authority was obtained to establish these sales commissaries, and a captain
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 911
of the Quartermaster Corps was attached to the army surgeon's office to
supervise them. Personnel for their operation was obtained from various
sources. These commissaries functioned exactly as did the sales commissaries
of the large hospital centers. 27
The medical supply parks established in Coblenz and Trier were replen-
ished on telegraphic requisitions to the Services of Supply. All requisitions
from army hospitals were acted upon in the army surgeon's office and for-
warded to these medical supply parks for issue. 23
The army sanitary trains always had available a number of evacuation
ambulance companies which operated from central points in Trier and Coblenz.
They provided ambulances for the hospitals in these cities, while to outlying
hospitals sections of evacuation ambulance companies were assigned. The
sanitary train also answered all calls from army troops. 28
Arrangements of all matters pertaining to railroad transportation of
personnel, equipment, and supplies were handled by the transportation officer
in the office of G-4. Third Army. 28
Every hospital was provided by the American Red Cross with a home and
hospital service worker and an American Red Cross representative in charge
of recreation. The former had a wide field of action, for she wrote letters
for the sick and injured, attempted to trace missing soldiers, and distributed
magazines, cigarettes, chocolates, etc.. in the hospital wards. As some of the
patients in army hospitals had not received any pay for some months and
were without toilet articles, she supplied toothbrushes, tooth paste, shaving
outfits, and many other necessities. 29
Most of the recreational facilities at the army hospitals were provided
by the American Red Cross, for officers as well as for patients, nurses, and
enlisted men. It was not necessary to call upon the American Red Cross for
medical or surgical supplies. 29
The Third Corps
The Third Corps consisted of the 2d. 32d, and 42d Divisions. The 2d
and the 32d Divisions started at 5.30 a. m. November IT on their march to
the Rhine. The 42d was to complete its concentration east of the Meuse and
to follow the 2d Division after a few days. The movement was by two routes,
the northern, followed by the 2d Division, traversing part of Belgium, and
the southern, followed by the 32d Division, lying south of that country.
Corps and 42d Division headquarters durings the first day of the march re-
mained unchanged in situation, but the headquarters of the 32d Division
moved to Marville, and of the 2d Division to Stenay.
On the right of the Third Corps was the American Fourth Corps, com-
posed of the 1st, 3d and 4th Divisions: on the left, the French Eleventh Corps
marched with two divisions. Liaison was established with the flanking divi-
sions of these two corps. During the first day of the march the head of the
32d Division advanced 19 km. (11.7 miles) : the head of the 2d Division, about
14 km. (8.6 miles). 30
912 FIELD OPERATIONS
The 32d and 2d Divisions continued the march on November 18, reaching
this day the general line Etalle — St. Leger — Ruette — Aubange — Herserange —
Audita (all inclusive). Tlie weather continued excellent, and with good
roads the day's advance was made according to schedule, all units arriving
in their billeting areas before 5 p. m. The 42d Division remained in place.
Headquarters of the corps opened at 5 p. m. at Longuyon : headquarters of
the 32d Division moved to Longwy and of the 2d Division to Virton. Heads
of columns marched between 20 and 25 km. (12.4—15.5 miles).*" 1
No advance was made on the 19th. the day being spent in resting and in
cleaning equipment. All headquarters remained unchanged. Orders were
issued for an advance movement of all three divisions on the 20th, the 42d to
follow in real' of the 2d Division. 31 During the day, some 4,000 Russians, sev-
eral hundred French, and a few Italian and American released prisoners of
war entered the American lines. Many were weak and sick from lack of
food, and many complained of the treatment they had received while in Ger-
man and Austrian hands. At Virton, there was a large German hospital con-
taining 1.500 sick and wounded Germans, with 25 American prisoners. Women
nurses, in attendance, and American soldiers stated that they had been well
cared for. 31
Large quantities of German war material of all kinds were daily received.
The more important German dumps were turned over by guards of German
troops who had been left behind to protect the property. Armistice terms
were observed and no hostile incident was reported. There were, however,
reports of pillaging by the retreating Germans. 32
The march of the three divisions of the Third Corps began on Novem-
ber 20 at 7.30 a. m., and the advance was made in good order and without
special incident, advance divisions reaching the general line Grendel — Aultel-
bas — Mondercange. The 2d Division's advance was 25 km. (15.5 miles):
that of the 32d Division, about 15 km. (9.3 miles). All units reached billeting
areas by 6 p. m. Roads continued excellent and good weather prevailed, as
was the case from the first day of the march. A certain amount of straggling
was observable in the divisions, caused largely by the British field shoes
which the men wore. 32 There was some shortage in the supply of gasoline,
due chiefly to a delay in connecting and opening up the railway system and
the rapid advance of the divisions. The following changes were made in
locations of headquarters: Corps, to Longwy; 32d Division, to Petange; 2d
Division, to Arlon; 42d Division, to Montmedy. 32 Many released prisoners
of war passed through American lines during this day, chiefly French. Rus-
sians, and Italians. Almost all these men were in poor physical condition.
Their mental condition seemed to be that of dull relief, with an intense
desire to reach their homes. 32 Large supply depots at Virton and Mousson
were taken over. 32
On November 21 the three divisions again advanced, reaching at the close
of the day the general line Schandel — Boevange — Bofferdange — Neuhausen.
The 42d Division billetted for the night in the area St. Leger — Mussy-la-
Ville — Signeulx — Ilarnoncourt — Robelmont. Leading; elements covered 25
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 913
km. (15.5 miles). All troops made the march in good order and were in
place by 4 p. in. The following changes in headquarters were made during
this day: Corps, to Mamer: 32d Division, to Walferdange; 42d Division, to
Brouch; 2d Division, to St. Leger. 33 Numbers of repatriated prisoners of
war continued to enter American lines, including some 700 Russians. 33
All organizations of the Third Corps marched on November 22, troops
arriving in place before 5 p. m. Advance units of the corps reached the
general line Ingeldorf — Betzdorf, covering from 12 to 15 km. (7.4-9.3 miles).
Continued good weather and the fine condition of roads aided greatly the
progress of the march. 33 The following changes were made in headquarters
locations during the day: Corps, to Junglingster ; 32d Division, to Nieder-
anven; 2d Division, to Mersch; 42d Division, to Arlon. Barrier posts from
Florenville to Hussigny were taken over at 4 p. m. by detachments of the
42d Division, with instructions that these posts be held until relieved by
troops of the lines of communications. 33
Orders were received from the Third Army headquarters that no troops be
billeted in the cities of Luxemburg and Thionville and forbidding molesta-
tion of property belonging to the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg. 33
Troops of the Fourth Corps marched approximately abreast those of the
Third Corps. The line of the French Eleventh Corps, on the left, was slightly
behind that of the Third. Two more divisions had been ordered to join the
French Eleventh Corps in the immediate future. 33
No hostile or overt acts had been experienced thus far, and all terms of
the armistice apparently were observed by the retiring foe. Material turned
over by him was found to be serviceable. 34
On November 23 all troops completed the day's march in good order by
5 p. m., the line having reached the Saner River, which was the border.
Advanced elements marched approximately 15 km. (9.3 miles). The Third
Corps now remained halted for a week, awaiting further instructions before
the march was resumed. The journey to the Rhine was now half completed.
Corps headquarters remained at Junglinster during this halt. Changes in divi-
sion headquarters were as follows: 32d Division, to Consdorf: 2d Division,
to Fels; 42d Division, to Mersch. 34
A few prisoners of war entered our lines, and a considerable number of
(ierman ex-soldiers recently discharged and on their way to their homes in
Alsace were met at examining posts. Several German deserters also were
encountered. 34
During the time that it occupied this area the Third Corps organized
an outpost line of defense along the banks of the Saner River, slightly rear-
ranged its units, carried on drills, training exercises, and inspections. Oppor-
tunity was given the troops to rest and to clean their equipment. So far as
practicable new clothing and equipment were issued. 34
Keleased prisoners of war continued to present themselves at American
examining posts and appeared to be in better mental and physical condition
than those at first seen. 34
914 FIELD OPERATIONS
A detailed reconnaissance of bridges over the Saner River was made
between Weilerbach and Wasserbillig, for the purpose of determining the
most practicable routes for troops on the resumption of the march. 35
On December 1 the first day's march through hostile territory was com-
pleted without unusual incident. The rainy weather which had prevailed
during the immediately preceding occupation of Luxemburg continued, and
this, with narrow roads, in poor condition, and with many steep grades, made
the advance difficult and wearisome. The general line reached for the niglu
was Lichtenborn- — Lauperath — Mulbach — Idenheim and the line of the Kyli
River. Leading elements of the 2d Division covered 80 km. (18.C miles):
those of the 32d Division advanced 22 km. (13.6 miles).
Headquarters of the 42d Division remained unchanged. The 32d Divi-
sion headquarters moved to Welschbillig: 2d Division headquarters to Metten-
dorf : corps headquarters to Eehternach. 88
The attitude of the civil population was that of curiosity and some con-
cern, but no hostility was shown. 36
The march continued the following day, retarded by hilly country and
by rain. The unusual narrowness of German roads caused much congestion
and road blocks that with roads of the usual width could have been avoided.
All units were slightly late in reaching their billeting areas, the general line
for the night being Hontheim — Drum— Schonecken — Neidenbach — Metter-
nich — Rievenich. 37 Corps headquarters remained unchanged. Changes in
divisional headquarters were as follows: 32d Division, to Speicher: 2d Divi-
sion, to Rittersdorf : 42d Division, to Consdorf. 37
The attitude and behavior of the German people in the occupied territory
was all that could have been desired. They seemed favorably impressed by
our well-behaved troops and by the fact that no pillaging or disorder pre-
vailed. Their first nervous apprehension gave way to relief. All our orders
were obeyed, and the best billets in the towns were turned over without
hesitation to the army of occupation. 37
On December 3, the march was somewhat shorter than usual, and in spite
of steep grades and slippery roads, all units reached their billeting areas by
3 p. m. The line for the night was Manderfeld — Olzheim — Budesheim —
Salm — Eisenschmitt — Wittlich. 37 Changes in headquarters were as follows:
Corps, to Kylburg. 2d Division, to Prum, 42d Division, to Helenenburg (1 km.
west of Welschbillig). Headquarters of 32d Division remained unchanged. 37
The 2d Division, on the left, renewed its march on the 4th. while the 32d
Division halted and spent the day in rest and in cleaning equipment. The
42d Division also remained halted, with the exception of its artillery column.
which was advanced during the day to the line Birtlinger — Masholder. The
line of the 2d Division for the night was Dahlem — Oberbettingen — Gerol-
stein — Salm. All headquarters remained unchanged. 38
The character of the country through which the troops were passing lie-
came more and more rugged and roads showed no improvement. Shortage of
forage, added to the difficulty of travel, made the march a trying one for
artillery horses. Daily inspections of the troops en route showed marker!
AMEKICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 915
general improvement in march discipline and in the appearance and personal
equipment of the men. Straggling had been reduced to a minimum. !S
Field Orders, No. 73, Third Corps, prescribing details of the march for
December 5, was amended upon receipt of orders from the Third Army. The
next day the 2d Division remained in place on the line Glaadt — Weidenbach
and prepared to resume the march on December 6. 38
The 32d Division reached the line Xerdlen (exclusive) — Darscheid (ex-
clusive) — Ellscheid — Gillenfeld, though on account of bad roads some of its
organizations were forced to march 3G km. (22.3 miles). 3S
The same day the 42d Division moved to the area Schleid — Seffern — Mal-
berg — Orsfeld — Gindorf — Dudeldorf — Speicher — Blersdorf. Headquarters of
the Third Corps and of the 2d Division were unchanged, headquarters 32d
Division moved to Daun. and of the 42d Division to Speicher. 38
Liaison had been established with the Canadian Corps of the British Sec-
ond Army, which had taken the place of the French on the left of the Third
Corps. 39 The Fourth Corps, on the, right of the Third Corps, continued its
advance abreast of the latter. Its headquarters was now at Schweich. 19
Progress on December G was slow, owing to rain and poor roads, but all
units reached their billeting areas by 6 p. m. Horses were in poor condition,
the forage supply still being inadequate; but march discipline showed decided
improvement, and the troops presented a neat and orderly appearance. The
32d Division reached the line Boos — Laubach — Driesch : headquarters at
Daun. 39
Because of the poor roads in the southern part of the 32d Division's sector
it was necessary to echelon the two leading divisions by one day's march so
that the left of the 32d Division could pass over the Boxberg — Kelburg road
on the 6th. The right column of the 2d Division was ordered to pass over the
same road on the 7th. Line of 2d Division was Udelhoven — Ober Ehe — Dock-
weiler; headquarters at Gerolstein. The 42d Division occupied for the night
the region Budescheim — Lissingen — St. Thomas — Feuerscheid — Schonecken
and the region Manderseheid — Bettenfeld — Eisenschmitt — Oherkail. Head-
quarters were at Birresborn. Corps headquarters remained at Kylburg. Both
adjacent corps continued their advance in conjunction with the Third Corps. 39
It was reported that the larger part of the enemy retiring forces had
crossed the Rhine. 39
The day's march of December 7 was completed by all units in good condi-
tion, though the scarcity of roads in the region traversed, and their poor
condition, somewhat delayed the progress of most columns. The army line
was reached by the 32d Division: Ettringen — Mayen — Greimershurg. with
headquarters at Mullenbach. The 2d Division reached the line Rupperath —
(iilgenbach — Drees, with headquarters at Xohn. Advance columns of the 42 d
Division halted on line Feusdorf — Birgel — Pelm. headquarters remaining at
Birresborn. Third Corps headquarters moved to Daun at 3 p. m. Both
front-line divisions advanced about 23 km. (13.8 miles). 40
Having reached the army line, the 32d Division remained halted during
December 8, while the 2d Division marched to the line Meckenheim — Ahr-
weiler — Kempenich — Ettringen, the 42d Division assembling its elements in
916 FIELD OPERATIONS
the zone Uclelhoven — Boxberg — Wallenborn — Grlaadt. Advance cavalry pa-
trols from Troop I, 2d Cavalry, sent out to reconnoiter the Rhine from Renta-
ge n to Sinzig, reported the Remagen bridge blocked with cars of coal and
si one. These were the first organized detachments of American troops to
reach the Rhine. 40
Headquarters of the corps and 32d Division remained unchanged. Head-
quarters of the 2d Division moved to Adenau: 42d Division headquarters to
Dreis. 40
From tins time the entire 2d Division was obliged to march on the one
road through the Ahr Valley. 40
On December 9, the three divisions renewed the march, which was made
easier by the less rugged character of the country, and by the better roads
which characterized the Rhine valley. Lines reached were as follows: 32<1
Division, eastern edge of Laacher See — Kerben — Munstermaifeld, headquarters
at Mayen; 2d Division, Rhine River from Rolandseck to Brohl — eastern edge
of Laacher See, headquarters at Ahrweiler: 42d Division, line Dumpelfeld —
Adenau — Boos, headquarters at Adenau. 4 '
The next day the two advance divisions only continued the march. For
the 2d Division it was necessary only to swing its right flank forward, thus
bringing its advance elements on the line of the Rhine along the entire
divisional front from Rolandseck to Andernach (exclusive). Headquarters of
the 2d Division was unchanged. The extreme left flank of the 32d Division
reached the river, its line for the night being Andernach — Winningen. Head-
quarters of this division moved to Ochtendung. The 42 d Division remained
in place. Corps headquarters moved to Polch. 41
At the end of December 11, troops of the Third Corps everywhere alonjz
the corps front had reached the Rhine, there to remain halted until further
instructions were received from the Third Army. 41
Only a short advance had to be made by the 32d Division to bring its
forward elements along the line of the Rhine, from Andernach (inclusive) to
the Moselle River. This movement, and the change of divisional headquarters
to Bassenheim, was completed by 12 noon. The 2d and 42d Divisions made
no other movement than some slight readjustments of units in preparation for
starting to cross the Rhine. The day was spent in a general cleaning of
clothing and equipment and in rest. 41
During December 12. all troops of the Third Corps remained in place.
The Third Corps was designated as the only corps of the army of occupation
to cross the Rhine and establish itself in the Coblenz bridgehead area, with
headquarters at Xeuwied. Only the northern sector of the bridgehead, the
southern boundary including Coblenz — (iackenbach and (iorgeshausen, was
to be occupied by American troops; the southern sector was to be held by the
French. The Fourth Corps was to remain in close support, north of the
Moselle, and the Seventh Corps on the line Gerolstein — Wittlieh — Bernrastel.
Headquarters were to be as follows: Third Army. Coblenz: Third Corps,
Xeuwied: Fourth Corps. Cochem; Seventh Corps, Wittlieh. 42
Field Orders No. 80 was issued, defining the " Plan of action. Third Army
Corps." Instructions were received from the army that the 1st Division
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 917
would pass under the command of the Third Corps at G a. m. on December
13, and that on the same date and hour the 42d Division would pass to the
command of the Fourth Corps. 42
All three divisions began to cross the Rhine at 7 a. in. of the 13th. The
1st Division, on the right, utilized the pontoon bridge at Coblenz. The 32d
Division crossed on the Engers bridge and also used the ferry at Xeuwied. The
2d Division, on the left, passed over the bridge at Remagen and the ferry
at Andernach. 42
Without exception, all crossings were effected in a smooth and orderly
manner, due largely to the excellent road discipline which prevailed. The
fine appearance of men. equipment, and material elicited the highest praise
from all who reviewed the passage. 42
By nightfall all organizations, with the exception of divisional trains,
special units, and corps troops, had crossed the Rhine and were well into the
bridgehead area. Corps headquarters remained at Polch. Headquarters of
the 1st Division moved from Coblenz to Montabaur; the 32d Division to Sayn:
and the 2d Division to Heddesdorf. 42
The Third Corps held the north sector of the bridgehead, with the 1st
Division (on the right) and the 32d Division (left) in the front line and the
2d Division in support. The mission of the corps was to hold itself in readiness
for aggressive offensive action in case of a resumption of hostilities, in which
case it was to cover the crossing of the Rhine by troops of the Fourth Corps.
The ground was to be organized in three positions, consisting of an outpost, a
second or main position of resistance, and a third position, with switch posi-
tions on the left for the purpose of connecting with the British in the event
hostilities were resumed. 42
On December 14 further advance into the bridgehead area was continued
by the divisions. At the close of this day practically all troops of the Third
Corps were across the Rhine. At 7 p. m. all units of the 1st and 2d Divisions
were reported in their billeting areas, while the 32d Division still had a short
distance to march before the most advanced elements would arrive in place.
No change occurred in divisional headquarters. The Fourth Corps began this
day its movement into the new area as support to the Third Corps, head-
quarters remaining at Cochem. Troops of the Canadian Corps, on the Ameri-
can left, were in place in the Cologne bridgehead, with corps headquarters
at Bonn. 42
By nightfall of December 15 the 32d Division had completed the short
march necessary to place its troops on the perimeter of the bridgehead, while
all corps troops and divisional special units had arrived in their permanent
billeting areas. Corps headquarters was established at Neuwied. and Third
Army headquarters opened at Coblenz. 43
The march of the Third Corps, the advance section of the American
army of occupation, to the Rhine River and into Coblenz bridgehead was now
completed, after covering approximately 300 km. (186 miles) in 16 marching
days. The strength of the corps on this date was 3.261 officers and 79.514
men. 43
918 FIELD OPERATIONS
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
On November 18 the corps surgeon's office moved to Longuyon, remain-
ing there until the 20th. Divisional triages were concentrated at Dun-sur-
Meuse, evacuating to Evacuation Hospital No. 15, at Glorieux. 44 An army
medical officer was sent forward, by arrangement with the armistice commis-
sion, to Luxemburg, Trier, and Coblenz to reconnoiter hospitalization re-
sources for the Third Army, bnt as it proved the Third Corps obtained little
in the way of army hospitalization or evacuation until it entered the Rhine
Valley."
The divisions established their triages at favorable points at each stage
of the march and evacuated to the corps collecting hospitals, whence evacua-
tions were made by corps ambulances to the evacuation hospitals which re-
mained as located for the last phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation. Both
the corps and divisions utilized the system of "leapfrogging" developed dur-
ing the offensives in which they had participated, but the absence of army
hospitals near the troops was at first a source of considerable difficulty. Later
the Third Army established evacuation hospitals at the more favorable sites
of the corps collecting hospitals, and these, in turn, were located at the triage
points of either the northern or the southern division in the corps front. 45
At the beginning of the march out troops were faced by the need of pro-
viding for refugees, and corps hospitals participated in the care given them.
One of the hospitals of the 32d Division at Longwy cared for many hundreds
until relieved by a corps hospital, which was also the collecting point for
American disabled in that vicinity. 45
The evacuation order issued by the Corps on November 1G. covering the
first portion of the march to the Rhine, read as follows: 45
Each division will establish its own triages within its area and evacuate as follows:
Surgical cases; very seriously sick: Mobile Hospital No. 1, Bantheville.
Moderately sick: Evacuation Hospital No. 15, Glorieux.
Slightly sick: Evacuation Hospital No. 4, Fromereville.
Contagious: Evacuation Hospital No. 8, Petit Maujouy.
Nervous: Psychopathic Hospital No. 1, Benoite Vaux.
Changes in evacuation will be announced in orders from time to time. When
evacuation by train is possible, the corps will maintain a collecting hospital at railheads.
Additional ambulance or hospital service will be furnished on request to corps
surgeon.
Each division will make proper provision for ambulances to march in rear of the
columns to take care of the sick and footsore. 40
After the front lines of the divisions reached the German frontier they
retained that position until December 1. Meantime the corps hospital at
Longwy was ordered to Echternach in time to serve troops after the march
was resumed, so that it received patients during the first three days of
December. On December 4 the following evacuation order was published: 47
Divisions will establish triages within their own areas, and such number of field
hospitals, at least one, as will accommodate the sick who are apt to return to duty
within three or four days.
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 919
All contagious cases, Including Influenza, all surgical cases, except the very slight
ones apt to recover within three or four days and all other cases not apt to return to
duty within three or four days, will be evacuated by divisions to the 3d Corps collecting
hospital at Echternach.
The corps collecting hospital will be moved forward at a date to be announced later.
The sanitary train, which had had its headquarters at Mont St. Martin.
just outside of Longwy, and later at Steinsel in Luxemburg, now moved to
Echternacherbruck, crossing into Germany as soon as the troops had advanced.
While the corps collecting hospital remained at Echternach, the divisional
triages followed the troops closely, establishing temporary collecting points.
For example, the 32d Division had such a formation at Damn, and the 2d
Division a more elaborate one at Prom. 47
When the advance had gone far enough the corps collecting hospital was
established at Prum, where it took over the building by the triage of the 2d
Division, and the headquarters of the Third Corps Sanitary Train was moved
from Echternacherbruck to the same place. When the 2d Division moved
forward to another triage the corps collecting hospital took over all its patients
and established a hospital of about 1,000 beds which served the corps until the
line had nearly or quite reached the Rhine. Thereafter, until army hospitals
were established in the, bridgehead area, patients were evacuated to Trier. In
the last days of the march, the Third Army evacuated the corps hospital at
Prom by a hospital train, but in the meantime it had been partially evacuated
by the Third Corps ambulance section, which later assisted in evacuating the
hospital at Trier. 48
After corps headquarters was officially opened at Xeuwied, in the bridge-
head area east of the Rhine, on December 15, corps hospitals were soon opened
in the same area. For the northern part of the bridgehead. Xeuwied was
selected as the best location for a corps collection hospital, and for the south-
ern part, Ehrenbreitstein. Good buildings w T ere obtained for both of these
institutions, and they were established at once, but were not completely manned
until after the army took over the hospital at Prum. thus releasing field hos-
pital personnel of the corps stationed at that place. 48 For a few days in the
early period of occupation, the 32d Division, with a triage at Andernach. and
the 2d Division, with a triage at Neuenahr. assisted the corps by retaining
and caring for large number of the sick. 49
When the Third Army began to receive patients in Coblenz some changes
took place in the distribution of corps medical organizations. The 1st Divi-
sion maintained its triage and hospital at Dernbach, while the 32d Division
had its triage at Sayn and its hospital in a summer hotel at Rengsdorf, the 2d
Division placing its triage at Engers and its hospital at Vallendar. The
corps collecting hospital at Ehrenbreitstein was taken over by a hospital of
the Third Army, but the corps continued to maintain its hospital at Xeuwied.
chiefly for the reception of sick from among corps troops. The sanitary train
was established in one of the modern fortifications on the heights of Ehren-
hreitstein. An army evacuation order was issued which in effect sent patients
direct from the divisions to army hospitals, and in consequence corps collect-
920
FIELD OPERATIONS
ing hospitals practically ceased to function. The officer in charge of evacua-
tion for the Third Army was directed to consult directly with the correspond-
ing officer in the corps. The functions of the corps surgeon, already reduced,
were thus further limited. 49
THE 2D DIVISION
In preparation for its march, 11 additional trucks and 25 G. M. C. ambu-
lances were received by the sanitary train of the 2d Division. Animal-drawn
ambulances were assigned to follow each column, and motor ambulance de-
tails called twice daily at all elements of the division, evacuating patients to
division field hospitals and from the latter to corps hospitals. During a part
of the march convoys of motor ambulances were detailed also to follow up
the column and carry forward to their organizations men w T ho fell out or
straggled. 50
Hospitalization was provided by sending with the advance a part of the
1st Field Hospital, which would establish itself as far forward as the day's
march permitted, while the other part of this unit cared for the disabled who
were left behind, until they were evacuated. The latter then moved up and
took over the hospital which had already been established by the former. On
a few occasions, when evacuations to the l'ear were long and difficult, other
field hospitals relieved the one mentioned, or another field hospital was estab-
lished to assist it. A section of the medical supply unit accompanied the ad-
vance field hospital to meet its needs and those of the Medical Department de-
tachments with troops. 50
Hospitals were established as follows on the line of march :
Place
Date
Organization
Number
of
patients
Nov
Nov
Nov
Nov
Nov
Nov
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dee.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
17-Nov. 18
40
Virton, Belgium
Arlon. Belgium
19-Nov. 20
20-Nov. 22
22-Nov. 23
23- Dec. 1—
do
do
do
do .. .
54
130
50
450
25-Dec. 7
23d Field Hospital
16th Field Hospital
"21
180
Oerolstein, Rhine Province, Germany..
3-Dec. 10
4-Dee.9
8-Dec. 10
10-Oec. 14
15-Dcc. 19
14-Dec.31.
1st Field Hospital
15th Field Hospital
130
413
16th Field Hospital
132
Neuenahr, Rhine Province, Germany
15th Field Hospital
16th Field Hospital
343
»5
1st Field Hospital
880
15-Dec. 31
27-Dec.31.
140
16th Field Hospital
24
2.152
" Admissions in addition to those transferred from 1st Field Hospital, at Cruchten, on departure of the latter.
b Admissions in addition to 349 transferred from 15th Field Hospital, at same place, on departure of the latter.
On the 25th of November, at Cruchten. Luxemburg. 24 Ford ambulances
were received, but on the 28th all surplus ambulances were ordered turned in
and a convoy of G. M. C. ambulances and 8 of these new Ford ambulances
were sent back to the Medical Department concentration area at Joinville.
Haute-Marne, France. This left ambulance strength of the ambulance section
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 921
as follows: 11 animal-drawn ambulances and 16 Fords to 16th Ambulance
Company, and 12 G. M. C. ambulances to each of the other three companies,
1st. 15th, and 23d. 50
THE 32D DIVISION
On cessation of hostilities the entire 32d Division was transferred across
the Meuse and replacements were received, including both medical and dental
officers. The sanitary train turned in Peerless trucks, which were replaced
by Packards. Animal-drawn units were motorized. New clothing and, in
so far as practicable, new shoes were issued throughout the division, but the
supply of the latter was insufficient. On November 19, when the division
started on its march to the Rhine, ambulances followed each infantry column,
field hospitals opening for the reception of patients. At Longwy, Field Hos-
pital No. 127 was established to care for some 250 sick and wounded found
there, of whom 8 were Americans. Later this hospital transferred its patients
to the sanitary train of the Third Corps. During the march Field Hospital
Xo. 125 established at Noers, Daun, and Andernach; Field Hospital No. 120
at Dun-sur-Meuse, Minden, and Andernach; Field Hospital No. 127 at Longwy.
Walferdange. Nieder Mendig. and Rengsdorf; Field Hospital No. 128 at
Dudeldorf and Sayn. 51
The chief difficulty which the Medical Department experienced on this
march was that of moving the field hospitals forward to keep pace with the
advance, transportation available having been reduced to two-thirds of the
regulation quota. About every second day a hospital would be opened at a
new location, and as soon as it could be cleared by corps hospitals, acting as
evacuation hospitals, trucks were sent back to move it forward. The amount
and character of work which the field hospitals were called upon to perform
were considerably heavier than was provided for in their Tables of Organiza-
tion and Equipment. The problem of rationing these hospitals, which some-
times were scattered over a route 100 km. (G2 miles) in length, was very
difficult."
Evacuation to corps collecting stations was effected by division ambu-
lances. There was some sickness, particularly among unseasoned recruits,
but most cases were admitted for treatment on account of sore, bruised, or
lacerated feet— conditions attributed chiefly to an insufficient supply of good
shoes. Three men per thousand were evacuated from the division. On Decem-
ber 13, when the 32d Division crossed the Rhine, Field Hospital No. 128 —
later supplemented by Field Hospital No. 126 — was established in two hotels
at Sayn, which town later became the billeting area of the entire sanitary
train. These hospitals here received patients from the area of the 64th
brigade, while Field Hospital No. 127, at Rengsdorf, performed a similar
service for the 63d Brigade. 01
THE 42D DIVISION
In this division, in preparation for the march to the Rhine, one motor
and two animal-drawn ambulances were assigned to each Infantry regiment,
one of each to every Artillery regiment, and one motor ambulance to each
922 FIELD OPERATIONS
Machine Gun Battalion, to the Artillery brigade headquarters, and to the
division surgeon's office. A liaison officer was assigned to each Infantry
regiment and to the Artillery brigade. 53 Working in close cooperation and
using the " leapfrog " system, the units of the sanitary train furnished, during
each day's march and at its end, collecting points for the disabled from all
parts of the division. A field hospital and an ambulance company constituted
a team, the former housing and treating patients until the latter had cleared
the particular area concerned and completed evacuations to the rear. The
team then moved forward, overtook the division, and in its turn again opened
a division triage. Thus at the end of each day's march a hospital was found
receiving patients who should be evacuated and an ambulance company sup-
plementing as needed the ambulances assigned to the troops. 54
Though the plan worked well, its actual operation required unremitting
attention. In many instances the distance to evacuation hospitals was con-
siderable, and distribution of rations was difficult when the four evacuating
teams were scattered (each an ambulance company and a field hospital)
from 30 to 50 km. (18 to 31 miles) apart. After the division reached Mersch
only hospital cases were evacuated, men with minor ailments being carried
forward by truck or ambulance. By this means more than 1,400 men were
retained with the troops, while a total of 1,000 were evacuated. 54
On December 15 the sanitary train, less one field hospital and one ambulance
company which had been left at Adenau to care for a small group of des-
perately sick patients, had reached its destination at the Kreis of Arhweiler.
on the Rhine. 55
The Fourth Corps
Headquarters of the Fourth Corps, now a part of the Third Army, moved
to Buxerulles in anticipation of the move into Germany, and the composition
of the corps was changed so that it now consisted of the 1st, 3d, and 4th
Divisions. Field Orders, No. 66. Fourth Corps, issued on November 16.
directed the 3d Division to enter No Man's Land at 5.30 a. m. on the 17th
on the two roads: Charey — Chambley and Woel — Latour-en-Woevre — Friau-
ville, to the line Jarny — Conflans — Abbeville; the 1st Division to enter No
Man's Land at 5.30 a. m., marching via Moranville — Warcq — Rouvres and
Abaucourt — Ftain, to occupy the line Gondrecourt — Domremy-la-Canne ; the
the 4th Division to march on the Bernecourt — Thiaucourt — Gironville — Vig-
neulles-les-Hattonchatel. to Thiaucourt and Vigneulles-les-Hattonchatel, and
corps troops to be ready to follow on short notice. Designated places were
reached, as directed, on the same day. Corps headquarters was at Woinville
on the night of November 16-17. That of the 1st Division, at Le Cabaret
Ferine; of the 3d Division, at St. Maurice; and of the 4th Division, at Boucq. 56
On the night of November 17-18 corps headquarters was still at AVoinville:
1st Division, Etain ; 3d Division, Conflans; 4th Division, Boucq. 50
Divisions marched prepared at all times to resume the offensive upon re-
ceipt of orders to do so. After this date, corps troops were moved and
stationed according to the uses to be made of them. 56
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IX GERMANY 923
On November 18 the Fourth Corps occupied the line Ste. Marie-aux-
Chenes — Briey — Audun-le-Roman — Fillieres; the 3d Division marching via
Jarny — Auboue and Conflans — Briey ; the 1st Division marching via Lan-
dres — Audun-le-Roman and Norroy-le-Sec — Sancy; the 4th Division remain-
ing in its billeting area prepared to march, and the corps troops marching on
the roads between the two leading divisions. 50 Corps headquarters moved to
Etain at 10 a. m. Headquarters of the division was at Landres; no change in
location of 3d and 4th division headquarters. 56
On November 19 the Fourth Corps was halted, headquarters at Joppe-
court; no change in headquarters of 1st, 3d, or 4th Divisions. On the 20th the
corps advanced to the line Gandrigen — Hayingen — Angevillers — Wollmer-
ingen — Mondercange. corps headquarters at Joppecourt. division headquarters
as follows: 1st, Audun-le-Tiche; 3d, Moyeuvre; 4th. Thiaucourt. 57
Next day the corps continued its advance to the line Cattenom — Breistroff
la Grande — Rentgen-Basse — Freische — Aspelt — Dahleim — Moutfort — Schut-
trange, with its leading divisions, and the 4th Division occupied the line
Batilly-Hatrize — Ozerailles. Corps headquarters remained at Joppecourt.
those of the divisions as follows: 1st. Hesperange; 3d, La Grange St. Francois;
4th Division, Conflans. 57
On the 22d of November the leading divisions occupied the line Schen-
gen — Remerschen — Remicb — Stadtbredimus — Greiweldange — Wormeldange —
Flaxweiler — Betzdorf. and the 4th Division occupied the line Gandringen —
Hayingen — Algringen.
A safety zone of approximately 10 km. (6.2 miles) was maintained be-
tween advance elements and the German rear elements. Headquarters of the
corps was at Bettembourg ; 1st Division at Canach. 3d at Fixem, and 4th at
Briey. 57
On the 23d the 3d Division remained in place, the 1st occupied the line
Aim — Machtum — Grevenmacher — Mertert — Wasserbillig (exclusive) . and the
4th Division marched to the line Garsch — Gr. Hettingen — Otringen (all in-
clusive). Headquarters of the corps was at Hesperange, of the 1st Division
at Canach, the 3d at Remich, and the 4th at Hayingen. 57
From November 24 to 30, inclusive, the corps was halted on the west bank
of the Moselle River, with headquarters at the following places: Corps,
Hesperange; 1st Division, Canach; 3d Division, Remich; 4th Division,
Hayingen. 57
At 8 a. m. on December 1 the Fourth Corps crossed the German frontier.
The 1st Division utilized bridges at Wormeldange and Grevenmacher over
the Moselle, at Wasserbillig over the Sauer, and at Konz and Wiltingen over
the Saar, and occupied the line Schoden (exclusive) — northern outskirts of
Trier (exclusive) — Steigenberg Hill. The 3d Division utilized the bridges at
Schengen and Remich and occupied the line Hill 440. 1 km. (0.6 mile) south-
east of Traben — east bank of Saar — Schoden. The 4th Division prepared to
follow the 3d, but made no change. Headquarters of the corps was at Greven-
macher, that of the 1st Division at Konz, of the 3d Division at Saarburg, with
no change in 4th Division. 58
924 FIELD OPERATIONS
On December 2 the 1st Division occupied the line Waldrach (exclusive) —
Riol — Iletzerath (inclusive) ; and 3d Division the line taking in Hill 659 —
Ruwer Creek to Waldrach (inclusive) ; the 4th Division cleared the line
Diedenhofen (exclusive) — Gr. Ilettingen — Suftgen — Bettembourg. Dead-
quarters were as follows: Corps. Grevenmacher : 1st Division, Schweich; 3d
Division, no change; 4th Division, Remich. 58
Next day the 1st Division occupied the line Heidenburg ( inclusive ) —
Minheim — Osann — Flatten — Wittlich (inclusive) ; the 3d Division occupied
the line Grimburgenhof — Heidenburg (exclusive), and the 4th Division
cleared the line Fixeni — Mondorf — Schuttrange and prepared to cross the
Saar at Saarburg, Wiltingen, and Konz. Headquarters were located as fol-
lows: Corps, Schweich; 1st Division, Hetzerath; 3d Division, Osburg: 4th
Division, Remich. 58
On December 4 the corps continued its advance astride the Moselle, the
1st Division occupied the line Gornhausen (exclusive) — Berncastel — Wittlich:
the 3d Division occupied the line Nonnweiler — Deuselbach — Gornhausen (inclu-
sive), and the 4th Division moved to the line Nieder-Zerf — west bank of the
Ruwer, clearing the line of the Moselle, using the bridges at Schengen.
Remich, and Wormeldange. Headquarters as follows: Corps, Schweich; 1st
Division, Hetzerath; 3d Division, Osburg; 4th Division, Saarburg. 58
On December 5 the 1st Division occupied the line Raversbeuren (ex-
clusive) — Enkirch — Bengel — Scheidweiler — Wallscheid; the 3d Division oc-
cupied the line Ringel-Kpf — Raversbeuren (inclusive), and the 4th Division
moved to the line Waldweiler — Kell — Farschweiler — Riol (all inclusive).
Headquarters were as follows: Corps, Schweich; 1st Division, Wittlich; 3d
Division, Morbach ; 4th Division, Fellingen. 50
Next day the 1st Division occupied the line Hesweiler (exclusive) — Sen-
heim — Bremm — Driesch; the 3d Division occupied the line Hausen — Toden-
roth — Hesweiler (inclusive), and the 4th Division moved to the line Nonn-
weiler — Thalfang — Mulheim — Osann. Headquarters of the corps was at
Schweich; of the 1st Division at Alt', 3d Division at Morbach. 4th Division at
Osburg. 50
On December 7 the 1st Division occupied the line Morsdorf — Klotten —
Landkern ; the 3d Division the line Kellenbach — Simmern — Bell — Morsdorf
(exclusive), and the 4th Division occupied the line Allenbach — Sensweiler —
Lotzbeuren — Traven — Kinderbeuren, Headquarters of the corps was at Zell.
of the 1st Division at Alf, 3d Division at Kirchberg, and of the 4th Division
at Cues. On the 8th the corps remained halted and headquarters unchanged. 5 "
December 9 the 1st Division occupied the line Liesenfeld — Burgen — Gap-
penach; the 3d Division occupied the line Rheinbollen — Liesenfeld (exclusive),
and the 4th Division moved to the line Rhaunen — Oberkostenz — Schauren —
Zell — Beuren. Headquarters were as follows: Corps, Cochem : 1st Division,
Treis: 3d Division. Simmern; 4th Division, Cues. 50
Xext day the 1st Division occupied the line Boppard — Waldesch — AVin-
ningen (exclusive), the 3d Division the left bank of the Rhine to Boppard
(exclusive), and the 4th moved to the line Mengerschied — Simmern — Mors-
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IX GERMANY 925
dorf — Klotten (exclusive). Headquarters were: Corps, Cochem; 1st Division,
Treis; 3d Division. Rheinbollen ; 4th Division. Kirchberg. 50
On the 11th the 1st Division occupied the line of t he Rhine to Coblenz
(exclusive), the 3d Division made no change, and the 4th remained as on the
preceding day. No change was made in headquarters. Next day the 1st
Division passed to the Third Corps and the 42d was transferred to the Fourth
Corps. Corps dispositions remained unchanged. 00
On the 13th, on account of changes in the southern boundary of the Third
Army and the Fourth Corps area, the corps was assigned a position west of
the Rhine and north of the Moselle. The 3d Division prepared to march via
Boppard — Coblenz, to occupy the Kreis of Mayen. using the bridge at Treis
in part. The 4th Division marched via the bridges at Treis and Bullay to
occupy the Kreises of Cochem and Adenau. The 42(1 Division prepared to
occupy the Kreis of Ahrweiler. No change was made in headquarters of the
corps nor of the 3d and 42d Divisions; 4th Division headquarters was at Alt'. 1 '
On the 14th the corps continued the movement to occupy areas assigned
to the divisions. The 3d Division remained halted, as did the 4th. The 42d
occupied a portion of the Kreis of Ahrweiler. Headquarters of the corps and
of the 3d Divisions remained unchanged. Headquarters of the 4th Division
was at Alf and of the 4'2d at Adenau and Ahrweiler. 00
On December 15 the Fourth Corps continued the movement. The 3d
Division marched via Coblenz and the 4th marched to occupy its area. The
42d Division completed the occupation of the Kreis of Ahrweiler. Corps head-
quarters was not changed. Division headquarters were as follows: 3d. Bop-
pard; 4th. Bertrich; 42d, Ahrweiler. 00
The corps continued its movement next day, but headquarters remained
as on the preceding days. Headquarters of the 3d Division was at Andernach,
4th Division at Bertlich, and 42d Division headquarters remained at Ahr-
weiler. 00
The corps completed the movement on December 17 when divisions were
all placed in their areas. Corps headquarters remained at Cochem. the 3d
Division at Andernach, 4th at Bertrich, and the 42d at Ahrweiler. 01
MEDICAL DKPABTMENT ACTIVITIES
The corps was supplied with a corps sanitary train whose personnel and
field hospital equipment were drawn from the 76th Division and the ambu-
lances and trucks from various near-by divisions which did not participate
in the march. By working day and night, the personnel overhauled these
vehicles and put them into condition within two days, so that they were ready
for use on the day that the march began. For the most part the corps train
moved as a unit, such ambulances as were necessary being detached to accom-
pany various corps organizations." 2
As no buildings were left standing in the territory first traversed, the
problems of hospitalization and evacuation of the sick presented difficulties.
The 1st Division, which came from the Argonne region by way of Longwy
and Longuyon. joined the corps on the march, evacuating its ineffeetives to
926 FIELD OPERATIONS
the hospitals already established in the region it was leaving, which was
still operating under the First Army. During the first two days of the march
the sick of the 3d and 4th Divisions had to be transported back over No Man's
Land to a receiving hospital moved forward for that purpose by the Second
Army. This was in the region of Mars-la-Tour, to which point the division
ambulance companies transported these, patients. Thence they were carried
by the Second Army to hospitals in the environs of Toul. 62
During the early part of the march no attempt was made to establish
corps hospitals, but as it progressed two of these hospitals were established
at Jarny in school buildings. They operated here for two days, but were
more concerned in feeding stragglers and such troops as had failed to get their
rations than in actual care of the sick. After this evacuation was still to
the rear, across the devastated region, even though the haul was becoming a
long one. It having been learned that some American wounded prisoners
had been left in Briey, a corps hospital and corps ambulance company were
sent forward to that town, where the former took over a well-equipped and
modern civil hospital which had been used as a military hospital by the Ger-
mans. A number of nontransportable wounded were found, including some
Americans, but most of the patients here were Germans or Austrians. One
German medical officer and a few sanitary corps men had been left behind to
look after them, but only three days' supply of poor food had been left when
the Germans evacuated the hospital, and this was entirely exhausted when the
Fourth Corps sanitary formations took it over. The hospital continued to
operate at Briey under the same jurisdiction until relief was provided by an
evacuation hospital of the Third Army. 62
Patients in the corps field hospitals at Jarny having been evacuated,
these two units were moved forward and established in Esch. Luxemburg,
where excellent school buildings, well adapted to hospital purposes, were
found. The 4th Field Hospital of the corps sanitary train took over the
location of a field hospital established in Esch by the 1st Division, relieving
the latter for forward movement. 02
Until the troops reached Luxemburg the weather had been excellent,
there had been no great amount of sickness, and the march had continued
daily. During a rest period of some eight days in that duchy, the weather
turned cold and rainy, and influenza cases complicated by pneumonia increased
so that the hospitals in Esch were taxed to capacity. Now, evacuation to
France and rear areas by ambulance had to be abandoned and evacuation
to forward occupied areas begun, since it was necessary for its hospitals to
stay within the corps area as it advanced.' 1 ''
The march having been resumed on December 1. the corps hospital
which had been relieved at Briey took over the site of the field hospital of
the 1st Division at Grevenmacher. Two of three corps hospitals at Esch
also moved forward at once and occupied large barracks of good capacity in
Trier, establishing themselves at once for the reception of such patients as
could bear transportation from P2sch forward. (Patients with influenza were
evacuated, but those with pneumonia were held.) At the time these patients
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 927
were being received. Evacuation Hospitals No. 3 and No. 12 arrived and
took over the hospitals established in Trier ; but as only part of their personnel
and none of their equipment came with them the corps hospitals were left
in situ and operated under direction of their commanding officers, pending
the arrival of the full equipment of the evacuation hospitals. The corps
hospital in Grevenmacher was also evacuated and moved to occupy a hotel
building near Traben-Trarbach, on the eastern bank of the Moselle. The
hitter was operated for some time, caring especially for influenza and pneu-
monia patients whose evacuation was deemed inadvisable. 63
Upon resumption of the march from the Duchy of Luxemburg into Ger-
many proper, foot trouble among Infantry troops began to assume formidable
proportions. This was due not to the long-continued marching, but chiefly to
improperly fitting shoes. The majority of the soldiers had been issued the
British army shoe, which was heavier, built on different lines, and made of
less pliable leather than the American shoe. A great many of the troops fell
out on the line of march because of blistered and excoriated feet. Though of
only temporary character, this disability threw a great burden on ambulance
companies and accounted for an increased sick rate. Influenza, which had ap-
peared while the troops were at rest, continued, but to a lesser extent. Foot
troubles and influenza caused practically all the disabilities toward the end of
the march. 63
The area assigned the Third Army, extending along the western bank
of the Rhine, joined the British sector to the north and the French to the
south and extended back in the occupied territory some 80 km. (50 miles).
The 1st Division, which had been part of the Fourth Corps on the march, passed
to the Third Corps, its place in the Fourth being taken by the 42d Division,
which held the northern portion of the sector, the 3d Division the southern
portion, and the 4th Division the back area. Corps headquarters was placed
at Cochem and there remained.'' 3 Division field hospitals were located at the
places most advantageous for service of the division areas concerned, and
corps hospitals were distributed so as best to serve the divisions as entities —
one at Cochem, one near May en, one at Andernach, and one at Neuenahr. The
hospital at Neuenahr was relieved later by an evacuation hospital of the Third
Army, and was then moved to Andernach. 63
After reaching Cochem, the corps ambulance companies were reinforced
by 36 Ford ambulances, thus securing ample ambulance transport to the corps.
Extra corps ambulances were stationed at the various division hospitals to
evacuate patients to corps hospitals. From the latter, such patients as evi-
dently required hospitalization for a period longer than four to seven days, in
accordance with instructions from the chief surgeon, Third Army, were evac-
uated to evacuation hospitals of the Third Army, whore definitive treatment
was given them. 64
THE 1ST DIVISION
On November 17, as part of the Fourth Corps, the 1st Division started
on its march to the Rhine after an unsuccessful attempt to reequip the troops.
928 FIELD OPERATIONS
Its troops started on the march thinly clad, poorly shod, and without having
had an opportunity to bathe or disinfect themselves. Notwithstanding these
conditions, however, the number of men requiring hospitalization was small."
When the division assembled after the last offensive it was only with the
greatest difficulty that the sanitary train was able to extricate its transporta-
tion from mired roads and to reach division headquarters at La Cabaret Ferine
in the area east of Verdun. Men reporting sick were picked up by battalion
or regimental medical personnel and evacuated as was necessary to Evacuation
Hospital No. 15, at Glorieux, just west of Verdun. An ambulance was attached
to each regiment to care for emergency cases, and other ambulances visited
each battalion and regimental station to evacuate the sick. 05
The command reached the Duchy of Luxemburg November 20, and Field
Hospital No. 3 operated as a division hospital at Esch until the 25th. Nearly
all the 295 patients it here received were suffering from foot trouble caused
by improper shoes." 5 In a few days most of these men were returned to the
lines, but seriously sick patients were transferred to the Third Corps hos-
pital, also located at Esch. The division remained in Luxemburg until Decem-
ber 1, billeted, as a rule, in barns, but enjoying bathing facilities adequate
to give all men at least one bath. There were no facilities for disinfestation.
however, and almost every member of the command harbored vermin. Field
Hospital No. 2, established at Grevonmacher, admitted 534 patients up to
December 1, most of them because of foot troubles. More than half the cases
of disability during the march were due to this cause. 00 After the division
reached Coblenz December 12 and deployed through the area beyond the
bridgehead, the sanitary train was billeted first at Hoehr and then at Ilill-
schied, serving at the latter location until the divison was withdrawn. The
division surgeon's office was located at division headquarters in Montahaur.
Field Hospital No. 3 occupied a part of a German hospital building at Dern-
bacb, where it functioned as a division hospital until March 5. on which date
it was relieved by Field Hospital No. 2. From December 15, 1918, to March
15, 1919, 2,042 patients were received. Corps orders directed that patients
who did not recover in three days be evacuated to the corps hospital at
Neuwied. 07
THE 3D DIVISION
The 3d Division started on its march to the Rhine November 16, its route
lying through Connnercy, Vigneulles, Contians, Briey, Moyeuvre-la-Grande.
Thionville, and Remicb, Luxemburg. 08 Entering Germany on December 1. the
division passed from the high, rolling plateau, across which it had marched
up to this time, and entered a more rugged terrain. Passing through Saar-
burg. Morbach. Kirschberg. and Simmern, it reached the Rhine near Bach-
arach and St. Goar. On December 16 it reached its billeting area, with head-
quarters at Andernach. 00
By November 1. after the division had entered the rest area south of
Bar-le-Duc, the sanitary train congregated at Tronville and Velaine. Here
all organizations were brought up to full strength and were reorganized.
equipment was repaired, and shortages were filled. Special attention was
given to personal cleanliness, and a vigorous training schedule was followed
AMElilCAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 929
Repair and replacement of equipment and training of personnel were con-
tinued throughout the march. 70 Moving from Tronville on November 1<>,
headquarters of the sanitary train reached Flvange, Luxemburg, on November
■2?) and there remained until the division entered Germany on December J. As
the several organizations of the train were moving constantly and usually
independently, it was not until train headquarters reached a permanent place
that difficulties pertaining to the rendition of reports were overcome and all
such papers were brought up to date. During much of the march dismounted
members of the train were carried on trucks or in ambulances. 71
During the march the division surgeon held frequent conferences with
regimental surgeons, who reported that the physical condition of the troops
was excellent, yet by the time the division reached Bemich a considerable num-
ber — chieHy replacements — were suffering from chronic arthritis, flat-foot, and
other foot conditions which required their evacuation. Nevertheless, transfers
to hospital were not excessive. Close inquiry was made concerning the health
of inhabitants in the territory traversed, and appropriate measures were taken
to avoid infection.' 19
On the march the sanitary train functioned as follows:
Ambulance Company No. 5, from November 1 to 17. evacuated patients
from Field Hospital No. 27, at Velaines, to Base Hospital No. 83, at Bevigny.
On the 17th the company proceeded to Mondori where, on the 23d, it evacuated
patients to the corps hospital at Esch. On the same date the company was
assigned to the 6th Brigade, which it served during the remainder of the
march. 7 - During this time it evacuated patients from regimental infirmaries
to hospitals at Mondorf, Saarburg, Treves, Buchenbeuren, Salzig, and Maria
Laach. On December Hi it reached its final station at Maven. Germany,
when it evacuated patients to Field Hospital No. 5 at Maria Laach. 73
Ambulance Company No. 7, after being relieved in the Meuse-Argonne.
was stationed at Tronville until November 14, when it was assigned to the
6th Brigade, which it served until November 23, when it was relieved by Am-
bulance Com2>any No. 5. 72 On December 1 the company arrived at Mondorf-
les-Bains. where it evacuated patients from the corps hospital. December G
it proceeded to Saarburg. where it evacuated Field Hospital No. 7. On the
following day it proceeded to Buchenbeuren. where Field Hospital No. 7 es-
tablished a hospital; the ambulance company evacuated this until the 14th.
The following day the company left for Simmern. where it served Field
Hospital No. . r >. On the 16th it again moved forward and evacuated Field
Hospital No. 27 at Salzig until the 28th. when it proceeded to its final station
at Welling. Germany. 73
Ambulance Company No. 20. animal drawn, after its relief from the
Meuse-Argonne, accompanied the 5th Brigade animal-drawn train to Tron-
ville. where it remained until the 14th. when it proceeded to Mars-la-Tour.
arriving there on the 19th. The following day it started with the train on its
march into Germany, arriving at its final destination, Trimbs, on December 17. ™
Ambulance Company No. 27 was stationed at Tronville November 1 to lfi.
where it conducted ambulance service for the f>th Brigade. On the 17th it
13576—25 59
930 FIELD OPERATIONS
accompanied the 5th Brigade on its march into Germany, arriving at its iinal
destination, Andernach, Germany, on December IT. Throughout the march
the company served the different regiments of the 5th Brigade. 72
Field Hospital No. 5 was billeted at Velaines November 1 to 17, when it
started on its march into Germany. 74 It did not function until it reached
Simmern, Germany, on December 9. where it established a divisional sick
hospital. December 15 all patients were evacuated, and the organization pro-
ceeded to its final destination at Maria Eaach, where it established a hospital
in a monastery and a hotel, caring for division sick. Up to the last of December
it admitted 397 patients, with 2 deaths. 75
Field Hospital No. 7 was billeted at Velaines November 1 to 17, when
it started on its inarch into Germany. On December 2 it reached Saarburg,
Germany, where a detachment of 3 officers and 13 enlisted men opened
and operated a hospital until the 8th. The remainder of the company operated
a hospital at Buchenbeuren, Germany, from the 6th to 13th. The organization
then proceeded to Andernach. where it opened and operated a hospital. 7 "'
Field Hospital No. 26. animal drawn, after the Meuse-Argonne operation,
was located at Velaines. leaving there on the 14th for Mars-la-Tour, where
it arrived on the 19th. The following day the hospital resumed its march,
arriving at its final destination at Trimbs. December 17. The organization
did not operate any hospitals during the march. 75
Field Hospital No. 27 was established at Velaines November 1 to 17.
caring for divisional sick. During this time it admitted 516 patients. Evac-
uating all its patients to Base Hospital No. 83, at Revigny. it then started
on the march into Germany. It resumed operations at St. Elizabeth's
Convent, about 1 km. (0.6 mile) from Mondorf. Luxemburg, where it received
patients from November 24 to 25. On the latter date the hospital returned
to Elvange. and on December 1 it again opened at the St. Elizabeth's Convent.
This operated until December 6, when its patients were turned over to a
hospital of the 4th Division. During this time it cared for 202 patients,
with 1 death. On December 12, the hospital arrived at Bad Salzig, where
it operated until January 18. 1919. During this period it admitted 325
patients with 7 deaths from pneumonia. 78
THE 4TH DIVISION
Orders originally issued concerning the evacuation service of the 4th
Division during its march to the Rhine are quoted below: 70
Headquarters 4th Division.
American Expeditionary Forces,
Office of the Division Surgeon,
France, J'lth Xovember, 1918.
Circular letter No. 4.
To all medical officers, Jjth Division.
I. In case the division is called upon to carry out a march of more than one day's
duration, the following sanitary tactics will ordinarily he applied:
1. Disposition of sanitary units on the march :
a. Comhat equipment with comhat train of battalion and regiments.
b. Camp infirmaries with comhat train of regiments.
AMEBICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 931
c. One field hospital and one ambulance company in rear of advance guard or center
column.
d. Remainder of sanitary train in rear of main body.
e. Two animal-drawn ambulances with each regiment of Infantry, one with each
regiment of Engineers and Field Artillery.
f. One motor ambulance detachment patrolling the roads in the rear of the marching
troops.
2. Care and evacuation of the sick and injured on the march:
«. Soldiers who are unable to march with their units on account of sickness or injury
will be given a pass signed by a commissioned officer and, accompanied by a noncom-
missioned officer, will await the arrival of or proceed to the medical officer marching in
the rear of the battalion, who will make proper disposition of the case and who will
send back the pass to the unit commander by the noncommissioned officer, having noted
thereon the disposition made of the case.
//. According to the condition of the soldier, he will march with the sanitary detach-
ment or be transported upon the animal-drawn ambulance marching witli the column.
C. In case it is assured that the soldier will be unable to inarch with his unit on the
following day, or that he is in need of immediate hospital care, he will be turned over
to the motor ambulances patrolling the roads in the rear of the column. In case the
motor ambulance can not make contact with the particular body of troops, the soldier,
accompanied by the necessary personnel of the sanitary detachment, will await the
arrival of the motor ambulance at the side of the road.
(I. Motor ambulances will evacuate patients to the division field hospital operating as
the evacuation point for that particular day. as explained below.
e. All soldiers disposed of as indicated above will lie tagged with a diagnosis tag
whether accompanying the column either by walking or in ambulance, or evacuated.
3. Care and evacuation of sick and injured at conclusion of day's inarch:
a. The Field Hospital accompanying the advance guard will open immediately upon
arrival at halting place for the night and will be the evacuation point for the following
twenty-four hours.
b. Sick call will be held by battalions as soon as practicable after the troops are settled
in billets, camp or bivouac.
c. Motor ambulances of the ambulance company accompanying the advance guard will
call at each battalion and regimental aid station or infirmary at the hour designated for
sick call or. if none is designated, will call between the hours of l(i and 17 o'clock and
will evacuate patients in need of hospital care to the field hospital designated above.
(1. Patients not in need of evacuation, hut assumed to he unable to march with the
units on the following day, will be tagged "Quarters," and ordered to report at the begin-
ning of the next day's march to the sanitary detachment for transportation upon the
animal-drawn ambulance.
e. Patients in need of evacuation at the hour of the beginning of the day's march may
be left at the side of the aid station, where the ambulance detailed to the duty of
patrolling the roads for that day will report at least one-half hour before the hour of
inarching and from which point these ambulances take up their day's work.
/. In ease of emergency need of a motor ambulance during a halt, it may be obtained
at the field hospital with the advance guard, where one ambulance will be retained for
emergency calls.
y. In case of a halt of more than one night, surgeons will ordinarily open their camp
infirmaries at which "quarters" cases can be given better observation and care than within
their units.
4. Disposition of units of sanitary train:
it. Evacuation to the field hospital designated above will begin as soon as possible
to the evacuation hospital designated to the commanding officer of the sanitary train as
his evacuation point, and will he completed not later than the evening of the following
day, whereupon this field hospital will close and prepare to rejoin the volume of the
sanitary train for the following day's march.
932 FIELD OPERATIONS
6. At the conclusion of ench day's march a second field hospital and a second
ambulance company will he designated by the commanding officer of the sanitary
train to join the troops that are to form the advance guard upon (he following day.
The place and hour at which these sanitary units will report will he designated in the
march order.
ft In tins way it appears that two field hospitals arc always open. In case evacua-
tion to the rear from the field hospital is delayed, or the number of patients is relatively
large, three field hospitals in echelon may he open at the same time.
<L In case one brigade is detached from the division for duty al a distance, one
field hospital and one ambulance company will ordinarily be detailed for duty witli
such brigade.
c. The disposition of the motor ambulance detachments is therefore as follows:
(1) One detachment with advance guard, which collects from battalions after the
halt and evacuates the field hospitals after collection is completed.
(2| One detachment with the field hospital opened at the preceding halt and evacuat-
ing its cases to the rear.
(3) One detachment patrolling the roads in rear of the troops and evacuating them
to the field hospital opened at the preceding halt.
(4) These detachments perform the duties indicated in paragraphs 1. 2. and 3 above In
daily rotation, in the sequence in which they appear above: i. e., the detachment with
the advance guard becomes the detachment evacuating the field hospital on the following
day, and on the detachment patrolling the roads behind the troops.
f. In case of a halt of more than one night the disposition to field hospitals and
ambulance companies remains as on the night of the halt.
ii. In case a motor ambulance is required at tiny point in real emergency and an
ambulance patrolling the roads is not to be had in time, an ambulance may he obtained
from the detachment with the advance guard or center column.
//. The commanding officer of the sanitary train will issue the necessary orders
to put these general provisions and those of the daily march order into effect.
5. When patients are reported for evacuation, in case the routine ambulance service
will not meet the particular need, the following information is desired in order that
an ambulance may be sent promptly and certainly:
From: (Individual sending the message.)
Representing: (Surgeon, 39th Infantry.)
At: (Place from which message is sent — geographic location. I
No. of patients (3) ; sitting (2) ; recumbent (1).
Contagious*: (Yes or no.) Type: (Mumps.)
Organization: (Hdqrs. 39th Infantry.) At: (Vignot. )
Ready at: (Once or 1(>:00 o'clock, 15 Nov.)
These orders were soon modified by memoranda issued by the division
surgeon."
17th November, 1018.
Memorandum to the commanding officer, 4th Sanitary Train.
I. In order to carry out the general provisions for the evacuation of sick and the
movement of the sanitary train on the inarch with the division, the following principles
will apply in addition to those already indicated in previous orders or Instructions:
1. The area for each night's bivouac or billeting will be indicated in the day's march
order for each brigade of Infantry and the brigade of Field Artillery. The Field Artillery
brigade will ordinarily be one day's march in rear of the Infantry. The area between
that of the Field Artillery and that of the two Infantry brigades will be available for the
sanitary train for bivouac or billets. In default of specific orders, the commanding officer,
salutary train, will select the bivouac or billeting area for bis train within the area desig-
nated above for each halt, this area to be along the division axial roads or on crossroads
leading thereto from the corps axial roads. This area will include ordinarily the place
at which the field hospital is opened each afternoon as the evacuation point for the follow-
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IX GERMANY 933
ing twenty-four hours. The immediate vicinity of the corps axial roads will not be utilized
for bivouac, billets, or establishment of field hospitals without special request to and
authority from this office.
18th November, 1918.
Memorandum to commanding officer, 4th Sanitary Train.
I. Previous instructions concerning movement of route ambulances by corps axial
roads are rescinded.
II. Corps axial roads will not be used by the 4th Sanitary Train.
III. Motor ambulances evacuating from organizations will move on the division
axial roads and on the roads included within them.
Before the- march each regimental surgeon was provided with a Ford car
and one motor ambulance was assigned to each regiment. During each day's
march motor ambulances were stationed at important crossroads and in towns
passed by each column, remaining in place until the troops had passed, to col-
lect any disabled who might have been overlooked. Ambulances patrolled
the roads and visited all towns where troops had rested or had passed the night.
All but 7 patients were collected by the primary regimental ambulance service,
and of these all but 1 was picked up by this supplementary patrol."
When, after resting in the latter part of November, the troops again
advanced on December 2, evacuation orders were changed. The inarch could
have been continued under these substituted orders for one or two weeks longer
than proved necessary, but some of the divisional units fell far to the rear.
The order under which field hospitals now operated was as follows: 7 "
1st December, 1918.
Memorandum to the commanding officer, 4th Sanitary Train.
I. The evacuation and care of the sick on resumption of the march will be in general
as follows :
I. One field hospital will open each second day in advance portion of division area
as evacuation point for following two days and will remain open for seven days, or
until necessary to bring it forward to rejoin command.
II. Evacuation further to the rear will be limited to definite necessities in order to
avoid unnecessary loss of soldiers to duty and unnecessary crowding of hospitals of the
rear. The following cases will ordinarily lie evacuated at once:
1. Contagious cases, excepting the milder influenza and respiratory infections.
2. Major surgical cases.
:'>. Disability cases unfit for combat duty.
III. When a field hospital receives orders to close and rejoin command, if it lias
remaining cases who will probably return to duty within seven days, these patients
will lie transferred to the field hospital next toward the front.
IV. In order to facilitate evacuation from units when the field hospital operating
as evacuation point is at a distance, a collection station may be opened at headquarters,
4th Sanitary Train, at the halt when new field hospitals are opened for the purpose
of transferring patients to other ambulances with economy of transport.
Orders such as the following were issued daily under the foregoing
jreneral plan : so
oth December, litis.
Message to commanding officer, 4th Sanitary Train.
I. The division continues its inarch at 8 o'clock. 5th December.
II. The 4th Sanitary Train, less Field Hospitals Nos. lit. 21. and 23. will proceed
to Hiol, 6th December, for billets- night, 0/7 December. Transport will proceed via
Nieder — Zerf — Pelligen — Trie.- [Treves], Marching troops will take the most direct
practicable route.
81
82
934 FIELD OPERATIONS
III. Field Hospital No. 28 will open at Itiol (Kuwer-I'aulin being out of division area)
at 9 o'clock 6th December, as evacuation point.
IV. Field Hospital No. 19 will rejoin command at Biol.
V. Acknowledge receipt of tbis message and of Field Order No. 98 tliese Hq. to tliis
office by radio.
It was estimated that 100 cases a day would be admitted to the field
hospital opened for the service of the division, and that at the end of five
days 125 of tliese patients would have returned to duty, leaving 75 to be car-
ried to the next field hospital then operating farther forward. The number
of patients in the latter hospital would have been reduced meanwhile to 125.
thus enabling it to admit the patients from the rear hospital. Admissions
were actually at the rate of SG a day, but because of difficulty in finding hospi-
tal accommodations in the small towns there was some irregularity in the
program. Hospitals enjoying the best facilities e. g, those located at Mon-
dorf and Cues, remained open somewhat longer than had been planned origi-
nally. As many cases as possible were retained with the division. Admis-
sions were due chiefly to foot troubles caused by hurried equipment of the com-
mand just before the march began, and the consequent lack of opportunity for
breaking in new shoes, to lack of endurance and morale among several thou-
sand replacements received just before the march began, and to an epidemic
of mumps which appeared in the division. 8
The following statistics are quoted :
Approximate length of march km__ 330
Total number of days included in march 20
Actual number of marching days 15
Average day's march km 22
Mean strength of division on march 24.990
Total number of admissions to field hospitals 2. 107
Rate per 1,000 of admissions 80.0
Average daily number of admissions 80
Average daily rate per 1,000 of admissions 3.4
Total number evacuated farther to the rear 1,097
Total number returned to duty from field hospitals 732
Average number remaining in field hospitals at 12 noon 222
The Seventh Corps
Organized in August, 1918, with headquarters at Remiremont, Vosges, the
Seventh Corps served in the zone of the French Seventh Army until November
7, under the administrative control of our American First Army. On Novem-
ber 8 the corps was relieved from duty in the Vosges sector, assigned to the
First Army, and located at Benoite Vaux until after the armistice. On Novem-
ber 15 it moved to Laheycourt and November 22 became part of the Third
Army. It moved successively to Dun-sur-Meuse on November 20, Virton,
Belgium, November 23, Grevenmacher. Luxemburg. December 4. and on Decem-
ber 12 to Wittlich, Germany, remaining at the last-named place until it
was repatriated.
During the march into Germany the Seventh Corps, consisting of the 89th
and 90th Divisions, was the rear element of the Third Army. The :5:5<1
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 935
Division passed to the corps on December 12 and on the 17th was transferred
to the Second Army. After arrival in Germany the Seventh Corps was located
in the western part of the American sector, with headquarters at Wittlieh,
89th Division headquarters being at Bitburg and that of the 90th Division at
Berncastel. 83
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
With the exception of Field Hospital No. 156, which was retained to as-
sist Camp Hospital No. 70, at St. Florent, the hospital section of the 114th
Sanitary Train moved to Souilly, where on November 11 Field Hospital No.
155 was detached and the other two, Field Hospitals No. 153 and No. 154, were
assigned to the sanitary train of the Seventh Corps. These hospitals were
billeted at first at Rambluzin, remaining there until November 10 when they
went with the Seventh Corps to Auzecourt. November 21 they moved to
Dim-sur-Meuse and were joined there by Evacuation Ambulance Companies
Nos. 5, 6, and 8. On November 23 the train moved to Virton, Belgium, and
thence, on December 5. to Berg, Luxemburg. Field Hospital No. 155, which
had rejoined shortly before the last movement, Field Hospital No. 154, and
Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 5 were ordered to Echternach on Decem-
ber 12, to establish a corps collecting hospital and to relieve hospitals of the
89th and 90th Divisions. 84 One of these units was also established for a few
days at Hetzerath, Germany, to care for the sick from corps troops and for
stragglers from divisions in advance. 85
On December 14 headquarters of the field hospital section, Field Hospi-
tal No. 153, and Evacuation Ambulance Companies No. 6 and No. 8 accom-
panied Seventh Corps headquarters to Wittlieh, where, on the 16th, Field
Hospital No. 153 opened the corps collecting station, which also functioned
as a camp hospital as long as the corps remained in Germany. The units
which had been located at Echternach were relieved on December 27 and re-
joined at Salmrohr, Germany, but on January 8 the personnel of Field
Hospitals No. 154 and No. 155 were assigned to duty with PAaeuation Hospi-
tal No. 3, at Trier. On January 11 headquarters of the sanitary train and of
its field hospital section were located at Dreis, where Field Hospitals No. 154
and No. 155 rejoined on February 8. Headquarters of the 114th Sanitary
Train and of its ambulance section, with Ambulance Companies Nos. 153
154, and 155 joined on January 18, having been retained for duty until this
time in the 39th divisional area. The designation of the train was changed
on January 20 to that of Seventh Corps Sanitary Train, which then consisted
of train headquarters, headquarters of its ambulance company, and hospital
sections Ambulance Companies Nos. 153, 154, and 155, and Field Hospitals
Nos. 154, 155, and 156. Evacuation Ambulance Companies Nos. 5, 6 < and 8,
which had served the corps throughout the march, were relieved on January
24 and returned to the First Army. 84 These companies had assisted in the
evacuation from divisions, had cleared corps hospitals, and furnished ambu-
lances to the various organizations composing the corps troops.
936 FIELD OPERATIONS
From the field hospitals as finally located evacuations were effected by
division and corps ambulance companies to two evacuation hospitals in Trier
and to one in Prum.
THE 33d DIVISION
On December 7 the 33d Division began its movement to the Third Army
area, reaching Conflans, 50 km. (31 miles) distant, in two days. On the 10th,'
it reached Aumetz and on the 12th, Esch, in the southern part of the Duchy of
Luxemburg. The total length of the march approximated OS km. (t!0.8 miles),
covered in six days. Rain was continuous. On December 16 the division
started to move to the Grevenmacher area in eastern Luxemburg, and thence
to Diekirch, where it arrived on the 20th. 80
Arrangements of the medical department were as follows: Ambulances
in real' of the columns collected men who were unable to continue the march
and took them to the field hospitals. Field Hospital Xo. 129 was located at
Creue on December 7 and 8, receiving patients during the first day of the march ;
Field Hospital Xo. 131, at Conflans. received those incapacitated the following
day. Similarly. Field Hospital Xo. 130 opened at Briey on December 10. re-
ceiving those incapacitated as the march progressed toward that point and be-
yond it. On December !). Field Hospital Xo. 12!) closed and moved to Ottingen,
where it opened the next day as a collecting post for the sick. To this place
that class of casualties continued to be removed as the march progressed. When
division headquarters was established at Esch the sanitary train, with the ex-
ception of Field Hospital Xo. 130, which remained at Briey, was located at
Ottingen, with its headquarters at Schifflingen. Until this time there had been
but l."!5 evacuations from the division. During the first part of the march
which ensued. Field Hospital Xo. 129. at Ottingen, received casualties: during
its latter part Field Hospital Xo. 131, at Grevenmacher. When the division
reached the Diekirch area that town was made headquarters of the sanitary
train and of its sections. The field hospitals were located (December 2<i) at
Fttlehruck. La TJochette. Grevenmacher, and Cruchten. In the latter part of
the march 115 men became incapacitated/ 7
THE S0TH DIVISION
After the armistice the 89th Division was assigned to the army of oc-
cupation and began its march to Germany on November 24. The first troops
of the Division crossed into Germany on December 5, at Echternach. Head-
quarters was established at Kylburg, and remained there until the division re-
turned to the United States."*
Unfortunately there is no report available of the activities of the Medical
Department of the 89th Division during its inarch to the Bhine.
THE 00TH DIVISION
After the armistice the division was assigned to the army of occupation
and latei' marched into Germany. The first troops crossed into Germany
on December (>. Headquarters were established at Berncastel December
21, and remained there until the division returned to the United States. 8 *
AMEBICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 937
As the 00th Division moved into Germany the field hospitals advanced
by "leapfrogging," each operating at a given site for a few days only. 89
Field Hospital No. 359 functioned at Blanc Fontaine from November
13 to December 3: Field Hospital No. 358 at Ire-le-Sec, from November
23 to December 6 ; Field Hospital 360 at Hesperange, from December 3
to 8; Field Hospital No. 358 at Kartbans, from December 7 to 10; No. 359
at Remich, from December 7 to 11; No. 357 at Hetzerath. from December
10 to 21 : No. 359 at Ernst, from December 12 to 20 ; and No. 300 at Udersdorf,
from December 14 to 16. After arrival in Germany the field hospitals were
used as camp hospitals and located at Daun. Gerolstein, Cues, and
Manderscheid. 89
On November 23 the ambulance section, less Ambulance Company No.
359, which remained at Blanc Fontaine for duty with Field Hospital No.
350, moved with the other field hospitals to Ire-le-Sec. On December 1.
Ambulance Company No. 360, moved to Gouraincourt, where it received a
new allotment of animals and was attached to the 343d Field Artillery. The
remainder of the ambulance section proceeded with the train, arriving at
Manderscheid on December 16. Here it was joined by Ambulance Company
No. 360 and ambulances were distributed throughout the division over an
area some 135 km. (83.8 miles) long by 53 km. (32.9 miles) wide. 89
THE 5TH DIVISION
As rapidly as possible, after the armistice, the troops of the 5th Division
were provided with bathing facilities, were disinfested. and furnished new
clothing, meanwhile undergoing training. Twenty-five motor ambulances
were transferred to the 1st Division at Nantillois on November 15 and the
animal-drawn transport of Ambulance Company No. 30, 5th Sanitary Train,
was turned over to the 5th Division salvage dump at Donlcon on
November 30.""
By Field Orders, No. 80. Third Army, dated November 21. the 5th
Division was detached from further duty with the Seventh Corps and assigned
to duty with the line of communications. To function directly under the
Third Army, the division commander being designated as the commanding
general of the Third Army, line of communications. On November 25,
division headquarters advanced to Lon<ruyon. where Field Hospital No. 17
had opened on November 23 to receive patients from the 5th Division and
returned allied prisoners and also to conduct a cliniu for French civilians
living in the vicinity. Field Hospital No. 30 opened at Longwy on the 29th.
assisting a hospital of the Third Corps. At Virton and at Montmedy Medical
Department detachments operated small hospitals, the former for allied
soldiers and French civilians, the latter for sick and wounded Germans. A
third detachment took over patients at Stenay. thus releasing a hospital of
the 90th Division, while a similar detachment released the hospitals at Ire-
le-Sec. Evacuation Ambulance Companies No. 5 and No. 8 joined on
November 28, but were relieved two days later by United States Army
Ambulance Service Sections No. 560 and No. 571.
isr.Tti — 25 uo
938 FIELD OPERATIONS
When division headquarters moved to Hollerich on December 4 it was
accompanied by Field Hospital No. 29. On the 12th headquarters advanced
to Merl and on the 17th to Esch, but Field Hospital No. 29 remained at
Hollerich until tbe 18th. when it rejoined headquarters at Esch. 91
REFERENCES
(1) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1. 1919, 55.
(2) History of the Third U. S. Army. November 14, 1018. to July 2, 1919, undated, .'!.
On file, Historical Section, the Army War College. 193-11-4.
(3) Ibid., 4.
(4) Final report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September. 1, 1919. 5(i.
(5) History of the Third U. S. Army, November 14, 1918, to July 21, 1919. undated. 5.
On file, Historical Section, the Army War College, 193-11-4.
(6) Ibid., 6.
(7) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1. 1919, 57.
(8) History of the Third XT. S. Army, November 14. 1918. to July 2, 1919, undated. 7.
On file, Historical Section, tbe Army War College. 193-11-4.
(9) Ibid.. 1.
(10) Ibid., 8.
(11) Ibid., 9.
(12) Ibid., 10.
(13) Ibid., 11.
(14) Ibid.. 12.
(15) History of hospitalization for tbe Army of Occupation in Germany, by Major H. C.
Maddux, M. C, undated, 1. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(10) Report on the activities of the Medical Department in Germany to May 31, 1919.
from chief surgeon. Third Army, to the assistant chief of staff, G-4. Third Army,
June 20, 1919, 1. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(17) History of hospitalization for the Army of Occupation in Germany, by Major H. C.
Maddux. M. C, undated. 2. on tile. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(18) Ibid., 3.
(19) Ibid., 6.
(20) Ibid., 4.
(21) Ibid., 5.
(22) Report on the activities of the Medical Department in Germany to May 31. 1919,
from the chief surgeon. Third Army, to the assistant chief of staff, G-4. Third
Army, June 20, 1919, 2. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(23) Ibid., 3.
(24) Memorandum 34. Headquarters Third Army. A. E. F., December 23. 1918. 3. On
file. Historical Section, the Army War College, 193^43-1.
(25) History of hospitalization for the Army of Occupation in Germany, by Major H. C.
Maddux, M. ('.. undated. 7. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(26) Ibid., 8.
(27) Ibid., 9.
(28) Ibid.. 10.
(29) Ibid., 13.
(30) History of the Third Army Corps, November 12, 1918. to June 28. 1919, undated.
Vol. III. 2. On file. Historical Section, tbe Army War College 1S3-11-4.
(3D Ibid.. 3.
(32) Ibid.. 4.
(33) Ibid.. 5.
(34) Ibid., 6.
(35) Ibid., 7.
(36) Ibid., 8.
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY 939
Ibid., 9.
Ibid.. 10.
Ibid., 11.
Ibid., 12.
Ibid., 13.
Ibid., 14.
Ibid., 15.
Report of Medical Department activities, Third Army Corps, by Col. .Tamos L. Bevans,
M. C, corps surgeon, undated. 39. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
Ibid.. 40.
Ibid., 41.
Ibid., 42.
Ibid., 4'?.
Ibid., 44.
Report of operations, November 12 to December 31, 1918, from commanding officer,
2d Sanitary Train, to the commanding general, 2d Division. February 20, 1919.
Report of Medical Department activities, 32d Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 18. On file, Historical Division, S. O. O.
Ibid., 44.
Report of Medical Department activities. 42d Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 63. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
Ibid., 64.
Ibid., 65.
Report of Fourth Army Corps. "Advance on Germany," following the signing of the
armistice. November 11. 1918. December 29, 1918. 1. On file. Historical Section, the
Army War College.
Ibid.. 2.
Ibid.. 3.
Ibid.. 4.
Ibid., 5.
Ibid.. 0.
Report of Medical Department activities, Fourth Army Corps, by Col. J. W. Hanner,
M. C. corps surgeon, undated. 2. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 4.
Report of Medical Department activities. 1st Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. Part II, 57. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
Ibid., 58.
Ibid.. 59.
Report of Medical Department activities. 3d Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. Part I, 18. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
Ibid.. Part I, 19.
Ibid., Part II, 76.
Ibid.. Part II. 77.
Ibid., Part IV, 57.
Ibid.. Part IV, 58.
Ibid.. Part IV, 59.
Ibid.. Part IV. 61.
Report of Medical Department activities, 4th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 11. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
Ibid., Part I, 13.
Ibid.. Part I. 15.
Ibid., Part I, 23.
Ibid.. Part I, 26.
Ibid.. Part I, 16.
Ibid., Part I, 14.
940 FIELD OPERATIONS
(83) Special report of the Seventh Army Corps as the Reserve Corps of the Army of
Occupation, undated.
(84) Account of Service of the Seventh Corps Sanitary Train with the American Expedi-
tionary Forces, by Lieut. Col, <;. P. Carroll, M. C, undated. On file, Historical
Division. S. G. O.
(S5) Report Of Medical Department activities. Seventh Corps, by Lieut. CoL Wallace
De Witt, M. C, corps surgeon, July, 1920, ^. On tile. Historical Division. S. G. 0.
(8(i) Report of Medical Department activities. 33d Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. Part 1. 1I>. On file. Historical Division. S. (!. O.
(87) Ibid., Part I, 11.
(88) Outlines of Histories of Divisions. 1'. S. Army. 1917-1919, prepared in the His-
torical Section, the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War
College.
(89) Report of Medical Department activities. 90th Division, prepared under the direc-
tion of the division surgeon, undated. Part II. 11. On tile. Historical Division.
S. ti. O.
(00) Report of Medical Department activities, oth Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. Part V. 44. On tile. Historical Division. S. (I. O.
(ill) Ibid., Part V, 4,"., 40.
CHAPTER XXXIX
AMERICAN OPERATIONS IN ITALY (BASE SECTION NO. 8)
General Pershing, in explaining the necessity for sending troops to Italy,
stated : ]
The Italian Government early marie request for American troops, bul the critical
situation (in the Western Front marie it necessary to concentrate our efforts there.
When the Secretary of War was in Italy during April, 1918, he was urged to send Ameri-
can troops to Italy to show America's interest in the Italian situation and to strengthen
Italian morale. Similarly a request was made by the Italian Prime Minister at the
Abbeville conference. It was finally decided to send one regiment to Italy, with the
necessary hospital and auxiliary services, and the 332d Infantry was selected, reaching the
Italian front in July, 191S.
The regiment was attached to the Italian Third Army. Its several
battalions visited different sections of the front in order to create the impression
that a large body of American troops had arrived. From October 27 to 29.
the regiment assisted in establishing bridgeheads across the Piave River and
from October 30 to November 4 took part in the pursuit of the Austrians. On
November 4 it reached the Tagliamenta River, near Valvasone. crossed in the
face of machine-gun fire from front and Hank, and pushed forward 16 km.
(10 miles) to Villaroba. where it was in position when the Austrian armistice
went into effect. 2
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Our medical activities in Italy, though of minor importance, were of a
twofold nature: Those in connection with the small body of American troops
which has just been discussed and those directly concerning the Italian Army
through our ambulance sections which served with it. For our own troops,
beside the regulation allowance of regimental medical personnel for one In-
fantry regiment, the Medical Department consisted of one field hospital and
one base hospital. The base hospital was really detailed for service with the
Italian Army. Thirty sections of the United States Army Ambulance Service
were sent to Italy originally: later. lf> of these were withdrawn. While all
these sections were officially for service with the Italian Army, one section was
actually used to evacuate patients from our regiment.'
Officers and enlisted men of the Medical Department were attached to each
battalion of our regiment when it went into action, and aid stations were es-
tablished under direct supervision of the regimental surgeon. The motor trans-
port furnished by the United States Army Ambulance Service section from
the Italian Army carried patients to Field Hospital No. 331, which had been
attached to the regiment. This hospital, specially staffed and equipped, oper-
ated for a time in two sections stationed 95 miles apart at Lumbraga. anil Cos-
toza. respectively. The section of the hospital at Lumbraga occupied a modern
941
942 FIELD OPERATIONS
concrete building with two stories and an attic, provided with electric lights,
running water, good toilet, and other facilities. It operated 5 large wards,
and 2 smaller ones of 6 beds each for shocked and gassed cases. 3 When the
regiment which this hospital served went into action, a subsection of the sec-
tion at Lumbraga followed it to operate as a field hospital, while the sub-
section left behind operated as an evacuation hospital. The latter sent its
patients to Base Hospital No. 102 which had been detailed for service with
the Italian Army, and permanently stationed at Yicenza, September 6, 1918.
During the operation which the Italian Army conducted in October and No-
vember, 19 1<S. this base hospital sent to the front surgical teams which served
at, dressing stations and assisted in evacuation of the wounded. Until after
the armistice this hospital did not admit medical cases from the Italian Army
but in September arrangements were made for it to accept both medical and
surgical patients from the American forces in Italy. Later it also or-
ganized a hospital of 400 beds for medical cases only, reserving the original
plant for surgical cases. 4
The 30 sections of the Ambulance Service sent from the United States
on June 13, 1918, for duty with the Italian Army, comprised 76 officers and
1,641 men."' Each section was provided with transportation as follows: 11
1 1%-ton Pierce Arrow truck.
1 Dodge truck.
1 Dodge touring car.
12 Standard G. M. ('. motor ambulances.
1 180-gallon tank mounted on G. M. C. chassis.
1 repair car, G. M. C. chassis.
1 motor cycle with side car.
Machine shop truck units accompanied two of the companies.
While the equipment of the sections was being assembled in Italy, plans
for operating the service were in course of completion. The port and quarter-
master base was at Genoa; headquarters and one motor repair park at
Mantua; the advance base for supplies, a bakery, and a post office at Vicenza;
and one motor repair park at Castelfranco. The sections were distributed
among the several Italian armies and began operations, the locations selected
for them being in a semicircle to the east, north, and west of Vicenza, and
extending from Lago da (iarda to Venice. Four of the sections worked in
the mountains and the remainder on the plains. 7 The system of supply here
was based on formation of the sections into groups of three or four each, as
deemed best according to location. One section in each group collected the
mail and orders for supplies from the other sections of its group, and twice
each week, on specified days, sent them to Vicenza, by a truck which brought
back mail, supplies, and fresh bread for all the sections of the group con-
cerned. Trips to the advance base were thus reduced to the minimum. 7
In August, 1918, our Government requested the Italian Government that
13 of the United States Army Ambulance Service sections with it be sent
for service in France. Six were forwarded at once by rail on August 24.
at the same time the remainder of the 15 going overland under 1 their own
power, a distance of some 960 km. (600 miles). To compensate for this
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN ITALY 943
loss to the Italian Army, 3 ("provisional") sections were organized and
equipped, by reducing the number of men in each section (old and new)
from 45 to 32 and by supplying the new units from replacement material.
After dispatching the 15 sections to France and the 3 provisional sections
to the Italian front, headquarters moved to Castelfranco where it remained
until the United States Army Ambulance Service was withdrawn from Italy. 8
The Italian sanitary service, like our own, provided a dressing station
operated by an ambulance company. It was found in practice, however, that
under some circumstances much transport service was needed where no dress-
ing stations were required, and that under others, dressing stations were
needed in excess of the regulation number of ambulances attached to them.
Consequently the ambulance service transport and the dressing stations
actually became more and more independent of each other and so no difficulty
was experienced in finding assignments for all the United States Army
Ambulance Service sections, which were transportation units only. Some
furnished wounded transport to isolated outposts on the extreme front, where
they received their patients from regimental and even from battalion aid
stations; others reported to the u smutimento " (general sorting station),
whither patients were sent from the aid stations to be assigned and trans-
ported to rear hospitals specializing in the different branches of medicine or
surgery. The sections along the lower Piave had extremely heavy work
evacuating malarial patients, as that disease proved a serious cause of disability
to such parts of the Italian Army as were located at certain places on the
river. 9
No effort was spared by the Italian authorities to make the general con-
ditions under which the ambulance service operated as pleasant as possible.
As a rule the sections were assigned excellent quarters and all were granted
the privileges of the Italian commissary. 10
In the final great battle on the Italian front, known as Vittorio-Veneto.
(October 24 to November 4, 1018) the United States Army Ambulance Service
sections accompanied the troops to which they were attached, some going
north into the Trentino and others following the contingent of the Italian
Army which pursued the retreating Austrians around the head of the Adriatic,
taking stations in the neighborhood of Goritzia and Trieste. 11
As the demand for transportation for wounded was urgent at this time,
all vehicles available, including heavy draft trucks, and all personnel, including
clerks in the offices, were sent to the front to augment the strength of the
ambulance sections. 11
"When the Austrians had been driven out of Italy and a new line had been
established, the distance from the front to the hospitals south of the Piave
River, to wdiich patients were now evacuated, was from 120 to 240 km. (75
to 150 miles.) The mild winter of 1918-19, almost without snow and with no
severe cold in Italy, presented no obstacles to the transport of sick and
wounded which continued uninterruptedly until late in March, 1919. when
the ambulance sections were withdrawn and assembled at Genoa, to sail for
America. 11
944 FIELD OPERATIONS
The supply depot of the American Expeditionary Forces located at
Allessandrie, Italy, and organized October 81, 1918. was the base for medical
as well as other supplies in Italy. 12
It is also desirable to mention here that the American Red Cross operated
three small hospitals in Italy — at Koine. Florence, and Milan — and stood
ready to equip others should need arise. It sent nurses wherever they were
most required and furnished supplies to a great number of medical depart-
ment organizations of the Italian Army. In September. 1918, it offered to
receive American casualties, whether medical or surgical, into all its hospitals. 13
It did not prove necessary to take advantage of this offer.
REFERENCES
(1) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, 54.
(2) Outlines of histories of divisions. U. S. Army, 1917-1919. Prepared in the Historical
Section of the Army War College. On file. Historical Section, the Army War
< 'ollege.
(3) Medical History of Base Section No. ,8. May 15, 1919, 19. On tile. Historical Division,
S. G. 0.
(4) Ibid., 17.
(5) I*. S. Army Ambulance Service, with the Italian Army, by Lieut. Col. E .E. Persons,
M. <"'.. chief of service, undated. 4. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(0) Ibid., 2.
(7) Ibid., 8.
(8) Ibid., 9.
CO Ibid.. 10.
(KM [bid., 11.
(11) Ibid., 14.
(12) Medical history of P.ase Section No. 8. May 15. 1919, 18. On file. Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(13) Ibid.. 19.
CHAPTER XL
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN NORTH RUSSIA
On August 9, 1018. certain units were designated to constitute the original
American contingent of the north Russian forces, sometimes called the "Mur-
mansk expedition." or "Expedition to the Murman coast." They were: The
339th Infantry; 1st Battalion. 310th Engineers; 337th Field Hospital: and
337th Ambulance Company. These organizations, which belonged to the
American Expeditionary Forces, had arrived in England prior to the above
date, and at the time were being prepared and equipped, at Aldershot, for serv-
ice in Russia. Their instructions provided that no animals should be taken
with them to Russia, hut all vehicles, saddlery and harness (except for the field
hospital company), and American field kitchens. British personal equipment
was ordered issued, and clothing for winter service, with Russian rifles and
Lewis machine guns. Russian pattern. On August 10. modified instructions
directed that American personal equipment be taken instead of British. Prep-
arations were completed and the command embarked on August 27. 1918, and
arrived at Archangel on September 4. 1
The American forces, numbering 143 officers and 4.334 men, after their
arrival at Archangel, were promptly disembarked and shortly thereafter dis-
tributed. Tlie 1st Battalion. 339th Infantry, joined the allied forces on the
Dwina and Vaga Rivers. The 2d Battalion, 339th Infantry, was stationed at
the base (Archangel. Bakharitza, and vicinity), with the exception of a de-
tachment on guard duty at Isakagorka and a detachment at Onega. The 3d
Battalion was distributed through the allied forces, two companies going to
the left wing at Seletskoe. Shortly thereafter regimental headquarters was
located in Archangel. Ambulance Company No. 337 was divided into 3 sec-
tions, 1 officer and 35 men being detailed to the allied forces along the railroad.
1 officer and 35 men with the allied forces on the Dwina. the remaining officers
and men to the base. A detachment of five of the ambulance company per-
sonnel and one of the 339th Infantry. Medical Department, accompanied our
other troops to Onega by way of Dwina Bay. White Sea. and Onega Bay. where
they established a hospital and later accompanied our troops to Chekuevo. Field
Hospital No. 337 remained at Bakharitza to care for the 378 influenza patients
admitted in September, of which 00 proved fatal. Soon after, however, a sec-
tion of the field hospital established a 100-bed hospital at Bereznik. 1
From September, 1918. to May, 1919, occurred a series of engagements in
which 82 Americans were killed and 7 died of wounds. 2
Withdrawal of our forces commenced in May. 1919. and on August 25 only
a small graves registration detachment remained. 2
045
946 FIELD OPERATIONS
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
The office of the chief surgeon of the American troops in North Russia
was established in the convalescent hospital (described below) in Archangel,
and an assistant represented him in the Dwina area because of its distance
(135 miles) from the base. All arrangements for medical supplies and per-
sonnel were made through the deputy director (British) of the medical serv-
ices. 3 In every area the senior medical officer was British. Both armies had to
comply with their respective regulations and some months elajjsed before mu-
tually satisfactory methods were evolved. The following arrangements were
made January 5, 1919, over the signatures of the deputy director of Medical
Services (British Army), French chief medical officer, and the chief surgeon,
United States troops : E
1. The deputy director of medical services carried out the general direction of the
entire medical services of the force and is responsible to the general officer commanding
in chief.
2. All questions affecting the medical administration of the Force and relating to
policy, to the drafting of orders, to the distribution, disposal, and relief of personnel and
to sanitation will be decided after consultation between the senior allied or American
administrative medical officer concerned and the D. D. M. S.
.'{. The chief surgeon, U. S. troops, and allied senior medical officers have control of
their own personnel and will distribute them in conformity with the military and medi-
cal situation after consultation with the D. D. M. S.
4. A similar arrangement will hold in regard to fighting forces. With each force
there is a senior administrative medical officer who is responsible to the officer com-
manding that force and to the D. D. M. S. This officer will work in close cooperation witli
the senior allied or American medical officer.
No action affecting different nationalities should be taken until its advisability lias
been discussed with the representative with the force of the senior allied medical officer
or of the chief surgeon, U. S. troops.
All assignments of duties or movements, allied or American personnel, will be
carried out under the orders of their S. M. O.'s or the chief surgeon or the representative
of these officers on the spot.
5. All communications from British medical officers for the chief medical officers
or allied and American troops at G. H. Q. should be made through channels to the D.
D. M. S.
Similarly all communications from allied or American medical officers will be passed
through their own chief medical officers.
6. All differences of opinion which can not be otherwise adjusted should be referred
to S. M. O.'s, the chief surgeon, or the D. D. M. S.
7. In case of emergency the senior medical officer of the force or station may issue
any order to allied or American medical personnel, but he must at the earliest opportunity
report it to the representative at G. H. Q., of the medical service concerned and to the
D. D. M. S. through the usual channels.
The most difficult problem for the Medical Department at first was proper
distribution of its personnel, so as to cover the ground. The front then held
was approximately 450 miles in length, encircling Archangel on three sides,
from Pinega on the east and TJst Padenga on the south, to Onega on the west.
The distance from Archangel to Pinega was 112 miles: from Archangel to
Ust Padenga. 234 miles; and from Archangel to Onega, 145 miles. The total
area occupied was approximately 15.000 square miles. 3 As the American
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN NORTH RUSSIA 947
troops were not concentrated in one sector, but were distributed throughout
the entire area occupied, it was impossible to maintain their medical organi-
zations intact. Officers and enlisted men of the Medical Department, includ-
ing those on duty with Field Hospital No. 337 and Ambulance Company No.
337. therefore, were "pooled" and detachments varying in strength from 2 to
35 were sent to the various positions, and then moved as the military situation
necessitated. The detachments with line troops accompanied their respective
battalions and were subdivided when necessary. Owing to the rapidly chang-
ing military situation, the medical detachments were, often moved and their
strength was changed. 3
A weekly report showing the distribution of the medical personnel was
made to headquarters, A. F. F., North Russia, and a duplicate was sent to the
deputy director of medical services, allied forces. Archangel. In some in-
stances, the personnel was assigned to duty in hospitals, dressing stations, and
aid posts and under direction of American medical officers served the needs
of both American and allied troops, while on other occasions it was assigned to
hospitals and dressing stations under British, French, or Russian control.
Because of the distribution of the allied troops as a whole, all hospitals, dress-
ing stations, and aid posts outside of Archangel cared for sick and wounded
of all the allied forces in their respective sectors, regardless of the army to
which they belonged or the nationality of patients admitted. Though this
arrangement was essential under the circumstances, and operated to the best
interests of all concerned, it rendered administration and the keeping of
records and returns difficult. 3
At first there were no French, Russian, or Italian military hospitals in
the advance area, but later, when Russian troops permanently took over cer-
tain forward areas, the hospitals in these areas were transferred to them.
In some instances buildings used as hospitals by British were turned over to
the Americans upon their arrival in an area. 3
During the voyage to Archangel an epidemic of influenza developed, the
first case being recognized on August 29. Despite all possible precautions, the
disease spread rapidly, until, on arrival at Archangel, there were 100 cases on
the S. S. iSom-ali, 75 on the S. S. Negoga. No cases occurred on the S. S.
Tideus. These were the three vessels which transported the expedition. No
deaths occurred at sea. Upon arrival it was found that the British hospitals
were able to care for only a small percentage of the patients. Twenty-five of
the most seriously ill were transferred to the British 53d Stationary Hospital,
and American emergency hospitals were immediately opened. At this time
the Archangel district was inadequately provided with hospitals and facilities
to care for the sick. Not until November were enough beds available here to
meet needs imposed by the epidemic. Field Hospital No. 337 took over two
Russian barracks at Bakharitza, a small hospital (40 beds) was opened at
Smolny Barracks (Archangel), and the American Red Cross provided a
building at the north end of Troitsky Prospekt. which (accommodating 30
patients) was used for hospital pur]x>ses. The buildings at Bakharitza and
Smolnv Barracks were in a filthv condition, and even after thorough cleaning
948 FIELD OPERATIONS
it was necessary to scrub and spray them daily, as they were infested with
vermin/ 1 It had been anticipated that these accommodations would he tem-
porary only, but the last mentioned continued to be utilized for a number of
months. A convalescent hospital accommodating 100 patients, later enlarged
to care for 200, was opened October 8, 1018. This was equipped with a Thresh
disinfestor. It was supplemented by a depot where all men returning to duty
were equipped. 4 On November 16. through the cooperation of the American
ambassador, the British deputy director of medical services and the Russian
authorities, the American Red Cross obtained a large building adjoining the
convalescent hospital which it offered to our Medical Department. The offer
was gladly accepted and the American Red Cross equipped the institution,
undertook to maintain it. and assigned two female nurses to it. The proffer,
at the same time, of the services of one of the American Red Cross medical
officers was made. This hospital, which had a capacity of 100 beds, later
increased, was the base hospital of the expedition and remained in operation
until our troops were withdrawn. 4 It received 911 patients and performed
103 operations. As it had no X-ray plant, necessary radiographic examina-
tions were made by the British 53d Stationary Hospital, which was provided
with equipment for that purpose."
In addition to the hospitals which have been mentioned. ;"> infirmaries
were established in or near Archangel. A delousing station was placed at
Sniolny Barracks, and prophylactic stations operated there and at the con-
valescent hospital. Field Hospital No. 337 remained for a few weeks at Bak-
haritza to care for influenza patients, 4 but on September 2H was divided into
sections A and B. the former then moving to Beresniki, where it established
a hospital of 100 beds. Section B remained at Bakharitza until October 7.
when it moved to Shenkursk. where it operated a hospital of the same size.
In January, when Shenkursk was abandoned, section li moved to Osinovo.
where from the British it took over and enlarged the small hospital they had
been conducting there. 11 Another part of this section took over a detention
hospital from the British at Ust Yaga. In this, the Dwina Vaga sector.
American medical detachments were stationed at Malo Beresniki. Kitskoe,
Toulgas, Kurgomin, Ust Padenga, and Chamova, maintaining aid posts, dress-
ing stations, or infirmaries, according to the need. 8 At 1st Padenga and at
Chamova, 10-bed hospitals, and at Toulgas a 1-bed hospital, were established.
At Ust Padenga. the dressing station was moved three times during the
military activities of January 10, 20. and 21. and was struck once, three
patients being killed and two wounded, among them a medical officer who
died later in the hospital at Shenkursk. During the several days' fighting,
and until this line retreated to Shenkursk, many wounded were brought in to
the field hospital and greatly overcrowded it. On January 24 it was necessary
to evacuate this hospital, the Shenkursk hospital (Field Hospital 337. section
B). At midnight 0(! patients were transported to Shegovari, a distance of
20 versts (13.2 miles). This proved very difficult, as the enemy machine
guns covered the main roads and in consequence the retreat had to be con-
ducted over roundabout trails through the dense woods. Excellent help was
AMERICAN KXI'KIUTIOXAHY ACTIVITIES IX NORTH RUSSIA 949
given by Lieutenant Tufanoff, Medical Corps, Russian Army, who later was
killed in action at Kitskoe. 4
Field Hospital 337, Section A. at Beresniki, was not able to furnish ac-
commodations for the patients in question except for about 12 hours, as its
capacity was only 100 beds and it was nearly full at the time of the retreat.
Therefore, they had to be sent on to the base at Archangel. Tn the evacuation
to the base but one patient died, a tuberculous case. This seems remarkable
when it is considered how they were hurried on to Archangel, a distance of
some 375 versts (247.;") miles). The temperature was about 30' below zero.
The patients in the retreat were crowded by continually adding more wounded
to their sleds. However, all were in sleeping bags and little complaint was
heard on questioning them on their arrival at Archangel. 4
In the Shegovari and Kitskoe region on the Vaga River a great deal of
fighting took place during February, and the medical personnel worked night
and day. often under heavy Hie. Patients were evacuated to 1st Vaga, where
a dressing hospital had been established, and then sent on to Beresniki to the
field hospital there. 4 At a later date, a third detachment (C) of Field
Hospital Xo. :?:5T was formed and established a small hospital at Morjeg-
orskaya. 8
At Pinega, the most easterly point of the line, a hospital, with a capacity
of 07 beds, was established December 20 by an American detachment of 1
officer and 8 enlisted men. It operated until April 8, 1!)19, when it was turned
over to the Russian medical military department, as American troops were
withdrawn from the sector. 4
A small detachment made up from Ambulance Company Xo. 337 and
from medical personnel with line troops accompanied troops beyond Seletskoe,
where they assisted the British in establishing a small detention hospital which
operated until May. 1!>1!). 4
For the Vologda or railway sector hospital facilities were provided in
the railroad station at Obozerskava which was taken over for this purpose.
The hospital here was in position to receive patients from the Onega sector to
the west and from the Seletskoe sector to the east and south, as well as from
the railroad area. A very complete operating car and ambulances were
maintained by the British based at this point. One or more American medical
officers and the number of men required were kept on duty in this sector. :;
The Onega expedition, which left Archangel September 14. included
detachments of our Medical Department personnel which reinforced a British
hospital at Onega and a dressing station at Chekuevo until American troops
were withdrawn from that area. 7
The supply of drugs, surgical dressings, and appliances proved sufficient.
The type of bed in use practically everywhere — a wooden frame with canvas
top — gave satisfaction, and the supply was ample. Additions to the ration
by gifts from the American Red Cross, by requisition of medical comforts
from British stores, and by barter with the local citizens for eggs. game. fish,
potatoes, and milk made possible a fairly liberal and varied hospital dietary.
In some localities Russian nurses (female) volunteered their services and
950 FIELD OPERATIONS
were of material assistance. Except at the most advanced stations, operative
work could be done under good conditions, but the distance from the front
in some sectors was so great that, with the difficulty in communication.
wounded from these points did not receive operative care for several days.
Tn some cases five days elapsed before they could be given any treatment other
than re-dressing of their wounds. The Carrel-Dakin technique was em-
ployed whenever possible. Serious difficulties due to shortage of personnel
occurred at times. They were really chargeable to poor transportation facili-
ties rather than to lack in the Medical Department strength. 3
In the early fall it was possible to evacuate sick and wounded from ad-
vanced points to the base on hospital barges. These provided a relatively
rapid and comfortable method of transportation from the Vaga.Dwina.Pinega,
and Seletskoe sectors. As navigation on the Dwina River became impossible
after October 2G. 1018, this method was no longer practicable. From that time
until the river again opened in May the sick and wounded were transferred
by horse-drawn sleds, carrying usually one or two patients each. Various
types of covered or closed sleighs were constructed and tested, but all were
unsatisfactory, as they either tipped over too easily or proved too heavy. The
common Russian sled, built on the lines of a short, flat-bottom boat on
runners, was ultimately found best. One of these would carry two recumbent
patients. Lying on hay. in sleeping bags, covered by several blankets, with hot
bricks to the feet, and with head and hands well protected by fur caps and
heavy mittens, patients were transported comfortably in these conveyances.
Convoys often were accompanied by our enlisted men to give patients the
necessary care and attention en route. The journey was broken by frequent
stops at the rest houses or hospitals which were established at intervals of
from 5 to 20 miles along the route, and at some of these the convoys passed
the night. 3 The personnel staffing these places Avas drawn from the British
Royal Army Medical Corps. As the distances of advanced points from the
base ran up to 224 miles, the time necessary to perform the journey involved
was considerable. Convoys of sick and wounded consisted of from 15 to 50
sleds, the larger convoys being preferable, as there was less likelihood of enemy
attack on them. Small raiding parties and hostile patrols at times displayed
considerable activity along the more exposed portions of the sled routes,
notably between Beresniki and Emetskoe. The larger convoys were forced to
proceed slowly, rarely averaging over 2 miles per hour. 3 Even under the best
conditions, and when traveling with a light load, a single sled could not make
much more than 3 to 3 1 /2 miles an hour.
As during the winter daylight was limited to from two to four hours,
much of the traveling was then done in darkness, which was intensified by
the heavy forests through which the trail ran for many miles. Tn spite of
these handicaps, over 500 sick and wounded were evacuated by sleds to Arch-
angel during the winter of 1918-19. No serious accident occurred: only one
death en route was recorded — a case of advanced tuberculosis — and no case of
frost bite, of freezing, or of any other condition due to exposure, was reported
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN NORTH RUSSIA 951
On the other hand, many cases were observed where the long journey in the
open air proved distinctly beneficial, and patients who had not been progress-
ing satisfactorily in hospital sometimes showed marked and rapid improve-
ment en route. An inspector who investigated several convoys on the Dwina-
Vaga front reported that all the patients said they were well fed, well cared
for. and amply protected against cold. Even with temperatures as low as 50°
below zero patients came through very well. 3
Direct communication with Archangel by railroad existed at all times from
the Vologda sector, and until March, 1919. the majority of casualties oc-
curring in the Onega sector were evacuated by sled to the railroad and then
transferred to Archangel by rail. 3 In the latter part of March, Bolshieozerki
was captured by the Bolsheviki. and the line of communication between the
Vologda and Onega forces was cut for a short time. Until the recapture
of Bolshieozerki, casualties occurring in the Onega sector were evacuated by
sled to Onega and there treated in a British hospital. From Pinega it was
necessary, because of swamps and forests, to evacuate southwest 80 miles
to the Dwina Tviver. 3
Evacuation ok Sick and AVounded to England
A total of 527 patients were returned to England for further observation
and treatment or because of permanent disability. A medical officer ac-
companied each group of patients. On June 3, 1919, 325 were evacuated.
The considerable number at this time was because cases had accumulated
during the winter months Avhen transportation was not available and because
the commanding officer. 339th Infantry, had requested that only men able
to perform full duty be returned to that organization. Many of the patients
in this large group were convalescing and would have been fit for duty in
a short time, only 8 of the 325 being classed as " lying down cases." 3
Evacuation of Troops
The first detachment of troops left Economie June 3, 1919, on S. S. Czar,
carrying 1,6G8 officers and men. On June 15, the S. S. Menomina and S. S.
Porto, sailed, carrying, respectively, 853 and 1,300 troops, representing the
balance of the 339th Infantry and the 310th Sanitary Train detachment :
this left in Archangel only the 310th Engineers and the commanding general
and staff, with a small headquarters detachment, all of whom sailed soon
afterward. 3
All troops were disinfested and reequipped upon arrival from the several
fronts. Prior to embarkation all were inspected for venereal diseases, con-
tagious diseases, scabies, and lice, and ships were rigidly inspected before
troops were allowed to embark. Conditions on board ship were found to
be good except that most of the ships' tanks had been refilled for the return
voyage with untreated Dwina River water, which was known to be badly
contaminated. This necessitated chlorinating all water on board before
troops embarked. 3
95'2
FIELD OPERATIONS
Summary of Hospital Facilities 8
The location of hospitals, dressing stations, and aid stations is given below.
Designation
Location
Opened
Field Hospital No. 337
Infirmary, 2<i Battalion
American Red Cross (annex)
American Red Cross hospital
Detention hospital
Field Hospital No. 337, detachment A
Detention hospital
Convalescent hospital
Field Hospital No. 337, detachment B
Detention hospital
Dc
Do
Field hospital, detachment B
F'ield hospital, detachment C
Hospital barge No. 335
Aid station
Do
Do
Do
Do
Do
Do
Bakharitza Sept. 6,
Archangel .do.
do Sept.
do Sept.
Seletskoe I Sept.
1918
Sept
Sept
Oct.
Oct.
Nov
Total bed capacity.
Beresniki
Obozerskaya
Archangel. ~
Shenkllrsk. -
Shegovari. -
Pinega J Dec.
LTst Vaga. J Jan.
( )smovo | Mar.
N 1 orjegerskaya i Apr.
Toulgas J May
Ust Padenga
Malo Beresniki
Chinovo
Kurgomin
Chamovo
Kitsa__
Vcrst 435
7,
10,
25|
29,
8,
19,
9,
6,
29,
25,
17,
9,
(»)
(°)
(«)
(»)
(■)
<«)
(•)
1918
1918
1918
1918
1918
1U18
1918
1918
1918
1918
1919
1919
1919
Closed
Oct. 6,
Nov. 21,
June 3,
June 20,
May 20,
June 10,
Dec. 1,
June 13,
Jan. 25,
Jan. 20,
\pr.
June
May
May
June
11,
31,
10,
13,
(»)
C)
(°)
(»)
(»)
(")
(°)
1918
1918
1919
1919
1919
1919
1918
1919
191!)
1919
1919
19111
1919
1919
1919
Bed ca-
pacity
250
40
30
85
80
100
25
225
100
10
200
20
m
20
40
10
in
10
10
1(1
10
in
• Dates not given, as these stations were occupied alternately by American and British medical personnel.
Number of hospitals, dressing stations, and aid stations maintained by United States
Army Medical Department, Sept. •">. 1918, to June 20, 191!) 22
Number maintained by British Army medical service 26
Total lied capacity. United States Army 1,37")
Total bed capacity, British Army 2. 750
Note. — (1) Bed capacity is approximate, as emergency capacity varied widely in
different localities; (2) hospitals were often maintained alternately by American and
British medical personnel; the above figures represent as closely as possible hospitals,
etc.. under distinctive control of each Government; (3) 75(! British beds were on
II. M. 11. S. Kalyan, which was used as a hospital while frozen in the ice during the
winter, but left for England .Tune 3. 1019."
Total admissions to hospital (all causes) 2,352
Total discharged to duty 1,700
Transferred to other hospitals 12
Evacuated to England 527
Remaining June 20, 1919 3
Died 104
Total 2. 352
Total casualties not admitted to hospital:
Killed in action 82
Accidentally killed 5
Suicide 1
Total missing:
No Information
Heard from as prisoners.
Later released by enemy
Later reported dead
86
3
4
8S
•Hi
Total casualties 2. 480
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IX NORTH RUSSIA 953
Total deaths:
Killed in action -- S2
Accidentally killed 7
Suicide 1
Died of wounds 30
Died of disease 72
10°
Heaths from disease : -
Lobar pneumonia 36
Bronchopneumonia 3-
Enteritis, chronic, variety undetermined 1
Tuberculosis, chronic, pulmonary 1
Tuberculosis ( psoas abscess) 1
Meningitis 1
REFERENCES
(1) Report on North Russian Expeditionary Forces, by Brig. Gen. \Y. P. Richardson.
commanding general, A. E. P., North Russia, June 27. 1019. On file. Historical
Section, the Army War College.
(2) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919.
(3) Report of Medical Service. American Expeditionary Forces. North Russia, by I.ieut.
Col. E. Corning. M. C, June 20, 1919. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(4) Report of work accomplished by the Medical Department since arrival ill North
Russia to March 31. 101!). by Maj. Jonas It. Longley, M. <'.. chief surgeon, I". S.
Troops, Archangel, Russia. On file. Historical Section, the Army War College.
(5) Report of activities and war diary, Red Gross Hospital. Archangel, by Maj. \V. H.
Henry. M. ('.. commanding officer, undated. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(0) Report of activities and war diary. Field Hospital No. :\'.Yi. Detachment I?., prepared
under the direction of the commanding officer, undated. On file. Historical Division.
S. G. O.
(7i Report of Medical Department activities. Onega sector, by I.ieut. Col. E. Corning,
M. C, undated. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(8) Annual Report of the Surgeon General. U. S. Army. 1020. -40S. 400.
CHAPTER XLI
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN SIBERIA
The primary mission of the American forces which were sent to Siberia
during August and September. 1918, was conducting an operation in con-
nection with the Japanese and Czechoslovaks, which had for its object the
clearing of the Ussuri-Amur Provinces of the Bolshevik bands which were
present there under the leadership of armed Austro-German prisoners of
war. 1
COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH
The American forces were made up of troops from both the Philippines
Department and the United States.
On August 3, 1918, The Adjutant General cabled the commanding
general, Philippines Department, to send by the first available United States
Army transports the following troops to Vladivostok for station: The 27th
and 37th Regiments of Infantry, one field hospital, one ambulance company,
and a company of a telegraph battalion, fully equipped, including clothing for
winter service. As the strength of the designated regiments was only about
2.700, the commanding general. 8th Division. Camp Fremont. Calif., had been
instructed to select 5,000 infantrymen from the 8th Division, the number
necessary to bring the Philippine regiments up to war strength. lie had also
been instructed to provide for the necessary staff corps. 2
Authorization was granted by The Adjutant General to the commanding
general. Philippines Department, to send to Vladivostok staff officers, with
such intelligence personnel as might be deemed necessary for investigating
the amount, character, and availability of supplies of all kinds, including sub-
sistence, fuel, forage, and animals for the maintenance of the expeditionary
forces. 2
Subsequent orders (August 6-10) placed under the command of the com-
manding general, 8th Division, who had been designated to command the
American Expeditionary Forces, Siberia, Evacuation Hospital Xo. 17 (then
at Fort Sam Houston, Tex.), Base Hospital Xo. 93 (Camp Lewis, Wash.,
Medical Supply Depot Xo. 7 (San Francisco, Calif.), and authorized him to
take with him to Vladivostok one veterinary field unit, certain officers of the
Medical Department, as well as other personnel from headquarters of the 8th
Division. 2
The troops from the Philippines Department sailed from Manila on
August ."> and 12, and the commanding general, A. E. F., Siberia, with a part
of his staff and 1,889 enlisted personnel, departed from San Francisco on
August 14. The contingent from the Philippines arrived at Vladivostok on
August 15-16; that from the United States on September 2. 2
OSS
956
FIELD OPERATIONS
Fig. 02.— Typical Russian barrack!
Fir,. 03. — Interior of Russian barracks, subsequent to renovation by American troops
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN SIBERIA
957
Immediately after landing, a survey of Vladivostok was made with a
view of determining the barracks, storehouse, hospital, and commercial re-
sources available and adaptable to the needs of the troops. After a conference
with the Russian authorities, barracks were selected, cleaned, and occupied,
and other arrangements were made for the establishment of a military base.'
The maximum effective strength of the American Expeditionary Forces
in Siberia -was 8,831 : this was in the month of September. 1918. This number,
which included 286 officers, was gradually reduced, so that by the end of Feb-
ruary. 1020. the month immediately preceding that in which our forces were
withdrawn from Siberia, there were but 4.288. In detail, the strength of the
subdivisions of the forces for the month of October, 1918, was as follows :*
Troops oilier than Medical Department
Organization
Officers
Men
Total
27th Infantry--.
55
72
81
3.522
3.420
744
3, 577
3. 4H2
825
Total ....
208
7,686
7.8S4
In, or in the immediate vicinity of, Vladivostok, the base, the troops varied
in numbers between 1,000 and 1,800, the remainder t>ein<r widely scattered. 8
Medical Department
Organization
Field Hospital No. 4, __.
Ambulance Company No. 4
Evacuation Hospital No. 17
Medical Supply Depot No. 7
Personnel unassigned to units
Total
Grand total.
Officers
Men
5
»|
1
144
21
236
3
41
33
133
63
635
271
8.321
Tdtill
86
145
"257
44
166
8.592
" This number does not include 27 nurses assigned to Evacuation Hospital No. 17.
From the beginning of the activities of the American forces in Siberia,
hoth the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Medical Department,
proved insufficient in number. This was due to the fact that in August, 1018.
the 27th Infantry left Vladivostok on a combined expedition to Habarovsk.
Numerous stations and substations were established along the railroad for a
total distance of many hundreds of miles. American forces garrisoned these
practically the entire time our troops were in Siberia. This wide distribution
of troops made the problem of providing medical attendance for them very
difficult. The fact that medical officers and men generally lacked training
was a further source of embarrassment : nor. widely scattered as they were.
was central supervision possible, and this added to the difficulties. Then. too.
railroads and telegraph lines frequently were interrupted. Connection, espe-
cially with Verkhne-Udinsk. 1,700 miles distant from Vladivostok, was most
unsatisfactory. Medical records and returns, from which only the medical
situation at distant points could be assumed, were very generally defective. 4
958 FIELD OPERATIONS
The shortage of officers and trained enlisted personnel was intensified
when in the fall of 1918 all emergency personnel was ordered to the United
States for discharge. This caused so much additional embarrassment in the
care of the disabled that it became advisable to repatriate cases of hernia and
other operable defects which had existed prior to enlistment. 4
The dental personnel was sufficient to give emergency treatment and
rendered as satisfactory service as circumstances permitted, but thorough
dental treatment of the command was not practical. Because of the exigencies
of the service which required many stations and substations to make frequent
changes of personnel, it was generally impracticable, to complete treatments
which were indicated. 4
As measured by results, the veterinary personnel proved sufficient. The
chief veterinarian reported no deaths from communicable diseases in animals
from August 15, 1918, to June 30. 1919. and no outbreaks of such diseases
(including "landers) during the six months ending December, 1919. No epi-
demic ever occurred among the animals, but a large number had to be killed
just prior to departure on account of unserviceability. 4
SANITARY UNITS
Field Hospital No. 4
Field Hospital No. 4 arrived in Siberia, September 14, 1918. For the
period of the occupation it had an average personnel of 5 officers and 70 en-
listed men. With the ambulance company of the same number, it served at
Habarovsk and at Verkhne-TTdinsk-Beresovka, sailing for Manila on March
30. 1920. The establishments which it operated are discussed in other parts
of this chapter. 4
Ambulance Company No. 4
Ambulance Company No. 4 arrived in Siberia on September 14, 1918. Its
average personnel was 1 officer and 130 enlisted men. Of this enlisted per-
sonnel, 05 men were detached for service with the troops guarding the rail-
road on the Spasskoe-Kazdelnoe and Shketevo sectors, about half of this num-
ber bein<r on duty at the Habarovsk hospital from November, 1918. to June,
1919. 4
The fidl complement of animal-drawn wagons and ambulances, with the
required number of animals, was brought by the company. The wagons were
old and worn and their need of repairs was so aggravated by the bad roads
that there were never more than six in commission at any one time. By April,
1919, only two were serviceable, and three others were obtained. Two wagons
were used at Habarovsk, later at Spasskoe, and two at Verkhne-Udinsk-Bere-
sovka. By May. 1919. all the wagons and teams in serviceable condition were
transferred to Evacuation Hospital No. 17, Vladivostok, many having been
condemned. There were four "White'' motor ambulances, all of which were
serviceable on June 30, 1919. after constant use since September 14, 1918, but
these vehicles, which saw very hard service over very rough roads, were not
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN SIBERIA
959
Fio. 94. — Medical ward, Evacuation Hospital No. 17
Fig. 95. — Interior of surgical ward. Evacuation Hospital No. 17
960 FIELD OPERATIONS
sufficient to meet demands. Three motor ambulances loaned by the American
Red Cross, furnished practically all ambulance transportation for the last two
months of the expedition's stay in Siberia.*
Evacuation Hospital No, IT
Evacuation Hospital No. 17, which was used as the base hospital for the
expedition, was organized at Fort Ililey, Kans., March 4. 1918, was transferred
to Fort Sam Houston, Tex., dune -AC), and sailed from San Francisco on Sep-
tember 2. 1918, arriving at Vladivostok on September 29. The next day it
occupied barracks at Ulysses Bay. Its location was about 3 miles from the
base, or from the limits of Vladivostok proper, and about 6 miles from head-
quarters, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia. The only occasion
when it was called upon to care for battle casualties was on June 25, 1919.
after an attack by Bolsheviki upon an American detachment of 70 men.
Forty-five of these were taken to the hospital, 19 dead and 27 wounded. 4
The site of the hospital was a peninsula with Petroclus Bay on the east
and Ulysses Bay on the west. Practically all the buildings used by the hospi-
tal were on one large hill, but they were widely separated, it being about a
mile from the surgical ward to the nurses' home. Including headquarters and
the nurses' home, the hospital proper occupied 10 buildings. The normal ca-
pacity of the hospital was 400 beds, with equipment for 500; and by crowding
the enlisted men on duty and by utilizing some of their barracks space, the
additional 100 were accommodated with fair satisfaction. 4
In addition to the troops, this hospital cared for the sick from a German
prison camp with approximately 500 prisoners, which was under American
control. Young Men's Christian Association workers. Knights of Columbus.
Russian railway engineers service corps, many patients from United States
battleships stationed at Vladivostok and a large number of civilians. Be-
tween October 18. 1918, and March 23, 1920. its period of operation as such,
the total number of patients treated in Evacuation Hospital No. 17 was
8,100, including a great variety of cases, both medical and surgical. The
maximum number of patients at the hospital at any one time was 500, on
January 15. 1920. For the winter months of 1919 and 1920. the average
number was about 300. Acute infectious diseases, though few in number,
were seen in almost every form found in a temperate climate. This was due
undoubtedly to the association of the troops with the civilian population, in-
fectious disease among the latter being very prevalent and sanitary condi-
tions very poor. Deaths from disease in this hospital numbered 86. It was
finallv closed on March 31, 1920. 4
HOSPITAL TRAIN
The expedition, sent north along the Ussuri railway, necessitated a hos-
pital train, for the distance was too great and the roads too poor to warrant
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IX SIBERIA
961
any other kind of transportation. After considerable trouble with the local
authorities, two hospital cars were tittoil up from two small freight car-, an. I
later three others were obtained for the same purpose. Equipped with
standee bunks from the I'. S. Army transport Warren, with Sibley stoves,
and with medical and surgical supplies from the regimental hospital of the
27tb Infantry, these cars, with their operating personnel, were sent forward,
complete, in about 1!> hours. They proved satisfactory until the cold weather
in November demanded another type of vehicle. Each of the new cars, then
provided, was a unit complete in itself, with kitchen, lavatory, ward, and
quarters for personnel. Operated with it was an additional car for baggage,
fuel, and hospital supplies for the various posts along the line. The two
together formed a small but complete hospital and medical supply tram.
Fig. 96. — Improvised hospital
tmerlcan Expeditionary I"'
The hospital car itself was the conventional compartment type of the con
tinental railroads, converted by standard Army equipment into a verj satis
factory hospital of 12-bed capacity." These cars were operated continuously,
though not without considerable difficulty and interference because of fre
quent attacks on trains and the destruction of bridges and telegraph lines.
During the evacuation of patients, on June 12, 1919, the train was attacked
at Knooring siding. 14 miles from Spasskoe, several title bullets passing
through each of the cars killing or wounding several passengers, but it
proceeded to Habarovsk and evacuated patients, thence to the hospital at
Spasskoe. The train, besides fulfilling its other purposes, made possible
medical attendance to small detachments distributed along the railway line
and the prompt removal of those found unfit for duty. 4
13576— 25 61
962
FIELD OPERATIONS
Fia. 07. — Interior of car shown in Fis. 00
Fig. 98. — Converted hospital car, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN SIBERIA 963
I
MEDICAL SUPPLY DEPOT NO. 7
Medical Supply Depot No. 7, organized in San Francisco in August,
1918, with a personnel of 3 officers and 45 enlisted men, was charged with
securing and distributing medical department supplies.
The supply departments were never consolidated in Siberia, requisitions
being handled as they were in the United States prior to December 31. 1918.
The main medical supply depot, with a floor space of 18,900 square feet, was
located in Vladivostok. The officer in charge was also the disbursing officer
of the Medical Department, most of his disbursements being for labor and
for laundry work. The Medical Department conducted a laundry here which
took care of all hospital linen which could be sent to this point. 4
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT SUPPLIES
The supplies furnished, with few unimportant exceptions, were ample for
nil the needs of the Medical Department. Indeed the quantities received in
the initial shipment were more than actually required and, because of limited
storehouse space, were a source of considerable embarrassment. Under proper
authority, large quantities of medical supplies were turned over later to the
American Eed Cross. 4
The only defect in the quality of the supplies was that the biological
products at first were received from the United States so short a time before
the date of the expiration of valencv- that they were no longer potent. This
condition was corrected later. A small quantity of vaccines was purchased
locally. 4
The methods of packing shipments from the United States sometimes
proved unsatisfactory, and certain articles were received in a badly damaged
condition. The following hospitals and infirmaries received their initial
equipment from the depot, as well as numerous replacements issued from time
to time, as required: Evacuation Hospital No. 17: United States military
hospitals at Habarovsk, Spasskoe, Eazdolnoe, Verkhene-Udinsk. Kharbin:
dermaii prison camp infirmary; emergency hospital, base, and line of com-
munications; military hospital, allied mine guard. Sauchian mines infirman 7 .
camp infirmary, 31st Infantry, Shkotovo; infirmary. Company K. 31st
Infantry, Ugolnoya; Hospital Train No. I. 4
The method of transporting supplies by rail proved very satisfactory,
especially from Vladivostok to Habarovsk and to points between, for the
medical supply depot car which was attached to the hospital train in
November, 1918, solved the problem of forwarding supplies to stations on the
railroad, without delay. This car served two purposes: It was loaded with
medical supplies going from Vladivostok, and on the return trip was used
as a baggage car for patients. It also brought soiled linen from the hospitals
to the hospital laundry at Vladivostok."
ACTIVITIES
The work of the American expedition in Siberia may be divided into the
following phases: 1 (1) The operation in connection with the Japanese and
964 FIELD OPERATIONS
Czechoslovaks for the purpose of clearing the Ussuri and Amur Provinces
of Bolsheviki bands. This phase really terminated when the command went
into winter quarters in the fall of 1918. (2) The period of garrison duty
between the close of the allied campaign, in the fall of 1918, and the assump-
tion of the duty of the protection of the Siberian railways (April 14, 1919),
by the Allies under the interallied railroad agreement. (3) The railroad
guard.
THE SHMAKOVKA TO HABaROVSR AND THE AMUR CAMPAIGNS'
American participation in allied operations in Siberia, which was destined
to play a very minor part, was begun at a time when the situation may be
described thus : The Czechoslovaks along the Ussuri River, now supported by
detachments of Cossacks, British; French, and Japanese, had been rather
severely defeated and were in a somewhat precarious situation. Allied assist-
ance was rapidly developing, however. The enemy was definitely confined to
two sides of a triangle, with Habarovsk: at the apex. Roth ends of the base
of the triangle. Chita and Vladivostok, along the Chinese Eastern Railway,
were easily within the grasp of the Japanese forces. At the mouth of the
Amur and in Peter the Great Ray. allied naval strength effectively controlled
any possible approach by water of assistance to the enemy; the railroads from
Vladivostok to Nikolsk and thence westward through Manchuria and the
junction of the Chinese Eastern Railway with the Trans-Siberian Railway
were meshes in the net which confined the enemy to a section of the valley
of the Amur. 2
On August 20. 1918. the 27th Infantry was directed to join the allied
forces at the TJssiiri front, reporting to the Japanese general commanding.
The troops left on three trains composed of box cars, arriving at Sviagina the
following day. Here the regiment was directed to maintain its position, and
all the railway cars which had been used by it, save supply, hospital, ammuni-
tion, and officers' cars, Were tbeu turned over to the Japanese forces. 2
On August 30 the regiment began its march by road to Ussuri. at which
place it arrived on September 4. Here it was directed to remain until further
orders. After the Japanese troops had occupied Habarovsk, a verbal order was
received by the commanding officer, 27th Infantry, directing one company of
that regiment to proceed by train to Habarovsk, to participate in the formal
occupation of that city. The company designated entrained that day and
arrived at Habarovsk on the day following- 2
At f> p. m.. September <>. orders were issued by the allied commander in
chief, virtually indicating the termination of the Ussuri campaign and the
inauguration of a new' movement, wdikh had for its purpose the clearing of
the Amur Valley of the enemy. 3
By the end of the first week in September the position of the enemy in
eastern Siberia had been flanked from both sides. The Ussuri campaign and
the capture of Habarovsk. September 5-6, completed the shutting in of the
enemy and his confinement to the Amur Valley between the confluence of the
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN SIBERIA 965
Onon and the region west of Habarovsk. 2 "With Blagovestchensk and the
destruction of the, remaining Bolsheviki forces as the objective, a concerted
attack from all sides was inaugurated during the week of September 5-12,
1918. Japanese forces, part of the Japanese 12th Division, with Company E,
American 27th Infantry, moved west from Habarovsk up the Amur. These
forces of Infantry, however, had very little to do, for the advance of the
Japanese cavalry troops was all that was necessary to sweep away the enemy. 1
To replace the Japanese troops which had moved out of Habarovsk the
American 27th Infantry, less Company E. was directed to take station at
Habarovsk. This movement began on September 14, and was completed on
the 16th. on which date Company C and some recruits for Company E were
dispatched to join the troops moving toward Blagovestchensk. On September
20 Companies A, B, and D entrained for points west of Habarovsk. along the
railroad, for guard duty at different stations. 2
Companies C and E were, relieved from guard duty west of Habarovsk
and joined the 27th Infantry at Habarovsk on October 11. 1918. Somewhat
later, November 10, Company C was dispatched to Spasskaya for guard duty,
and Company E, on November 12, proceeded to Kraskaya Retchka, south of
Habarovsk, for duty as prison guard over enemy prisoners. Companies A,
B, and D also were sent on November 15. after being relieved from railroad
guard duty west of Habarovsk, for station at Spasskaya. The remainder
of the regiment remained in barracks at Habarovsk. 2
HABAROVSK EXPEDITION
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Coincidently with the departure of the troops from Vladivostok toward
the north on August 5, 1918, it became necessary not only to provide for their
care in the field but also for the evacuation of their sick and wounded to the
base being established at Vladivostok. 5
At Habarovsk a military hospital was established, staffed by the per-
sonnel of Field Hospital No. 4. one-half of the personnel of Ambulance Com-
pany No. 4, and the Medical Department detachment which accompanied
the 27th Infantry. The hospital was opened on November 11, with a capacity
of 100 beds, and continued in operation until the departure of the troops to
Spasskoe on June 20, 1919, when its material, personnel, and patients were
transferred to Spasskoe military hospital. Unfortunately the Habarovsk
hospital was cramped for space, and it was quite difficult to make it function
satisfactorily. A number of slight cases had to be treated in quarters. When
taken over by the American troops, the hospital buildings were in deplorable
condition, necessitating much repair work and interior renovation. The main
hospital building was piped for water, and a small drain pipe connecting with
a cess pool was constructed by our troops, with the aid of Russian laborers.
The hospital proper consisted of four separate buildings somewhat apart from
one another. The main building, of brick and two stories high, accommodated
the patients. 5
966
FIELD OPERATIONS
Infectious diseases in this area were isolated and treated in a large build-
ing some distance from the main hospital. This was of two-story construction,
the lower story being destined for an isolation and convalescent hospital. It
was well adapted for the purpose.*
A prison hospital of 100 beds was established on November 8, 1918, at
Krasnaya Retchka, 13 miles from Habarovsk, where one company of the 27th
Infantry was stationed as guard over some 1,800 prisoners of war. 4
SUCHAN MINES
To protect the region some 75 miles east of Vladivostok, from which
much of the coal supply for the Priamur Provinces was derived, against
local disturbances and disorder from the unsettled political condition, an
Fig.
99. — Hussian barracks in Habarovsk, used as an isolation hospital by the American Expedi-
tionary Forces in Siberia
allied mine guard was established in September, 1918. To this was assigned
one company of the 31st Infantry. The troops arrived at Suchan September
12, met with no opposition and were quartered in the town hall. Nothing
worthy of note occurred in the occupation of the district; the inhabitants were
friendly. 5
THE SIBERIAN RAILWAYS
Prior to the arrival of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia,
a corps of American railway men had landed at Vladivostok with a view to
assisting in the rehabilitation of Siberian railways. However, since they had
no authority, these Americans could do little more than give advice; so, to
put the railway in proper shape, the interallied railway agreement was adopted
on April 14, 1919; and the railway was divided into sectors for guarding.
The sectors assigned to the United States were: (1) Vladivostok, inclusive, to
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN SIBERIA 967
Nikolsk-Ussuri, inclusive, and including the branch line to Suchan mines;
total miles, 14-4. (2) Spasskoe, exclusive, to Ussuri inclusive; total miles, 70.
(3) Verkhne-Utlinsk, inclusive, to Baikal City, inclusive; total miles, 265.
This was later changed to Verkhne-Udinsk to Mysovaya, including 102 miles;
total mileage being 316. 1
VERKHNE-UDINSK SECTOR
About the middle of April orders were received from American head-
quarters in Vladivostok directing the 3d Battalion of the 27th Infantry to take
station at Verkhne-Udinsk in the Lake Baikal sector. Companies A and B had
already been ordered from Spasskoe and had taken station in this sector late
in March. By May 15 all the companies of the 3d Battalion had reached
Verkhne-Udinsk. During June detachments were sent westward and took sta-
tion at the following points: Mostovi, Tantaurovi, Selenga, Posolskaya, and
Mysovaya. After the arrival of the Americans in this sector there was no case
of interference with traffic on the railways or with connections by wire. 6 No
quarters for our troops could be secured in Verkhne-Udinsk. consequently, in
September, headquarters and the entire command, excepting the necessary de-
tachments along the railroad, took station at Beresovka, a small station 8
miles west of Verkhne-Udinsk. From the middle of September to the middle
of November all efforts were concentrated on the preparation of the barracks
there against the coining winter. 6
Early in January orders were received to withdraw the troops to Vladi-
vostok preparatory to departure from Siberia. 6
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
Field Hospital No. 4, which had moved with the 27th Infantry from
Habarovsk, occupied the floored and framed tents which provided accom-
modations for patients while the troops were in camp at Verkhne-Udinsk.
Later, it was established at Beresovka in barracks buildings which were
thoroughly cleaned, refloored, and whitewashed before occupancy. 4
During the summer of 1019 about 75 American Red Cross nurses were
stationed in Verkhne-Udinsk, in consequence of the approaching collapse of
the Kalchak government. The volunteer services of some of these nurses
were accepted in the hospital, its commanding 1 officer providing them com-
fortable tents and a good mess. Between November 15, 1919, and January
15, 1920, 12 of these nurses who had remained in Verkhne-Udinsk were asked
for by the commanding officer, 27th Infantry, to assist in the care of patients
suffering from influenza, it having become epidemic among the troops. Quar-
ters were furnished and meals were provided in the officers' mess, the cost
being refunded by the American Red Cross, which in turn planned to seek
reimbursement from the Medical Department of the Army. 4
SPASSKOE SECTOR
During the last days of May and the first half of June, 1919, the 2d
Battalion, 27th Infantry, was moved from Habarovsk to the Spasskoe Sector.
968 FIELD OPERATIONS
Two companies of the 31st Infantry had heen stationed at Spasskoe, with
Companies C and D of the 27th Infantry, but upon arrival of the battalion
from the north it took station in and near Vladivostok. 6
In the latter part of May. 1919. Companies C and D took station in little
villages just north of Spasskoe. They were later, by the middle of June, joined
by Companies E and F. This left Company H at Spasskoe, the headquarters
for that sector.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
During the month of November, 1918. a military hospital of 50 beds had
been opened at Spasskoe, which now became headquarters of the medical
service of the sector. Increased on June 20. 1919, to a bed capacity of 100 beds,
this hospital provided comfortable accommodations for the, entire sector. In
June the occasional encounters of the troops with small bands of partisans,
which also attacked passenger trains, taxed the hospital to the utmost. The
hospital was closed on January 9. 1920. when troops left for Vladivostok to
sail for Manila. 4
VLADIVOSTOK-XIKOI.SK-U.SSritl SECTOR
The 31st Infantry was stationed in Vladivostok, on the Vladivostok-
Kazdolnoe sector and on the Ugolnaya, Shkotovo, and Suchan mines sectors
Also a company of this regiment was sent to Harbin in October, 1918. "
.MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES
An infirmary was opened at Ugolnaya in May, 1919, and closed October
0. 1919, and a hospital was opened at Razdolnoe in November, 191S, and closed
March 7. 1920. on which date the troops were returned to Vladivostok prepara-
tory to embarkation for Manila. A hospital at the Suchan mines was opened
on September 11, 1918, and closed August 19, 1919, when this command was
transferred to Vladivostok. Frequent attacks by partisans were made upon
the troops, who during the months of June and July made a number of puni-
tive expeditions into the surrounding country and suffered a few casualties.
The wounded were treated in Vladivostok at Evacuation Hospital No. 17.
A 40-l>od hospital was opened at Sehotoval on April 23, 1919, and cared for
the patients from four substations. It was closed on January 12, 1920, troops
leaving on that date for Vladivostok, en route to Manila."
On June 25, 1919, the 70 men stationed at Romanovka were surprised at
daylight by a large force of partisans, and suffered a loss of 19 men killed
and 26 wounded. The hospital train had been sent up the railroad line the
day before to distribute supplies and to be held in readiness for the evacuation
of sick and wounded. On notification of the attack, received while the train
was at Kanzaug. 20 miles distant, it was hurried to Romanovka. arriving there
while the attack was still in progress. The wounded arrived safely at
Vladivostok at 7 o'clock that niirht. 4
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES IN SIBERIA 969
REFERENCES
(1) Operations to June SO, 1919, commanding general, A. E. F., Siberia, September 25, 1918.
(2) An account of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia, August, 1918, to March,
1919, by Captain Lawrence B. Packard, U. S. A., April, 1919. On file, Historical
Section, the Army War College.
(3) Returns from the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia to The Adjutant Genera!
August, 1918, to March, 1920.
(4) Report of the activities of the Medical Department with the A. E. F., Siberia, during
occupation of Siberia, submitted by Col. W. F. Lewis, M. C. chief surgeon, to the
commanding general, A. E. P., Siberia, March 31, 1920. On file, the Historical
Section, the Army War College.
(5) Report of Medical Department activities, A. E. F., Siberia. By Col. James S. Wilson.
M. C, chief surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(6) Report of operations, 27th Infantry, May 2, 1919, to January 29, 1920.
(7) Report of operations, 31st Infantry, August 21 to December 31, 1918, July 15, 1919.
13576—25 62
APPENDIX
971
ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations are used ei
thereto :
A. A., American ambulance.
A. A. S., American Ambulance Service.
A. C, Army Corps.
A. E. C. American embarkation center.
A. E. F., American Expeditionary Forces.
A. G. O. S. D., Adjutant General's Office, Sta-
tistical Division.
A. P. M., Assistant Provost Marshal.
A. R. C, American Red Cross.
A. W. C, Army War College.
A. \V. O. L., Absent without leave.
B. E. F., British Expeditionary Forces.
B. H., Base Hospital.
Boy., Boyav.
C. A., Colonial Army.
D. C. P., Division chasseur a pied (light in-
fantry).
D. I., Division of Infantry.
Fme., Ferme (farm).
F. O., Field Orders.
Gde., Grande.
G. H. Q., General Headquarters: G-l, G-2,
G-3, G-4, G-5, Sections of General Staff.
A. E. F.
tlier in the text or in the reference appended
G-4-B, group under G-4, to which all mat-
ters affecting the Medical Department
were referred.
G. M. C„ General Motors Company.
G. O., General Orders.
L. B., Litter bearers.
L. C, Line of Communications.
M. M. D., Manual for the Medical Depart-
ment.
M. T. C, Motor Transport Corps.
N. C. O., Noncommissioned Officer.
P. C, Post Command.
Q. M. C, Quartermaster Corps.
S. C, Sanitary Corps.
S. S. U., Sanitary Service Unit.
Sn. Tn., Sanitary Train.
Sgts., Sergeants.
S. G. O. Surgeon General's Office.
S. O., Special Orders.
S. O. S.. Services of Supply.
T. M. B., Troop Movement Bureau.
T. O., Tables of Organization.
Tr., Tranchee (trench).
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS
THE 1ST DIVISION 1 ■'
(Regular Army. Insignia: A crimson figure 1 on a khaki shield)
The 1st Division was organized in June, 1917, from troops of the Regular Army
which, at that time, were much scattered, most of them being in service on the Mexican
border. All were at peace strength and were raised to war strength by transfers from
other units. The division was not concentrated until arrival in France. The organization
was as follows:
1st Infantry Brigade:
10th and 18th Infantry : 2d Machine Gun Battalion.
2d Infantry Brigade :
26th and 28th Infantry ; 3d Machine Gun Battalion.
1st Field Artillery Brigade:
6th and 7th (light), 5th (heavy) Field Artillery; 1st Trencli Mortar Battery.
1st Machine Gun Battalion.
1st Engineers.
2d Field Signal Battalion.
Trains:
1st Sanitary Train (Field Hospitals Nos. 2, 3, 12. 13, and Ambulance Com-
panies Nos. 2, 3, 12, 13).
973
974 FIELD OPERATIONS
The first troops sailed from Hoboken on June 13, 1917, and disembarked at St.
Nazaire on June 26, 1917. Division headquarters landed on June 27, 1917. The remaindei-
of the troops followed in rapid succession, except the supply train, which did not arrive-
in France until May 6, 1918. The division (less Artillery) was sent to the Gondrecourt
area for training. For a similar purpose the Artillery brigade went to Valdahon. En
route from St. Nazaire to Gondrecourt, the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, participated in
the Fourth of July parade in Paris, the first public appearance of American troops in
France.
Field Hospital No. 18 and Ambulance Company No. 13 arrived at St. Nazaire, with
the division, on June 27, 1917. Headquarters field hospitals, headquarters ambulance sec-
tions, Field Hospitals No. 2 and No. 12, and Ambulance Companies No. 2 and No. 12
arrived September 26, 1917. Field Hospital No. 3 and Ambulance Company No. 3 arrived
December 29, 1917. While the division remained in the vicinity of St. Nazaire, all sick
were cared for by a French military hospital, in that city. Later a part of this hospital
was turned over to us and staffed by American medical officers, nurses, and enlisted men
from Base Hospital No. 18 (Johns Hopkins), which had arrived in the same convoy with
the 1st Division. On July 11, 1917, Field Hospital No. 13 and Ambulance Company No. 13
(the only sanitary train units in France at that time) proceeded under their own trans-
portation to the training area around Gondrecourt, arriving there July 15, 1917. The
field hospital established a hospital in frame barracks at Gondrecourt, which was ex-
panded by additional equipment, and designated Camp Hospital No. 1. It provided
permanent care for all sick, there being no hospital, except a small French one, to
which it could evacuate. When, later (in September, 1917), Base Hospital No. 18 was
established at Bazoilles, Camp Hospital No. 1 evacuated all its serious sick and operative
cases to that hospital. Field Hospital No. 13 was relieved by Field Hospital No. 12 on
October 21. On November 7, Field Hospital No. 12 was relieved and a permanent per-
sonnel was assigned to Camp Hospital No. 1. On January 25, 1918, Field Hospital No. 3
took over the camp hospital and operated it nntll April 3, I91S, when it was taken over
by the Services of Supply. The training area, consisting of 32 towns, was evacuated in
turn by Ambulance Company No. 13, stationed at La Neuville, and by Ambulance Com-
pany No. 12. stationed at Hevilliers; their evacuation included that to the base hospital.
The remainder of the sanitai-y train was located at Villiers le Sec. Hevilliers, and La
Neuville.
Luneville Sector, October 21, 1917, to November 20, 1917.
On the night of November 29, the division was withdrawn from the line to the Gondre-
court area, where it continued its training until January 15. 1918.
Ansauville Sector. January 15 to April 3, 1918.
Cantigny Sector, April 25 to June 8, 1918.
Montdidier-Noyon operation, June 9-13, 191S.
Cantigny Sector, June 14 to July 7, 1918.
Aisne-Marne operation, July 1S-23, 1918.
The division, after its relief from the Soissons operation, was again moved eastward.
On August 7, 191S, it took over the quiet Saizerais sector, near Toul. Here it remained
until August 24, when it was withdrawn to Vaucouleurs, in preparation for a new
offensive.
When the division moved into the Saizerais sector, on August 7, 1918, the sanitary
train was disposed of as follows:
Field Hospital No. 2 was stationed at Avrainville for contagious and venereal diseases.
Field Hospital No. 3, at Griscourt, functioned as triage. Field Hospital No. 12, at
Roziers-en-Haye. was for surgical cases. Field Hospital No. 13, at Rogeville, took care
of sick and skin diseases.
A dressing station was established by Ambulance Company No. 12 at Jezainville ;
United States Army Ambulance Service Section 649, assigned to the division, took station
at Pont-a-Mousson and evacuated wounded from the front to the dressing station. Divi-
sional ambulance companies evacuated from the dressing station to the triage and hospitals
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 975
at Toul. During its stay in this sector, intensive efforts were made to free the division
from lice and to overhaul all motor equipment. Field Hospital No. 2, heretofore animal
drawn, was motorized, thus rendering all these units equally mobile. When the division
moved to the vicinity of Vaucouleurs, most of the sanitary train was located at Pierrot.
Field Hospital No. 12 was established at Burey-en-Vaux for the sick and Field Hospital
No. 13, at Sauvigny, for skin and venereal diseases. All seriously sick were evacuated to
Base Hospital No. 66 at Neufchateau.
Here the division engaged in maneuvers, simulating those it expected to employ in the
coming St. Mihiel operation. Field hospitals and dressing stations were actually estab-
lished and moved in conformity with the general problem worked out by the division.
Ambulance company equipment was increased by the addition of large quantities of
dressings, litters, splints, and blankets, each ambulance now carrying 12 blankets, 6 to 8
litters, and a supply of leg and arm splints. Arrangements were made for replacing sup-
plies unloaded with patients. Dressing-station supplies were supplemented by such addi-
tional articles as antigas suits and gloves, sodium bicarbonate (for mustard gas), hot water
bottles, shell-wound dressings in three sizes, issued to litter-bearer detachments, and
additional tourniquets, furnished to stations and bearers.
The Medical Department belt for enlisted men was abandoned at this time and small
pouches were issued in their stead. The former would not hold the larger dressings now
required, nor did it permit the wearer to carry a litter. Each field hospital now carried 70
litters and 500 or more blankets.
After training and reequipment the 1st Division moved to the St. Mihiel salient, and
the entire sanitary train was assembled at Raulecourt.
St. Mihiel operation, September 12-13, 1018.
Meause-Argonne operation, September 26 to November 11, 1918.
Army of Occupation.
Division headquarters embarked at Brest on August 25, 1919, and arrived at New
York, September 5, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS
Col. Bailey K. Ashford, M. C, June 8, 1917, to October 23, 1917.
Col. Herbert G. Shaw, M. C, October 24. 1917, to July 13, 1918.
Col. James I. Mabee, M. C, July 14, 1918, to February 16, 1919.
Col. Perry D. Boyer, M. C, February 17, 1919, to June 18, 1919.
Eieut. Col. Edwin B. Maynard, M. C, June 19, 1919, to August 27, 1919.
THE 2D DIVISION *• '
(Regular Army and Marines. Insignia: An Indian head on a white star background)
The 2d Division was organized in October, 1917, from troops of the Regular Army
and the Marine Corps. The organization was as follows :
3d Infantry Brigade :
9th and 23d Infantry: 5th Machine Gun Battalion.
4th Infantry Brigade :
5th and 6th Marines ; 6th Machine Gun Battalion.
2d Field Artillery Brigade:
12th and 15th (light), 17th (heavy) Field Artillery; 2d Trench Mortar Battery.
4th Machine Gun Battalion.
2d Engineers.
1st Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (2d Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 1, 15. 16, 23. and Ambulance
Companies Nos. 1, 15, 16. 23).
The first unit of the division arrived in France June 27. 1917: the last, March, 15,
]»18.
976 FIELD OPERATIONS
For training purposes, the infantry was sent to the Department of Haute Marne and
division headquarters was established at Bourmont. Upon arrival of the artillery, in
Decemher and January, 1918. it was sent to Valdahon for instruction. During the latter
month, all elements of the division were assembled in the vicinity of Bourmont for final
training.
On March 10 the division went into a quiet portion of the line between Verdun and
St. Mihiel — the Toulon — Troyon sectors. Here the troops were mingled with the French,
and took part in numerous minor operations; on the night of April 13-14 the !Kh Infantry
repulsed an unusually strong raid with complete success. The division remained in this
sector until May 13 when it moved to the vicinity of Chaumont-en-Vexin (Oise) for
further training preparatory to relieving the 1st Division, near Montdidier. But on May
27 the Germans began their offensive between the Aisne and the Marne, and the division
was placed at the disposal of the French.
Field Hospital No. 15 and Ambulance Company No. 15 arrived at Brest December 20,
1917. Field Hospital No. 1 and Ambulance Companies No. 1 and No. 23 arrived at St.
Nazalre December 22, 1917. Field Hospital No. If. and Ambulance Company No. 10
disembarked at Brest February 5, 1918. Field Hospitals Nos. 1. 15, and 23 were sent to
Bourmont for training where Field Hospital No. 15 opened Camp Hospital No. 3 for
the divisional sick. It evacuated contagious cases to Neufchateau and special cases to
Base Hospital No. 18. at Bazoilles. Barer it also evacuated cases to the hospitals at
Vittel-Contrexeville. Field Hospital No. 10 (animal drawn), upon arrival in France, was
sent to Blois, where it remained until March 14, 1918.
The ambulance companies, with the exception of Ambulance Company No. 16,
were stationed at Rozieres, where they underwent training and evacuated sick. Ambu-
lance Company No. 10 was at Blois, where it trained and performed fatigue and general
duty. On March 10. the sanitary train arrived in the Toulon-Troyon sector.
Field Hospital No. 1 took station at Fontaine Brillante, where the French operated
a triage. Here they assisted in operating the French dressing station, until given barrack
space for the sick and wounded of the division. From here patients were evacuated to
the French hospitals in the rear.
Field Hospital No. 15 was located at Genicom - !, where the personnel assisted the
French in the operation of a triage until April 2. when this hospital was sent to Souilly
to assist in a French evacuation hospital. Eater, three wards were turned over to Field
Hospital No. 15 for divisional casualties. Evacuations from this hospital were made by
hospital trains to base hospitals in the interior.
Field Hospital No. 23 took over a Frencli triage at Ambly. The station had a capacity
of 100 beds and good operating and sterilizing rooms . On April 10, the unit moved to
Fontaine Bouton, where it worked in conjunction with a French mobile surgical unit.
On April 20. it moved to Mau.jouy. where it took up similar duties.
Field Hospital No. 10 arrived in this sector by rail from Blois, on March IS, and
was sent to a French hospital at Maujouy for duty and training. On April 10, one officer
and 20 men of the unit were assigned to duty at a French hospital at Petit Monthairon.
On April 20, it reopened the triage (formerly operated by Field Hospital No. 23) at Ambly,
which it operated until May 9.
Ambulance Company No. 1. was sent to Fontaine Brillante. from which place it
furnished ambulance and litter-bearer service for the left area of the sector. On March
31, the company moved to La Chiffoure. but continued the same service.
Ambulance Company No. 15, was located at Genicourt, whence it furnished ambu-
lance and litter-bearer service for that portion of the sector.
Ambulance Company No. 23 took station at Troyon, and served the right area of the
sector.
Ambulance Company No. 10 arrived in the sector on March 24, from Blois, and took
station at Bevigny. The majority of its personnel was distributed among the other three
companies for training and instruction. Details were also sent to French hospitals at
Dieue and Petit Monthairon. The animals and equipment of this company were re-
ceived the latter part of April.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 977
Medical supplies were handled by the headquarters ambulance sector. Requisitions
were filled by the divisional medical supply depot at Bourmont.
Evacuations, at first, were made through the French triage near the front at Geni-
court, on the right, and at Fontaine Brillante. on the left. About April 1. divisional triages
were established at Ambly and Fontaine Brillante.
Patients were evacuated to the following hospitals:
Seriously wounded and all officers: French hospital at Petit Monthairon.
Wounded : French hospital, Maujoue.
Gassed: French hospital, near Rambluzin.
Infectious : French hospital, Benoite Vaux.
Sick: To any division field hospital.
Evacuation: To French evacuation hospital at Souilly.
Aisne operation, May 31 to June 5, 1918.
Chateau-Thierry Sector, June to July 9, 1918.
On July 9, after having spent 40 days in action, which cost losses of 9,000 men, the
division was relieved and moved to a reserve position along the line Montreuil — St. Aulde.
Aisne-Marne operation, July 18-25. 1918.
The division was in training in the Ormoy-Villers area until July 28, when it moved
to the vicinity of Nancy. On August G it relieved a French unit in the Marbache sector,
wheer it remained until relieved by the S2d Division, on August 16.
It then moved to the Oolombey-les-Belles area, where active preparation for the Im-
pending St. Mihiel operation was taken up.
In the Marbache Sector the sanitary train took over various ambulance posts, dressing
stations, and field hospitals from the French Service de Sante; its units were located as
follows :
Field Hospital No. 1 and Ambulance Company No. 23 were at Dieulouard, the other
hospitals serving troops east of the Moselle in a group of French hospital buildings at
Millery with the other ambulance companies in their vicinity. Here Field Hospital No.
10 cared for the sick and Field Hospitals Nos. 15 and 23, formerly Unit No. 3. which
joined at this time, formed a group which cared for surgical cases only. Because of the
proximity of these formations to the front, no dressing stations were established, and the
ambulances at night brought the wounded direct from the battalion posts. lairing the day,
as the roads were under direct enemy observation, patients had to be brought back to am-
bulance heads by the litter-bearer squads assigned to the several battalions. The medical
supply unit was located at Belleville, the railhead, and distributed supplies by ambulance
in advance of the field hospitals.
The wounded were evacuated to Evacuation Hospital No. 1, at Sebastopol, a distance
of 20 km. (12.4 miles) from the field hospitals and the sick to the evacuation hospitals
at Toul.
St. Mihiel operation, September 12-10, 1918.
Meuse-Argonne operation, October 1-10. and October 22 to November 11, 1918.
Army of Occupation.
The division headquarters sailed from Brest July 25, 1919, arriving at New York
August 3, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Ralph S. Porter, M. C, November 7, 1917, to December 7, 1917.
Col. Charles R. Marrow, M. C, December 8, 1917, to July 19, 1918.
Col. John W. Hanner. M. C, July 20, 1918, to September 22, 1918.
Lieut. Col. Richard Derby, M. C September 23, 1918, to January 7, 1919.
Col. W. A. Powell, M. C. January 18, 1919. to February 20. 1919.
Col. Orville G. Brown, M. C, March 4, 1919, to June 18, 1919.
Col. Perry L. Boyer, M. 0., June 19, 1919, to August 8, 1919.
978 FIELD OPERATIONS
THE 3D DIVISION ' B
(Regular Army. Insignia: Three white stripes superimposed diagonally on blue square)
The 3d Division was organized in November, 1917, at Camp Greene, N. C, from
troops of the Regular Army, and by transfers from other units. The organization was
as follows :
5th Infantry Brigade:
4th and 7th Infantry : Sth Machine Gun Battalion.
Cth Infantry Brigade :
30th and 38th Infantry; Oth Machine Gun Battalion.
7th Machine Gun Battalion.
3d Field Artillery Brigade :
10th and 76th night), and I Sth (heavy) Field Artillery; 3d Trench Mortar
Battery.
6th Engineers.
5th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (3d Sanitary Train, consisting of Field Hospitals Nos. 5, 7, 26. 27, and
Ambulance Companies Nos. 5, 7, 26, 27).
The first unit to go overseas was the Oth Engineers, which was designated for early
duty in France. It arrived there December 20, 1917. A detachment of the regiment
serving with the British occupied active sectors and took part in the operation known as
the Somme defensive. Division headquarters arrived in France on April 4 and the
last unit May 12, 1918.
For training purposes the division (less artillery and engineers) was sent to the
Chateauvillain area, the artillery going to Coetquidan for the same purpose. The artillery
rejoined the division July C, 1918, and was present with it in the Marne operation, and
the Aisne-Marne operation, remaining with the division until September 7, 1918, when
it was detached for participation in the St. Mihiel operation with the Fourth Corps.
The artillery brigade rejoined the division September 15, 191S, and from this time until
the armistice served as divisional artillery either with the 3d or with some other division.
On May 27 the Germans began their offensive between the Aisne and the Maine,
and the 3d Division was placed at the disposal of the French. Unfortunately the history
of the sanitary train in the training sector is not available.
Aisne-Marne operation, July 18-30, 1918.
Chateau-Thierry Sector, June 6 to July 14, 191S.
Champagne-Marne operation, July 15-1S, 191S.
Aisne-Marne operation, July 18-30, 1918.
The division was relieved on July 30 by the 32d Division, and assembled south of
Chateau-Thierry. On August 2 the Oth Brigade was dispatched to support of the French
Third Army Corps operating toward the Vesle. It was relieved from this duty on
August 10 and rejoined the division, which had gone into rest area near Gondrecourt.
On September 4 the division proceeded to the Vaucouleurs area preparatory to
taking part in the St. Mihiel operation. In this operation it was in the reserve of the
Fourth Army Corps.
After its relief from the Aisne-Marne operation, the sanitary train moved to the
vicinity of Bonet, where it resumed training and received replacements. Field Hospital
No. 5 opened a scabies hospital at Demange on August 22. On September 4 the entire
sanitary train proceeded to the St. Mihiel sector and located near Boucq. where it
remained in reserve during the St. Mihiel operation. After this action, the train moved
to the Bois de la Cote, where it remained in camp until the beginning of the operation
on September 26.
Meause-Argonne, September 26 to November 11, 1918.
Army of Occupation.
The division headquarters sailed from Brest on August 14 and arrived in New York
August 23, 1919.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 979
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. William It. Eastman, M. C, November 24, 1917, to July 14, 191S.
Col. Frederick S. Wright, M. C, July 15, 1918, to November 20, 1919.
THE 4TH DIVISION '• '
(Regular Army. Insignia: A green four-leaved ivy about a green circle)
The 4th Division was organized in December, 1917, at Camp Greene, N. O, from units
of the Regular Army.
The organization was as follows :
7th Infantry Brigade :
39th and 47th Infantry; 11th Machine Gun Battalion.
8th Infantry Brigade :
5Sth and 59th Infantry ; 12th Machine Gun Battalion.
4th Field Artillery Brigade :
ICtli and 77th (light), 13th (heavy) Field Artillery; 4th Trench Mortar
Battery.
10th Machine Gun Battalion.
4th Engineers.
8th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (4th Sanitary Train consisted of Field Hospitals Nos. 19, 21, 28, 33, and
Ambulance Companies Nos. 19, 21, 28, 33).
The first unit to go overseas arrived in France May 10, 191S, the last, June 8, 1918.
The transport Moldavia, carrying Companies A and B of the 58th Infantry, was
torpedoed and sunk on May 23 ; 56 men of the two companies were lost.
The division (less artillery) was assigned to the American Second Army Corps,
serving with the British, and was concentrated at Samer (Pas de Calais) for training.
The Artillery brigade went to Camp de Souge near Bordeaux for the same purpose, and
did not rejoin the division until the first week in August. Early in June, the division was
placed at the disposal of the French and moved to Meaux (Seine et Marne), where train-
ing was continued nearer the front. During the German oifensive of July 15 it was in
reserve divided between the French Second and Seventh Corps between Soissons and
Chateau-Thierry. Here it suffered its first battle casualties. While the division was in
training with the British, casualties were cared for by British medical units.
The 4th Sanitary Train arrived in France in the early part of June, 1918, and joined
the division at Meaux. On June 22 Field Hospital No. 33 established a hospital for the
care of sick at Chateau Montebise, which it operated until July 0. Field Hospital No. 28
opened at Meaux on July 1. Ambulance companies arrived with no transportation and
all casualties were evacuated by the French sanitary service.
Aisne-Marne operation. July 18 to August 6, 1918.
Vesle Sector, August 7-12, 1918.
On the night of August 11-12 the division was relieved by the 77th Division, and
withdrew to the Boise de Dole and the Foret de Nesles, the Artillery brigade remaining
in action until August 17. W'hile in this sector, the sanitary train was billeted in Prez-
sous-I.a-Fauehe and Eiffol-le-Petit. Field Hospital No. 33 opened in the latter station for
care of the division sick. Intensive training schedules were resumed in preparation for
the coming St. Mihiel operation.
St. Mihiel operation, September 14, 1918.
Meause-Argonne operation, September 20 to October 22, 1918.
Army of Occupation.
The division returned to the United States in July, 1919; headquarters sailed from
Brest July 24 and arrived in New York July 31.
DIVISION SUKGEONS •
Col. Robert L. Carswell, M. C, December 9, 1917, to October 5. 191 S.
Col. Paul Waterman, M. C, October 0, 1918, to August 3. 1919.
()gO FIELD OPERATIONS
THE 5TH DIVISION ■'■ »
(Regular Army. Insignia: A red diamond)
The 5th Division was organized at Camp Logan, Tex., December 1, 1917, from units
of the Regular Army. These being at peace strength, the shortage was made up by assign-
ment of National Army men.
The following organizations composed the divison :
9th Infantry Brigade:
00th and 61st Infantry; 14th Machine Gun Battalion.
10th Infantry Brigade:
0th and 11th Infantry : 15th Machine Gun Battalion.
13th Machine Gun Battalion.
5th Artillery Brigade:
19th and 20th (light), 21st (heavy) Field Artillery; 5th Trench Mortar
Battery.
7th Engineers.
9th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (5th Sanitary Train, Field Hospitals Nos. 17. 25, 29, 30, and Ambulance
Companies Nos. 17, 25, 29, 30).
The first unit of the division arrived in France March 20, 1918, the last June 19.
Bar-sur-Aube was selected as the training area for the infantry, while the artillery was
sent to Valdahon for a similar purpose.
On June 1 the division was placed at the disposal of the French Thirty-third Army
Corps, then operating in the Vosges. To this sector it was immediately moved. Here the
troops were mingled with the French behind the lines for further training. June 14 the
division entered the line with combat units, half French. The sector was quiet, hut the
division suffered its first casualties June 14.
On July 15 the division was transferred to the quiet St. Die sector, and on July 19
the command of this sector passed to the Americans. The artillery joined the division
July 28, after having completed its training at Valdahon, In a 'ocal engagement of
August 17 the town of Frapelle and Hill 451 were taken and held against counterattacks.
The division was relieved by the French August 20. and repaired to Arches, south
of Epinal, for rest and training. From this point it moved to the vicinity of Luneville,
August 28.
The 5th Sanitary Train did not arrive until June 20; but due to the urgent need of
medical personnel and transportation, Field Hospital No. 101 and Ambulance Company
No. 161, 41st (Depot) Division, were assigned to the 5th Division on May 11, 1918. These
units opened Camp Hospital No. 42, at Bar-sur-Aube, for division sick. When the division
moved to the Anould sector, in the Vosges, on June 2. 1918. Field Hospital No. 141 and
Ambulance Company No. 141 were ordered to duty with French Evacuation Hospital 2/29
at Fraize. On June 8 Field Hospital No. 103 and Ambulance Company No. 162. of the
41st Division, reported for duty. The field hospital was assigned to French Evacuation
Hospital 2/S at Gerardnier and the ambulance company performed evacuation. These
organizations were relieved from duty with the 5th Division during the latter part of
July and early part of August.
Service in the Anould sector was of peculiar interest because of the character of the
terrain and the close association with the French. The country was rugged, with but
few roads leading through the mountain passes. Though steep, these roads were good, and
at certain points narrow-gauge railways were sometimes available for the evacuations of
wounded. As allied trenches were usually on the eastern slope of the hills, roads leading
to them were under direct enemy observation and frequently were shelled, especially during
a raid from either side. These circumstances prohibited the near approach of ambulances
to the advance stations and required that the wounded be removed from them by hand
carriage or wheeled litter for a distance of from 3 to 5 km. (1.8 to 3.1 miles) over steep
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 981
and winding trails. From one advance station it was necessary that eight bearers carry
a wounded man for four hours before he could be placed on a vehicle. First aid was
applied at battalion stations located in front-line trenches, and the patients were then taken
by handcarriage or on wheeled litters through communicating trenches or over trails
to the nearest point accessible by motorcycle litter or ambulance. Ambulance centers
were maintained near the hospitals, from 5 to 8 km. (3 to 4.0 miles) from the front.
Here approximately two-thirds of the ambulances were parked, the others being posted
at protected and accessible points as near the lines as possible. When casualties occurred,
notice was telephoned to the hospitals and an ambulance was sent forward to the post
which had been vacated by the ambulance sent to collect the casualties in question. Thus
there was kept up a circuit of vehicles and prompt service, compensating for inability to
maintain a number of ambulances at a forward post because of enemy airplane observa-
tion and direct fire. Animal-drawn transportation was not used in the American service
in this sector. The use of wheeled litters and motor cycles for removal of the wounded in
this rugged terrain is discussed in Chapter IV.
Small hospitals — practically posts for rest and emergency treatment — were installed
at protected points, and here patients were retained until roads were passable or until,
if seriously wounded, they had recuperated sufficiently to continue the journey. Regi-
mental hospitals, where the less seriously sick and the slightly wounded were kept, were
located at the base of the mountains. Back of these were the French evacuation hospitals
where, under French command and instruction, our sanitary train personnel received
training and rendered service. These units were the following: Fraize, French Evacuation
Hospital, 2/28, 7 km. (4.2 miles) from the front, frequently shelled and later evacuated;
Gerardmer, French Evacuation Hospital 2/8, 15 km. (9 miles) from the front by road.
well situated in a large hotel: St. Die. Hopital St. Charles, well equipped and located in
the city hospital building, 7 km. (4.2 miles) from the front and too near to be used in
time of activity; Bruyeres, French Evacuation Hospital 2/14, 25 km. (15 miles) from the
front and therefore too distant for emergency work, though well equipped ; Le Rudlin.
Alpin Ambulance No. 305. Though frequently shelled, this unit was used for the
immediate treatment of serious cases.
All these sanitary formations, in rear of the battalion aid stations — and even these
if necessary — received French and American disabled alike.
From July 15 the division occupied the front east of St. Die, in the Vosges. Here,
on August 17, about 2,500 men, including Companies L, M, and of the 0th Infantry,
with troops from other organizations, carried out a local attack which resulted in the
capture of Frapelle and Hill 451. Resulting casualties numbered 418, but most of those
due to gas occurred among troops in dugouts in the vicinity of the attacking troops.
The system of evacuation in the St. Die sector was similar to that described above.
Ambulance centers were located at St. Die and Raon l'Etape, where in times of stress
the vehicles available were augmented by ambulances from Evacuation Hospital No. 2.
Evacuations were made to Field Hospital No. 29 and to St. Charles Hospital (French),
at St. Die, to Field Hospital No. 17 and Hopital Mixte (French), at Raon-1'Etape. and for
nontransportables to Evacuation Hospital No. 2, Baccarat, and to Field Hospital No. 25
with French Evacuation Hospital 2/14 (French), at Bruyeres. From the southern front
of the sector disabled men passed through the hospitals at St. Die, where Field Hospital
No. 29 received the sick and the gassed and Hopital St. Charles operated ; the seriously
sick from the entire sector were sent to Bruyeres. Casualties from the northern part
of the line were sent to Field Hospital No. 17. which transferred seriously wounded
patients to the Hopital Mixte, at Raon-1'Etape. All other battle casualties, including
passed, were sent to Evacuation Hospital No. 2, at Baccarat. At each of the French
hospitals French and American teams alternated in service.
During the Frapelle attack the regimental aid station of the 6th Infantry was located
at Dijon, with aid stations at Nayemont, Chapelle Ste. Claire. Charmont, and Neuvillers.
Seven medical officers and seventy-four enlisted men from the sanitary train were attached
to the 6th Infantry to reinforce its medical personnel. Six ambulances, with litter squads
982 FIELD OPERATIONS
from Ambulance Companies No. 25 and No. 29, were posted at the stations mentioned
above, and the remainder were held at the " alert " at St. Die, where Field Hospital
No. 29 operated the triage.
No arrangements had been made at this time for details of litter bearers from the
fine, and use of bandsmen proved unsatisfactory. As regimental personnel was fully en-
gaged in rendering first aid, it was decided that it should not be employed for bearer
service, yet during a general engagement the details to the regimental service, from ambu-
lance companies which were already fully occupied, proved inadequate.
Of the 2G1 gas casualties in the Frapelle attack, more than 50 per cent were so slightly
affected that their removal to the rear was not necessary. The number mentioned included
those suffering from gas fright, and also malingerers.
An information service was initiated at this time, which was utilized and developed
in subsequent engagements. It is described as follows in the medical history of the 5th
Division :
Information was furnished to the division staff every hour during times of activity,
and less frequently — depending upon the character of action — as to the number and na-
ture of casualties and the location from which they came. Such information was of value
in confirming reports received from other sources and in forming an estimate of the rela-
tive gravity of the military situation at various points on the line, as well as the kind of
shells and other means of warfare used by the enemy.
Information was required from regimental surgeons and others. Reports were sent
to the division surgeon of the progress of the attack, the number and kind of casualties,
the number of cases received at the hospitals, the need for supplies and anticipated
casualties.
This information enabled the division surgeon in some instances to anticipate the
needs of sanitary units at the front. Knowledge that gas shells were being used in
quantity was an indication for obtaining a supply of blankets and additional uniforms.
Before the request for these articles was received at headquarters the supplies were on
their way to the front. Information regarding actual and anticipated casualties enabled
officers at the triage and at other hospitals to plan work and distribute patients so that
each ease could receive attention at the earliest possible moment. * * *
Negative information was often of great value. Report that activity had subsided
and that few or no cases were to be expected for a time was helpful in relieving the
nervous strain of the hospital personnel and allowing at least a part of them to obtain
much-needed rest. It was found of value not only for the hospitals but also for ambulance
company troops.
Reports received from medical sources were of value to the operations section. G-3.
These included statements concerning the character of wounds and injuries, estimates of
number of wounded on the field, the presence of gas in certain areas, and general physical
resistance of the men.
Information received through headquarters and transmitted to medical officers with
the line included (a) prior to the engagement, plans for the action, routes for evacuation,
number of ambulances available, and other preparations; (6) information relating to de-
velopment in the military situation which required preparations on the part of the
medical officers.
Prior to the engagement there was a conference of the medical officers of line troops,
the commanding officers of ambulance and field hospital companies, and others concerned.
A thorough reconnaissance was made of the terrain not then occupied by the enemy. Lo-
cations for ambulance stations were selected and plans made from study of maps for lo-
cation of stations in the occupied area as soon as an advance was made. It is interesting
to note that these plans were executed with practically no variation either as to location or
as to time.
St Miliiel oi>eration. September 12-KS.
From September 17-27 the division, minus the artillery, was stationed at Domevre-en-
Haye, near Toul, for rest and training. The artillery remained in the St. Mihiel sector
until after the signing of the armistice, and formed a part of the Second Army. On Sep-
tember 27-28 the division moved to Pagny-sur-Meuse, west of Toul, and there resumed
training.
Meuse-Argonne operation, October 5 to November 11, 1918.
Army of Occupation.
The division was relieved, May 10, 1919, for return to this country, but its departure
was delayed until July. Headquarters sailed from Brest July 13 and arrived at New
York July 21.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 983
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Robert H. Pierson, M. C, December 3, 1917, to January 1, 1919.
Col. Carey J. Vaux. M. C, January 2. 1919. to June 4, 1919.
Lieut. Col. George C. Kieffer, M. C, June 5, 1919, to September 11, 1919.
THE 6TH DIVISION 18
(Regular Army. Insignia: A six-pointed red star)
The 6th Division was organized at Camp McClellan, Ala., in November, 1917, from
units of the Regular Army. These being at peace strength, the shortages were made up
by assignment of National Army men. Especially was this true of the 318th Engineers,
which was composed almost exclusively of the latter. The following organizations com-
posed the division :
11th Infantry Brigade :
51st and 52d Infantry ; 17th Machine Gun Battalion.
12th Infantry Brigade:
53d and 54th Infantry; 18th Machine Gun Battalion. 16th Machine Gun
Battalion.
6th Field Artillery Brigade:
3d and 78th (light), 11th (heavy), Field Artillery; 6th Trench Mortar
Battery.
318th Engineers :
6th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (6th Sanitary Train; Field Hospitals Nos. 20, 37, 38, 40, and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 20, 37, 38, 40).
The first unit of the division arrived in France July 10 ; the last July 20. 1918. Many
units landed first in England and Scotland and then crossed the Channel. While at Le
Havre the artillery came under fire from an enemy airplane and suffered the first casual-
ties inflicted upon the division.
After training in the vicinity of Chateauvillain, the division, minus the artillery, de-
parted August 27 for Gerardmer, in the Vosges, which sector it occupied, under French
command, until relieved October 11. During this period the sector was quiet, although
enlivened with frequent raids and patrol combats. The divisional artillery at this lime
was in training at Valdahon.
The sanitary train arrived in France July 22, 1918, and was sent to the training area of
the division. Training was immediately taken up under a training schedule issued by Gen-
eral Headquarters. Instruction was very intensive, but was carried out under considerable
difficulties due to lack of manuals and necessary equipment. Units were scattered over
a wide area, and it was very difficult to collect the personnel of the various units, except-
ing that in the sanitary train, for collective instruction. The sanitary train had no trans-
portation. It received four-mule ambulances shortly prior to departure from this area,
but these could not be taken along owing to lack of animals. Evacuation service was
performed by Camp Hospital No. 9, and the divisional specialists were also assigned to this
hospital for duty. While in this training area the health of the command was excep-
tionally good, with the exception of the occurrence of diarrhea.
When the division moved to the Gerardmer sector, August 17, the sanitary train
functioned for the first time, taking over the hospitals from the 35th Division ; sites of
two of these were changed almost immediately after arrival. These hospitals were
located as follows : Field Hospital No. 20 was at Gerardmer, functioning as a surgical
and a general medical hospital, the surgical portion being in Hotel de Lac in conjunction
with a French hospital, and the general medical in Maternelle Hospital. Field Hospital
No. 37 was located at Storkensohn, working in connection with a French hospital. This
hospital was in Bessonneau tents, and functioned as a surgical hospital for the southern
984 FIELD OPERATIONS
portion of the sector. Field Hospital No. 38 was located in Kruth, in buildings formerly
occupied by a French hospital, the buildings having been turned over to it by a factory.
This hospital functioned as a general medical and gas hospital. Field Hospital No. 40
was located at the same place in temporary wooden buildings and functioned as a skin,
contagious disease, and venereal hospital. These hospitals acted as evacuation hospitals
also, there being no evacuation hospital in the area. Evacuations were made to Rase
Hospital No. 23, at Vittel, about 61 km. (36.6 miles) distant.
A surgical team was assigned to the division, September 11, 1918, and functioned with
Field Hospital No. 37, at Storkensohn. X-ray outfits of the French were used at both
surgical hospitals. The mobile laboratory was assigned to work with Field Hospital
No. 38, and the divisional specialists were attached to the sanitary train and visited all
the division hospitals.
Evacuations in a sector of this character were carried on under many difficulties. All
forms of transport were used over the mountainous terrain, and included Sunbeam motor-
cycles, with side litters, mule litters, mule ambulances, G. JVI. C. ambulances, and Ford
ambulances. Hand carry was in some places long and tedious, and in several localities
as many as three or four relays had to be provided, necessitating sometimes 16 men to
transport one wounded man before he could be placed on mechanical transport. As the
division had no ambulances regularly assigned to it, these were provided by attaching
United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 524 and Ambulance Company No. 102.
giving a total of 32 ambulances. These ambulances were distributed pursuant to a scheme
of distribution made by the director of ambulance companies. There was considerable
difficulty in the use of ambulances in this particular type of terrain, owing to the burning
out of brake linings of both the Ford and the G. M. C.
The supply service, though also working under difficulties owing to lack of trans-
portation, was, nevertheless, very efficient, medical department supplies being distributed
through the dressing stations to the front-line organizations. The medical supply depot
was located at Gerardmer, with a branch depot at Kruth. The American Red Cross
rendered very valuable services, procuring and distributing their own supplies. They
established five advance comfort stations where they supplied hot chocolate and dough-
nuts to the troops on the march. The American Red Cross supply depot was located at
the railhead at Cornimout.
The Meuse-Argonne operation being under way. the division, on October 27, was sent
north to take its place in the line. Detraining near St. Menehould, south of the Argonne.
a long and trying march due north was begun. Lack of transportation facilities forced
the troops to drag their machine guns and other equipment by hand through the forest
and over roads which a retreating enemy bad used every means at his command to make
impassable. After a march of approximately 50 km. (31 miles), divisional headquarters
was established, November 6, at Stonne. At this time the division was a unit of the
First Corps and in reserve.
On November 6, the left of the First Corps rested in the vicinity of Stonne. They
began the turning movement eastward to the Meuse. As the left flank of the corps swung
to the northeast, liaison with the French on the left was temporarily lost. Into this gap
units of the 6th Division were hurried, and what promised to be a dangerous situation
was thus saved.
The enemy at this time was in full retreat; and the necessity for its services no
longer existing, the 5th Division was moved to the area northeast of Verdun. Before it
could enter the line in this sector the signing of the armistice ended the fighting. The
11th Field Artillery went into action with the 80th Division during the Meuse-Argonne
operation.
Forty days were spent by the division in quiet sectors and none in active ones.
Twelve prisoners were captured and casualties totaling 576 were suffered. When the
division arrived in the Meuse-Argonne region, the sanitary train took station near Froidos.
Due to shortage of ambulances in the corps, United States Army Ambulance Service
Section No. 524 was detached from the division, leaving it only 12 G. M. C. ambulances.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 985
Eight were assigned to the division organizations which evacuated their own patients to
evacuation hospitals in the vicinity. The sanitary train was without other transportation
with the exception of six mule ambulances, without animals, and two motor trucks for its
own supplies.
The sanitary train, while the division was in the Meuse-Argonne operation, was
moved from its first camp, near Froidos. to the site of a former German hospital about 2
km. (1.2 miles) north of Apremont, where it was immobilized until the division was
withdrawn. One field hospital function, taking care of a number of sick of the 6th Divi-
sion and of sick from other divisions. One dressing station was established. This was at
Stonne, the farthest point north reached by the 6th Division. Here a number of refugees
and wounded from other divisions were cared for.
Division headquarters was established at Aignay-le-Duc, November 30, 1018. On April
12. 191S. movement of the division to Germany was begun. Division headquarters was
at Bad Bertrlch on April 30. On May 6 the movement of the division was stopped, about
00 per cent of the personnel having arrived in Germany. On May 20 movement to Brest
was begun. Division headquarters embarked on .Tune 3, 1010. and arrived at New York
mi June 10.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Paul L. Freeman. M. C, December 28, 1917, to May 12, 1919.
Col. James M. Phalen, M. C, May 13, 1919, to June 30, 1910.
Lieut. Col. Howard K. White, M. C, July 1, 1919, to August 31, 1919.
Lieut. Col. Fletcher O. McFarland, M. C., September 1-10. 1919.
THE 7TH DIVISION 1 °
(Regular Army. Insignia: Two black triangles with their apexes touching in center of
a red circle)
The 7th Division was organized January 1, 101S, from troops of the Regular Army
and by transfers from other units. For the purpose of training, organizations concen-
trated at Tamp McArthur, Tex., in June, 1918, but the division was not completely
assembled as a unit until arrival in France.
The organization was as follows :
135th Infantry Brigade :
55th and 56th Infantry : 20th Machine Gun Battalion.
14th Infantry Brigade :
34th and 64th Infantry ; 21st Machine Gun Battalion.
7tli Field Artillery Brigade :
70th and 80th (light), and 8th (heavy) Field Artillery; 7th Trench Mortar
Battery.
19th Machine Gun Battalion.
5th Engineers.
10th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (7th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 22, 34, 35, 36 and Ambulance
Companies Nos. 22, 34, 35, 36).
The first unit of the division to go overseas arrived in France August 0. 1018: the
last September 3, 1918.
For training purposes the division (less artillery) was sent to the fifteenth training
area, with headquarters at Ancy-le-Franc (Yonnei. For a similar purpose the artillery
hrigade was sent to Camp Meucon (Morbiban). It never joined the division during
operations.
The division, less artillery, departed on September 27 for the front, detraining in the
vicinity of Toul. It became reserve of the Fourth Corps. First Army. Headquarters was
established successively at Gondreville. Villers-en-Haye, and Euvezin.
986 FIELD OPERATIONS
The sanitary train arrived at Brest, France, August 25, 1918, and four days later
proceeded to the training area, arriving at Ancy-le-Frnno September 1, 1918. The train
arrived without any equipment, and as there were no hospital facilities in the area
with the exception of a 10-bed French hospital, seriously sick were shipped by train
to Base Hospital No. 17, at Dijon. Those unable to stand transportation were held at
the overcrowded French hospital.
On September 20, 1918, Camp Hospital No. 49 opened at Daignes and relieved the
situation. Field Hospital No. 22 assisted in the operation of this hospital while the
division was in this area.
Puvenelle Sector, October 10 to November 11, 1918.
January 10, 1919, the division moved to the region north of Toul, with headquarters
at Saizerais (Meurthe et Moselle), one regiment (34th Infantry) remaining in the de-
vastated area for guard and police duty.
In April the division moved to the Colombey-les-Belles area, and then to the Le
Mans Embarkation Center preparatory to returning to the United States.
Headquarters embarked on June 12, 1919, and arrived in New York on June 20. 1910.
DIVISION SURGEON 3
Col. A. W. Williams, M. C, May 26, 1918 to November 8, 1919.
THE 26TH DIVISION '• "
(National Guard. Insignia: Dark-blue monogram YD on diamond-shaped field of olive
drab)
The 26th Division was organized in August, 3917, at Boston, Mass., from National
Guard troops of the New England States, supplemented by the small quota of National
Army troops from Camp Devens, Mass.
The organization was as follows:
51st Infantry Brigade :
101st and 102d Infantry ; 102d Machine Gun Battalion.
52d Infantry Brigade :
103d and 104th Infantry; 103d Machine Gun Battalion.
101st Machine Gun Battalion.
51st Field Artillery Brigade :
101st and 102d (light), 103d (heavy) Field Artillery; 101st Trench Mortar
Battery.
101st Engineers.
101st Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (101st Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 101, 102, 103, 104, and
Ambulance Companies Nos. 101, 102, 103, 104).
The first unit to go overseas arrived at St. Nazaire, France, on September 20, 1917.
The last element arrived on November 12, 1917.
The division (less artillery, engineers, and signal battalion) remained in a training
area with headquarters at Neufchateau until February, 1918. For purposes of training,
the artillery was sent to Coetquidan. It, as well as all other elements, rejoined the
division early in February and remained with it during all activities in which it par-
ticipated.
The division proceeded to the vicinity of Soissons on February 6, 1918, where attached
to the French Eleventh Corps, its units went into line in the Chemin des Dames sector
on February 10. It was withdrawn March 21, and moved to the Da Reine and Boueq
sector northwest of Toul, relieving the American 1st Division and the French 10th
Colonial Division in line on April 3. From April 10-13 the division successfully repelled
an attack by the enemy on the Bois Brule subsector at Apremont. This was the first
engagement in which American troops took part in any number. On April 20-21 the
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 987
division was involved in a defensive operation known as the "Seicheprey raid." This was
an enemy attack in force against the defenses of the town of Seicheprey. Although
American losses were heavy, the enemy was repulsed, and all ground taken by him was
recaptured by counterattack. Minor operations of both an offensive and a defensive
character kept this sector active during the remainder of the division's stay therein.
The sanitary train arrived in France in September and October, 1917, and was sent
to the Neufchateau training area. Here the sections of the sanitary train were located
in widely separated towns, the ambulance section at I.iffol-le-Grand and the field hospital
section at Bazoilles-sur-Meuse.
Field Hospital No. 101 assisted in the construction of the hospital center at Bazoilles
and Field Hospital No. 104 opened at Neufchateau for division sick. On December 7,
1917, Field Hospital No. 101 established a hospital at Liffol-le-Grand for the sick and
Field Hospital No. 104 cared for contagious diseases only. Field Hospital No. 103 was
sent to Dijon, where it assisted in the construction of Base Hospital No. 17. Field Hospi-
tal No. 102 was sent in detachments to the operating division hospitals and to line
organizations. In the last week of January, 1918. preparations were made for a move,
and the hospitals being operated by the field hospitals were turned over to Base Hospital
No. 66, at Neufchateau. The field hospital personnel was assembled and reorganized.
On arrival in the Chemin-des-Dames sector, the sanitary train was subdivided among
French medical personnel. Though line troops received valuable training here, the medical
Department had no opportunity to train satisfactorily its units by actual experience in
their field duties, and the French cared for almost all casualties. It made observations,
however, in gas treatment, in operation of the triage, and in other details of field service.
As our troops had no base hospitals in this region, the French permitted us to transfer
patients to the American Ambulance (later American Red Cross Hospital No. 1), at
Paris.
The field hospitals functioned as follows: Field Hospital No. 101 went to Bois Roger;
Xo. 102 to Ambulance St. Paid at Soissons for seriously wounded ; No. 103 operated in a
chateau at Muret et Crouttes ; No. 104 assisted in a French evacuation hospital at Vas-
seny. Detachments were also sent to various other French hopitals. including contagious,
gas, venereal, skin, and psychoneurotic hospitals.
When the division entered the lines in the Toul sector, dressing stations were operated
at Gironville and Diouville, on the left, and at Mandres-aux-Quatre-Tours and Bois de
Itehanne, on the right. Ambulance companies were reinforced by United States Army
Ambulance Service Section No. 647. Because of the long frontage of the Toul sector — 18
km. (10.8 miles) — two triages were established. That for the left of the line, operated by
Field Hospital No. 104, was located successively at Aulnois-sous-Vertuzey and at Abbaye
Rongeval ; while that on the right, operated by Field Hospital No. 102, was located first at
Menil-la-Tour and later, after June 2, at a point near Minorville. Wounded and gassed
from the left sector were evacuated to Mobile Hospital No. 39 near Aulnois-sous-Vertuzey,
and from the right sector to Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at Sebastopol, while contagious,
venereal, and skin cases were sent to Field Hospital No. 103, at Toul. Divisional sick
and gassed who were fit for transportation were sent to Field Hospital No. 101, at
Caserne-la-Marche, in Toul. Before the division left this sector this hospital had expanded
to a capacity of 900 beds and was amply equipped.
Chateau-Thierry Sector, July 10-14.
Champagne-Marne operaion, July 15-18.
Aisne-Marne operation, July 18 to August 3.
The division, on August 16, proceeded to the Chatillon training area. The 101st
Engineers remained in line under the First Corps until August 3, and the artillery brigade
until August 4 supporting the 4th and 42d Divisions.
The sanitary train also entrained for the 12th Rest Area, in the vicinity of Chatillon-
sur-Seine. where field hospitals were located at Villotte for divisional sick, severe cases
being sent to Base Hospital No. 15, at Chaumont. Mobile Surgical Unit No. 7. which now
joined the division, was assigned to Field Hospital No. 3.
St. Mihiel operation, September 12-16.
988 FIELD OPERATIONS
On September 26, Field Hospital No, 102 was moved to Ambly, and on the 28th all
field hospitals except No. 102 were set up at Ohapelle and Ferine de les Palameix. This
disposition of field hospitals continued until the division left this sector. When the
division attacked, on September 20, 1918, Ambulance Company No. 101 followed the
infantry and established a dressing station at Raulx. with litter bearers working well in
advance. Ambulance Company No. 102 evacuated the wounded, running into Saulx and
beyond, making connection with the litter-bearer section. That night the field was
cleared of wounded and the dressing station was moved back to Hannonville.
Meuse-Argonne operation.
On November 14, 1918, the division proceeded to the Sth Training Area, with head-
quarters at Montigny-le-Roi. In January it moved to the I.e Mans embarkation center,
where it remained until its return to the United States.
Division headquarters sailed from Brest on March 27, 1919, and arrived at Boston
April 4, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. James L. Bevans, M. C, August 22. 1917, to June 24, 1918.
Col. Ralph S. Porter. M. C, June 25 to November 23. 191S.
Maj. Fred. E. Jones, M. C. November 27 to December 9, 1918.
Lieut. Col. Thomas I.. Jenkins, M. C December 10. 1918, to February 4, 1919.
Col. John H. Allen. M. C, February 5 to April 29, 1919.
THE 27TH DIVISION ' "
(National Guard. Insignia: A red-bordered black circle with the letters NYD in mono-
gram and surrounded by seven stars placed as in the constellation of Orion)
The 27th Division was organized in September, 1917, at Camp Wadsworth, S. C, from
National Guard troops of New York.
The organisation was as follows :
53d Infantry Brigade:
105th and 106th Infantry; 105th Machine Gun Battalion.
54th Infantry Brigade:
107th and 108th Infantry; 106th Machine Gun Battalion.
52d Artillery Brigade:
104th and 105th (light), 106th (heavy) Field Artillery; 102d Trench Mortar
Battery.
104th Machine Gun Battalion.
102d Engineers.
102d Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (102d Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 105, 106, 107, 10S. ami
Ambulance Companies Nos. 105, 106, 107, 108).
The first unit of the division arrived in France May 7, 1918; the last, July 12. 1918.
For training purposes, the division (less artillery) was attached to British units
in the Department of the Soinine until July 3, 1918. For the same purpose the Artillery
brigade went to Camp de Souge, where it remained until August 30, 1918. It never served
again with the 27th Division, but participated in the Meuse-Argonne operation, September
26 to November 11. 1918.
The sanitary train did not rejoin the division until the latter part of July and August.
While in the training area all casualties were cared for by British field ambulances and
casualty clearing station.
Dickenliush Lake and Scharpcnberg sectors. July 9 to August 30, 1918.
Ypres-Lys operation. August 31 to September 2. 1918.
Sonune operation, September 24 to October 20, 1918.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 989
The division was withdrawn from line October 21, and proceeded to the Corbie area,
with headquarters at Corbie. On November 23 it moved to the Be Mans embarkation
center preparatory to its return to the United States.
Division headquarters sailed from Breast on February 26, and arrived at New
York on March C, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Lieut. Col. Edward R. Maloney. M. C, July 16, 1917, to August 22, 191S.
Col. Walter C. Montgomery, M. C. August 23, 1918, to February 26, 1919.
THE 28TH DIVISION 1 ■ »
(National Guard. Insignia: Red keystone)
The 28th Division was organized in September, 1917, at Camp Hancock. Ga., from
National Guard troops of the State of Pennsylvania.
The organization was as follows :
55th Infantry Brigade:
109th and 110th Infantry; 108th Machine Gun Battalion.
56th Infantry Brigade:
111th and 112th Infantry; 109th Machine Gun Battalion.
107th Machine Gun Battalion.
53d Field Artillery Brigade :
107th and 109th (light) ; 108th (heavy) Field Artillery. 103d Trench Mortar
Battery.
103d Engineers.
103d Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (103d Sanitary Train; Field Hospitals Nos. 109, 110, 111, 112 and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 109, 110, 111. 112).
The first unit of the division to go overseas arrived in France May 14, 1918; the last,
Jane 11, 191S.
For training purposes, the division (less artillery) was attached to the British 34tli
Division, south of St.-Omer. where it remained until June 9. The division proceeded to
the vicinity of Paris June 18, where it was attached to French troops for further training.
For the same purpose the Artillery brigade went to Camp Meucon. It rejoined the
division in August, 1918, and remained with it until October. 191S, when it passed to the
reserve of the First Army Artillery. It later participated with the 91st Division in the
Ypres-Lys operation. October 29 to November 11, 191S.
The sanitary train arrived at Liverpool, England, on May 31. 1918. and was sent to
Fays-Billot, in the vicinity of I.angres, France, for training. Here it remained until
.Inly 6, 1918, when it rejoined the division in the vicinity of Chateau-Thierry.
Chateau-Thierry Sector. July 7-14, 1918.
Champagne-Marne operation, July 15-1S, 1918.
Aisne-Marne operation. July 18 to August 6, 1918.
Fismes sector, August 7-17, 1918.
Oise-Aisne operation, August 18 to September 7, 1918.
Meuse-Argonne operation, September 26 to October 10. 1918.
Upon its relief from the Meuse-Argonne operation the division proceeded to the Thiau-
court sector, Toul, which it held from October 16 to November 11, 191 S.
Field Hospital No. 109 operated at Bouillonville. but the number of patients admitted
was very small. On October 30 it moved to Xonsard, where it opened a triage in a large
harn, operating here until the armistice.
Field Hospital No. 110 on October 17 took over the tentage of Field Hospital No. 146
of the 37th Division at Berneeourt. Here it functioned for two days, moving to Essey-et-
Maizerais, where it erected and operated a tent hospital until the armistice.
990 FIELD OPERATIONS
Field Hospital No. Ill established in a French hospital near Minorville on October
18, and on the 23d moved to Bernecourt. On the 30th it moved to Buxerulles.
Field Hospital No. 112 established at Essey-et-Maizerais on October 18, but as the
work was very light it closed on November 1, 1918.
After the armistice the division remained in the Thiaucourt sector tintil January
9, 1919, when it moved south of Toul, with headquarters at Colombey-les-Belles, remaining
there until the latter part of March, when it moved to the Be Mans embarkation center
preparatory to returning to the United States.
Division headquarters sailed from St. Nazalre April 20, 1919, and arrived at Newport
News May 1, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEON 3
Col. William J. Crookston, M. C, May 22, 1917, to April 18, 1919.
THE 29TH DIVISION «• u
(National Guard. Insignia: A circle bisected by two half circles, reversed and joined;
one-half of circle blue, other half gray)
The 29th Division was organized at Camp McClellan, Ala., under authority of a War
Department order dated July 20, 1917. It was originally composed of National Guard
units from the District of Columbia and the States of New Jersey, Delaware. Maryland,
and Virginia. Later, however, the Delaware troops were withdrawn and organized into
pioneer infantry units.
The following organizations composed the division:
57th Infantry Brigade :
113th, 114th Infantry ; 111th Machine Gun Battalion.
58th Infantry Brigade :
115th, 110th Infantry; 112th Machine Gun Battalion.
54th Field Artillery Brigade :
110th. 111th (light), and 112th (heavy) Field Artillery; 110th Trench Mortar
Battery.
110th Machine Gun Battalion.
104th Engineers.
104th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (104th Sanitary Train Field Hospitals Nos. 113, 114, 115, 110, and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 113, 114, 115. 116).
The first element of the division arrived in France June 8, 191S, and the last, July
22, 1918. Many of the units landed in England and then crossed the Channel.
Within a few days after its arrival in France the division proceeded to the 10th Train-
ing Area and established headquarters at Prauthoy (Haute Marne). After two weeks'
training, orders were received to move to upper Alsace for the purpose of taking over a
quiet sector of the front. From the 17th to 25th of July the division was stationed
near Belfort under command of the French Fortieth Corps.
Occupation of the center sector, upper Alsace, began on the 25th of July and was com-
pleted on August 7, at which time command of the sector passed from the French to the
Americans.
On September 23 the division was withdrawn to the vicinity of Belfort and ordered
to the Robert Espagne training area. After leaving Belfort the division was assigned to
the American First Army and ordered to the area in which the Meuse-Argonne operation
was soon to be launched. Division headquarters was established at Conde. September 24.
From this point the division moved north, with headquarters successively at St. Andre
and Blercourt. On October 1 the division was placed in reserve of the French Seventeenth
Corps, with headquarters at the citadel of Verdun.
The sanitary train did not join the division while in the training area, and all sick
were cared for by Camp Hospital No. 10. The train rejoined the division in the center
BRIEF HISTORIES OE COMBAT DIVISIONS 991
sector on July 25, 191S, and functioned as follows: Field Hospital No. 113 at Romagny,
for gassed cases, most of its equipment being furnished by the French ; Field Hospital
No. 114 at Reppe; Field Hospital No. 115 at Montreux Jeune, for medical, contagious, and
venereal cases. This unit operated a small infirmary at Retzwiller for the treatment of
skin cases and emergency gas. Field Hospital No. 116 was stationed at Chevannes-les-
Grandes, for surgical cases. The medical supply dump was at Fontaine.
From the field hospitals, cases that required evacuation were sent to French hospitals,
there being no American evacuation or base hospitals in the sector.
Ambulance Companies No. 113 and No. 114 took station at Traubach-la-Haute. where
the former established a dressing station. While in this sector, the sanitary troops
received their most important training. Each field hospital received and treated patients.
Two medical officers and three enlisted men were sent from each field hospital to French
hospitals for a course of instruction in the French methods of handling wounded. Details
were also sent to the schools for gas defense at Chaumont and Langres. and to the motor
transport school.
Meuse-Argonne operation, September 26 to November 11, 1918.
After the signing of the armistice the division was removed to a rest area, with
division headquarters at Bourbonne-les-Bains. The movement to the embarkation center
for return to this country began April 11, and on the 14th, headquarters was established
at Ballon, near Le Mans. Division headquarters sailed May 6 and arrived at Newport
News May 19.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Craig R. Snyder, M. C, August 24, 1917, to January 30, 1918.
Col. John B. Huggins, M, C, January 31, 191S, to October 19. 191S.
Col. Arthur M. Allen, M. C. November 18, 1918. to December 2S. 1918.
Col. John B. Huggins, M. C, December 29, 1918, to May 31, 1919.
THE 30TH DIVISION 1 "
(National Guard. Insignia: Monogram "OH" containing Roman numeral XXX, all in
blue on maroon field)
The 30th Division was organized in October. 1917 at Camp Sevier, S. C, from Na-
tional Guard troops of Tennessee and North and South Carolina.
Tile organization was as follows: 2
59th Infantry Brigade :
117th and 118th Infantry ; 114th Machine Gun Battalion.
60th Infantry Brigade :
119th and 120th Infantry ; 115th Machine Gun Battalion. 113th Machine Gun
Battalion.
55th Artillery Brigade:
113th, 114th (light), 115th (heavy) Field Artillery; 105th Trench Mortar
Battery.
105th Engineers.
105th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (105th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 117. US, 119. 120 and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 117, 118, 119, 120).
The first unit of the division to go overseas arrived in France May 14, 1918; the last.
June 24, 1918.
For training purposes, the division (less artillery) was attached to British units in
the Eperlecques area (Pas-de-Calais), where it remained until July 4, 1918. For the
same purpose the artillery brigade went to Coetquidan. It never served again with the
:10th Division, but participated in the St. Mihiel operation, September 12 to 16, 1918. and
in the Meuse-Argonne operation, September 26 to October 8. 1918. It was also in line
992 FIELD OPERATION*
in the Tout sector Angus', 23 to September 11, 1918, and in the Woevre sector October II
to November 8. 1918. 2
The 105th Sanitary Train upon arrival in France was detached from the division and
did not rejoin it again until August 1, 1918, when Field Hospitals No. IIS and No. 119 and
Ambulance Companies No. 118 and No. 119 reported. The remainder of the sanitary train
did not join until after the armistice. While in the training area casualties were evacu-
ated and cared for by British medical organizations.
Canal Sector, Belgium, July 10 to August 30. 1918,
Ypres-Lys operation, Belgium, August 31 to September 2, 1918.
Somme operation, September 24 to October 20, 1918.
The division was withdrawn October 20 and proceeded to the vicinity of Amiens, where
it remained until November 24, when it was ordered to the Le Mans embarkation center
preparatory to return to the United States.
Division headquarters sailed from St. Nazaire March 18, 1919. and arrived at Charles-
ton, S. C, on April 2, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS
Col. Arthur M. Whaley. M. C, August 25, 1917. to November 25, 191S.
Maj. Philip Norris, M. C, November 26, 1918, to December 9. 191S.
Maj. Henry Norris, M. C, December 10, 1918, to February 15, 1919.
Lieut. Col. Jerome L. Morgan, M. C, February 22, 1919, to April 15. 1919.
THE 32D DIVISION '■ "
(National Guard. Insignia: A red arrow piercing a line)
The 32d Division was organized at Camp McArthur, Tex., under authority of a War
Department order dated July 18, 1917. It was composed of National Guard troops from
the States of Michigan and Wisconsin,
The following organizations composed the division :
03d Infantry Brigade:
125th and 126th Infantry; 120th Machine Gun Battalion.
04th Infantry Brigade:
127th and 128th Infantry; 121st Machine Gun Battalion.
57th Field Artillery Brigade:
119th, 120th (light), 121st (heavy) Field Artillery; 107th Trench Mortar
Battery.
119th Machine Gun Battalion.
107th Engineers.
107th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (107th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 125, 120, 127. 128, and
Ambulance Companies Nos. 125, 12(5. 127, 128).
The 147th Field Artillery of the 41st Division was attached to the 57th Field Artillery
Brigade and served with it throughout its activities.
The first unit of the division arrived in France February 0. 1918, and the last. March
14, 1918. The first casualties were suffered when the transport Tuacania, carrying the
107th Sanitary Train, was torpedoed and sunk February 5, 15 men of this organization
being lost.
Division headquarters was established at Prauthoy. Haute Marne, on February 24.
The 32d Division was originally designated as a replacement division and as such sent
many of its members to other organizations - . However, the German offensive of March 21
and the resulting necessity for additional American troops forced a change in these plans.
Replacements were furnished it, and the division assembled in the 10th Training Area
preparatory to taking the field as a combat unit. After four weeks spent in this area,
the division was ordered to the quiet Haute-Alsace Sector. The movement to this sector
BKIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 993
began May 15, and on the 16th, headquarters was established at La Chapelle. On the
18th, the French troops in the sector were relieved and the division for the first time
took over front-line trenches, which were held until .Tidy 21.
The sanitary train arrived in France in the latter part of February and early part
of March, 1918, and joined the division in the 10th Training Area. Casualties were cared
for by Camp Hospital No. 10, which was operated by Field Hospital No. 127, assisted by
details from other held hospitals. All serious cases were evacuated to Base Hospital No.
17, Dijon. On its arrival in the Haute-Alsace sector, the sanitary train was very inti-
mately associated with the medical service of the French Army. Each field hospital was
sent to operate in connection with a French ambulance. Field Hospital No. 125 went
to Valdieu, and on June 27 opened a hospital at Chavannes-les-Grands. Field Hospital
No. 126 operated with a French ambulance at Romagny, but after July 1. functioned
alone for the care of gassed and sick.
Field Hospital No. 127 was sent to Lnuw, Alsace, where it operated a hospital in
conjunction with a French ambulance. On June 26, a part of this unit opened a hospital
at Masseveaux, Alsace.
Field Hospital No. 128 operated a hospital with a French ambulance at Bellemagny,
Alsace, to June 11, and from June 20 assisted in a French evacuation hospital at La
Chapelle. There being no American evacuation hospitals in the sector all evacuations
from the division were made through French evacuation hospitals.
Aisne-Marne operation, July 30 to August 6, 191S.
Oise-Aisne operation, August 28 to September 2, 1918.
Meuse-Argonne operation, September 26 to November 11, 1918.
Army of Occupation.
Division headquarters sailed from Brest, April 27, 1919, and arrived at New York,
May 5.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Perry L. Boyer, M. ('., August 25. 1917, to November 4, 1937.
Col. Gilbert K. Seaman, M. C, November 5-21. 1917.
Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. 0., November 22, 1917, to March 10, 1918.
Col. Gilbert R. Seaman, M. C, March 11. 1917, to October 21, 1918.
Lieut. Col. James R. Scott, M. C, October 22, 1918, to January 27, 1919.
Major Louis A. Moore, M. C, February 1. 1919, to March 15 1919.
Lieut. Col. James R. Scott, M. C, March 16, 1919, to May, 1919.
THE 33D DIVISION 1 ■"
(National Guard. Insignia: A yellow cross on a black circle)
The 33d Division was organized at Camp Logan, Tex., in July, 1917, from National
Guard troops of Illinois. The organization was as follows:
65th Infantry Brigade :
129th and 130th Infantry; 123d Machine Gun Battalion.
66th Infantry Brigade:
131st and 132d Infantry ; 124th Machine Gun Battalion.
58th Field Artillery Brigade:
122d, 124th (light), and 123d (heavy) Field Artillery; 108th Trench Mortar
Battery.
122d Machine Gun Battalion.
108th Engineers.
108th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (108th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 129, 130, 131. 132 and
Ambulance Companies, Nos. 129, 130. 131, 132).
The first unit of the division arrived in France May 18, 1918; the last. June 15, 1918.
13576—25 63
994 FIELD OPERATIONS
For the purpose of training, the division (less artillery) was sent to the Huppy area
near Abbeville, where it began instruction with the British. On June S, it moved to the
Eu area, and on June 20-21 advanced into the Amiens sector, where certain units par-
ticipated in several active operations. On July 4, two companies of the 131st Infantry
and two companies of the 132d Infantry took part in the attack of the Australians on
Hamel. In the Somme offensive, the 131st Infantry played a prominent part in the attack
on Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood.
On August 23, the division was transferred to the area of the First American Army
in the Toul sector and was concentrated in the vicinity Of Tronville-en-Barrois. On
Sepember 5, it began its movement to the Verdun sector, where it relieved the French 120th
Division and the right regiment of the French futli Division on the nights of September 7,
S, and 0.
The sanitary train arrived in France June 20, 1918. One-half of the train (Field
Hospitals No. 129 and No. 130 and Ambulance Companies No. 129 and No. 130 and four
camp infirmaries) proceeded to Molliens-aux-Bois for training under the British, while
Field Hospitals No. 131 and No. 132, and Ambulance Companies No. 131 and No. 132 were
sent to a training area in southern France.
In order that the Medical Department of the division might employ British equip-
ment, it was necessary so to organize the sanitary train that its elements would function
in a manner similar to those of corresponding units in the British Army — the field
ambulances. This was effected by combining two ambulance companies and two field
hospitals. One ambulance company and one field hospital then constituted a provisional
field ambulance. The two units thus formed were numbered 129 and 130, and both were
equipped with British medical materiel
Provisional Field Ambulance No. 129 went into training at Famechon, operating in
conjunction with Field Ambulance No. 42 (British). On July IS it moved to Allonville.
with the 65th Brigade, where it was attached to the Australian Third Corps, and per-
formed evacuation service from forward areas.
Provisional Field Ambulance No. 130 went into training at Pierregot, performing
regular ambulance service for the 06th Brigade while in the British sector and also
serving British troops located near it. Detachments were sent forward frequently to the
main dressing stations, advance dressing stations, and bearer posts for the purpose of
instruction. Provisional Ambulance Company No. 130 operated with the 00th Brigade and
the British in front of Vadencourt, Henencourt, and Montigny. In the attack on Chipilly
Ridge and Gressaire Wood, eight casualties occurred in the Medical Department detach-
ment of the 131st Infantry.
When the sanitary train arrived in the Toul sector British equipment was retained
with the exception of the transport, which was returned to the British. Field Hospitals
No. 131 and No. 132 rejoined the division on August 31, but the remaining two ambulance
companies (No. 131 and No. 132) did not join until October, and United States Army
Ambulance Service Section No. GOO was assigned to the division to replace them.
The sanitary train was located at Menil-sur-Saulx and Field Hospital No. 129 estab-
lished a sick collecting point at Tronville. When the division moved to the Verdun sector,
the sanitary train was disposed as follows: Field Hospital No. 131, at Glorieux, triage:
Field Hospital No. 130, gas cases, at Souhesmes ; Ambulance Company No. 129 established
an advanced dressing station at Da Claire. The remainder of the sanitary train took
station at Sivry-la-Perche, where Field Hospital No. 132 opened a divisional sick collecting
station.
From the field hospitals casualties were evacuated to Evacuation Hospitals No. 6
and No. 7. at Souilly.
On September 10 the sanitary train moved to Thierville and Glorieux and prepara-
tions were made for the coming operation.
Meuse-Argonne operation. September 20 to October 23
Trovon sector. October 20 to November 11. 1918.
BR.IEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 995
On December S, 191S the division commenced an advance which carried Its leading
brigades across the Moselle into Rhenish Germany. During this movement it was
attached to the army of occupation, but upon the revocation of this disposition, on
December 15, it was withdrawn west of that river and established in the northern part
of Luxemburg, with headquarters located at Diekirch. There it remained until the latter
part of April, 1910, when the movement to I,e Mans was begun preparatory to returning
to the United States. Division headquarters sailed from Brest on May 9. and arrived at
Hoboken on May 17, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. L. M. Hathaway, M. C, August 23, 1917. to January G, 1919.
Col. Harry D. Orr, M. C, January 7, 1919, to May 18, 1919.
THE 35TH DIVISION 1 ■ "
(National Guard. Insignia: Santa Fe cross within two circles of varying colors, the
outer one divided into four arcs)
The 35th Division was organized at Camp Doniphan, Fort Sill. Okla.. in September,
1917. from National Guard units of Missouri and Kansas.
The organization was as follows :
69th Infantry Brigade :
137th and 13Sth Infantry; ]29th Machine Gun Battalion.
70th Infantry Brigade :
139th and 140th Infantry; 130th Machine Gun Battalion.
80th Field Artillery Brigade:
128th, 129th (light), 130th (heavy) Field Artillery: 110th Trench Mortar
Battery.
12Sth Machine Gun Battalion.
110th Engineers.
110th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (110th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 137, 13S, 139, 140 and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 137, 138, 139, 140).
The first unit of the division arrived in France May 11. 1918; the last, June 8, 1918.
For training purposes, the division (less artillery) was sent to the vicinity of Eu
(Somme), where it remained until June 8, 191S. It moved to the vicinity of Epinal on
June 11, and on June 30 it moved to the Vosges. where it was brigaded with the French
in line in the Gerardmer sector. Command of the sector passed to the commanding
general, 35th Division, on July 27. The Artillery brigade trained at Camp Coetquidan.
It rejoined the division in the Vosges. August 14.
On August 31, the division was relieved by units of the American 6th Division, and
French 131st Division, and proceeded to the Foret de Haye, west of Nancy, for concen-
tration preparatory to the St. Mihiel operation, in which it was in the reserve of the
Kirst Army.
On September 15, the division was placed under the tactical control of the French
Second Army, and moved to the Naives-devant-Bar area, with headquarters established at
I'assavant-en-Argonne, on September IS. On September 19. it moved to the Vraincourt —
Auzerille area, with headquarters at Autrecourt. On September 23. it relieved the French
7.3(1 Division, in the line in the Grange-la-Comte sector.
The sanitary train did not join the division until June 12. Practically no medical
equipment had been brought from the United States except the personal equipment of
officers and enlisted men. Battalions were supplied with British equipment and three
British field ambulances. Nos. 9G, 97, and 98, were assigned t<> the division :is training
units as well as to care for division casualties. When the division arrived in the vicinity
"f Epinal, the sanitary train rejoined it and was billeted at Eloyes, The train arrived
with but little equipment, and no transportation was available for the first 30 hours.
996 FIELD OPERATIONS
Ten large 3-ton trucks were assigned to the train, eight of which were used to collect and
evacuate the sick and injured. Within a week after its arrival in this* secror, 42 trucks
and 12 motor ambulances were received.
Field Hospital No. 137 established in tents and buildings at Eloyes for sick and
contagious cases.
Field Hospital No. 140 and Ambulance Company No. 140 were stationed at La Racine
for the hospitalization and evacuation of the 69th Brigade and llOtli Engineers. Field
Hospital No. 13G and Ambulance Company No. 130 were at Le Menil, to cover the 70th
Brigade and Machine Gun Battalion.
Field Hospital No. 189 and Ambulance Company No. 130 were held in reserve. Ambu-
lance Company No. 137, with headquarters at Eloyes, operated as an evacuation ambu-
lance company.
When the division began to filter in with French troops in the Vosges, Field Hospital
No. 139 took over a section of a French hospital at Bussang and Ambulance Company-
No. 140 established in part at Ranspach. On June 20, United States Army Ambulance
Section No. GOG reported for duty with the sanitary train and was assigned to Ranspach
for evacuation from battalions in the line to the field hospital at Bussang.
On June 28 Field Hospital No. 13S relieved No. 139 at Bussang. the latter moving to
Kruth, where it operated a hospital for contagious diseases. A section of Field Hospital
No. 137 established a hospital for surgical and gas cases at Storkensohn. Field Hospital
No. 140 operated at Urbes for medical and venereal cases. The medical supply depot was
also at the latter place. A section of Field Hospital No. 137 remained at Eloyes to care
for seriously sick at that point.
Ambulance Company No. 138 moved up to Bussang. and the remainder of the ambu-
lance companies established their headquarters at Ranspach.
Motor ambulance stations were established at Larchey, Dreh, Kruth, Haag, Wagram,
and Moosch. Ambulance Company No. 140 operated its animal-drawn ambulances from
Thann and Mittlach. The dressing sections of Ambulance Companies No. 139 and No. 140
were operating in connection with Alpine ambulances at Larchey and Wagram. Dressing
station sections were also operating at Haag and Wagram. On July 1 the section of
Field Hospital No. 137, operating at Eloyes, was closed and consolidated at Storkensohn.
Sections from Ambulance Companies Nos. 137, 139, and 140 also occupied parts of the
Alpine ambulances at Mittlach, Larchey, and Nonette. These three principal dressing
stations served the front line and were the farthest points to which ambulances could be
sent. From the battalion aid stations to these dressing stations it was necessary to
transport the patients by hand, pack mule, or wheeled litter.
The Alpine ambulances were permanent sector installations, with a small personnel
from the French medical department. They were absolutely 7 shell-proof and were prac-
tically entirely underground ; each was equipped for the treatment of the gassed and had
its wards, operating rooms, etc., as well as quarters for the personnel.
On July 20 the dressing station at Nonette was given up. Ambulance Company No. 137
established a dressing station at Ventron. At this time Ambulance Company No. 139
operated the station at Mittlach and Ambulance Company No. 138 at Larchey. The trans-
port section of the latter operated as an evacuation ambulance company.
United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 606 was relieved from duty with
the division and a part of section No. G42 was assigned.
On August 10 units of the sanitary train were located as follows: Field Hospital No.
137, operating in three sections, at Storkensohn, with Surgical Unit No. 13, for surgical
cases, at Kruth for surgical and gassed cases, and at Dreh for gas and nontransportable
wounded.
Field Hospital No. 138, at Bussang, functioned as an evacuation hospital ; No. 139, at
I^e Menil, for contagious ; No. 140, at Ventron, for medical, venereal, and skin cases.
Ambulance Company No. 137 operated dressing stations at Larchey and performed evacua-
tion in that sector. Ambulance Company No. 138, at Bussang, evacuated to base hospitals.
Ambulance Company No. 139, at Ventron, evacuated the reserve area. Ambulance Com-
pany No. 140 operated a dressing station at Mittlach, evacuating that sector.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 997
The problem of evacuation of tlie wounded from the front in the mountains back to
the field hospitals presented at all times almost every imaginable difficulty. The character
of the terrain rendered any plan of uniform evacuation impossible. On account of the
difference in the lateral elevation of most of the trenches, it was necessary for each of
the battalions to establish from two to four aid stations, and, in addition, there
were always one or two Medical Department men operating a small aid station with each
company in line.
From the front-lino trenches it was always necessary to carry the wounded back by
band; in most instances not even a litter could be used, the men being transported on the
backs of the litter bearers. Litter bearers ordinarily worked in squads of four, the
litter being carried on the shoulders of the four men. Occasionally it was possible to use a
wheel litter, where the paths were not too rough and not too steep.
From battalion aid stations to the dressing station it was occasionally possible to
send up narrow double-decked French litter ambulances carrying two patients recumbent.
This ambulance, however, was unsatisfactory because of its weight and unwieldiness,
and also because on the steep paths it always required two mules. The pack carrier, or
cacolet, was tried out, but was soon abandoned because of the pain that transportation by
it gave the wounded man. In spite of all the difficulties and the long distances, no patient
was ever received at the surgical hospital later than 12 hours after his injury.
When, on August 31, the division was relieved in the Gerardmer sector, the relief of
the Medical Department was carried out in conformity with the following orders :
Secret.
D. S. 35th Division.
August 31st, 191S.
Field Medical, Order Xo. 8
1. In compliance with orders, headquarters. 35th Division and 33d French Corps, the
sanitary units of the Gth Division will relieve the sanitary units of the 35th Division.
This relief will be completed before midnight of September 1. 1818. The relief will be
made, unit for unit, in the present location of the sanitary units of the 35th Division.
2. The commanding officer. 110th Sanitary Train, will continue to clear the field
hospitals of the 35th Division into the Base at Yittel, with all available transportation,
until midnight September 1, 1918.
3. As soon as the relief of units of the 35th Division is complete, each unit will move
to its new billeting area. The billeting areas designated for the sanitary train, September
2. 1918, are Barren Scroux and Arrents de Carcicux. Unit billeting officers should be
sent 24 hours ahead of the movement of their unit. The relief and movement of the
units of the sanitary train of the 35th Division must be completed before 6 p. m., Sep-
tember 2, 1918.
4. The commanding officer, 110th Sanitary Train, will arrange to cover movement
of troops with ambulances and to collect sick and injured from the new billeting areas.
Evacuation to be made to the hospitals at Gerardmer or to the French Ambulance at
Fraizc.
5. The surgical team, less the three female nurses and the X-ray unit with per-
sonnel, will accompany Field Hospital Xo. 137. The three female nurses will be sent to
Vittel, to remain there until the division arrives in its new area.
6. Intransportnble cases of sick and injured will be taken over by the field hospitals
of the 6th Division.
7. Every field hospital, ambulance company, and regimental or battalion unit will be
completely equipped with medical supplies. Shell dressings on the basis of 700 to each
field hospital will be taken. Each field hospital will take its allotment of ward tents and
other necessary tentage.
8. The medical supply depot will cut its supplies down to two truck loads after
supplying the units of the 35th Division. All surplus supplies from hospitals, ambulance
companies, and medical supply depot will be turned over to the Gth Division. Red Cross
and French beds, together with all French equipment and all surplus American equipment
now held in the 35th Division, will be turned over to the corresponding units of the tith
Division on informal receipt.
9. The bath at Kntth. with one Foden lorry, will be left with the 6th Division as
sector equipment. One Foden lorry will accompany the division.
10. In compliance with telegraphic orders. 7th American Army Corps, Ambulance
Company Xo. 102 will report for duty to the 6th Division as soon as the 35th Division
moves.
998 FIELD OPERATIONS
Hdqrs., Macktary,
August 31, 191S.
Secret
Field Orders, No. 60.
1. In accordance with secret orders, hdqrs. .'{5th Division, the sanitary train of the
Ctli Division will relieve the units of this command. Relief will be effected before
midnight, September 1, 1918. The relief will be made unit for unit in the present loca-
tions of units of this train.
(a) In order to avoid unnecessary transportation, units will, when possible, make
an exchange of equipment.
(&) Red Cross beds and mattresses, French equipment, and all surplus American
equipment will he turned over to the units of the 6th Sanitary Train, on informal
memorandum receipt.
2. Lieut. Charles L. Mosley, 140th Field Hospital, will have command of the truck
train and will be responsible for the observance of the movement schedule of tins or-
ganization.
(a) Lieut. Vehrs, 187th Field Hospital, will report to Lieut. Mosley for tempo-
rary duty.
(6) All trucks in possession of organizations of this train, with drivers (two days
ration), will report before 9 a. m., September 1, IMS. as follows: From organizations
east of Ventron, to Lieut. Mosley at Kruth ; from organizations west of Kruth, to
Lieut. Vehrs at Ventron.
3. (a) Ambulance Company 138 will continue to evacuate field hospitals until mid-
night Sept. 1, 1917, to the American base at Vittel. This company will cover
movement of the troops of this division and the billeting areas (as per attached schedule),
evacuating the sick and injured to the field hospital, 6th Division, at Gerardmer or
to the Alpine ambulance station at Fraize. Location of regimental and battalion in-
firmaries will be reported to these hdqrs. The four Ford ambulances now with A. C.
137, with personnel and one day's rations, will report to the C. O., A. C. 13S, for duty,
on relief from present stations. This company, less transportation section, will clear
Ventron at 1 p. m., Sept. 2, 1918, for Barney Seroux, movement to be made by trucks
via Cornimont, Vagney, and Gerardmer. On completion of movement of the division,
transportation will take station with company.
((*) A. C. 137 will rendezvous at Hillside dressing station, on being relieved. They
will proceed at 4 a. m., Sept. 2, 191 S, for Barbey Seroux, marching to Kruth, and from
this place to destination by trucks. The equipment of this company will be transported
to Kruth by Ambulance Company 14(l in time t<> be loaded on trucks at 5.30 a. m..
Sept. 2, 1918.
(c) A. C. 139 will clear Le Collet at 1 p. in., Sept. 2, 1918, for Barbey Seroux,
movement to be made on trucks via Gerardmer.
(d) A. C. 140, less transportation section, will proceed to Barbey Seroux at 5 a. m.,
Sept. 2, 1918, movement to be made by trucks via Cornimont, Vagney. and Gerardmer road.
The transportation section will transport its own and the equipment of A. C. 137 from
dressing stations to Kruth. Upon completion of this duty it will proceed via Wildenstein,
Le Collet, and Gerardmer to company hdqrs., at Barbey Seroux.
4. (a) F. H. 139 will close at Le Menil at 10 a. m.. Sept. 1, 1918, moving by truck to
Arrents de Carcieux, via Cornimont, Vagney, and Gerardmer.
(b) F. H. 140 will clear Ventron at 10 a in., Sept. 1, 1918, moving by truck via Corni-
mont. Vagney, and Gerardmer to Arrents de Carcieux.
(c) F. H. 137 will clear Kruth at 3 p. m., Sept. 1, 1918, proceeding to Arrents de
Carcieux by trucks.
(d) F. H. 138 will clear Gerardmer at 2 p. m., Sept. 1, 1918, proceeding to Arrents de
Carcieux by trucks.
(e) The 162d A. C. will maintain its present stations for the time being. Upon
movement of this command it will stand relieved from duty with this division, and in
compliance with telegraphic orders. 7th American Army Corps will report to the 6th
Division for duty.
5. Trucks returning to Kruth for the 137th F. H. will travel via Gerardmer, Le Collet,
and Wildenstein.
(a) All patients in the hospital at the time of closing will be transferred to the
relieving units.
6. By direction of the division surgeon, the surgical team, less three female nurses,
will accompany F. H. 137.
(a) The female nurses will proceed to Vittel, remaining there until the division
arrives at its new area.
(6) The C. O., A. C. 138, will arrange for the transportation necessary for com-
pliance with (a).
7. The X-ray unit and personnel will accompany F. H. 137.
S. The division laboratory will move with F. H. 139.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 999
9. The medical supply depot will close at Gerardmer and Kruth at 1 p. m.. Sept. 2,
1918, and move to Barbey Seroux. Two truckloads of assorted supplies will be taken.
Shell dressings, on the basis of 700 to each field hospital, will be taken. Field hospitals,
ambulance companies, regimental and battalion infirmaries will be fully equipped with
medical supplies. The remaining supplies will he turned over to the M. S. O. (medical
supply officer) 6th division.
9^2- The train supply officer will make necessary arrangements for the supply of the
units of this command in compliance with Orders No. 80, division hdqrs., August 30th, 1918.
10. AH unit commanders will make careful inspections of quarters and billets occu-
pied by the personnel of their command, to see that they are properly policed and that
no equipment is left. The billeting distribution lists will be properly closed.
11. Division orders relating to march discipline and aerial observation will be strictly
complied with. The senior officer of the troops moving will be responsible for the proper
discipline of his command. Men will not ride on top of trucks nor on the sides.
12. Field hospitals will not open at new locations.
13. The personnel officer will have charge of billeting arrangements of all units of
this command.
14. Train headquarters will close at Gerardmer at 2 p. m.. Sept. 2. and open at same
hour and date at Barbey Seroux. Lieut. Mosley will furnish two trucks to train hdqrs.
for this movement.
During the St. Mihiel operation, September 12-16, the division was in reserve, and
Field Hospital No. 137 was established at Les Cinq Tranchees, on the Nancy — Toul road,
to act as a triage and to care for emergency cases; seriously sick and injured men were
evacuated to the Justice Groupe at Toul.
Meuse-Argonne operation, September 26 to November 8. 101S.
The division proceeded to the St. Mihiel area, with headquarters at Commercy. On
March 9. 1919, it moved to Montfort (Sarthe), remaining until April 5. when it pro-
ceeded to St. Nazaire preparatory to returning to the United States.
Division headquarters sailed from St. Nazaire on April 8. 1919. and arrived at
Newport News, Va., April 20, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Wilson T. Davidson, M. C, September, 1917, to April 9, 1918.
Col. Raymond L. Turck, M. C, April 10, 1918, to January 8, 1919.
Lieut. Col. Carl Phillips, M. C, January 9, 1919, to April. 1919.
THE 36TH DIVISION '• 18
(National Guard. Insignia: An arrowhead with the letter "T" superimposed)
The 36th Division was organized at Camp Bowie, Fort Worth. Tex., under authority
of a War Department order dated July 18. 1917. It was composed of National Guard
troops from the States of Texas and Oklahoma. Just prior to embarking, the division
was brought up to war strength by the addition of several thousand National Army men
from the two States mentioned.
Its composition was as follows :
71st Infantry Brigade :
141st and 142d Infantry: 132d Machine Gun Battalion.
72d Infantry Brigade :
143d and 144th Infantry; 133d Machine Gun Battalion.
131st Machine Gun Battalion.
61st Field Artillery Brigade:
131st, 132d (light), and 133d (heavy) Field Artillery; 111th Trench Mortar
Battery.
111th Engineers.
111th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (111th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 141, 142, 143, 144 and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 141, 142, 143, 144).
The first units of the division arrived in France May 31. 1918. and the last August
2, 1918.
1000 FIELD OPERATIONS
Immediately upon arrival all units, with the exception of the artillery, were sent to
the Thirteenth training area in the vicinity of Bar-sur-Aube, where division headquarters
was established on July 27. The 61st Field Artillery Brigade was detached and sent to
Ooetquidan, an Artillery training camp in Brittany, where it remained throughout the
period of hostilities.
The division was stationed at Bar-sur-Auhe until September 20, at which time it
moved by rail to the area between Epernay and Chalons and established headquarters at
Pocancy, Department of the Marne. Here it remained 10 days, as a reserve of the
French group of armies of the center, attached to the French Fifth Army for purposes
of supply.
To the north, only a short distance, the Mouse-Argonne operation was under way.
The American attack between the Argonne and the Meuse was being aided by the French
Fourth Army in the Champagne just to the west. In the latter sector the enemy stubbornly
resisted every attack, and on October 3 the 3Gth Division was transferred to the French
Fourth Army, with which the American 2d Division was already serving.
On the night of October 4 units of the division began moving from the Pocancy area
to the vicinity of Suippes and Somme-Suippes.
The sanitary train arrived in France July 31, 1918, and joined the division at Bar-sur-
Aube on August 24. Here the train underwent training, and Field Hospital No. 141 estab-
lished a temporary hospital for class C men and Field Hospital No. 143 opened for skin
and venereal cases. All other casualties were cared for by Camp Hospital No. 42, at Bar-
sur-Aube.
On September 27 the train proceeded to Plivot, Marne, where Field Hospital No. 143
established a skin and venereal hospital and Field Hospital No. 141 opened a convalescent
hospital at Aulnay. Here the train received 29 additional G. M. C. ambulances, 24 large
trucks, and 1 motor cycle. On Octoher 4 United States Army Ambulance Service Section
No. 588 reported for service with the division.
Meause-Argonne operation, October 7—26, 1918.
The division was then assembled in the Suippes-Somme-Suippes area and from this
point moved to the Triaucourt area and established headquarters at Conde-en-Barrois.
Here it remained until the signing of the armistice as a unit of the American First Army.
Shortly after the conclusion of hostilities the division moved to the lOtli Training
Area, around Tonnerre, and established headquarters at Cheney. Here it remained until
April 26, 1919, when the first element started for a port of embarkation for return to
this country.
Division headquarters sailed from Brest May 23 and arrived at New York. June 4.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Raymond F. Metcalf, M. C, September 3, 1917, to December 6, 1918.
Lieut. Col. John J. O'Reilly, M. C, December 7, 1918, to May, 1919.
THE 37TH DIVISION 1 "
(National Guard. Insignia: A red circle with a white border)
The 37th Division was organized at Camp Sheridan, Ala., under authority of a War
Department order dated July 18, 1917. It was composed of National Guard troops from
the State of Ohio, supplemented by National Army men.
Its composition was as follows :
73d Infantry Brigade:
145th and 146th Infantry ; 135th Machine Gun Battalion.
74th Infantry Brigade :
147th and 148th Infantry; 136th Machine Gun Battalion.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF (tOMBAT DIVISIONS 1001
62d Field Artillery Brigade:
134th and 135th (light), 136th (heavy) Field Artillery; 112th Trench Mortar
Battery.
134th Machine Gun Battalion.
112th Engineers.
112th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (112th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 145, 140, 147, 148, and
Ambulance Companies Nos. 145, 146, 147, 148).
The first unit of the division arrived in France June IS, 1918, and the hist July 21,
1918. All elements, with the exception of the artillery, were immediately dispatched to
the Bourmont (Haute-Marne) area for preliminary training. For the same purpose the
artillery was sent to Camp de Souge, near Bordeaux. It never rejoined the division during
the period of hostilities, but participated in the Meuse-Argonne operation, serving suc-
cessively with the American Fourth Corps, American Second Army, French Second Colonial
Army Corps, and the French Seventeenth Army Corps.
The division remained in the Bourmont area until the latter part of July, at which
time it entrained for the quiet Baccarat sector, in the Vosges. On August 4 front-line
trenches were occupied for the first time. The division was relieved in this sector Septem-
ber 16.
From Baccarat it moved to the area around the town of Robert-Espagne, and after
a rest of four days proceeded to Kecicourt, Department of the Meuse. Two days later
the first elements of the division moved north to join in the Meuse-Argonne operation,
soon to be launched: division headquarters was established at Verrieres-en-Hesse Farm, 4
km. (2.4 miles) south of Avocourt.
The sanitary train joined the division in the Bourmont training area and moved with
it to the Baccarat sector. Here the ambulance triage was established at Merviller, with
ailvance dressing stations at Vaxainville, Ste. Pole, and Pexonne, from which points "cab
stands," or ambulance posts, were established in various towns, ambulances for these
stands being sent out by the nearest ambulance company. These four ambulance dressing
stations were maintained by each ambulance company in turn so each became familiar
with the duties of a triage and dressing station.
The field hospitals did not receive battle casualties; these were sent direct from the
Iriage to Evacuation Hospital No. 2, at Baccarat.
The field hospitals functioned as follows: Field Hospital Xo. 145 was established in
the woods between Merviller and Brouville for skin and venereal diseases, except scabies;
No. 146 on the Meurthe, near Baccarat. This hospital had excellent bathing facilities for
the treatment of skin diseases; No. 147 was established in semipermanent barracks in the
chateau grounds at Baccarat and cared for all minor and emergency surgical work.
Xo. 148 occupied permanent barracks near Baccarat and cared for all cases not included
in the foregoing classification.
Meuse-Argonne operation, September 26 to October 3, 1918.
On October 1 the division was relieved on a line just south of Cierges and retired
to Pagny-sur-Meuse.
After a brief rest it was transported to the St. Mihiel region, and headquarters was
established at Euvezin. In this area the division took over a line extending from the
Bois de Hailbot, along the northern edge of the Bois de la Montagne and Bois de Charey,
to the southern edge of the Etang de Lachaussee. Although the sector was normally
quiet, the division was subjected to a heavy and continuous bombardment from the moment
it entered. It was relieved in this sector on October 15, and again moved to Pagny-sur-
Meuse.
In this sector the sanitary train took over the positions occupied by the 89th Division.
Two field hospitals and a triage were established at Bernecourt; one field hospital at
Bouillonville and the remaining hospital took care of the sick of the division in a French
hospital near Noviant. The ambulance companies established dressing stations at Pagny.
13576—25 64
1002 FIELD OPERATIONS
Thiaucourt. and Jaulny. The regimental stations were located near .Taulny. Beney, and
Xammes. This sector was very active, with considerable artillery fire, a preponderance
of gas shells, and many casualties.
Ypres-Lys operation, October 31 to November 11, 191S.
After the signing of the armistice the division started moving east : but just before
reaching Brussels orders were received to turn back, and, on December 7, headquarters
was located at Hondschoote. France. Detachments of the division, however, participated
in the entry of King Albert into Brussels.
From Hondschoote the 37th Division moved to Wormhoudt and thence to Le Mans
to embark for this country. Division headquarters sailed on March 15 and arrived at
New York March 2.'!, 1010.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Lieut. Col. James A. Hall, M. C, September. 1017. to August 2S, 191S.
Col. John C. Darby, M. C, August 29, 1918. to September C, 1918.
Col. Louis Brechemin. jr.. M. C, September 7, 1918, to February 8, 1919.
Col. John C. Darby, M. C. February 9, 1919, to March. 1919.
THE 42D DIVISION 1 20
(National Guard. Insignia: Particolored quadrant representing part of a rainbow)
The 42d Division was organized in August, 1917, at Camp Mills. N. Y. Its personnel
was composed of National Guard troops from 26 States and the District of Columbia.
Individual enlistments and later replacements brought into the organization representa-
tives of practically every State in the Union, thus making this division a truly com-
posite, ail-American unit.
The organization was as follows :
83d Infantry Brigade:
165th and 166th Infantry : 150th Machine Gun Battalion.
84th Infantry Brigade:
107th and 108th Infantry: 151st Machine Gun Battalion.
149th Machine Gun Battalion.
07th Field Artillery Brigade :
149th and 151st (light). 150th (heavy) Field Artillery; 117th Trench Mortar
Battery.
117th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (Sanitary Train 117: Field Hospitals Nos. 165, 100, 107. 108 and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 165, 166, 167, 168).
The first unit of the division to go overseas arrived in France November 1. 1917: the
last December 3, 1917.
For training purposes, the division (less artillery) was sent to the Vaucouleurs area
and then to the Kimaucourt and Rolampont areas, successively. For the same purpose
the Artillery brigade went to Coetquidan, rejoining the division in the Rolampont area
the middle of February. With the exception of three short periods, when it supported
the 4th. 32d, and 2d Divisions, successively, the Artillery brigade served continuously with
the 42d Division throughout operations.
To complete its training the division was attached to the French Seventh Army Corps,
in the Luneville Sector, February 21. 191S, and its units participated in raids of major
and minor importance and in the routine of trench warfare. On March 31 the division
took over the Baccarat Sector, relieving the French 128th Division in line.
The sanitary train arrived with the division at the Vaucouleurs area in the early part
of November. 1917. with the exception of Field Hospital No. 100. which joined December
24. 1917. Here the train underwent extensive training. For the first two weeks the
division had no ambulances, and infirmaries were established in every village where
milEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 1003
troops were billeted. On November 11 Field Hospital No. 168 opened for division sick
.it Mauvages. When the division moved to the Rolampont area, in December, 1017, Field
Hospital No. 165 established a camp hospital at Langres.
In the Duneville sector the field hospitals were so disposed as to be of most assistance
to the French medical service, under whom the train served coincident with the move to
this; sector. Motor equipment was issued for three field hospitals and animal-drawn
transportation for Field Hospital No. 168.
Field Hospital No. 106 established, on February 25. 191S. at Luneville; Field Hospital
No. 167 was held in reserve at the latter place, but furnished details to assist Field
Hospital No. 106. The animal-drawn Ambulance Company No. 168. at Baccarat, was
split up and details were assigned to various French hospitals. Field Hospital No. 165
remained at Eangres. The ambulance companies received 36 new (J. M. C. ambulances.
Dressing stations were not established in this sector, but numerous ambulance posts
were maintained. In addition to these posts, tours of the entire area were made each
day by other ambulances for the purpose of collecting such sick and wounded as had
accumulated during the preceding 24 hours. Ambulance posts were changed every two
days, thus giving the entire personnel an opportunity to familiarize itself with the
locations and roads as well as with conditions as they existed at the front.
When, on March 31, the division relieved the French 12Sth Division in the Baccarat
sector, it took over the line as a tactical unit on a frontage of about 15 km. (9 miles).
Ambulance posts were established at Migneville. Reherrey. Montigny, St. Maurice. Badon-
viller, Village Negre, I'exonne, Celles Wood, Vacqueville, Neufmaisons, and Merviller,
with company reserves at Bertrichamps. Tactically the sector was divided into halves,
with Neufmaisons and Merviller as the controlling centers or frontal points, each having
access to the front by at least three roads. Dressing stations were established at
.Montigny. at a sawmill near St. Maurice, and at Pexonne. A relay and regulating station,
which also performed some service as a dressing station, was located at Merviller.
Animal-drawn ambulances were stationed at Azerailles. Olonville. Neufmaisons. Brouvllle,
and Deneuvre. while to meet emergencies four motor ambulances were posted at Baccarat,
two of them at French Evacuation Hospital 2 1 /. and two at Hospital No. 226. An
emergency group was formed consisting of 1 officer, 24 men. and 3 ambulances. The
irroup. whose personnel was changed daily, was posted at Bertrichamps and was available
for immediate service in the event of any emergency at the front. When an emergency
developed, the dressing station part of the area affected moved forward to reinforce
the aid station involved, taking over the station and sending forward such of its personnel
as were needed near or in the lines. As a result of this practice, seriously wounded
reached the hospitals within three or four hours : frequently in less time.
The field hospital section was ordered to this sector shortly after April 23. Field
Hospital No. 65 received seriously and nontransportable wounded at Baccarat until
Evacuation Hospital No. 2 began to receive patients from the division. French Hospital
No. 220 received the sick, Field Hospital No. 68 operated at the French hospitals
"mixte" and "temporaire." and took entire charge of French Evacuation Hospital No.
2y 2 - All of these formations were at Baccarat. The personnel of Field Hospitals No.
165 and No. 168 was supplemented by 20 female nurses. A hospital for skin cases and
a camp for venereal cases were operated by Field Hospitals No. 106 and No. 167,
respectively.
Champagne Sector, Ohampagne-Marne defensive, June 21 to July 17.
On .Tune 21, the division was withdrawn and proceeded to east of Reims, where it
took part in the Cbampagne-Marne operation.
Champagne-Marne operation July 15-17, 1018.
Aisne-Marne operation, July 25 to August 3, 1918.
St. Mibiel operation, September 12-10. 1018.
After the St. Mibiel operation the division remained in front-line position in the Essey
and Pannes sector until September 30, when it was withdrawn and moved to the region
south of Verdun, and became part of the reserve of the First Army.
1004 FIELD OPERATIONS
Meuse-Argonne operation, October 1 to November 11, 191S.
Army of Occupation.
Division headquarters sailed from Brest on April 7, 1019, and arrived at New York
on April 26, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Jay W. Grissinger, M. C, August 14. 1917. to June 30, 191S.
Col. David S. Fairchild, jr., M. C, July 1, 1918, to May, 1919.
THE 77TH DIVISION '■ "-'
(National Army. Insignia: Facsimile of Statue of Liberty in gold against a blue sky)
The 77th Division was organized in August, 1917. at Camp Upton, N. Y. It was com-
posed of National Army drafted men, the majority being from New York State, and from
the metropolitan district in particular. The minority were drawn from all sections of the
country. The organization was as follows:
153d Infantry Brigade:
305th and 306th Infantry ; 305th Machine Gun Battalion.
154th Infantry Brigade:
307th and 308th Infantry; 306th Machine Gun Battalion.
152d Field Artillery Brigade :
304th, 305th (light), 306th (heavy) Field Artillery; 302d Trench Mortar
Battery.
304th Machine Gun Battalion.
302d Engineers.
302d Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (302 Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 305, 306, 307, 308 and Ambulance
Companies Nos. 305, 306, 307. 308).
The first unit of the division arrived in France April 12, 1918; the last May 12, 191S.
For purposes of training, the division (less artillery) was attached to the 39th
British Division in the vicinity of Eperleeques (Pas-de-Calais). For the same purposes
the Artillery brigade was sent to Camp de Souge near Bordeaux. It rejoined the
division in the Baccarat sector July 12, and remained with it throughout combat opera-
tions. On June 11 the division proceeded by train to the Vosges. and on June 21 entered
the line in the Baccarat Sector, brigaded with the French. On August 4. it was relieved
in line by the 37th Division, and marched to Le Charme, where it entrained August 6 for
the Chateau-Thierry area.
In the Baccarat Sector, as in the British training area, regimental medical detach-
ments received continual instruction, according to a very thorough schedule, in all duties
Incident to their service. The ambulance companies operated individually toward a central
point designated as the triage, and the field hospitals were assigned to care for the
several classes of cases received — Field Hospital, No. 305, skin and contagious cases ;
No. 300. general medical ; No. 307, surgical ; and No. 30S, venereal. In more active sectors
venereal cases were kept with their organizations. Special efforts were made to assign
medical officers according to their qualifications. One of the most important developments
in this sector was the organization of the triage, but this was not fully perfected until
the division moved to its sector on the Vesle.
Vesle Sector, August 12-17, 1918.
Oise-Aisne operation, August IS to September 16, 1918.
Meuse-Argonne operation, September 26 to November 11, 191S.
After the armistice the division was sent to the 9th Training Area, with headquarters
established at Chateauvillain. Here it remained until it returned to the United States.
Headquarters sailed from Brest on April 17 and arrived at New York April 25, 1919.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 1005
DIVISION SURGEONS*
Col. Charles K. Reynolds, M. C, August 2G, 1917, to August 5, 1918.
Col. Robert Y\\ Kerr, M. C, August 7. 1918. to January 23, 1919.
Col. O. G. Brown, M. <'., January 24, 1919. to March 3, 1919.
Lieut. Col. David B. Downing, M. C. March 4, 1919 to April, 1919.
THE 78TH DIVISION 1 ■"
(National Army. Insignia: A lightning flash in white diagonally across a red semicircle)
The 7Sth Division was organized in August. 1917, at Camp Dix, N. J., from National
Army men of New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, later supplemented by men from the
New England States and Illinois. The organization was as follows:
155th Infantry Brigade:
309th and 810th Infantry; 308th Machine Gun Battalion.
156th Infantry Brigade:
311th and 312th Infantry; 309th Machine Gun Battalion.
153d Field Artillery Brigade:
307th. 30Sth (light), 300th (heavy) Field Artillery ; 303d Trench Mortar
Battery.
307th Machine Gun Battalion.
303d Engineers.
303d Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (303d Sanitary Train ; Field Hospitals Nos. 309, 310, 311, 312. and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 309, 310, 311, 312).
The first unit of the division arrived in France May 18, 1918; the last June 12. 1918.
Upon arrival the division (less artillery) was assigned to the Second Army Corps,
then operating with the British in Flanders. Training was begun in the area around
Nielles-les-Blequin, near the Ypres front. For the same purpose the Artillery brigade was
sent to Camp Meucon, in Brittany. It left Camp Meucon on August 17 and marched to
the Toul sector, where it relieved the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, on August 28-29. It
supported the 90th Division in the St. Mibiel operation, and rejoined the 78th Division
October 4.
On July 18, the division moved to the Arras area, with headquarters established at
Roellecourt. On August 20, it left the British sector and moved to the 11th Training
Area, with headquarters at Bourbonne-les-Bains (Haute-Marne). While here the division
was placed in the reserve of the First Army Corps, and a march north preparatory to the
concentration for the St. Mibiel operation began.
The sanitary train arrived in France June 10, 1918, and while at Le Havre half of
the train (Ambulance Companies No. 309 and No. 310 and Field Hospitals No. 309 and
No. 310) were detached and sent to an American training sector. They rejoined the
division in September and October, 1918. On arrival in the British training sector Am-
bulance Companies No. 311 and No. 312 and Field Hospitals No. 311 and No. 312 were
combined, forming Field Ambulances No. 311 and No. 312. These were equipped and
made to conform with the British field ambulance.
Field Ambulance No. 311 took station at Bournonville and Field Ambulance No. 312 at
Vieil-Moutier, where they took care of the division sick. Serious cases were evacuated
to a base hospital near Boulogne. July 19 the field ambulances were separated into
field hospitals and ambulance companies, the former moving to Buneville, where they
again cared for division sick, and the latter to Neuville-au-Cornet, where they served the
division in collection of the sick. On August 20 the train left for Bourbonne-les-Bains,
where it remained until the 2Sth. While at this station, Field Hospitals No. 309 and No.
310 rejoined the division and United States Army Ambulance Service section No. 500 was
100G FIELD OPERATIONS
attached. The train left Bourbonne-les-Bains on August 28-29, 1918. for Bourniont, where
it remained until September 3, when it proceeded to the Toul area.
St. Mihiel operation, September 12-16.
Tlie sanitary train remained in the areas mentioned in the St. Mlhlel operation until
October 4.
On the nights of October 3-4 and 4-5 the division was relieved and moved to the
Foret de la Reine, and thence to the Clermont-en-Argonne area. On October 10 it moved
to the eastern border of the Argonne Forest, with headquarters at Varennes. It was at
tiiis time a unit of the First Army Corps, operating as the left flank corps of the First
A rmy.
The sanitary train proceeded with the division to Clermont-en-Argonne, with the
exception of Field Hospital No. 310, which remained at St. Jacques to care for the re-
maining sick.
Meuse-Argonne operation. October 15 to November 11, 1918.
In the latter part of November the division moved to an area in the Cote d'Or. with
headquarters at Lemur-en-Auxois. It moved to ports of embarkation the latter part of
April. Headquarters sailed from Bordeaux on May 24 and arrived at New York June
C. 1919.
DIVISION SURGEON 3
Col. George M. Eckwurzel, M. O. August 25, 1917 to June 10, 1919.
THE 79TH DIVISION *■ a
(National Army. Insignia: A gray lorraine cross on a blue shield outlined in gray)
The 79th Division was organized August 25, 1917, at Camp Meade, Md. It was origi-
nally composed of National Army men from the States of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
the District of Columbia. Later drafts brought men from New York, Ohio, Rhode Island,
and West Virginia.
The organization of the division was as follows:
157th Infantry Brigade:
313th and 314th Infantry: 311th Machine Gun Battalion.
158th Infantry Brigade :
315th and 316th Infantry; 312th Machine Gun Battalion.
310th Machine Gun Battalion.
154th Field Artillery Brigade:
310th, 311th (light), and 312th (heavy) Field Artillery.
304th Field Signal Battalion.
304th Trench Mortar Battery.
304th Engineers.
Trains (304th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 313, 314, 315, 316 and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 313, 314. 315, 316).
The first unit of the division arrived In France July 12. 1918, and the last August 3.
1918.
The division, less the artillery, immediately went into training in the 10th training
area, with headquarters at Prauthoy, Haute-Marne. The artillery, upon landing in France,
was sent to La Courtine (Creuse). where it remained in training until after the armistice
and rejoined the division in January. 1919. in the Souilly area, south of Verdun.
The work in the training area continued until September 8, when the movement to the
front started. Moving by rail to an area around Robert Espagne and Bar-le-Duc, the
division detrained and proceeded by trucks and marching; on September 16 it took over
the Montfaucon. or 304th, sector (about 16 km. (9.6 miles) northwest of Verdun), relieving
the French 157th Division. This sector was approximately 5 km. (3 miles) in width, but
on September 22. in anticipation of the MeuseArgonne operation, was contracted to about
2.5 km. (1.5 miles). While in this sector two enemy raids were repulsed.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 1007
The sanitary train arrived with the division and underwent training at the Prauthoy
training area. No ambulances were available until the latter part of August, when two
sections (Nos. 502 and 506) of the United States Army Ambulance Service were attached
to the sanitary train.
Meuse-Argonne operation, September 26 to October 3, 191S.
Troyon sector, October 8-25, 1018.
Meuse-Argonne operation, October 29 to November 11, 191S.
From November 11 to December 26 the division remained on the battle front, taking
over a front extending from E>amvillers, on the north, to Fresnes-en-Woevre, on the south,
for patrol and police. On December 10, the headquarters, Headquarters Company, and
3d Battalion, 314th Infantry, proceeded to an area around Montmedy, Stenay, and Virion
(Belgium) for the purpose of guarding property, listing material, and maintaining order.
On February 1, 1919, this detachment rejoined the division in the Souilly area.
Moving to the Souilly area, south of Verdun, on December 27 the division found itself
completely assembled for the first time in France, when it was joined in January by the
Artillery brigade.
The division moved from the Souilly area during the last days of March to the fourth
training area, northeast of Chaumont, around Andelot and Rimaucourt, where it was
reviewed on April 12 by General Pershing. The movement from this area to Nantes and
St. Nazaire began on April 19, the artillery going to St. Nazaire and the infantry to the
vicinity of Nantes and Cholet.
Division headquarters sailed from St. Nazaire on May IS, 1919, and arrived at New
York City on May 27, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEON 3
Col. Philip W. Huntington, M. C, August 22, 1917 to June, 1919.
THE 80TH DIVISION '• "
(National Army. Insignia: Three blue peaks on a shield of khaki)
The 80th Division was organized August 27, 1917, at Camp Lee, Va. It was com-
posed of National Army men from the States of Virginia, West Virginia, and western
Pennsylvania.
The organization was as follows:
159th Infantry Brigade:
317th and 318th Infantry ; 313th Machine Gun Battalion.
160th Infantry Brigade :
319th and 320th Infantry; 315th Machine Gun Battalion.
155th Field Artillery Brigade:
313th, 314th (light), 315th (heavy) Field Artillery; 305th Trench Mortar
Battery.
314th Machine Gun Battalion.
305th Engineers.
305th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (305th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 317. 31S, 319, 320 and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 317, 318, 319. 320).
The first unit of the division arrived in France May 23. 1918. and the last June IS.
The division, less the artillery, immediately went into training with the British in
the Samer training area, a few kilometers east of Boulogne. The artillery was first sent
to Redon, near St. Nazaire, but completed its training at Camps de Coetquidan and
Meucon. The Artillery brigade did not rejoin the division until September, 1918.
1008 FIELD OPERATIONS
After a short period of training at Samer, the division moved to the Third British
Army sector, with headquarters at Beauval. Second line trendies between Albert and
Arras were occupied. During this period front-line trenches were also occupied by
battalion units. One battalion participated in an attack in conjunction with New Zealand
troops, and one with the Welsh 38th Division.
The division was relieved in this sector on August 20 and moved south to the four-
teenth training area, lying between Chaumont and Chatillon-sur-Seine. Here it remained
until August 31. On September 1 the 80th Division moved by rail to the Stainville area,
and later marched to the Tronville area. While in the latter the division composed the
reserve of the First Army during the St. Mihiel operation. The 820th Infantry and 315th
Machine Gun Battalion were attached to the French Second Colonial Corps and actively
participated in the operation. The 155th Artillery Brigade rejoined the division while
in this sector.
On September 14 the 80th Division was transported to the vicinity of Ippecourt
and placed in the American Third Corps. On the night of the 20th it moved forward
preparatory to entering the Meuse-Argonne operation.
The sanitary train arrived in France June 8-9, 1018. It did not join its division
immediately, but was billeted and underwent training during June and July in three small
villages in the Department Haute Saone — Chauvirey-le-Chatel, Chauvirey-le-Vieil, and
Ouge. On July 28, Field Hospitals No. 319 and No. 320, and Ambulance Companies No. 319
and No. 320 were ordered to the British Third Army sector for further training and were
furnished British equipment. Ambulance Companies No. 317 and No. 318 were detached
from the train the latter part of July and were lost to the division until October.
When the division was relieved from the British training area, the sanitary train
proceeded to the Tronville area, where it remained in reserve during the St. Mihiel
operation.
Meuse-Argonne operation, September 2G to November 11, 1918.
On November 8 the division marched to the Cornay-Apremont area and on the 12th
moved to the Les Islettes area. Here it rested until the 18th, then the division moved by
marching to the fifteenth training area, southwest of Cbatillon-sur-Seine.
The 155th Artillery Brigade rejoined December 5. after having served successively
with the 80th, 4th, 5th, and 90th Divisions, without relief, for a period of 48 days.
On March 30, 1919. the 80th Division started for the Le Mans area, and upon arrival
headquarters was established at Ecommoy. Here it remained until its return to the
United States.
Headquarters sailed from Brest May 17, 1919, and arrived at Newport News May 20,
1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Thomas L. Rhoads, M. C, September 10, 1917, to November 13, 1918.
Col. Elliott B. Edie, M. C, November 14, 1918, to May, 1919.
THE 81ST DIVISION' a
(National Guard. Insignia: Silhouette of wildcat in varying colors according to the
different branches of the service)
The 81st Division was organized at Camp Jackson, S. C, in September. 1917, from
National Army drafts from North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Florida, Illinois, and
New York.
The organization was as follows:
161st Infantry Brigade:
321st and 322d Infantry: 317th Machine Gun Battalion.
162d Infantry Brigade:
323d and 324th Infantry ; 318th Machine Gun Battalion.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 1009
156th Field Artillery Brigade :
316th, 317th (light), 318th (heavy) Field Artillery; 306th Trench Mortar
Battery.
316th Machine Gnu Battalion.
306th Engineers.
306th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (306th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 321, 322, 323, 324, and
Ambulance Companies Nos. 321. 322, 323, 324).
The first unit of the division arrived in France August 15, 1918; the last August
25, IMS.
For training purposes, the division (less artillery) was sent, to the sixteenth training
area, with headquarters at Tonnerre (Yonne). For the same purpose the Artillery
brigade was sent to Valdahon (Doubs). It did not participate in operations, but rejoined
the division in November, 1018.
The division proceeded to the Vosges on September 14. Arriving September 20, it
took over the St. Die Sector and remained in the front line from September 20 to October
10, 1918, as part of the French Thirty-Third Corps, and later as part of the French Tenth
Corps. Command of the sector passed to the commanding general, 81st Division, on
October 2. On October 10 the division moved to the vicinity of Rambervillers (Vosges),
and from there to the Sommedieue sector, southeast of Verdun, where it was in the
reserve of the French Seventy-Second Colonial Corps. On November 7 it passed to the
French Second Colonial Corps, and relieved the American 35th Division in line. 2
The sanitary train arrived in France the latter part of August, 1918, and joined the
division in the sixteenth training area, September 4. Here the train underwent training
until September 15, when it proceeded to the St. Die sector.
Owing to the fact that in the St. Die sector the front was 37 km. (22.2 miles)
and the evacuating points were two, Baccarat and Bruyeres, respectively, it was necessary
to establish all field hospitals with varying functions: Field Hospital No. 321 relieved
Field Hospital No. 367, 02d Division, at Bruyeres. It moved on October 12 to La Salle,
where it assisted Field Hospital No. 322. Field Hospital No. 223 relieved Field Hospital
N'o. 305, 02d Division, at Raon l'Etape. Field Hospital No. 324 relieved Field Hospital No.
306, 92d Division, at St. Die. Ambulance Company No. 324 established dressing stations
at Celles, Veriges, and Pierre Percee.
Other ambulances were stationed at various points on the front and were accessible at
all times for sick and wounded. During the stay of the division in this sector battle
casualties were very light, only 62 being evacuated to divisional hospitals. It suffered
greatly from influenza, and during the period from September 20 to October 23 field hos-
pitals admitted 1,040 influenza cases and 165 cases of pneumonia.
Meuse-Argonne operations, November 1-11, 1918.
On November 17 the division was relieved from the Sommedieue sector, and moved
to the Chatillon-sur-Seine training area, with headquarters at Mussy-sur-Seine, where it
remained until May 2, when it was sent to the Le Mans embarkation center preparatory to
returning to the United States.
Division headquarters sailed from Brest June 1, 1919, and arrived at New York June
11, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEON'
Col. Kent Nelson, M. C, August 25, 1917, to June, 1919.
THE 82D DIVISION ' "
(National Army. Insignia: Letters "A A" in gold on a blue circle, the whole superim-
posed on a red square)
The 82d Division was organized at Camp Gordon, Ga., in August, 1917, from National
Army men from Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee. At a later date the majority of these
1010 FIELD OPEEATIONS
men were transferred to other divisions, their places being tilled by drafts from Camps
Dodge, Travis, Devens, Upton, Dix, Meade, and Lee, so that the organizations became a
truly composite " ail-American " unit, as suggested by its insignia.
The organization was as follows :
lG3d Infantry Brigade:
325th and 326th Infantry ; 320th Machine Gun Battalion.
164th Infantry Brigade:
327th and 328th Infantry ; 321st Machine Gun Battalion.
157th Field Artillery Brigade:
320th, 321st (light), 310th (heavy) Field Artillery; 307th Trench Mortar
Battery.
310th Machine Gun Battalion.
307th Engineers.
307th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (307th Sanitary Train : Field Hospitals Nos. 325, 32G, 327, 328, and
Ambulance Companies Nos. 325, 326, 327, 328).
The first unit of the division arrived in France May S. 101S : the last July 12, 1918.
For training purposes the division (less artillery) was sent to the Escarbotin area.
west of Abbeville, where it was attached to the British 66th Division. For the same
purpose the Artillery brigade went to La Courtine (Creuse). It rejoined the division
in August, 1918.
The division left Escarbotin June 16, and on June 25 relieved the 26th Division in
the Toul sector, where it was brigaded with the French until July 17, upon which date
command passed to the commanding general, S2d Division. On August 9 it was relieved
by the 89th Division and proceeded to the vicinity of Toul, with headquarters at Blenod-
les-Toul.
The sanitary train arrived in France in June, 1918, and joined the division in the
Toul sector. While the division was in the Escarbotin area, all casualties were cared for
by the British.
In the Toul Sector the train took over corresponding units of the 26th Division,
establishing at Toul two field hospitals, which functioned essentially as base hospitals,
one near Royaumeix which served as a triage and one at Abbaye de Rangeval which
received gassed patients. The ambulance company section, which had but 20 vehicles
(8 G. M. C. and 12 animal drawn), was supplemented by United States Army Ambulance
Service Section No. 647, with 30 Ford ambulances.
Marbache Sector August 17 to September 11, 19IS.
St. Mihiel operation, September 12-16, 191S.
Meuse-Argonne operation, September 26 to November 7, 1918.
After its relief the division moved by successive stages to the tenth training area,
with headquarters established at Prauthoy (Haute Marne), November 15, 1918. In
March it moved to the vicinity of Bordeaux, with headquarters at Castres, preparatory
to returning to the United States.
Division headquarters sailed from Bordeaux on May 9, 1919, and arrived at New
York May 20, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Conrad E. Koerper, M. C, August 25, 1917, October 27, 1918.
Lieut. Col. Frederick G. Barfield, M. C, October 28, 1918.
THE 88TH DIVISION 1 •"
(National Army. Insignia: Two solid figures "8" crossed at right angles, resembling a
four-leaf clover)
The 88th Division was organized at Camp Dodge, Iowa, in September, 1917. from
National Army drafted men of North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois,
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 1011
later supplemented by drafted men from Missouri and Nebraska. The organization was
as follows :
175th Infantry Brigade:
349th and 350th Infantry : 338th Machine Gun Battalion.
176th Infantry Brigade :
351st and 352d Infantry ; 339th Machine Gun Battalion.
103d Field Artillery Brigade:
33Sth (light), 337th, and 339th (heavy) Field Artillery; 313th Trench Mortar
Battery.
337th Machine Gun Battalion.
313th Engineers-.
313th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (313th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nog. 349. 350, 351, 352 and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 349, 350, 351, 352).
The first units embarked for overseas on August 9, 1918; the last units arrived in
France September 7, 1918.
Upon arrival the division (less artillery) was ordered to the twenty-first training
area, with headquarters established at Lemur (Cote d'Or). The Artillery brigade was
sent to the artillery training school at Clermont-Ferrand, in the south of France. It
never served in the division again and returned to the United States in January. 1919.
On September 14 the division was placed under the command of the French Seventh
Army and moved by rail to the Hericourt training area (Haute Saone) near Belfort.
For administrative purposes alone the division was under the American Seventh Corps
with headquarters at Kemiremont.
On September 23. 1918, the division relieved the French 3Sth Division in the center
sector, Haute Alsace, with headquarters established at Montreux Chateau, on October 7.
It held this sector until November 2, 1918, when it became a part of the American Second
Army. One brigade was placed in reserve of the Fourth Corps, the remainder of the
division being in army reserve, with headquarters at Lagney.
The sanitary train arrived in England on September 1, 1818, and on the 8th proceeded
to the training area at Lemur, France. While in this area all casualties needing hospital
care were sent to French Auxiliary Hospital No. 35 at Lemur. The train had no ambu-
lances and sick were evacuated in automobiles. Serious cases were evacuated to Base
Hospital No. 17, at Dijon, by ambulances belonging to that hospital.
On October 10 the sanitary train established headquarters at Chavennes-sur-1'Etang.
in the center sector, Haute Alsace. This sector was divided by the Rhine-Rhone canal
into a northern segment, held by the 175th Brigade, and a southern segment, held by the
170th Brigade. One regiment of each brigade was in the line. In the northern segment
two battalions were in line, with headquarters at Hecken and Buethwiller. respectively,
the northern battalion operating two avdance aid posts located in dugouts in the woods
and a battalion aid station at Hecken. All of these stations were easily reached by ambu-
lance. The southern battalion operated one advance aid post in the northern end of their
line and a battalion aid station at Balschwiller, which was very close to the front line.
It was necessary to carry by litter from the upper station to Balschwiller, which was
easily accessible by ambulance. These two stations evacuated directly to the field hospi-
tal located at Bellemagny all except gassed patients, who were sent to the triage at Retz-
willer.
The segment south of the canal was held by three battalions of one regiment, with
headquarters at Hagenbach, Badrieourt, and Fulleren, respectively. The northern bat-
talion operated a battalion aid station at Hagenbach and three advance posts located
in the woods behind companies in the front lines. All of these stations were so located
that ambulances could go within a very short distance of them. The middle battalion
operated a battalion aid station at Badrieourt and three advance stations located along a
road behind the companies in the line. All of these stations were reached by ambulance.
1012 FIELD OPERATIONS
The southern battalion operated a battalion aid station at Fulleren and two advance
stations behind companies in the line. These stations also evacuated patients from the
battalion aid stations by ambulance to the triage at Retzwiller.
The advance aid posts were equipped to do first-aid dressings and to hold a limited
number of patients pending evacuation. The battalion aid stations had shock tables and
were equipped to furnish hot drinks to patients needing them. Antitetanic serum was
also administered here. Supplies and equipment were ample for the care of the wounded
received. Regimental stations, which were used as supply depots, carrying reserve sup-
plies, cared for only a few slightly sick men who needed care for a clay or two.
After September 20, when motor ambulances were received, all transportation was
pooled and ambulances were placed with each battalion and with regimental headquarters.
When train headquarters was established at Chevannes-sur-rEtang in the Alsace sector,-
training of the ambulance section personnel, less the transportation section, was con-
tinued. The litter-bearer section and dressing-station personnel of the ambulance com-
panies were used as additional personnel at the field hospitals. On October 34, Ambulance
Company No. 349 established, at Belfort, Rethenans Barracks Hospital, and operated
there until November S, when it was taken over by Field Hospital No. 352. A part of
the personnel of Ambulance Company No. 351 established a convalescent camp at Bevil-
liers. Ambulance Company No. 352 established, on October 17, a triage at Retzwiller
which it operated until November C, 1918, when the train was reassembled at Vetrigne
and entrained at Belfort on November S. On the 9th, it detrained at Pagny-sur-Meuse
and marched to Eegney, where it remained until November 29, arriving at Hevilliers
on December 1, 191S.
Field Hospital No. 350 assisted French evacuation hospital at Hericourt from Septem-
ber 22 to November 6, 1918. Field Hospital No. 352 established at Romagny from Septem-
ber 20 to November 2 for the care of gassed cases. It then took over Rethenans Barracks
Hospital at Belfort, operating it until December 6, 1918. Field Hospital No. 349 established
a hospital on Septmeber 20 at Bellemagny and operated it until November 5. Field
Hospital No. 351 was established on September 29 at Cheeannes-les-Grands, where it
operated until November 4.
The field hospital at Bellemagny cared for medical and surgical cases north of the
canal, the triage evacuating medical and surgical cases to the field hospital located at
Chevannes-les-Grands and gas cases to the gas hospital at Romagny. During the first
part of the time spent in this sector, field hospitals evacuated to Hericourt, where Field
Hospital No. 350 operated a portion of the French evacuation hospital, but later a hospital
was opened at Rethenans Barracks to receive patients from the division. The hospital at
Hericourt was then gradually cleared and closed, personnel and equipment being moved
to the hospital at Rethenans Barracks to receive patients from the division. When the
time came for the division to move, all sick patients were transferred to this hospital.
which was operated until all had been discharged.
On November 10 the division arrived in the Toul sector, with headquarters at
Begney, 9 km. (5.4 miles) north of Toul, where arrangements were made to complete
equipment for more active fighting, but these were discontinued next day when the
armistice was signed.
On November 29 the division moved by marching to the first training area, at Gondre-
court (Meuse). On April 15, 1919, the division was transferred to the First Army. Ou
April 26 it passed to the command of the commanding general, S. O. S., preparatory to its
return to the United States. Division headquarters sailed from St. Nazaire on May 21,
1919. and arrived at Newport News on June 1, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. J. R. Shook, M. C, August 20, 1917, to November 30, 1918.
Mai. H. Hansen, M. C, December 1, 1918, to February 27, 1919.
Maj. C. M. Dargan, M. C, February 28, 1919, June, 1919.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 1013
THE 89TH DIVISION 1 K
(National Army. Insignia: A black " W " surrounded by a black circle)
The 89th Division was organized in August, 1917, at Camp Fuuston, Kans. Its per-
sonnel was composed of National Army men from the States of Kansas, Missouri, Colorado,
Nebraska, Soutli Dakota, Arizona, and New Mexico.
The organization was as follows :
177th Infantry Brigade :
353d and 354th Infantry ; 341st Machine Gun Battalion.
178th Infantry Brigade:
355th and 350th Infantry; 342d Machine Gun Battalion.
340th Machine Gun Battalion.
lG4th Field Artillery Brigade :
340th, 341st (light), 342d (heavy) Field Artillery: 314th Trench Mortar
Battery.
314th Engineers.
314th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (314th Sanitary Train : Field Hospitals Nos. 353, 354, 355, 356 and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 353, 354, 355, 356).
The first unit of the division to go overseas arrived in France June 11, 1918; the last
July 10, 1918.
For training purposes the division (less artillery) was sent to the fourth training
area, with division headquarters at Reynel. For the same purpose the Artillery brigade
went to Camp de Souge, near Bordeaux. It rejoined the division immediately after the
St. Mihiel operation, operating with it until the relief of the division in the Euvezin
sector, on October 9, 191S, when it remained in support of the 37th and 28th Divisions,
successively, until the armistice. It rejoined the 89th Division on the march into Germany.
On August 4, 1918, the division began the relief of the 82d Division in the quiet I,ucey
sector north of Toul, completing the relief August 10. The division operated under the
Thirty-second Corps, French Eighth Army, until August 20. when it passed to the Fourth
Army Corps of the newly organized American First Army.
Prior to the arrival of the sanitary train in the training area, July 15, 1918, all sick
were sent to the neighboring hospitals. Field hospitals of the division were erected and
went into operation July 17, 1918.
During the night of August 7-8, while the division was relieving the S2d Division,
the enemy put over from 8,000 to 10,000 gas shells, causing many casualties. Most of
these casualties occurred when men marching from advance positions through a deep
ravine removed their masks.
Medical Department units in this sector were distributed as follows :
Ambulance Company No. 353, dressing station at Noviant, 5 km. (3 miles) behind the
advanced trenches. Headquarters at Minorville, 2.5 km. (1.5 miles) behind the dressing
station.
Ambulance Company No. 354, dressing station in Rehanne wood, 9 km. (5.4 miles)
behind the front line; headquarters at Andilly, 4 km. (2.4 miles) in rear of the dressing
station.
Ambulance Company No. 355 acted as an evacuation company, removing patients
from triage to Toul.
Ambulance Company No. 35G (animal drawn) was in reserve at Andilly.
The field hospitals were located and functioned as follows: No. 353 and No. 354, in
French barracks at Toul. supplemented by 16 nurses, operated in effect as evacuation
hospitals. Field Hospital No. 355, near Royaumeix, 10 km. (6.2 miles) from the front,
received gassed cases. Field Hospital No. 356, in Abbaye de Rangeval, on the extreme left
of the divisional sector, received surgical cases. After the gas attack above mentioned
there were relatively few casualties in this sector, for, except during occasional raids, it
was quite inactive.
1014 FIELD OPERATIONS
St. Miliiel operation, September 12-10. 101S.
Meuse-Argonne operation, October 19 to November II. 191S.
Army of Occupation.
Division headquarters sailed from Brest on May 10 and arrived at New York on
May 31, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. John L. Shepard, M. C, August 25, 1917. to September 25, 1918.
Maj. F. W. O'Donnell, M. C, September 27, 191S. to November 30. 1918.
Col. L. P. Williamson, M. C. December 1, 191S, to May 14. 1919.
Maj. F. \V. O'Donnell, M. C, May 14, 1019. to June. 1919.
THE 90TH DIVISION *• *
(National Army. Insignia: Monogram of the letters " T " and " O " in red)
The 90th Division was organized in August. 1917. at Camp Travis, Tex. Its per-
sonnel was composed of drafted men from the States of Texas and Oklahoma.
The organization was as follows :
179th Infantry Brigade :
357th and 358th Infantry; 344th Machine Gun Battalion.
180th Infantry Brigade :
359th and 360th Infantry; 345th Machine Gun Battalion.
343d Machine Gun Battalion.
105th Field Artillery Brigade:
343d and 344th (light). 345th (heavy) Field Artillery; 315th Trench Mortar
Battery.
315th Engineers.
315th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (315th Sanitary Train : Field Hospitals Nos. 357. 358, 359. 300 and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 357, 358, 359, 360).
The first unit of the division to go overseas arrived in France June 23, 191S ; the last,
July 17. 1918.
For training purposes the division (less artillery) was sent to the Department of Cote
d'Or, with headquarters at Aignay-le-Duc. For the same purpose the Artillery brigade
went to Camp Hunt, at Le Courneau (Gironde). It did not participate in operations.
but rejoined the division after the armistice on the march into Germany.
On August 19, 1918, the division moved to the vicinity of Toul, with headquarters estab-
lished at Gondreville. This move was scarcely completed when the division was ordered
to relieve the 1st Division in the line in the Villers-en-Haye sector north of Toul. which
was accomplished on August 24, 1918.
The sanitary train arrived in England July 10. 191S, and on the 16th joined the divi-
sion in its training area in France. Headquarters of the sanitary train and field hospital
section were established at Recey-sur-Ouree ; Ambulance Companies No. 357 and No. 35S
were at Rocefort and Ambulance Companies No. 359 and No. 300 at Busseau. While in
this area a program of intensive training was carried out by the entire organization.
The ambulance section did not receive its vehicles until August 13, when 40 ambulances
were received.
On August 23 the sanitary train relieved that of the 1st Division, headquarters being
located at Rosieres-en-Haye. The 90th Division now held a section of the trenches west
of Pont-a-Mousson. and the various ambulance companies and field hospitals carried out
a methodical system of evacuation, with aid and dressing stations, triage and specialized
field hospitals. Ambulances were assigned to the service of the several regiments, and
units of the train were distributed as follows : Ambulance Company No. 357 to St
Georges, Ambulance Company No. 358 to P.ois de Marbnche. Ambulance Company No. 350
to Jezainville, where it established a dressing station, and Ambulance Company No. 300
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 1015
to Foret d'Avrainville, in reserve. Field Hospital No. 357, at Griscourt, acted as the
triage ; Field Hospital No. 358, at Rogeville, received gassed and slightly sick patients ;
Field Hospital No. 359, at a point 2 km. (1.2 miles) south of Rosieres-en-Haye, the slightly
wounded and the sick ; and Field Hospital No. 360, at Bois le Pretre, the contagious and
venereal cases. Seriously sick and wounded were sent to the hospitals at Toul. The
division surgeon's office was established at Rosieres-en-Haye on August 22. Here a thorough
course of training was given all the medical units, aid stations were established, provision
was made for treatment of gassed patients, and equipment was completed for battle. Com-
panies were filled to war strength and all preparations were made for the coming engage-
ment. About September 2 Ambulance Companies No. 357 and No. 358 were ordered to
Gezoncourt and Ambulance Company No. 360 to Joli wood, northeast of Villers-en-Haye.
St. Mihiel operation, September 12-16. 1918.
The division remained in line in the Puvenelle sector until October 10; during this
period it engaged in raids of major and minor importance, and participated in demonstra-
tions conducted against the enemy simultaneously with the initial attack in the Meuse-
Argonne operation, September 26, 191S. On October 10 it was relieved by the 7th Division
and proceeded to the P.lercourt area west of Verdun, in the reserve of the First Army.
By September 17 the battle line had again become stationary, and operation of the
medical detachments took on a more or less routine character. Ambulance Company
No. 357 established an advance dressing station at Vilcey, on September 20. and a few
days later Ambulance Company No. 358 opened one at Vieville. behind the left flank of
the 179th Brigade.
Meuse-Argonne operations, October 13 to November 11, 1918.
Division headquarters sailed from St. Nazaire on May 2S. 1919. and arrived at Boston
on .Tune 7. 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Paul S. Halloran, M. C, August 25, 1917, to December 31, 1918.
Lieut. Col. F.arl I.. Parmenter, M. C, January 1-16. 1919.
Col. Normal L. McDiarmid, M. C, January 17, 1919, to May, 1919.
THE 91ST DIVISION »• 30
(National Army. Insignia: Green fir tree)
The 91st Division was organized in August, 1917. at Camp Lewis, Wash., from drafted
men from the States of California, Washington. Oregon, Nevada, Utah. Idaho. Montana,
and AVyoming and from the Territory of Alaska.
The organization was as follows :
181st Infantry Brigade :
361st and 362(1 Infantry; 347th Machine Gun Battalion.
182d Infantry Brigade:
363d and 364th Infantry: 348th Machine Gun Battalion.
166th Field Artillery Brigade:
346th, 347th (light), and 34Sth (heavy) Field Artillery: 316th Trench
Mortar Battery.
346th Machine Gun Battalion.
316th Engineers.
31Cth Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (316th Sanitary Train: Field Hospitals Nos. 361, 362, 363. 364. and Ambu-
lance Companies Nos. 361, 362, 363, 364).
The first unit of the division arrived in France July 20, 1918; the last. July 29. 1918.
For training purposes the division (less artillery) was sent to the eighth training
area, in the Department of Haute-Marne. with headquarters at Montigny-le-lioi. For the
same purpose the Artillery brigade went to Camp de Sotige (Gironde), and Clermont-Fer-
1016 FIELD OPEBATIONS
rand (Puy-de-Dome). It never rejoined tlie division nor did it participate in combat
operations.
On September 7 the division left the training area and moved to the vicinity of
Gondrecourt, with headquarters at that place. It was assigned to the reserve of the
American First Army during the St. Mihiel operation, and headquarters was established at
Sorcy, September 11, 1918.
The sanitary train arrived in England on July 20, 1918, and then proceeded to St.
Nazaire, where it remained in training until August 24, when it rejoined the division at
Montigny-le-Koi. The train was without motor transportation, but on August 27 United
States Army Ambulance Service Sections No. 593 and No. G40 were assigned to the division.
Various specialists reported during September, as did a mobile field laboratory. The
field hospitals did not function during the St. Mihiel operation ; all sick were evacuated to
Evacuation Hospital No. 9, at Vaubecourt.
By the end of September, the sanitary train had received sufficient motor trucks to
carry all its equipment and six truck loads of supplies, but when the division entered the
Meuse-Argonne operation the ambulance section of the train still had no ambulance trans-
portation except seven animal-drawn ambulances, and the evacuations fell largely on the
two ambulance sections mentioned above.
Meuse-Argonne operation, September 26 to October Ifi, 1918.
Ypres-Lys operation, October 31 to November 11, 1918.
After the armistice, November 11, 1918, the division remained in Belgium until
January, when it moved to the Le Mans embarkation center preparatory to its return to
the United States.
Division headquarters sailed from St. Nazaire on April 6, 1919, and arrived at New
York April 1(5. 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS 3
Col. Peter C. Field, M. C, September 4, 1917, to October 28, 191S.
Lieut. Col. John G. Strohm, M. C, October 29, 1918, to November 1C, 1918.
Col. O. G. Brown, M. C, November 17-24. 1918.
Lieut. Col. John G. Strohm, M. C, November 25. 1918, to May, 1919.
THE 92D DIVISION *• »
(National Army, colored. Insignia: Buffalo in black circle on olive-drab field)
The 92d Division was organized in October, 1917, at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge.
Upton, Meade, and Dix from National Army drafts from all parts of the United States.
The division was assembled at Camp Upton, N. Y., in June, 191S.
The organization was as follows:
183d Infantry Brigade:
365th and 868th Infantry ; 350th Machine Gun Battalion.
184th Infantry Brigade:
367th and 368th Infantry; 351st Machine Gun Battalion.
107th Field Artillery Brigade:
349th, 350th (light), 351st (heavy) Field Artillery; 317th Trench Mortar
Battery.
.'149th Machine Gun Battalion.
317th Engineers.
317th Field Signal Battalion.
Trains (317th Sanitary Train : Field Hospitals Nos. 365, 366, 367, 368, and
Ambulance Companies Nos. 305, 306, 307, 308).
The first unit of the division arrived in France June 19, 1918; the last July IS. 1919.
For training purposes the division (less artillery) was sent to the eleventh training
area, with headquarters at Bourbonne-les-Bains (llaute-Marne). For the same purpose
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 1017
the Artillery brigade went to La Courtlne (Creuse). It rejoined the division in the
Marbache sector (Lorraine) October 31, 1918. On August 11, the division went to the
Vosges, with headquarters at Bruyeres. On August 24 it commenced the relief of the
5th Division in the St. Die sector, completing the relief August 31. It remained in
line until September 21. when it proceeded to the vicinity of Triaucourt (Meuse).
The sanitary train joined the division in the eleventh training area, where it under-
went extensive training. When the division moved to the St. Die sector, Field Hospital
N'o. 367 established at Bruyeres, in connection with a French hospital. This unit func-
tioned as an evacuation hospital for the division. In another French hospital in the
same city an American operating team was also established.
Field Hospital No. 30(1 opened a triage at St. Die, from which the sick were trans-
ported to Field Hospital No. 307. at Bruyeres, the wounded to the French hospital where
the American operating team was stationed, and the gassed to a gas hospital at St. Die.
Another triage was established at Kaon l'Etape by Field Hospital No. 365. This evacu-
ated its gassed to St. Die and its wounded to St. Die or Baccarat (Evacuation Hospital
No. 2). The animal-drawn organizations. Field Hospital No. 36S and Ambulance Company
No. 368, were in reserve at La Salle.
The ambulance section of the sanitary train did not function due to lack of trans-
portation. Ambulance service was performed by an attached United States Army Ambu-
lance Service section.
Battalion aid stations were in dugouts, well up to the front lines, or with the reserve,
and patients were littered to ambulances in the rear. In some cases, however, it was
possible for ambulances to reach the stations. Ambulance posts were established at
Dijon, St. Jean d'Ormond, St. Michel, and Raon l'Etape. An ambulance dressing station
was established at St. Jean d'Ormond, about 2 km. (1.2 miles) from the front line.
Meuse-Argonne operation, September 26 to October 4, 1018.
Marbaehe Sector (Second Army), October 9 to November 11, 1918.
After the armistice the division remained in the occupied area until the middle of
December, when it proceeded to the Le Mans embarkation center, preparatory to its
return to the United States.
Division headquarters sailed from Brest on February 7, 1919, and arrived at New York
on February 17, 1919.
DIVISION SURGEONS +a
Col. Perry L. Boyer, M. C, November 7, 1917, to October 5. 1918.
Lieut Col. J. S. White, M. C, October 6, 1918, to February, 1919.
REFERENCES
(1) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared by the Historical
Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.
(2) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(3) Personal Reports. On file, Personnel Division, S. G. O.
(4) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On rile, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(5) Report of Medical Department activities, 3d Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(6) Report of Medical Department activities, 4th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(7) Report of Medical Department activities, 5th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(8) Report of Medical Department activities. 6th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
1018 FIELD OPERATIONS
(9) Report Of Medical Department activities, 7th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(10) Report of Medical Department activities, 26th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(11) Report of Medical Department activities, 27th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division, S. G. 0.
(12) Report of Medical Department activities, 28th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division, S. G. 0,
(13) Report of Medical Department activities, 29th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(14) Report of Medical Department activities, 30th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(15) Report of Medical Department activities. 32d Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(10) Report of Medical Department activities, 33d Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(17) Report of Medical Department activities. 35th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(IS) Report of Medical Department activities. 30th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(19) Report of Medical Department activities, 37th Division, prepared under the di-
rection of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(20) Report of Medical Department activities, 42d Division, prepared under the di-
rection of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division. S. G. O.
(21) Report of Medical Department activities, 77th Division, prepared under the di-
rection of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(22) Report of Medical Department activities. 78th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G .O.
(23) Report of Medical Department activities, 79th Division, prepared under the direc-
tion of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O.
(24) Report of Medical Department activities, SOth Division, prepared under the di-
rection of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division. S. G. O.
(25) Report of Medical Department activities, 81st Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(20) Report of Medical Department activities. 82d Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Divison, S. G. O.
(27) Report of Medical Department activities, SSth Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(2S) Report of Medical Department activities, 89th Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(29) Report of Medical Department activities. 90th Division, prepared under the direc-
tion of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
(30) Report of Medical Department activities, 91st Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file. Historical Division, S. G. O
(31) Report of Medical Department activities, 92d Division, prepared under the direction
of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.
LIST OF DEPOT AND REPLACEMENT DIVISIONS
31st, National Guard of Georgia, Alabama, Florida.
34th, National Guard of Minnesota, North and South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska.
3Sth, National Guard of Kentucky, West Virginia, Indiana.
39th National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi. Arkansas.
BRIEF HISTORIES OF COMBAT DIVISIONS 1019
40th , National Guard of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico.
41st, National Guard of Washington, Oregon, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming.
76th, National Army, draft ; New England States.
83d, National Army, draft ; Ohio and West Virginia.
84th, National Army, draft ; Indiana and Kentucky.
85th, National Army, draft : Michigan and Wisconsin.
86th, National Army, draft; Illinois.
S7th, National Army, draft : Arkansas. Louisiana, Mississippi.
CHIEF SURGEONS OF ARMIES 3
First Army :
Col. A. N. Stark, M. C, June 6, 1918, to December 31, 1918.
Col. T. L. Rhoads, M. C, December 4, 1918, to April, 1019.
Second Army :
Col. Charles R. Reynolds, M. C, September 28, 1918, to May 31, 1919.
Third Army:
Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, November 15 ,1918, to July 15, 1919.
CORPS SURGEONS 3
First Corps :
Lieut. Col. William Reno, M. C, January 20 to February 13, 1918.
Col. Robert M. Culler, M. C, March 3, 1918, to June 15, 1918.
Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C, June 30, 1918, to November 14, 1918.
Col. T. L. Rhoads, M. C, November 15, 191S, to December 2, 1918.
Second Corps :
Col. C. C. Collins, M. C, March 19, 1918, to January 18. 1919.
Third Corps:
Col. James L. Bevans. M. C, July 1, 1918, to March 10, 1919.
Fourth Corps :
Col. George H. R. Gosman, M. C, June 28, 191S, to September 22, 1918.
Col. John W. Hanner, M. C, September 23, 1918, to May 5, 1919.
Col. J. R. Shook, M. C, May 6, 1919, to May 27, 1919.
Fifth Corps:
Col. W. R. Eastman, M. C, August 19, 1918, to February 23, 1919.
Sixth Corps :
Col. Charles R. Reynolds, M. C, August 5, 1918, to September 27, 1918.
Seventh Corps :
Col. Wallace De Witt, M. C, September 7. 1918, to April 24, 1919.
Lieut. Col. R. H. Pierson, M. C, April 25, 1919, to May 27, 1919.
Eighth Corps:
Col. J. R. Shook, M. C, December 1, 1918, to March 31, 1919.
Ninth Corps :
Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C, November 25, 1918, to December 21, 1918.
1020
FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS, U. S. ARMY
TART I
ORGANIZATION
ARTICLE I.— LAND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
* * * * * * *
3, The mobile army. — The mobile army is primarily organized for offensive operations
against an enemy, and on this account requires the maximum degree of mobility.
The basis of organization for the mobile army is the division. A division is a self-
contained unit made up of all necessary arms and services, and complete in itself with
every requirement for independent action incident to its ordinary operations.
When several divisions are acting together they may be grouped into field armies. To
the field army there are attached certain organizations of an auxiliary character, called
field army troops.
When the number of field army troops attached to a field army make it necessary,
they are organized into a separate brigade for purposes of supply and administration and
a commander is designated and the necessary staff is assigned to him. Infantry, cavalry,
or military police may be attached to this separate brigade for defensive purposes on
the march. The number of troops so assigned depends on the condition of the service and
the number of field army troops in the brigade. Troops for the protection of field army
troops are preferably furnished from troops assigned to the line of communications.
If the conditions of the particular service require it, divisions operating independently
may be furnished with the necessary field army troops. A brigade operating independently,
when so designated by competent authority, is known as a separate brigade, and when so
operating may be supplied with the necessary special and field army troops.
When several field armies are operating in the same theater of war and if conditions
so require it, they may be organized into armies.
4. A line of communications is established for each important force about to engage in
field operations of an extensive character and supplied from a separate base.
*******
PART III.
ADMINISTRATION
ARTICLE IV. THE ZONE OF THE ADVANCE
Sanitary Service
329. In general, the functions of the sanitary service are as follows :
(a) The institution of all practicable sanitary measures, to the end that the fighting
forces suffer no depletion in strength due to avoidable causes.
(6) The temporary care and professional treatment of the sick and wounded and their
transportation to accessible points where they are transferred with as little delay as
possible to the line of communications.
(c) The supply of the necessary sanitary equipment.
In addition, the sanitary service is charged with the preparation and preservation of
individual records of sickness and injury in order that claims may be adjudicated with
justice to the Government and the individual.
1021
1022 FIET-D OPERATIONS
330. The personnel of the sanitary service in the zone of the advance may be classi-
fied into two general groups, as follows: First, that attached to organizations smaller
than a brigade, which functions under the immediate orders of the organization com-
mander and accompanies its unit into combat; second, that attached to the sanitary train,
which functions under the orders of the division surgeon in accordance witli such general
or specific instructions as he may receive from the division commander. When necessary
the sanitary personnel attached to organizations may be temporarily detached, in whole
or part, and directed to operate with the sanitary train.
331. Sanitation. — Officers and men of all arms must have a knowledge of sanitation
and its importance, to the end that no depletion of the fighting force occurs through
avoidable causes. The importance of adopting and carrying out proper sanitary measures
can not be overestimated.
Commanders of all grades are responsible for the sanitary condition of the quarters
or localities occupied by their commands and for the enforcement of all sanitary regu-
lations. In addition they are responsible that all sanitary defects reported to them are
promptly corrected.
A medical officer of experience, designated sanitary inspector, is charged, under
direction of the division surgeon, with investigating and reporting upon the sanitation
of the division to which he is attached. Sanitary inspectors report the result of their
inspections to local commanders as well as to the division surgeon.
332. First-aid packet. — Every man witli the division carries a first-aid packet. The
sanitary detachments with organizations carry pouches containing appliances for first aid
and stimulants. The combat train carries litters and the necessary equipment for regi-
mental aid station.
333. Regimental aid station. — This station, established by each regiment or independ-
ent battalion during combat and when justified by the number of wounded, is the place
to which all wounded of the organization are carried by its sanitary personnel, and where
emergency treatment is administered. The position of the station is fixed by the organi-
zation commander and is as near the firing line as possible. This station will often he but
little more than a place for assembling the wounded, as its personnel belongs to the
organization and, therefore, must be prepared to move with it. After receiving emergency
treatment all wounded able to walk (except those with trivial wounds, who are sent back
to the line) are directed to the station for slightly wounded; those unable to walk are
delivered to the bearers sent forward from the sanitary train.
The equipment of the regimental aid station is carried on the combat train. It is
operated by the sanitary personnel of the organization.
334. Dressing stations. — These stations, established during combat by ambulance com-
panies of the sanitary train in the immediate rear of the line or regimental aid stations,
tire the places where all wounded unable to walk are collected from regimental aid sta-
tions by bearers of ambulance companies. If conditions so warrant, these bearers may
he assisted in their work by portions of the organization sanitary personnel. From these
stations the wounded are transported by ambulance companies back to field hospitals.
The equipment of dressing stations is more elaborate than that of the regimental aid sta-
tion. It provides light nourishment and stimulants for the wounded and affords facilities
for more elaborate dressings and for emergency surgery.
The equipment for dressing stations and the necessary personnel arc supplied by the
ambulance companies of the sanitary train.
33o. Ambulance companies. — Ambulance companies push up close to the rear of the
fighting troops and as near the line of regimental aid stations as possible and establish
dressing stations. It addition to their functions sit the dressing stations, they are charged
with the transportation of the wounded back to field hospitals and with providing the
necessary equipment for infirmary service in camps. When field hospitals have not been
set up and when sanitary columns or railway hospital trains of the line of communica-
tions are reasonably accessible, ambulance companies transport the wounded directly to
them.
1023
336. Field hospital companies. — Field hospital companies form part of the sanitary
train. They are set up when conditions so warrant ordinarily some 3 or 4 miles from
the battle field, and are the places to which the wounded are transported by ambulance
companies. Their position must be one accessible both from the front and rear and where
good water is available. Field hospitals are not set up when the sick or wounded can be
turned over conveniently to elements of the sanitary column or railway hospital trains
of the line of communications. Canvas is pitched only when buildings are not available
or are inadequate for the purpose of housing the wounded.
The equipment of field hospitals, while more elaborate than that of dressing stations
and while providing canvas for protection of the wounded from the weather and facilities
for more extended surgical work, is nevertheless limited to providing necessities for the
sick and wounded pending their evacuation to the rear by the line of communications.
(See also par. 26S.)
337. Evacuation points. — The sanitary column of the line of communications includes
ambulance companies and evacuation hospitals; there may also be available railway
hospital trains and boats, any or all of which may be used as the means for the evacua-
tion of the sick and wounded from the division. The places at which the sick and wounded
are transferred from the division to the line of communications elements are termed
evacuating points.
The positions of evacuating points are fixed in the same manner as is the refilling
lioint of the supply service (see par. 2SS) and communicated directly from division head-
quarters to the commander of the sanitary train.
338. Station for slightly wounded. — A station for slightly wounded is established when
combat is imminent to relieve dressing stations and field hospitals of the slightly
wounded who can walk and require but little attention. Its position is fixed in division
orders. It is operated by the personnel of the sanitary train detailed for the purpose.
It is conspicuously marked so that it can be readily found.
33!). The sanitary train. — The sanitary train is composed of a train headquarters,
ambulance companies, field hospital companies, camp infirmaries, medical supply unit,
and reserve medical supplies. The sanitary train is commanded by the senior medical
officer on duty with the train. Upon its release from the control of the commander of
trains, it operates in accordance with orders or instructions received from division bead-
quarters. (C. F. S. It., Nos. 3 and 10.)
340. Service in camps. — In camps an ambulance service is furnished from the sanitary
train. Infirmaries are set up at convenient points by order of the division surgeon and
operated by the sanitary personnel attached to the organizations which the infirmary
serves. Here cases not requiring hospital treatment are cared for, all other cases being
promptly removed by the ambulance service. The senior medical officer of the units
served by the infirmary assumes charge of the same and is authorized to call directly on
the other organizations for their proportionate share of medical officers and sanitary
personnel for the infirmary service. The sergeant, Hospital Corps, detailed with the
infirmary, remains with it in charge of the equipment. If necessary, field hospitals are
set up for the reception of the seriously sick and wounded. (C. F. S. R., No. 3.)
341. Service on the march. — When out of the presence of the enemy, ambulances are
ordinarily ordered distributed by the division commander throughout the column, in the
rear of regiments, battalions, etc. A camp infirmary is assigned to each brigade and
marches in its rear, and a field hospital should be so located in the column of march as
to permit of its being available for the reception of seriously sick and injured as soon as
possible after the arrival of troops in camp. (C. F. S. It., No. 3.)
342. During marches in the presence of the enemy, ambulance companies are kept
intact. It may be advisable to assign one or more of these companies to a position in
the column of the combatant troops, but any further dispersion is inadvisable. When
combat is imminent and when so ordered by the column commander, the ambulance
companies fall out of the column, and as soon as the combatant troops have passed they
proceed to function as described in "Service in Combat." (See par. 111.1
1024 FIELD OPERATIONS
343. A man falling out from sickness or injury is sent with a pass, showing liis name,
company, and regiment or corps to the medical officer in the rear. The latter returns the
pass, having indicated thereon the disposition made of the man.
If the man is unable to walk he is picked up by the lirst ambulance and cared for.
If able to walk he may either be required to follow immedately behind his organization
or ordered to await the arrival of the sanitary train. In the latter case, he is furnished
with a tag showing the orders given him.
The arms, personal equipment, and clothing of soldiers who fall out are carried
with them.
The horse, saber, and horse equipment of a mounted soldier admitted to the am-
bulance, or otherwise disposed of, are taken back to the troops by the noncommissioned
officer that accompanied him.
344. Service in combat. — In the absence of medical assistance the wounded apply their
first-aid packets, if practicable. With this exception the care of the wounded devolves
upon the sanitary troops, and no combatant, unless duly authorized, is permitted to take
or accompany the sick or injured to the rear.
34o. The sanitary personnel of organizations must remain with it when advancing
into action and during the whole course of an engagement. Accordingly the wounded
will be treated where their wounds are received, and the sanitary personnel will pause,
if the organization is moving, only so long as is necessary to give appropriate first aid.
At a later stage of the combat, when the movement of the organization permits and
when justified by the number of wounded, a regimental aid station is established and
operated.
34G. When combat is imminent, the station for slightly wounded is announced in
division orders, and thereafter it is to this station that all disabled men able to walk are
ordered to report. They are furnished with a tag showing the orders given them by the
medical officer authorizing their proceeding to this station.
347. The evacuation of the wounded from regimental aid stations when established,
and the evacuation of the wounded left by the organizations during an advance when
a regimental aid station has not been established, devolves on the personnel of the sanitary
train. In the case of a deliberate attack on the enemy in position or when our forces
occupy a defensive position, the positions of dressing stations are fixed in orders by the
division commander, and communicated to the troops. The division commander in this
case advises the commander of the sanitary train as to the position of the field hospitals.
348. In the case of a rencontre engagement, the work of establishing dressing sta-
tions, field hospitals, and of evacuating wounded during combat from the dressing station
to the field hospital, or in certain cases directly to the line of communications, must be
left to a great extent to the initiative and judgment of the commander of the sanitary
train and his subordinates. To this end the commander of the sanitary train sends
forward one or more ambulance companies to make contact in certain prescribed areas
with the sanitary formations of the combatant units. When ambulance companies have
been assigned positions in the column of march of combatant troops, they are ordinarily
utilized in this work. The remaining ambulance companies ordinarily accompanied by
one field hospital and under the immediate command of the sanitary train commander
follow, and are held together in reserve at a certain prearranged position selected by
the sanitary train commander and by him communicated to the commander of the
ambulance companies sent ahead. The other field hospitals remain for the time being
under the control of the commander of trains, to be brought forward later if required.
The ambulance company commanders ordered to make contact with the combatant or-
ganizations push forward agents for the purpose of sanitary reconnaissance and for
arranging for the position of the dressing stations and for determining the best lines
of approach to them. When so ordered they establish dressing stations and commence
collecting wounded from the different regimental aid stations, ultimately sending them
back to the field hospital at the prearranged point. The commander of the sanitary
train keeps himself advised by means of agents of the progress and development of the
FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS, U. S. ARMY 1025
battle and the number of casualties in certain areas and from these reports and from
orders received from the division surgeon, he pushes forward additional ambulance com-
panies when required, prescribing the area of their respective activity and the point
to which their wounded are to be transported. At the same time he may order forward
such additional field hospitals as may be required.
349. Search for wounded. — After an engagement commanders organize a thorough
search of the battle field in their vicinity for the wounded and assist in their protection
and removal. The dead are collected by details from the line as soon as practicable after
the battle and disposed of as the commander directs.
231. * * * Field hospitals immobilized for the care of the wounded will be evac-
uated as rapidly as the condition of the wounded and facilities for evacuation to the rear
will permit. When the decision has been adverse and a retreat is necessary, all the
severely wounded and the wounded whose transport might delay or impede the retreat will
be left behind with the sanitary personnel and supplies necessary to their immediate needs.
350. Before a command enters upon a campaign, every memVier thereof is provided
with an identification tag by which he can be identified if killed or wounded. Such tags are
not removed from the dead, but are left on the bodies when interred or otherwise disposed
of. Tags found on the bodies of the enemy's dead are collected and turned over to the
i-ommander of trains, who sends them to the provost marshal at the base.
351. Retreat. — In a retreat such portion of the sanitary personnel of the division as is
required will remain with the sick and wounded that can not be moved, under the
protection of the Red Cross fiag.
352. American National Red Cross Association. — The services of this association, its
equipment and personnel are utilized under the immediate direction of medical officers
to the greatest extent possible in the care of sick and wounded in the service of the
interior and on the line of communications. Their services are not utilized in the zone
of the advance.
353. Badge of neutrality. — The emblem of neutrality is a red cross on a white ground.
All persons belonging to the sanitary service, including the Red Cross Association per-
sonnel and chaplains attached to the army, wear on the left arm a brassard bearing this
emblem stamped by competent authority. Those not uniformed carry a certificate of
identity in addition to the brassard.
All sanitary formations and establishments display a Red Cross flag accompanied by
the national flag. At night the position of sanitary formations are marked by green
lanterns.
1357G—25 05
MANUAL FOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, 1916
ARTICLE XII.— THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS, GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EFFICIENT SANITARY SERVICE
027. The mobility of an army may be the factor which determines its success or its
failure. It is therefore highly important (1) that the army should be relieved as promptly
as possible of the encumbrance of its sick and wounded; (2) that this should be accom-
plished without obstructing other military operations in progress, and with the minimum
of transportation and personnel.
(a) In view of these requirements, it is evident that the sanitary service must be
thoroughly organized; that it must operate systematically, and that its personnel should
have had thorough preliminary training.
C2S. Efficient medical administration should therefore provide: (1) In the zone of
the advance, only emergency treatment for the wounded and their prompt transportation to
the rear; (2) in the zone of the line of communications, a service so complete in equip-
ment, supplies, and personnel that it will afford the sick and wounded all the facilities
and comforts of the service of the interior, rendering it unnecessary to transport farther
to the rear such patients as will later be able to rejoin their commands; (3) in every
sanitary station from the firing line to the base, a careful classification of the sick and
wounded according to the nature and severity of their disabilities, with a view to such
disposition as will prevent any unnecessary depletion of the combatant forces.
629. For the evacuation of the sick and wounded to the rear it will be necessary for
the Medical Department to utilize all available transport. In addition to that normally
assigned to the department, combat wagons and field train wagons when authorized by
competent authority, automobiles, and other impressed civilian transportation of all kinds,
should be obtained and used when the situation demands
ARTICLE XIIL— THE ZONE OF THE ADVANCE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE SANITARY SERVICE
G30. The sanitary personnel of the zone of the advance may be divided into two
general groups, as follows : First, that attached to line organizations smaller than a
brigade, which functions under the immediate orders of the organization commanders;
second, that comprising the sanitary trains, which functions under the orders of division
surgeons in accordance with such general or specific instructions as they may receive from
their division commanders.
SANITARY TROOI'S ON DUTY WITH LINE ORGANIZATIONS
(See also Field Service Regulations)
631. Sanitary troops with line organizations, including detachments with regiments,
battalions, trains, etc., vary in personnel with the strength of the organization served
and the nature of the duties they are required to perform. (See Tables of Organization:
War — Regimental Organizations.)
632. When a regiment is operating independently the Medical Department equip-
ment available for its use consists of the first-aid packet carried by each officer and en-
listed man of the Army as a part of his individual equipment; the articles carried as
1026
MANUAL FOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1027
Individual equipment by each medical officer (par. 864) and by each member of the
Hospital Corps (par. 805) ; the combat equipment (pars. S6G and 867) ; the camp Infirmary
equipment (pars. S09 and 870) ; and the additional articles necessary for the establish-
ment of a regimental hospital (par. S72).
(o) The additional articles for the regimental hospital will be taken to the field
only under circumstances requiring the organization to provide hospital care for its own
sick and wounded.
633. AVhen a regiment or other line organization is operating as a part of a division
the Medical Department equipment provided for its exclusive use consists of the first-aid
packets and individual equipments mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and the combat
equipment (pars. SOG and S07). A small box of surgical dressings (par. 954) and one or
more litters are carried on each ammunition wagon. The requisite articles for the estab-
lishment of the aid station are carried on the pack mule allotted the sanitary service,
which marches with the combat train of the organization. The medical officer respon-
sible for this equipment will see that it is complete and that it is maintained intact for
service in combat.
(a) On the march and in camp, with the exceptions noted in paragraph 601, the
medical supplies and dispensary service required by regimental organizations are provided
through the medium of the camp infirmary.
(b) In combat it is contemplated that the expenditures of dressings, etc., from the
equipment of regimental organizations will be replenished from the reserve supplies of
the nearest ambulance company or camp infirmary. (See par. 551.)
634. The surgeon of a line organization is both an advisory and an administrative
officer (par. 361).
(a) He commands the sanitary troops on duty with the organization.
(6) He is the adviser of the organization commander in medical and sanitary matters
and, to the extent of his authority, is responsible for the execution of sanitary measures
in connection with the organization.
(c) He provides care and treatment for the sick and wounded, and is responsible for
the efficient performance of the entire sanitary service of the organization.
(d) He makes such sanitary inspections as may be necessary. In connection there-
with he supervises the water supply and its purification, the sanitation of kitchens, the
disposal of garbage and waste water, the police of latrines and urinals and the filling in
and marking of the same when discontinued, the police of bathing places and picket lines,
the measures taken for the destruction of flies and mosquitoes, and all other sanitary
procedures necessary to preserve the health of the command.
(e) He instructs, at suitable times designated by the commanding officer, the entire
personnel of the organization in personal hygiene and first aid.
(/) He trains his subordinates in all departments of field sanitary work.
(g) He makes timely requisition for necessary supplies and equipment.
635. On the march the duties of the sanitary personnel are to render first aid where
required, to transport the sick and wounded, and to make suitable disposition of them
on arrival in camp.
636. Ordinarily the surgeon marches with the regimental commander, and one medical
officer marches in the rear of each battalion. Each officer is mounted and accompanied by
a mounted orderly. The remaining regimental sanitary personnel usually march with
the battalion units.
637. When out of the presence of the enemy, ambulances are ordinarily ordered
distributed by the division commander throughout the column, in the rear of regiments,
battalions, etc. Unless otherwise ordered these ambulances join their companies at the
end of the day's march or at the beginning of an engagement. When a regiment operates
independently it may be assigned its full quota of four ambulances. (See pars. 673
and 721.)
638. A soldier falling out of the marching column from sickness or injury is sent
to a medical officer in the rear, with a pass from his company commander, showing the
soldier's name and organization. The medical officer returns the pass, showing the
1028 FIELD OPERATIONS
disposition nincle of the soldier. The mas may be given authority to ride in the am-
bulance at the rear of the regiment, or his arms and personal equipment may be carried
in the ambulance, and he may march at the rear of the regiment with the sanitary
detachment.
639. When an ambulance at the rear of a regiment is filled it may fall out and join
its company at the rear of the column, and the director of ambulance companies or the
ambulance company commander may send forward another ambulance to take its place;
or the ambulance may remain with the regiment, and men requiring transportation may
be given diagnosis tags authorizing their transportation by the ambulance company in the
rear. In the latter case the men fall out and report to the commander of the ambulance
company for transportation.
040. The arms, personal equipment, and clothing of a soldier who falls out are taken
with him in the ambulance. The horse, saber, and horse equipment of a soldier admitted
to the ambulance or otherwise separated from his organization because of sickness or
injury are taken back to the troops by the noncommissioned officer who accompanied him.
041. Upon halting for the night all but the trivial cases are taken in charge by a field
hospital designated by the division surgeon, or they are sent to the rear, as the conditions
may warrant. It may be necessary to leave them under shelter — in houses, if practicable —
with the necessary food and attendants until taken in charge by sanitary troops from the
line of communications.
042. In combat the duties devolving on the sanitary personnel are to render first aid
to the wounded ; to establish and operate an aid station, and to collect the wounded
thereat ; to direct those with trivial wounds to return to the line, and to direct others
with slight wounds to the station for slightly wounded ; and in exceptional cases to
transport the severely wounded to the dressing station.
643. The detachment invariably accompanies its line unit in combat, rendering first
aid to as many as possible of those who fall out, without losing touch with the command.
It is assisted by the band if the latter is assigned to duty with the sanitary troops.
644. Unless medical assistance is available, the wounded apply their first-aid packets,
if practicable. With this exception the care of the wounded devolves upon the sanitary
troops, and no combatant, unless duly authorized, is permitted to take or accompany the
sick or wounded to the rear.
045. With dismounted troops the aid station, not more than one for each regiment
or smaller independent unit, will be established as the engagement develops and the num-
ber of wounded warrant it providing it is probable that the command will remain, for a
short period at least, near the proposed location of the station. With a mounted command
the sanitary detachment accompanies the troops during the whole course of the engage-
ment, pausing only so long as is necessary to render first aid and to collect the wounded
at some place where they can be turned over to an inhabitant of the country to be cared
for. The commander of the advancing foot troops or of the advance section should be
promptly notified of the location of the wounded thus collected.
640. In locating the aid station it is of the highest importance that advantage be taken
of any shelter from fire which the terrain affords. To a large extent the distance of the
station from the firing line must depend upon this consideration. It will be borne in mind
that any building which offers a good target for artillery fire is worse than no shelter at
all, and that the nearer the station is to the front the safer it will be from dropping
projectiles.
647. The surgeon remains, as a rule, at the aid station, with a noncommissioned officer
and the necessary number of privates, for to this station the commanding officer will send
information or orders which he may have to communicate to the surgeon, and through this
station the surgeon gains contact with the units of the sanitary train in the rear. The
other medical officers and the remainder of the detachment keep in touch with the firing
line, tending the wounded as far as possible and conveying the helpless to the station,
if practicable. If the enemy's fire is such that the wounded can not reach the station,
advantage is taken of trenches, ravines, and other inequalities of the ground affording
MANUAL FOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1029
temporary shelter, and the wounded are brought in during intervals in the firing or after
nightfall.
648. No one belonging to the sanitary personnel of an organization will go farther to
the rear than the aid station, except by authority of the surgeon.
649. The aid station, which will often be but little more than a place for assembling
the wounded, should not undertake elaborate or fixed arrangements for their care and
treatment, as its personnel must keep in touch with the regiment and be prepared to close
or move the station without delay when the regiment moves. The treatment given will
usually be limited to first aid and to the readjustment of dressings. Occasionally it may
become necessary to ligate an artery or to perform an emergency operation. Fractures,
if not previously immobilized, should be put in splints. Diagnosis tags will be attached
to all wounded and the duplicates disposed of as directed in paragraph 571. The arms and
equipment of wounded separated from their companies and taken in charge by the Medical
Department should, so far as practicable, accompany them until they reach the line of
communications.
650. In the course of battle the advance of troops may result in the aid station being
separated so far from the line that it can no longer fulfill its purpose. In this case it
must be advanced to a more favorable location. Ordinarily the wounded left behind will
,be looked after by the advancing ambulance company, but if it is apparent that this will
be long delayed a small portion of the regimental personnel may be detailed to remain
with them. Similar action will be taken in case of retreat. The closing or moving of
the station rests on the decision of the regimental surgeon. In reaching his decision he
should be governed by the primary necessity of always keeping in touch with the regiment.
THE SANITART TRAIN
651. The sanitary train is composed of camp infirmaries, ambulance companies, and
field hospitals. It is commanded by the division surgeon.
THE D1HECTOR OF AMBULANCE COMPANIES
652. For each division a medical oflicer of the grade of major is designated as di-
rector of ambulance companies, and there is assigned under him one sergeant and one
private first class or private, Hospital Corps, both mounted. The relation of the director
of ambulance companies to the division surgeon and to the ambulance companies is similar
to that of a major of the line to the colonel of his regiment and to the companies of his
battalion. He maintains no office of record, but communications from the division surgeon
ro the ambulance companies and vice versa are sent through him for his information.
653. The director of ambulance companies will make frequent inspections to ascer-
tain whether all the companies have their regulation allowance of personnel and equip-
ment, whether the personnel are properly instructed, and whether the equipment Is in
good condition, and will take the necessary measures to correct any deficiencies found
therein.
654. On the march the director will ordinarily accompany one of the ambulance
companies on duty with the marching troops and will superintend the ambulance service
of the march. He will keep the division surgeon advised as to where communications
will reach him.
655. His duties during and immediately after combat comprise supervision of the
removal of the wounded from the aid stations (and in emergencies from the front) and
their care and treatment en route, via the dressing stations, to the field hospitals. His activi-
ties cover, therefore, the entire zone between the firing line and the field hospitals, with
the terrain of which he should make himself familiar, and he will proceed from point to
point thereof as his presence may be required. As far as practicable he will keep the
division surgeon apprised of his movements.
(a) He will, under the division surgeon's authority, direct the opening of dressing
stations at the places decided upon. Under the same authority he will direct such changes
1030 FIELD OPERATIONS
in the location of these stations as may be necessary during the battle, and their closing,
and the reassembling of the several units for movement with the division as soon as
practicable after its conclusion.
656. The director of ambulance companies also commands the camp infirmaries of the
division, as outlined in paragraph 659.
CAMP INFIRMARIES
657. Each regiment of a division has assigned to it in time of peace one camp
infirmary equipment (pars. S69 and 870), including one wagon belonging to the divisional
sanitary train. (See Tables of Organization: Peace — Regimental Organizations.)
658. When the division is assembled the camp infirmary equipments authorized for
the service of the mobilized division (usually on the basis of one for each brigade) are
retained for duty as camp infirmaries. The remaining camp infirmary equipments, except
transportation, are turned in to the officer in charge of medical supplies and the wagons
thus released are assigned to those units of the sanitary train for which no transportation
is provided in time of peace.
659. The camp infirmaries retained for the service of the division will be placed by
the division surgeon under the immediate charge of the director of ambulance companies.
This officer will receipt and account for the property and will be held responsible for its
condition and completeness at all times. He will have general charge of the assignment
of the infirmaries to the troops which they are intended to serve and he will keep the
service records and accounts of the permanent personnel on duty therewith. (C. M. M. D.,
No. 3.)
660. For permanent duty with each infirmary there will be required one sergeant,
Hospital Corps, in immediate charge of the property, and one driver. The men and animals
of the camp infirmary will usually be attached, for rations and forage, to one of the
regiments served by the infirmary or to an ambulance company.
661. The camp infirmaries with each division will be numbered from one upward
consecutively, and the wagon belonging to each infirmary will be marked as prescribed
in Tables of Organization. (See also par. 545.)
662. The primary function of the camp infirmary is to furnish dispensary facilities
to one or more organizations during field service when other provision is made for the
hospital treatment of all sick and wounded or for their prompt evacuation to the rear.
When such provision is not made and the camp infirmary becomes the nucleus around
which a camp hospital (see par. 604 )is developed, it becomes an immobile unit, and if
the organization to which it is attached should move, another camp infirmary will be
required to accompany it.
663. The senior medical officer of the units served by the infirmary assumes charge
of the infirmary service and is authorized to call directly on the other organizations for
their proportionate share of medical officers and sanitary personnel for such service.
664. The sergeant on permanent duty with the infirmary, after reporting to the
senior medical officer of the units served, remains in subordinate charge of the equip-
ment as the representative of the director of ambulance companies.
665. When the camp infirmary is to be opened for service the surgeon in charge
will, with the approval of the camp commander, notify the surgeon of each other unit
which the infirmary is to serve of the time at which it will be available for his use to
hold sick call. He will maintain such service at the infirmary as the conditions may
warrant.
666. In combat the equipment of the camp infirmary may be ultilized for the
establishment of a station for slightly wounded. (See par. 710ft.)
THE AMKULAIVCE COMPANY
667. The ambulance companies will be numbered from 1 upward in a single consecu-
tive series for the entire Military Establishment.
MANUAL FOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1031
608. The vehicles of the ambulance company will be marked as prescribed in Tallies
of Organization. (See also par 545.)
669. The commanding officer of the ambulance company is under the immediate
orders of the director of ambulance companies, when there is one; otherwise, he is under
the immediate orders of the division surgeon.
670. The personnel of an ambulance company at war strength, as given in Tables
of Organization, are ordinarily distributed as follows:
(a) With the dressing station, including the litter bearers: 4 officers, 1 sergeant
first class, sergeants, 1 acting cook, 40 privates first class and privates, all of the
Medical Department.
(6) With the wheeled transportation: 1 officer, 1 sergeant first class, 1 sergeant, 1
acting cook, 2S privates first class and privates (1 as farrier, 1 as saddler, 2 as musicians,
12 as ambulance drivers, and 12 as ambulance orderlies), all of the Medical Department;
also 1 sergeant (blacksmith) and 3 privates (drivers) of the Quartermaster Corps.
671. The function of the ambulance company is to collect the sick and wounded, to
afford them temporary care and treatment, and to transport them to the next sanitary
unit in the rear.
672. In camp the ambulance company operates an ambulance service between the
camp infirmaries and the field or other hospitals.
673. On the march ambulances are distributed among the marching troops, usually
one to each regiment, for the purpose of supplying transportation to those who become
unable to march. (See pars. 037 and 721.)
674. In combat the company operates in two parts (par. 070). The first establishes
and operates a dressing station and collects the wounded thereat ; the second operates the
wheeled transportation in evacuating the wounded.
075. The dressing station party, including the litter bearers, with its equipment on
pack mules, moves forward in rear of the troops ready to establish the dressing station.
076. The location of the dressing stations and the number to be established will be
determined by the division surgeon acting under the instructions of the division com-
mander. The director of ambulance companies will supervise their opening, giving
the necessary orders therefor to the commanders of the ambulance companies. He will
report their opening to the division surgeon.
077. Exact rules can not be formulated as to the time when the dressing station shall
be opened. Generally speaking, when the advance has ceased and the wounded are so
numerous that they can no longer be cared for by the regimental personnel, the time has
come for the opening of the station.
078. It is desirable that the site selected for a dressing station have the following
advantages: (1) Protection from rifle fire, (2) protection from direct artillery fire, (3)
accessibility for wheeled transportation, and (4) a supply of water. Effective shelter
from fire is the chief desideratum. A site inaccessible to ambulances on account of
exposure to fire need not invariably be condemned, for the greater part of the work of
the ambulances is done after the close of the battle or after nightfall. The station will
always be pushed as far to the front as possible to reduce to the minimum the distance
over which the wounded must be carried on litters.
679. In some cases in which the establishment of the dressing station has been
delayed, or in which the troops are about to move forward, it may be possible to locate
the dressing station at the aid station, thus practically eliminating one station. Under
these circumstances the dressing station assumes the work of the aid station and the
personnel of the two stations cooperate until the aid station moves forward.
(a) The requirement that the sanitary personnel with the combatant organizations
keep in touch with those organizations may make it necessary for them to leave the
wounded where they fall, pausing only to administer such aid as may be absolutely
essential. Cases thus left will be collected and eared for by the dressing station party
as it advances. (See par. 650.)
080. As soon as the dressing station is opened its bearers under the direction of a
medical officer proceed to the front as far as the enemy's tire permits. Ordinarily they
1032 FIELD OPERATIONS
will be divided Into as many sections as there are aid stations, each under a noncom-
missioned officer, and one section will proceed toward each aid station.
(a) They direct wounded who are able to walk to the station for slightly wounded.
They transport other wounded from the aid station to the dressing station. When
practicable they also assist the regimental medical personnel in the care and removal
of wounded from points in advance.
(&) Meanwhile the commanding officer of the company with the dressing station
personnel proceeds to put the dressing station in condition to receive patients. When
possible for wheeled transportation to reach the dressing station, a message should be
sent to the officer in charge of the ambulance train directing him to report at the station
with the ambulances.
C81. The work of the dressing station is carried on under the following departments:
Dispensary.
Kitchen.
Receiving and forwarding.
Slightly wounded.
Seriously wounded.
682. All wounded will pass through the receiving and forwarding department. Those
whose injuries are not sufficient to incapacitate them for the present performance of
their military duties will, after receiving the necessary treatment, be directed to return
to their units, and the fact that such directions have been given them will be noted
upon their diagnosis tags. Other slightly wounded, able to walk, will, after like treat-
ment, be immediately directed to the rear in command of their highest ranking officer or
soldier. Generally they will be sent to the station for slightly wounded.
G83. At the dressing station only such operations will be performed as may be imme-
diately required to save life or to render the patients tit for farther transportation.
Permanent occlusive dressings may be applied if time permits. The rules to be followed
generally are that no operative or other interference should be attempted under condi-
tions unfavorable for asepsis or antisepsis, and that no wounded for whom transportation
is available should be delayed at the dressing station. Conditions in these respects must
vary widely in different battles; when there are good facilities for the surgical treatment
of cases and at the same time lack of transportation for wounded, it would manifestly
be proper to give them definitive treatment.
084. A memorandum showing the number of patients received and their disposition
will be kept in the receiving and forwarding department. Diagnosis tags should be applied
to all wounded not previously tagged and supplemental entries made on tags as required.
For further records of sick and wounded required of ambulance companies, see paragraph
575 et seq.
GS5. The ambulances and wagons remain farther to the rear than the dressing station
(usually in proximity to some unit or station through which communication with division
headquarters may be maintained) until it is practicable to determine a line of evacuation
for the wounded. As soon as the dressing station is established and the location of the
field hospital is determined, a safe route for the ambulance service between these two
establishments is sought, and, when found, the ambulances advance to begin the removal
of wounded from the dressing station. The wagons of the ambulance company, carrying
a reserve of dressings, may remain at a field hospital, whence the supplies may be sent
forward by ambulances returning to the dressing station. (See par. 728.)
C8G. Ambulances must reach the station as early as possible even at the risk of losses.
Ordinarily ambulances will carry wounded only from the dressing station to the nearest
field hospital, immediately returning to the former ; any other destination for wounded
must be prescribed by the division surgeon.
687. When the ambulances are insufficent the division surgeon should request the
division commander to permit the Medical Department to make use of part or all of the
transportation of the division on its return from the front.
MANUAL FOB THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1033
68S. During the daytime when a battle is still in progress it will rarely be possible
for ambulances or otber wheeled vehicles to advance farther to the front than the dressing
station. Opportunity to have them do so will sometimes occur at night, and on the con-
clusion of an engagement they should always be used, as far as may be, at all points on
the battle field.
689. To prevent further injury, it is important that the wounded should be handled
or otherwise disturbed as little as possible in the course of their transportation to the
rear. No wounded man once placed on a litter should be removed from it without evident
necessity until he reaches the field hospital, whether be is transported by ambulance
or otherwise.
690. While authority to close a dressing station or to move it must ordinarily be
obtained from the division surgeon, nevertheless under exceptional conditions, when
communication with the division surgeon is interrupted, the director of ambulance
companies may, if he deems the emergency requires it, close or move the station at
discretion. In this case the division surgeon will be notified as soon as possible of the
action taken.
(a) Should it be impossible to evacuate the wounded at a dressing station before
it is closed or moved, by reason of retreat or otherwise, the commanding officer of the
ambulance company will leave with the wounded, according to their number and con-
dition, sufficient medical personnel and supplies to provide for their immediate neces-
sities, and will advance or withdraw with the division the remainder of the personnel
and equipment.
THE DIRECTOR OF FIELD HOSPITALS
691. For each division (except cavalry divisions) there is designated as director
of field hospitals one medical officer of the grade of major and there is assigned under
him one sergeant and one private first class or private, Hospital Corps, both mounted.
692. The director of field hospitals is, like the director of ambulance companies,
immediately under the division surgeon and is the latter's executive in respect to the
field hospitals of the division. His supervision over the field hospitals is similar to that
exercised by the director of ambulance companies over those companies.
693. He will ordinarily accompany the field hospital in advance on the march and
remain with it in camp. He will keep the division surgeon informed of his movements.
694. He should maintain communication with the director of ambulance com-
panies, to enable that officer to make suitable arrangements for the removal of patients
from the front, and with the surgeon in charge of the sanitary column from the advance
section to promote the rapid evacuation of patients to the rear.
THE FIELD HOSPITAL
(Cnpnoity 216)
695. The field hospitals will be numbered from 1 upward in a single consecutive
series for the entire Military Establishment.
696. The w-agons of the field hospital will be marked as prescribed in Tables of Organi-
zation. (See also par. 545.)
697. The commanding officer of the field hospital is under the immediate orders of
the director of field hospitals, when there is one ; otherwise he is under the immediate
orders of the division surgeon.
698. The personnel of a field hospital at war strength, as given in Tables of Organiza-
tion, are ordinarily assigned as follows: 1 major (commanding); 5 captains and
lieutenants (1 adjutant and quartermaster, 4 ward surgeons) ; 3 sergeants first class (1
acting first sergeant in general supervision of the hospital and in charge of medical
property and records, 1 in charge of transportation and quartermaster property and
records, 1 in charge of mess supplies and cooking) ; C sergeants (1 in charge of the dis-
13576—25 66
1034 FIELD OPERATIONS
pensary, 1 in charge of operating equipment, 1 in charge of patients' clothing and effects,
3 in charge of wards) ; 3 acting cooks; 55 privates first class and privates (40 attendants,
1 dispensary assistant, 1 artificer, 4 orderlies, 3 supernumeraries) ; and of the Quarter-
master Corps, 1 sergeant (wagon master) and 7 privates (drivers).
009. The function of the field hospitals is to keep in touch with the combatant
organizations and to provide shelter and such care and treatment as are practicable for
the sick and wounded of the division who are brought in by the ambulance companies
until the sanitary service of the line of communications takes charge of them. A field
hospital can meet these requirements only when it is relieved so promptly by the sanitary
units in the rear that its mobility is not interfered with. Prompt evacuation of the sick
and wounded is necessary also to secure for them the facilities for treatment and the
comforts which are available on the line of communications.
700. On the march and in temporary camps, however, the field hospitals are the
nightly collecting points for the divisional sick and injured who are unable to continue
the march, and must provide for the care of such patients until they can be turned
over to the medical service of the line of communications or to a local hospital or
hospitals. (See par. 041.) The use of the field hospitals for this purpose should be
carefully regulated by the division surgeon.
(a) So far as practicable in each division only one field hospital at a time will
be used in this service, leaving the others entirely free of patients. Furthermore, only
so much of the equipment of the field hospital assigned to this work should be unpacked
as is required to care properly for the patients actually in the hospital and their
necessary attendants who are to remain behind when the division moves on. The number
of personnel detailed to remain will be as small as possible.
(b) The equipment which has not been unpacked and the personnel who have not
been detailed to remain with the patients will move with the division.
(c) Every effort will be made by the division surgeon to dispose of the patients left
behind. Should unusual delay in turning them over to the medical service of the line of
communications supervene, temporary provision for them should be arranged in civil
hospitals of the locality or otherwise as may be most practicable until the medical units
of the line of communications can take charge of them.
(d) As soon as the patients are disposed of, the personnel detailed for the temporary
care of such patients will immediately rejoin the hospital.
701. For service in combat, the locations of the field hospitals and the number to be
opened will be determined by the division surgeon acting under the instruction of the
division commander. The director of field hospitals will supervise their opening, giving
the necessary orders therefor to the commanders of the field hospitals. He will report their
opening to the division surgeon.
(a) It is desirable that they be centrally located and beyond the zone of conflict, which
will usually necessitate placing them 3 or 4 miles in rear of the dressing stations.
(6) Field hospitals should be easily seen and reached from front and rear and yet not
be in the way of troops and trains. An ample supply of good water is necessary, and
suitable buildings are of great advantage. Such buildings should be utilized first, and
only so much tentage put up as may be required.
(c) If the enemy retires, field hospitals will be established, if possible, near the
dressing stations having the greatest number of wounded.
(d) A field hospital may be moved forward under the direction of the division sur-
geon to replace a dressing station and to take over the patients.
702. The time when field hospitals should open will be communicated by the division
surgeon to the director of field hospitals, should there be one, or, there being none, to
the commanding officers of the hospitals concerned.
(a) Only one will, as a rule, be opened early in the battle. This will be done as soon
as the number of wounded justifies it. The other field hospitals should not be set up
until the necessity for them is apparent. If the conditions are such that the wounded
can be evacuated directly to the line of communications, the opening of field hospitals
will be unnecessary.
MANUAL FOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1035
703. On the receipt of an order to open a field hospital the following departments will
be established :
Dispensary.
Kitchen.
Receiving and forwarding.
Slightly wounded.
Seriously wounded.
Operating room.
Mortuary.
704. All wounded arriving at the field hospital will be received at the receiving and
forwarding department, which is the administrative office of the hospital.
(a) The slightly wounded, able to walk, will be immediately directed to the rear
or to the station for slightly wounded, as the circumstances may indicate.
(6) The seriously wounded, and the slightly wounded unable to walk, will be as-
signed to the proper department for treatment.
(c) Records of the wounded will be made as prescribed in paragraph 575 et seq.
705. Under ordinary battle conditions operations at the field hospitals should be
such only as are needed to fit the patients for transportation to the rear. Many extensive
dressings will, however, be required under all circumstances. All operations should be
clone under the strictest antiseptic or aseptic precautions, and every effort made to dress
cases so that they will not require redressing for some time. Patients should be fed, if
practicable, before being sent to the rear.
706. Every opportunity should be taken to transport the wounded to the rear. Or-
dinarily they will be turned over to the transportation of the line of communications, but
the returning transport of the division may be utilized for this purpose in the same man-
ner as at the dressing stations (par. 687).
707. When the number of wounded is very great and the transportation facilities are
bad, with no rear hospitals to relieve field hospitals, the latter will, despite all efforts,
become crowded with wounded which they can not dispose of. In this case the division
surgeon may be compelled to concentrate all wounded in one or two field hospitals so as
to free the others for an advance. The hospitals left behind should be cleared as soon as
possible, in order that they may rejoin their division.
(a) When no adequate provision is made for the evacuation of the sick and wounded
and a field hospital becomes the nucleus around which a camp hospital (par. 604) is
developed, it becomes an immobile unit, and. if the troops to which it is attached should
move, another field hospital will be required to accompany them.
70S. Field hospitals ordered to close or to move will dispose of their patients as di-
rected by the division surgeon.
(<i) If by reason of retreat or otherwise a field hospital is required to move before
it can evacuate its patients, its commanding officer will take action similar to that pre-
scribed for dressing stations in the like contingency. (See par. 690a.)
709. The opening, moving, and closing of field hospitals will be reported by their
commanding officers through the director of field hospitals to the division surgeon, who
will report the same when necessary to the surgeon of the advance group of the line of
communications.
THE STATION FOR SLIGHTLY WOUNDED
710. The station for slightly wounded is a transient divisional organization on the
battle field ; it has no permanent personnel or definitely prescribed equipment.
(a) The personnel required for the station, usually one medical officer, two non-
commissioned officers, and eight privates, will be detached from such unit of the sanitary
train as the division surgeon may elect. In some instances it may be practicable to utilize
personnel sent forward from the line of communications.
(6) For the equipment of the station one of the camp infirmaries of the division
may be utilized, or a medical and surgical chest and such other supplies as are necessary
may be temporarily detached from one of the field hospitals.
1036 FIELD OPERATIONS
711. The functions of the station for slightly wounded are (1) to afford a place
where men who are unable to accompany their units into combat may be assembled :
(2) to relieve dressing stations and field hospitals of the congestion incident to the
presence of the slightly wounded who can walk and who require but little attention.
712. The station, usually one for each division, is established when combat is
imminent. It should be about the same distance from the firing line as the field hospitals.
A building should be selected for its use when practicable. It should preferably be
located on the route over which the troops have advanced, as this route is the one
which the disabled are most likely to follow in working their way to the rear. In any
case it should be so conspicuously marked that it can be found readily.
713. Extensive preparations at this station are unnecessary. A tent should be
erected, if no building is available, where dressings may be applied or readjusted and
arrangements made for the preparation of simple nourishment. Diagnosis tags should
be attached to all wounded not already tagged. The duplicates of the tags will be dis-
posed of as directed in paragraph 571. A list of sick and wounded will be prepared
as prescribed in paragraph 580.
714. As soon as possible wounded at the station who are not able to return to their
commands will he collected into groups and directed to the rear in charge of one of
their number.
(a) Minor cases requiring no further treatment or only slight treatment will,
however, be directed to return to their organizations, and the fact that such directions
have been given them will be noted on their diagnosis tags. Men who arrive at the
station without authority and are able to do duty will be turned over to the provost
guard for return to their organizations.
(6) Should any of the sick or wounded be found too much exhausted or too badly
hurt to go farther afoot, the commanding officer of the station will report them to the
nearest field hospital.
715. Upon the conclusion of the engagement the personnel and equipment of the
station will be disposed of as directed by the division surgeon.
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SANITARY SERVICE OF THE DIVISION
716. In administrative matters the division surgeon bears a relation to the units of
the sanitary train similar to that of a regimental commander to the battalions and com-
panies of his regiment.
717. In order that the sanitary service may attain its highest efficiency, flexibility
in the distribution of sanitary personnel and equipment is essential. The elements com-
prising the sanitary train are, therefore, not ordinarily assigned to units smaller than a
division unless the unit is operating independently. They are, however, frequently at-
tached to smaller units as, for example, when a division marches by two roads, a part
of the sanitary train may accompany each detachment of the division. Under these circum-
stances the units of the sanitary train are subject to the general control of the senior
line officer present With the immediate command which they accompany.
718. When, by divisional orders, units of the sanitary train are temporarily separated
from direct headquarters control and placed with line organizations or trains, the senior
medical officer present with the units will report them to the line officer in command
Without further orders and will receive his instructions in such matters as the conduct
of the march and the location and security of the units in camp. Units so separated
trom headquarters are not regarded as detached unless they are specifically ordered to
report to the commander of the line troops for duty.
719. The method of control of the sanitary train varies according to circumstances.
For example, at a camp where arrangements have been made in advance for an ade-
quate supply of water and forage, an entire division may be assembled, in which case all
the elements of the sanitary train will be directly controlled by the division surgeon
(par. 051). On the other hand, to facilitate loading on ships, for example, the troops
of a division may be concentrated at one port and the trains at another port, in which
MANUAL, FOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1037
case the entire sanitary train is under control of the commander of the divisional train
and under the immediate command of the senior medical officer with the sanitary train.
720. When the division is on the march the sanitary train is ordinarily divided.
The division surgeon will advise the division commander as to which units of the sanitary
train he considers necessary for service with the marching troops and which units may
be placed under the commander of the divisional train. When the latter units are re-
leased from the divisional train they remain under the immediate command of their senior
medical officer until the division surgeon assumes control.
721. On a march not in the immediate presence of the enemy, conditions may warrant
placing an entire ambulance company witli the advance guard and the distribution of the
ambulances of one or more companies through the main body, an ambulance following each
regiment or independent battalion. (See pars. 637 and 073.)
722. A field hospital will ordinarily be needed to care for the disabled brought in by
the ambulances at the end of the march, and should be placed in the marching column
with due regard for this requirement. A field hospital used for this purpose will be
promptly evacuated in order that it may proceed with the troops when they advance.
723. In order that the men needing medical attention may be cared for as soon as
practicable after camp is established, the camp infirmaries may be distributed through the
marching column, one in proximity to each group of organizations which will camp to-
gether. When for any reason this is not practicable they will march with the field trains
of the units which they are to serve.
724. When combat is imminent, elements of the sanitary train scattered through a
marching column may be ordered to fall out, allowing the troops to pass forward. It is
essential at this juncture that no sanitary unit hamper the movement of combatant
organizations.
725. In combat, the operation of the divisional sanitary units will be governed in
general by the character of the engagement, whether defensive, offensive, or retrograde,
and in each particular case by the immediate conditions incident to the locality.
72G. When the mission of the command is defensive, and particularly if a line of
fortifications or some natural barrier, such as a river, can be taken advantage of, it may
lie practicable to make, in advance, a definite outline of the sanitary service. Under
these circumstances the zone within which casualties will probably occur can be deter-
mined with sufficient accuracy to enable the division surgeon to make definite recommenda-
tions concerning the announcement in the battle order of the location of the station for
slightly wounded, the dressing stations, and the field hospitals. As soon as the distribution of
the troops on the line of defense is indicated the aid stations may be located and routes from
them to the dressing station may be selected. The sanitary service of the line of com-
munications may send forward evacuation ambulance companies and evacuation hospitals,
into the zone of the advance in readiness to evacuate the wounded immediately.
727. When the command takes the offensive the difficulties of the sanitary service
are greatly increased. The station for slightly wounded is established at once for assem-
bling the sick who are not able to accompany their organizations into battle. As the
situation develops the organizations, followed by their sanitary detachments, move for-
ward. Wounded are given first aid, but no aid station is established until the organiza-
tion has ceased, temporarily at least, to advance, and until the number of wounded in that
vicinity justifies it. (See par. 645.) The time and place for the opening of the station is
determined by the organization commander, unless he has authorized the surgeon to use
his discretion in the matter. Dressing stations are established when required by the num-
ber of wounded on any sector of the line. The division surgeon, with the approval of the
division commander, gives directions for the opening of the station to the director of am-
bulance companies. The dressing station, as soon as it arrives at its location, sends for-
ward bearers to establish communication with the aid stations of organizations serving
on its sector of the line. (See par. 680.)
728. The wagons of the ambulauce companies may be left at field hospitals, in order
that the supplies which they carry may be forwarded to the dressing stations by means
of the ambulances as they go hack and forth. (See par. 685.)
1038 FIELD OPERATIONS
729. All the field hospitals may be held in readiness to establish until definite in-
formation can be secured as to the progress of the engagement and the number of casual-
ties, or when conditions warrant it one field hospital may be established as soon as the
dressing stations are located (par. 702a). Ordinarily the work of field hospitals will
not commence until several hours after the engagement has begun.
730. In a retrograde movement, whenever practicable, transportation and supplies
precede the troops. The sanitary service will require some ambulances held as near as
possible to the rear guard, which should be accompanied by a liberal allowance of sani-
tary personnel. So far as practicable the wounded in rear-guard actions should be placed
on litters and promptly carried forward to the ambulances.
731. The defensive, offensive, and retrograde movements practically cover the entire
field of the activities of the sanitary service in combat. The rencontre engagement neces-
sarily develops into one of these three by the time a definite course of procedure for the
sanitary service must be determined.
732. Whatever the form of the engagement the division surgeon arranges, as soon
as practicable, for the publication in orders of the information necessary for the operation
of the sanitary service. In order that divisional orders may not be burdened with details,
he recommends for inclusion in these orders only such information as is required by com-
batant organizations and their attached sanitary personnel, and he issues orders direct
to the units of the sanitary train embodying the details of the service which concern these
units only.
733. Combatant troops desire to know (1) the location of the aid station for their
organization, and (2) the location of the station for slightly wounded. The location of
the aid station is published by the organization commander as soon as it has been deter-
mined, while the location of the station for slightly wounded should be published in the
battle order.
734. It is important that the surgeons of combatant organizations should know as
early as practicable the location of the dressing station serving their sector of the line,
in order that they may so locate the aid stations as to reduce to the minimum the distance
that patients will have to be carried by litter bearers. The surgeons of combatant
organizations also require information as to the location of the station for slightly
wounded.
735. The divisional battle order usually furnishes information in paragraph 4 as to
the location of the station for slightly wounded, and in defensive operations it may
announce the locations of dressing stations and possibly of field hospitals, though the
latter, as a rule, does not directly concern the combatant troops. When it is impossible
to determine in advance of an engagement the locations of the dressing stations, that
information is furnished the combatant organizations through military channels as soon as
practicable. In any case the surgeons of combatant organizations finally learn the
locations of the dressing stations through the litter bearers who are sent forward to the
aid stations.
730. In defensive engagements, as indicated above, the division surgeon may recom-
mend that paragraph 4 of the battle order state that a station for slightly wounded is
established at a designated point ; that dressing stations will be located at designated
points to serve certain sectors of the line ; for example, one to serve the sector extending
from the left flank to a certain road, house, creek, or other landmark indicated on the
maps, with which the troops are supplied; another to serve the sector extending from the
point above mentioned to the right flank ; and, in case conditions warrant such an
announcement in advance, that one or more field hospitals will be established at designated
places.
737. In offensive movements it may be impracticable to include in the divisional
order anything more than the statement of the location of the station for slightly
wounded, and, if deemed expedient, some information concerning the places at which
ambulance companies and field hospitals will hold themselves in readiness. (See
par. 6S5.)
MANUAL FOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1039
738. If the locations of the dressing stations and field hospitals have not been
announced in the battle order, the division surgeon, with the approval of the division
commander and ordinarily after consultation with the directors of field hospitals and
ambulance companies, will issue orders concerning the locations of these units and will
usually designate by number the field hospital and ambulance company units which are
to open at the locations specified. He also transmits such information necessary for
the operation of the sanitary units as he may have received from the division commander ;
e. g., the routes vehicles may take between front and rear.
739. In a retrograde movement a formal order may not be issued. In this case the
sanitary units not rendering service with troops will be governed by the general instruc-
tions given the commander of trains ; those serving the troops will be governed by the
orders of the officer in immediate command on whom devolves the responsibility for
meeting emergencies as they arise.
740. In service with mounted commands pertaining to an infantry division it is
ordinarily impracticable to establish aid stations in combat. The sanitary personnel
continue with the organization. When any of them pause to render first aid, they rejoin
the command as soon as possible. (See par. 64u. )
741. When a cavalry division is operating as a screen, the sanitary service is
confronted by many difficulties. The cavalry may be one or more days' inarch in advance
of the infantry divisions and, in a hostile country, may make no effort to continue in
control of the territory over which it has passed. The mission of the sanitary service
under these conditions will be to render first aid and to transport the wounded as
rapidly as possible to the nearest place accessible to the sanitary service of the infantry
or of the line of communications. For this reason a cavalry division is provided with
a greater number of ambulances in proportion to the divisional strength than an infantry
division. In ease it is deemed impracticable to take hospital equipment into the area
in advance of the infantry divisions a field hospital pertaining to the cavalry division
may be established within the line controlled by the foot troops, and under these cir-
cumstances the additional ambulance facilities provided will be required to transport
the wounded to the field hospital. On the other hand, if conditions warrant advancing
the field hospital into the area between the infantry and cavalry, abundant ambulance
facilities will bo required to transport wounded to the field hospital from the broad
front which the cavalry when acting as a screen may occupy. Under these circum-
stances the use of a portion of the ambulance for transportation of the unmounted
Hospital Corps attached to the field hospital may be unavoidable to enable the field
hospital to keep in touch with the mounted troops. When opposing armies approach
each other cavalry is finally withdrawn from the intervening space and may take posi-
tion on the flanks of the infantry, in which case the sanitary service is operated as in
an infantry division and may be directed by the commander of the field forces to cooperate
with the sanitary units of the infantry or of the line of communications.
742. The service of sanitary detachments with organizations of the cavalry division
is similar to that of the sanitary troops with the cavalry of an infantry division. When
difficulties of communication render it impracticable for the division surgeon to direct
personally the sanitary service with the cavalry division, much will necessarily be left
to the initiative and judgment of the director of ambulance companies and the senior
medical officer with each individual unit.
DUTIES OF THE DIVISION SURGEON
743. The division surgeon is both an advisory and an administrative officer. (See
par. 361.) In his advisory capacity he makes recommendations concerning all matters
pertaining to the sanitary welfare of the command and concerning matters pertaining
to the personnel and equipment of the sanitary service under organization commanders.
In his administrative capacity he is in immediate command of the Medical Department
personnel attached to division headquarters, of the sanitary train, and of American
1040 FIELD OPERATIONS
National Red Cross units, and other voluntary aid personnel should they be authorized
in exceptional cases to perform service with the division.
744. The duties of the division surgeon that may be specifically stated are as follows:
(a) He will take action on all official papers passing through his office in a manner
similar to that prescribed for department surgeons (pars. 365 and 308). The channels
through which papers pertaining to the Medical Department go forward will be determined
by the chief surgeon of the field army according to circumstances. (See par. 828.)
(6) He will render to the chief surgeon, field army, the consolidated daily field
report of sanitary personnel and transportation and the consolidated daily field report
of patients (Form 84) and the weekly noneffective curve chart (Form 85).
(c) He will see that proper inspections are made of sanitary conditions in the
division and of the medical units of the division. These inspections will ordinarily be
made by the sanitary inspector.
(d) He will arrange a systematic and orderly service for the care and disposal of
the sick and wounded of the division in camps, on the march, and in battle, having in
view the retention of effectives at the front and the prompt removal of noneffectives to
the rear.
(c) He will keep the surgeon, advance group, advised as to the probable require-
ments of the sanitary service of the division and as to the number of patients for whom
provision will be required on the line of communications.
(/) He will keep the chief surgeon of the field army advised as to the efficiency
and requirements of the divisional sanitary service.
(g) On the march the division surgeon ordinarily accompanies the division com-
mander, giving such advice and information regarding the sanitary service as may be
called for, and securing all information necessary concerning the disposition of troops to
enable him to formulate plans for the sanitary service which these dispositions will require.
(h) When battle is imminent he will utilize all facilities available to familiarize him-
self with the terrain which will probably be covered and will obtain and distribute to the
officers of the sanitary train such information of a general nature as will assist them to
determine their course of action.
(i) After tin engagement he will immediately report losses in medical personnel to the
division commander and will take proper measures to replace the supplies and equipment
of the sanitary troops of the division. He will free field hospitals of patients as promptly
as possible in order that they may be ready for another engagement or a forward move-
ment.
745. The senior medical officer of a brigade or detachment acting independently will
perform for the command such of the duties of a division surgeon as the circumstances
may render necessary.
THE DIVISION SANITARY INSPECTOK
74G. As an assistant to the division surgeon a medical officer of the rank of lieutenant
colonel is assigned to each division for duty as sanitary inspector. He is primarily an
advisory officer (par. 302) but may in addition be assigned certain executive duties.
747. A sanitary inspector is charged especially with the supervision of the sanitation
"f the command to which he is assigned. In this connection he inspects and reiwrts upon
the sanitary conditions within the command, upon the occurrence of preventable diseases
and the sufficiency of the measures taken for their prevention, and in general upon all
matters affecting the sanitary care of troops.
(a.) At the end of every month each sanitary inspector will forward to the Surgeon
General, through military channels, a report of the inspections made by him during the
month under the provisions of this paragraph, indicating the sanitary defects, if any,
observed and the measures taken for their prevention. This report will be made on Form
60, modified if necessary to suit the case.
74S. Sanitary inspectors also inspect and report upon the administration of the units
of the sanitary train: the efficiency, instruction, and adequacy of the medical personnel;
MANUAL FOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1041
the condition of hospitals; the character and sufficiency of medical supplies; the facilities
for transporting medical supplies and the sick and wounded ; and in general all matters
affecting the care, well-being, and comfort of the sick and wounded.
(o) A report of each formal inspection made under the provisions of this paragraph
will be made on Form 50b, and will be forwarded within five days after the inspection
is made through military channels to the Surgeon General. A duplicate will be filed in the
office of the division surgeon. Should this report indicate any irregularities or defects of
medical administration, the sanitary inspector will furnish a triplicate through military
channels to the medical officer commanding the Medical Department organization con-
cerned, who will, without delay, report by indorsement thereon what remedies he has ap-
plied or will apply to correct each of the irregularities or defects noted. Such reports so
indorsed will also be forwarded through military channels to the Surgeon General.
749. Organization commanders are usually required by divisional orders to remedy
sanitary defects reported to them by the sanitary inspector. To facilitate the attainment
of satisfactory sanitary conditions the sanitary Inspector may be authorized by the division
commander to direct, in the name of the latter and within such limitations as he may
prescribe, the prompt correction of conditions prejudicial to the health of the troops.
750. For the purpose of supervising or executing sanitary measures in divisional
camps of more or less duration, sanitary squads may be organized and placed under the
control of the sanitary inspector. (See pars. 774 to 777.)
(a) Manure and refuse dumps used by the division in common, the water supply,
measures for the prevention of mosquitoes and flies, the policing of areas outside the juris-
diction of organization commanders, etc., may be placed in charge of such squads.
(6) In the employment of sanitary squads in divisional camps the provisions of
paragraph 777 will be strictly complied with.
ARTICLE XIV.— THE LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS
GENERAL
751. The line of communications is the connecting link between the service of the
interior and the zone of the advance. It is established when an important force is about
to engage in field operations involving a movement from a base unless the territory
through which the supply services extend can be safely occupied without military oper-
ations of an extensive character. In the latter case administration and supply are accom-
plished as in the service of the interior.
752. The point at which the base of a line of communications is to be established is
fixed in War Department orders. The zone of the line of communications embraces all
territory from and including the base to the point or points where contact is made with
the trains of the combatant forces. Certain of its activities, including those of the
sanitary service in evacuating the wounded, extend forward into the zone of the advance
when necessary.
753. The line of communications is ordinarily divided into a base section and an
advance section. In certain cases, due to prolongation of the line of communications, an
intermediate section may bo required. An advance section is required at the head of each
important route of supply diverging from the base.
754. The mission of the sanitary service of the line of communications is (1) to
provide such adequate facilities for the treatment of the sick and wounded that those
not permanently disabled may be returned to the front with the least practicable delay ;
(2) to furnish such an efficient evacuation service as will promptly relieve the fighting
forces of the encumbrance of their sick and wounded and allow the sanitary units in
the zone of the advance to maintain contact with their combatant organizations; (3) to
organize and maintain a system of supply that will enable the sanitary troops in the
theater of operations to replenish their equipment and supplies by direct methods and
1042 FIELD OPERATIONS
without delay ; (4) to maintain satisfactory sanitary conditions among the troops on the
line of communications and, if necessary, to take entire charge of sanitation among the
inhabitants of the occupied territory.
755. When the military conditions in occupied territory are such as to impair the
usual agencies of medical relief among the inhabitants thereof, the Medical Department
may take such measures, not incompatible with the necessities of the occupying forces,
as may be necessary to relieve the distress and suffering of the sick.
750. The Medical Department units pertaining to the line of communications are the
following :
Base group. — A medical supply depot, one or more base hospitals, and when required,
convalescent camps, contagious disease hospitals, hospital trains and trains for patients,
hospital ships and ships for patients, casual camps, sanitary squads, field laboratories,
and organizations of the American National Red Cross.
Intermediate group. — Rest stations, organizations of the American National Red Cross,
and such other sanitary formations as may be necessary.
Advance group. — Two evacuation hospitals and one evacuation ambulance company
for each division at the front supplied from the advance section, and an advance medical
supply depot. The evacuation hospitals and evacuation ambulance companies of the
advance section are collectively known as the sanitary column.
THE BASE HOSPITAL
(Capacity 500)
757. Base hospitals are Medical Department units of the line of communications under
the supervision of the surgeon, base group. They will occupy buildings if suitable ones
are available.
758. The base hospitals will be numbered from 1 upward in a single consecutive
series for the entire Military Establishment. They w 7 ill be further distinguished by
adding the designation of the field army to which they belong, as " Base Hospital No. 9,
3d Field Army."
759. These hospitals should be established at the base and, when necessary, in acces-
sible situations along the line of communications. The number to be assigned to each line
of communications when first established is determined on the basis of the number of
troops to be served and the percentage of sick and wounded which may reasonably he
anticipated in the particular campaign in question. (See par. 152.)
(o) New base hospitals may be established when those already in operation have
become too far separated from the Army, when they are needed to supplement the services
of more advanced hospitals, or when new sites will be more convenient to handle wounded.
(6) On the eve of battle it may be necessary for the surgeon, base group, to open addi-
tional base hospitals near the front or to augment the personnel and supplies of those
already established there.
760. The personnel allowed a base hospital, as given in Tables of Organization, are
ordinarily assigned as follows: 20 medical officers, 1 colonel (commanding), 1 major
(operating surgeon), 18 captains and lieutenants (1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 path-
ologist, 1 eye, ear, nose, and throat specialist, 2 assistant operating surgeons.
12 ward surgeons) ; 1 dental surgeon; 8 sergeants first class (1 general supervision. 1
in charge of office, 1 in charge of quartermaster supplies and records, 1 in charge of
kitchen and mess, 1 in charge of detachment and detachment accounts, 1 in charge of
patients' clothing and effects, 1 in charge of medical property and records, 1 in charge
of dispensary) ; 16 sergeants (1 in dispensary, 2 in storerooms, 1 in mess and kitchen.
4 in office, 2 in charge of police, 6 in charge of wards) ; 14 acting cooks; 115 privates
first class and privates (68 ward attendants, 3 in dispensary, 5 in operating room. 1
in laboratory, 14 in kitchen and mess, 6 in storerooms, 4 orderlies, 5 in office, 4 outside
police, 1 assistant to dentist, 4 supernumeraries); 46 nurses, female 1 (1 chief nurse,
1 assistant to chief nurse, 41 in wards, 2 in operating room, 1 dietist).
1 When female nurses are not available, additional enlisted men will be assigned in their stead.
MANUAL FOE THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1043
761. So far as adaptable the regulations for general hospitals will govern the
interior administration of base hospitals. (See pars. 283 to 31C.)
762. The base hospitals are designed to receive patients from the field and evacuation
hospitals, as well as cases originating on the line of communications, and to give them
definitive treatment. They should be well equipped for such treatment and there should
be sent to the home territory only those patients who require special treatment or
whose condition is such that they may be regarded as either permanently disabled or
likely not to recover within a reasonable time. If, however, the number of new cases
from the front is taxing the base hospitals beyond their capacity or the facilities thereof
are inadequate from any cause to meet the demands upon them, more extensive evacua-
tion of patients must be effected. On the eve of battle the base hospitals near the front
should be cleared as far as possible to make room for new patients.
763. Unless otherwise provided, the personnel, supplies, and equipment for the
evacuation of patients from advanced base hospitals to the rear will come from the
hospitals receiving them.
764. The commanding officer of the hospital will indicate under " Remarks " in his
daily report made on Form 83, the number of patients who require transfer so that
arrangements may be made accordingly. He should himself supervise the selection of
patients for further transfer In order to keep down to the lowest possible figure the
number of men lost to the Army.
765. Base hospitals ordered to close will dispose of their patients as directed by
the surgeon, base group.
THE CONVALESCENT CAMP
766. In appropriate cases convalescent camps may be established in the vicinity of
base hospitals. Such camps will be branches of the base hospital near which they are
situated.
THE CONTAGIOUS DISEASE HOSPITAL
767. Ordinarily cases of infectious disease occurring among troops in the theater of
operations will be cared for in the isolation wards of base or other hospitals and so far
as practicable at or near the place of origin of the disease. In the presence of a serious
epidemic, however, special facilities for the isolation of cases may be required. In this
event the surgeon, base group, with the authority of the commander of the line of com-
munications, will organize such contagious disease hospitals as may be necessary to meet
the emergency.
768. No definite organization for these hospitals can be prescribed in advance of
their establishment. The personnel for their operation will be procured from the home
territory or provided from the line of communications, as circumstances may warrant.
TRAINS, BOATS, AND SHIPS
769. The general regulations governing the organization, personnel, materiel, and
operation of hospital trains, trains for patients, hospital ships, and ships for patients in
the service of the interior will apply also to the similar Medical Department units on the
line of communications, except that the duties performed by the Surgeon General with
respect to the former will devolve in the latter case upon the surgeon, base group.
(See pars. 613 and 619.)
770. As hospital trains are permanent Medical Department units, when their organi-
zation on the line of communications is necessary, timely measures to procure the pre-
scribed personnel therefor from home territory should be instituted. Pending the arrival
of such personnel the medical officers and Hospital Corps men needed to operate these
trains should temporarily be drawn from other Medical Department units on the line,
exclusive of the evacuation hospitals and evacuation ambulance companies, whose per-
sonnel should under no ordinary circumstances be diminished.
1044 FIELD OPERATIONS
(a) When it is necessary to organize trains for patients they may also obtain their
medical personnel temporarily from other units on the line of communications, exclusive of
the evacuation hospitals and evacuation ambulance companies, but permanent details
from the service of the interior should be requested for their continued operation.
771. General arrangements for the running of hospital trains and trains for patients
will be made by the surgeon, base group, with the officer in charge of the base. Details in
regard to the loading and unloading of patients at railway stations will be arranged be-
tween the officers in charge of such stations and the commanding officers of the evacua-
tion ambulance companies or hospitals which are to transfer or receive the patients.
772. Circumstances will rarely be such that hospital ships will be available on the
line of communications. But navigable streams will often offer opportunities for the more
comfortable and expeditious transportation of the sick and injured than can be had by
land, and the surgeon, base group, should in such event avail himself thereof by organiz-
ing the necessary boat service. The personnel and supplies for such service will be drawn
from the line of communications as in the case of trains for patients.
CASUAL CAMrS FOR SANITARY TROOPS
773. These camps are designed for the reception, shelter, and control of Medical
Department personnel on their arrival and during their stay at the base pending assign-
ment. They will, with the approval of the commanding officer of the line of communi-
cations, be established by the surgeon, base group, at or near the base. They will be
under the immediate command in each case of the senior medical officer on duty therein,
and their administration will be governed by general military principles.
SANITARY SQUADS
774. For the purpose of giving attention to sanitary matters not within the control
of regimental or other military organizations, sanitary squads will be organized on the
line of communications at such places as may be necessary.
775. The personnel of such squads will consist of enlisted men of the Hospital Corps
augmented by such number of other enlisted men and civilian laborers as the amount and
character of the w r ork may justify. Each squad will bo in immediate charge of a medical
officer.
77(5. The function of sanitary squads is to supervise or execute, as the case may be:
(1) The necessary measures for the sanitation of camp sites, towns or villages not oc-
cupied or garrisoned, or of such parts of the same as may be otherwise unprovided for;
(2) sanitary work that may be necessary for the general welfai - e but that can not be
performed conveniently or profitably by individual organizations; (3) the operation of sani-
tary apparatus used by troops in common and not under control of any one organization.
777. Sanitary squads will not be employed to relieve regimental and other similar
organizations of the duty of providing for the sanitation of their own camps.
FIELD LABORATORIES
77S. One or more field laboratories will be established on the line of communications
where most convenient for the work to be accomplished. A suitable building should
be chosen in each case, preferably in a town provided with water and gas supply.
779. The technical supplies for a field laboratory are listed in paragraph 896. Such
additional equipment will be supplied as the surgeon, base group, may deem necessary.
REST STATIONS
780. Rest stations are organized for the purpose of giving temporary care and treat-
ment to sick and wounded en route. When on railway lines those established on the line
of communications are similar in every way to those pertaining to the service of the
MANUAL EOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1045
interior and their personnel should, if practicable, be obtained in like manner. (See
par. 618.)
781. In exceptional cases the distance between the hospitals in the zone of the
advance and the advance section of the line of communications may be so great that it
will be necessary to establish rest stations on the route of the evacuation ambulance com-
panies. Under these circumstances the rest stations will usually be of a temporary
character and their personnel and supplies will be provided by the evacuation ambulance
companies. At such stations provision should be made for temporary but comfortable
shelter, nourishing food, and readjustment of dressings or other treatment necessary to
enable the patients to proceed comfortably to their destination.
THE BASE MEDICAL SUPPLY DEPOT
782. A medical supply depot will be established at the base. The officer in charge
of this depot will prepare in quadruplicate a list of all supplies required, showing the
maximum and minimum quantities of each article which should be kept on hand in the
depot, having due regard in formulating this estimate to the number of troops to be supplied,
the time required by the depot to replenish supplies, the character of the military operations
in prospect, etc. In stating the minimum quantity of supplies the supply officer should in-
clude at least one medical reserve unit (par. 891) for each division at the front, in ad-
dition to the supplies likely to be required by the sanitary formations on the line of com-
munications. Three copies of the above-mentioned list will be forwarded through military
channels to the commander of the military forces. When approved, one copy will be
retained at the headquarters of the commander of the field forces, one copy will be sent
to the Surgeon General, and one copy will be returned to the officer in charge of the depot.
(a) When the supply on hand of any article exceeds or falls below the specified
maximum or minimum, the fact will be reported in writing to the commander of the
line of communications and to the senior medical officer on the staff of the commander
of the field forces, with appropriate explanatory remarks.
783. Stock to replace issues from these depots will be maintained without formal
requisition. (See F. S. II. : Zone of the Advance, General.) When such replenishment is
desired single copies of the invoices on which supplies were issued, stamped " Replenish-
ment requested," will be forwarded direct to the designated source of supply. Any articles
shown on an invoice for which replenishment is not desired will be erased therefrom
before the invoice is stamped and forwarded. Invoices stamped and forwarded as above
described will be acted upon as if they were approved requisitions.
7S4. Requisitions from the depot for other than the replenishment of issues, if within
the limits of the maximum and minimum table, will be forwarded in duplicate to the sur-
geon, base group. He will modify them at his discretion, forward one copy to the issuing
depot in the home territory, and return the other copy to the base depot with his modifica-
tions, if any, noted thereon.
785. Requisitions for supplies not provided for in the maximum and minimum table
require the approval of the Surgeon General.
786. In emergencies the surgeon, base group, may authorize local purchases to supply
the immediate needs of the depots on the line of communications. (See par. S190.)
THE ADVANCE MEDICAL SUPPLY DEPOT
787. The stock on hand at this depot will be considered a part of the available supply
of the base depot, as far as the table fixing the maximum and minimum stock limits is
concerned.
788. Maximum and minimum limits of stock to be maintained at this depot will be
determined by the commander of the line of communications on recomendation of the
surgeon, base group, to whom any variation of stock above or below the prescribed limits
will be reported at once with appropriate explanatory remarks. In making his recommenda-
1046 FIELD OPERATIONS
tions the surgeon, lmse group, should include in the minimum quantity of supplies to he
maintained at this depot at least one medical reserve unit (par. 891).
789. Issues from the advance depot will be replenished from the base depot without
formal requisition, in the manner provided under base supply depots (par. 783).
790. Requisitions from the advance depot for supplies other than those required to
replace issues will be forwarded in duplicate to the surgeon, base group. He will modify
them at his discretion, send one copy to the base supply depot for issue, and return the
other copy to the writer with his modifications, if any, noted thereon.
791. The advance depot is intended as a source of supply for troops in the zone of the
advance, and it should not, except in emergency, be depleted by issues to evacuation
hospitals, evacuation ambulance companies, and other units on the line of communications.
792. The operations of this depot will necessarily be controlled by the military
situation in the zone of the advance. If the troops are occupying defensive positions
with little probability of an immediate advance, the depot may be established in buildings,
if they are available, or under canvas ; if they are advancing, the depot may be main-
tained on barges, in box cars, or on motor trucks. In the latter case the prescribed stock
of supplies may temporarily have to be reduced to such essentials as surgical dressings,
medicines, and other articles of that class. In determining the character of the articles
that may be eliminated under these circumstances much will depend upon the facility with
which supplies can be obtained from the base.
THE EVACUATION HOSPITAL
(Capacity 432)
793. The evacuation hospitals are Medical Department units belonging to the
line of communications. Ordinarily two evacuation hospitals will be assigned to a line
of communications for each division which it serves in the zone of the advance. They
will be numbered and designated like the base hospitals (par. 758).
794. The personnel of an evacuation hospital at war strength, as given in Tables of
Organization, are ordinarily distributed as follows : 16 medical officers, 1 lieutenant
colonel (commanding), 1 major (operating surgeon), 14 captains and lieutenants (1
adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 2 assistant operating surgeons, 10 ward surgeons) ; S sergeants
first class (1 in general supervision, 1 in charge of office, 1 in charge of quartermaster
supplies and records, 1 in charge of kitchen and mess, 1 in charge of detachment and
detachment accounts, 1 in charge of patients' clothing and effects, 1 in charge of
medical property and records, 1 in charge of dispensary) ; 20 sergeants (1 in dispensary,
2 in storerooms, 1 in mess and kitchen, 4 in office, 1 in charge of police, 10 in charge of
ward, 1 in operating room) ; 10 acting cooks; 141 privates first class and privates (98
ward attendants, 3 in dispensary, 5 in operating room, 10 in kitchen and mess, 4 in store-
rooms, 4 orderlies, 5 in office, 6 outside police, 6 supernumeraries).
795. The primary function of the evacuation hospital is to replace field hospitals so
that the latter may move with their divisions, or to take over their patients with the
same object in view. So far as it would not interfere with this function the evacuation
hospital may be used for ordinary hospital purposes on the line of communications.
796. An evacuation hospital is preferably established on a railway or navigable
stream, but this preference must, of course, yield to the military situation. Care should
be taken to choose a site accessible to wheeled transport and with an abundant supply of
water and fuel. When suitable buildings are available they will be utilized.
797. The places where evacuation hospitals are to be established or to which they
are to be moved will be determined by the surgeon, advance group, under the authority
of his commanding officer.
798. Before a battle all evacuation hospitals will be brought as far forward as pos-
sible and will remain In readiness tor opening or further advance.
799. The duties of an evacuation hospital when opened are similar to those of a field
hospital in combat (par. 701) and corresponding departments will be created (par. 703).
MANUAL FOR THE .MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1047
800. The character of the surgical treatment to be given to wounded therein will vary
widely under different conditions. When during battle many wounded are being received
the treatment afforded will hardly be more extensive than that at field hospitals, viz,
emergency operations and bettor preparation for transport. When few wounded are coming
in and there is no probability of an early move, complete treatment may be given even
during battle.
801. Serious cases requiring protracted treatment and all patients permanently in-
capacitated should be sent to the rear from evacuation hospitals as soon as their condition
permits.
(o) When battle is expected active measures of evacuation should be employed to
clear the evacuation hospitals in use so that they may be ready for movement toward
the front.
(6) During battle all patients in evacuation hospitals who are fit for transportation
should be hurried to the rear as soon as possible to make room for new cases from the
front. It will rarely be possible for evacuation hospitals to send slightly wounded back to
their organizations during combat, but every opportunity should be taken to do so in order
that such wounded shall not become further separated from their commands.
802. The necessary transportation for moving patients to the rear from evacuation
hospitals will be provided by direction of the commanding officer of the advance section
of the line of communications.
803. The commanding officer of the evacuation hospital will indicate, under " Re-
marks " in his daily report made on Form 83, the number of patients who require trans-
portation to the rear.
THE EVACUATION AMBULANCE COMPANY
804. Evacuation ambulance companies are organized only in time of war or when war
is imminent. They are allowed in the proportion of one for each division at the front.
They will be numbered consecutively from 1 upward for each field army to which they
belong, as " Evacuation Ambulance Company No. 1, 3rd Field Army."
805. The commanding officer of the company is under the immediate orders of the
surgeon, advance group.
800. The allowance of personnel and equipment for an evacuation ambulance company
will be that provided for an ambulance company with such modifications as the conditions
under which the former is serving may warrant. Motor ambulances should, if practicable,
he substituted for horse-drawn vehicles. Ordinarily pack mules will not be required and,
owing to the fact that the company normally operates from the head of the line of com-
munications where there is a supply depot, the quantity of reserve surgical dressings
provided for the ambulance company may be largely reduced.
807. The primary function of the evacuation ambulance company is the evacuation
of field hospitals and the transportation and care of patients en route therefrom to evacua-
tion, base, or other hospitals on the line of communications or to points with train or
boat connections for rail or water transport to such hospitals.
808. On the march the company will be brought up to clear field hospitals of patients
collected by the latter (par. 700), and to take them to points on the line of communica-
tions.
809. When battle is soon to occur it will usually be necessary to greatly increase the
number of vehicles and bearers of the company. This increase will be provided by the
officers in charge of the advance section on the recommendation of the surgeon, advance
group.
810. Just before a battle commences all evacuation ambulance companies should be
located as far in advance as the conditions permit.
811. At the proper time or times during or after the battle each company, under
instructions given therefor by the surgeon, advance group, will proceed to the field hos-
pitals which it is to evacuate, will report to the commanding officers thereof, will receive
1048 FIELD OPERATIONS
the patients who are to go to the rear, and in due course will deliver them to the Medical
Department organization which is designated for their further care.
(a) The evacuation ambulance company will receive and provide for all patients
turned over to it by a field hospital. (See also par. 706.)
(6) It will also receive and provide for the slightly wounded, able to walk who report
to it by proper authority from the dressing stations, the station for slightly wounded, or
other places on the field.
812. The assignment of the sick and wounded to the various kinds of transport (auto-
mobiles, ambulances, wagons, country carts, bearers, etc.) will be made by the commanding
officer of the company according to their condition. In doubtful cases the authorities of
the hospital should be called upon for necessary information.
ADMINISTRATION
813. For administration and control the line of communications is organized as
follows :
(1) A service of defense.
(2) A supply, sanitary, and telegraph service.
(3) A service of military railways.
814. The commander of the line of communications is responsible, under existing
regulations, for the defense of the zone and for the government of that portion of the
zone placed under military control. All troops, military establishments, and personnel
in the zone of the line of communications are under his control. He is responsible that
the reserve of supplies on hand in his various depots shall be maintained between the
maximum and minimum amounts fixed by the commander of the field forces.
815. All personnel pertaining to the sanitary service of the line of communications
report at the base for assignment to duty. Here advance and intermediate sections
are organized and sent forward as required.
81G. Base, intermediate, and advance sections are each commanded directly by the
commander of the line of communications through an assistant chief of staff authorized
to issue orders in his name.
817. The senior medical officer assigned to duty at the base section of the line of
communications (surgeon, base group) acts in a dual capacity. (1) He is the technical
adviser of the commander of the line of communications on all matters relating to the
operation of the Medical Department within the zone of the line of communications. In
this capacity he transacts his business directly with the headquarters of the line of
communications. (2) He acts in an executive capacity, controlling directly all Medical
Department establishments pertaining to the base. In this relation all communications
between the surgeon, base group, and the commander of the line of communications pass
through the officer in charge of the base.
818. As adviser to the commander of the line of communications the duties of the
surgeon, base group, and the relation he bears to the medical personnel in the zone of the
line of communications, are analogous to those of a department surgeon, and he will be
governed by the regulations for the latter (see pars. 364 to 370) with such modifications
as the different conditions demand. To the extent of his authority the surgeon, base
group, is responsible for the efficiency of the entire medical service of the line of com-
munications, and for the accomplishment by such service of its mission as outlined in
paragraph 754.
S19. The duties of the surgeon, base group, that may be specifically stated are as
follows :
(a) He will direct and control personnel of the American National Red Cross on
duty with the line of communications.
(&) He will decide whether personal service individually volunteered shall be accepted
(par. 537) ; and, when accepted, he will direct how it shall be employed.
(c) He will devise appropriate measures for the shelter, supply, treatment, and
transport of the sick and wounded, including suitable provisions to secure the retention
MANUAL FOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1049
of effectives at the front and for the sending of noneffectives to the rear ; and will con-
sult with the chief of staff and the heads of other staff departments in reference to the
details of such measures.
(A) He will coordinate the Medical Department administration of the line of com-
munications, and to that end will keep continuously in touch with the surgeons of advance
and intermediate groups.
(e) He will communicate with the Surgeon General regarding medical arrange-
ments for the movement of patients from the base to home territory and the provision
of Medical Department personnel and supplies from the home territory for the line of
communications.
(/) He will act on requisitions for Medical Department supplies as provided in
paragraph 552.
(g) With the approval of the Surgeon General he may give authority for the pur-
chase in local markets of medical supplies immediately necessary for the care of the
sick and wounded and the prevention of the spread of disease.
(ft) With the approval of the Surgeon General he may receive voluntary contributions
in money or kind for the benefit of the sick and wounded and he may expend the same
as he deems fit.
(t) With the approval of the Surgeon General he may make contracts with surgeons
and employ or authorize the employment of other civilians for emergency service under
the Medical Department on the line of communications.
(j) When battle is impending be will take such steps as are necessary to insure
that mobile units of the line of communications are free to advance when required ; that
hospitals are cleared for new cases ; that sufficient medical supplies are collected in the
immediate rear of the army to meet the exigencies of combat; and that personnel avail-
able for assistance in the zone of the advance are assembled and held in readiness as
far forward as practicable.
(fc) He will make timely recommendations to the commander of the line of com-
munications regarding transportation required for medical supplies and for patients.
(0 He will render to the chief surgeon of the field army the consolidated daily
field report of sanitary personnel and transportation and the consolidated daily field report
of patients (Form 84) and the weekly noneffective curve chart (Form 85).
820. The relations of the senior medical officer assigned to duty with the advance
section (surgeon, advance group) and of the senior medical officer of any intermediate
section that may be established, to the surgeon, base group, are similar to those of post
surgeons to department surgeons.
821. The surgeon, advance group, under the supervision of the officer in charge of
the advance section, controls directly all sanitary units at the head of the line of com-
munications.
822. The surgeon, advance group, lias general charge of the transportation of patients
from the field hospitals or other units in the zone of the advance to the evacuation hos-
pitals or other places on the line of communications prepared for their reception.
823. During or after battles of any magnitude the transportation included in tho
sanitary column will usually be found greatly inadequate for the evacuation of the
wounded. It will be the duty of the surgeon, advance group, to anticipate these condi-
tions and to make timely provision for obtaining the increased transportation necessary.
Under competent authority, vehicles belonging to the civilian population may be im-
pressed, and use made of the supply column of the advance section. He should direct
the operation of such additional transportation until the emergency is past.
824. Under all circumstances the surgeon, advance group, should maintain close touch
with the division surgeons and medical organizations at the front and make suitable
arrangements to relieve them promptly of the sick and wounded left behind.
825. When battle is impending, he will clear his evacuation hospitals as far as neces-
sary, so that room may be available for wounded from the front; he will assemble near
the front his evacuation ambulance companies and one or more evacuation hospitals, and
1050 FIELD OPERATIONS
he will advance supplies to points where they may be readily available for the divisional
units.
82G. One of the most important duties which devolve upon all medical officers in
the zone of the line of communications is careful exercise of judgment in making recom-
mendations regarding the transfer of the sick and wounded to the home territory in
order that hospitals on the line of communications may not be burdened with patients
who are permanently disabled and that soldiers who are likely to be able to rejoin their
commands within a reasonable time be not sent too far to the rear.
827. The duties of sanitary inspectors assigned to the service of the line of commu-
nications are analogous to those of department sanitary inspectors, and they will be
governed by the regulations for the latter (pars. 371 to 374) with such modifications
as the different conditions demand.
ARTICLE XV.— ADMINISTRATION OF THE SANITARY SERVICE OF THE
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
THE CHIEF SURGEON OF A FIELD ARMY
S2S. The chief surgeon of a field army belongs to the technical and administrative
group of the staff of the commander. During the period of grand tactical operations when
a line of communications is in operation the chief surgeon is, in general, an advisory
officer, administering directly only the limited personnel of the Medical Department attached
to headquarters. In his advisory capacity he concerns himself only with the broad prin-
ciples underlying sanitary administration. His recommendations are such that, when
promulgated by the commander, the details of the sanitary service will be left to sub-
ordinate commanders. Under these conditions the chief surgeon maintains no office of
record. He may, however, direct that all or any of the Medical Department reports from
the zone of the advance pass through the office of the surgeon, base group, before beinc
forwarded to the War Department, in order that the information contained therein may
be tabulated for his use or that the reports may be returned for correction.
829. Upon the completion of the grand tactical operations and upon the discontinu-
ance of an organized line of communications, or if no line of communications has been
been organized, he assumes a more direct control of such Medical Department personnel,
depots, hospitals, etc., as the War Department may place under the command of the
officer upon whose staff he is serving. Under these circumstances the chief surgeon will
maintain an office of record in so far as he is assigned the duties which devolve upon
rue surgeon, base group, when a line of communications is operated.
S30. The duties of the chief surgeon include those outlined in paragraph 362. He is
specifically charged with the following:
(a) He will keep the Surgeon General advised of the condition and efficiency of the
sanitary service of the command.
(&) He will take the necessary steps to insure coordination of the sanitary service
of the zone of the advance and the zone of the line of communications, and to that end
will keep continually in touch with the division surgeons and the surgeon, base group.
(c) He will make recommendations relative to the adequacy of the table of maximum
and minimum supplies to be maintained in the depots on the line of communications.
(See par. 782.)
ARTICLE XVI.— RESUME OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE SANITARY SERVICE
IN WAR
831. When war is imminent, the Regular Army is mobilized at its permanent posts
or stations and the Organized Militia at mobilization camps. Little is required of the
Medical Department at the time of mobilization in connection with the preparation
of organizations of the Regular Army for active service. Field equipment is maintained
MANUAL FOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1051
at designated stations or depots in readiness for service at all times; the men of the
Hospital Corps available for service with line organizations and with the sanitary train
are designated in time of peace and are in readiness to join their respective units. The
men composing the line organizations have been given thorough physical examinations
which have been made of record, and they have been vaccinated against smallpox and
typhoid fever. Each man is equipped with a first-aid packet and has been instructed in
its use. So far as the Medical Department is concerned, therefore, these troops should
be in readiness to proceed from their points of mobilization to the camps of concentration
on short notice.
832. Mobilization camps for the Organized Militia are provided in each State. An
officer of the Regular Army commands each camp and has on his staff a camp surgeon,
usually a medical officer of the Regular Army. Mobilization camps are operated under
the control of department commanders, who are responsible for the complete preparation
and equipment of the troops which assemble there. The work of the Medical Depart-
ment at these camps is supervised by the department surgeon and the sanitary inspector
of the department. The camp surgeon is provided with an adequate corps of assistants.
Physical examinations of troops mobilized are made and recorded in accordance with
specific instructions from the War Department. Vaccinations against smallpox and
typhoid fever are administered and records made thereof. Individuals and organizations
are furnished such portions of their equipment as pertain to the Medical Department ;
and such training in sanitary matters is given both the line troops and the sanitary
troops as is possible, and appropriate to each (par. 594). When for any reason it is
impracticable to fully prepare individuals and organizations for service at the front, so
far as this preparation devolves upon the Medical Department, the camp surgeon will
furnish a full report to the department surgeon showing what remains to be done in
order that the latter may take the necessary steps to have the preparation of such
individuals and organizations completed at the camp of concentration.
833. After mobilization, equipment, and preliminary training, the troops are assembled
at concentration camps for immediate use against the enemy or for transport to an over-
sea theater of operations. At camps of concentration the general instruction and train-
ing of the line and sanitary troops in connection with the work of the sanitary service Is
conducted under the direction of the camp surgeon.
834. On leaving camps of concentration, troops pass from the service of the interior
to the theater of operations, where they come under the control of the commander of the
field forces. They may pass directly into the zone of the advance or they may traverse
the zone of the line of communications before reaching the zone of the advance, or they
may be assigned to duty on the line of communications. In the latter case they may be
assigned either to the service of defense, to the supply, sanitary and telegraph service,
or to the service of military railways. The relations and duties of the sanitary personnel
in this zone are described in paragraphs 751 to 827.
835. The sanitary service of the zone of the advance is treated in detail in paragraphs
630 to 750. The purpose of the service in camp, on the march, and in combat is to render
temporary aid to the sick and wounded and to expedite their transportation to the rear,
always making such disposition as will secure the retention at the front of all men fit
for duty and relieve the fighting force of the impediment incident to the presence of men
incapacitated for duty. To that end the service of the advance is assisted by the service
of the line of communications, if one has been organized ; otherwise, directly by the service
of the interior. In either event it cooperates with the advance station of the service in
its immediate rear. When battle is imminent, the resources of the sanitary service behind
the zone of the advance are placed in readiness to meet the demands for the care and
transportation of the wounded which may reasonably be expected, and personnel and
supplies are advanced as near the seat of operations as practicable, reaching forward into
the zone of the advance if conditions warrant it.
836. The troops engaged in combat are accompanied by medical officers and Hospital
Corps attendants ; ordinarily a medical officer with a detachment of Hospital Corps men
accompanies each battalion into combat, and the surgeon of each regiment with the equip-
1052 FIELD OPERATIONS
ment carried 011 si pack mule ^ n>ar. 800) establishes an aid station. The wounded apply
their own first-aid dressings, if ■practicable, and the sanitary personnel attached to organ-
izations render first aid as st>o«c» as possible. The sanitary personnel with each battalion
collect the wounded in groups ixxn. <3 transport those who are unable to walk to the regimental
aid station. Men with trivial wounds are sent back to their commands when their wounds
are dressed, and those slightly- -wounded but able to walk are directed to the station for
slightly wounded several miles £21 the rear, in order that dressing stations and field hospi-
tals may not be unnecessarily- «^-*-i»ugested by the presence of this class of men.
837. At the aid stations tli^ sanitary service with troops connects with the service of
the sanitary train. Each anibulnncs company establishes a dressing station in a protected
location, usually some distance i n rear of the aid station. The dressing stations send for-
ward bearers to remove the w«^"nuded who have been brought in to the aid statons. At
the dressing stations light nourisliment is provided, dressings are examined and adjusted
or reapplied, as conditions ms*^^ require, and the patients who require transportation
are made as comfortable as posisiMe until it is practicable to transport them to the rear.
usually to the field hospitals. "W-~~lienevcr possible the dressing stations are so located that
they can be reached by wheel t ir-«nsportation, and the wounded are sent to the field hos-
pitals in ambulances.
838. The field hospitals do asz^ot perform the functions of civil hospitals or of base or
general hospitals, in that their ^^cjuipment is limited to those things necessary to provide
shelter, nourishment, and eniergc-ncj' treatment for patients until they can be transferred
to the immobile units at the rear. At the field hospitals no beds or cots are provided. The
patients are placed on straw *>~^—^r which blankets are spread. The service of the zone
of the advance controlled by the? « division surgeon terminates with the field hospitals. The
units of the line of commimicatiions pushed forward into the zone of the advance (par.
825) relieve the field hospitals <>f=- "their sick and wounded as rapidly as possible.
839. One of the evacuation 1 *. «r»spitals held in readiness at the head of the line of com-
munications will ordinarily recei -^~e the patients from the field hospitals. In some cases
an evacuation hospital is pusliecl forward and takes charge of the patients at the location
of the field hospital ; in other csat ses transportation from the advance section of the line
of communications is sent forwnx— «f* to the field hospital to receive the patients, and in many
eases the wagons going to the x~>^s-iir for supplies will transport the patients: back to the
refilling point where they will t*-^s- turned over to the wagons sent forward from the ad-
vance section. The evacuation ^fcfcospital is the first sanitary unit in which provision is
made to retain patients for any H^e-ngth of time. It is equipped with cots, blankets, and n
liberal supply of comforts for tr"*^*? sick, but ordinarily the evacuation hospitals will be
cleared of patients as early as x~»-raeticable in order that they may be ready to receive
others from the front. The pati^?aats are usually sent back by trains or boats to the base
hospitals where all possible comf*z»rts and facilities for their care are provided. All sick
and wounded who will be able <r «-» return to duty within a reasonable time will be re-
tained in these hospitals rather *~ Sine turned over to the service of the interior. Patients
who no longer need medical atte- nation are placed in convenient camps operated in con-
nection with the base hospitals "marrtil they regain sufficient strength to return to their
commands. The base is the greo -fc center of medical activity of an army. Personnel and
supplies intended for the Array ». x — <^ accumulated here and sent forward as required. The
sick and wounded are sent back: «: «z» the base and cared for. Records of both supplies and
personnel are kept at the base, s» ^cacl such abstracts and tabulations as the chief surgeon
of the field army may require froixi time to time are made here and supplied to him.
840. The losses at the front are being constantly replaced by men sent forward
through the channels above descritoed. New recruits are sent to the mobilization camps
where they are equipped and drl lied and pushed forward to meet the demands in the
zone of the advance.
841. Supplies furnished by th^s- Medical Department for troops at the front are ordi-
narily obtained from the supply «3epot at the head of the line of communications on
requisitions approved by the divis=ion surgeon. Each sanitary formation may make Its
MANUAL FOR THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1053
own requisition, and its supplies may be sent forward from tlie advance section to the
refilling points where the transportation furnished by the line of communications turns
over the supplies to the transportation sent back from the divisional organizations. The
stream of supplies coming forward, consisting of rations, clothing, and ammunitions, is
constant, and ample opportunity is afforded to bring up the articles required by the
sanitary service with the other supplies. When found to he more convenient the regi-
mental sanitary supplies may be replenished from camp infirmaries or from the supplies
carried by ambulance companies, these latter making requisitions for the supplies which
they require. The supply depot at the advance section draws its supplies from the
depot at the base, the stock of which is automatically maintained by the service <>f the
interior.
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION, U. S. ARMY
On May 3, 1917, tables of organization for the United States Army, as authorized by
the national defense act approved June 3, 191G, were promulgated. These tables included
the typical Infantry and Cavalry divisions, the division being then our highest adminis-
trative unit.
For present purposes, the table for the Infantry division only, at maximum strength,
will be given. Following this, tables for Medical Department organizations of and
personnel attached to this division will be given. Then will be shown the changes made
in the general Tables of Organization, from time to time, and with them, the modified
changes in the tables concerning the Medical Department organizations and personnel
attached to mobile organizations.
1064
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION, IT. S. ARMY
1055
~l •'. -
ec «5 « _
Tt r^ M
MNQCfl
2=^
3; cl3
■g K
■W Eh
8 w
»
be £
i
- c
£3°
S 3
2Si2
» r,
53
S8
tan
S" s
Si 5
S| i
"a ,m
ga
2 _^ 3 o s 5«
1
Eh
be bo
121
S.S.S
3 B* B ■
~§~SS3&fj 11
iii
■= Be -
a— 2 a,
1056
FIELD OPERATIONS
C
I
I « > M hJio « 1 1 O
2a B.
I —< lO O I~
si
3 3
E-2
^M3) M
C5 OCJ <N
e
e
o
.2 3
"32
Si
SI
i*-4C4C4 *0
- -H<N tN iO
'"S S3
a
-. CO > -^«
3
-
-
a 2
p • &
g 5 "S
•2.2 « s
o
HI
TABI.ES of organization, u. s. army
1057
.0 ^
m
2 * >■
OhCO
>n
j> -0 ci —
d as -f
tit;
-a
p i« *r -r -r T X p O
01 1 - Cl Cl Cl
1^
00
00
CM
Cl C4 — Cl Cl —
COg
CN
cs
s
«•
" r* w
!l' 5
<#
1 -tt*
>■
-0
! i ! ! !"* i
ISO
CO
g
n
a-,
oa
a
3
J3
i-
K P
=-. B£
£ s
-
S-5
01 O
7 J
CN
OS
CS
Cl Cl Cl f 00 — >
t-
M
CO
1 <N Cl Tf 1 Tf" Cl
> cs 1 — >.-:
is
§
e«»
CS
Cl CI CI Cl T O
00
§
-1
1 -
. . 1 r 1 — i Tj"
g
Cl
=
cs
cs
to Cl
Cl ->*• (O
CO
=
[ -
iN i ..1
III
' 1
30
«
« § 3
cs
"
j ;
r
! In ! ! 'ao
III
! I =
; | co
te
Ml
<
Is
. F- .-
~ Tt ^ ^ •-
— i.T !
--c
MO
— — — — <N <«
! ! ! I !r-cs
Cl
is
C3
CO
£2 i~
— 10 1
-
M "J
" s
g
I -H 1 Cl 1
!;;
;
O
""' Cl
T CS
2 ""
-
—
Cl Cl ^D
O || O
3
a
S
c
>
Tf (N ?l ?) N W N C 00
CS
8
re
1 1 ! ! 3. co <e
1 < 1 r Cl O
X Cl
CO
3 III
a
s
■a
£
-<
-
^
CSOJ
-1 —
CISC Cl
CT5
05
CO
?l
S° == j : i
i : : i
1 i i
. 1! =
1 w;
CS
««
Ohm
c3 S3 1.
5 S «
re
~
! >.ti
O
-
I In I ! In ! !
' II
3
Ani-
mal-
drawn
ambu-
lance
com-
pany
■O i
•■:
c» ~ — — — — co "*•
— CS
s
U5
■ !lNf X jj TtO
i i : i
si
**
>c i
1.-
CS — to '
C*
-
—
^1
CS CO '« 1
-
2
'3
5
"5
s
! c !
1 - •
! c 5
i||
MS
ea .is
i
z
%
i
1
\
T
:
1
:
c
e
r
E
z.
DC
!
= i
- -
tat,
8 i
sfi • a
I
i"o !
I w I
— c-
'a
0>
-
i
60
3 . 1 . 1 1 p»
3^ : t-i- \B
B P S £ S ; 'n
C O g_rt
s S IS S -< ^ fi
a
-
13576-25 67
1058
FIELD OPERATIONS
<9
•i H
« %
8" *
*(*
•Jl
T3
CD
O
—
0-3 e
^55
CD
g
CO
a
- ™
g s
c
a
o.i.2
IO ■«*• 00
1- O
I- —
r -
r
— iO
CN ""*
CN
■-.
CN
feO
■ ':.
s
CN
10
10
COCN **• X CN
CO i—> -^ — ( op
CO— '^H 55
1
88 i
©
5
I CM CN
■ O — <
1- — .
S
CN
CN
3
IO CO
I—
'CN —■
CO
e*
C fe-
es c3
CN i— '
OS io
1 c»
O
O
C-l
3
OO
Ico-*
KM
i
CO
' 'x
X
a
IB
CM i
N II CN !
00 1
CN
f
oo>-i !
OS
: !
o
Pi
"3,
a
m
OO '
00
S !
1 :
-t"
CO
CN
I-
-*t
CN
: : :
OB
u
CO '• '•
CN i '
0Q
CN
■^ 1
OS ;
-r
ro
OS
CN
cS
CN
-.O
CD
co ac co
CO
5
;
X
= ■35- a >>.§
u- S C3 s'S ^"3
.j. g a -„ x
-
O CO ■
M
1 CN CN
CO
1— t-
CN
CN
CO
71
M
CO
CN
CO
CO
1 CN CN
-f
IcNCN I
-*> 1
so
So = 5 .2
CO *-« 1
■o M -H
C
"
X
CN
CN
CO
ri
IC*H
a
Hi
CN
C£§£§
CC'CO
CN -1
r-
CO
S
— ■
re
CO
S
CO
CO
S
1-
, t-r-
ItOCO ■
CO •.O'-JH •
C5
CN
_
i«
c S3 SiJ-^5
on i r-
CI i c-
OO 1(3^
1-
One
field
Artil-
lery
brigade
(2 regi-
ments
3-ineh
guns,
1 regi-
ment
4.7 or
6 inch
how-
itzer, 1
trench
mortar
bat-
tery)
^ CO
/ r
CN «#
si
no"
CO
00
"^
CO
1.-'
CO
5C
s
§
-'
1 CO iO
1 t^CN
CN X O
oai-
2
jCNC-)^
CN
OS
cc
V3
CO CO
i -
-1
CN N CO CN
CO
fr»
1? . 2*
> e, 5 S2 ~= =-g s
£■§ § 5..S— _3 I g o
s™ ;
r--
r-X
CN
CO
92
■ ~
S
IU3 -h
--0
"
! ! ! *a
d
! I ' S
ill K
ill «
i i i 1
! J ! 5
! °
Q i * 3
| >fl ©
ca g"3 £->
■9 — a,
c^ 5 0?
a ■ 2
Hi
a i-i
u c cet
v E -1
KM
13 1 !
: ; i? ; ; : i ; :
1 IS !
S ' Ji §S» ' !!!!
c ; 3 S 3 ' ! ■ «
! c B » 3.2 <= =
°. : "£* s =2 = =
ey cd *J" B jj- bf _!. = - —
es c3 o"Co > ^_rCNcN— r
60 60 -C£ ? t= - " 3!
cu cd s*^° ra e O « ™
60 to ot --x c =*i ( ^' :;
< <s rf w h sssa
O O - - - - -
=* 6t— . *J *J *- *f
>>2 asaa
a
CD
O
— MM
*"T
tO CO
r*
00
Ol
o<mn
2
fCCN
X
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION, U. S. ARMY
1059
ptc o '.- t- -r — - r.
co i-i cs a r~ ■— oo
C X h- ■XtD-OCO
■» tt ' Tf M — ■ '-- I -
o» > a
iSS
— • t— •— «o
c c.:
Ml t£
gs<
§11
a o =
£ = ■<
." £-
III
OOOWM
t£> CD — «D
— I- O-T
~:t: c
t, — —
o
=5 3'
I.!
* c-i c-» ?•» ?■* ci ci
€ s -jo s = g j
J SaSise!
r- X D C — Cl.~? -
1060
FIELD OPERATIONS
=) s
--.
s
-
<
w
a
o
e**
1
eg
3d
5
BB —
a Normally
a first lieu-
tenant.
•> Mounted
on liorse.
OS
S 5^ - 2.2
sllii
P S = S 5
! CO cm
to
ri CJ
' OS
CI
-
h- CO CI
CO
P.
=
c
bp
£3
2 S~H's £
P. s= " s S
-
-
-
CD
f~
00
rac
£3 =
Cfl
a a a .5 3
ps = ss
- ;
- 1 1
-
CO
-f
00
J
*»
■3 a c » 5= a3 c.3 3 ,
H&- = -2 PS^SS '
r
i
-
<o
■-'
s
CO
CO
'bib
d
W
m ©
*■*; —
■is
P S
J!
CI
J3
C&
o
71
CI — — 1
Ifl
pe
-c J3
CM
-
iO
o
r-
00 — —
•^
d
'to
o
«
'x s
SB
;s|
Pi 5
ja
CI i
CO
£
s
CO —
PS
CO
CO
CI
»c
f
CO —
Field Artillery
—
i i .„ j, >.
■s s~-;s
= 33-33
P S ~ S E
M
CO
■^
-r
-
g 2
2 3 — re T-i
1
(0
— JO
8
=
7^.
as c*cN
CO
.S3 i-t CO N
pe
CO
— CO
— CI
— t c»
CI
71
CO
CM
71
1- CI 7
CJ
IT'S « S
8| s a
— CI CI
— < CI N
s
go CI CI
ia
'bC~
:!§
PS
«
o
c»
O <M CI
13
g
£
V
P s
CO
— i CO
5 s
CN
CO
CO
r7
a* cm ci
CO
m
rt
.3 —. - MW
PS
to
— CO
l~
71
i -
71
t^ C» CI
c»
>t$
>>
g
a
« 1
-
-
C*
CO
-
*>
^-gMCd S a-s | £ s « £ £
* 1
-
O
o
"5
55
-
«o
d
9
J]
'5b
S
M
3 3
— so 1
t»
s*
CO
— • CO
e>*
:ll
PS
— ' CO !
*
_ r^
1^
CM
rt
..■=
T7
-
3
"a
a
1
|
BQ
g
o
c
'3
>
1
H
o
a
8
as
C ^
d
S
o
o>
/-
c
a
B
c-
-/
a
e
3
! !
1 : |
s
E
&
-
'•a
a>
E
j =
id
C.
P
Ph
-
CI
CO
-*
»o
(O
^-
ae
o
©
-
p
CO
2
—
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION, IT. S. ARMY
1061
s
a
g <
-
<
ser-
in aster
scr-
y ser-
ge am-
ns, 3
.' u, x: J, i i
o B +J H or
$ — K i_ fi £ J
tee ^ J3 c a & 3
H
c
ser-
rgc of
irge of
ser-
y ser-
tist, 1
I So I
1
2
"rt c
CD 01 i-l
Oi Of 'fX*t l XO 00
o
OS
fx-w'ccs-ft£'»»'-$ , '<f-r
CS C-J — cs cs o
O0CS o
f NNM W M
—
J5
14
o'g
'~
~-
c-.
■""
cs
E-~
||
**
5 JS 5 .2
!•*• i ! •#
j
J
I 1*41 i
l«5
<o
£1
: II i : i ; ; i i
:;;;:; : i ! ;
**■'
i ii i
t i i i i
l«
r*
^
iC — '
colj(NiO irfWW^-00 Oi
«o
s
Icscscsco i-WCSCSC-lCS
C3
fM i
(M — M ■ r-
1
I I--
r-
n
(M
X
o
O
i
1
«
Sills
(M (ON !*NNNf "#
■c
S
■ '1- cs ' cs -r
les
cs
?*
1
! j j ] ! j :
&
-ill
(M O 1
M (O N i i i i CI -<f O
—
-
jcscscs -t- ! ! !cs '<
o
■^
—
il i i i i
'•
o
E
C3 S i-
*£, i i
CJ
I-C I 1 1 1 I 1 «
Ii-* I ! ! ! I ! »o
CO
r
1 ! ' In ! ! i ! {«
o 3 a>
*
|
rr
s x t» g g
j. ja
(j, ] j; ^
11 1 '
•
5? o cs 3 «
«0
ro sC lei-"- 1 : 1 ! f-
<"2
cs , |t~— ! — cs
«e
SO
s
- — , o
r.
00 , cs
I i
CO
ce
"
= 1 A >/§ | " * i
o J
no i i i i — i cs o
— — i i i i j.
/
0C It ' — >-"-< CS ! ! riH >
00 ; —
j= ^ 1 ,
II 1 1 ■ 1 1
l_
— — — —
"> 1
XC^-r-^WCJ.'-j'M <C
SO
cs -f c r? ro tc -r « cs o o ic
oe ■*■
cs
C3 M
ri
fl-N -— IC
<o
r^ cs cs ic
tft
**•
S
T
•o
c
o
Mill ! - ;
r
Trcic-ifC^c^MO c-i
55
CO
1 ! 1 1 !-»<oocs 'esx
CC-f
cs
*°
a>
S
a
-
CS
«
CS i •«■
— ■
V.
o c.s o is:
S s Co i ;
^ 8 §•! i i
c
•*■ not ' ! iwc CC
cs— • > i Cl
-
-
-r o cs cs to '• * 'cs !
cs
i»
3
i i — .
<N
Ti
J3
a
<
|
e*s
.— ...I . "^
to i a
■*
- - -
, , M
.
1 g = S-S £ IS!
5
1 ; : : : : :
e-3
4
i
IC
CI — ^CS-h — — M jjjp
5
g
Mil! r*~ :" s
~7-
e
«
•C
'':::: :
i t i
3 o . >, fe ! *° I
•£iS?2 : :
S £ o a £ '
«
(M — O • ' f — « Ci
%\
r-
WK--W i < '-H i
' •
c*
* ! ! ! "
III 11
■ '
^-S 8 &£
111 II
1 \ ',
•:!::::::::
'» J J !
^*
g
-
i ; ^
b ; : !
I J i i : i i : i :
1 2 i ; i : i i il
~T
-
«
"a
b
c
| Il jl |
1 l"5 j*S ■
I il iS
■ »a : ■
• e s =•
B t- *- c»
t ;, -y, n C
Mt
j
'■tS'C ** . . ' a . ■ o ■ c
»-^S5 x. z —
• • s S o *f***a s " "S ' «
.^: - -■- ■= <- c
Ilil lllllluf? Sill*!
-^ O &t. > /. v. ' OQ MOM ^. *< — ^*- <". -*
*" "c ^ ** C — —
-
1 « M^»r
10
^••5222325
t -
■r
— cs ci ri *1 r
'-. fi '-"( -i :
8;
s 1
1062
FIEIJ) OPERATIONS
■as
as
3>
25
00 o-iONM-r?:- -i- — <
00 ^5 — ' Ci iO C5 CS >0 "3 W C
iO CM CS — • O ■— f- CO t-H •■-
o
-
C3
■Sfl
^3
3-2 £ ■
2J"3 2-a2 S a C-9.-S
c^co'ii'irtcoi-aooiO'-
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION, U. S. ARMY
1063
>. p.
a.
S
* s
-
-
'-
ae
Supply
train,
Infan-
try
division
(Table
2C)
Maxi-
mum
and
mini-
mum
»
o ■
=
<c
-H 1
1
3
"* s-3'3 a
a 3 c -9 3
sa a aa
.-. CM
CO
CI
50
?o
fQHHH
!iO '<
^s
•=.-3 != «T3~ >>gg >,~s^
■ja-s-aa
aa = aa
i*
-
Aft
h-M tCO
III;
»»
11
as
'coO
23 C 3^
■r- - .2 £ w
'^ a ts "s a
sa n aa
~
"
1-1--1 CJ
*
•".
!?i ! '
SO
1
C
•a a
c: 3
sa
— .01
CO
r -
CO
<ow ! t>»
!
sa
^-<cn
CO
~ C^ ?i
1C ,
/ ,
ON iC4
|
»"
>>
3
H
•? Sab-
*- 3 ar 4
•saTj-gS
r: 3 3.5 3
sa«aa
— . CO
^"
,
i
=
a ■= "si
'si
sa
-< co
•<*«
mm a 1 co
c* 1 eo
! !co — ^ iN
V?
a
o
s
s a
-HM
-f
^ CO i^
N
! Ico j-
Lf • C4
3
3
O
n
.Hi C
g-2 5-
pig
■a a
Sa
-- CN
CO
^ M o
3
-^
M
o
>
-3
00
il
aa
JS -C
— I tN
CO
1 * JS A
>o
r
mm !«
a
a
= § 5 fg
■SB
S 3
3a
-i CN
CO
-H d O
o>
a
J
! ic
^ ■
^ ■
■O ' —
a
a
-
bu ^ (_. « rt
SI
sa
-t tM
CO
— -CM C^
»o
00
-o ■ —
>«
a
"a
-*■•§•»,§ = s g,t i sa a aa
i Is
-
HH S
-»*
•.-
!
C0-- "^
-*
21o|l8gg sa a aa
i "a
~
<D
i-
CM •
■5,3
=3 3
sa
— «;
t-
1 M "=
1 — -*■ n
—
.-
— ' CO -co
«*
. „ I ....
7.Z
" P" 1
~7
ro
go— I--
<
1
2
a
-
60
a
w
! i
it
■
;
;
•
■
I-
! i
I 1
5 E
« s
5 £
1
(
1
1
- u
: (
. ;
j. \
: ;
j
1
;
! 1
i
M
il
. 3
H
B
M
1
ffl
i ;d
aa -8
laa
!|
E 8
'■'•
: h
a 8
a ,
Q :
i |
ley*
— 3 .
-3 1
►ft
1
-
«
co
r u-
<
Dh
•0
r
;
-
M
2=2
• i- * * 5?
2 1 = 5
1064
FIELD OPERATIONS
so «-
00 =
S = c
sal
a sag
w 2.
s*
SICflS'-H^.^U
00
(M
3
n
<:
.-
= w c
§11
: e* ■ • — ■
oo «c -*• ec •■
S3 III
(-. O C3
10 ci — o ro
^3
N M N O! (D X O
"i L~ r^
» c; — 'C
W M «* «3
i; - —
MSB £7
C-1 — ' — f <.
; tt, _,<•/-., P- P. £-.
N»0>0-Nnt"fl«S
— ClWfl
id p ™ =
: 5 lis o
era
1 6b-g jn .
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION, U. S. ARMY
1065
C= 0-J* PC QO
hxkc«:©
z s
1 Z ■—'■■— ■—
- ~ ='-3 t s
B*i
"p C 8
o jn "
S2 i
32 g
so 2
»* g
oS •=
s 5 S
sj si
51 a °
£ 2 £•>>
°3 oc.
o_ o a
- —
3 «
13 *&
- —
c C. K
fift O " 9
iCiTS O -3 Oh _ .i- Pf<3 6 « — c
pEslssllislssS,
p £ g DA % 3 3 * £ 3 =.= 9
-4-> CJ
Ell
13.576°— 25-
-68
1066
FIELD OPERATIONS
a.
W
&«
Eh
o
A
H
S
-
&-
^
s
— ■*
fc>
o
i-H
s
£!
X
J
«-
pa
IS
H
1 -2S
.1*11
3
o
— ' a
©3
M
*»& ■- a
^ t- CJ
s is a
= :.s
03 i=
-5_ c £• —
EJ43 m5°
o =-- t
— *- — -^ y ~ ac _
■P S .. g S c8 C § (
' '- m -
^ © g 5— as -j
d ® 5 J 5 t» +* ° O ** m 3 1 ■ '£
M g-ta ^2 E*E =-r.
eq_« c'ei
. = 5o-
= a
a:
= — c-
5'Ko.S" 1 'so5«m
fflSs§_^§sS5SIMs§"s
f ■"*• - —
— S c ~ — s
e- 5
: e
a,2jS
O fc£
SaSfpS i
, gO -OS
: - ^ ~
2.2 = = 8 2'SJ
J &£.o^
2A B
1 8 oJ &
S KT.2 o P
~ 3
E S
O >
E-a
bj ^<
3<H
■2*®
si
3 u
3 is
~ q. «
fisj
-* cj
■° H 2
e0 -
2 S |g
So"
E * M
8ertS
1 ia-S ff JJ
■a esj o s
: r —
J >. o
•EH
".S.I
-
H
•SI
=-2
CCtCINO
:5o5ffl
sP
f (TO W CO
(M O O ?»
•— in n
If
'4. o
H™ > Tf CS — 1- — I
■ * oo c d o a
3 B ti c >,
? 5w 2 i:
a c a
rt i — i —
ET S I"i'S
8 'S ■« ■"-£?
g bf= 3 3
"-" ® *J cj; be
MO. SB
<n m <4< >o 40 r
TABLES OP ORGANIZATION, XJ. S. ARMY
1067
•2 Kt B r ; J
7 .s1£e-< 8 31
V
^ f-v C? r"3 rr»
nJ ' > — Q"- 1
2 2£=-a.g
3 *© *f SI
£ t- ° 5; f
3 M S t C -t _.
llllgl
in b a £^:
«-^? * — — 6J0 Hi
c SO C-S a c ;
■3.5
"go
;-SSgo
s S be o
;S^ = 2
J K ~ o -
C* 3 ffl - -
3 £ tut ?, a
3 a*c 2 fi
C3
will!
J3«*
B H&-
a . -3 ^
= 3.2
a a
— ■ ©
■Bb„SS a
P £ a a o
o bj2^:
b p M t:
3 §■" a
O* V J?
S»o°E
a>.H PtTl o
•2-IS.o
„§a alias
.7-1 CT — Bt-*J'B
O O r- [/} ~ B
Pi °
,_ — 3 «
•gal-'
03
•3 3
,— B
■ Is
n
2 Eja
55 s-
sill
d.s r
Si! o.[
;^r-?-?-?j
CO 9 :
O
4W«S
C3 (O
i ~ r - m* "ft 1 - >■"■ 1^ CO t
CS SC 10 c ^ (O * 1
^OMMMOtO Q CI
CO CO CM O CD (O CO |-» CO
000
S N N
HicnoNMO'Ort'Diii
■M QCO CO-»
c; cs T tt< ■*
_. to t-» ta
COCOt-COtO^O <D I— CO O CO
OttoCaNiCiOcoOiOOOO
x :i ■/ o ■- 1 -1 - L", « » 1- 00 ©
» O N h N --1CCO r- M
M^ i r.waO-«--'-'™icq-i-ci---(N-f»c5-i-ioiNCir;'.-CMCcf!oDNr-o > n ©
n «« -f o ^ o o o o ci c o c s c r o o m -r ?:?:■-- 1.- o c o -r f) ■■■; 1* '■"'■': to • co co
^■^coCNcocccicococorocococoror-:rororcc j :(>)C"iri?iC)C , jTj"-r^r(N cococococo icoco
O — © HHXr
«*OtD "<P i-i t-
2*s
a 2
8 >.
||
E B
<■£ ! b.£ as
;~ a : 5.5= »•
B ^ k — B W ■
— Qj.ti-CBoW^
:'«3 2 cj^'as {
><) &■?•- &° r ■
= g.2 .
•a t*> o o
a.2cc
bb££
" a
1 c c
I B B
; ca.
;E3
c o
B B
!q ! e I
z= ^
i_S
= s
- ^. p ° 2
£ i» « 1 5 S s .»
g &i S2 |J &
=
a > ~ x
^J Lt B s;
HuKH
5 „«J
, & 3fS
£sgg
a 145 I a
' cage.
. , 1. - - zr
tj » •- *- a w
^^■C-O £ a
jj X c c — c
BbC sfl C'«
sj^ gaol
: ° s ,,*
•= ^ c 1
•a&g
■ /o C
Sir O
; S cj o
go
■S 00
c c'bb &S a- « I
■III!
L u - «
S s*
o-^?)Mfiotor-McfiO — (Nrefioo
O - M M f iC tO I-- CO Cj © —
NMPINflMN CI C* ?* CO CO
INDEX
Page
Abbreviations 973
Accident department, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 242
Activities:
American divisions attached to French corps East of the Meuse, Meuse-Argonnc
operation 797
American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 963
corps surgeon's office, details of 67
Administration:
council of, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 243
of the sanitary service —
of the army 74
of the corps 66
of the division 63
United States Army Ambulance Service in France 249
Administrative sections, army chief surgeon's office 76
Admissions, Mobile Hospital No. 39, at Aulnois 195
Advance into Germany 895-940
Advanced depot at Metz, quartermaster, United States Army Ambulance Service in
France . 240
Aid, company, in trench warfare lH
Aid station:
battalion —
in open warfare 12J
in trench warfare H*
personnel of lj«j
supplies of H"*
regimental—
in open warfare . **2
in trench warfare 1J^
Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 311-j440
criticism of Medical Department in__ •}'"'
Medical Depart ment service in rear of divisions •}-'J
2d Division »**
ambulance companies ^J»
field hospitals ?};?
Medical Department activities *12
Medical Supply Unit ^ji
3d Division -? 1 *
ambulance companies ^Jq
field hospitals ^|c
Medical Department activities ;*:„
Medical Supply Unit - "?.jj)
Aisne-Marne operation ^ qSS
divisions participating with the French yz\
First Corps ^'„ q
burial of the dead.
389
•I'M)
hospital corps belt ;^ g g
inadequacy of ambulance transportation !? s g
inadequacy of sanitary personnel ;^,g
long hauls . ;Lj
Medical Department activities .jqQ
mobile surgical hospitals jjgg
position of division surgeon during battle -- ;,' s „
road congestion ',.r,
Medical Department service in rear of divisions .,^2
participating with the French ',.,1
medical service of the French Sixth Army
1069
1070 INDEX
Aisne-Marne operation — Continued. Page
Third Corps 403
Medical Department activities 404
1st Division J 358
ambulance companies 362
evacuation 365
field hospitals ~~ ~ 364
Medical Department activities 360
medical supplies 366
participating with the French 358
2d Division " ~ 367
ambulance companies 369
field hospitals 370
Medical Department activities 368
Medical Supply Unit ~ 372
participating with the French 367
sanitary train 369
3d Division" '_'_ 405
ambulance companies 406
field hospitals " 408
Medical Department activities __ 406
participating with the French 405
4th Division '_'_"_'_ 379,399
Medical Department activities 380, 400
participating with the French 379
sanitarv train _ _ _ 400
26th Division ~~~~ 391
Medical Department activities 391
sanitary train _ 392
28th Division '.ZS-ZZ-Z 413
ambulance companies 413
field hospitals 414
Medical Department activities-. ___ 413
32d Division 409
Medical Department activities 410
sanitary train __ 410
42d Division 394
ambulance companies 396
evacuation 39S
field hospitals 397
Medical Department activities 395
Allowance of medical personnel 13
Ambulance and litter-bearer service of the ambulance train in trench warfare 118
Ambulance companies:
evacuation 207
of the sanitary train in trench warfare 117
First Corps, Mouse- Argonnc operation 557
1st Division —
Aisne-Marne operation 362
Ansauville Sector 293
Cantigny Sector 300
Meuse-Argonne operation 649
St. Mihicl operation 496
2d Division —
Aisne-Marne operation 369
Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 313
St. Mihiel operation 477
3d Division —
Aisne-Marne operation 406
Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 319
Champagne-Marne operation 346
26th Division —
Champagne-Marne operation 344
St. Mihiel operation 502
28th Division —
Aisne-Marne operation 413
Champagne-Marne operation 349
Oise-Aisne operation 434
32d Division —
Meuse-Argonne operation 678
Oise-Aisne operation 442
INDEX 1071
Ambulance companies — Continued.
42d Division — Page
Aisne-Marne operation 396
Champagne-Marne operation 352
77th Division, Oise-Aisne operation 439
82d Division, St. Mihiel operation 465
89th Division, St. Mihiel operation 490
90th Division, St. Mihiel operation 46S
Ambulance company:
bearer detachment, 4th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation C>19
dressing station of sanitary train, in trench warfare 122
evacuation in open warfare 130
Ambulance Company No. 4, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 958
Ambulance head, 4th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 620
Ambulance posts, 4th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 620
Ambulance sections:
United States Army Ambulance Service in France 248
personnel 248
Ambulance service:
American, in France prior to April 5, 1917 223
United States Army (See also United States Army Ambulance Service) 223-259
Ambulance transportation, inadequacy of, First Corps, Aisne-Marne operation 388
Am bulances 34
Army, patients carried by, Meuse-Argonne operation S09
distribution of 35
methods of shipping from the United States 35
pooling system 35
procurement of 34
shortages of 36
United States Army Ambulance Service in France 250
American ambulance service in France prior to April 5, 1917 223
American and French medical services, maintenance of contact between 59
American divisions:
attached to French corps east of the Mouse, activities of, Meuse-Argonne opera-
tion 797
with French armies 291-448
American Expeditionary activities in Germany, Italy, Siberia, and North Russia., 895-969
American Expeditionary Forces:
chief su rgeon 55
chief surgeon's early estimates of personnel needed in the 14
medical personnel allowed 15
American Expeditionary Forces in North Russia 945-953
evacuation of sick and wounded to England 951
evacuation of troops 95 1
Medical Department activities 946
summary of hospital facilities 952
American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 955-969
activities 963
Ambulance Company No. 4 958
composition and strength 955
evacuation Hospital No. 17 960
Field Hospital No. 4 95S
hospital train 960
Medical Department supplies 963
Medical Supply Depot No. 7 963
sanitary units 958
American Expeditionary Forces with the British:
Second Corps 875-894
Medical Department activities 880
27th Division 881
Medical Department activities 884
30th Division 889
Medical Department activities 891
American operations in Italy (Base Section No. 8) 941-944
Medical Department activities 94 1
American organization, United States Ambulance Service 224
American Red Cross hospitals, assistance rendered by 33
American Red Cross Military Hospital No. 110, Meuse-Argonne Hospital 830
American Red Cross Military Hospital No. 114, Meuse-Argonne operation H31
Amur, Shmakovka to Habarov.sk, campaigns, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia. 9W
1072
INDEX
Pau«
Ansau villc Sector 292
1st Division in 291
Medical Department activities 292
ambulance companies 293
field hospitals 294
medical supply unit 295
Areas:
evacuation, Mouse- Argon nc operation 540
training and rest —
billeting facilities in S4
classification of officers and men in 88
combat divisions in 84
combat divisions in, and on the march; depot and replacement divisions S3-104
development of Medical Department personnel in 85
division venereal disease camp in 88
establishment of camp hospitals in 86
evacuation of patients in 87
location of 84
Medical Department equipment and supplies in 88
Medical Department training in 90
Medical Department transportation in 87
provision for medical care of troops in S6
Armies:
chief surgeons of 1020
French, American divisions with 291
zone of the, primary evacuations from the 261
Army, administration of the sanitary service of the 74
Army ambulances, patients carried by, Meuse-Argonnc operation 809
Army chief surgeon, organization of the office of the 75
Army chief surgeon's office, administrative sections of 76
Army dumps (medical) , establishment of 2S
Army hospitals:
Meuse-Argonnc operation S10
operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 857
St. Mihiel operation 507-520
Army operations, Meuse-Argonne operation 525, 629, 729
Medical Department activities 530, 632, 731
Artillery and machine-gun companies, medical service of, in open warfare 135
Assembly and revision plant, Motor Transport Division, United States Army Am-
bulance Service in France 236
Assembly plant, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 245
Assignment of medical personnel of combat divisions to other duties 20
Assistance rendered by American Red Cross hospitals 33
Attending surgeon, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 241
Auto-ch : r. (See Mobile hospitals.)
Barges, hospital 46
Base camp, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 243
Base hospitals, Meuse-Argonne operation:
at Toul 833
No. 51 833
No. 55 833
No. 78 833
No. 82 834
No. 83 835
No. 87 . 835
Bathing and preparation of patients, Mobile Hospital No. 39 at Aulnois 195
Battalion, orthopedic training, in depot and replacement divisions 101
Battalion aid station:
in open warfare 129
in trench warfare HI
personnel of 113
supplies of 113
4th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation til 9
Battalions, companies, and regiments, care of casualties in:
in open warfare 12*
in trench warfare 111
Battle casualties, Meuse-Argonne operation ,x<)9
Bed assignment office, Mobile Hospital No. 39, at Aulnois 198
Bel lean Wood, Vaux and, Aisne operation ;jH
INDEX 1073
Page
Belt, hospital corps, First Corps, Aisnc-Marne operation 390
Billeting facilities in training and rest areas 84
Billets, staff difficulties incident to dispersion of troops in 85
British, American Expeditionary Forces with the 875-894
Burial of the dead :
First Corps —
Aisne-Marne operation 389
St. Mihiel operation 464
in open warfare 149
Camp:
base, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 243
division venereal disease, in training and rest areas 88
entrenched, of Paris, service of the, with United States Army Ambulance Service
in France 254
venereal labor, in depot and replacement divisions 101
Camp Crane, mobilization at, United States Army Ambulance Service 226
Camp hospitals, establishment of in training and rest areas 86
Campaigns, Shmakovka to Habarovsk and the Amur, American Expeditionary Forces
in Siberia 964
Cantigny operation 296
Cantigny Sector:
and Montdidicr-Xoyon operation 295
1st Division in 291
ambulance companies 300
evacuations to the rear 306
field hospitals 303
Medical Department activities 298
Medical Department service with regiments, etc 299
Casuals, Medical Department — replacements 22
Casualties, battle, Meuse-Argonne operation 809
care of, in companies, battalions, and regiments —
in open warfare 128
in trench warfare 111
Centers, evacuation, Meuse-Argonne operation 539
Champagne. {See Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) operation.)
Champagne- Alarnc operation .. 341- 356
First Corps, Medical Department activities 342
Medical Department activities in rear of divisions 353
3d Division in 344
ambulance companies 346
field hospitals 348
Medical Department activities 345
26th Division in 343
ambulance companies 344
field hospitals 344
Medical Department activities 344, 349
28th Division in 349
ambulance companies 349
field hospitals 349
42d Division in 350
ambulance companies 352
field hospitals 353
Medical Department activities 350
Changes in Medical Department operations in depot and replacement divisions 99
Chief surgeon :
American Expeditionary Forces 55
Army, organization of the office of 75
Chief surgeon's early estimates of personnel needed in the A. E. F 14
Chief surgeons of armies 1020
Classification of officers and men in training and rest areas 88
Combat, medical service of the division in 105-155
Combat divisions:
assignment of medical personnel of, to other duties 20
brief histories of 973 1018
in training and rest areas 84
in training and rest areas and on the march; depot and replacement divisions 83 104
on the march 94
Commissary, sales, quartermaster, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 240
1074 INDEX
Companies, battalions, and regiments, care of casualties in: fage
in open warfare 128
in trench warfare 111
Company aid:
in open warfare 128
in trench warfare 111
4th Division, Meuse-Argonnc operation 019
Complementary groups. (See Mobile Surgical Units.)
Composition of the corps 06
Concentration area, Medical Department 22
Consultant:
medical, army chief surgeon's office 70
neuropsychiatry, army chief surgeon's office 76
orthopedic, army chief surgeon 's office 70
surgical, army chief surgeon's office 70
urology, army chief surgeon's office 76
Contact between French and American medical services, maintenance of 59
Contagious disease hospital at Toul, Meuse-Argonnc operation 836
Control exercised by G-4-B over evacuations by hospital trains 59
Convalescent depots 206
Coordination of hospitalization and evacuation t 59
Corps:
administration of the sanitary service of the 66
composition of 60
Corps regulating officer, Meuse-Argonne operation 542
Corps rest camp, First Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation 555
Corps surgeon's office, details of 07
Corps surgeons 1020
Council of Administration, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 243
Courier service, Meuse-Argonne operation 544
Criticism of Medical Department, Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood. 329
Dead, burial of the:
First Corps —
Aisne- Marne operation 389
St. Mihiel operation 464
in open warfare 149
Demobilization, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 255
Dental surgeon, army chief surgeon's office 77
Departments, special, of evacuation hospitals 175
Departures from priority schedule 17
Depot :
advanced, at Metz, quartermaster, United States Armv Ambulance Service in
France J 240
supply. (See Supply depot.)
Depot and replacement divisions 97, 1018, 1019
changes in Medical Department operations in 99
combat divisions in training and rest areas 83-104
hospital facilities in 98
medical service in 97
venereal labor camp in 101
Depot division, First, discontinued 102
Depots:
convalescent 200
medical supply, establishment of 27
Development of Medical Department personnel 85
Direction and inspection, Motor Transport Division, United States Army Ambulance
Service in France 238
Dispersion of troops in billets, staff difficulties incident to 85
Distribution of ambulances 35
Division :
administration of the sanitary service of the 63
depot and replacement, venereal labor camp in 101
first depot 97
in combat, medical service of the 105-155
Division laboratories in open warfare 148
Division surgeon, position of, during battle, First Corps, Aisne-Marne operation 38S
Division surgeons:
1st Division 975
2d Division 977
3d Division 979
INDEX 1075
Division surgeons — Continued. Pa « e
4th Division -. 979
5th Division 883
6th Division 985
7th Division 986
26th Division 988
28th Division 990
29th Division 991
30th Division 992
32d Division 993
33d Division 995
35th Division 999
36th Division 1000
37th Division 1002
42d Division 1004
77th Division 1005
78th Division 1000
79th Division 1007
80th Division- 1008
81st Division 1009
82d Division 1010
88th Division 1012
89th Division 1014
90th Division 1015
91st Division 1016
92d Division 1017
Division venereal disease camp in training and rest areas 88
Divisions:
American —
Attached to French corps, activities of, Meuse-Argonne operation 797
with French armies 291
combat —
assignment of medical personnel of, to other duties 20
brief histories of 973-1018
in training and rest areas 84
in training and rest areas and on the march; depot and replacement divisions. 83-104
on the march 94
depot and replacement 97
changes in Medical Department operations in 99
combat divisions in training and rest areas and on the march 83-104
hospital facilities in . 98
list of 1018, 1019
medical service in 97
French, duty with, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 253
in line, first phase, Meuse-Argonne operation 549
in reserve, first phase, Meuse-Argonne operation 549
Medical Department service in rear of the, Aisne-Marne operation 415
participating with the French, Aisne-Marne operation 357
Medical Department service in rear of 372
particular, orders prescribing methods in the 105
Dressing station:
ambulance company, of sanitary train, in trench warfare 122
Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation 759
in open warfare 139
4th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 620
Dumps:
Army (medical), establishment of 28
supply, Meuse-Argonne operation 542
Duty with French divisions, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 253
Echelons, medical supply, and systems of replenishment 28
Eightieth Division :
brief history of 1007
division surgeons 1008
insignia 1007
Meuse-Argonne operation 609, 621, 703, 740
Medical Department activities 621, 704, 74S
Eighty-eighth Division :
brief history of 1010
division surgeons 1012
insignia 1010
1076 INDEX
Eighty-first Division: Page
brief history of 1008
division surgeons 1009
insignia 1008
Meuse-Argonne operation 802
Medical Department activities 803
Eighty-ninth Division:
advance into Germany 936
brief history of 1013
division surgeon 1014
insignia 1013
Meuse-Argonne operation 687, 767
Medical Department activities 687, 771
St. M ihiel operation 483, 489
ambulance companies 490
field hospitals 490
Medical Department activities 490
Eighty-second Division:
brief history of 1009
division surgeons 1010
insignia 1009
Meuse-Argonne operation 651
Medical Department activities 653
St. Mihiel operation 465
ambulance companies 465
field hospitals 466
First Corps 461
Medical Department activities 465
Elimination and reassignment of medical officers in training and rest areas 88
England, evacuation of sick and wounded to, American Expeditionary Forces in
North Russia 951
Equipment:
and supplies, Medical Department, in training and rest areas 88
individual. United States Army Ambulance Service in France 251
of evacuation hospitals 171
United Slates Army Ambulance Service in France 249
Establishment:
of army dumps (medical) 28
of medical supply depots 27
Estimates, chief surgeon's early, of personnel needed in the A. E. F 14
Evacuation:
ambulance company, in open warfare 136
and hospitalization, coordination of 59
from the zone of the army, St. Mihiel operation 521-523
in rear of 32d Division, Oisc-Aisne operation 444
influence of road congestion on, Meuse-Argonne operation 554
Mobile Hospital No. 39, at Aulnois 19,8
of patients in training and rest areas 87
of sick and wounded —
plan of, Fifth Corps, St. Mihiel operation .500
to England, American Expeditionary Forces in North Russia 951
of troops, American Expeditionary Forces in North Russia 951
of wounded, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 251
standard plan for, First Corps, Aisne-Marne operation 390
1st Division, Aisne-Marne operation 365
42d Division, Aisne-Marne operation 398
Evacuation ambulance companies 207
Evacuation and consultation team, Mobile Hospital No. 39, at Aulnois 198
Evacuation areas, Meuse-Argonne operation 540
Evacuation centers, Meuse-Argonne operation 539
Evacuation Hospital:
No. 1, operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 358
No. 2, operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 859
No. 3, Meuse-Argonne operation 81,5
No. 4, Meuse-Argonne operation 815
No. 5, Meuse-Argonne operation 816
No. 6, Meuse-Argonne operation 816
No. 7, Meuse-Argonne operation 818
No. 8, Meuse-Argonne operation 818
INDEX 1077
Evacuation Hospital —Continued.
No. 9— r««
Mease- Argonne operation 823
St. Mihiol operation 518
No. 10, Meuse-Argonne operation 825
No. 11, Meuse-Argonne operation 825
No. 12, operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 859
No. 13, operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 859
No. 14, Meuse-Argonne operation 827
No. 15—
Meuse-Argonne operation 828
operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 859
No. 16, Meuse-Argonne operation 828
No. 17, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 960
No. 18, operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 860
No. 20, Meuse-Argonne operation 828
No. 21, Meuse-Argonne operation 828
No. 22, Meuse-Argonne operation 829
No. 23, Meuse-Argonne operation 829
Evacuation hospitals 157
equipment of 171
functions of 158
location of 165
mobile hospitals, mobile surgical units, professional teams, convalescent depots,
evacuation ambulance companies, mobile laboratories 157-222
number of ._ 157
personnel of 172
special departments of 175
Evacuation officer, Meuse-Argonne operation 543
Evacuation section, arrm' chief surgeon's office 76
Evacuations :
by hospital trains, control exercised by G-4-B over 59
in rear of the 2d and 36th Divisions, Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) operation.-. 869
in rear of Third Corps, Oise-Aisne operation 440
primary, from the zone of the armies 261-286
hospital trains in 261
regulating stations in 261
routing of trains in 272
to rear, 1st Division, Cantigny Sector 306
train, Meuse-Argonne operation 810
Expedition, Habarovsk, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 965
Field Hospital No. 4, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia _ 958
Field hospitals:
Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation 759
in open warfare 142
of sanitary train, in trench warfare 125
1st Division, Aisne-Marne operation 364
Ansauville Sector 294
Cantigny Sector 303
Meuse-Argonne operation 650
St. Mihiel operation 496
2d Division —
Aisne-Marne operation 370
Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 315
St. Mihiel operation 478
3d Division —
Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 319
Aisne-Marne operation 408
Champagne-Marne operation 348
4th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 620
5th Division, St. Mihiel operation 475
26th Division —
Champagne-Marne operation 344
St. Mihiel operation 502
28th Division —
Aisne-Marne operation 414
Champagne-Marne operation _. 349
Oise-Aisne operation 436
32d Division —
Meuse-Argonne operation 678
Oise-Aisne operation __ _. 443
1078 INDEX
Field hospitals — Continued.
42d Division — Page
Aisne-Marne operation 397
Champagne-Marne operation 353
Meuse-Argonne operation list;
77th Division, Oise-Aisne operation 439
82d Division, St. Mihiel operation 46(1
S9th Division, St. Mihiel operation 490
90th Division, St. Mihiel operation 469
Field Service Regulations, United States Army 1021-102")
Fifth Corps:
Meuse-Argonne operation 581, 607, 755
dressing stations 759
field hospitals 759
Medical Department activities 584, 070, 757
St. Mihiel operation 499^-505
Medical Department activities 500
plan of evacuation of sick and wounded 500
Fifth Division:
advance into Germany 937
brief history of 980
division surgeons 983
insignia 980
Meuse-Argonne operation 707, 787
Medical Department activities 711 790
St. Mihiel operation 469
field hospitals 475
First Corps 461
Medical Department activities 473
sanitary train 474
First Army:
St. Mihiel operation 449.459
Medical Department activities 452
First Corps:
Aisne-Marne operation 357 j 381
burial of the dead 389
hospital corp belt 390
inadequacy of ambulance transportation 388
inadequacy of sanitary personnel 388
long hauls 388
Medical Department activities 383
mobile surgical hospitals 390
position of division surgeon during battle — 388
road congestion 388
standard plan for evacuation of 390
Champagne-Marne operation 341 342
Medical Department activities 342
Meuse-Argonne operation 549, 637, 737
ambulance companies 557
distribution of wounded 557
influence of road congestion on evacuation. 554
Medical Department activities 553,638 738
rest camp '555
St. Mihiel operation 461-4S1
Medical Department activities 463
First Depot Division 97
First Division:
advance into Germany 927
Aisne-Marne operation 357
ambulance companies 362
evacuation 365
field hospitals 364
Medical Department activities 350
medical supplies 366
participating with the French 358
Ansauville Sector —
ambulance companies 293
field hospitals 294
Medical Department activities 292
medical supply unit 295
INDEX 1079
First Division — Continued. Pa B e
brief history of 073
Cantigny operation 296
Cantigny Sector 295
ambulance companies 300
evacuations to the rear 306
field hospitals 303
Medical Department activities 298
Medical Department service with regiments, etc 299
medical supply unit 305
division surgeons 975
insignia of 973
Meuse-Argonne operation 549, 576, 647, 682, 775
ambulance companies 649
field hospitals 650
Medical Department activities 576,648,682,776
medical supply unit 651
St. Mihiel operation 483,494
ambulance companies 496
field hospitals 496
Medical Department activities 495
Sommerviller, Ansauville, and Cantignv sectors. The Montdidier-Novon opera-
tion . .. 291-310
Sommerviller Sector, Medical Department activities 291
First phase, Meuse-Argonne operation 525, 549, 581, 609
Flanders. See Ypres-Lys (Flanders) operation.
Food and sanitation, department of, United States Army Ambulance Service in France, 249
Forty-second Division :
advance into Germany 92 1
Aisne-Marne operation 341, 357, 394
ambulance companies 396
evacuation 398
field hospitals 397
Medical Department activities 395
brief history of 1 002
Champagne-Marne operation 350
ambulance companies 352
field hospitals 353
Medical Department activities 3.50
division surgeons 1 004
insignia 1 002
Meuse-Argonne operation 683, 750
field hospitals 686
Medical Department activities 684, 751
St. Mihiel operation 483, 492
Medical Department activities 492
Fourth Corps:
advance into Germany 922
Medical Department activities 925
operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 851
Medical Department activities 852
St. Mihiel operation 483-497
Fourth Division:
advance into Germany 930
Aisne-Marne operation 357, 399
Medical Department activities 400
participating with the French 379, 380
sanitary train 400
brief history of 979
division surgeons 979
insignia 979
Meuse-Argonne operation 609, 616, 705
ambulance company bearer detachment 619
ambulance head 620
ambulance posts 620
battalion aid station 619
company aid 619
dressing station 620
field hospitals 620
Medical Department activities 616, 707
1080 INDEX
Fourth Division — Continued.
Meuse-Argonne operation — Continued. '' age
medical supplies 621
regimental aid station 619
rest or relay stations 620
St. Mihiel operation 499,503
Medical Department activities 504
Sanitary train 504
France, reserve supplies in 26
French, divisions participating with the, Aisne-Marne operation 357, 358
Medical Department service in rear 372
French and American medical services, maintenance of contact between 59
French armies, American divisions with 291
French liaison officer, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 243
French 15th Colonial Division, St. Mihiel operation 499
French 167th Division in the Champagne-Marne operation 341
French Sixth Army, medical service of, Aisne-Marne operation 421
Functions of evacuation hospitals 157
Garage, service, Motor Transport Division, United States Army Ambulance Service in
France 236
Gas hospitals, Meuse-Argonne operation 832
Gas teams 205
Gas treatment officer, medical, army chief surgeon's office 77
General considerations, Medical Department activities, Meuse-Argonne operation ,809-842
General Headquarters, Medical Department representatives with the general staff 56
General Staff, General Headquarters, Medical Department representatives with the 56
Germanv, advance into, Third Armv 895-940
Fourth Corps . 922
Medical Department activities 925
Medical Department activities 900
Seventh Corps 934
Medical Department activities 935
Third Corps 911
Medical Department activities 918
1st Division 927
2d Division 920
3d Division 928
4th Division 930
5th Division 937
32d Division 921
33d Division 936
42d Division 921
S9th Division 936
90th Division 936
Germany, American Expeditionary activities in 895
Group compldmentaire. (See Mobile Surgical Units.)
Habarovsk and the Amur compaigns, Shmakovka to, American Expeditionary Forces
in Siberia 964
Habarovsk expedition:
American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 965
Medical Department activities 965
Hauls, long, First Corps, Aisne-Marne operation 388
Headquarters, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 234
Histories, brief, of combat divisions 973-1018
Hospital:
contagious disease, at Toul, Meuse-Argonne operation 836
evacuation. (See also Evacuation hospital.)
No. 9, St. Mihiel operation 518
Mobile. (See also Mobile hospital.)
No. 39, at Aulnois 191
Hospital barges 46
Hospital Corps belt, First Corps, Aisne-Marne operation 390
Hospital facilities:
in depot and replacement divisions 98
summary of American Expeditionary Forces in North Russia 952
Hospital group, Justice, St. Mihiel operation 508
Hospital train, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 960
Hospital trains 37
control exercised by G-4-B over evacuations by 59
evacuation from the zone of the army, St. Mihiel operation 521
in primary evacuations from the zone of the armies 261
INDEX 1081
Pugc
Hospitalization and evacuation, coordination of 59
Hospitalization section, army chief surgeon's office 76
Hospitals 30
American Red Cross, assistance rendered by 33
Army —
Meuse-Argonne operation 810
St. Mihiel operation . .507-520
Base. (See Base hospitals.)
camp, establishment of, in training and rest areas 86
evacuation 157
field. (.Sec Field hospitals.)
gas, Meuse-Argonne operation 832
Mobile, and mobile surgical units 184
mobile surgical, First Corps, Aisne-Marne operation 390
Insignia:
1st Division 973
2d Division 975
3d Division !i7s
4th Division 979
5th Division 980
6th Division 983
7th Division 985
26th Division ilNti
27th Division 988
28th Division 989
29th Division 990
30th Division 991
32d Division 992
33d Division 993
35th Division 995
36th Division 999
37th Division 1000
42d Division 1002
77th Division 1 004
78th Divisioi 1 1 005
79th Division 1000
80th Division 1 007
81st Division 1008
82d Division 1 009
88th Division 1010
89th Division 1013
90th Division 1014
91st Division 1015
92d Division 1016
Inspection:
and direction, Motor Transport Division, United States Army Ambulance Service
in France . 238
United States Army Ambulance Service in France 241
Inspector general, report of, on Medical Department activities, Meuse-Argonne
operation 837
Instruction, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 251
Italy:
American Expeditionary activities in 895
American operations in 94 1 -944
Medical Department activities 941
Justice hospital group, St. Mihiel operation 508
Kitchen, rolling, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 25n
Labor camp venereal, in depot and replacement divisions 101
Laboratories :
division, in open warfare 148
Mobile 213
Laundry, Mobile Hospital No. 39, at Aulnois 198
Liaison officer, French, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 213
Litter-bearer and ambulance service of the sanitary train, in trench warfare 118
Litter bearers, Mobile Hospital No. 39 at Aulnois -_ 19s
Location :
of evacuation hospitals 165
of training and rest areas 84
Machine-gun companies and artillery, medical service of, in open warfare 136
1082 INDEX
Page
Manual for the Medical Department, 1910 1026-1053
Article XII, The theater of operations, genera) 1020
Article XIII, The zone of the advance 1020
Article XIV, The line of communications 1041
Article XV, Administration of the sanitary service of the theater of operations.- 1050
Resume of the operations of the sanitary service in war 1050
Materiel 25
personnel, organization, and 13-53
Medical army dumps, establishment of 28
Medical care of troops in training and rest areas, provision for 80
Medical consultant, army chief surgeon's office 70
Medical Department activities:
American Expeditionary Forces —
in North Russia 940
in Siberia, Spasskoe Sector 908
in Siberia, Verkhne-Udinsk Sector 967
In Siberia, Vladivostok-Nikolsk-Ussuri Sector 90S
with the British 880
American operations in Italy (Base Section No. 8) 941
Army operations, Meuse-Argonne operation 032, 731
Fifth Corps —
Meuse-Argonne operation 584, 670
St. Mihiel operation 500
First Army, St. Mihiel operation 452
First Corps —
Aisne-Marne operation 381
Champagne-Marne operation 342
Meuse-Argonne operation 553, 638, 738
St. Mihiel operation 463
Fourth Corps —
advance into Germany 925
operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 852
general considerations, Meuse-Argonne operation 809-842
Habarovsk expedition, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 965
in rear of divisions, Champagne-Marne operation 353
Meuse-Argonne operation 530, 682, 757, 794
operations east of the Meuse 722
report of inspector general on 837
Second Army, operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 845
Seventh Corps —
advance into Germany 935
Third Army, advance into Germany 900
Third Corps —
advance into Germany 913
Aisne-Marne operation 404
Meuse-Argonne operation 612, 694, 781
Oise-Aisne operation 432
1st Division —
Aisne-Marne operation 360
Ansauville Sector 292
Cantigny Sector 298
Meuse-Argonne operation 576, 648, 651, 776
St. Mihiel operation 495
Sommerviller Sector 291
2d Division —
Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 313
Aisne-Marne operation 368
Meuse-Argonne operation 765
Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) operation 865
St. Mihiel operation 477
3d Division —
Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 313
Aisne-Marne operation 40g
Champagne-Marne operation 345
Meuse-Argonne operation 605, 673, 716
4th Division —
Aisne-Marne operation 400
participating with the French, Aisne-Marne operation 380
St. Mihiel operation 504
INDEX 1083
Medical Department activities — Continued.
5th Division — i^ee
Meuse-Argonne operation 711, 700
St. Mihicl operation 473
7th Division, operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation... 853
26th Division —
Aisne-Marne operation . 391
Champagne- Marne operation 344
Meuse-Argonne operation 727, 802
St. Mihiel operation , r >01
28th Division—
Champagnc-Marne operation 349
Meuse-Argonne operation 505, 040
Oise-Aisne operation 434
operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 856
29th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 724
30th Division, American Expeditionary Forces with the British 891
32d Division —
Aisne-Marne operation 410
Meuse-Argonne operation 678
Oise-Aisne operation 442
33d Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 025, 722, 804
35th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 569
36th Division, Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) operation 867
37th Division, Ypres-Lys (Flanders) operation 870
42d Division —
Aisne-Marne operation 395
Champagne-Marne operation 350
Meuse-Argonne operation 6S4, 751
St. Mihiel operation 492
77th Division —
Meuse-Argonne operation 560, 043, 745
Oise-Aisne operation 439
7Sth Division —
Meuse-Argonne operation . 059, 741
St. Mihiel operation 479
79th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation . 0(K), 799
80th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation . 621,701,71s
Nlst Division, Meuse-Argonne operation S03
N2d Division, St. Mihiel operation 405
89th Division-
Mouse- Argonne operation .. .. . 687,771
St. Mihiel operation 490
90th Division —
Meuse-Argonne operation 713, 783
St. Mihiel operation 467
91st Division —
Meuse-Argonne operation . . 588, 681
Ypres-Lys operation 871
92d Division—
Meuse-Argonne operation 578
operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 850
Medical Department casuals — replacements 22
Medical Department concentration area 22
Medical Department considerations, general, operations contemporaneous with
Meuse-Argonne operation 857
Medical Department, criticism of, in Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau
Wood 329
Medical Department equipment and supplies in training and rest areas 88
Medical Department operations, changes in, in depot and replacement divisions 9ft
Medical Department organization, general view of the 13-53
Medical Department personnel:
development of, in training and rest areas 85
result of shortage in 25
shortages of 18
supplementing the 23
Medical Department representatives with the general staff, General Headquarter) 56
Medical Department service in rear of divisions:
Aisne-Marne operation 415
Aisne operation, including Vaux and lielleau Wood 320
Ypres-Lys (Flanders) operation S73
1084 INDEX
Page
Medical Department supplies, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 963
Medical Department training in training and rest areas 90
Medical Department transportation 33
in training and rest areas 87
Medical gas treatment officer, Army chief surgeon's office 77
Medical officers, elimination and reassignment of, in training and rest areas 88
Medical personnel:
allowance of 13
from an unexpected source 21
of combat divisions, assignment of, to other duties 20
Medical representatives, general staff, Meuse-Argonne operation 543
Medical regulator at regulating station, in primarj - evacuations from the zone of the
armies 272
Medical service:
at a regulating station, organization of 270
in depot and replacement divisions 97
of army troops, section of, army chief surgeon's office 76
of artillery and machine-gun companies in open warfare 135
of the division in combat . 105-155
of the French Sixth Army, Aisne-Marne operation 421
theater of operations, general direction of 55-82
Medical services, French and American, maintenance of contact between 59
Medical supplies:
1st Division, Aisne-Marne operation 366
4th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 621
United States Army Ambulance Service in France 251
Medical Supply Depot No. 7, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 963
Medical supply depots, establishment of 27
Medical supply echelons and systems of replenishment 28
Medical supply unit:
1st Division —
Ansau ville Sector 295
Cantigny Sector 305
2d Division —
Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 315
Aisne-Marne operation 372
3d Division, Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 319
Medical supply units in open warfare 148
Men, officers and, classification of, in training and rest area 88
Methods:
in particular divisions in combat, orders prescribing 105
of shipping ambulances from the United States 35
Meuse, operations East of the, Meuse-Argonne operation 721
Meuse-Argonne operation 525-874
activities of the American divisions attached to French corps, East of the Meuse_ 797
American Red Cross Military Hospital —
No. 110 *_ 830
No. 114 831
army operations 525, 626, 729
Medical Department activities 530,632,731
Base Hospital —
No. 51 833
No. 55 S33
No. 78 833
No. 82 834
No. 83 835
No. 87 835
base hospitals at Toul 833
battle casualties 809
Contagious Disease Hospital at Toul 836
courier service 544
divisional t riages 530
evacuation areas 540
evacuation centers 539
Evacuation Hospital —
No. 3 815
No. 4 815
No. 5 816
No. 6 S16
No. 7 818
INDEX 1085
Meuse-Argonne operation — Continued.
Evacuation Hospital — Continued. Page
No. 8 818
No. 9 823
No. 10 . 825
No. 11 825
No. 14 827
No. 15 828
No. 16 828
No. 20 828
No. 21 828
No. 22 829
No. 23 829
evacuation office 543
Fifth Corps 581-608, 067, 755
dressing stations 759
field hospitals 759
Medical Department activities 584, 670, 757
First Corps 549, 637, 737
ambulance companies 557
distribution of wounded 557
Medical Department activities 553, 638, 738
first phase 525, 549, 58l| 609
gas hospitals 832
general considerations, Medical Department activities S09-842
influence of road congestion on evacuation 554
medical representative, general staff 543
Mobile Hospital —
No. 1 810
No. 2 811
No. 4 811
No. 5 812
No. 6 813
No. 8 814
Neurological Hospital No. 1 S30
operations contemporaneous with S43-S74
operations East of the Meuse 721
Medical Department activities 722
patients carried by Army ambulances S09
regulating officer 542
report of the inspector general on Medical Department activities S37
rest camp, First Corps 555
sanitation 837
Second Army, operations contemporaneous with _ 843-862
second phase 629, 637,667, 691, 721
surgical reports 544
Third Corps 609, 69 1 , 779
Medical Department activities 612, 694, 781
third phase 729, 737, 755, 779, 797
t rain e vacua! ions 810
1st Division 549, 576,647, 682, 775
ambulance companies 649
field hospitals 650
Medical Department activities 576, 648, 682, 776
medical supply unit 651
2d Division 762
Medical Department activities _ . 765
3d Division 604,672,715
Medical Department activities 605, 673, 716
sanitarv train 673, 717
4th Division 609, 616, 705
ambulance company bearer detachment 619
ambulance head 620
ambulance posts 620
company aid 619
dressing station 620
field hospitals ___ 620
Medical Department activities . 616,707
medical supplies 621
regimental aid station 619
rest or relav stations 620
1086 INDEX
Mcuse-Argonne operation — Continued. Pa £ e
5th Division 707, 787
Medical Department activities 711, 790
26th Division 645, 726, 802
Medical Department activities 727, 802
28th Division 549,564
Medical Department activities 646, 565
29th Division 7' 3
Medical Department activities 724
32d Division 5S1, 605, 676, 793
ambulance companies 678
field hospitals 678
Medical Department activities 606,678,794
33d Division 609, 625, 707, 722, 804
Medical Department activities 625, 722, 804
sanitary train 626
35th Division 549, 567
Medical Department activities 569
37th Division __ ___ _ __ 581,592
42d Division 683,750
field hospitals 686
Medical Department activities 6S4, 751
77th Division 549, 558, 641, 743
Medical Department activities 560, 643, 745
78th Division 655, 739
Medical Department activities 659, 741
79th Division 581, 598, 797
Medical Department activities 600,799
80th Division 609, 621, 703, 746
Medical Department activities 621, 704, 748
Slst Division 802
Medical Department activities 803
82d Division 65 1
Medical Department activities 653
89th Division 687, 767
Medical Department activities 687,771
90th Division 713, 781
Medical Department activities _ __ 713,783
91st Division 581, 586, 681
Medical Department activities 588, 681
92d Division 549, 577
Medical Department activities 578
Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) operation 863-874
2d Division 864
Medical Department activities 865
2d and :16th Divisions, evacuations in rear of 869
36th Division 867
Medical Department activities 867
Miscellaneous teams 205
Mobile Hospital:
No. 1, Meuse-Argonne operation 810
No. 2, Meuse-Argonne operation 811
No. 3, operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 858
No. 4, Meuse-Argonne operation 811
No. 5, Meuse-Argonne operation 812
No. 6, Meuse-Argonne operation 813
No. 7, operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 858
No. 8, Meuse-Argonne operation 814
No. 39—
at Aulnois 191
operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 857
Mobile hospitals and mobile surgical units 184
Mobile laboratories 213
Mobile Operating Unit No. 1 201
Mobile surgical hospitals, First Corps, Aisne-Marne operation 390
Mobile surgical units (complementary groups) 199
Montdidier-Noyon operation 291, 297
Cantigny Sector and 295
Morale and promotions. United States Army Ambulance Service in France 241
Motor supply depot. Motor Transport Division, United States Army Ambulance .Serv-
ice in France 235
INDEX 1087
Page
Motor Transport Division, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 235
assembly and revision plant 236
direction and inspection 238
motor supply depot 235
motor vehicle situation 237
operating supplies 238
service garage 236
Motor trucks 37
Motor vehicle situation, United States Ambulance Service in France, Motor Transport
Division 237
Neurological Hospital No. 1, Meuse-Argonne operation 830
Neurological Unit No. 1 (from Base Hospital No. 117), Benoite Vaux-St. Mihiel
operation 519
Neuropsychiatry consultant, Army chief surgeon's office 76
Ninetieth Division:
advance into Germany 936
brief history of 1014
division surgeons 1015
First Corps, St. Mihiel operation 461
insignia 1014
Meuse-Argonne operation 713, 781
Medical Department activities 713,783
St. Mihiel operation 466
ambulance companies 468
field hospitals 469
Medical Department activities 467
Ninety-first Division:
brief history of . 1015
division surgeons 1016
insignia 1015
Meuse-Argonne operation 581, 586, 681
Medical Depart ment act ivities 588, 681
Ypres-Lys ( Flanders ) operation 871
Medical Department activities 871
Medical Department service in rear of 873
Ninety-second Division :
brief history of 1016
Division surgeons 1017
insignia 1016
Meuse-Argonne operation 549, 577
Medical Department activities 578
operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 850
Medical Department activities 850
North Russia:
American Expeditionary activities in 895
American Expeditionary Forces in 945-953
evacuation of sick and wounded to England 951
evacuation of troops 951
Medical Department activities 946
summary of hospital facilities 952
Office:
corps surgeon's, details of activities of 67
of the army chief surgeon, organization of the 75
Officers :
and men, classification of, in training, and rest areas 88
medical, elimination and reassignment of, in training and rest areas 88
Oise-Aisne operation 431-448
Third Corps 431
evacuations in rear of 440
Medical Department act ivities 432
28th Division 434
ambulance companies 434
field hospitals 436
Medical Department activities 434
32d Division 441
ambulance companies 442
evacuation in rear of 444
field hospitals 443
Medical Department activities 442
1088 INDEX
Oise-Aisne operation — Continued. Pasc
77th Division 438
ambulance companies 439
field hospitals 439
Medical Department activities 439
Open warfare 128
ambulance company evacuation in 130
battalion aid station in 129
burial of the dead in 149
company aid in 128
division laboratories in 148
dressing station in 139
field hospitals in 142
medical service of artillery and machine-gun companies in 135
regimental aid station in 135
sanitary train in 136
triage in 143
Operating room, output of, Mobile Hospital No. 39 at Aulnois 196
Operating supplies, Motor Transport Division, United States Army Ambulance
Service in France 238
Operation:
Aisne, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 311
Aisne-Marne 357
Cantigny 296
Champagne-Marne 341
Meuse-Argonne 525-863
Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) 863
Montdidier-Noyon 291, 295, 297
( )ise- Aisne 43 1
St. Mihiel 449-521
Vpres-Lys (Flanders) 870
Operations:
contemporaneous with the Meuse-Argonne operation 843-874
army hospitals 857
Evacuation Hospital No. 1 858
Evacuation Hospital No. 2 859
Evacuation Hospital No. 12 859
Evacuation Hospital No. 13 859
Evacuation Hospital No. 15 859
Evacuation Hospital No. IS 860
Fourth Corps . 851, 852
general Medical Department considerations 857
Mobile Hospital No. 3 858
Mobile Hospital No. 7 858
Mobile Hospital No. 39_ 857
Second Army 843, 845
Sixth Corp- 849, 850
7th Division 853
281 h Division 855. 856
92d Division 850
east of the Meuse, Meuse-Argonne operation 721
Medical Department activities 722
Medical Department, changes in, in depot and replacement divisions 99
theater of, general direction of the medical service in the 55—82
Orders prescribing methods in particular divisions in combat 105
Ordnance and supply, Motor Transport Division, United States Army Ambulance
Service in France 236
Organization 47
of the Medical Department, general view of the 13-53
of the office of the army chief surgeon 75
personnel, materiel and 13-53
Orthopedic consultant, army chief surgeon's office 76
Orthopedic training battalion in depot and replacement divisions 101
Paper work and personnel, department of, United States Arlny Ambulance Service
i n Fra nee 249
Paris, service of the entrenched camp of, with United States Army Ambulance Service
in France.. 254
Park system, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 244, 24.")
Parks in operation, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 246
Patients:
carried by Army ambulances, Meuse-Argonne operation 809
evacuation of, in training and rest areas 87
INDEX 1089
Page
Paymaster, quartermaster, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 240
Personnel ._ ..... 13
allowed . IS
ambulance sections, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 248
and paper work, department of, United States Army Ambulance Service in France. 249
materiel, organizal ion and 13-53
medical, allowance of . - 13
Medical Department
development of in training and rest areas 85
result of shortage in 25
medical —
from an unexpected source. 21
of combat divisions, assignment of, to other duties 20
shortages of . 18
needed in the A. E. F., chief surgeon's early estimates of 14
of battalion aid station 113
of evacuation hospitals 172
sanitary, inadequacy of, First Corps, A isne-Marnc operation 388
specialist 20
supplementing the Medical Department 23
Pooling system, ambulances . 35
Post office and shipping, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 242
Primary evacuations from the zone of the armies 261-286
Priority schedule 17
departures from the ._ 17
effects of the departures from the 18
Procurement of ambulances 34
Professional teams 201
Promotions and morale, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 241
Provision for medical care of troops in training and rest areas 86
Quartermaster:
supply department, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 239
United States Army Ambulance Service in France 239
sales commissary 240
Quartermaster advanced depot at Metz, United States Army Ambulance Service in
France 240
Quartermaster paymaster, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 240
Railway trains, light 41
Railways, Siberian, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 966
Reassignment, elimination and, of medical officers in training and rest areas 88
Red Cross, American hospitals, assistance rendered by 33
Regimental aid station:
in open warfare 135
in trench warfare 117
4th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 619
Regiments:
companies, and battalions, care of casualties in —
in open warfare 12S
in trench warfare 111
service with, Medical Department, 1st Division, Cantigny Sector 299
Regulating officer:
corps, Meuse-Argonne operation 542
duties of 265
Regulating station:
Medical Department subsection of 265, 266
organization of medical service at a 270
Regulating stations in primary evacuations from the zone of the armies 261
Regulator, medical. (See Medical regulator.)
Replacement and depot divisions 97
changes in Medical Department operations in 99
combat divisions in training and rest areas 83-104
hospital facilities in 98
list of 1018, 1019
venereal labor camp in 101
Replacements — Medical Department casuals 22
Replenishment, systems of, and supply echelons, medical 28
Report of inspector general on Medical Department activities in the Meuse-Argonne
operation 837
13576°— 25 69
1090 INDEX
Page
Reports, surgical, Meuse-Argonne operation 54.4
Representatives, Medical Department, with the general staff, General Headquarters- 56
Reserve supplies in France 26
Rest and training areas:
billeting facilities in 84
classification of officers and men in 8S
combat divisions in 84
and on the march; depot and replacement divisions 83-104
development of Medical Department personnel in 85
establishment of cam]) hospitals in 86
evacuation of patients in 87
location of 84
Medical Department transportation in 87
provision for medical care of troops in 86
Rest camp, First Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation 555
Road congestion:
First Corps, Aisne-Marnc operation 388
influence of, on evacuation, Meuse-Argonne operation 554
Rest or relay station, 1th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 620
Roentgenologist, army chief surgeon's office 77
Routing of trains in primary evacuations from the zone of the armies 272
Sales commissary, quartermaster, United States Army Ambulance Service in France. 240
Sanitary personnel, inadequacy of, First Corps, Aisne-Marne operation 388
Sanitary service:
of the army, administration of the 74
of the corps, administration of the 66
of the division, administration of the 63
Sanitary squads in training and rest areas 92
Sanitary train:
ambulance companies of, in trench warfare 117
Fourth Corps, St. Mihiel operation 504
in open warfare 136
in trench warfare 117
2d Division, Aisne-Marne operation 369
3d Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 073, 717
4th Division, Aisne-Marne operation __ 400
5th Division, St. Mihiel operation 474
26th Division, Aisne-Marne operation 392
32d Division, Aisne-Marne operation 410
33d Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 626
Sanitary units, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 95S
Sanitation:
food and, department of, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 249
Meuse-Argonne operation 837
Sanitation section, army chief surgeon's office 76
Schedule, priority:
departures from 17
effects of departures from the 18
Second and Third Divisions, Aisnc operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 311
Second Army:
Medical Department activities, operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne
operat ion 845
operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation.- . S43-862
Second Corps, American Expeditionary Forces with the British _ 875-894
Medical Department activities 880
Second Division:
advance into Germany 920
Aisnc operation, including Vaux and Belleau wood 311
ambulance companies 313
Medical Department activities 313
Aisne-Marne operation 357-367
ambulance companies 369
field hospitals 370
Medical Department activities 36S
Medical Supply Unit 372
Sanitary train 369
brief history of 975
division surgeons 977
First Corps, St. Mihiel operation 461
insignia 'J75
INDEX 1091
Second Division — Continued. p age
Meuse-Argonne operation 762
Medical Department activities 765
Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) operation 864
Medical Department activities 865
St. Mihiel operation 476
ambulance companies 477
field hospitals 478
Medical Department activities 477
Second phase, Meuse-Argonne operation 629, 637, 667, 691, 721
Sections, administrative, army chief surgeon's office 76
Sector:
Ansauville, 1st Division in 291,292
Cantigny, 1st Division in... 291,295
Sommerviller, 1st Division in 291
Service garage, Motor Transport Division, United States Army Ambulance Service
in France 236
Service with regiments, Medical Department, 1st Division, Cantigny Sector 299
Seventh Corps:
advance into Germany 934
Medical Department activities 935
Seventh Division:
brief history of ... 985
division surgeons 986
insignia 985
operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 853
Medical Department activities 853
Seventy-eighth Division :
brief history of 1005
division surgeons 1006
insignia of 1005
Meuse-Argonne operation 655, 739
Medical Department activities 659, 741
St. Mihiel operation 479
First Corps 461
Medical Department activities 479
Seventv-nintli Division:
brief history of 1006
division surgeons 1007
insignia 1000
Meuse-Argonne operation 581, 598, 797
M edieal Department activities 600, 799
Seventy-seventh Division :
brief history of 1004
division surgeons 1005
insignia 1004
Meuse-Argonne operation 549, 558, 641, 743
Medical Department activities 643, 745
Oise-Aisnc opera t ion 438
Ambulance companies 439
field hospitals 439
Medical Department activities 439, 560
Shipping:
ambulances from the United States, methods of 35
and post ollice, United States Ambulance Service in France 242
Shmakovka to Habarovsk and the Amur campaigns, American Expeditionary Forces
in Siberia 964
Shock room, Mobile Hospital No. 39 at Aulnois 195
Shortages 29
of ambulances 36
of Medical Department personnel 18
result of 25
Siberia:
American Expeditionary activities in 895
American Expeditionary Forces in 955-969
activities 963
Ambulance Company No. 4 958
composition and strength 955
Evacuation Hospital No. 17 960
Field Hospital No. 4 958
Habarovsk expedition 965
1092 INDEX
Siberia — Continued.
American Expeditionary Forces in- — Continued. Page
hospital train 960
Medical Department supplies 963
Medical Supply Depot No. 7 963
Sanitary units 95S
Shmakovka to Jlabarovsk and the Amur campaigns 964
.Siberian railways 966
Spasskoe Sector 967, 96S
Suchan mines 966
Verkhne-Udinsk Sector 967
Vladivostok-Nikolsk-Ussuri Sector . 968
Siberian railways, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 966
Sixth Corps, operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation 849
Medical Department activities - - 850
Sixth Division:
brief history of 983
division surgeons . 985
insignia 983
Sommerviller Sector, Medical Department activities 291
1st Division in 291
Spasskoe Sector, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 967, 968
Special departments of evacuation hospitals 175
Specialist personnel 20
Squads, Sanitary. (See Sanitary Squads.)
Staff difficulties incident to dispersion of troops in billets 85
Statistical department, l'nited States Army Ambulance Service in France 240
Statistics and record section, army chief surgeon's office 76
Sterilizing room, Mobile Hospital No. 39, at Aulnois 196
St. Mihiel operation 449-523
army hospitals 507-520
evacuation from the zone of the army _. 521-523
Evacuation Hospital No. 9 ' 518
Fifth Corps 499-505
Medical Department activities. 500
plan of evacuation of sick and wounded 500
First Army 449-459
Medical Department activities 452, 463
First Corps 46 1-48 1
Fourth Corps 483-497
French 15th Colonial Division 499
Justice hospital group 508
Neurological Unit No. 1 (from Base Hospital No. 117), Benoite Vaux __ 519
1 st Division 483, 494
ambulance companies 496
field hospitals 496
Medical Department activities 495
2d Division 476
ambulance companies 477
field hospitals 478
l'i rst ( 'orps 461
Medical Department activities 477
3d Division 483
4th Division 499, 503
Medical Department activities 504
sanitary train 504
5th Division 469
field hospitals 475
First Corps 461
Medical Department activities 473
sanitary train 474
26th Division 499, 501
am l)ii la nee companies 502
field hospitals 502
Medical Department activities 501
42d Division 483, 492
Medical Department activities 492
78th Division 479
First Corps 461
Medical Department activities _ . 479
INDEX 1093
St Mihiel operation — Continued. Pap-'
82d Division 405
ambulance companies 465
field hospitals... 466
First Corps 481
Medical Department activities 465
89th Division _ 483, 489
ambulance companies 490
field hospitals 490
Medical Department activities 490
90th Division 466
ambulance companies 468
field Ik ispitals 469
First Corps - 461
Medical Department activities , 467
Suchan mines, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 966
Summary of hospital facilities, American Expeditionary Forces in North Russia 952
Supplies 25
and equipment, Medical Department, in training and rest areas 88
.Medical—
United States Army Ambulance Service in France 251
1st Division, Aisne-Marne Division 366
4th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation 621
Medical Department, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 963
of battalion aid station 113
operating Motor Transport Division, United States Army Ambulance Service in
France 238
reserve, in France 26
Supply;
and ordnance, Motor Transport Division, United States Army Ambulance
Service in France 236
department of, United States Army Ambulance Service in F ranee 249
Supply department, quartermaster, United States Army Ambulance Service in France. 239
Supply depot, motor, Motor Transport Division, United States Army Ambulance
Service in France 235
Supply depots, medical, establishment of _ 27
Supply dumps, Meuse-Argonne operation 542
Supply echelons, and systems of replenishment, medical 28
Supply section, army chief surgeon's office 76
Supply unit, medical:
1st Division —
Cantigny Sector 305
Meuse-Argonne operation 651
2d Division —
Aisne-Marne operation 372
Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 315
3d Division, Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 319
Supply units, medical, in open warfare 148
Surgeon, attending, United States Arm} - Ambulance Service in France 241
Surgical consultant, army chief surgeon's office 76
Surgical reports, Meuse-Argonne operation 544
Surgical teams 204
Mobile Hospital No. 39, at Aulnois 195
Surgical units, mobile:
and mobile hospitals 184
complementary groups 199
Systems of replenishment and supply echelons, medical 28
Tables of organization, United States Army 1054
Teams :
gas 205
M iscellaneous 205
professional 201
surgical „ 204
Theater of operations, general direction of medical service in the 55-82
Third Army, advance into German}- _ 895
Medical Department activities 'Kin
Third Corps:
advance into Germany 911
Medical Department activities 918
Aisne-Marne operation 357, 403
Medical Department activities 404
1094 INDEX
Third Corps — Continued. Page
Meuse-Argonne operation 609, 691, 779
Medical Department activities 612, 694, 781
Oise-Aisne operation 431
evacuation in rear of 440
Medical Department activities 432
Third Division:
advance into Germany 928
Aisne operation, including Vaux and Belleau Wood 318
ambulance companies 319
field hospitals 319
Medical Department activities 318
Aisne-Marne operation 357, 405
ambulance companies 406
field hospitals 408
brief historj^ of 978
Champagne-Marne operation 341, 344
ambulance companies 346
field hospitals 348
Medical Department activities 345
division surgeons 979
insignia 978
Medical Department activities 406
Meuse-Argonne operation 581, 604, 672, 715
Medical Department activities 605, 673, 716
sanitary train 673, 717
St. Mihiel operation 483
Third phase, Meuse-Argonne operation 729,737,755,779,797
Thirtieth Division:
American Expeditionary Forces with the British S89
Medical Department activities 891
brief history of 991
division surgeons 992
insignia 991
Thirty-fifth Division:
brief history of 995
division surgeons 999
insignia 995
Meuse-Argonne operation 549, 567
Medical Department activities 569
Thirty-second Division:
advance into Germany 921
Aisne-Marne operation 357, 409
Medical Department activities 410
sanitarv train 410
brief history of 992
division surgeons 993
insignia 992
Meuse-Argonne operation >i 581, 605, 676, 793
ambulance companies 678
field hospitals 078
Medical Department activities 006, 678, 794
Oise-Aisne operation 431, 441
ambulance companies 442
evacuation in rear of 444
field hospitals 443
Medical Department activities 442
Thirtv-seventh Division:
brief history of 1000
division surgeons 1002
insignia 1000
Meuse-Argonne operation 581, 592
Medical Department activities 594
Yprcs-Lys (Flanders) operation 870
Medical Department activities 870
Medical Department service in rear of 873
Thirty-sixth Division:
brief history of 999
division surgeons 1000
insignia 999
INDEX 1095
Thirty-sixth Division — Continued. Page
Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) operation 8G7
evacuations in rear of S69
Medical Department activities . 8G7
Thirty-third Division :
advance into Germany 930
brief history of 993
division surgeons 995
insignia 993
Meuse-Argonne operation (i()9, 625, 707, 722, 804
Medical Department activities . (525, 722, 804
sanitary train . 626
Touring cars, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 250
Train :
hospital, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia - 960
sanitary —
Aisnc-Marnc operation, 26th Division 392
Aisne-Marne operation, 32d Division 410
in open warfare 136
in trench warfare 117
Meuse-Argonne operation, 3d Division . 673,717
St. Mihiel operation, Fourth Corps 504
St. Mihiel operation, 5th Division 474
2d Division, Aisne-Marne operation 369
4th Division 400
33d Division 626
Train evacuations, Meuse-Argonne operation 810
Training and rest areas:
billeting facilities in . S4
classification of officers and men in 88
combat divisions in S4
and on the march; depot and replacement divisions. 83-104
development of Medical Department personnel in 85
division venereal disease camp in 88
elimination and reassignment of medical officers in. .... 88
establishment of camp hospitals in 86
evacuation of patients in 87
location of 84
Medical Department —
equipment and supplies in 88
training in 90
transportation in_ S7
provision for medical care of troops in 86
Training battalion, orthopedic, in depot and replacement divisions.. 101
Trains:
hospital 37
control exercised by G-4-B over evacuations by 59
in primary evacuations from the zone of the armies 261
light railway 41
routing of, in primary evacuations from the zone of the armies 272
sanitary, evacuation from zone of the army, St. Mihiel operation . 521
Transportation :
ambulance, inadequacy of, First Corps, Aisne-Marne operation.. :;s\
department of, United States Army Ambulance Service in France . •_>(!»
Medical Department 33
in training and rest areas 87
Transportation facilities, United States Army Ambulance Service __ 227
Transportation section, army chief surgeon's office 76
Trench warfare 111
battalion aid station in 111
care of casualties in companies, battalions, and regiments in_ 111
company aid in 111
regimental aid station in — 117
sanitary train in 117
Triage in open warfare 143
Triages, divisional, Meuse-Argonne operation 530
Troops:
dispersion of in billets, staff difficulties incident to 85
evacuation of, American Expeditionary Forces in North Russia 951
provision for medical care of, in training and rest areas 86
1096 INDEX
Trucks: Pag"
motor 37
United States Army Ambulance Service in France 250
Twenty-eighth Division :
Aisne-Mame operation 357, 413
ambulance companies 413
field hospitals 414
Medical Department activities 413
brief history of 989
Champagne-Marne operation 341, 349
ambulance companies 349
field hospitals 349
Medical Department activities 349
division surgeons 990
insignia . 989
Meuse-Argonne operation, . 549, 504, 045
ambulance companies 434
Medical Department activities 505,040
Oise-Aisne operation- 434
field hospitals 430
Medical Department activities 434
operations contemporaneous with Meuse-Argonne operation .__...__ 855
Medical Department activities 850
Twentv-ninth Division:
brief history of 990
division surgeons . . 991
insignia 990
Meuse-Argonne operation . . 723
Medical Department activities 724
Twenty-seventh Division:
American Expeditionary Forces with the British 881
Medical Department activities 884
brief history of ...... .. 988
division surgeons ..... .-__.. 989
insignia ... . ... 98S
Twenty-sixth Division :
Aisne-Marne operation. 357,391
Medical Department activities. __ 391
sanitary train. . 392
brief history of 980
Champagne-Marne operation . 341,343
ambulance companies 344
field hospitals __ 344
Medical Department activities __ 344
division surgeons 988
insignia _ 980
Meuse-Argonne operation . . . 720, S02
Medical Department activities. 727,802
St. Mihiel operation 499,501
ambulance companies 502
field hospitals. . . 502
Medical Department activities . 501
Undressing teams, Mobile Hospital Xo. 39, at Aulnois 195
I "nit Medical Supply. (See Medical Supply I'nit.)
United States Army Ambulance Service.. 223-259
American organization 224
in France 234
accident department 242
administration ... 249
advanced depot at Metz, quartermaster 240
ambulance sections 24S
ambulances 250
assembly plant 245
at lending surgeon 241
base camp 245
commanding officer and executive officer 233
council of administration 243
demobilization 255
department of food and sanitation 249
department of personnel and paper work 249
INDEX 1097
United States Army Ambulance Service — Continued.
in France -Continued. Pa & e
department of supply 249
department of transportation 249
duty with French divisions 253
equipment 249
evacuation of wounded 251
French liaison officer 243
headquarters of 234
individual equipment 251
inspection 241
instruction 251
medical supplies 251
mode of operation under the park system 245
motor supplv depot, Motor Transport Division 235
Motor Transport Division 235,238
Motor Transport Division, direction and inspection 238
motor vehicle situation, Motor Transport Division 237
park system 244
parks in operation 246
personnel, ambulance sections 248
promotions and morale 241
quartermaster paymaster 240
quartermaster sales commissary 240
rolling kitchen 250
Service garage, Motor Transport Division 236
service of the entrenched camp of Paris with 254
shipping and post office 242
statistical department 240
supply and ordnance, Motor Transport Division 236
supply department, quartermaster 239
touring cars 250
mobilization at Camp Crane 226
quartermaster 239
transportation facilities 227
Units:
medical supply, in open warfare 148
mobile surgical (complementary groups) . 199
mobile surgical, mobile hospitals and 184
Urology consultant, army chief surgeon's office 76
Vaux and Belleau Wood, Aisne operation 311
Vehicles, motor:
in service, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 237
lost in service, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 237
situation, United States Army Ambulance Service in France, Motor Transport
Division 237
transferred to other services, United States Army Ambulance Service in France. 237
Venereal disease camp, division, in training and rest areas 88
Venereal labor camp in depot and replacement divisions 101
Verkhne-Udinsk Sector, American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 967
Veterinary Service 287-289
Vladivostok-Nikolsk-Ussuri Sector, American Expeditionary Forces in, Medical
Department activities 968
Ward assignments, Mobile Hospital No. 39, at Aulnois 198
Warfare , Trench 111
Wounded :
distribution of, First Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation 557
evacuation of, United States Army Ambulance Service in France 251
X-ray department, Mobile Hospital No. 39, at Aulnois 196
Ypres-Lys (Flanders) operation 863,870
Medical Department service in rear of 37th and 91st Divisions 873
37th Division 870
Medical Department activities 870
91st Division : 871
Medical Department activities 871
Zone of the armies, primary evacuations from the 261
Zone of the Army, evacuation from, St. Mihiel operation 521-523
13576—25 70
O
Live Music
Archive
Librivox
Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland
Museum of Art
Internet
Arcade
Console Living Room
Open Library
American
Libraries
TV News
Understanding
9/11